

ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC;

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
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTION.

BY

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"Now it is by the *sense* that RHETORIC holds of LOGIC, and by the *expression* that she holds
of GRAMMAR."—DR. CAMPBELL.



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PREFACE.

It is only within a few years that the subject of Rhetoric has been thoroughly studied, and that those making it a special study have sought to introduce it as a part of elementary education.

Most of the text-books have treated Rhetoric as a higher sort of Grammar, and have failed to recognise its true relation to Logic. But its logical relations form its primary and most important division. Dr. Blair's charming lectures, on verbal and literary criticism, have been used as an epitome of the art of Rhetoric for elementary instruction, quite apart, it must be thought, from the author's original design. Full of excellent illustrations, and treating the grand division of *Style* with great ability and interest, he has not touched upon the rhetorical arrangement of argument, and the invention of discourse.

When the author of the following pages undertook the preparation of a text-book, his first observation was that all former works may be ranged into two

distinct classes; in the first class were the *philosophical* treatises, of great value, but sealed books to young students by reason of their depth and technicality. In the other were the more elementary books, which treat chiefly of *style*, and give forms and exercises for perfecting one's self in the rhetorical use of language.

Holding with Dr. Campbell that Rhetoric is allied to Logic in the sense, as well as to Grammar in the expression, the author has attempted to give a clear exposition of the art of constructing discourse; by the application of philosophy to practice. Beginning with clear definitions, the art is divided according to its three great functions of INVENTION, ARRANGEMENT, and STYLE. The place of Rhetoric among the arts is then determined; then a lucid analysis of the DIFFERENT KINDS OF DISCOURSE is given; and after this, the great functions just mentioned are treated in their order. While in most other works old illustrations, handed down from generation to generation, have been used, the author has chosen his examples from the Bible, and, as far as possible, from modern English and American writers.

His effort has been to be perspicuous and simple

in treating of a subject, which, as a whole, is seldom grasped, although many parts of it have been currently studied, and much appertaining to it has been investigated.

To mention the numerous sources from which he has derived valuable information would require too much space. He would, however, especially notice Whately's "Elements of Rhetoric;" Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric;" Aristotle's "Rhetoric and Poetic," translated by Buckley, with Hobbes' Brief; and many treatises on Logic and Grammar. Impelled by the great want of such a text-book, and actuated by the desire to form a work suited to his own classes, the author ventures to express the hope that this little treatise will commend itself to his brother instructors, who may have felt the same want.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, March 1, 1859.



TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

RHETORIC.

	PAGE
Section 1. Definition of the Term, and Historical Scope of the Science	13
2. The Early Uses of Rhetoric	14
3. Rhetoric in Ancient Greece	16
4. Grecian Institutions which aided the progress of Rhetoric	18
5. Confused Notion of Rhetoric in early days	20
6. Want of Just Classification	22
7. Cicero and Quintilian	23
8. Modern Errors	26
9. Of the Relations subsisting between Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric	28
10. Objections to Rhetoric as an Art	32

CHAPTER II.

DISCOURSE.

Section 11. Of the Purpose of Rhetorical Discourse	38
--	----

	PAGE
Section 12. Four Ends of Discourse	38
13. Conviction and Persuasion	40
14. Division of Rhetoric	42

CHAPTER III.

THE RELATIONS OF RHETORIC TO ÆSTHETICS.

Section 15. Rhetoric among the Arts	47
16. Objective and Subjective	52
17. Of the Pleasures of Taste	55
18. Imagination	57
19. Taste	60
20. Correctness and Delicacy of Taste	67
21. Genius	70
22. Of Rhetorical Taste	74
23. Of the Sources of the Pleasures of Taste	75
24. Of Beauty	75
25. Of Grandeur or Sublimity in Discourse	82
26. Novelty	93
27. Wit and Humour	96
28. Satire and Irony	101
29. Ridicule	103

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF DISCOURSE.

Section 30. Aristotle's Division of Oratory	109
31. Logical Division of the Kinds of Discourse	112
32. Poetry	113
33. Different Kinds of Poetry	117
34. Epic Poetry	118
35. Lyric Poetry	121
36. Pastoral Poetry	122

	PAGE
Section 37. Dramatic Poetry	124
38. Didactic and Descriptive Poetry	128
39. Satirical Poetry	131

CHAPTER V.

OF DISCOURSE IN PROSE.

Section 40. Of Oratory	135
41. Modern Divisions of Oratory	137
42. Academic Oratory	138
43. Debating Societies	143
44. The Oration	144
45. Political Oratory	149
46. Sacred Oratory	154

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF WRITTEN DISCOURSE.

Section 47. Of Letters	159
48. History	163
49. Biography	168
50. Essays	172
51. Prose Fiction	173

CHAPTER VII.

INVENTION.

Preliminary Remarks	180
Section 52. The Invention of the Subject	183
53. The Object of Discourse	189

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF CONVICTION.

	PAGE
Section 54. The Rhetorical Use of Arguments	191
55. Of the Different Kinds of Arguments	194
56. Rhetorical Division of Argument	196
57. Of à priori Arguments	199
58. Second Division of Rhetorical Arguments	202
59. Sign	203
60. Testimony, as an Argument	204
61. Fact and Opinion	205
62. Witnesses	205
63. Of the Modes of obtaining Testimony	208
64. Cross-examination	209
65. Concurrent Testimony	211
66. Doctrine of Chances	211
67. Progressive Argument	213
68. Example	215
69. Induction	216
70. Analogy	217
71. Experience	219
72. Real and Invented Examples	220
73. The Topics of Arguments	221

CHAPTER IX.

Section 74. Of the Modes in which Arguments are used in Dis- course	223
75. Of the Burden of Proof	224
76. Of Refutation	231
77. Proving too much	234

CHAPTER X.

PERSUASION.

Preliminary Remarks	237
Section 78. Of Exhortation	239

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Section 79. Of Appeals to the Passions	240
80. Of the Feelings	245

CHAPTER XI.

ARRANGEMENT.

Section 81. The Parts of a Discourse	248
1. Exordium	249
2. Narration	250
3. Discussion	251
4. Peroration	252
82. The Three Unities	256

CHAPTER XII.

OF STYLE.

Section 83. Preliminary Inquiries	261
84. Of Language in General	262
85. Of Spoken Language	263
86. Of Written Language	266
87. Of the English Language	270
88. Of the Diversities of Style	272

CHAPTER XIII.

QUALITIES OF STYLE.

Section 89. Perspicuity	280
<i>The First Quality.</i>	
90. Of Purity, as one of the Elements of Perspicuity	288
91. Of Propriety, as an Element of Perspicuity	290
92. Of Precision, as an Element of Perspicuity	292
93. Of Synonyms	293
94. Of the Structure of Sentences	302

	<i>The Second Quality.</i>	PAGE
Section 95.	Energy	307
	96. Of Rhetorical Tropes	313
	97. Comparison	318
	98. Metaphor	322
	99. Synecdoche	326
	100. Metonymy	328
	101. Hyperbole	330
	102. Hypocatastasis	332
	103. Personification	333
	104. Apostrophe	334
	105. The Allegory	337
	106. Antithesis	340
	107. Onomatopœia	342
	108. Climax	342
	109. Elegance	348
	<i>The Third Quality.</i>	
	110. Euphony and Harmony	350

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE APPLICATIONS OF STYLE AND THE FORMS OF COMPOSITION.

	Preliminary Remarks	354
Section 111.	The Rhetoric of Conversation	358
	112. Conclusion	361

R H E T O R I C .

CHAPTER I.

RHETORIC.

(1.) *Definition of the Term, and Historical Scope of the Science.*

RHETORIC is the art of constructing and applying *discourse*.

By *discourse* is meant the invention and arrangement of thought, and its expression in language.

Under this comprehensive term, *discourse*, are included historical and biographical writings, essays, letters, orations, sermons, and all other kinds of written or spoken utterances of thought.

Let us look, for a moment, at the historical steps by which we reach such a definition of Rhetoric.

The term RHETORIC (Greek *ρητορικη*, *rhetoriké*), is derived from the verb *ρῆω* (*rheō*), which primarily means *to flow*, and, in its second intention, *to speak*. Thus

the original idea which the Greeks conveyed when they used the word $\rho\eta\tau\omega\rho$ (rhetōr)—which is derived from $\rho\epsilon\omega$ —as an *orator* or *speaker*, was very much what we express when we call a public speaker a *fluent man*—borrowing this same phraseology from the Latin verb *fluo*, to flow—*i. e.*, a man whose words *flow* forth copiously, clearly, and pleasantly to the ear.

It must be observed, that in the origin of the rhetorical art, this *fluency* which is expressed in the word *Rhetoric*, was of much greater comprehension and importance than at the present day. But this will appear as we proceed.

Under the ancient forms of government in Greece, Rhetoric was cultivated with great assiduity, because in the early Hellenic commonwealths, which were unlike the oriental despotisms, those persons attained the highest stations who could sway the multitude *by their words*, moving them to warlike action by impassioned eloquence, or soothing their irritated feelings by gentle and pathetic appeals. In that period, to be *fluent*, was the way to become *famous*; and hence $\rho\eta\tau\omega\rho$ was a professional title of honourable distinction, and Rhetoric, or the art of fluent speech, was one of the most honourable studies and professions.

(2.) *The Early Uses of Rhetoric.*

The art of Rhetoric, it may be justly asserted, is

much older than Greece, since it belongs to speech and must have been practised, to some extent, if not professed, wherever language exists. Nor is this assertion without proof in the history of people much more remote from us than the Greeks. If we turn to the Old Testament Scriptures we shall find constant records of the rhetorical use and importance of language: in the pleading of Abraham for the delivery of Sodom from threatened vengeance; in the touching dialogue between Joseph and his brethren; in the setting apart of Aaron as the mouth-piece of Moses, in the great scheme of Hebrew deliverance from Egyptian bondage, because he could “speak well;” in the triumphal ode of Deborah and Barak; and in the sublime address and prayer of Solomon at the dedication of the Holy Temple.

Indeed the history of all nations, from the earliest periods, shows us that the power of speech, modulated by vocal utterance, adorned by fancy, flowing like a river of thought, to instruct, gratify, or destroy, has been a great moving power in the world, and has demanded a theoretic attention proportional to the culture and light of the people among whom it was used. But without entering into an analysis of the heads and applications of Rhetoric, among such nations, it is evident that the form and shape in which we find Rhetoric at the present day had their birth in early Greece, and have been preserved in

feature as well as in name through the moulding process of Roman oratory, and all the schools of art and literature since the decline of Roman power. If Grecian Rhetoric had its day of banishment when the scholastic philosophy was in the ascendant, it revived in renewed youth when the Greek classics were restored in the fifteenth century.

(3.) *Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.*

If, now, we would point to the first great manifestation of Grecian Rhetoric, its showing forth to the world, if not its birth,—its birth was too obscure to be clearly discerned;—it is to be found in the time of Alexander the Great; when the revival of mind and letters, the throwing open of the entire East, the developments of History, of Logic, and of Natural Philosophy, gave a new impulse to thought, and formed a period, in the fourth century before Christ, typical in many ways of the modern revival in the fifteenth century of our era: a period in no degree less glorious and important to the philosophic student of history, but marking only that great cycle of progress of which the latter was a greater epicycle, and destined to be the beginning of a system

“Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb;”

which must be accomplished in the future. This

was the age of Demosthenes the orator, and Aristotle the rhetorician.

As illustrative of the interest felt at this time in *oratory*—the first great form of Rhetoric—it is recorded that when Demosthenes was to speak, whether before the judges of the Areopagus, or on some question of popular interest, men journeyed from distant parts of Greece, and flocked to Athens, for no other purpose than to hear him; most of them purely interested in the oratory, and not in the business.

If we carefully study the characteristics of the Greek mind, we shall find that this was due in great part to the intrinsic love of liberty which had pervaded Greece from the time of the early migrations of Eolians, Ionians, and Dorians in that mysterious period a thousand years before Christ. This love of liberty and independence had displayed itself in the colonizing of Thrace, Macedon, Africa, and Italy; had abolished monarchy in Attica in the days of Solon, and had established, on principles altogether democratic, wise institutions to cement the states and protect the individual people. We shall find upon inquiry that there were four institutions eminently calculated to produce these results, and they were all immediately concerned in the origin and progress of the rhetorical art:—

(4.) *Grecian Institutions which aided the progress of Rhetoric.*

I. *The Council of Amphictyons* (οἱ Ἀμφικτυόνες), composed of one hundred members, held their spring meetings at Delphi, under the shadow of Parnassus, and their autumnal sessions at Thermopylæ. Their object was to make and to explain the laws which bound the new Grecian commonwealths together. They were not concerned about foreign states, for in that early day all foreigners were enemies. In the absence of records adequate to their business, and where many conflicting interests were concerned, public speaking—the form which Rhetoric first assumed—was of great importance. The affairs of this council were entirely conducted by the speeches of the delegates, and although a superstitious mythology laid great stress upon omens and auguries, and various orders of priests, still oratory had the principal weight in the decision of momentous questions.

II. Next in importance for the culture of Rhetoric, was the establishment, as a perpetual institution, of the *Olympic games*, established by Iphitus, beginning and ending with a sacrifice to the Olympian Jove. Here, at Olympia, as well as in the localities of the Isthmian and Pythian games, established for similar

purposes, Grecian freemen of good character were invited to contend: the country around was adorned with groves and beautiful walks fitted with seats and benches, used from an early period by sophists and philosophers, poets and rhetoricians.

Besides the athletic exercises, so important to inculcate a proper physical training among a free people, there were poetic and rhetorical prizes much sought after, and tending greatly to the advancement of Rhetoric. At these games Herodotus recited his history; Simonides and Pindar sang their varied lyrics; and thus the power of mind in its lofty utterance of speech, began to vie with the Cæstus and Palæstra, and the swiftness of the chariot race.

III. Nor were the laws of Solon and Lycurgus less active in increasing the value and popularity of the rhetorical art in the rival countries of Athens and Sparta, by inviting men of every degree to contend for eminence in its cultivation. Aimed mainly against the corruptions of civilized society, while they somewhat trenched upon its refinements, and sometimes upon the natural rights of man; considering a warlike spirit and political liberty as the chief developments of man in civilization, they gave such importance to the individual, that each within judicial limits might plead his own cause, and thus use his own native Rhetoric for his own interests. "To be a citizen was to be a legislator—a soldier—

a judge—one upon whose voice might depend the fate of the wealthiest tributary state, of the most eminent public man.”

IV. If to these institutions, we add the oracle at Delphi, as a religious element, discerned in every nation, in some form or other, speaking in grand and sententious parables of double import, and affecting the public speech of Greece, by affecting the individual imagination of its citizens, we shall have another spur to eloquence, that of religion, which more modern times have proved to be so essential an element in the development of the rhetorical art.

The forms of invocation and appeal; the highest efforts of apostrophe; the best examples of personification, are immediately connected with man's religious cravings, the innate feeling after the great First Cause in his word and his works; while the imagination in its immortal flights demands a ready utterance and a subtle invention with which to describe it. Religious poetry, and religious exhortations in sermons, are among the finest developments of Rhetoric.

(5.) *Confused notion of Rhetoric in early days.*

From what has been said, and when we consider the elementary state of written language in Greece, it would seem that when the name, *Rhetoric*, was first assumed, it could only refer to speech or oral

language; and, as far as it was considered as appropriating language at all, this was true. But, as we shall further see, such was the chaotic and mixed condition of science at that period, that Rhetoric was made to include an investigation of much of the subject-matter of *discourse*, and invaded the domain of philosophy. But as far as Rhetoric had to do with language it was almost synonymous with that branch of modern Rhetoric, which we call *elocution*. But as letters were brought progressively and more commonly into use, so that an exact correspondence could be maintained between the eye and the ear, and the mind be reached equally by the medium of either, Rhetoric was made to include *writing*, in its second intention, and this second intention has become the more important of the two, in proportion as the written word is more permanent and of more multiplied extension than the spoken. Well might the Greeks flock to hear Demosthenes, for they could not, as we can, read his speech at their leisure: and there was but one Demosthenes in Greece.

But this is self-evident; the sound of an orator's voice can only be heard by a limited number of persons, at one time, and when once heard is lost upon the air, or exists only in a fading memory; the *written* thought remains, is multiplied and scattered, to teach distant countries and coming generations. Fancy cannot invoke an echo of Demosthenes from

the Acropolis, but the letters which Cadmus is fabled to have brought to Greece, have sent his eloquence, his thunders, and his triumphs to our own time, and make him still a mighty master of oratory.

In the progress of the Rhetorical art there was, very naturally, much obscurity in defining its scope.

(6.) *Want of just classification.*

This was due, in a great degree, to an entire want of classification among the sciences. There were very few then in existence, but even these few were not clearly defined and classified, and thus each was made to infringe upon those nearest to it, until Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, and Dialectics were, in parts, at least, mistaken for each other, and their scope entirely undefined.

The ten Categories of Aristotle, which he invented to constitute a first attempt at this classification (Logic, p. 228), have been rather a rough model for the great minds of succeeding philosophers, than a real mode of classification. But although we are not to blame Aristotle for the crudities of science in his time, yet it is significant of its obscure condition that he has been called the founder of Criticism and Grammar. He made a complete revision of the poems of Homer for his distinguished pupil, Alexander the Great; and yet a reference to his volume

on *Rhetoric*, will show us how crude were his own notions of its meaning and its comprehension.

Aristotle defined Rhetoric to be "the power of inventing whatsoever is persuasive in discourse." However this may have been regarded in his day as expressive of a just view of the science of Rhetoric, it is both faulty and erroneous, when subjected to present criticism. *Invention*, as we shall see hereafter, is but one part of *Rhetoric*, and his definition excludes, or only negatively implies the important parts of *arrangement* and *style*. Indeed he leaves his own definition entirely, and has dwelt quite at length upon the subject of *style*. And *persuasion*, which he thus makes the exclusive object of discourse, and which perhaps enters largely into judicial and deliberative discourse, is only a part of that object, conviction being quite as important a result at which to aim in discourse.

It may be true that the word *persuasion* was originally used in a generic sense to include *conviction*, but the clearer definitions given to us by the modern study of syllogisms, preclude such a use of it in our day.

(7.) *Cicero and Quintilian.*

Cicero, besides being a great master of the rhetorical art, both in his elegant essays and his finished orations, has left us a valuable treatise *De Oratore*, in

which, carefully reviewing and employing the rules and arguments which Aristotle has left us, he has also clearly defined his own notions of an orator, as to himself, his hearers, the occasion, and the subject-matter; he has thus taught us most beautifully both by precept and example. The treatise *De Oratore*, is a dialogue, as are also his other rhetorical works, all which are of the greatest importance to the student of Rhetoric, in its historical bearings; in the *Oratoricæ Partitiones*, we have the best rules for the proper arrangement of the parts of the discourse: so as to produce the desired effect upon his audience: and in the dialogue on famous orators, called *Brutus*, we have slight sketches of famous Greek and Roman orators down to his own day. But Cicero had always in view an audience, oral language, with all the aids of presence and occasion, and thus we find his very extended and valuable rhetorical treatises, not of practical application in this day of paper and print.

Quintilian, who was himself a professor of Rhetoric in the early days of the Roman empire, has defined Rhetoric to be "*Scientia bene dicendi*" (the science of speaking well), a meaning too broad entirely, since *to speak well* implies *to speak* correctly, thus invading *Grammar*; *to think* correctly, thus infringing the science of *thought*, and in part of metaphysics; and *to reason* correctly, thus implicating *Logic*, or the art of Reasoning.

If we turn from this unsatisfactory definition of *Quintilian* himself, to the practice of the schools in his time, we shall find such a wide extension of this branch of learning as his definition would lead us to expect. Rhetoric included among its branches *philology*—as far as it was known—a term equally vague, *law*, *morals*, *politics*, and *other sciences*, so that a nominal professor of Rhetoric had the greatest number; and the most important of the elementary studies in his charge. But in later times, as science after science became known and developed, this nomenclature became more real and stable.

During the decline and fall of the Western Empire, Rhetoric rested entirely upon the basis of Cicero and *Quintilian*, until it too became neglected, corrupted, and despised. The period of the middle ages gives us neither the names nor works of rhetorical writers; and when at length the dawn of the new era began to break in the thirteenth century, poetry and history and oratory seemed to undergo a new birth, and to pass through a weak but growing infancy. With the revival of letters, and the illumination of mind, Philosophy, Physics, Mathematics, Art, in its various forms, were more attractive to the new and ardent seekers for truth than rhetorical forms and systems of difficult rules. Aristotle was still buried; and only a few copies of Cicero existed in the monasteries of Europe.

But, at length, like a glorious inundation of the Nile, Greek letters began to flow westward, and to combat old Gothic traditions and scholastic superstitions; the press multiplied that classical learning, and Rhetoric was once again placed where Cicero and Quintilian had established it as a science.

It is not designed, in this work, to enter into a History of Rhetoric: it would neither be proper nor profitable; but this slight sketch will show that what we call Rhetoric at the present day is a science incident to a new order and condition of things; modified entirely from its Roman form and type, to suit the age, when writing and printing have usurped the place of formal oratory: when the writer may have no advantages of occasion, voice, gesture, magnetic enthusiasm, but must subject his discourse to the cool criticism of those who never saw him, and of those who were farthest from his thoughts when that discourse was prepared.

(8.) *Modern errors.*

And now, since the derivation of the word gives us, in this view of the subject, no clue to its present technical meaning; we must look to the best usage at the present day, as well as to a just classification of the sciences, for a clear and satisfactory definition, for without this we should do wrong to begin its

study: especially as this is one of a number of words standing for sciences and arts, which, though not exactly confounded together, overlap each other as it were, and thus leave debateable, double-garrisoned grounds on their confines, and give cause of perplexity, confusion, and error. Such are the words *Logic*, *Grammar*, and *Rhetoric*, and in more recent times, *Philology*.

Let us endeavour to explain then the true scope of these terms, and thus by elimination determine the exact meaning of Rhetoric.

Before doing this; however, it may not be amiss to remark that much error has crept into text-books of Rhetoric, by a one-sided view induced by a close and partisan study of one author or one modern school. It is for the generally received meaning of the term that we are to look.

As we have seen that a careful study of ancient writers would lead to systems obscure and unprofitable, because too comprehensive; so, a lover of Lord Bacon would find his practice inextricably entangled with the invalid Logic of the Organon, or the undue preponderance of the inductive philosophy: while the intense German student seems to be less concerned to find out the special scope of Rhetoric, than to discern the manner of its approximations to ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics.

That there have been so many systems, and so

much rhetorical faction, has been of great injury to Rhetoric itself as a science, and has given point to the satire of an English poet, that—

“All the Rhetorician’s rules
Teach nothing but to name his tools.”

If then we would keep clear of such errors, let us proceed to mark clearly the lines which divide Rhetoric from the other arts just mentioned.

(9.) *Of the relations subsisting between Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric.*

If we examine a written discourse, framed according to the laws of Rhetoric, we shall find it to consist of propositions and arguments, couched in correct language, and appropriately connected, arranged, and adorned for the purposes of *conviction* and *persuasion*.

Now what part of this composition belongs to Logic? Manifestly only the reasoning, the simple arguments, as to their validity or invalidity: i. e., the process of *passing from two known judgments to a third which is dependent upon them*, and grows out of their union. Not the invention of these arguments, which must depend upon a knowledge of the subject-matter contained in them, and the purpose they are designed to effect, but the simple formula of putting

them together according to just rules, and judging of their validity or invalidity.

Logic—it has been observed in the treatise on that subject (p. 18)—is the science and the art of reasoning, and that the process of reasoning is *one, simple, and universal*, it consists in passing from known premisses to a conclusion justly deduced from them. All the logical processes then may be made independent on the language used, or the subject thoughts conveyed. We might frame them in symbols of a general application, writing our arguments thus:—

premisses *conclusion*
A is B,
C is A,
Therefore C is B,

and the logic would be faultless.

It is to clothe these frameworks of Logic with thought, body, and vital language, and to arrange them in proper order, that Rhetoric, in one of its provinces, is used. Thus, when the proper material for a written work has been provided by a careful investigation, and just analysis of something not before known, the subject-matter of the premisses is thus formed, and the Rhetoric consists in clothing these premisses upon the logical formula already known, and deducing the proper conclusions. But by what law of language are these premisses expressed, and the arguments arranged? This is the

province of Rhetoric. Under the control of Rhetoric it is the function of Grammar to clothe these in *correct* language, while Rhetoric takes the whole collection of *Logical* arguments thus stated in *Grammatical* language, and *arranges* them in the best manner, having a care that their order of sequence is such as to make the sense most clear, and the arguments most forcible, determining the most effective division into chapters, parts, paragraphs, sentences, &c.; using the *words* according to their most appropriate relations; and applying *fitting ornaments*, figures of thought, and figures of speech, to illustrate, elucidate, and interest—thus establishing the sense of the whole. Thus, “it is,” says Dr. Campbell, “by the *sense* that Rhetoric holds of Logic, and by the *expression* that she holds of Grammar.”

Logic has no direct relation to *Language*, every logical process being easily expressed by symbols: but Rhetoric is immediately concerned about *language*; from the repertory of language it finds fitting garments for the thought already formed, nor is it less concerned about *thought*, for although *it does not provide* the subject-matter of the discourse as to its original discovery, it must be perfectly cognisant of that subject-matter before it can thus use what it needs, arrange what it uses, and clothe it with proper language, so as best and most appropriately to determine its sense.

Whatever views may be elsewhere taken, then, let us agree to consider Rhetoric as *the art of inventing, arranging, and clothing thought in appropriate language to produce a certain effect*: or, in more concise language, *the art of discourse*.

We have said that Rhetoric is the *art* of discourse. It is of importance here to notice that Rhetoric is less of a science than an art, as its practical applications are its only claims to our notice. As a *science* it rather depends upon the sister sciences of Mind, and Logic, and Grammar, than has any distinct existence apart from them, but as an *art* it subsidizes them all in making a harmony between language and thought, and using both to secure worthy ends.

It is plain that the art of Rhetoric implies the existence of Grammar and Logic, and uses the rules of both in the proper construction of discourse.

It has been already observed that in its original meaning, and even now in a limited meaning, Rhetoric is applied to *oratory*, and in this application of it we have constantly in use another word and its paronyms—*i. e.*, words derived from the same root—the meaning of which is not entirely fixed, as *eloquent* and *eloquence*. These words, and another which is more determined, *elocution*, introduce into the consideration of modern Rhetoric another element, which was the principal one in the ancient art, that of the human voice;—the effects produced by its varying

tones, which no mere written discourse can express to the eye. To this, special reference will be made hereafter.

Even these words, however, belonging, as they primarily do, to the voice, are applied, in a second intention, to writing; thus we speak commonly of an *eloquent chapter*, or an *eloquent article* in a written work, meaning that they produce to the mind something of the thrilling effect which an eloquent speech would have done; or that, when read, their flowing periods and harmonious diction are well suited to the voice, although not originally intended for it.

(10.) *Objections to Rhetoric as an Art.*

Like all other arts—perhaps more than any other—Rhetoric is liable to great abuse, and so its name will be misused by designing men to cover their evil deeds and deceptive speech.

To please itching ears, and to cater to diseased and prurient imaginations, unprincipled men have often used Rhetoric to array falsehood and impurity in gay and alluring forms of language, and have succeeded in deceiving and injuring their auditors or readers. Hence, Rhetoric, by the aid of which they achieved their success, has often fallen into disrepute, and has received the obloquy which should rest upon the false propositions, the invalid logic, and the

honeyed tones and evil minds which have used it: such are the efforts made by self-interest to support an unworthy cause; such the rhetorical forms assumed by *material fallacies*, and the conclusion of which must of course be invalid arguments, the premisses of which are false,—which are fully treated of in the companion work on Logic (p. 175).

“This, then, constitutes the principal objection to Rhetoric, as an art: it has been used as a gaudy cloak to cover much moral evil; but the easy illustration already used, will show how illiberal as well as false such an objection is; for it would, by parity of reasoning, be an objection to our fashion of coats that we cannot tell simply from them the moral character of the wearer; that they are worn alike by villains and gentlemen; nay more, a gentleman’s dress is assumed by rogues to avoid detection. Nor is this error confined to Rhetoric; it applies equally to Grammar, since falsehood of the blackest dye may be stated in correct and pleasant language, and this language be thus made the vehicle of wide spread evil. Thus, by one remove more, the error lies in *Language*. But is it not evident that such objections are in reality only new assertions of the general evil which pervades humanity; of that “trail of the serpent” marking even the “flowrets of Eden,” which are our inheritance from the wreck of the first Paradise? It is manifest that they can only be

used, as they have always been, by ignorance or by imposture.

There seems indeed, in the history of every science, and its corresponding art, a *period* when objections are numerous and have great force.

Such a statement is illustrated by a consideration of Logic and the Mathematics, which suffered in the days of Bacon, and were even much decried at a later period, when they advanced the practical applications of what had long existed only in theory. This is due in part to an *ignorance* which always leads to absurd results, and in part to a *quackery* which would attribute false powers to science, and control men, by appealing to their hopes, their fears, and their superstition, when a practical judgment alone is required.

The voyage of Gulliver to Laputa was written by Swift, to ridicule the movements of exact science in his age, and its applications to discovery, invention, and the mechanic arts: that was the age of the South Sea bubble, of Law's Mississippi scheme, and such like enormous frauds, when figures, of which it has been said in common phrase that "they never lie," were used by lying speculators and stock-jobbers, and made to seem false. So because of the misuse of Rhetoric, in certain historic periods, by which great evils have been produced, Rhetoric has been satirized, ridiculed, and abused, and oratory has been considered only a specious form of public

deception. That it is ever so is the fault of the orator and not the art.

To state then the objections which have been brought against the art, in all the forms which have been urged, it is called—

1st. A *pedantic* art, leading men out of the plain, matter of fact transmission of thought in wholesome language, filling them with a jargon of the schools, not used in common life.

2d. A *frivolous* art, for the same reasons that it is pedantic, and additionally because it usurps time and taste better devoted to other and more useful studies; and

3d. An *injurious* art, used to hoodwink the judgment by alluring the fancy to make "the worse appear the better reason."

These are the objections, it will be observed, brought principally by *ignorance*: but that there are so called rhetoricians, who *knowingly* use their art in a manner pedantic and frivolous, and for the purpose of attaining their own selfish ends, is not disputed. Reasoning, however, from such impostors to a general conclusion against the science, would be reasoning, *ex abusu*,—against the use of a good thing, from its *abuse*,—and what art can bear such a test?

Strength of body given to man for useful ends—to work, to protect, to defend—when used by a maniac or a brigand are destructive.

Strength of mind may prove, when misapplied, a great evil; and great geniuses, like great heroes, have often been most noted by the ruin they leave in their train. The arch fiend of Milton's fancy assumed the form of a spirit of light, and even among his peers in Pandemonium seemed only

Less than archangel ruined, and the excess
Of glory obscured;

and yet, due to his crimes, he saw "in the lowest depths a lower deep."

If we look through nature, or examine its atomic ingredients, we everywhere find, that to reason from the abuse of a good thing is the most unjust form which the "fallacy of objections" can assume.

In closing this preliminary chapter, let us briefly recapitulate what has been said in our attempt, as originally stated, to arrive at the true and modern definition of the term *Rhetoric* :—

We have seen that it originally meant fluent speech or oratory; that in its second intention it was applied to written matter; that in Greece and Rome, owing to the chaotic state of scientific classification, it was made to stand for and to comprehend many sciences, since happily separated from it, as they all have become better known and more clearly defined; that in the middle ages it was almost entirely uncultivated; and

that so perfectly has Rhetoric now assumed its own identity among the sciences, that it may be defined *the science and art of constructing discourse*; that in its practical uses it is essentially an *art*; and that its functions will vary according to the varying character and purpose of the discourse itself. We have also mentioned a few of the principal objections to Rhetoric as an art, and demonstrated their invalidity.

The next step in our investigation of the subject will be the rhetorical uses or designs of discourse.

CHAPTER II.

DISCOURSE.

(11.) *Of the purpose of Rhetorical Discourse.*

BEFORE stating the division of the subject which we shall employ in treating it, it is proper to consider first the uses of Rhetoric, as the art of discourse,—or the designs which we purpose to effect by discourse. Although if we should make a minute statement of such designs they would be found very numerous, moulded as they would be by a thousand circumstances, local and individual, they have been reduced to four ends or purposes: 1st, to enlighten the understanding; 2d, to please the imagination; 3d, to move the passions; and 4th, to influence the will.

(12.) *Four ends of discourse.*

1st. Thus, when a speaker undertakes to enlighten the understanding, he addresses himself to the pure instruction of his hearer, in explaining something before entirely unknown, or making plain something

indistinctly known; in which cases information is given which demands a ready belief, or some position is proved which before was not granted to exist; and thus he convinces the hearer of the truth, and of his former error. In each case the process is that of clear argument.

2d. When he addresses the *imagination* of his hearers, he presents beautiful or touching pictures of such objects as are fitly introduced into the region of Imagination. Like the painter, he must propose suitable subjects, and treat them in a lively manner, rising to beauty and even sublimity of thought in his attempts to carry the hearer with him into the higher regions of Fancy.

3d. And here he trenches upon that third purpose of discourse which is to *touch the passions*; for here too the Fancy enables him to draw such scenes and characters as awaken love or grief, aversion or desire, and play upon the heart-strings, the notes and chords of its passions.

4th. By a combination of the three ends just proposed, does the orator strive to secure the fourth—the *influencing of the will*: strong argument alone is often resisted by obstinacy, but when joined with a power over the imagination, and the control of the passions, persuasion is attained and the will overcome.

This latter attainment is the greatest triumph of

the orator, and history is not without abundant records of men who have been gifted thus, not only to *inform*, to *please*, to *move the heart*, but also to sway the will and bring it an humble captive in the train of eloquence and genius.

(13.) *Conviction and Persuasion.*

Yet these four ends of discourse, we think, may be, for convenience, stated as ranging under one general topic, which we call *instruction*; and this, according to the manner in which it is conveyed, may be divided into *conviction* and *persuasion*.

Instruction may be defined the process of conveying truth to others who are ignorant of it, either entirely or virtually.

By *conviction* is meant the presenting of truth—*i. e.*, the *instruction* of a person who believes the contrary, or is in doubt between the two. Thus a man is *convinced* of his error, or is led to believe that what he thought *right* is *wrong*, or that what he was doubtful about is truly wrong. The use of the word *convicted*, which would seem to belong directly to the word *conviction*, is a legal technicality, showing that although the criminal may not confess his guilt, and stands *convicted* only before the world, that the world itself is *convinced* of his guilt. In our use of the

word *conviction* we mean the process and end of *convincing*.

By *persuasion* we mean the act of influencing the will of another, and leading him to acknowledge or to do something of which his judgment may have been before *convinced*, but which his will so steadily resisted, that he may be said to have been *practically ignorant* of the tenet or the deed in question. Thus we have, as the lamentation of a heathen moralist, the apparent paradox—

Video, proboque meliora,
Deteriora sequor,

and our own literature is full of similar aphorisms. Butler's couplet—

He that complies against his will,
Is of his own opinion still,

contains the same paradox; and the old Scotch adage, "a wilful man maun have his ain way," is only a little more homely and practical; it conveys the same truth.

It will be observed that this division of instruction, into *conviction* and *persuasion*, contains at once the *act* of instruction, the *manner* of it, and the *frame and temper of mind* to be met and overcome.

It is to both these processes then that the func-

tions of Rhetoric are to be applied. And in them both it may readily be seen, by an inverse process to the one just employed, we must address ourselves to the imagination of the hearer or reader, and use *just means* of exciting his passions.

(14.) *Division of Rhetoric.*

In this view of the subject it has become important to divide Rhetoric into such a number of parts, as correspond to the framing and arrangement of discourse, to produce these ends; and we now proceed to a convenient statement of these constituent parts of Rhetoric as the art of discourse. Following Aristotle in his general arrangement, Cicero has enumerated five parts of Rhetoric, which were meant to include, however, branches of learning now disjoined from Rhetoric.

They were *Invention, Disposition, Elocution, Memory, and Pronunciation.*

As we have regarded Rhetoric to be the art of discourse, applied indiscriminately to written or spoken discourse, *Elocution*, in its first intention, forms no necessary part of the subject; although, in connection with Oratory, we shall devote a chapter to its consideration. But elocution, in its second meaning, as "the application of proper words and sentences to invention," is in reality what our modern writers

have called *style*; and under this head it will be treated. The early writers spoke with their lips; the modern speak through the pen and press.

Memory being simply the firm perception by the mind of the things and words, applied to Invention, has come now to take its place in the domain of intellectual philosophy—a science very indeterminate in Cicero's day; and *memory* is consequently eliminated from his division of Rhetoric; and *pronunciation*, which then meant more than at present, including indeed the management of voice and gesture in speaking, lies in part within the domain of grammar, and in part in that of oratory. It would include what we now call *delivery*.

Thus, from Cicero's own division, which was the result of a study of the Greek writers and of great experience, and which exhibits also the loose state of scientific classification at that day, we develop the true division of the subject into—

INVENTION,

ARRANGEMENT,

STYLE.

And here it may be well to warn the student that these words are used with a technical and exact meaning, different from that which they bear in ordinary discourse, and yet not entirely disconnected from that. Let us explain this technicality.

The word *invention*, derived from *in* and *venire*, to

come upon, signifies the act or process of *finding*, or of achieving a certain result by the original combination of known elements. Such, then, is much of the character of rhetorical invention in the application to ordinary discourse; but combined with imagination, as in the higher flights of oratory, or the soarings of poetry, it claims something more. It consists then not only in *finding* what before existed, as in relation to time and space, but it *creates* new realms in which to work, and peoples them with orders and hierarchies likewise born at the dictum of the poet's thought. In this view *invention* means *creation*, and it corresponds with our idea of the *entirely original* in poetic genius.

Arrangement, called by the great Roman orator *disposition*, is the orderly setting forth of the things invented. It includes the method by which the thoughts of the writer are placed before the reader to instruct, and the successive steps of that instruction.

Let a subject be suggested to us for a discourse, and from the moment we begin to think about it, a commingled stream of facts, fancies, and combinations rush in upon the mind, in its effort to present the subject clearly.

What is more common than to find writers of good invention, so careless, or so naturally disorderly, in their arrangement as to be obscure, and disjointed in their discourse? Like troops in a rabble, their

thoughts have no union, and no massive force: *Arrangement* is the strategy and tactics which bring them into clockwork order, movement, and effectiveness. Strictly speaking, *Arrangement* is rather a second part of the process of *Invention*, than a distinct division of *Rhetoric*.

Style, which Cicero has called *Elocution*, is the language in which the author expresses his meaning: the fitness of the speech to the thought, as invented and arranged in the mind. And this analysis now given, is in reality but a return to that of Aristotle, which Cicero, with the ambition to be regarded as the founder of a new system, tried to improve upon, and which was stated to be *Invention*, *Elocution* (*Style*), and *Disposition* (*Arrangement*).

Perhaps one of the happiest illustrations of the excellence of this analysis of Aristotle, is that used by Mr. John Quincy Adams, to describe how exactly it follows the process of divine wisdom in the creation of light, as given in the exact words of Scripture:—

1st. The *Invention* of the Creator is thus given: "In the beginning *God created* the heaven and the earth; and the earth was without form and void."

2d. The *Elocution* or speech: "And *God said*, Let there be light."

3d. The *Disposition*: "And *God divided* the light

from the darkness; and God called the light day, and the darkness he called night."

Thus we have the highest warrant for this statement of the constituent branches of the rhetorical art, which, after some other necessary preliminary remarks, we shall endeavour clearly to explain.

Before doing this it will be necessary to consider what place among the arts is occupied by Rhetoric.

CHAPTER III.

THE RELATIONS OF RHETORIC TO ÆSTHETICS.

(15.) *Rhetoric among the Arts.*

: THE Arts have been divided among civilized nations into two general classes: the *fine* Arts, and the *common* or *useful* Arts. This is evidently a division, based upon the general purpose to which Arts are applied; the *fine* Arts being designed to improve and refine the imagination, and thus to please the taste; while the *useful* Arts have for their object to benefit mankind practically.

The term *Fine Arts* has been also varied by being called *Elegant* or *Liberal Arts*, and among the French, *les beaux Arts*, or the beautiful Arts; while the *useful* Arts have also been called the *mechanical* or *practical* Arts. Among the *fine* Arts are to be classed *Painting*, *Sculpture*, and its art-development, *Poetry*.

But if, according to the division just stated, we endeavour to classify Rhetoric as an Art, what shall be its place? It certainly is a *useful* Art in that it

constructs and sets forth discourse, the medium of communication between men, the very foundation of law and government; but it is no less certainly an *elegant* Art, developing and subsidizing beauty not only as decorative or ornamental, but as it is directed in its fitness of the means to the end. With this view the French have placed it in the general division which they call *belles lettres*.

Since, then, it seems that Rhetoric is to be placed in both classes, it will be evident that this division of Arts will often be a distinction without a difference: Architecture, as an Art, is to be placed in this same category; its first aim is indeed *utility*, but in all its parts it has much to do with that beauty and harmony which at once class it among the elegant Arts.

The truth is, that, as practical science progresses, there will be a progressive union of the useful and the beautiful, so that most Arts will partake of both, and the long-established division into *fine* and *useful* Arts be at length given up, as no longer just. Look at a fine ship, with the graceful lines of her hull, her tapering spars, her tall masts, and slender ropes scarcely defined against the sky; or with canvas gracefully rounded with the breeze, as she leaps to the careering seas: is she not beautiful in every part, and in the general adaptation of the whole to the design of the builder? and yet every part is designed and the whole is arranged with a reference,

almost if not entirely alone, to *utility*, to speed, to tonnage, to strength, to buoyancy, to making the most of a gentle breeze, and yet to withstanding the most violent hurricane. And is not this very fitness, this nice adaptation for utility an element of beauty? Or, for another example, consider another mechanism, primarily designed for practical purposes alone—the locomotive engine. How nice its arrangement and order; how beautiful the passage of thought, in the adaptation from the wood and water to the fire and steam; from the steam to its calculated force when compressed; from the valve-box to the cylinder, to the moving piston; from the piston-rod to the crank; from the crank to the wheel; from the driving-wheel to the great mass of produce, and stores, and passengers, which it urges along; from them to the great marts connected by the passage, and so to the commerce and civilization of the world.

Thus, as the world progresses to a higher civilization, Science and Art, with magic powers, have transformed chaos into order, dark and dingy substances into the brilliant diamond, deformity into beauty; and have thus created a new element in art, making what were before purely mechanical arts to rank among the fine arts, and demanding that the fine arts shall also display *utility* as a distinguishing element.

Again; although beauty and grace are everywhere interwoven with the useful, it is, by no means, only

on this account that they are to be sought and cultivated: it is because they have also an inherent *utility* entirely their own: because in contemplating them we enjoy a pleasure, a satisfaction of desire which God meant for us; and because, to the *imagination*, this contemplation and this enjoyment are as necessary as food, dwellings, and raiment are for our bodies. Thus, linked with our ordinary conception of the *useful*, and thus containing the useful, in an extraordinary manner, *beauty* pervades all Arts, and breathes upon all forms of existence.

But we need no further illustration to show us that the *useful* Arts are rapidly becoming *elegant* or *fine* Arts, and that some other distinction or classification will be necessary.

Suppose, then, that instead of endeavouring to classify these complex and varying Arts, we strive to find out the elements of beauty in them all, by the establishment of a new science, whose end shall be to analyze and explain the *beautiful*. This is the end and aim of the Science of *Æsthetics*.

Æsthetics, derived from the Greek, *αισθησις* (perception), means the *science of the beautiful*, or, in an extended sense, *the philosophy of taste*.

Æsthetics as a science has struggled into permanence against the most determined opposition; it was for sometime domiciled in Germany, where indeed, in its modern form, it came into existence.

It has principally been employed upon Painting and Sculpture, as the most prominent and exclusive of the fine Arts; but its scope is commensurate with the existence of beauty, and every art in which beauty is found is subjected to its analysis. In this connection it will be seen that Rhetoric, as one of the Fine Arts, has long needed its control; for Rhetoric has not only the beauties of *expression*, which may be styled the *æsthetics of language*, to bring to its standards, but also the beauties of imagination and of rhetorical invention, which may be justly styled the *æsthetics of thought*.

Since this science then seeks for beauty everywhere, and, as we have seen, destroys in part at least the old division of Arts, finding in almost all, more or less, developed the elements of beauty, the many Arts in which beauty in its varying forms predominates, have been called *Æsthetic Arts*, and thus we may properly say of an art that it is more or less an *Æsthetic Art*.

Among these Rhetoric, it is observed, holds a prominent place, as will be further evident, when we see that it subsidizes the *power of the imagination*, the *play of the softer passions*, the *charms of language*, and in oratory, the *graces of speech*, of *gesture*, of *form*, the *expression of the eye*, the *curve of the lip*, and the *smile*, which plays like rippling light upon the countenance; and that all these beauties are

means beautifully adapted to a useful end. Rhetoric is essentially then an *Æsthetic Art*.

It has been said that this science of *Æsthetics* was very much needed; it was not more needed by any Art than by Rhetoric; because, before its creation to fill a vacant niche—*wit* and *humour*, as rhetorical instruments; *beauty* and *sublimity* of objects, and of thought, and of their description in writing; indeed, all that came, either in thought or diction, within the domain of taste, were absolutely without a place among the classified sciences, and were baldly stated as existing without being referred to any scientific classification.

They are now all included under Rhetorical *Æsthetics*; and rules are laid down for judging of the beautiful in discourse.

(16.) *Objective and Subjective.*

It may not be amiss, while on this general topic of the philosophy of the beautiful, to explain the meaning of two other words much used but frequently misunderstood, especially in their connection with Painting and Sculpture. They are the words *objective* and *subjective*, and they are particularly applicable to the consideration of Rhetoric. These are words of recent introduction in our language, but they were much needed before they came.

To explain these, let us take any grammatical sentence having a *subject*, a finite verb, and an *object*. Now in Philosophy, as in Grammar, the *subject* is supposed in every case to be *thinker*, the *person acquainted with*, or the *person acting*; while the *object* is the *thought*, the *person or thing known*, or the *person or thing acted upon*.

But the *subject* and the *object* are only such *relatively* to each other, for it is evident that every subject may become an object: for, if *I* conceive of the given subject as related to the given object, then both are *objects* to me, for *I* am the *thinker* and *they* the *things thought of*.

Let this give us the clue then to the meaning of these terms: *objective* means that which really and essentially belongs to the *object* itself; *subjective* means the *manner in which* the *subject*, or individual, conceives of that object. And thus *objectivity* means the existence of the world around me quite independent of my conceptions of them, while *subjectivity* means the *expression of my views* of the world around me.

The *objective painter* or *writer* displays things, or portrays persons, *as they exist*, free from any prejudice or peculiarity of his own; such as would spring from his *school*, or his *nationality*, or his *own personal views*.

While the *subjective writer* gives us the *peculiar*

impressions made upon himself, and thus frequently the objects are distorted by being viewed through him as a medium. The one is nature seen with the clear unblemished eye; the other the same nature seen "through a glass darkly."

To state extreme cases, the annalist or statistician is *objective*; the man of genius usually more *subjective*.

To obtain pure truth in a pleasing form, we look for a combination of the *objective* and *subjective*.

Shakspeare has been instanced as remarkable for the happy counterbalance of the two: his characters,—men and women;—his portraitures of virtue and vice, "holding the mirror up to nature," are splendidly *objective*; and show to all ages "our fathers in their habits as they lived."

And yet, on the other hand, what writer has ever more perfectly stamped everything he wrote with the signet of his own genius; making everything Shakspearean and subjective?

So too has Milton, "of imagination all compact," peopled the world of that imagination with the finest objective creations, and yet every line of the *Paradise Lost*, or of *Comus* is so truly Milton's that we could recognise it by a comparison with his life and his other works.

A purely objective view, while it informs or instructs, gives us no pleasing or grateful thought of the instructor; a purely subjective view shows us the

instructor, but we learn *him* rather than the truths he professes to teach.

But to return to the province of Taste in rhetorical discourse.

(17.) *Of the pleasures of Taste.*

It has been stated, at the beginning of this volume, that Rhetoric, as the Art of Discourse, consists in the invention, arrangement, and style, or expression, of discourse.

We have shown that in the invention and arrangement of the discourse the development of thought is the proper province of Rhetoric; we now come to consider the fact that in the thought and language of discourse there is an inherent relation to *Taste*; thus, not only may we clearly invent and distinctly express our thought, but the thought itself and the dress it wears, may, besides simply *informing* our hearer, awaken in him an emotion of pleasure, incident to the *beauty, grandeur, or sublimity* which they contain.

To illustrate:—It may be our desire to inform a person, before ignorant of the fact, that God made everything, and that he only *said that they should be made*, and that they were so made. If, now, we look beyond the mere instruction to be conveyed, we find the thought expanding in the effort of utterance; we observe that our mind dwells beforehand upon the

dignity of approach to such a thought, that an elevated and serious tone becomes natural to our expression, and so we rise at once to the language of the Psalmist: "By the word of the Lord were the Heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth; He gathereth the waters of the sea together as an heap; he layeth up the depth in storehouses. Let all the earth fear the Lord; let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of him. For he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast."

Here, besides the mere instruction conveyed, there is great *beauty* in the invention and arrangement; that is, the development of the thought. First, the fact of creation; then the ennobling consideration of the Great Omnipotent Being, who could thus create; his mighty unseen hands in the ocean depths—the storehouses of his munificence; the vastness of his visible universe; the transition of the mind from primitive chaos to order, from darkness to light; the potent reasoning that such a God should be had in awe and holy fear by all the inhabitants of the world; and the grandeur of the final and splendid epitome: "For he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast."

Is not an emotion of great pleasure, merging into awe, excited by this development of thought and fitness of expression? If we had no other volume than

the Bible, from which to illustrate a chapter on Rhetorical *Æsthetics*, we should have a storehouse full of treasures of thought and diction.

With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to the consideration of the scope, subjects, and instruments of *Æsthetics* in the consideration of Rhetoric.

It must be observed, that the pleasures derived from such thoughts and such language are pleasures produced by the *Imagination* and discerned by *Taste*; and, lest we may be misunderstood, before going farther, let us explain the meaning of these terms, *Imagination* and *Taste*.

(18.) *Imagination.*

Perhaps there is no term which has been more difficult to explain, or of which more conflicting explanations have been given, than the word *imagination*. It is derived from the Latin word *imago*, which means an image, and therefore, in its etymological sense, it is the conjuring or bringing before the mind certain images; but, in its secondary sense, it may be called *the power of endowing substances with qualities which they do not possess*; and making these qualities inhere in a lively and natural manner.

It is mainly in its conflict with another word, *Fancy*, which has frequently been used as synonymous with it, *i. e.*, having nearly the same meaning,

that it has been found necessary to define *Imagination* more clearly than before, and yet it is difficult to find an agreement among those writers who have attempted to state this distinction.

Fancy, from the Greek (*φαντασιν*), may be called the power of combining ideas already known, in such a manner as to produce new and pleasant scenes to our mental sight. Imagination is a *creative* power, often *originating* ideas; or, if not making the ideas themselves, creating such a connection between the most simple and insignificant things as to render them new objects of human sympathy.

Thus we have in Milton's *Comus*:—

Wrapped in a pleasing fit of melancholy,
To meditate my rural innstrelsy,
Till *Fancy* has her fill.

But it is

———*Imagination* bodies forth
The forms of things unknown,

and presents them to the poet, until his pen

Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

Imagination is a quality of the mind by which these images are evoked according to an invariable

mental law; Fancy is the condition of the mind unbent, uncontrolled, and often lawless.

The Imagination soars when the intellectual powers are in full, strong, and healthful play. It is Fancy which directs our reveries, or is present in our dreams.

Imagination is oftenest linked with pure feeling; she observes and appreciates the closest and most pathetic resemblances or analogies; detects and loves beauty in its subtlest forms. Fancy only sports unfeeling with the resemblance of things, airy and fantastical.

Imagination is the close attendant, the inseparable friend of the *tragic* muse, while Fancy alone disports herself in the atmosphere of *comedy*.

In a word, Imagination, creative, elevated, serious, dignified, belongs to poetic genius, and opens to it a world of high and holy thought, and of perennial pleasures, into which Fancy never enters.

The glorious faculty assigned
To elevate the *more than reasoning* mind,
And colour life's dark cloud with orient rays;
Imagination is that sacred power,
Imagination lofty and refined.

Among the plays of Shakspeare, so often marked by exalted Imagination, the "Midsummer Night's Dream" is full of delicate as well as capricious

Fancy; while in Homer, the Imagination is far more abundant, making the Iliad original, lively, glowing, and natural.

Pope's "Rape of the Lock" has been regarded as the best illustration, in one poem, of the predominance of Fancy, filled as it is with the Rosicrucian spirits, sylphs, gnomes, and nymphs.

The "Divina Commedia" of Dante, and the "Paradise Lost" of Milton, are full of fine imagination: while the "Faërie Queen" of Spenser, and Shakspeare's "Tempest," are fine examples of the beautiful combination of the Imagination and the Fancy.

For a long time, and indeed until quite recently, these two words were regarded as exactly synonymous, and were so used constantly.

While this was a great error, it will still be evident that, in their relation to Rhetoric, Imagination and Fancy are both important; and that, while *genius* alone may be able to create with the *imagination*, it is the province of *taste* to judge of the fancy and the imagination as displayed in writing, and of the beauties and pleasures arising from both.

(19.) *Taste.*

We come now to a consideration of the meaning and the province of *Taste*.

Taste has been defined the *faculty* by which we discern and enjoy the beauties of Nature and Art.

Whether *Taste* be a single faculty in itself, or whether it be a combination of other faculties, is a question which mainly concerns Intellectual Philosophy; but that there is such a power of discriminating must be admitted by all. If this be admitted, it is unimportant whether it be a simple or a complex faculty.

This power is the universal gift of God to man, although in different degrees; thus, the coarse tastes of the savage differ from the refined tastes of civilized life; and yet all will agree that sugar is sweet, vinegar sour, light and gay colours pleasant to the eye.

It is by *taste* that we create our standards of judgment in art, as well as in the world around us.

If we seek for such a standard of rhetorical judgment we shall find it to be drawn from nature, and dependent, as are our standards in the other Arts, upon that natural faculty which we have called *Taste*.

This term *Taste*, it is evident, is used in a secondary meaning when applied to the pleasures of Imagination. It has been by some persons derived from the verb *tango*, to touch, and may thus be regarded as the effect produced by coming in contact with anything; but to us its primary meaning is the power of judging, by the palate, of the quality and nature of things which we eat and drink.

The process of its second application is an easy one; thus, a *sweet* food produces a pleasurable sensation upon the palate, analogous to that of a *sweet* sound upon the ear, or such as one whom we call a *sweet* person produces upon our hearts; we thus speak of the taste of the food, a taste for music, or a person so much to our taste; by an extension of this process, Taste is made to apply to works of literature and art in all their branches, including the pleasures of the Imagination, and, in especial, to Rhetoric, in its task of inventing, arranging, and expressing discourse.

The capability of being pleased or pained by the works of Nature and Art around us, has been justly called *sensitiveness*; it springs directly from the union of the *mind* and the *conscience*; and thus is brought to bear upon all forms in the physical and moral world. In the term *mind* we include both the reason and the imagination. In our effort to be clear and concise we have avoided technical phrases borrowed from mental philosophy, and have limited ourselves to the plainest language.

After our sensitiveness is thus attracted towards or repelled from the various objects and ideas which surround us, it is the province of Taste to tell us why we are thus influenced, and to discern the beauties and deformities of Nature and of Art, and to arrange them according to some scale or law of gradation. The question has often been asked—"Is

there any standard of Taste?—and so many have denied the existence of such a standard, that an adage was framed by the Latins, and has been retained to our own times as the summary settlement of this question—"De gustibus non est disputandum:" There is no disputing about Tastes.

It is worth a remark, in illustration of the case before us, that, *in general*, adages and aphorisms are only one half true, and the other half grossly and fatally false. Take for example the false part of the common motto, "A penny saved is a penny got." It is easily shown, by instances from everyday life, that this has been productive of many other evils as great as spendthriftiness; perhaps its injury to mankind has been greater than its good. It has steeled the heart against the famishing orphan or the indigent widow, and buttoned the pocket over the "penny saved," as though it were a generous and praiseworthy act.

In the words of Thomson:—

Here you a muck-worm of the town might see,
At his dull desk, amid his ledgers stalled,
Eat up with carking care and penury;
Most like to carcase parched on gallow-tree.
"A penny savèd is a penny got:"
Firm to this scoundrel maxim keepeth he,
Ne of its rigour will he bate a jot,
Till it has quenched his fire and banishèd his pot.

CASTLE OF INDOLENCE.

If, then, we would apply a similar criticism to the adage about *Taste*, we shall find that it has been entirely wrested from its true meaning, which was—that inherent tastes are so hard to overcome, and to convince of error, that we should not dispute about them; and that it has been construed thus: Since we are all gifted with taste by God, each man's taste must be as good as his neighbour's; and therefore there can be no standard.

But there is a standard; and although, in matters of general doubt some latitude must be allowed, there is a large domain in which all well-ordered and cultivated minds agree, and this agreement constitutes, in that province at least, the standard of Taste. Such, we shall also see, is the philosophy of the standard of Rhetorical Taste. This standard may be defined the concurrence of the right judgment of many well ordered and duly cultivated minds, when directed within the province and upon the objects of Taste, and the establishment of this standard has been a special object of that science of Taste which has been called *Æsthetics*.

It seems hardly necessary to dwell upon this point; but let any one compare, in thought, the extremes of barbarism and refinement; a hut of reeds with a gorgeous palace; an Indian canoe with the floating palaces which cross the Atlantic; an Indian village with one of our great cities—Philadelphia or New

York; the barbarous and inadequate dialect of the Hottentot with the copiousness of the English or the graces of the Spanish language: and a union, a concurrence of *Taste*, not only among the refined, but among the barbarous, as far as they can comprehend these things, will establish the necessity and existence of a standard of *Taste*.

But this, it will be observed, except in such a comparison of extremes as those just mentioned, will be a varying standard, and will depend upon the habits and customs, domestic, social, and national, of the individuals concerned: what is pleasant to a man of culture will be indifferent to one lower in the intellectual scale, because he will not appreciate it; while that which satisfies and charms the boor will be distasteful, by contrast, to those surrounded by all the appliances of culture and taste.

Besides, there may be *different* tastes and yet each good of its kind. Each man, in the ardour with which he pursues his special train of thought and study, finds in it matter more to his taste than in any other pursuit; and so the *jurist* evokes beauties and pleasures from the law, finding, in the words of Hooker, “that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.”

The *mathematician* may so revel in his problems, and be so intent to weave his analysis, that, like

Archimedes, he may be deaf to the roar of battle around his house.

The poet may soar on the pinions of the Imagination

Above the smoke and stir of this dim spot,
Which men call earth;

and each may find beauties, the source of pleasures which by the others are unseen and unappreciated. This is just; its philosophy is apparent.

But, if the lawyer should say to the mathematician, Your labors are dull and disagreeable, and I pity your dry routine and plodding life; or, if the mathematician demand sneeringly of the poet, What does the "Paradise Lost" prove? then violence is done to true taste by those who are simply unable, from ignorance, to recognise real beauties.

And here it should be next observed that this faculty of *Taste*, like all other faculties, physical and mental, with which man has been endowed, is *improved* and *developed* by cultivation, and *impaired*, even to entire loss, by disuse.

This needs no proof: look at the development of the senses by constant practice; the dealer in tea becomes extremely well acquainted with the various kinds by taste and smell; the person accustomed to judge of wines will detect the peculiar flavours even when two or more are mixed together.

In the same manner, the man of cultivated intellectual taste will become more and more able to discriminate the beauties of an author, to discern his faults, and to distinguish him, by his peculiar manner of thought and diction, from all others.

(20.) *Correctness and delicacy of Taste.*

With this view of the development of Taste, Rhetoricians have stated the principal characteristics of Taste to be *two*—*correctness* and *delicacy*; qualities in part indeed due to nature, and possessed in a greater degree by some than by others; but also capable of being attained by study and culture. It is not meant that these qualities are given in an equal degree to the same individual, or that every individual is susceptible of the same amount of culture; but this will appear when we define their meaning.

By *Correctness of Taste* is meant that property by which we are enabled to bring *sound judgment* to bear in our discernment of the objects and beauties of Taste. It is a *correct* taste which presents to our view *only the real beauties*, and which is not deceived by what is false and meretricious in ornament.

By a correct taste we are enabled also, after discerning many real beauties in Nature or Art, to classify these for the reference of others, to find out the sources whence they spring, and to keep our-

selves from too little or too much praise of any such objects; admiring just in the degree we should, and no more.

Thus, a concurrence of correct Tastes establishes for us a standard of correctness in Taste, to which we and others may apply for our after needs.

By *delicacy* or *refinement* of Taste is implied the finer powers with which some minds are endued, by which they are permitted to discern beauties and delicacies which are not seen by commoner intellects. A *refined* Taste observes, in a combination of thoughts, the beauty of each individually, as well as that of the combined thought; just as a nice ear bears along each part in a complex harmony, as well as the harmony itself, where one confused or blended sound is present to the unpractised ear. So, a delicate taste will detect in a dish of many ingredients the flavour and the presence of each.

It has been said that these qualities are not always given in the same measure; a man may have a correct taste, may *justly* estimate every object around him, as far as he estimates it at all, and yet be blind to many beauties which would be discerned by a refined taste.

On the other hand a *refined* taste, seeking the rare beauties, may neglect the just outlines and true forms of things, and, catered to by individual prejudice, may distort these, and thus may be able to lay

little claim to correctness. This is, however, an uncommon case. It generally happens, that the cultivation of the faculty of Taste, which is necessary to make one *correct*, is the cause of the revelation of new beauties; and these new beauties constantly unfolding to the eye tend to cultivate refinement.

Indeed no taste can be truly *refined* without being *correct*; nor *correct*, in its most extended sense, without being *refined*.

There have been many technical uses of the word *taste*, which it will be unnecessary for us to consider; they are only different applications of the general functions of Taste already laid down. Thus, *Technical Taste* is that used by an artist or a writer, in making his picture or his discourse, according to the standards already laid down by the great masters; just as a mechanic applies rules, the principles of which he is ignorant of; while *Philosophical Taste* is that based upon the true principles of beauty and adaptation, that is, upon the principles of *philosophy* as thus applied, and constitutes the true and final standard of judgment; these principles, based on Nature, are now the same they were in the days of Homer, and of Aristotle, and this is plainly and well expressed in Pope's verses—which contain such high praise of Homer directly, and such implied admiration of Virgil:—

When first young Maro, in his boundless mind,
 A work to outlast immortal Rome designed,
 Perhaps he seemed above the critic's law,
 And, but from nature's fountains scorned to draw;
 But when to examine every part he came,
 Nature and Homer were, he found, the same.
 Convinced, amazed, he checks the bold design,
 And rules as strict his laboured work confine,
 As if the Stagyrite o'erlooked each line.
 Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem;
 To copy nature is to copy them.

(21.) *Genius.*

In this relation the word *Genius* has often been associated with *Taste*; and its meaning has been not unfrequently misunderstood. It is derived from the Latin verb *gigno*, to be born; signifying a something which is peculiar to a person, as if born with him. It differs from the *Intellect*, which is the universal gift of understanding, in that *Genius* is something superposed upon and implying *intellect*; we frequently speak of a man of superior *intellect* without meaning that he has *genius*; we can never speak of a great genius without implying great intellect. *Genius* differs also from *talent*, with which it is often confounded; talent meant originally a Greek coin (*ταλεντων*) of more than one hundred pounds, and came into its present use from our Saviour's parable of the ten talents; it therefore implies something of ready and practical utility to the possessor. *Genius*

is creative and original, and often erratic and fanciful; *Talent* imitates and combines what genius or nature has created, into the useful and practical: a great poet has *genius*; a great historian only *talent*. The manner in which *Genius* differs from *Taste* is of more concern to us, because here it is employed in an æsthetic sense. *Taste* is a critical power to discern the beauties of Nature and Art, and may be technically attained to some degree at least, if it be not originally possessed. *Genius* is the birth-right power of executing great things in Art and Science. *Genius* may, in its works, display a sound *taste*.

By the cultivation and development of *Taste* the *Critic* is made; by *Genius* the Poet, the Orator, the Painter accomplish famous works. To the *critic*, whose domain is that of *Taste*, constant and careful study is requisite: while it improves and guides the genius, it is not essential to the existence of genius.

There can be little doubt which is the higher power. It is that incommunicable gift which we call *Genius*; and yet Pope, in his *Essay on Criticism*, has said:—

'Tis hard to say if greater want of skill
 Appear in *writing* or in *judging* ill;

* * * * *

Some few in *that*, but numbers err in *this*,
 Ten *censure* wrong for one who *writes* amiss.

And he roundly asserts that Taste is born with a man, as well as Genius:—

In poets as true *genius* is but rare,
True *taste* as seldom is the critic's share.
Both must alike from Heaven derive their light,
These born to judge as well as *those to write*.

We speak of a *taste* for poetry, painting, music, &c., and equally of a *genius* for them; by the former is implied a fondness for them, and a cultivated faculty by which we discern and enjoy their beauties; by the latter we imply the power to write a great poem replete with creations of the imagination, to paint a great picture full of original forms, and conceived in an original spirit, or to compose some grand sonata.

The sterling English writers most frequently use these words in their true meaning, and from them we may derive just illustrations, and endeavour to explain them to ourselves;

Thus Wordsworth speaks of one

——By science led
His *genius* mounted to the plains of Heaven;

thus at once granting the original power of genius, and its guidance by science.

And Leigh Hunt quotes the beautiful and pathetic passage from Homer, which describes old Priam kneel-

ing before Achilles and begging for the dead body of Hector, as he reminds him of his own father, until Achilles is melted to tears; then, as he finishes the passage, he exclaims “Oh lovely and immortal privilege of *genius!* that can stretch its hand out of the wastes of time, thousands of years back, and touch our eyelids with tears.”

It is *Genius* which controls and subsidizes the imagination, using its creative and combining powers with the noblest results.

But it cannot be denied that, although Taste and Genius are so distinct, they are often found conjoined in the same individual. The great poets, who are by this very fact geniuses, are often our best standards of true taste; Genius, however, is usually limited to one or to few Arts, while Taste may range over many, and be developed in many directions.

And it is equally true, that in some cases true Genius exists in a constitution most deficient in Taste.

Thus Dr. Johnson, who claimed to be a poet, and whose satires were in great favour during his lifetime, abused Milton's Lycidas and Comus, was severe even in his praise of the Paradise Lost, and denounced Milton's sonnets,—those noble English verses,—as very bad; while Lord Byron, a rare poetic *genius*, found no beauty in Shakspeare, and clung with fond-

ness to the *artificial* poetry of Dryden and Pope, which exhibits very little poetic *genius*.

(22.) *Of Rhetorical Taste.*

It is some time we were beginning to apply what has already been said on the subject of *Æsthetics*, to the subject immediately under our consideration.

It is evident that Rhetorical Taste is the employment of the faculty of Taste in the criticism of discourse; especially in that kind of discourse which is ordinarily called *Literature*, as distinguished from *Science*.

In a succeeding chapter there will be given, at length, a list and description of the different kinds of discourse; it will, therefore, be sufficient here to say that in the class which bears the name *Literature*, are included those branches which come within the scope of Rhetorical Taste, as, for example, historical writing, narratives, poetry and prose fiction, and epistolary writing, especially in certain of its uses. Under the general topic of *Science*, are now comprised those branches of study which have for their purpose to lay down and illustrate the principles of knowledge, and to give strength and culture to the reason.

It is at once evident from the etymology of these words that the meanings thus given are by no means

their primary significations; since *Literature*, from the Latin *Litteræ*, by its derivation includes all thoughts expressed by *letters*; and *Science* from *Scio, to know*, comprehends all kinds of knowledge.

But in the progress of language, which meets the wants and expresses the culture of the people, these words have drifted from their etymologies to compass more limited branches of discourse; *Literature* being, in more general terms, that which is the field of Rhetorical Taste, and *Science* the domain of the reasoning powers.

(23.) *Of the Sources of the Pleasures of Taste.*

It has been said that Rhetorical Taste has to do with works of the imagination; hence, the pleasures arising from the exercise of this taste upon the creations and combinations of the imagination are truly Pleasures of the Imagination; and the sources of these pleasures have been considered as ranging under three heads: *Beauty, Sublimity, and Novelty*.

(24.) *Of Beauty.*

The word *Beauty* has been traced through the French *beauté*, to the Latin *bellus*, thence to *benulus*, *benus*, and *bonus*, which latter word means *good*, thus allying the beautiful with the good.

The element of *Beauty* may be defined, first, as

that ideal quality which gives pleasure to the organs of sense, the eye, the ear, &c., as colour, form, sound, motion, &c.; but in its extended application it refers to that which pleases the intellect, the imagination, and the conscience. It will evidently be twofold, the beauty of the thought, and the beauty of language, as to its adaptation and harmony.

The beauty of thought is generally a fixed, inherent element, to which alone is given the name of Beauty; as in nature, the azure of the sky, the calm flow of a river, are called *beautiful*, and the thought of these before its expression is *beautiful*. But there is also a beauty of language, which, besides its inherent existence, is attended by two circumstantial forms of beauty, of which the one is ordinarily called *grace*, as to its ornaments; and the other *propriety*, as to its adaptation.

It has been said that beauty addresses itself to the senses: thus, colour, figure, and motion please the eye; sounds, which are soft and harmonious, please the ear; and these exhibited all around us in nature constitute her manifold charms, to which every eye and every heart respond.

Take, by way of illustration, a fine landscape, in which the fields adorned with living green are divided and contrasted with streams sparkling as they flow; in which are dotted here and there, in little clumps or fairy groves, trees of various kinds, from the venera-

ble oak with its spreading arms, to the fine straight sapling rejoicing in its youth; woodland roads, with figures of men and horses; the rustic bridge; the boat idly borne by the current, or reflected in the mirror-like water as it is moored to the shore; grazing herds; birds singing in concert; and all these bathed in the beautiful light of the morning sun;—there is beauty not only in each, that is, in the separate principles of colour, sound, figure, and motion, but in the union of them all, which constitutes a complex beauty.

Now to describe this, or any similar scene, with the pencil of art, is the study and the purpose of the painter, and we call his work beautiful; he chooses his choicest colours, and endeavours, without indeed an attempt at illusion—for he does not mean to cause us to mistake his picture for nature—to make us enjoy, in his painting, the remembrance of the original, and also to admire his skill in its reproduction on canvas; and we, as critics, exercise our *artistic taste* in judging of his work.

Analogous to this is the *writer's* attempt to portray this same scene in words, and to excite in our minds a pleasing emotion; seizing the beauties which it presents with an artist's eye, he arranges them into thoughts; he chooses from his store of language *beautiful*, and hence appropriate, words, with which to describe these natural beauties which he has now

fashioned into beautiful thought. Sometimes, in the attempt, he rises, with the poet's imagination, to the language of apostrophe:—

——Forth in the pleasing spring,
Thy beauty walks, thy tenderness and love.
Wide flush the fields; the softening air is balm;
Echo the mountains round; the forest smiles;
And every sense, and every heart is joy.

Or in simple but most graphic prose he describes such a scene, so that it is once more painted upon our mind's retina:—

“A few amber clouds floated in the sky, without a breath of air to move them, the horizon was of a fine golden tint, changing gradually into a pure apple green, and from that into the deep blue of the mid heaven. A slanting ray lingered on the woody crests of the precipices that overhung some parts of the river, giving greater depth to the dark blue and purple of their rocky sides. A sloop was loitering in the distance, dropping slowly down with the tide, her sail hanging uselessly against the mast, and as the reflection of the sky gleamed along the still water, it seemed as if the vessel was suspended in the air.”

To these descriptions, of which the one is highly poetical and the other simply and minutely descriptive, we apply equally the canons of Rhetorical

Taste; finding in the first, the general beauty of the scene; the superior beauty of the apostrophe to God:—

“*Thy beauty walks, thy tenderness and love;*”

and the power with which the imagination has vivified everything;—*the flush of the fields; the echoing mountains; the smiling forest.* Add to these the harmony and flow of the language, and we declare the whole beautiful.

So, in the latter, besides the placid beauty of the landscape, and the charming change of colour in the sky, the words and images chosen with which to describe them are beautiful, and the emotion awakened in us is one of unmixed pleasure.

From what has been said it will be evident that the emotion awakened by *Beauty*, in Nature and Art—and in the term *Art*, *discourse* is included—is not of a violent or vehement kind; it is placid and gentle; the imagination in its creation of the beautiful, and the discourse in its description, does not agitate the soul strongly, or appeal powerfully to the passions.

The *beautiful in writing*, intended to express and describe the *beautiful in nature*, or *mind*, or *morals*, is smooth, flowing, harmonious, and graceful.

The more violent appeals belong to the *grand* or *sublime*.

The idea of beauty is usually associated with gladness, and surely most of the emotions of beauty are excited in a mind serene and cheerful, or buoyant and lively, and yet there is a union of beauty with sadness, which gives an emotion of pleasure. When beauty is joined with melancholy we have *pathos*, and this produces an emotion which heightens the pleasure of beauty by contrast. Originally this word, *pathos*, as its derivation from the Greek, *πάσχω*, *to suffer*, indicates, meant *passion*, and implied vehemence; it has now grown to mean *that* which awakens *tender emotions*, and chiefly those of a humane and hearty sympathy.

Among the writers in whose poems *beauty* abounds, Goldsmith is a striking example; his muse, dwelling mainly in the sphere of beauty, presents such charming and quiet pictures; now of

“Sweet Auburn, loveliest village of the plain;”

and again of the placid countenances of those who were its familiar tenants long ago. Thus we have the country pastor,

“To all the country dear,
And passing rich with forty pounds a year.”

The village schoolmaster: whose learning was so great that

———“Still the wonder grew
That one small head could carry all he knew.”

In many of his descriptions rural life is presented in its fairest verdure and its quiet charms.

The descriptions in the “Traveller” are likewise full of beauties; many of them of a higher order, as he passes from descriptions of nature to moral reflections upon European life and manners.

Cowper is another illustration of the beautiful in writing; and of more modern poets, Scott, in his animated descriptions in prose as well as verse; Coleridge, and Wordsworth, are striking examples; the one in his charming delineations of purity and love—

“And hopes, and fears that kindle hopes,
An undistinguishable throng,
And gentle wishes long subdued,
Subdued and cherished long;”

and the other in his elaborate descriptions of rural life and persons in England:—

“Of him who walked in glory and in joy,
Following his plough along the mountain side.”

Keats, and his later type, Tennyson, should also be mentioned as being full of beauties, as well of language as of rare thought. Of that beauty which is found in the pathetic, a very notable example is

found in Sterne's story of Lefevre, in Tristram Shandy; we have the *beauty of heart* in my Uncle Toby and Corporal Trim, so concerned as they were about the sick Lieutenant; the beauty of invention and arrangement in the details of the story, and a charm of language which covers the whole with a veil of soft and dewy light, and makes it a beautiful picture in the great art gallery of English literature.

Nor are our American writers wanting in a genius to create, and a taste to subsidize the beautiful: Washington Irving has given us those placid and yet beaming pictures of life on the Hudson, the banks of which he has made classic ground; Bryant has his ears ever open and his eyes ever responding to the charms of nature, and his pen ever ready to portray them in immortal colours. It is out of our province, in this place, to multiply illustrations of this fact, but it may be stated in general, that, as American scenery abounds in what is beautiful, the beauties of its description abound in the works of American authors.

(25.) *Of Grandeur or Sublimity in Discourse.*

The next source of the pleasures of imagination, in discourse, has been called *Grandeur* or *Sublimity*.

Some persons have regarded these as different in the degree in which they awaken pleasurable emo-

tions, making *grandeur* less powerful than *sublimity*: yet, although this difference in degree may be kept in mind, a consideration of the synonymous character of the two words will cause us, generally, to range the emotions excited by both under the general head of the *sublime* in writing.

Grandeur, from the Latin *grandis*, and the French *grand*, implies *greatness*, originally in size; but, by its secondary adaptation, it differs from *greatness*, in that it includes the idea of excellence and worth. In its adaptation to thought it implies expansion of sentiment, and also the character of the expression of sentiment.

Sublime, from the Latin *sublimis*, means originally *greatness in height*, and, when applied to discourse, means elevation as well of *thought* as of *diction*.

To Art and Nature alike the term *Grand* may be applied; *Sublime* is only properly used when speaking of Nature.

A natural scene may be both grand and sublime; *grand* in the impression of its extension and vastness which is made upon our imagination; *sublime* in the *effect* which it produces upon our imagination, in elevating it beyond the sphere and consideration of lesser objects or concerns.

The pyramids of Egypt are grand; the ocean in its sport is grand; but the ocean in fury passes out of the sphere of grandeur and becomes *sublime*.

In discourse we speak of certain authors as grand or sublime, according to the predominance of *sublimity* in their works. Homer, who is full of *beauty*, often merges simple beauty into *grandeur* of thought and of style in his descriptions of prowess on the battle-field, as well as in his pictures of the glowing beauties of the old Ægean; and the classic shores of Asia Minor. So, also, Milton passes from the placid beauties of the terrestrial paradise to the grandeur of creation, and to the sublimities of the Court of Heaven; the terrible splendours of Pandemonium; and the splendid fabric, which "rose like an exhalation," "to the Dorian mood of flutes and soft recorders"; but in all his works is found a great predominance of sublimity, so much, indeed, as to constitute his great work one of the sublimest poems ever written.

The Scriptures, ever abound with sublimity in thought, and in language: the two so aptly united in the harmonies of prophetic language, which announce, through the poet's tongue, the mission and glories of the Messiah. But the sublime in Scripture is ever present with us, from the universal diffusion of the Bible in our country; and illustrations suggest themselves to the daily delight of its readers.

Among the modern authors, whose works are replete with sublime thoughts, fitly expressed in glowing words, Byron is the chief of English poets;

his poem of Childe Harold abounding in lines which give us, with lightning vividness, glimpses of the true sublime in writing. They are so well known that they will recur readily to most readers. The apostrophe to the ocean; rising, in a beautiful climax, from earth to heaven; representing the immense expanse, in itself so grand, as

"The glorious mirror, where the Almighty's form
Glasses itself in tempests;"

is one of the sublimest descriptions on record. His lamentations over the fallen glories of Greece and Rome, and the fleeting honours of the more modern Mediterranean republics, are also in many instances truly sublime.

Coleridge often passes, with easy ascent, from the beautiful to the sublime, with the finest effect; and like many other writers, who reach the region of the sublime, he often combines sublimity with terror. Let us take, for example, a little picture from the *Ancient Mariner*:—

"The thick black cloud was cleft, and still,
The moon was at its side;
Like waters shot from some high crag,
The lightning fell with never a jag,
A river steep and wide."

The whole forms a terrific picture, especially when

read with the attendant circumstances in the poem. There is a grandeur of thought, too, in the picture of that despairing ocean, in the same poem:—

“Still as a slave before his lord,
The ocean has no blast,
His great bright eye most silently
Up to the moon is cast.”

A modern critic has declared the last two lines to be among the finest in the language.

Sublimity in discourse, it is evident, is more vehement and violent, in the emotions it awakens, than Beauty; and still within a certain limit it is a source of pleasure to taste: yet it is a pleasure not without its cost; the mind is startled; the whole man snatched as it were from the earth to a higher air in which are wonders and beauties not unmixed with awe.

It may even go so far as to unite with fear, and thus to become a source of terror, when all pleasure is lost. Horrors of colossal size throng around us, and the imagination seizes the reason, and bears it away captive into the doleful regions of despair: such is often the poet's aim; and the contrast, when he returns to more placid scenes and milder words, renders them all the more pleasing. What, for instance, is there of pleasure in the wild revolutionary vision of Coleridge, in which:—

“——The giant Frenzy,
Uprooting empires with his whirlwind arm,
Mocketh high Heaven.——
——The old Hag, unconquerable, huge,
Creation's eyeless drudge, black Ruin, sits,
Nursing the impatient earthquake.”

Many striking examples of the sublime in writing may be found in the poems of Mrs. Browning, and they constitute exceptions to a general rule which would make beauty, rather than sublimity, the characteristic of a woman's mind.

It will be evident that so exalted an emotion as that of sublimity cannot be long maintained; unlike the steady, placid sunlight of beauty, it comes in electric flashes of dazzling splendour, but short duration.

If, now, we consider the kind of language in which sublime thoughts are naturally couched, we shall find it to be generally of the simplest kind; a transparent garb disclosing rather than veiling the sublime conceptions. In the example already used of the creation of light at the word of God, this simplicity is manifest:—“God said, Let there be light, and there was light.” What can be grander than the thought, and yet what can be simpler than the language?

So, in the Psalms of David, this beautiful simplicity of language is allied to the highest thoughts. Sometimes it is a denunciation of vengeance against the wicked: “Let God arise, and let his enemies be

scattered." Or, again, it is the praise of universal Nature to its Creator: "The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy-work; Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge."

There is no straining after effect in language; the words are as simple as the thought is sublime.

The Book of Job has often been adduced as a very copious illustration of sublimity of thought; it might be readily brought forward as also illustrating the simplicity of language.

Efforts have been made to analyze the sublime, and to discover its sources; but, beyond the idea conveyed by its derivation, we can arrive at no satisfactory result. *Vastness, confusion, high virtue, contempt of death, fear*, have all been mentioned as elements of the sublime; and, perhaps, *obscurity* which hides the lofty conceptions from us, and yet implies their existence, is a most distinguishing characteristic of the sublime, very much employed in the Bible, and by the best authors.

Thus the Psalmist says:—

"Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God!" leaving to our imagination and faith to meditate upon the glories of which the mere mention is thus made.

It is this which constitutes so much of the sublime in the prophecies; their glowing and yet simple lan-

guage, containing truths of sublime importance, the whole of which we are not gifted to know, and yet of which we form some faint conception:—

"Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power; in the beauties of holiness from the womb of the morning; thou hast the dew of thy youth."

"He shall drink of the brook in the way; therefore shall He lift up the head."

Of the power of obscurity to heighten the sublimity of that which is purely imaginative, we have the most frequent examples in Milton; Satan is drawn:—

"His stature reached the sky,
And on his crest sat Horror plumed."

The mind soars to reach that lofty height; and the imagination expands in its attempt to portray to itself that strange ideal, "Horror plumed."

The entire description of the encounter of Satan with Sin and Death, at Hell-gate, owes much of its sublimity to that awe-inspiring darkness through which it is indistinctly discerned: it seems the highest effort of the *ideal* imagination.

Here rises a

"——Grisly Terror, and in shape,
So speaking and so threatening, grew tenfold
More dreadful and deform."

A most artistic composite of obscure phrases, producing a sublime and awful picture.

And, again:—

“So frown the mighty combatants, that hell
Grew darker at their frown; so matched they stood;

From what has been said it will be apparent that the sources of the sublime in writing lie more in the thought than the language; for the proper language in which sublimity of thought is couched, is, as has been already remarked, simple and common, giving only clear and lucid expression to the thought.

Sometimes, however, the language is a real aid to the thought. In the skilful use of language there are adaptations of *sound* to *sense*, which are sometimes adopted to heighten the effect. This subject will be referred to more at length hereafter; but it may be well to state, in this place, the existence of such an adaptation of the powers of language to heighten the effect of the thought. In a less degree we have observed that harmonious language is a fitting vehicle for *beauty* of thought; thus Byron has described the morning dawn in the East, in words of harmonious sound:—

“Night wanes—the vapours round the mountains curled
Melt into morn, and Light awakes the world.”

in which the sound uttered softly, is a fitting accom-

paniment to the scene which the words describe; and again he opens one of his poems with a similar effect:—

“It is the hour when from the boughs
The nightingale’s high note is heard;
It is the hour when lovers’ vows
Seem sweet in every whispered word.”

So, too, with the *sublime* in language.

In many single lines or sentences of his other poems, Byron has accompanied a grand and stirring thought with words of trumpet sound, which would convey something of their meaning to one even who was ignorant of the language.

Thus in his description of the opening of the battle of Waterloo:—

“But, hark!—that heavy sound breaks in once more,
As if the clouds its echo would repeat;
And nearer, clearer, deadlier, than before!
Arm! arm! it is—it is the cannon’s opening roar.”

In this the *heavy sound* is a phrase which carries something of its booming meaning with it; the climax of thought is fully conveyed in the words “*nearer, clearer, deadlier* than before,” especially if the voice aid the illusion by rising with the words: and the words *arm* and *roar*,—especially the latter as the concluding word in the final line of the stanza,—are particularly effective.

But there is one stanza of Childe Harold which has been considered the finest, in respect of the adaptation of sound to sense, in that poem, full as it is of such rare combinations; it is worth quoting entire, and reading aloud, that we may note the nice and yet apparently intuitive adjustment of the two:—

“Hark! heard ye not those hoofs of dreadful note?
 Sounds not the clang of conflict on the heath?
 Saw ye not whom the reeking sabre smote,
 Nor saved your brethren ere they sank beneath
 Tyrants, and tyrant's slave?—the fires of death,
 The bale-fires flash on high;—from rock to rock
 Each volley tells that thousands cease to breathe,
 Death rides upon the sulphury siroc,
 Red battle stamps his foot and nations feel the shock.”

The last line has been declared, by a competent critic, to have no superior in English poetry.

There is great force of language in the effect of the following lines; which are quoted to portray the close of Napoleon's career:—

“Like a statue thunder-struck,
 Which, though quivering, seems to look
 Right against the thunder-place.”

The phrases *thunder-struck* and *thunder-place* give in themselves some idea of the sudden confusion which the thought would express, and the word *quivering* is most expressive, even in sound, of the effect of the stroke.

But with these passing remarks upon language, as adapted to sublimity of thought, we come to the third source of the pleasures of taste which we have mentioned.

(26.) *Novelty.*

By *Novelty* in discourse is meant the expression, not only of that which is *new*, which the mind may be on the alert to hear and know; but also of that which is sudden and unexpected—*i. e.*, truly *novel*. A fact or theory may be stated as *new*, as opposed to what is *old*; or *novel*, as opposed to what is *known*; or two well known facts may be brought into a new and unexpected connection; thus creating for us the effect properly called *Novelty*. The pleasure derived from novelty is due, then, not only to the pleasing thoughts and appropriate language, but also to the vivid impression and exhilarating nervous effect arising from the unexpected nature of the object or thought presented; the mind is thrown into a pleasant state of excitement; and thus a thought which has no beauty or sublimity, a specious argument to which the mind is not ready to yield its assent, will still, when first presented, please by their *novelty*.

The best illustration of this peculiarity of the human mind is to be found in the search which everybody is making for happiness, by the examination of “something new.” There are in every age

those pointed out by the Psalmist of old, as crying "who will show us any good?" that is, seeking for good in *novelty*; and the same truth was asserted by St. Luke of the Athenians, when he said, they were ever on the alert "to tell or to hear some new thing."

So it has been in all ages of the world, and so it will ever be; and although it is found that novelty does not give rise to permanent happiness, yet, in its momentary and recurring excitements, it has been justly classed as one of the sources of the pleasures of Taste.

It is often intimately connected with beauty and sublimity, for while in poetry it is to the *unexpected* creations of the imagination—that is, to *novelty*—that something of the pleasure of taste is due; we have already seen that the beauty or sublimity of these conceptions is the chief source of our pleasure.

The emotion excited by *Novelty*, although for the moment quite vivid, is very transient, and when it passes away it never can be recalled by the same object, then no longer new; it is unlike beauty, in that beauty is inherent, and remains always a part of the object itself. In the opening line of *Endymion* this permanence of beauty is justly stated in charming words, which embody a thought often felt by all, and yet never so well expressed:—

“A thing of beauty is a joy for ever.”

It is due to *Novelty* in part, although not entirely, that the quality which is called *Wit* owes its power to excite pleasure; for it is characteristic of wit that it brings objects or thoughts together into strange and unwonted union; and a pleasant emotion is excited by the unexpected contrast.

Some writers have considered *Melody* and *Harmony* as sources of the pleasures of Taste; but these so manifestly come under the general head of *Beauty* in their more placid flow, and of *Sublimity* in their more vehement styles, that they cannot justly be mentioned as separate sources of pleasure.

So, also, *Imitation* has been styled a source of pleasure; but it seems manifest, that besides the reproduction of the *beauties* copied, the pleasure which arises from Imitation grows out of the unusual exhibition of power in copying thought, or form, or colour, or style, and this pleasure it would seem is, in part at least, of the nature of *novelty*; an astonishment at the exertion of unexpected and unusual skill. So imitation seems only to subsidize the sources of pleasure already mentioned. It seems, then, that all the sources of the pleasures of Taste may be properly ranged, as we have ranged them, under the three heads—Beauty, Sublimity, and Novelty.

Among certain characteristic forms of discourse,

which are of the nature of the pleasures of Taste, we must devote some space to a consideration of Wit, Humour, and Ridicule, which are rhetorical weapons of great power and skill. Like Imitation, they partake in different degrees of the sources already mentioned, but in their peculiar forms they deserve a more critical examination. They constitute the last of those general topics, which we shall adduce under the head of Rhetorical Æsthetics.

(27.) *Wit and Humour.*

It will be observed that Beauty, Sublimity, and Novelty, of which we have just treated, are *mainly* used in the preparation of *public* discourse—that is, what is to be delivered in oratorical form to an audience, or to be printed and read by numbers; but in the ordinary forms of discourse used in *conversation*, although they are not to be entirely lost sight of, yet they do not constitute the principal sources of pleasure.

In the commoner forms of discourse, known as conversational, *wit* and *humour* constitute the principal charms, and give a sprightliness and vivacity which can spring from no other source. It is not meant by this that *wit* and *humour* are excluded entirely from more public forms, but that it is mainly in colloquial discourse that they are important. Hence, the public

form of written discourse, in which they constitute the chief charm; and the staple pleasure of the drama, designed to be acted colloquially upon the stage.

Like many such synonymous words, *Wit* and *Humour* are often confounded in their meaning, and when not confounded are sometimes improperly used; but as rhetorical instruments they should be carefully distinguished from each other.

Wit is derived originally from the Saxon verb *witan*, altered in the modern German into *wissen*, which means *to know*.

Its first application then was to the *intellect*, by which we *know* anything, and to our general expression of *what we know*. In its next use it was applied to the *combination of known ideas, in so new and sprightly and yet natural a manner, as to occasion surprise and pleasure to the hearer.*

In this general sense it is rhetorically employed; and thus it gives to discourse, especially familiar discourse, a charm which belongs peculiarly to itself. True wit is evidently a gift of nature. That it should be *original*, and at the same time *natural*, is well inculcated by Pope, in his “*Essay on Criticism* :”—

“True wit is nature to advantage dressed;
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed;
Something whose truth convinced at sight we find,
That gives us back the image of our mind.”

True wit is not of necessity allied with the comic or jocose, but is often in its most brilliant displays of a dignified and serious character.

Nor is it necessary that anything of a *marvellous* or striking nature should be inherent in the *subject*; it is mainly in the combinations of thought, and in the imagery and ornaments of language that wit displays itself. Fully to illustrate it, we should be obliged to consider the whole range of figures of speech, which *wit* so abundantly uses; but wit may be here defined under the general head of the æsthetics of discourse, without full illustration: the subject of *figurative language* is kept back to be treated under the general head of *Style*, where it appropriately belongs.

It has been determined by the Rhetoricians that the purpose of *Wit* is effected in one of three ways:—

1st. By placing an object or subject, which claims to be serious and dignified, in a ludicrous or mean position.

2d. By rendering things which are truly frivolous and mean, serious and dignified.

3d. By combining common things in so new and interesting a manner as to excite both surprise and pleasure.

In the *first* case it is evident that the design is to satirize that which *pretends* to a dignity to which it has no just claim. This is done by what is called

burlesque, and by bemeaning comparisons and metaphors these false pretensions are stripped off, and thus the satirist becomes the dispenser of just punishment. Of this nature is the general idea of Cervantes, in his “Don Quixote,” where he *burlesques* the institutions and customs of chivalry, by bringing them into ridicule. Such, also, is Butler’s “Hudibras,” in its burlesque of the Presbyterians and Independents, in the days of Charles II.

Under the *second* head those persons and things which, like those just mentioned, advance unjust pretensions, are not directly assailed; but meaner persons and objects are elevated into similar positions and clothed in similar false raiment, and thus by comparison the pretenders are rebuked and punished. In poetry this is known as the *mock heroic*. Of the mock heroic, many examples are found in the classics. Such is Homer’s “Battle of the Frogs and Mice;” and in modern literature, Pope’s “Rape of the Lock,” is a notable example.

Under the *third* division by far the greater class of the efforts of wit are found; in this division wit subsidizes all the powers of language, and shines in many and brilliant forms in discourse: and upon this general ground it branches into many and various forms, from the most dignified sallies in oratory to the common forms of rebus, conundrums, and *bon mots* of every kind and degree.

In considering the present meaning of the word humour, we must refer to the old and long-exploded theory, that there were four distinct and yet connected *humours* or *moistures* of the human body; on the distribution and just admixture of which health of body and cheerfulness of mind alike depended. The next step was naturally a division, according to these supposed causes of our different moods, into *good* or *bad humours*; by a natural advance, good *humour* gave rise to spirited sallies of conversational eloquence; and thus it reached its rhetorical meaning.

Humour may be defined that quality of the mind which unites ideas in a fantastic manner, and tends to arouse our mirth by their communion. Humour may flow in a continuous current, and advance to a climax of the ludicrous; while in contrast, from the nature of *Wit*, it is evident that it excites an emotion of pleasure, which is of short duration. It has been said that wit must be natural; it may be farther remarked that wit, as an exertion of the intellect, must be spontaneous also. "Laboured or forced wit is no wit;" and there should not be even, of that which appears natural, too much in one discourse. This is alluded to by Pope, when he says:—

"——Works may have more wit than does them good,
As bodies perish through excess of blood."

Wit, then, as distinguished from humour, is brilliant

and momentary, like the coruscations of heat lightning; Humour flows in a strong and enduring stream. The witty thoughts in a poem or play may be numerous, but they are distinct and independent of each other; the humour is in a vein, and forms the very essence of *comedy*.

It may further be remarked that wit is frequently of the nature of satire; it is bright and trenchant like a Damascus blade. Indeed, as we shall see, *satire* is properly denominated one kind of wit, while *humour*, although usually presenting objects in a ludicrous light, is so connected with human sympathy that it is neither sarcastic nor mocking. If *wit* be the sharper weapon, *humour* is the more genial encounter.

It has been usual, until within a recent period, to consider *wit* the higher manifestation of the two; but a little thought will show us that humour, in its highest development, is *wit combined with human sympathy*, and that true *humour* is a far more distinguishing mark of genius than the most brilliant *wit*.

(28.) *Satire and Irony.*

Classed under the general topic of *Wit*, and containing but little trace of genuine *humour*, are *Satire* and *Irony*; and it is lamentably true that very much of the most brilliant wit is of the specific kind called *Satire*.

This word probably comes to us from the Greek Satyric drama, in which old Silenus and his Satyrs appeared, and shamed men, by showing them what brute instincts would lead even the best of human beings to become, if the spark of divinity in us were withdrawn.

If, as some writers have supposed, it has another derivation, *sat* and *ira*, *abounding in anger*, this is at least significant of the manner in which the shafts of wit are often thrown by the satirists. They are sharp, unsympathetic, and angry, and are designed to pierce and wound; and yet this, it must be observed, is in open warfare; but they are delicate and refined weapons, which few can use with dexterity and success.

Irony, another species of Wit, is derived from the Greek, *εἰρωνεία*, *the act of dissembling one's meaning in discourse*: this is also a censorious kind of wit, but instead of its being open, like Satire, its shafts are shot from a covert. This is done by expressing directly the opposite of what we mean, and often, by our presentation of this opposite, rendering it so *ridiculous* as to cause the mind to revert to the true object with a mischievous sort of pleasure.

This is a common form of wit in our ordinary discourse, and when used merely to enliven it, it is harmless and pleasant; as a logical weapon it is often of the nature of a fallacy, since it *changes the point in dispute* (*v. Logic*, p. 185) from the true

merit of the case, by casting ridicule and contempt upon our opponent when fair argument is no longer available.

A remarkable example of extended Irony is found in Dean Swift's "Argument for the Abolition of Christianity," aimed really against its opponents. And Defoe has left a powerful invective, which is also *ironical*, in his pamphlet entitled "The Shortest Way with the Dissenters;" in which he decides that any man who is guilty of becoming a dissenting minister should be *put to death*. To make the *irony* more striking, it must be remembered that Dean Swift was a beneficed clergyman; and that Defoe had been subjected to imprisonment and mutilation, for being a champion and ally of the dissenters.

It will be observed, that while these various forms of wit and humour are treated of here as belonging to the subject-matter of discourse, and as ranging justly under the general head of Rhetorical Æsthetics, they owe much of their power to the language in which they are couched; and to that extent are also included in the subject of Style, and of the energy and ornaments of Style. This general subject will be considered hereafter.

(29.) *Ridicule.*

The element of discourse called Ridicule, is so

analogous to *Wit* and *Humour* that it is often mistaken for these; and is most frequently used in conjunction with one or the other. While it is a source of pleasure to the hearer or reader, who is not the aim of ridicule, exciting in him the emotion of mind which finds its vent in laughter, it must be regarded as it concerns the person ridiculed, especially if he stand in the light of an opponent in a controversy, as a rhetorical weapon of the greatest force; and is often a fallacy producing the end which only a valid argument should reach.

Thus, when a person finds himself in danger of being defeated in an argument, he leaves the point in dispute, and addresses himself to the task of raising a laugh against his adversary. This is in many cases an easy matter. As men do not much respect those *at whom they laugh*, so they lose respect for the cause as well as the person, and thus such a course is often successful in establishing the cause which is really weak and unjust.

It must be observed, however, that *ridicule* is in many cases just. Thus, when it assails false doctrine, and seeks to bring into contempt that which is really contemptible, it is a fair weapon; and it often happens that those dogmas which, on account of our superstition or other cause, are not to be uprooted by the *clearest logic*, are quite within the reach of the shafts of *Ridicule*.

If its lash is severe, it is often the most potent in reforming, and, although it should never be used except with justice and moderation, it is a powerful means of promoting social improvement, and removing insidious errors. In the hands of the English satirists, from the days of Addison to the time of Dickens and Thackeray, it has been prominent among the wholesome means of reform.

It has been said that it is most frequently associated with wit and humour. It is, indeed, characteristic of much of wit, humour, satire, and irony, that they place the objects of their attack in a ridiculous light; and their power is thus greatly increased. To illustrate the common but unjust use of *ridicule* combined with *wit*, we have Cowper's lines concerning Voltaire:—

“The Scripture was his jest-book, whence he drew
Bon mots to gall the Christian and the Jew.”

Butler's “*Hudibras*” was a satire on the Puritans, in which *Ridicule* abounds. And even Lord Bacon does not disdain its use in his “*Errors of Learning*,” quoting the “*Echo*” of Erasmus. In his objections to an excessive study of oratory, and its graces of speech, he speaks thus:—

“Then did Car of Cambridge, and Ascham, with their lectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young men that were

studious unto that delicate and polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing echo: 'Decem annos consumpsi in legendo Cicerone;' and the echo answered in Greek 'ὄνε,' 'Asine,'" which signifies, in plain English, that if he had spent ten years in reading Cicero he was a *donkey* for his pains.

In concluding these remarks upon *Wit* and *Humour*, in their various forms, it may be well to mention a few modern English and American writers in whose works they are found, and a general perusal of which will illustrate our subject, to the student, better than more extended precepts.

And here it should be observed that most writers for popular favour, do, at some time or other, undertake the witty and humorous in discourse; but there are a few who find in themselves the comic element an exhaustless stream, which flows through all their works. Of course, then, in looking for such illustrations, we first accost the professed humourists; and here we shall find wit and humour abounding. Genuine humour, combined with true pathos, may be found in the works of Charles Lamb; his *Essays of Elia* being a double fount, from which we may constantly draw both laughter and tears. Fun and pathos are both to be found in the stories of the half-pay officer, Captain Jackson; and the superannuated man—*i. e.*, Charles Lamb himself; and there is a

never-failing point to his illustrations of the "Popular Fallacies," and particularly in his refutation of the adage "Handsome is that handsome does," by describing a lady so very ill-looking that the adage could not apply. Perhaps as a *humourist*, in the fullest meaning of the word, English literature presents no rival to Lamb.

Sydney Smith is a professed *wit*, whose sayings are repeated everywhere; but he has little *humour*. Thomas Hood has given universal pleasure by his comic poems, and by his humorous prose stories, and has realized our idea of genuine *humour* by his exquisite pathos in the "Song of the Shirt," and "The Bridge of Sighs." Barham is renowned for his plays upon words, and for many humorous descriptions. Dickens and Thackeray are *wits* of the kind called *Satirists*, and yet they both have rare powers of wit and humour of a more genial nature. Praed, in his "Vicar," and "Belle of the Ball," has exhibited both wit and humour, and in his "Red Fisherman," a powerful combination of humour and satire.

Washington Irving, in his *Knickerbocker's History of New York*, has indulged in a humorous vein, with entire success; and his sketches of Geoffrey Crayon, are genial and delightful, from their occasional sly and delicate touches of humour.

It may be doubted whether any country has produced a writer in whose poems *wit* and *humour* are so cleverly

employed, either separately or in combination, as in the works of Dr. O. W. Holmes. In his comic poems *humour* is always present, and in his "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table," there are flashes of true wit irradiating the less humorous paths of science and philosophy.

It is astonishing to observe that among the poets, and some too of fertile imagination, a few are not gifted with wit and humour. Byron has very little of either, and his poems owe their charm to clear, connected, elevated thought; and Wordsworth was absolutely without *wit*; and was, we are told, unable to comprehend it in others.

It is manifest that extracts from any of these writers could find no place in a work of the compass of this. The student must seek his own illustrations, and he will be amply repaid by the search. The study of Rhetoric presupposes the study of the great works, by means of which the standards and rules of Rhetoric are framed. Although, as has been already observed, language and style, in all their efforts to please the taste, come under the scrutiny of Rhetorical *Æsthetics*; they occupy so important a place in the divisions of Rhetoric that they must be treated of separately. Before considering them, however, the next important step is to enumerate, classify, and explain, the different kinds of Discourse.

This will form the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF DISCOURSE.

(30.) *Aristotle's Division of Oratory.*

ALL our examples and illustrations, by means of which we may consider the manner of constructing discourse, as to its *invention*, *arrangement*, and *style*, are to be found in the varieties of discourse already existing, which form the wealth of standard English literature. It will be better, at this point, therefore, to mention the *different kinds of writing* according to their form and purpose, and to give definitions and illustrations of each.

Most of these kinds of discourse are well known to persons of even little reading, and a few simple explanatory words will enable us to bear them in mind, to aid us when we come to the subjects of *Invention* and *Style*. From their analysis, indeed, we shall become better able to understand the design of invention in discourse, as we observe how this design is carried out by the distinguished masters of English

and American literature. And here we can have but little aid from the ancient rhetoricians, since in their time discourse meant principally *oratory*, and all divisions of it had reference to a speaker and a hearer. Things are now entirely changed. *Printing* has made *written* discourse the great general subject of rhetorical rules, and *oratory* but one subordinate class. It is true that Aristotle lays down a few rules as to the difference between the style to be used in *writing*, and the style to be used in *pleading*; but in this case his *written discourse* is one originally designed to be pronounced as an oration, and afterwards to be consulted for reference; and his *pleading* is *extemporaneous speaking*, in which the circumstances and the occasion prompt thoughts, words, and action. With the view that every *discourse* is an *oration*, he has ranged all kinds of orations under the three heads—*Demonstrative*, *Judicial*, and *Deliberative*—using these words with significations not unlike those we apply to them now.

Demonstrative oratory he asserts is that which we only *hear*—with regard to the points of which we are not constituted *judges*—and it has relation to the *present* time; we take for granted what is said, and receive it as of necessity true, because it is supposed to come from an informed and skilful *demonstrator*. If, besides merely *hearing* and receiving in *present time*, the hearer is also to *judge* of some things that

are already past, as the jurymen judge, in our law courts, of the *evidence*, the *speeches of counsel*, and the *charge of the judge*, then these *speeches and charge* constitute *judicial* oratory.

Again, if the hearer is to *judge* of something to *come*—that is, to frame his future plans or conduct by the oration which he *hears*, this is called *deliberative oratory*.

To the *demonstrative* oratory, he says, it belongs to *praise* or *dispraise*, and thus to establish the *person* or *action* as *honourable* or *dishonourable*: it belongs to *judicial* oratory to *accuse* and to *defend*, as in law, and thus to prove the *person* or *cause just* or *unjust*: and to *deliberative* oratory it belongs to prove a *thing*—with an eye to its *future* uses—as *profitable* or *unprofitable*. At a glance it will appear that all kinds of modern oratory might really be ranged under these three heads.

Aristotle has given us a full treatise upon the *subjects*, the *means*, and the *ends* of these different kinds of discourse, which, historically considered shows us the state of rhetorical science in that day, and is, for this reason, quite valuable; and, as applied to *oratory* alone, it is not without application at the present day; but so various and different are the divisions of discourse as applied to various ends, in modern times, that we must seek a more extended list of the different kinds of writing: and one which includes the

various kinds of printed discourse. We shall not attempt to mention every kind of writing, for this task would be impossible; but, with a glance at the philosophy of its variety, we shall give a few of the simpler forms and illustrate them. In doing this we shall begin by laying down the principles of a general classification.

(31.) *Logical Division of the kinds of Discourse.*

And here it is necessary to keep in view the principle *according to* which we mean to divide; the division should be logical, and the different parts or members should be independent of each other. Thus, if we state *poetry* to be one kind of discourse, and *epistolary writing* to be another, we shall be evidently wrong, since *letters* may be and are frequently written in *poetry*, and thus the two are at once confounded; so, too, *prose fiction*, or *novels*, are often written in a series of *letters*. Now we may choose many principles of division *according to which* to classify the different kinds of writing.

Thus, *according to the form*, we divide discourse into *poetry* and *prose*: for it is evident that the *subject-matter* of poetry, although usually of a higher order than that of prose, may be presented in prose; and that the peculiarity of poetry, in this regard, lies *in the form*.

Again, *according to the effect which we design to produce on the mind of a hearer*—keeping this always in view as a part of our theme—we may divide discourse, whether written or extemporaneous, yet designed for delivery, into *oratory*, which is observant of the character and mind of a hearer who is present and known, and *written discourse*, designed only to be read with the eye to inform the mind of those who may be unknown to the writer.

And written discourse, in prose, may be divided, *according to the subject itself and its just treatment*, into *Letters, History, Biography, Essays, and Prose Fiction*. The number may be increased by subdivisions, but it is thought that under the *genera* or *classes* mentioned most forms of discourse will range themselves.

In this part of the work we shall principally confine ourselves to the clear definition and illustration of these various classes.

Keeping in mind these distinctions, let us begin with Poetry, in the first-mentioned division, which, it has been said, differs from Prose mainly in form. It constitutes a large division of discourse.

(32.) *Poetry.*

The question has been often asked, What is Poetry? and if no simple definition has been found, it is be-

cause it is a most complex subject, and will scarcely admit of one.

As to its *form*, Poetry may be defined to be *metrical composition*, or *versified language*; and as to the *subject-matter* and its treatment, poetry differs from ordinary prose, in that it is the *language of the imagination and of true sentiment*. As contrasted with Poetry, *prose* would imply the common language of men, untrammelled by poetical measure and rhyme, in which the imagination does not play so prominent a part. But from what has just been said, it is evident that a simple definition will not properly limit the meaning of Poetry. Nor, unfortunately, are we aided in our search by the derivation of the word. It is derived from the Greek, ποιειν, *to do*, or *make*, and hence the ποιητης, or poet, was a *maker*: a maker of what? Many persons have thought that they found in this derivation the recognition of the *creative* power of the poet's imagination; but in this they have been mistaken. In the earliest Grecian periods, the bard *made* and *sung* his own verses, and was called αιδος, *the singer*; but when, owing to the popularity of this early poetry, the two functions were separated; when one man *made* and the other *sang* the ballads and the epics, the *singer* was as before the αιδος, and the *maker* was called ποιητης, the poet, and the combined art of maker and singer was denominated *Poetry*.

The due rhetorical order in which to consider Poetry would be, *first*, as to its form, that is, the character and kinds of *versification*, and the whole subject of poetical prosody; and, *second*, the domain of Poetry, as to its subjects, its thoughts, and its dealings with the imagination and the heart. But such considerations would require a volume to themselves.

The *first* of these belongs justly to the science and art of *Grammar*, and need not here be discussed. We shall premise our consideration of the *divisions of poetry* with a few words concerning the second, viz.: poetry, as to its essence, and the materials with which it works. And here we state that Poetry, as an art, must be distinguished from that poetic feeling inherent in so many minds, but for the utterance of which so few are gifted with power. The power to appreciate and enjoy poetry has often been mistaken for the power to express it.

This power of utterance enables the poet to express this inherent passion for beauty and grandeur, for truth and power, with which many minds are gifted; and in the accomplishment of these glorious ends to subsidize the Imagination and the Fancy, and to choose, adapt, and modulate language, and all this according to the principle of variety in uniformity.

The objects of poetry are to please and to refine the human mind, and to expand the affections of the human heart, making the whole being glow with a

new enjoyment; and to this end it embodies nature and art; and passing beyond the region of either, it creates new worlds of Fancy, and new beings as their fitting denizens.

Poetry has been classed with Painting and Music; and while it has much in common with both, it is greater than either; for it transforms both to its own uses.

Painting depicts only to the eye; poetry paints to the mind: music reaches only the ear; poetry, often adopting the accompaniment of music, and yet not absolutely needing its aid, has a power to make harmony in the soul, to attune the intellectual powers to tones of which the music of the ear is entirely incapable.

Poetry, like the beautiful tinted light passing through "storied windows," throws its glories upon the common things of life, and makes them radiant and lovely; as upon Keats's kneeling maiden:—

"Rose blooms fell on her hands together prest,
And on her silver cross soft amethyst,
And on her hair a glory like a saint;
She seemed a splendid angel newly drest,
Save wings, for heaven."

And if such, in general, be the sphere and power of poetry, what is it to be a poet? To be a poet implies several rare qualities, and a rarer combination

of them. Accurate observation of human life, its essence, its aims, its hopes, and its faith; and faithful descriptions of what he sees in all the realms of thought. It also implies to be gifted with a *sensibility* which is keenly alive to the beautiful and the sublime in what he sees and makes the subject of his verse.

Imagination and Fancy he must possess, to create and combine.

Reflection he must have as a habit, by which the regions of the Imagination are made familiar, and duly peopled with ideal forms of fitting character and instinct with life, and not with grotesque images; and a rare judgment which will so use these other faculties, and so curb any one of them in its unruly moods as to assure symmetry and just proportion. And yet what diversity do we find among the poets themselves, by reason of the unequal distribution of these gifts, and the undue predominance of one to the detriment of others! Thus are formed different schools of poetry, and much controversy as to the nature of the art itself.

(33.) *Different Kinds of Poetry.*

Poetry has been, for convenient arrangement, divided into several *forms*, or classes, according to the materials used, and the manner of their setting forth.

They may all be included under the following classes: EPIC, LYRIC, PASTORAL, DRAMATIC, DIDACTIC, and SATIRIC Poetry. This, it will be observed, is a convenient rather than a logical and exact arrangement, since the different kinds evidently overlap each other; the Drama may be *satiric*, and the *Epic* may set forth truth in a *didactic* manner; but for convenience the division is sufficient and useful.

(34.) *Epic Poetry.*

The derivation of this word is from the verb *επω*, (obsolete in the present tense,) which meant to speak: thus *επος* meant primarily a word; then a speech, and, by an easy movement, a *narration*.

Such, then, is the general signification of *Epic* poetry; it is *narrative* poetry, in which some principal personage is introduced as the hero, and the stirring events of his life and career are narrated, with all the accessories necessary to complete the story.

The *Epic* is subdivided into the *Heroic*, which has been called the *Epic Proper*; the *Poetic Romance*; the *Tale in verse*; the *Mock Heroic*; in all which the principle of narration is employed.

From the earliest times the *heroic* or *epic proper* has been, in general, founded on history, and narrates the historic deeds of great men. But if earthly

history is the basis of the story, in many cases the imagination of the poet soars beyond the earth, and strives to create and describe the history of new worlds, discovered by the imagination, and ingeniously to connect them with our own. Of heroic poems every one will readily point to the most notable examples. Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the first describing the wrath of Achilles, and narrating the wonderful deeds in and around Troy, and the second relating the adventures of Ulysses, are the finest of the ancient heroic poems. Homer is, indeed, the father of Epic poetry.

Among other truly *heroic* poems we must also class Virgil's "*Æneid*," Dante's "*Divina Commedia*," Tasso's "*Jerusalem Delivered*," Ariosto's "*Orlando Furioso*," and Milton's "*Paradise Lost*," all of which are renowned wherever literary culture has exerted the least influence.

Of the *Poetic Romance* Spenser's "*Faërie Queene*" is a magnificent example; and Byron's "*Corsair*" and "*Lara*" are well known as spirited illustrations. Such, also, is Moore's "*Lalla Rookh*," with its fine poetic stories. Of the next and humbler form of the *Epic*,—the *Tales in Verse*,—Crabbe's "*Tales of the Hall*," the "*Village*," and the "*Borough*," are examples. His design was to paint nature in low life, and Byron has called him "Nature's sternest painter,

yet the best." Of this kind are many of Wordsworth's poems.

It need hardly be asserted that epic poetry, in its highest forms, is only produced by the highest order of genius, and a glance at the course of history teaches us that epic poems of such an order are rarely produced—scarcely more than one in the same era, and after great intervals of time.

Cowper has justly and beautifully expressed this thought, in his Table-talk :—

“Ages elapsed ere Homer's lamp appeared,
And ages ere the Mantuan Swan was heard;
To carry nature lengths unknown before,
To give a Milton birth, asked ages more.
Thus genius rose and set at ordered times,
And shot a day-spring into distant climes,
Ennobling every region that he chose;
He sunk in Greece, in Italy he rose;
And, tedious years of Gothic darkness past,
Emerged all splendour in our isle at last;
Thus lovely halcyons dive into the main,
Then show far off their shining plumes again.”

The *mock-heroic* has been already described and illustrated in the section (27) on Wit and Humour, to which it is really allied in its design and construction. It retains the form and external characteristics of epic poetry, but it places in *heroic* positions, and endows with heroic functions, meaner persons and objects, with the design of ridiculing the true heroes and their deeds.

(35.) *Lyric Poetry.*

Lyric Poetry, as the name indicates, meant poetry set to the music of the *Lyra* or *Lute*, and was supposed to be *sung* with an *accompaniment*, as our ballads are to the music of a guitar or piano-forte at the present day. Under the head of Lyric Poetry are ranged the following subdivisions :—

The *hymn*, which is used in the praise of some Divinity, and, in the Christian worship, always in praise of God, and designed for a congregation; the *song*, which varies according to its subject, being of *love*, or *war*, or *comic character*; the *ballad*, which originally was the *song of the dancers*, and now means only a popular song of more pretension, perhaps, than the *song* just mentioned; and the *ode*, from the Greek *ὠδή*, a *song*, which was designed to express feelings of high excitement, and in its divisions of *strophe*, *antistrophe*, and *epode*, formed a prominent part of the Greek drama.

In more modern times the ode seems to have been longer than the other lyrical poems, and of a more dignified and stately nature. Such are the Odes of Keats, one of which is entitled an “Ode to Pan”—in imitation of the Greek poetry, and another the “Ode to a Nightingale.” So, too, we have Dryden's “Ode to St. Cecilia,” and Collins's “Ode on the Passions,” and his exquisite “Ode to Evening;” and, among

(37.) *Dramatic Poetry.*

The derivation of our word *drama*, from the Greek δραω, *to make*, gives us no trace of its present use; but it is very easily defined without such aid. The drama is a poem portraying events and actions in human life as represented by persons standing for those to whom they are attributed. In all other forms of poetry the poet himself speaks; here he remains hidden, and makes others speak; and his success, in a great measure, depends upon his making them say just what they ought, under the circumstances in which he has placed them. The divisions of *dramatic* writing are into *Tragedy*; *Comedy*; *Dramas founded on History*, and being neither essentially comic nor tragic; the *Masque* and the *Opera*. Many other names have been coined to express slight deviations from these, as *Vaudeville*, *Melodrame*, &c.

Tragedy, which in the Greek (τραγωδια, from τραγος, a goat, and ωδη, a song) meant originally a *goat song*, that is, a song sung in honour of Bacchus, with the *sacrifice of a goat*, has passed through many phases to arrive at its present meaning. It now contains the *heroic* element, and may be defined *a dramatic poem usually dwelling upon the deeds of some illustrious or interesting hero, and always ending fatally to one or more of the principal persons*. It is thus designed to awaken *pathos*, and sometimes even *terror*. Thus,

in the *Tragedy of Hamlet*, the principal characters, Ophelia, Hamlet, Laertes and others, die in the course of the play. In *Othello*, the plot is fatal to Desdemona and Othello; *Macbeth* and *Richard the III.* are other examples of Shakspeare's tragedies familiar to all. Others need not be mentioned for illustration.

Comedy (Greek κωμωδια), derives its name from the original players going about in carts from village to village (from κωμη, a village, and ωδη, a song), and thus the original comedy was the work of strolling singers. *Comedy*, in its present meaning, proposes, as the object of its aim, to satirize the vices and follies of mankind, and to this end it subsidizes *wit* and *humour* in their various forms, and *ridicule*.

These ends are admirably attained by the skill, the dress, and language of the actors. There is usually a tissue of intrigues, which is happily unwoven at the last, making all things right at the close; the design of the comedy is amusement, in its forms of mirth and merriment. It is further divided, according to the refinement of its style and the decency of its humour, into *high* or *genteel*, and *low* comedy. Under this latter designation is included the *farce*.

Besides *amusement*, however, comedy is also designed as a school of manners, and although it sometimes has exercised a good influence on the age, there

are many instances of its being a vicious and dangerous teacher. Thus the French comedies of Molière held up to just scorn the hypocrite (*Tartufe*), the miser (*L'Avare*), and the misanthrope, (*Le Misanthrope*), and may be regarded on the whole as having been beneficial to the people of that period; but the English comic dramatists of the Restoration, and many of the earlier plays of Beaumont and Fletcher, have held virtue up to ridicule, and made license and villany charming by the wit and humour with which they are surrounded. On the whole, as a school of manners English comedy has not generally been productive of good, and, with it, the drama for representation has sadly degenerated.

It is apparent that both Tragedy and Comedy, as to their subject-matter, may be written in *prose* as well as *verse*, and thus are not, of necessity, to be classed as a division of *poetry*: but the Greek drama, from which we derive the names, was almost always in verse, and accompanied with music, and so the exceptions are even rare in the modern drama, to the rule that tragedy and comedy are written in verse, and are poetic in style and structure. Of the dramas founded on history, we have good examples in the historic plays of Shakspeare, which are just representations of the age which they represent.

The *Masque*, scarcely known in our day, was a theatrical drama much in vogue in England during

the seventeenth century. The parts were played by distinguished, and even royal, personages, in *masks* or *visors*—hence its name. In the getting up of the performance the masque was frequently attended with some wonderful scenic transformations, not unlike those on the modern stage, in which a prison suddenly becomes a throne, or a mountain suddenly sinks, and leaves us an ocean scene, with ships in full sail.

Parts of Shakspeare's plays are *masques*; examples are also found in the writings of Beaumont and Fletcher; and particularly is Ben Jonson noted for the number and stateliness of his masques.

But of all dramatic performances that bear the name, none will compare in beauty with Milton's poem of "Comus," which owes its immortality to its noble sentiments so poetically expressed, much more than to its dramatic form, which seems accidental and unimportant. It should be mentioned that the use of tragic and comic masks, to cover the face and give expression to the actor, is as old as the Greek drama. The Greek tragic masks were frightful to see, and the comic masks were painted with a laughing countenance: both were provided with large mouths, within which were sounding bars of metal to give more strength to the voice—hence the use of the word *personare*, to sound through; which led to the *personæ* of the drama, and has given us our English word *person*.

The *Opera*—from the Latin *opus-era*, to indicate the labours of such an exhibition—is a dramatic performance set entirely to music, and presented with magnificent scenery, numerous performers, and rich dresses, and frequently accompanied with dancing.

The *Melodrama* is a play in which the dialogue is diversified by occasional songs. Such, also, is the *Vaudeville*, which is not used in English, but belongs exclusively to the French. The songs in this latter play are always light and comic.

(38.) *Didactic and Descriptive Poetry.*

By *didactic* poetry is meant that of which the principal object is *direct instruction*. Such poems are the *Georgics* of Virgil, written upon agriculture, cattle-breeding, and kindred subjects.

Other excellent examples may be found in Pope's famous "Essays," in verse, and also in Cowper's shorter poems, "Table Talk," "Tirocinium," and others, and in "Akenside's Pleasures of the Imagination."

As it is the primary design of the *didactic* poet to instruct, it may be asked, why not make *prose* the vehicle of a simpler and more natural instruction? The answer is easy: the poetic form is assumed to please, to enliven, and to render the instruction which, without it, might be dull and dry, by its

means interesting and attractive. This is done by the cadences of metre and rhyme, by the use of poetic figures and imagery, and by descriptive illustrations, which are of the nature of beautiful paintings, leaving a much stronger impression upon the mind than can be conveyed by ordinary prose.

It is hardly just to name as another class or kind of poetry what certain authors have called *descriptive poetry*: for description should belong, in some measure, to all kinds of poetry, and in an eminent degree to *epic*, *dramatic*, and *didactic* poetry; perhaps it is an essential element in these, and it may well be considered the test of genius in each of these forms.

For it is by *description* that the poet creates, combines, and presents his characters, seizing, as a painter does, the exact expression of his figures, and selecting the circumstances and accessories which form the concomitants of his picture. The descriptive poet catches the strong points of a picture, and endeavours to paint it to you not in *general terms*, but in *exact words*, by which you are led to see it just as he does. In the primeval forest you stand with him, among

"———old trees, tall oaks, and gnarled pines,
That stream with gray green mosses; here the ground
Was never touched by spade, and flowers spring up
Unown, and die ungathered."

Everywhere he describes his scenes so vividly that you are among them, and the impression of your spirit visit is never lost.

English poetry is full of charming descriptions. How beautiful and minute are the delineations of Keats, in the opening lines of "The Eve of St. Agnes!"

"St. Agnes' Eve—Ah! bitter chill it was;
The owl, for all his feathers, was a-cold,
The hare limped trembling through the frozen grass,
And silent was the flock in woolly fold;
Numb were the beadsman's fingers while he told
His rosary, and while his frosted breath,
Like pious incense from a censer old,
Seemed taking flight for heaven, without a death,
Past the sweet Virgin's picture, while his prayer he saith."

But it needs no lengthened demonstration to prove that *description* enters largely into all kinds of poetry. A few examples will suffice.

How many and how noble are the descriptions in the *Paradise Lost*! a poem which may stand as a model *Epic*. Amid much that is ideal, and that the poet designed to leave to some extent vague, in order to heighten the interest of our Fancy, we have numerous minute and beautiful delineations. Look at his noble description of the building of Satan's palace in Hell:—

"Built like a temple, where pilasters round
Were set, and Doric pillars overlaid

With golden architrave; nor did there want
Cornice or frieze with bossy sculptures graven;
The roof was fretted gold."

The lurid fane stands before us as we read.

Of the lake of fire itself, as Satan emerges from its burning depths, how expressive his outline of words!—

"On each hand the flames,
Driven backward, slope their pointing spires, and rolled
In billows, leave i' the midst a horrid vale."

There can be nothing more descriptive and more beautiful than Raphael's account of the Creation, in the seventh book of the *Paradise Lost*; the original instant birth of vegetable and animal being, passing from "harmony to harmony," until we have

"The diapason, closing full in man."

But the temptation, however strong, to linger upon these beauties of description, must be resisted: else we should quote largely from every book.

It would be easy and pleasant to show, by the use of spirited and graphic examples, what we have asserted, that descriptive poetry is rather an element present in all the various kinds of poetry, than a distinct class in itself.

(39.) *Satirical Poetry.*

The last of the kinds of poetry enumerated is

Satirical Poetry, which evidently means poetry, the design and burden of which is *satire*. This is a class which has been known from the earliest times.

Satirical poetry was used by the classic Latins as a vehicle for the rebuke of public vices, and their works have, at the present day, an historic value, in that they portray to us the evil state of society, scarcely exaggerated in the period of which they wrote. Whether as a censor of public morals the Roman satirist accomplished a good work, may perhaps be doubted. Among the renowned Latin satirists are Horace, Juvenal, and Plautus, whose works are currently read at the present day. They seem to have given a sort of model to satirical writers even of our own day, and their works possess an identity and originality more marked than any other form of Latin poetry. Thus Doctor Johnson has based his fine satires called "London," and the "Vanity of Human Wishes," upon the *third* and *tenth* of the Satires of Juvenal, and has followed their general plan closely. And Lord Byron, in his celebrated satire called "The English Bards and Scotch Reviewers," has imitated the beginning of one of Juvenal's satires in his own opening.

Among the most remarkable satirical poems in English, are the "Absalom and Achiophel," and the "Mac Flecknoe" of Dryden, and the more successful imitation of the latter, the "Dunciad" of

Pope. The "Mac Flecknoe" and the "Dunciad" have the same general plot—the elevation to the laureateship of stupidity, of the miserable rivals of these great poets. But while the former has sunk into obscurity, the latter is still read and admired. While conducting the poem as a *mock heroic*, called the "Dunciad," in imitation of the Iliad, or Eneid, and their heroes, and never forgetting the special object of his satire, Pope has laid down some inimitable laws of criticism, and stated many noble truths in his poem; his satire is interesting, because it is of the most trenchant character, and seems, in a great degree, to have been deserved by the objects of it. But like other kinds of merited chastisement, so well deserved by the recipients, the person who inflicted it has not elevated his own honour by it.

In our own day and country, some satirical poets have arisen. Among these, in a genial spirit, Holmes has written his *Astræa*, and *Urania*, and Saxe has produced, with other works of satirical character, a poem on *Progress*, which hits the passing fashions and follies of the age.

The temptation to the man of wit and humour is always towards satire; and since human nature is full of foibles, he is never without argument and illustration; but these he should resist or use sparingly, for satire presents great inducements to injustice,

and is generally cruel and aggressive in its flush of victory.

The habit of satirical writing in *prose* has been much more common in modern times than in poetry, and satire has taken the form, more complex and yet more interesting, of the novel or tale; or of short sketches, with attractive titles and evident aims. Of the satirical novel, the works of Dickens and Thackeray are good examples, and of the humbler forms of prose satire, Thackeray's lighter sketches, such as are found in "The Book of Snobs," and the numerous piquant incidents in the English "Punch," are the best illustrations.

The larger poems, the original aim and entire construction of which are satirical, are called *philosophical satires*; to distinguish them from those in which satire is not the principal object, although it may enter into their composition. On the whole, the philosophical satirist is not to be envied, for he rejects the good things which come within his scope, to dwell constantly upon the evils which abound in society; and the very contemplation must be corrupting and hardening.

There may be a few other forms of poetry growing out of a combination of some of these, forming, so to speak, *composite orders*; but this division of poetry, made entirely for convenience of arrangement, will be found quite sufficient for rhetorical classification.

CHAPTER V.

OF DISCOURSE IN PROSE.

(40.) *Of Oratory.*

WE next consider *Prose* writings, which include by far the most numerous forms of discourse. The first division of discourse in prose was, in general terms, into *spoken* and *written* discourse; and this was stated to be according to the part which the *hearer* played, as an element in the construction of the discourse—that is, whether the discourse is to be addressed to him by the voice of the speaker, or whether it is to be written, and thus addressed to the mind through the eye. When the idea of a hearer is present in the mind of the speaker, and when a certain impression or effect is to be produced upon him, not only by the thoughts contained in the discourse,—which might have been written out,—nor by the graces of language, as to its construction and its ornaments,—which might also have been put in the form of writing;—but by the kindling of the eye, the modulations of the voice, the movements and gestures of the hands and arms,

the tension of the nerves, and the action of the whole man; the placing, as it were, of his soul in magnetic contact with the souls of his hearers, so that they read its inmost meaning, then we have Oratory proper—which, in its perfection, is Eloquence.

This, as we have seen, was the primary ground and scope of Rhetoric; and with this it has achieved great historic triumphs in many famous periods. It wrought wonders in the days when Demosthenes thundered his Philippics from the Bema at Athens. It was powerful when Cicero saved Rome from the conspiracy of Catiline. From the lips of Peter the Hermit it roused Europe to the Crusades. It governed England in the days of Chatham, and Burke, and Pitt. It controlled the storms of France, under the powerful appeals of Mirabeau; and in our own revolutionary period our forefathers were strengthened to resist British aggression, by the stirring eloquence of Adams, Otis, and Henry; nor is there to be found a period of historic eloquence more brilliant than that in which Webster, Clay, and Calhoun have given us models of free and classic eloquence, as a noble legacy to American literature. But, in every case, the *hearer* is chiefly to be considered; and even now, when we read their speeches, we figure to ourselves the circumstances under which they were delivered; the eager auditory; the important issues; the impassioned speaker; and the expected result. We are

not content with the thoughts which lie embalmed in the printed words; we conjure up the glowing form; we hear again the voice, with its thrilling tones; we see the burning eye, the breathing form, the illumined countenance; we turn to the earnest hearers, all on tiptoe with expectation and excitement; and thus the cadences ring in our ears, while memory and fancy stand beside us, and give us their magic assistance.

(41.) *Modern Divisions of Oratory.*

For rhetorical convenience, Oratory, in modern times, has been divided into *Academic*, *Political*, and *Sacred*, a slight deviation from Aristotle's division, but more convenient than his. Here, again, it must be noticed that this is not an exact, but only a convenient distinction, since *sacred* oratory may sometimes be of an *academic* character, as is the case at the English Universities; and again it very often turns upon *political* affairs of moment. It is, indeed, a division rather of the general fields in which Oratory is used, than of Oratory itself.

Thus *academic* Oratory, having before it the setting forth of some good or knowledge, either for private or public instruction, covers the special topics of *orations*, *dissertations*, *disquisitions*, and *lectures*.

Political Oratory, having the judgment of a cause, and the administration of *justice*, either in the limited

sphere of a community, or in international matters, for its aims, is to be found with the judges and counsel, in courts of law; with the senators and representatives in legislative assemblies, and in the speech-making, which is a part of our system of public elections.

Sacred Oratory is rather of a composite order, and in modern times deals with man in his relations to God and his fellows; thus it includes *sermons*, *homilies*, and *expository lectures*. In these various kinds of oratory, the subject-matter and the language of the discourse may be prepared beforehand; or they may both be left to be drawn out by the occasion. This latter constitutes *extemporaneous* discourse.

(42.) *Academic Oratory.*

This kind of Oratory evidently includes not only the course of college instruction, but many forms of discourse connected with polite learning.

Mr. John Quincy Adams has compared the oratory of the college to the drill and the review of troops; a constant practice designed for other hours and sterner uses: the eloquence of the senate, the bar, and the pulpit, he likens to duty in the hour of battle, when our tactics and training are put to the sterner test. This is an apt illustration.

Considering *College Oratory* as one species of that

branch which we have called *Academic*, we propose to say a few words as to its uses and its varieties: and we observe that the general principles which apply to college oratory will, in some degree, apply to all oratorical discourse. In the consideration of Oratory, another word, which stands now for a distinct branch of study, plays a prominent part. That word is *elocution* (from *e* and *loquor*), and it means a cultivation of the voice as to its *volume*, its *articulation*, its *modulation*, and its *special adaptation* to the thoughts uttered, and the occasion. Elocution is practised by declaiming the works of the best speakers, and endeavouring to give to them the proper effect, such, indeed, as the authors are supposed to have produced. The practice of Oratory, in our colleges, is generally limited to the *declamation* of pieces selected from the speeches of the most eloquent men, or the recitation of poetical extracts, by the lower classes; and the composition and delivery of pieces upon set themes by the higher. These, with the preparation of essays and translations at stated periods, usually exhaust the practice and instruction in these branches in our colleges and seminaries. The purely oratorical part is taught according to a *system of elocution*; but many persons have regarded success in Oratory, or what is ordinarily called *eloquence*, to be a natural gift, and have thought that it is not to be in any degree acquired.

The history of Oratory teaches quite another lesson, however, for it shows us numerous instances of its development from the most unpromising beginnings, and by these examples offers encouragement to all men possessed of common parts, to cultivate the study and practice of Oratory.

Although a system of rules, founded upon the practice of the best speakers, has been formed, and may be followed with advantage, there are some directions dependent upon the *individual* rather than the *art*, which are more important still.

I. And, first of all, it behooves the speaker to be *clear*; *clear* in his own conceptions; *clear* in his expression of them; and so *clear* in his emphasis of words and sentences as to convey his exact meaning to the audience.

II. In the next place, it seems like a platitude to say to a college speaker that he should *be natural*.

By this direction we would imply, first, the natural invention and easy expression of the thought, with a view to the understanding of hearers; and in its delivery it would also imply the absence of *timidity* or *diffidence*, which in a mind unaccustomed to public display is quite pardonable, but which mars the effect of the discourse by exciting the hearer's pity for the speaker, rather than his interest in the subject. It also implies that we should say what we mean, in a

manner which is our own, and in language which naturally springs to our lips.

Again, to be natural implies the use and posture of the person, and the gestures made with the arms, in an easy, graceful, and natural manner; the gestures, particularly, being suited to the thought, and, like the words, expressing a part of it, or heightening the expression of the words: in the words of Hamlet, "suiting the action to the word, the word to the action; with this special observance, that you o'erstep not the modesty of nature."

III. Again: *be earnest*. Let *earnestness* appear in the discourse itself, as to the evident spirit of its preparation; so that the mind of the hearer may be convinced of the honesty and firm persuasion of your own mind; and that you consider your subject an important one, and the occasion of its presentation particularly important. Earnestness will call out too the appearance of *naturalness*, by its very forgetfulness of all artifice in the minor matters of elocution, and by its evident desire to impress the hearer with the subject of our discourse for its own sake.

The rules of elocution, when founded on nature, are valuable aids to the student of Oratory, but a dependence upon one's own natural powers, a perusal of the orations of men renowned for their eloquence, and an observation of the finished orators of

our own time, form an admirable system of instruction, which every one may study even without a master. Whatever is *clearly* conceived in our own minds we will be able to express with clearness; whatever is *earnestly* conceived there, will be earnestly expressed. Natural manners in speaking awaken the sympathy of the hearer; strength of emotion, displayed in words which seem to rise almost involuntarily to our own lips, will go to the heart. While, then, there is no doubt of the great importance of the subject-matter of an oration, the manner of its presentation and delivery are also of high importance, and should not be overlooked. With some justice it may be said, that Eloquence is born in us before we have rhetorical rules; and that Nature is the only true mistress of the art: other systems, excellent in themselves, being at best designed to copy, counterfeit, and develop nature, and to prove the truth of the motto, *Ars celare artem*, which implies that the greatest of all arts is to conceal art, or, in other words, to appear more closely like nature.

Nor will we be ready to account the orator's powers of easy acquisition, and of light moment. An American writer has justly said:—

“The labours requisite to form a public speaker are, by no means, duly appreciated. An absurd idea prevails among our scholars, that the finest productions of mind are the fruits of hasty impulse, the

unfolding of a sudden thought, the brief visitations of a fortunate hour or evening, the flashings of intuition, or the gleamings of fancy.

“The mistake lies in confounding with the mere arrangements of thought, or the manual labour of putting them on paper, the long previous preparation of mind, the settled habits of thought. It has taken but three hours, perhaps, to compose an admirable piece of poetry, or a fine speech; but the reflections of three or years, of thirty, may have been tending to that result.”

(43.) *Debating Societies.*

Connected with most institutions of learning are *debating societies*, the nominal design of which is to give young men readiness of thought and speech, and that self-control and presence of mind which extemporaneous speaking demands, especially when it is to be answered and criticised by an opponent immediately.

We shall refer hereafter to the general manner of conducting a debate, but here a few words may not be amiss by way of caution. The practice of extemporaneous debate is in many respects a good thing; but in order that it should be beneficial, the *amount of reading* and the *preparation of the subject* should bear a just relation to the fluency of speech.

When a young man gets such a readiness of speech that he can speak about *nothing*, and keep up a constant stream of elegant language, simply to occupy a certain time, then the practice of extemporaneous discourse becomes a decided evil, and should be checked.

So much has the show and splendour of Oratory gained the advance of its solid basis of learning; so much have the graces of Elocution usurped the place of solid thought, that many an indolent mind is satisfied to *talk* rather than *study*; and to practise Rhetoric at the expense of Science and Literature.

A distinguished rhetorician has expressed the startling doubt whether *a first-rate man can be a first-rate orator*. The danger of temptation which would lead the orator to depend upon his art, suggests the converse of the question—that is, whether a first-rate orator is ever a first-rate man.

From these very general preliminary remarks we pass now to consider some of the forms of Academic Oratory; let us first take the *Oration*.

(44.) *The Oration.*

The word Oration, derived from the Latin, *oro, to pray*, has come to mean, in our day, a speech or discourse of a refined and elevated character *pronounced* before a concourse of people.

It is usually upon some subject of very general interest, and upon a set occasion; as the obsequies of a great man; or a public anniversary; or at some academic exhibition, such as a college commencement; or before some literary societies of distinction.

Thus we have, as examples of the first kinds of orations, the oration of R. H. Lee on Washington, just after his death; that upon the death of Adams and Jefferson, by Webster; that by Adams upon the death of La Fayette; and the discourse of Edward Everett upon the death of John Quincy Adams.

A Funeral Oration is frequently called a *Eulogy*; and, as this word indicates, it is always designed to speak well of the dead, to set forth his merits, and either to be silent upon his faults or to palliate them.

Our addresses to the people on *Washington's Birthday*, and on *the 4th of July*, are examples of Anniversary Orations; and many of the finest efforts of English and American orators have been at *academic* celebrations; such as Lord Brougham's at Glasgow; Lord Macaulay's at Edinburgh; and those of our Everett, Webster, Story, Preston, and others, before many American colleges, or literary societies. In these latter, the subject of the oration is often of a literary, classical, or historical nature, and is treated in a much more elevated manner than those designed for more popular audiences.

Short and less important oratorical efforts, which

are of a nature similar to the Oration, are called *Addresses* and *Harangues*; the latter being particularly of a controversial and violent character, such as revolutionary times would induce; and by its very name indicating impatience of control, opposition, and boldness of speech.

In all cases the *orator* must choose his subject well—*i. e.*, with a view to the hearers and the occasion; and illustrate it as fully as may be requisite to a clear and brilliant presentation of it. Ornaments of thought and language seem to be very properly used as aids; they are sources of pleasure and interest, and relieve the mind from the attention necessary to the severer portions; and a certain degree of diffuseness and even of repetition is allowable, in order to present clearly and forcibly what is designed to be but *once* heard, and yet to make a lasting impression. The subject, on this account, may be very copiously illustrated, and placed in many lights, in order to leave, abundantly, in the hearer's mind the demonstration and its true importance.

There are various words used in the programmes of college commencements which express very slight shades of difference in meaning, and which, indeed, in some of the best dictionaries are defined in terms of each other.

Of these are *dissertation* and *disquisition*, compositions which are usually declaimed like orations, but

which are not necessarily prepared for such a purpose. The first of these is derived from *dis* and *sero*, to *cast* from one, as the farmer casts or sows his grain; from this it would seem to imply throwing out some general facts and hints on a given subject, and leaving them to germinate and grow in the minds of the hearers: but it is very loosely used to express a short and essay-like composition.

Disquisition, from *dis* and *quæro*, means a formal *inquiry* into a given subject; a presentation of the arguments, *pro* and *con*, with an attempt, in every case, to arrive at a definite conclusion.

Thus, we have *disquisitions* on *government*; on *morals*; a *disquisition* upon some disputed point in philosophy or science.

Not unlike the disquisition in that form of composition which has been called an *argumentative discourse*; and, partaking of the nature of a disquisition and dissertation combined, is the form of composition called a *thesis*, from the Greek verb, *τιθημι*, to *place* or *set*: the *thesis* is a set paper, required as an exercise from students before they advance from one grade to another, to demonstrate the attainments they have made.

One kind of academic oratory which is becoming daily of a more popular character, is that known as *lectures*.

A *lecture* (from *lego-lecturus*) meant originally a

discourse designed to *be read* to a class, on some subject of study: its form, indeed, was such that it might have been *read* by any one else as well as by the writer. It was not designed to attain for it anything by the graces of oratory, but its simple purpose was to impart the instruction desired upon the study in question. There were lectures on mechanics, physics, mathematics, &c. In past times, when textbooks were scarce and inadequate, this was the method of instruction, and on many subjects it may still be considered the best method of teaching.

But, passing from its just academic use, and its proper meaning, *the lecture*, in its modern acceptation, has become really an *oration*; and instead of being simply read, is delivered or pronounced with all the graces of oratory, and all the ornaments of style.

In accordance with its true academic meaning, the *lecture* should be plain, concise, sufficiently illustrative, and, above all, should be within the comprehension of the student, and not bear his fancy along at the expense of his judgment; for the lecture differs from the *disquisition*, in that it places in a clear light, and with plain demonstration, things already well known to all but the beginner, while the *disquisition* embodies new matter, which the writer has found after great labour and research, and which can only be appreciated by minds of equal culture with his own.

While lectures are used to convey solid instruction, in a popular form, they may be productive of good, but it may well be doubted whether isolated lectures, sweetened to suit the popular taste, and enacted like monologues on the stage, are not in their nature injurious, and do not render the people frivolous and superficial. Of course there are many exceptions to such a remark; but the habit of lecturing in this manner, so prevalent in late years, has been demonstrating the truth of Pope's assertion—

“A little learning is a dangerous thing.”

So much has been already laid down upon the general principle of spoken discourse, as it regards college oratory, that we need not linger long in the consideration of that kind of oratory which we have called *political*. The directions and cautions to the student apply equally to older men in the arena of politics.

(45.) *Political Oratory.*

Here, it will be observed, another element of discourse enters, one which is of the nature of the old Logic—*the debate*.

In every case there is an *opponent*, and an *opposite* side; and the hearers are often critics, who stand ready to deny, refute, or advance new modes of attack.

Among the different kinds of political oratory, and forming the highest class of its subjects, are the speeches of various kinds in the courts of law; the conflicting arguments of the opposing counsel; and the charge of the judge, which, while summing up the evidence, must, in most cases, imply a judgment as to the verdict in issue.

The subjects of such orations are of grave import, and appeal directly to our sympathies, since they concern the property, liberty, or lives of individual citizens, and, at the same time, have an eye to the welfare of the government—that is, of the greater number of individuals—by seeing that the laws are properly vindicated. This form of political oratory is therefore of prime importance.

This word *political*, derived from the Greek *πολις*, a city, and meaning originally what had to do with civic affairs, thus covers all the concerns of civil government, and may be as properly applied to the administration of justice as to the organization of government. We have, in modern times, however, used the word political in a more restricted sense.

In the *political* orations made in courts of law, which come under Aristotle's class of *judicial oratory*, besides the effort to judge of the justice of a cause, appeals to the feelings are frequently made, in order to mitigate the punishment which is allowed to be due to the crime.

Thus, we have what are called fine *criminal lawyers*, whose forte lies not only in presenting the cause of their client as favourably as possible to the jury, but also in enlisting the pity and clemency of the jury in behalf of the unfortunate, though criminal prisoner.

Some of the most illustrious orators have gained their greatest reputation by speeches of a judicial nature. Curran, Burke, and Sheridan are instances of English law-pleaders of renown; and in our own day, we have had Webster, Choate, Prentiss, Graham, Binney, Sergeant, and David Paul Brown, to adorn this department of oratory.

The next form of *political* oratory to be mentioned is that of the *debates in houses of legislation*; as in our United States Congress, and in the assemblies or legislatures of the several states: these are concerned in making the laws; the *application of which* is the scope of *judicial* oratory. And here it is that the element of *debate* becomes chiefly important, and may be more clearly discerned and studied. In almost every country two parties are found in the national legislature, differing on many and essential points, and striving with each other for the supremacy in making the laws of the land; and using, it must be admitted, many unjust methods of attaining their ends.

To triumph over their adversary, in many cases is

esteemed more desirable than to attain to truth, and so, many debaters adopt the Socratic form of propounding unanswerable questions; or they pervert the Logic of Aristotle to give them false conclusions, using false premisses, specious arguments, and undue appeals; or they invent a kind of argument, referred to by Addison and Sterne, as the *argumentum ad baculum*, which is expressed in English as *club-law*. All the resources of Rhetoric are enlisted to gain the conquest; wit, humour, and ridicule are suborned; and thus the excellent art of political oratory, which might be of great benefit, is put to the worst of uses.

But this is not always so. Pure and thrilling oratory is often heard in houses of legislation in defence of just laws.

There are no higher flights of English eloquence than those which were made in the English Parliament in the days when Pitt and Burke, patriots but philanthropists, were pleading the cause of the American colonies in the ears of their unnatural mother. And now, in Great Britain, Macaulay, and Stanley, and Brougham, stand like oratorical knights, whose fame and power attract, while they challenge, all new comers.

American eloquence has been far more signally displayed in *Congressional debate* than elsewhere. This was the arena in which Clay and Webster, Cal-

houn, Hayne, McDuffie, Berrien, and a host of worthy peers, triumphed. It was in our Congress that the memorable word-encounter between Webster and Hayne took place, and left us specimens of eloquence unrivalled in interest if not unequalled in power, in the English language.

The qualifications and duties which should be required of a public debater, holding office as a legislator, cannot be better given than in the motto of the coat of arms of one of the states of our Union: *Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation*.

The end aimed at should not be party success and party aggrandizement, but *Truth*; the modes of attaining these ends should be strictly *just*; and above all, the legislators should have that prudence, deliberation, and courtesy, which all bear a part in the excellent quality called *Moderation*.

Attention to these simple directions would save us from party rancour; from bribery, and dishonourable dealing among our legislators, and from personal conflicts on the floors of Congress.

The Constitution has taken proper steps to insure such results, and the laws have declared that no person shall be held answerable, out of either house, for words uttered within their walls. And yet so great are the temptations which beset men in public stations that *truth, justice, and moderation* are very

frequently lost sight of, the Constitution dishonoured, and the laws violated with reckless disregard.

(46.) *Sacred Oratory.*

The third and last division of this branch of our subject is *Sacred Oratory*, and this we have said includes *Sermons*, *Homilies*, and *Expository Lectures*; to all of which we attach the idea of *Christian teaching*.

A *Sermon* is derived from the Latin word *sermo*, *common discourse* or *speech*; but, more remotely, from *sero*, to *throw* or *cast*, like seed; and doubtless, in its present form, it retains some allusion to the good seed of Christianity, sown by the disciples of Christ. A *Sermon* is a serious public Christian discourse, then, delivered, commonly in a church, by a person licensed and authorized to teach the momentous truths of the Gospel, and is usually founded upon some portion of the canonical Scripture, which is called a *text*.

Sermons are *expository* and *exhortatory*. An *expository* discourse is one which is designed to *explain* clearly, to the comprehension of the audience, the meaning of the portion of Scripture taken as the text.

An *exhortatory* *Sermon* is one which takes for granted that the audience understand the Scripture quoted; its design, therefore, is to persuade the

stubborn will, and press home to the slumbering conscience, the truths to which the intellect already assents. Most sermons partake of both characters; after explaining the text, they apply it to those present.

It may well be feared that in modern times a habit has arisen of writing, instead of sermons properly so called, finished orations, in which the preacher is in danger of being set forth, quite as much, if not more than his holy theme. The art of the preacher, if there be any art allowed in so holy a place, is to keep himself back, and let his divine subject press forward to do its glorious work. *Sermons* may be *written* or *extemporaneous*: but in the latter case the subject is supposed to be carefully studied and arranged in the mind, and the preacher depends upon the occasion only for the words, and a few inspiring incidents.

A *Homily*, from the Greek verb, *ομιλεω*, to *converse in company*, implies a sermon of a plainer and humbler kind, conveying simple instruction, capable of being understood by the lowest among the people. The subjects of the homily are of the most elementary character; setting forth the first "principles of the doctrine of Christ." Thus the "Book of Homilies," of the English Church, is a collection of plain discourses, which were prepared by authority, at the time of the English Reformation, to be read by the

inferior clergy, who were not sufficiently educated to prepare their own sermons.

Partaking of the nature both of homily and sermon, are *expository lectures*, common among many denominations of Christians, and specially designed to explain the Bible in regular course. These are more informal than sermons, and do not usually form a part of the Sunday services of the church. The character of a sermon should depend in some measure upon the audience and the occasion. The number and nature of the ornaments, and the illustrations; the trains of argument, and the general application, would differ essentially for congregations differing in intellectual culture. In general it may be said that sermons should be very simple and plain, because in most congregations there are many ignorant people; and it may be feared that many a preacher, in military phrase, "shoots over the heads" of his people.

In proper hands these various kinds of sacred discourse are instruments of mightiest power, turning the hearts of men, awakening their consciences, and leading them "to newness of life;" by their instrumentality, in great measure, it would seem, God designs to Christianize the world.

Among many excellent Christian sermons, none are so good as those contained in the New Testament, with which we are all familiar.

Christ's *Sermon on the Mount* is beyond compari-

son the best; the happiest proof to us that he was both God and man. The sermon of St. Stephen, the first martyr, which surveyed the history of Christianity in electric glances, from the days of Abraham to the time of his own death, is a masterly discourse. The sermons of St. Peter at Pentecost, and in Solomon's Porch, after healing the lame man, as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, are models of Christian sermons; St. Paul's splendid discourse on Mars Hill at Athens, is greater than any oration of Demosthenes himself; and his sermon afterwards at Lystra, was so powerful that they would have done worship and sacrifice to his inspired eloquence, believing him to be a god. Christian ministers have the finest models before them in the Bible.

The sermons of Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Massillon, Bridaine, and other French divines, in the days of Louis XIV., are examples of the finest displays of eloquent piety, in a day of loose and uncontrolled morals. They are not of a controversial nature, but, like the apostle, they reason of "righteousness, temperance, and judgment." Hooker, Barrow, Jeremy Taylor, Leighton, Robert Hall, Whitefield, Horsley, are among the great names of illustrious English divines, distinguished for their eloquent and convincing sermons. Nor is America wanting in a full and brilliant representation, in this honoured department of our literature. Indeed, the American clergy con-

stitute a very large and respectable number of American *literati*, are among the finest of American orators, and adorn, by their high moral and religious tone, the communities in which they reside. Among so many eloquent preachers in our own day, it would be invidious to mention the few for whose names we might find room.

In a later chapter some general remarks will be made upon the kinds of style and the general manner of treating these various kinds of discourse.

Our next step is to consider *written* discourse, as contradistinguished from all kinds of *oratory*,—even though the oratorical discourse be written out beforehand,—in that it is not designed to be read *to* an audience with the voice, but *by* a reader with his eye.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF WRITTEN DISCOURSE.

(47.) *Of Letters.*

FIRST among the kinds of written discourse we have enumerated *Epistolary* writing, or letters, which, if we may use the phrase, is the most *natural* of them all. To write a letter is but one remove from holding a conversation with a person; and generally the subjects of a letter, and our treatment of them, are very much *what* we would say, and very much *the manner* we should use in saying it to the person himself were he present. After oratory, it approaches most nearly a personal address.

Letter writing enters so largely into all the affairs of life, that it constitutes by far the greatest amount of written discourse.

There are as many kinds of letters as there are forms of association, or relation, domestic, social, civic, or official; and each peculiar circumstance will dictate the character and manner of the letter; thus, in *letters of business*, or official letters, the design of

the writer is to express himself firmly, clearly, and concisely: to introduce nothing episodical, or foreign to the subject; and, above all, to be brief; remembering that busy men have not time to read long letters.

Letters of friendship, on the contrary, are kind, tender, diffuse, and gossiping. They should be of the kind referred to by Cowper, when he says he likes *talking* letters.

Letters of a high *civic* or *official* character, such as those that pass between ambassadors, or ministers of state, should be formal, grave, and particularly courteous; for it is as though two nations, through their ambassadors, were holding converse by this means, and all the pomp and circumstance of national glory are concerned in the ceremony and the result.

A few general directions on the subject of *letter-writing* may not be amiss.

I. All proper letters should be answered *as soon as received*. Attention to this caution would have saved many persons a great deal of discomfort, regret, and loss. Although no part of Rhetoric, the caution will be pardoned on account of its practical use; and, indeed, the rhetorical character of the answer depends somewhat upon the freshness of the impression made by the letter upon the mind; and the freshness is entirely lost by delay.

II. All letters should be *carefully* written. A habit is not uncommon, among men who write carefully on all other subjects, of slighting their letters; of making the *subject-matter* unintelligible and slovenly; of neglecting the *date*, and *address*; of putting no punctuation marks except *dashes*, which mean nothing; and of writing in a hand almost or quite illegible. All this is wrong, and can very easily be avoided.

III. Say exactly what you mean without circumlocution or affectation. Many persons write letters as though they were writing a novel or a history; pitching them in too high a key for the occasion and the subject; such are the sentimental letters, written in the romantic periods of life, and under fanciful rather than real influences.

But, it is evident, the *form* of a letter may be used to present any subject to the public. Sometimes such a communication is addressed to the editor of a newspaper; sometimes to the public in pamphlet form; and sometimes to some scientific body; but, besides the mere form, these have nothing of the letter about them, and might as well be put in the shape of essays or disquisitions.

Of this nature also are military or naval despatches, the design of which is to describe the movements of an army or corps, or of a fleet of ships; but which

are addressed to the secretary of war or the navy. Candidates for public office address their peculiar views to the public also in letter form.

By means of the letters of great men, and particularly of men great in literature, published after their death, we are enabled to see them as they really were, and as they could have had no expectation of being presented to the world; thus letters constitute the best material for biography, and are in themselves the best portrait of the writer, giving us the exact traits of character which the biographer might overlook, or fail faithfully to transfer; but which the writer himself has uttered "out of the fulness of the heart."

The letters of Cowper, witty, poetical, tender, but very sad at times, are such a faithful index to his pure but unhappy life. Those of Sterne show us his easy, careless, and unclerical career, more fully than his works or his autobiography. Indeed, the characters of most great men have been portrayed most faithfully by means of their letters.

Among the most charming letters are those of Madame de Sévigné. The letter-form is often used to embody political instruction, or to convey political satire and rebuke. A remarkable example of this is found in the Persian Letters (Lettres Persanes) of Montesquieu.

(48.) *History.*

Next in the order of written discourse we consider History, which, in its comprehensive acceptation, may be defined *the Narrative of Man's social life*. Those who would limit it to being the *Record of past events*, would trammel the philosopher, who uses history somewhat in the light of prophecy; who regards it as constantly going on around us, and as determining, to a certain extent, from what *has been* and *is*, what *is to be*. History, which thus claims to tell all that is known of man, and all that can be predicted by human means, has been called *Scientia Scientiarum*, the Science of Sciences: it is consequently the most important of the forms of written discourse; and, were it rightly written, would conduce greatly to the benefit of mankind.

There are various degrees of the value of history, according to its *philosophy*. Thus, the historian may only choose to give a faithful narrative of the facts which his research has discovered, and to leave the reader to combine them, and draw his own conclusions. Or he may describe the great men, the battles, the sieges, the treaties, the courts, and lose sight of the condition of the people, who form really the *subject* of history. His narrative may be current, interesting, and entertaining; in its effect, not unlike the rapid journey through just such scenes, if they

were really existing. But these constitute the lowest kind of historical writing, called in former times *Chronicles*.

Philosophical history seeks to find *the relations of cause and effect*; not only in a single community or kingdom, and in a single period; but the relations of communities and kingdoms to each other and to the whole world; and of single periods to the entire chronology, ancient and modern. Thus History, armed with divine philosophy, has taught us that *Christianity* is the *great fact* in this world of ours, shooting its rays back to the fall of man, and forward to the day of millennial glory; and that pure democracy—the freedom, purity, and happiness of the individual citizen—is the *great possibility* which we are approximating, and should strive to attain. History deals with pure truth; it seeks to know only “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” It is true that History has been shamefully perverted; that it has become the tool of party, and the organ of false panegyric; that it has received bribes from greatness, and has been blinded by flattery; and, worse than all, because most difficult of correction, that it has been eminently subjective rather than objective, giving us the prejudices and distortions of the writer instead of the truth. Lord Bacon’s *idols of the tribe* and *of the den* are the bane of History. Thus, almost all history is one-sided. Hume

gives us the aristocratic and tory view of English History; Gibbon the infidel view of Europe; Mitford the extreme aristocracy of Greece; Lingard the Roman Catholic view of England; and, Macaulay, pictures painted in most artificial colours, and placed in false and glaring lights. In one of his essays on History, Mr. Macaulay has inadvertently placed the sentence of his own condemnation. “This practice,” he says, “of painting in nothing but black and white, is unpardonable even in the *drama*, but in *history* this error is far more disgraceful. Indeed, there is no fault which so completely ruins a narrative in the opinion of a judicious reader.” And yet this is the historian who has drawn for us the pictures of William of Orange, Marlborough, and William Penn! No man need aspire to be a historian unless he so please, but every self-appointed historian renders himself amenable to certain invariable laws, which we shall now lay down.

I. He must be faithful in his study and research.

We depend upon him for the truth, and he ought to give us nothing but the truth. He should not exaggerate, either as to the facts themselves, nor by the lights in which they are placed, like *the picture-painting* just referred to. He should take no facts at *second hand* where the original source is within reach: sad mistakes have grown out of such a course, and great wrong has been done to the heroes of his-

tory. Patient, honest, faithful research is his first duty.

II. He must make a clear arrangement of these facts, a luminous order of events, so that we may pass from one to the other easily, and ourselves judge of their philosophy, or rather judge of his philosophic summary; for the historian should in every case sum up the evidence and state the judgment.

III. He must be entirely impartial, unswayed by friendship, prejudice, reverence; single-eyed to the truth alone.

IV. He must write in a pleasing and good style. His language must be well chosen; the ornaments, of which History does not admit very many, must be choice and striking; and the finished form of his work must be symmetrical, easy of reference, and complete in all its parts.

A very good *resumé* of the requisites for a historian is to be found in the words of an English critic.* “His *learning* should be greater than his *genius*, and his *judgment* stronger than his *imagination*. In private life he should have the character of being free from party, and his former writings ought always to have shown the sincerest attachment to truth. I ask

* Bayle, as quoted by Goldsmith, in his review of Smollett's History of England, in the “Monthly Review.”

several questions: who the historian is? of what country? of what principles? For it is impossible but that his private opinions will almost involuntarily work themselves into his public performances. His style, also, should be *clear, elegant, and nervous*. And, lastly, to give him a just boldness of sentiment and expression, he should have a consciousness of these his superior abilities.”

Nothing need be added to these judicious remarks; but that American literature boasts of names that have come nearer to such an endowment of faculties and qualities than those of any other country. This is due, in a great measure, to our free institutions, and to the fact that most of our historians have taken subjects quite above the turmoil of our own party politics, and look with great equanimity and moderation at the factious parties of other countries, of whose doings they have undertaken to write. Prescott, Bancroft, Motley, Hildreth, have written works of very general interest, on the history of foreign countries as well as upon our own; and many eminent and distinguished gentlemen have produced, under the auspices of our Historical societies, histories or historical papers of a local but interesting nature. It should be remarked, that the present age is eminently in advance of all former periods, in historical writings. New and valuable material has been brought to light, and such researches have been

made as to demonstrate the great faults and falsity of much of the former history. With these views of a historian's duty, we shall not be inclined to undervalue the talents which constitute a great historian. The world numbers but few such, and has accorded a lasting fame to all who approach the standard of excellence and power just laid down.

(49.) *Biography.*

This word, from the Greek, *Bios*, *life*, and *γραφω*, *to write*, means a sketch of the life of an individual.

Biography is a very important branch of *History*; for since history is the record of the actions of men, the men who perform these actions must be presented and described, and thus history is full of biographical pictures, or sketches of illustrious men. But in *history* they are mainly presented on account of the great events in which they participated.

Biography proper has as its subject not the events in which the subject of the sketch has shared, so much as himself,—his own personality. Here history is made secondary to the course of the actor's life. If a person write his own life, that is called an *autobiography*, and although not always free from prejudice,—as this prejudice can be generally allowed for,—an autobiography is very valuable.

The qualities which should distinguish a *biographer*

are very much the same as those which constitute a historian. He should be *just*; letting no prejudices blind him to the merits of his subject, or, what is far more to be feared, letting no feeling of friendship lead to undue praise or false representations. The task then, it is manifest, is a difficult one. A biographer may choose to present fairly the good qualities of the person of whom he writes; and to throw a veil over the evil: saying—"this is a part of the subject upon which we prefer not to touch,"—thus leaving to the mind of the reader to draw a just inference that faults and errors of a grievous kind are charitably omitted. Thus much cannot be regarded as improper benevolence. But the habit, by no means uncommon, of concealing the defects of a great man; of destroying or suppressing letters which display him in a fearfully evil light, and of making him appear only *good*, when he is known to have been *evil*, is to be deplored on many accounts; but principally because of the evil effects upon society. The world generally knows enough to be sure that the truth is masked, and that to a great extent; and the young, who read for example, look upon that evil of which so little is made, as quite venial and unimportant.

The request of Othello, just before his suicide, is the just rule of the biographer:—

“——I pray you, in your letters,
When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
*Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice.*”

It is only in this way that the life of a particular person is of value to the reader, as a model for imitation, or an example of what is to be avoided.

The biography of a great man—one who has occupied a very large space in the historic world—so that, in describing his life, one must also relate much of the contemporary history,—we call, more properly, *A History*. Thus, we speak of Scott’s “*History of Napoleon* ;” Carlyle’s “*History of Frederick the Great* ;” Voltaire’s “*History of Charles XII.*”

The style in which a biography should be written, is an easy narrative style ; connecting gracefully the events of the life before us. There is little room for elegance and ornament ; and, above all, that picture painting, to which reference has already been made upon the topic of history, should be carefully avoided ; or indulged in with the most jealous care in choosing the just colours for the portrait.

Biographies of a partial or fragmentary character, and of minor importance, are often called *memoirs*, and sometimes *lives*, a title subject to less misconception ; and these should be subjected to the same critical laws as biographies of more importance ; they may be more desultory, but should be purely impar-

tial. As excellent illustrations of biographical writing we have, in modern times, Jared Sparks’s “*Lives of Washington and Franklin*,” and Irving’s “*Biography of Washington*.” Johnson’s “*Lives of the Poets*,” and Boswell’s “*Life of Johnson*,” are examples of prominent biographies written in the last century. One of the most faithful biographies within our knowledge is the “*Life of Sir Walter Scott*,” by his son-in-law, Lockhart. Moore’s “*Life of Byron*” is one of those unjust and garbled biographies referred to, in which Lord Byron is made to appear far better than the materials which Mr. Moore had in his possession would have shown him to be, had they been faithfully used.

And Lord John Russell, in his publication of the *Letters of Moore*,—designed to create a fund for the poet’s wife,—has erred in the same manner, by leaving the impression upon the reader’s mind that the garbled journal and the selected letters present a true portrait of the modern Anacreon.

As biographies are generally written by friends, the error is almost always in the bestowal of undue praise, and the withholding of deserved censure. It has become a custom, within a late period, to prefix a short biography or life to new editions of the standard poets and writers of prose literature. These are generally executed with more justice than other biographies ; because criticism has already done its

work with the author's life and fame, and the truth alone will pass current.

(50.) *Essays.*

Among the most numerous of the shorter and occasional kinds of writing are *essays*, which, from the French verb, *essayer*, to try, means only experimental compositions, not pretending to the dignity of a higher order, and thus deprecating harsh criticism. They are of the nature of isolated thoughts, written out exactly as they come into the mind. This was, at least, its original use; and it has been said that it was first employed, in this meaning, by Lord Bacon, in dedicating a volume of short pieces, which he called *essays*, to Prince Henry, the elder brother of Charles I. of England.

A recent writer has justly observed that no better illustration of the word, in its more modern use, can be found than in those essays of Bacon, since well known and appreciated for their sound learning, good judgment, and profound thought. They remain the originals, and still the models of essays.

After Bacon, in the use of his word, were the well-known English *Essayists*, Addison, Steele, Dr. Johnson, Goldsmith, and others, whose works appeared in the *Spectator*, *Tatler*, *Rambler*, and similar papers. Under their hands, the *Essay* became a composition

periodically addressed to the public, giving, as it were, only a partial glimpse of its subject; often not promising more; desultory in its arrangements, but novel and suggestive in its statements.

What are called newspaper leaders, and editorials, are the most modern form of *essay*, and these, from their excellence and point, often verify the truth of Addison's assertion, that it is more difficult to write a series of essays—each of which is the germ of a volume—than a whole volume on some given subject. There are minds of high order, best suited, however; to this kind of writing; and many a good essayist would make but a poor volume on a single subject.

The style of the essay should be easy and natural; but occasional ornaments are allowable, and wit and humour may very properly be introduced, to give point and interest to the subject.

The word *essay* has been likewise very properly applied to the stated college and school compositions, which are short, partial, and suggestive.

(51.) *Prose Fiction.*

Prose fiction implies that kind of writing which presents fictitious or unreal things as though they really existed; creating personages who never existed, and relating a chain of events which never happened; as though both were real. As the design

of fiction is to instruct by example, the characters drawn must be so life-like as to call for our sympathy in their adventures and trials; and the events and circumstances must also be true to nature. The plot or combination of these, however, should be entirely original. Prose fiction includes works of many names, differing, some of them, but slightly from each other. They may all be classed under the following heads: the *Romance*, the *Novel*, the *Fable*, the *Tale*, and the *Story*.

By the *Romance* is meant a fictitious story of wonderful adventures, such as were incident to the days and customs of knight-errantry. The romance received its name from the fact that the story-tellers of that day used, mainly, the Romanz language of the Mediterranean. It is usually a tale of love and war of an extravagant character, and designed to awaken violent emotions, which, by this same etymology, have been called *Romantic*. The word, however, has often been used in a less exact and more general meaning, and has thus been confounded with the *novel*, a word of more modern application.

The *Novel*, originally meaning only something *new*, has now become the name of a tale founded upon some modern incident in history or ordinary life, and intended to portray the operation of the passions, and particularly of love: there is always a hero and a heroine, and the plot turns upon their fortunes;

ending usually with a happy and easily anticipated marriage.

The *Fable*, which has been traced back through the Latin, *Fabula*, to the obsolete Greek verb, *επω*, to *speak*, meant originally only something spoken or told.

The design of the *Fable* is to enforce some useful precept. In the fable there is usually no illusion: animals are made to talk, and to cover by their speech the wisdom of the *moral* designed.

The *Tale* and the *Story* are very much the same in their modern use.

Tale is from the Saxon verb, *tellan*, and the English *tell*, and only means *something told*; so that although a *tale* is often used to express a *fictitious* narrative, it does not necessarily imply this. One of Swift's allegories is called the "Tale of a Tub;" and we have also Marmontel's French Tales to illustrate the use of the word. The Scotch saying, "An ower true tale," expresses both uses of the word, the one directly, and the other by implication.

Story is only a contraction of *history*, and is used in rather an undefined sense, meaning sometimes a *true account*, sometimes a *fictitious narrative*, and sometimes a *falsehood*.

The words *tale* and *story*, when expressing a fictitious narrative, imply a short and unpretending effort, written without preparation, and with no careful

arrangement of the events. There can be no doubt that it requires genius of a very high order to compose *fiction* well. The novelist must create individual characters, who are to seem like life, and to live in our memory as friends, often met and well cherished; he must also establish such positions for these, and such relations between them, as will strike the reader as natural and interesting.

And while he must draw largely from nature for all this, he must no more be a simple copyist of nature than the great painter is so. His picture is a creative composition, unlike anything that ever existed as a whole, and yet in all its parts natural, attractive, and constantly developing new thoughts. In the art of painter and novelist alike, what is called *the composition* must be original, and is the work of a creative genius.

To nature he must go for the traits of real life, which he is, with the hand of genius, to combine. The remark has often been made, that "truth is stranger than fiction." It is further true, that the most striking fictitious pictures must be made up of truth. In the words of an American writer: "The tones of rapturous or agonized human sympathy, tenderness, love, pity, the gentle voices of kindness that echo from the familiar hearthstone, the accents in which a mother speaks to her suffering child, surpass all that fancy can imagine or the stage exhibit.

And no fictitious heroism is more noble than that which swells many a heart in the secret and solitary strife of virtue. And all the sentimental descriptions in the world are but cold rhapsody in comparison with what is actually witnessed and felt in the daily communion of heart with heart."

The chivalric period, in which almost every long fiction partook of the character of the times of chivalry, and was of the nature of the *Romance*, lasted, as far as fiction itself was concerned, almost without an exception until the middle of the eighteenth century, when the modern *novel* had its origin in the works of Richardson, Fielding, Smollett, and others. This was a great change in prose fiction. These *novels* are portraiture of men and things of the very time in which they appeared, and so true to English life are the descriptions of persons, customs, and scenery, as to verify positively the assertion of Macaulay, that "the history of nations is often best studied in works not professedly historical." The modern novelists just mentioned have been profound, if unconscious historians.

The early *Romance* was *poetical* in its form, and was very unlike the more modern works bearing that title; thus, we have the *Romance of the Rose* (*Roman de la Rose*), translated by Chaucer into English. Also, the Anglo-Norman romance *Le Brut*, founded on the historic chronicle of Geoffrey of Monmouth.

Later we have Italian Romances in *prose*; comic and satirical *Romances*, of which Don Quixote may be taken as the best illustration, Pastoral *romances*, and Heroic *romances*, coming down to the time of the modern novel in the middle of the last century. But after Richardson and Fielding had opened the way to the fresh and vivid portraiture of modern life, the old and artificial sank into disrepute, and though attempts were made by Walpole, Mrs. Radcliffe, and their school, to bring back the old Romance, the success was small, and they may be fairly considered as among the things that were.

Of modern novels we have a great number, of various value. They are so well known, that we need mention only a few. Sir Walter Scott's Waverley series are justly esteemed for their vivid portraiture of historical events and personages, combining the labours of the historian with the genius of the novelist; and Dickens has furnished a large number of most interesting novels, which unite to the mere interest due to the fiction, valorous attacks upon systems and institutions of an evil character in England. In more than one instance his satires have been efficacious in producing reform.

Cooper's novels give striking and natural pictures of life among our forests and their Indian tenants, a generation now passing away; and of life at sea, in all its varieties, from the cabin of a man-of-war

to hard work before the mast. Indeed, when we consider the highly drawn pictures, and loose language of the novels written a century ago, it cannot be doubted that prose fiction has very greatly improved in our day, and that it has become a much better school of morals in its examples and its teachings.

In concluding these remarks upon the various forms of discourse, it must be observed that the rules of rhetorical *invention* apply to them all, and that their expression in language is governed by the same general laws; with the exception of poetry, which, in its metre and versification, is constructed according to the laws of *Prosody*, one of the branches of Grammar. Thus, in form, Poetry is not strictly included in Rhetoric.

Bearing this in mind, we come, at length, to consider the methods of constructing the general form of discourse, which has thus been divided into particular varieties, and of presenting this discourse to others.

The processes now to be explained include every step in the preparation of a discourse, from the first conception of its subject or theme to its absolute delivery, or other public expression, to a hearer or reader.

Having thus presented to the student the range and scope of discourse in its numerous varieties, we are prepared to enter upon this new and most important inquiry.

CHAPTER VII.

INVENTION.

WE come now, after a due consideration of the history and derived meaning of Rhetoric, after explaining its relations to Æsthetics, and after describing the various forms of discourse constructed by its means, to an examination of its functions, in this process of construction—*i. e.*, to a division of labour in the act of building up a discourse.

These functions have been reduced, by modern rhetoricians, to three; and have been named: I. INVENTION. II. ARRANGEMENT. III. STYLE. The philosophy of this general division has been already explained. To illustrate the methods of their use, let the *subject* of the discourse be presented to the writer, as

Man is mortal.

He must *first invent*, that is, find arguments and display facts in proof of this assertion, and fairly express the moral and domestic lessons growing out of such a momentous assertion, with such other important considerations as may occur to his mind.

Second. He must *arrange* these arguments and facts, in the order best suited to accomplish his purpose; must see that the links in the chain of reasoning are clearly connected; in a word, that the thoughts, which he has *invented*, are clearly, concisely, and properly connected.

Third. These fruits of his *invention*, and the methods of his *arrangement*, must be clearly and appropriately set forth in language. This is the peculiar function of that division of Rhetoric called STYLE.

It hardly need be remarked, that although these divisions of Rhetoric are quite distinct from each other, so that each process is really independent of the others, yet their combination alone produces any true rhetorical result, so that, for a public manifestation, they may be said to depend upon each other for existence. Thus, we may *invent*, or collect all the necessary material for constructing the discourse, and we may in our minds *arrange* all the parts of the fair structure, to no purpose, at least, in the instruction of others,—which is the primary design of discourse,—if we give no utterance to our thoughts in *style*. And what would *style* or the mere expression in language be, even the readiest resources of speech, with all its forces, and its ornaments, if we had no *subject-matter* of discourse invented, and no arrangement of the crude materials lying around, which we had produced by our invention?

And here, before going farther, let us recall one portion of the remark of Dr. Campbell, which has been already mentioned, viz., that "Rhetoric holds of Logic by the *sense*." This finds its truth in the *Invention* of Discourse, for the invention implies the finding of Logical propositions and arguments containing and enforcing the thoughts which we have prepared: in other words, all the operations of the reason.

We shall especially attempt, in this, which is confessedly the most difficult part of Rhetoric, to render the study as simple as possible. Particularly is it important to rid ourselves, as much as we can, of the great number of technical words which formed the rhetorical nomenclature of the ancients, and have been brought down, undiminished in number, and useless from the change which has taken place in science and its classification, to modern times. They are more difficult than the things for which they stand, and modern usage expresses their meaning in simpler and better words. The "naming of our tools," in the satirical words of Hudibras, is by no means so important as to know how to use them; and such changes have happened to Rhetoric since the days of classic nomenclature, that both names and instruments are entirely changed.

When it is designed to construct a discourse, the general nature of whose subject is understood, the

first thing to be done is to ponder upon that general and perhaps vague *subject*, until it resolve itself into distinct shape, and assume a distinct and developing character. By *developing character* is meant, one readily admitting of *analysis*, by which we may arrive at new facts, proofs of these facts, and prominent results of these facts. By a strange but invariable process, the mind, in thus dwelling upon a general subject, finds the nebulous particles of thought aggregating themselves into symmetrical forms, and shaping themselves into beautiful and instructive discourse. Let us then consider the subject as the germ of discourse.

(52.) *The Invention of the Subject.*

In the choice of the subject of a discourse, *invention* plays its first and important part, and here much of the difficulty and confusion of writing compositions have their source; by a want of the proper understanding of the subject. The subject is to be chosen with reference to the object or design of the discourse; it is to contain in itself, perhaps, a new conception, the germ of the future discourse; and it is to attract by its name and appearance the interests of many in the discourse itself. There are many persons who have a special talent in *selecting*, or more properly in *inventing* subjects.

And here it should be observed, in some cases the

subject is already chosen for the writer, and his Invention is taxed only in treating it: such is the case in courts of law, in congressional debates, in competing for prize essays in academies and colleges; but even in these cases some scope is allowed, and very much depends upon the peculiar light in which the author places the given subject. Thus the topics in courts of law are of a wide and general scope; and he who *states the case* most plainly before proceeding to the discussion of it, shows the best *invention* in this respect.

Such, too, is the fact with regard to the questions brought before legislative bodies; the general topic indeed is known to the house, but some one has *invented* it, and it will always bear a statement in new and original words. In many cases the subject of a prize essay, or any other given topic, requires narrowing within better defined limits. But the subjects of great epics and dramas; of histories; of orations; of sermons; of prose fiction, are all to be chosen, and in their choice a fine invention may be displayed.

And this brings us to the remark that what are ordinarily called *subjects of a wide scope*, or *fertile subjects*, are the most difficult to treat, and offer the worst practice for our invention. Subjects upon which we can generalize, and range at large, lead to desultory and superficial compositions, lacking

unity and symmetry; while more restricted subjects, confining the mind rigorously to the consideration of a single and distinct theme, give us the earnest of compact, vigorous, and satisfactory discourse. The theme in question is sure to be thoroughly handled, and our impressions of it to be clear and just. Like the painter or sculptor, the author may then display a fine invention in the choice and clear expression of his subject. And the author who would choose a poor, barren, unsatisfactory subject, would be as foolish as the painter who should reject the *picturesque* for the gloomy, or the sculptor who should seek harsh and angular models, instead of those with the lines of grace and beauty. So, also, the author who chooses too wide a theme is not inaptly compared to the artist who chooses too large an angle for his picture, and thus violates the first law of pictorial composition.

A single glance at the great works of English Literature will prove the originality of Invention in the subject of the discourse.

The title or subject of Milton's poem, "Paradise Lost," conveys a world of thought, because it implies at once Paradise originally possessed, enjoyed, sin-curst, and lost. It is so in foreign Epics of great renown. Tasso's "Jerusalem Delivered" points to Jerusalem once enslaved and oppressed, and suggests

the mighty and daring deeds of the crusaders, by whom it was delivered.

And thus, in the choice of Historic periods and personages, the Historian invents his subject; in the presentation of a striking theme or incident the novelist invents his; and the essayist states, in pithy and attractive words, a *caption* to his short discourse.

In every discourse, it should be observed, there ought to be but *one* prominent *subject*, or *theme*, to which all other parts of it are subordinate and explanatory; and it is further manifest that the nature of this theme will be in some sort dependent upon the *object* of the discourse, or, in other words, upon the *effects* which we design to produce by it. This, then, constitutes the *unity* of a discourse, by which invention must be governed,—the single *subject* to be developed, in order that the single *object* may be pursued and attained.

To the *object* of the discourse we shall recur directly; before doing so, however, it seems important to guard students against errors into which they may fall in the choice of subjects, or in understanding those which may be given to them; for the word *subject* has been very vaguely used.

And the elucidation of this subject brings us to a few plain remarks upon the logical distinction of *terms*, *propositions*, and *arguments*, as they are used in Rhetoric.

These are fully treated of in the subject of Logic; and here it will be only necessary to explain the general difference between them.

A *Term* is a *single object of apprehension* expressed in language; as *man, house, city*.

A *Proposition* is the comparison of two terms, to see whether they agree or disagree, thus:—*John is a hero, or, John is not a hero*; in which we compare the *terms, John and hero*; in the first, asserting their agreement, and in the second their disagreement. The first term in a proposition, as *John*, is called the *subject*; the second, as *hero*, the *predicate*.

An *Argument* is the combination of *two propositions*, which bear a certain relation to each other, and the deduction of a *third* proposition from these two. Thus—

1. All men are animals;
 2. All Hindoos are men;
- Therefore 3. All Hindoos are animals;

In which the first and second propositions are called *premisses*, and the third the *conclusion*. The conclusion grows naturally out of the combined premisses. The first proposition is called the *major* premiss, and the second the *minor* premiss. With these explanations let us recur to the *subject* of a discourse. Is it a *term* or a *proposition*?

Suppose, for example, the *Subject* presented to a student, upon which he is required to write, be

Youth. The question at once arises, What is this? is it what it seems to be, a *term*? If so, it is not a *subject* at all, until the student use it in inventing a proposition, of which it is the *subject*; until he *predicate* something of it, as for instance: *Youth is the time for education.* Here, then, we have a subject in the form of a *proposition*: thus much at least has been the *invention* of the student; he might have made a different invention. He might have said—*Youth is the time for pleasure or the period of hope*; or he might have propounded an inquiry: *How should youth be spent?* and, in each case, the invention would be different. Thus, a *term* is only a step towards the invention of the true subject of discourse.

But having invented the *Subject*, what are the next steps of the writer's *invention*? Manifestly to invent arguments to prove the assertion contained in the subject; and this has to do with the *object* of the discourse.

It may be well to state, again, that a great deal of the vagueness, the trouble, and the discomfort of writing compositions, arises from the want of well-defined *subjects*. Many young men will confess that they do not know *what to write about*, when in reality they are trying to expand their thoughts over a range capable of containing hundreds of volumes; and in almost every case it is because they take *terms*, rather than *propositions*, for their themes. One writes upon

Rome, another upon *Carthage*, a third upon the *English revolution*; subjects, the development of which have been life-labours to distinguished literary men; and which it is now designed to treat in the space of three or four pages; and thus vague, weak, and puerile essays are the consequence; whereas, had some proposition been formed—some special inquiry propounded, the *subject* would be narrowed down, and the *object* more clearly defined.

(53.) *The Object of Discourse.*

Passing now to the consideration of the *object* of discourse, we have already stated it to be in the first instance *Instruction* in general; but, in its subordinate divisions, *Conviction* and *Persuasion*.

Some writers have included two other objects, viz., *Explanation* and *Excitation*; *explanation* preceding *conviction*, and *excitation* coming before *persuasion*; but *explanation* is manifestly contained in the idea of discourse itself, as to its *instruction*, and must be regarded rather as a means to attain the object than an object itself; and *excitation*, or the effect on the passions, the swaying the feelings, is also a means of *attaining an object*, rather than an *object* itself of discourse. It is frequently used to produce persuasion, or a change of will.

Conviction implies the *producing belief by means*

of argument ; and *Persuasion* the *change of the will*, which will lead to a change in action or character ; or will cause us to abandon the course we formerly pursued. As has been before clearly stated, under these two general topics all the *objects* of discourse may be ranged : the special *objects* or *designs* of discourse are very numerous ; in most *discourses* these two designs are combined, and in all they constitute the sole objects, viz., to *convince* and to *persuade*.

Perhaps there is no better illustration of conviction and persuasion, as the true objects of discourse, than is to be found in the Bible ; the aim of which is to *convince* men of the truth of their own lost state, and the way of salvation ; and to persuade them to accept the offers of mercy and salvation made through the atonement of Christ.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF CONVICTION.

(54.) *The Rhetorical Use of Arguments.*

FIRST, then, let us consider Conviction as an object of discourse.

If, as has been justly stated, Rhetoric "holds of Logic by the sense," then, in the attempt to *convince* a person of the truth of a subject or proposition, the effort of Rhetorical invention is to find *arguments*, as to their *subject-matter* or *thought*, by which to prove the given proposition ; and thus, while it is the province of Logic to apply its formulæ and dictum, and to *judge of the validity* of the arguments when found, it is that of Rhetoric to *find fitting arguments* ; to arrange them in a proper and confirmatory order, so as to make them of the strongest proof, and by their means to convince the hearer or reader of the truth of the propositions laid down at the outset. And here let it be observed, that as a proposition, when stated, requires proof, it may be generally considered as *embodying an argument*. Just as a term

is vague until it be embodied in a proposition; so is a proposition disallowed until it be proved, that is, until it be expanded into an argument.

Now, the proof required may be of different degrees of difficulty, ranging from the *intuitive* acknowledgment of the proposition to a severe and long-continued process of induction. But Rhetoric demands of every proposition brought forward that it be proved.

This consideration of arguments, the most important part of Rhetoric as an art, has been very much neglected, and in many cases entirely overlooked. It is evident that the *knowledge* on any given subject used in this kind of *invention*, and with which the logical forms of argument are invested, must be derived from the different sciences about which we may write, whether it be Logic, Mathematics, Theology, Law, or any other. For this knowledge Rhetoric is not responsible.

The first step in this process of invention to *convince*, is the use of *terms* in the framing of *propositions* throughout the discourse: these move hand in hand to form arguments in the later processes. Then comes the arrangement of arguments, and the combination of many arguments; so as to form the body of proof for which we are seeking.

To illustrate this: in its lower process *Instruction* begins with the presenting to the learner *terms*: as,

for instance, we show him what is the *sky*, and then, by a card or system of colours arranged upon paper, what is *blue*, we have imparted to him two *terms*, and are ready now for the next step, which is the framing of the proposition: the *sky is blue*; and so for as many *terms* as he is able to comprehend. But this is the most elementary learning; only used, here, for the sake of illustration.

In general it will be seen that by the ordinary means of observation, most men have a large number of *terms* at their disposal, so that this first process of *Instruction* will be usually unnecessary. We may proceed to the second.

The second, then, is in practice really the first and most important in this process. It has been justly called an "Inquiry after propositions;" which, as we have seen, concerns the choice of a *subject* of discourse, and all the subsequent steps of construction.

The forms which a proposition may assume to a learner, and with which Rhetoric is immediately concerned, are threefold, and grow out of our investigation of a term. Thus, suppose the term is A, we shall have:—

- Question 1. What is A? Answer, A is B.
 " 2. Why is A, B?
 " 3. What follows from the fact that A is B?

In which the answers to 2 and 3 constitute the

invention of the discourse, *i. e.*, of arguments to convince.

Thus, let us take the term *man*, and by the first question let us reach the familiar example:—

Man is mortal;

being possessed of both terms, *man* and *mortal*. The learner is first concerned with the *fact*, which is an *answer to the first question*; secondly, his curiosity leads him to know *why man is mortal*, thus opening many questions of natural and revealed religion; and, thirdly, if *man be mortal*, and all the causes for that mortality are distinctly present to him, what momentous consequences result from such a fact, springing from such causes.

For the general division of *propositions*, and of their logical arrangement, reference must be made to Grammar and Logic: but there are important questions connected with both that come more directly within the scope of Rhetoric.

(55.) *Of the Different Kinds of Arguments.*

Suppose that we have found certain propositions, which constitute the subject, and the general heads or divisions of our discourse; if, now, we consider the different kinds of arguments, and their adaptation to rhetorical use, we shall find that the *logical* divisions of argument are not of service to us; be-

cause Logic divides arguments according to the *form* simply, as, for example, into *regular* or *irregular*; *categorical* or *hypothetical*; *full* or *abridged*, &c., all of which have only a reference to the logical formulæ in which they appear.

Now, since it is the adaptation of thought to argument, about which rhetorical invention is concerned, this division is useless, since the same thought expressed *rhetorically* may be in any one of these forms, *viz.*, in a *regular* or *irregular* argument, or it may be *fully written out* or *abridged*.

Arguments, then, which are only different in *form*, are not different arguments at all in the intendment of Rhetoric: as Rhetoric could use all these forms to arrive at one and the same conclusion.

And, again: if we divide arguments as to the nature of the science upon which they are used, into *moral* and *demonstrative*, for example; this has no reference to Rhetoric. This has really to do with the substance of the distinct propositions under consideration, and not to the nature of the arguments themselves; the former would be concerned about moral or mental science, and the latter about mathematics or exact science.

Again: arguments have been divided according to the *intention* of the person who uses them; as, for example, whether it be to prove a conclusion *directly* from given premisses, or to prove that no other con-

clusion can be true, and hence indirectly to show that the desired one is true.

Thus, in Mathematics, we have both kinds of proof; we prove that the sum of the angles of a triangle will be equal to two right angles, *directly*; and we prove, *indirectly*, that since no other point is the centre of the circle, C must be so.

But this is evidently of no use, as a *rhetorical* division of arguments; and it becomes necessary to seek another: that which is justly stated as a rhetorical division is a division growing out of the relation of the *subject-matter* or *meaning of the premisses*, to the *subject-matter* or *meaning of the conclusion*, supposing it to be granted.

(56.) *Rhetorical Division of Argument.*

We arrive, then, at the only just division of argument which is recognised by Rhetoric; that is, the division which is based upon the *relation existing between the premisses and the conclusion, as to their subject-matter*, or meaning. Thus, we may have the *logical* form:—

A is B,
C is A,
Therefore C is B.

But, to consider the argument rhetorically, it behooves us to know the meaning of the several pro-

positions, *A is B*, *C is A*, and *C is B*, and then the *relation* subsisting between them as premisses and conclusion. Now, this subject-matter and these relations, it is evident, remain invariable, although written out in any one of a number of forms. Thus, let us invest the logical formula just written, with thought, as follows:—

All men are mortal,
All Americans are men,
All Americans are mortal;

This *full* or *complete* argument might have been *abridged*, by suppressing the major premiss; and we should have the equally valid form—

All Americans are men,
Therefore They are mortal.

Or, we might have written it in the form of a *condition*:—

If all Americans are men,
They are mortal;

in which the same argument is expressed. And so for the other *logical forms*; but the *rhetorical* part, *i. e.*, the relation of the subject-matter of the premisses to the subject-matter of the conclusion remains the same for all. Arguments, then, in which this relation subsists, may be called *Rhetorical Arguments*.

There are two principal divisions of *Rhetorical*

Arguments, under which every variety,—and there are many,—will be classed.

I. Arguments in which the premisses are stated as the *cause* of the conclusion; or, in more general phrase, where the premisses may be considered *sufficient* to account for the truth laid down in the conclusion. These have been called *à priori* arguments; and this phrase, in general, signifies the reasoning from *cause to effect*; thus, having as a conclusion or effect the grand and complete mechanism of Nature around us, and as *premisses*, the goodness and the omnipotence of God; we reason from these latter as a cause, to the former as an effect. So we reason from human corruption and human need as a *cause*, to the probability of a revelation from God as an *effect*.


II. In the second division are included all other kinds of arguments, or those in which the premisses would not serve to *account* for the conclusion, supposing it granted; but would be a *sign* of its truth, or would lead by *analogy* or *experience* to such a conclusion. For the sake of convenience in reference, arguments as to their *rhetorical use* may be put in the form of a scheme, or tree of division.

All merely *logical* forms are excluded, as they will be fully treated and explained in the treatise on Logic.

Scheme of Rhetorical Arguments,

According to the relation of the *subject-matter*

of the premisses, to the *subject-matter* of the conclusion.



In the use of the phrase, *à priori*, a much larger latitude is permitted than it at first would seem to allow; but to give this latitude will simplify the division and the discussion of rhetorical arguments very much. Thus *rightly* to use the words *cause* and *effect*, we would say that the intense *cold* is the *cause* of the river's *being frozen*; but, by a wider use of these words, we also say, that it will freeze, *because* the mercury falls in the thermometer. Whereas, in reality, the falling of the mercury is the effect of cold, and the *cause* of nothing. In the view of Rhetoric we call all these kinds of arguments, however, *à priori* arguments, since the *conclusion* in question is, in each case, fully accounted for by the given premisses; if it is not the direct cause, it takes us by one step to the direct cause.

(57.) *Of à priori Arguments.*

In the first form given, *i. e.* of arguments in which

the *proposition* in question, whether it be the *theme* of the discourse, or one of the subordinate *propositions* laid down in the discourse, is to be proved,—we adopt the proposition as a given conclusion, and then seek for premisses which, *under the circumstances*, would be supposed to *account* for it as a cause.

And here, as it appears, it is not necessary to conceive either the *conclusion* or the premisses to be *real, existent*, facts; but, for the sake of the argument, we agree to consider them so, during the discussion or discourse. Thus, in poetry, and in prose fiction, the whole body of the discourse, beginning with the subject, is fabulous, and yet the rhetorical arguments must be used properly and naturally to construct the discourse. We need not particularize here: take any one of Scott's novels, and trace its construction; the train of argumentation must be rhetorically correct, and the arrangement of the plot must be *probable*; for the time being we regard the story as true; and the genius of the author is displayed in establishing that verisimilitude of narration, which we call *natural* and *probable*; and which causes the *scene* to glow with light, and the *personages* of his creation to walk upon it in a life-like manner. But in the construction of *argumentative discourse*, there is no such temporary illusion; we demand valid arguments, containing true subject-matter, rhetorically invented, and placed in a just order of

arrangement, before we admit the *proposition* or propositions as proved.

And here it will be well to recur for a moment to the great ambiguity existing in the words expressive of *cause* and *effect*: such as *because* and *therefore*, and many similar words; and the answers implied in the question, *Why?*

Thus there are two meanings of *because*, or, rather, two common applications of the word, which are both in ordinary use as correct: the one expresses the relation of antecedent and consequent; as, for instance, a man is wounded *because* he is shot by a pistol ball; or we say that sensation is the *cause* of perception.

A second meaning is the referring of the particular fact in question to a general law, under which it will be a special example; thus, if I drop my hat, I say it falls to the earth *because* of gravitation. Now the law of gravitation is a general law or *genus*; the dropping of the hat is a *species* or individual case under that genus; but the genus *accounts* for the species.

Another use of the word *because*, is an entirely improper one. Thus, I say: "How do you know it is warm to-day?" The answer may be: "Because the people are wearing thin clothes." This, it is evident, is the reverse of the true statement; and, in place of *because*, we should read *therefore*. The word *therefore* is used exactly in the reverse meaning

of the word *because*, and is as incorrect in general in its use.

The ambiguity of the word *why*, is of very constant occurrence. Sometimes we ask, Why? when we desire to find out the *cause* of a thing; thus:—Why are the days and nights exactly equal at certain periods within the tropics?

Or we ask, Why? when we desire a *reason*, as in geometry, thus: Why is an inscribed angle measured by half the arc included between its sides? Or, when we desire only a rule by which to work, we use the word, Why? Sometimes, also, the *object* of an instrument is asked by the interrogation, Why? thus: Why is this machine thus constructed?

(58.) *Second Division of Rhetorical Arguments.*

In the second division of rhetorical arguments laid down in the table, we class by far the greater number and variety of them.

They are those in which the premisses could not be considered as accounting for the fact contained in the conclusion, supposing that to be granted. This class of arguments has been sub-divided into two kinds, and these have been called *Sign* and *Example*, as our scheme of division has already displayed. Other varieties, supposed to be different from these, in earlier periods, are all now included under them.

(59.) *Sign.*

Under this head are included all those arguments dependent upon *proof*: unlike the arguments *à priori*, in which the existence of the effect implies and grows out of the existence of the *cause*. What we desire in these arguments is not to establish the *cause* of the conclusion, but its *truth*.

If, instead of a cause, we speak of a *condition*, which does not, indeed, account for the effect, but, without which, the effect could not exist, (with which, indeed, the effect *might* not exist); we express what is called a *sign* of its existence. Thus, if a man who is suspected of having committed murder, be found with bloody hands, or a bloody knife, we should say this was a *condition* of the *effect*, or a *sign*—not always, be it remembered, an unfailing one—that he had perpetrated the deed: for his hands might have been made bloody in some other way. Sometimes, though not frequently, the *Sign* is a *certain* one; as, for example, the freezing of water is a *sure sign* that the mercury in Fahrenheit's thermometer has fallen below 32°.

The argument is evidently of this nature, also, when having a proposition to prove as an *effect*, and having no *cause* assigned, we endeavour to *prove* something to be a cause.

From what has been said, then, of this second

division of arguments, it will be seen that sometimes, we reason from an effect back to a *cause*, which we endeavour to prove a just or due cause; and sometimes from the effect, not to a *cause*, but simply to a *condition*, which is a *sign*, to be carefully consulted, of the effect contained in the conclusion. And here we open upon the whole subject of *testimony*, which, it will be observed, is an argument of this second division; a proposition is stated as a conclusion to be proved, and testimony is required to prove it. *Testimony*, then, is one kind of *sign*; and it deserves, in the construction of discourse, the most careful investigation and weight, for upon it the great burden of *conviction* falls.

(60.) *Testimony, as an Argument.*

It is not within our scope to enter at length into the kinds of testimony, and the manner of weighing evidence; this forms a most important investigation in the discussion of many sciences, and in the administration of public laws.

Many persons regard the use of testimony in the establishment of the truth of propositions as very simple and unerring; but if we consider the many and delicate elements which enter into the account, we shall find this to be a great mistake. In order to guard against such an error, let us take a general

survey of the *subjects* of testimony, of the *witnesses*, of the *character of the evidence*, and of the *modes* by which testimony is obtained.

(61.) *Fact and Opinion.*

Let us consider for a moment what the question or proposition is upon which the testimony is desired; whether it be only a matter of *fact* or a matter of *opinion*; for example, in a case of trial of overt crime, it may be, not only whether a person committed the deed in question, which is a *matter of fact*, but whether, if the deed was committed, the commission constituted a crime, which is a *matter of opinion*. Observe, again, that a *matter of opinion* like this, being amenable to some standard of right and wrong *opinions*, will, when applied to that standard, become also a *matter of fact*; and thus *fact* and *opinion* are, to some extent, relative terms.

(62.) *Witnesses.*

Again: the *character* of the persons who give evidence is of the greatest importance in arriving at the truth, for a witness must not only be an honest man, and design to tell the truth, but he must also be a man *capable morally and mentally* of determining what the truth is in the case before him. If we first consider the sincerity of the witness, we shall

find this affected not only by the bias of avowed dishonesty, but by prejudices of rank, age, family, station, and various other kinds.

If, then, a person's expressed opinion chime with his interests or his wishes, his testimony has not the weight it would have if it was found to be counter to both. Such is the bias of the human mind, even when the general intention is honest.

Again: upon a disputed point the *number of witnesses* who concur in giving the same testimony are of great importance. By witnesses, here, we do not mean merely adherents of a doctrine or science, believers in a fact which they never witnessed, who are ignorant themselves, but pin their faith to the skirts of others; we refer to real witnesses of the facts. The element of social influence is here excluded; each man must testify only of what he personally knows, and not what he believes some one else to have seen or to know.

It will be further observed that *testimony* as a *sign* of the truth of a given proposition, is frequently produced by those who, although witnesses of the fact, had no intention to give evidence of its truth; and such evidence is of great value. Such is the testimony to the bravery and firmness of the Nervii as borne by Cæsar, when, without designing to give them such an encomium, he tells us that they rushed upon the piles of their own dead as upon an emi-

nence, and when their own darts were exhausted, seized and returned the heavy javelins, the *pila* thrown at them by the Romans; and again, he merely relates a fact which is powerful testimony to the reality of that German valour which only needed the severe instruction of the Roman wars to fit them for the subversion of the entire Roman empire. "Fight us," is the language of Ariovistus to the Romans; "you will learn to know us; we are a nation that have been under no roof for fourteen years."

Of the nature of *undesigned* testimony is frequently the testimony which comes from an adversary, and which, as it must go counter to his own wishes, is to be considered as of great value. It is usually not straightforward testimony, but is incidentally given, and is brought out of its designed place to bear upon the question at issue.

It will be further observed, that the testimony given by a number of witnesses, although that borne by each may be slight and insufficient, often is of great weight when taken together; all concurring in the general fact which is to be proved.

Some writers have mentioned, as a kind of evidence, what is called *negative testimony*. When a certain argument publicly made, and known to have opponents, remains unanswered, this is strong evidence of its validity and power; for we immediately say, "If they can answer it, why do they not?" and

the triumphant inference is, that it is unanswerable. In a controversy, the party *silenced* is usually the party beaten.

As to the nature of the propositions with regard to which testimony is given, they may be of different degrees of probability. Some are highly probable, and the testimony demanded is but slight, for the mind is ready to give its assent on small proof: others are very improbable, and the testimony must be clear and conclusive. And yet sometimes the very improbability of a story leads to our doubting that it could be fabricated, and gives a sort of antecedent proof of its truth.

It becomes an important matter to determine how testimony should be obtained, so as to insure its truth in point of fact.

(63.) *Of the Modes of obtaining Testimony.*

As we cannot depend upon the word of all men, without certain greater sanctions than are ordinarily presented, it becomes important to determine some other means of obtaining the truth.

There are many men whose testimony, like their lives, is always honest; but there are others, who need, so to speak, a little spur to make them honest in giving evidence. For this reason the *civil oath* has been prepared, which, promising to tell "the whole

truth, and nothing but the truth," ends with the formula, "So help me God!" By this is implied two things: First, a petition that God will help the person so sworn, to tell the truth; and, second, that if he do not tell the truth, he gives up the help of God, which is the source of our happiness and prosperity.

There are many men, who, while they do not scruple to falsify in their ordinary talk, dare not tell a lie under *oath*.

For those, and they constitute a lamentably large class, who care nothing for the sanctity of an oath; who take it with a mental reservation, or in any way are willing to slight its sacred character, our laws have provided in the statutes for the crime of *perjury*, and thus they are led by the fear of consequences to tell the truth.

(64.) *Cross-examination.*

But to get at the truth, by superior legal shrewdness, and often without the knowledge of the witness as to the exact bearing of his answers, we have what is called cross-examination; which so disconnects the evidence, until the whole is drawn out, that the summary made by the whole is different in form from the expectation of the witness. In cross-examination by a skilful hand, a liar or prevaricator is often made

to contradict himself, and thus his testimony falls to the ground.

Although not of a rhetorical nature, it cannot be amiss to refer for a moment to the objections brought against *civic oaths*; and we do so for the purpose of asserting our belief that the civic oath, in an enlightened country, is one of the safe-guards of the government, and should be preserved inviolate. The frequent use of the oath has been said to make the invocation of God too common; and, since He is called to witness in *such* transactions, it might lead to the inference, that He does not witness and judge all our actions. It has been further said, that the Bible is opposed to oaths, as in the passage: "Let your communication be yea, yea, and nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil;" and again: "Swear not at all." Without mentioning other objections, for want of space, let us content ourselves with affirming that the invocation of God's holy name can never be too common, if it carry the right spirit with it. Let it pervade all our institutions, if "the words of the mouth" be accompanied by "the meditations of the heart." Again: the transactions in which an oath is required, are those involving great interests, and making it all important to get at the truth; and the Bible is full of solemn asseverations precisely like our oaths. "Behold, before God, I lie not," says the apostle; and God himself, "Since

he could swear by no greater, swear by himself." The injunction, "Swear not at all," refers to profane or light swearing, and not to legal oaths.

(65.) *Concurrent Testimony.*

The *concurrence of testimonies*, however slight each may be, *designed* to prove a certain fact, has been already referred to; but the testimonies to similar facts which confirm each other, seem frequently to have had no direct purpose to prove the fact in question; they were incidentally and very vaguely mentioned; thus, although the allusion in our Lord's parable of the *Prodigal Son*, to His gracious design to include the Gentiles in his promised salvation, is said to be so slight that one would hardly be warranted in interpreting it thus; when a similar though equally slight allusion is found in many other parables, as, undoubtedly in the *Rich Man and Lazarus*, and also in the *Labourers in the Vineyard*, and others; we can have no doubt that he vaguely proposed this purpose in each, although there were few if any of those that heard him who understood his meaning.

(66.) *Doctrine of Chances.*

Among the *probable* arguments which may be taken as *signs* of a given conclusion, is that arising from what has been called the *calculation of chances*: and

this is an argument of constant use, and very general application. We speak, in common parlance, of there being a *small chance* of such an occurrence; or again, we say that there are *ten chances to one* that such another thing will occur. And in this phraseology we undoubtedly have a meaning.

This subject has opened to the mathematician some of the most difficult problems, and must be treated with great care lest it lead us into error. We can hardly do more than mention it here.

It is not of course meant, by the use of the word *chance*, to imply that anything happens by *accident*; but we express by it our ignorance of the connection between natural causes and their results; and we endeavour to reason *partially* from what we know, to that which we do not know, but which this calculation of chances enables us to approximate. Thus:—if those who have the yellow fever *probably die*, and those who are exposed to it will *probably take it*, then we may *determine*, in current phrase, what will be the chance of a certain man's *dying* of yellow fever who is *exposed* to it. Suppose *ten* out of twelve who have it, *die*; and suppose that one-half of those who are exposed to it, take it; then if we express certainty by 1, we shall have the fraction $\frac{10}{12} = \frac{5}{6}$ to express the chance which any one *attacked with the fever* stands of dying; and $\frac{1}{2}$ will express the chance which any person who is *exposed* stands of getting it.

Multiplying these two fractions, we shall determine what the chance is that any *individual* who is *exposed* to the fever, *will die*. $\frac{5}{6} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{5}{12}$, or such a person has the chance of 5 out of 12 of dying; while his chance of living is 7 out of 12. In other words, he has a better chance of living than of dying. This, of course, is only a probable, never a certain conclusion.

Now, this argument is converted into a *fallacy* very often in times of alarm from pestilence: the feeling of fear exaggerates danger, and it is said of any one who is exposed in the manner above described, *that he will certainly die*. This subject may be found more expanded in the treatise on Logic (p. 202). It only need be referred to in this connection, as one form of rhetorical argument very commonly used.

(67.) *Progressive Argument.*

Last of the second division of Rhetorical Arguments enumerated under the head of *Signs*, we have the argument which comes, as it were, to a climax of proof, by the succession and order of the several *arguments*, or *experiments*, or *facts*, all of which bear upon one point. Such is the argument by which we prove the law that a body set in motion in an unresisting medium, will move with uniform velocity in a right line, and will never stop, or be deflected, unless

it meet some check or resistance. As every known medium is a *resisting* medium, we approximate to the *law* by this progressive argument; that is, by trying the experiment successively in *media less* and *less resistant* until we approach as nearly to one unresisting as possible; in each case the motion is longer continued, and more nearly in a right line.

But one of the most curious and interesting of arguments in this form is found in the Hebrew service for the two first nights of Passover: it is the argument by which the Hebrews *prove* their indebtedness to Jehovah:—

“What abundant favours hath the Omnipotent conferred on us!

“For if he had but brought us forth from Egypt, and had not inflicted justice upon the Egyptians, it would have been sufficient.

“If he had inflicted justice upon them, and had not executed judgment upon their gods, it would have been sufficient.

“If he had executed judgment upon their gods, and had not slain their first-born, it would have been sufficient.

“If he had slain their first-born, and had not bestowed their wealth on us, it would have been sufficient.”

And thus, enumerating the dividing of the sea; the drowning of the Egyptians; the pillar of cloud, and

of fire; the miraculous manna; the institution of the Sabbath; the law given at Sinai; the promised land of Israel; each of which would have been abundant proof of his goodness: the high priest thus concludes:—

“If he had brought us to the *land of Israel*, and had not *built the temple*, it would have been sufficient. How much, then, are we indebted for the manifold favours the Omnipresent conferred on us; (for he hath done all these things); and built the chosen holy temple for us to make atonement for all our sins.”

The argument from *Progressive Approach*, has been used to prove the attributes of the Deity; the mission of the Gospel in the world, and other very important propositions; but our space forbids more than a general explanation and a single illustration.

(68.) *Example.*

This word, which is the translation of the *εικος* of Aristotle, does not satisfactorily express its meaning; but it has been used by all English rhetoricians for the Greek word, and so, although not just, we shall use it simply as a *title*, to include a number of important arguments.

Εικος means *something like*, or *resembling*; and the use of the word *Example* to express the other

general subdivision of the second class of rhetorical arguments, would include all cases in which we arrive at a conclusion not absolutely certain, but approximating to the establishment of a general law. Thus we have *Induction*, where, from particular examples, we reason to the establishment of a general law; *Analogy*, where there is a resemblance of the *relations* of things; as, if a certain poison will kill a dog, we reason by analogy that it will kill a man; *Experience*, or from what we know to have occurred, we judge that by the use of the same means we may cause again to occur: and other forms, all ranging under the general topic of the *εἰκος*, or *Example*. We shall consider these briefly in the order named.

(69.) *Of Induction.*

Induction consists in passing from a number of particular examples to the determination of a general law; thus:—

Jupiter, Saturn, Venus, Mars, the Earth, &c., move round the sun in elliptical orbits. But all these are planets. Therefore, *all* planets move round the sun in elliptical orbits.

Here, what we know of *individual* planets, is asserted to be true of *all* planets. But, since all the planets have not been yet discovered; and since some further investigation may find a planet whose

orbit is not an *ellipse*, we only attain by scientific induction to the extreme probability or likelihood, and not to certainty. But sometimes the process of induction is made satisfactorily to depend upon only a single example. Thus, if in chemistry we find by one experiment that hydrochloric acid dissolves gold, we need not make other experiments with new pieces of gold and new acid; because this single example establishes the general law, that chlorine is a solvent of gold.

(70.) *Analogy.*

Analogy, as has been already remarked, is a resemblance, not of *objects*, but of their *purposes* and *relations*; thus there is an analogy between an *egg* and a *seed*, because each produces an original growth; between the life of man and the mutations of the year; between youth and the morning. It need scarcely be observed, that in no cases of analogy are the objects mentioned *alike*; but it is their relation to each other which is similar.

The teachings of our Saviour are full of analogies; and the parables are very striking examples of the use of this form of argument. Men are likened to *trees*, to *sheep*, to *corn*, &c.

But, it should be observed that analogy does not give us certain conclusions; thus, if we reason from

the similarity of the general structure of man and the brute, that what would be a poison to man would also kill a brute, we should err, because we have found by experiment that some brutes are totally unharmed by certain drugs which are strong poison to man.

Among the most striking arguments in this form are *historic analogies*, which need to be handled with the greatest care, lest we commit grievous error in attributing the characteristics and specific actions of one age or race, to another most unlike it.

Such an analogy may be found in the revolutions in England and France; the former resulting in the decapitation of Charles I. in 1649, and being followed by the restoration of Charles II. in 1660; and the latter in the execution of Louis XVI. in 1793, and the subsequent restoration of Louis XVIII. in 1814. But, although there are striking resemblances now to be discerned between the two, no one would have been justified by the relations of France and England in having reasoned from the results of the English rebellion, by *analogy*, to the probable results of the French revolution.

In general, we use the phrase *parity of reasoning*, when we mean analogical reasoning.

(71.) *Experience.*

Another form of argument, which may be stated under the general topic of *Example*, is the argument from *experience*. It is, perhaps, the most satisfactory of all to most minds. It has been justly said, that it is only the *past* which we can know certainly by experience, and yet we judge of the future by the past.

Thus, in the operations of the commonest laws of nature around us, we judge by *experience*. It is because, in all our past lives, we have known the sun to rise and set daily, that we feel sure it will rise and set to-morrow. This, it will be observed, is one form of *induction*, since from *past* examples, or *individual cases*, we venture to establish a *general law*, which will include the future.

This form of argument is very frequently used in *discourse*. Speakers appeal for proof of what they say, to the *experience* of their hearers; and if they can attain this, they are sure of success.

Patrick Henry enunciated the very law in his famous appeal to the Legislature of Virginia, when he said: "I have no lamp by which my feet are guided, but the lamp of experience. I know no way to judge of the future but by the past. And judging by the past, I wish to know what there has been in the conduct of the British ministry, for the

last ten years, to justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to solace themselves and the House."

A sailor will tell you that he knows, by *experience*, the best season to make a certain voyage, or the precautions necessary to be taken in certain latitudes. And thus experience furnishes us with the strongest and most satisfactory arguments in common life.

(72.) *Real and Invented Examples.*

As has been before remarked, in considering another kind of argument, it is not necessary that the examples which are used in *proof* of a question, be *real* facts; they may be entirely unreal, and made to suit a supposed case: but they must bear a strong analogy to the case in point. Socrates, who designed to condemn the practice of choosing public officers *by lot*, brought forward, as an *invented example*, the story of certain sailors who chose their steersman by lot; intending thereby, in both cases, to inveigh against a custom which would frequently lead to the choice of an unskilful person to control the lives and fortunes of others; to stand at the helm of ship or state.

In every case, such invented examples must have an air of fitness and probability, or they will be entirely without weight.

Invented examples, like the one just mentioned, are of frequent use as illustrations; but, besides these, *Fables* may be also classed among examples of this sort; they offer examples of analogy, and the *proof* which they thus convey in the story which forms the premisses, gives us, as a conclusion, the *moral* of the fable.

(73.) *The Topics of Arguments.*

In closing this general outline of arguments, as they are employed in Rhetoric, it may be well to state that the general subject of *proof* in discourse, has been, by the older rhetoricians, all included under the general head of the *Topics*.

This word, called by Aristotle *τοποι*, and by the Latin professors *loci*, means, literally, the division of arguments into their different classes or *places*, where they rightly belong.

We have designed to simplify the division by classing them all as *rhetorical* arguments, and by narrowing the subordinate classes; particularly because, in the progress of the art of Rhetoric, the nature and titles of the Topics have changed very much since the days of Aristotle.

Thus, Quintilian enumerated among his *Topics*: *prejudications*, which may correspond with the argument from *experience*; *common fame*, which has

something in common with *à priori* reasoning ; and, under what we would call *Signs*, he enumerates as *topics, written documents, witnesses, oaths, &c.*

An adequate nomenclature is, indeed, the just demand of any science ; but such quaint, unnecessary, and historically-changing words, are only mentioned here to give a reason why they are not used by us, and how we may dispense with them, and be better off without them. They are only needed in a History of Rhetoric.

CHAPTER IX.

(74.) *Of the Modes in which Arguments are used in Discourse.*

It now becomes important to consider some of the modes in which rhetorical arguments are advanced in discourse ; as, for example, whether in *proof* of some proposition asserted by ourselves, or in *disproof* of some objection started by our adversary ; whether in any discourse it *becomes us* to prove what we assert, or simply to deny what our opponent has asserted, and let the *burden* or necessity of proof fall upon him.

All such questions must be settled by the nature of our special design in the discourse ; we may be called upon to instruct and satisfy an honest mind seeking for truth, and anxious to receive and use it when found ; or it may be to combat the prejudices, and compel the belief of our opponents, who at the same time are doing all in their power to resist the truth and maintain error. It is very evident that the nature of the arguments used in these several cases would be very different ; and that what would be a

weak and *unconvincing* argument to determined opposition, might be sufficient and satisfactory to the ardent inquirer for truth: just as the earnest watcher for light would catch the first faint streakings of the dawn, which would be lost to one who is content to grope in the opposite darkness.

(75.) *Of the Burden of Proof.*

First, then, it is of great importance, in the process of our discourse, to lay down what may be *presumed* to be true, *without proof*; or, in other words, to determine on which side in any controversy rests the *burden of proof*—that is, the *necessity to prove what is asserted*.

Thus, we find intuitively established in the mind of man, a belief in, and an aspiration after, a *First Great Cause*—which we call God. The proofs of the existence of the Infinite Deity are all around us, and address themselves to our intuition as well as to our reason. With whom, then, in an argument,—not between a believer in God and an Atheist,—but an argument in which this question might incidentally occur, as a clue to other matters, with whom should the *onus probandi*, the burden of proof, reside? What, to the mind of man in all parts of the world, is the *presumption* on this subject? is it that there is a God, or that his Being is so doubtful that it

demands *proof*? Manifestly the former. So strong are our convictions, without set proof, that the human mind at once acknowledges the sagacity of the Psalmist, when he cries:—"The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God!"

The word *presumption* is commonly used to express that a certain proposition is to be esteemed *true*, until it be *disproved*; or that the *burden of proof* lies with the man who disputes its truth. Thus, the presumption in favour of a proposition, and the burden of proof, lie on opposite sides. To illustrate this, we have the well known maxim of the common law, that every man is to be considered innocent until his guilt be *legally* proven. What is this but a simple assertion that the *burden of proof* lies with his accusers? that, although we may know from our private judgment he is *not* innocent, that he is not required to prove his innocence, but that the law must prove his guilt? If sometimes, by legal quibble or sophistry, one guilty man escapes by these means, we know, that were the other mode resorted to, many innocent men would find it impossible to prove their innocence.

Many conditions might be stated in which the burden of proof can be easily determined; thus the presumption is in favour of established and existing conventions in the world, political, social, and religious.

Thus political conventions find their issue in *governments*; and the presumption is in favour of the existing government; all who make attacks upon it must be prepared with the proofs against it.

In social life, the presumption is in favour of existing forms, until they be proved to be evil. In religion, also, the same fact holds good; what exists may be, and has sometimes been, evil, but it must be so proved; because the presumption is in favour of the institution already existing, until it be proved wrong.

Again, the same may be stated in another form; as when we say that we must always presume the *innocence* not only of a person, before the court, but as to *motives* in daily life; this view comes from that heavenly principle of charity, which, since it cannot see the motives of men—God alone can do this—always contents itself with supposing some good motive for an action not in itself absolutely evil; and thus not only “believeth all things,” “but hopeth all things.”

On the contrary, what is new and untried, has always the presumption against it; with it lies the necessity to prove itself true. Thus, although at the present day, *Christianity* is the greatest *existing* institution; and, therefore, the presumption of its truth is strong, on that account; yet, when it first appeared, the whole case was different. The pre-

sumption was strongly against it, and it was called upon for proof of its divine origin.

That proof, indeed, was not wanting. It poured in floods of light from our Saviour's teachings, his blameless life, his wondrous miracles, his resurrection from the dead, his ascension to Heaven, and his presence with his Church in all time since; it was seen in all the wonderful and inspired acts of the holy apostles. The early Christian fathers were men who undertook not to prove directly the falsity of the pagan philosophy, but they were *apologists*: they undertook to prove the truth of Christian doctrine.

It should be noticed, however, in the use of this word that the *presumption* may be *strong* or *weak*. Thus, we constantly use such language as this: “The presumption is *very strong* in his favour.”

So, again, presumption sometimes does not rest upon *proof* or *intuition*, but upon a sort of suspension of the judgment in deference to the source whence the proposition comes; thus, if a person who is claimed to be *authority* in science or learning, asserts as a fact something in his special department of research; although I am perfectly ignorant of the matter, I assent to it, or, if with my lesser knowledge I incline to differ from him, I *defer* to his opinion; and, in many cases, if I should presume to differ from him, I should be esteemed *arrogant* and self-conceited. In matters of subordination and

order, there can be no doubt of the great respectability of authority; and the *learner* should surely be content to receive as true whatever comes from his *teacher*; but in matters within the scope of human judgment, although the presumption may be in favour of such propositions as come from high sources, we should carefully test them, and not undervalue the *reason* and *understanding* which God has given us with which to find and comprehend truth. This has been admirably stated by Lord Bacon, in his "Errors of Learning," in quaint but choice language: "As water will not ascend higher than the level of the first spring-head from whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, and *exempted from liberty of examination*, will not rise again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle; and, therefore, although the position be good, '*oportet discentem, credere,*' yet it must be coupled with this, '*oportet edoctum, judicare,*' for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief, and a suspension of their own judgment, until they be fully instructed; and not an absolute resignation or perpetual captivity; and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no more, but so let great authors have their due, as time, which is the author of authors, be not deprived of his due, which is, further and further to discover truth."

It is painfully true that this feeling of deference to the opinions of others has not only been a fre-

quent cause of leading men into error; but, what is far worse, it has made them hypocritical, by leading them to disguise or deny their own impressions of the truth.

But if, on the other hand, a fact or proposition be stated by one for whom we have no deference, who is not regarded as authority, it is evident the *presumption* is usually against it: from him we require *proof*. An error equal to the one just mentioned frequently grows out of this also: instead of acknowledging that such a proposition may be proved, and carefully examining the proof, we are apt to take the *presumption* against the proposition in question, as conclusive, and to think, although we should be unwilling to assert it, that it cannot be proved.

Much might be written of the use and misuse of the *presumption* in favour; and of the *burden of proof*; but our only purpose is to explain their meaning, and give a general illustration of their use.

It will be seen that sometimes the presumption may be removed, and placed upon the other side. One of the best illustrations is found in the question whether the Nathanael mentioned in St. John's Gospel, and called by our Saviour "an Israelite indeed, in whom there is no guile," was the same person who is known afterwards as the Apostle Bartholomew. Now, what is the *presumption*, in the absence of direct proof that they were the same? It is, that

there were two distinct persons, and not two names for the same person. But let us go a little farther: this name, *Bartholomew*, seems to have been among the Jews a patronymic. Simon Peter was *Bar-Jona*, the son of Jona; Joseph's name was *Bar-sabas*; and so this apostle, in all likelihood, had another name to distinguish him from his brothers, each of whom, like himself, was a *Bartholomew*, or the son of the same father. With this view the *presumption* is shifted, and is very strong in favour of the assertion that Nathanael was also Bartholomew, especially as Nathanael, a most excellent and eminent man among the earliest followers of Christ, is nowhere mentioned again by his own name.

So, also, with the change of *presumption*, the *burden of proof* may be sometimes shifted, as in the case of Christianity just mentioned. Before its *establishment* the necessity rested, as we have seen, with its apologists to prove its truth; but, in its present state of exaltation and self-demonstrating power, the *burden of proof* is shifted; it remains for its opponents now to prove it false—a most difficult, an impossible task; and yet one which there are not wanting men rash enough to attempt.

Such has been the case, also, with almost every science known to modern times: in their early and obscure periods when they were struggling into life, in opposition to the then existing tenets, they were

called upon for proof of their reality: all empiricism was thus detected and denounced; but when they took their places in the great system of classification, they no longer spent their time in asserting their claims, already made known; they content themselves now with leaving the *onus* of proof to their opponents, and with answering only objections brought against them from responsible and respectable sources.

From what has been said we see that, while *presumption* is in itself of the nature of proof, it does not give a necessary advantage to the side upon which it lies; it challenges proof against it, indeed, but this need not be wanting, for the *presumption* proceeds only upon reasonable grounds, and may be removed by fair argument, and a counter *presumption* established, or the *presumption* in favour be entirely destroyed. Many persons, of more boldness than honesty, make assertions *as though the presumption is in their favour*; and although it is not, they sometimes present so bold a front as to silence all opposition.

(76.) *Of Refutation.*

By the *refutation* of an opponent's argument, we imply, first, that his argument has been *fairly stated*, either by himself elsewhere, or by ourselves as embodied in our discourse, and that we *now proceed to*

answer it; and thus to destroy the proposition which he has laid down and attempted to establish.

There are two ways in which the proposition in question may be refuted: the first is by *destroying the arguments* by which he has attempted to prove it; and the second, by *proving the contradictory* of his conclusion. Thus, if we have the proposition as propounded by an adversary:—

All C is B;

we may state the premisses by which he proves this, namely, that—

All A is B,

All C is A,

And that therefore All C is B;

And then deny one of those premisses, either the *major* or the *minor*,—and this would falsify the conclusion;—or we may make the counter assertion, or proposition, that

Some C is not B;

which, in logical language, is the *contradictory* of his proposition, and undertake to prove that. If we succeed in doing this his proposition falls to the ground, since, by a logical law, if one *contradictory* be *true* the other must be *false*, and *vice versa*.

Thus, let a project be proposed, and let one man undertake to prove that it must be successful, for

certain reasons; I may *refute* his *reasons* or *arguments*, and thus destroy his proposition; or I may, quite apart from his plan of argument, prove that the project in question *must fail*, for *certain other reasons*. In either case I refute his assertion, and his arguments fall to the ground; and I attain the end proposed.

The *objections* of an opponent are to be refuted; the *fallacious* reasoning in any discussion is likewise to be refuted; and to do this we sometimes use irony, either directly or by implication; thus, if, in order to prove his proposition *absurd*, we assume as true, premisses which we afterwards *disprove*—the very act is ironical. This is always done in the indirect modes of reasoning, known, in geometry, as the *reductio ad absurdum*, and in many other sciences as the *reductio ad impossibile*. It cannot be too strongly enforced that *irony*, *wit*, *humour*, and *ridicule*, in all their forms, are dangerous weapons in argument, and are frequently used instead of valid argument to substantiate error; in all grave argumentative discourse they should be avoided.

Thus, says Mr. Milman, in his edition of Gibbon's Rome, "Paley, with his intuitive sagacity, saw through the difficulty of answering Gibbon by the ordinary arts of controversy; his emphatic sentence, 'Who can *refute* a sneer?' contains as much truth as point."

(77.) *Proving too Much.*

It may seem strange, that in any process of argumentation, there should be mentioned such a fault as *proving too much*. But sometimes an argument which seems to prove the proposition in question, may also prove another and an absurd conclusion; and thus the first conclusion is invalidated. If, for example, we are told that a slave was beaten to death by his master; and hence it is argued that a *system* which will allow it is *therefore* evil; then, if we find that a woman was beaten to death by her husband, or a child by his father, by the same reasoning we should object to *matrimony* and *paternity*. There may be, and are evils in every human system, but if we attempt to prove them by such invalid arguments, we injure, rather than support our cause.

If, in the construction of a discourse, we design to *refute* the arguments of our adversary, it cannot be too strongly urged that these arguments or objections *should be fairly and fully stated*; simple justice demands this; and besides, the effect produced on the mind of the hearer is an excellent one, when he finds that honesty, in this particular, characterizes the discourse. Thus, even in controversy, "Honesty is the best policy."

It is a difficult and delicate question to determine just how much proof of a given proposition is neces-

sary; how earnest may be our refutation of an opponent's position. For, the effect upon the mind of the hearer is weakened, if he finds that we are plying strong argument to prove something almost axiomatic; or to disprove something which is scarcely tenable without the attack. Thus he begins to fancy that the *apparently* weak assertion, which we combat with such energy, must conceal something *really* strong and difficult of refutation; and as the arguments against it are increased, and the supposed *latent* value of the proposition remains still undisclosed, the hearer begins to doubt. It is like the absurdity of levelling a cannon against a sparrow; the bird may be instantly destroyed, but if the sportsman have no manifest reason for such gunnery, he will be regarded as insane. Suppose, for example, that we attempt, with our strongest arguments, to prove the existence of the Deity, which we already believe, for we have no argument as strong as our intuition; we may find ourselves in the position conceived by the poetess, when she speaks of

"Books, which prove
God's being *so definitely*, that man's doubt
Grows self-defined the other side the line;
Made Atheist by suggestion."

The arguments adduced should be not only valid, but clear, commensurate in number and force with the demands of the subject; not endeavouring to

establish that which may be taken for granted; always ready with the just burden of proof; not proving too much, and thus defeating themselves; and not presenting a strong and bristling front to a weak and supine enemy.

The consideration of rhetorical arguments at length would require a review of many of the subjects treated by logic; such as the *forms* of arguments, and the different kinds of material fallacies, *i. e.* fallacies in which the subject-matter of the premisses or of the conclusion is *false*. But with the foregoing indications of the forms and general use of such arguments, we must leave the general subject of *Conviction* as an object of discourse. In the chapter on *Arrangement*, will be found a statement of the proper order and sequence of rhetorical arguments, to give strength and compactness to discourse in order to *convince*.

Before proceeding to the consideration of the *arrangement* of arguments, and of the other parts of discourse, we come to dwell, for a little time, upon the other principal *object* of discourse. This has been called *persuasion*; and, although it is not immediately concerned about purely argumentative discourse, it constitutes an important part of every discourse of a *mixed* nature; and is alone capable of exercising an influence over the wills and tempers of men, by which they are led to just and laudable actions.

CHAPTER X.

PERSUASION.

PERSUASION (*per* and *suadeo*, to *urge* or *incite through certain modes*), means the influencing of the will.

Conviction, we have endeavoured to show, is attained by the placing of new thoughts in logical forms of argument, and establishing in the mind the truth by means of valid proof. But this truth, thus armed and substantiated by proof, may be acknowledged, and assented to by the *intellect*, and yet exert no influence whatever upon the conduct or character, such as its acknowledgment ought to produce. We have *invented* our discourse to *convince* the Intellect; we must now undertake another process—through the *feelings* to sway the *will*. This is the work of *Persuasion*.

Persuasion, then, or the moving of the will, is effected by the presenting of motives to action, and by the appeal to the feelings which will give these motives an entrance and influence.

First, then, of the motives to action. These, it is

obvious, are of two kinds, and tend to show us that the special object proposed is truly a desirable one, and also that the modes by which it may be attained are the ones suggested in the discourse. That is, persuasion depends first on *Argument*, and then on *Exhortation*.

I. The first class of motives includes those which are purely mental, and the *conviction* produced by proof addresses itself to these motives. Thus, very often, the mere presentation of the truth to produce conviction, excites these motives, and also produces *persuasion*.

There are men who will shut their ears to all appeals to *feeling*, as intemperate and deceptive, and who will act promptly on *conviction* of the truth and of duty. With such, then, when we have attained the object of *conviction*, conviction has at once induced *persuasion*.

II. The other class of motives are such as are brought to bear upon the *sensibilities*, and to present such motives we make what are called *appeals to the feelings*; or, in other words, we *play upon the passions* of our hearers.

In the general term *sensibilities* are to be included the *appetites* and grosser *passions*, the *affections* of a higher order of sentiment, and the *emotions*, already referred to, as excited by beauty, sublimity, and goodness; all those feelings in short which hold man in

sympathy with the corporeal forms and spiritual beings around him.

But the *will*, like all other faculties, is the creature of habit, and begets a certain condition of a permanent nature, from which neither conviction nor ordinary appeals to the feelings will drive it. This fact constitutes an important reason why we should cultivate and render permanent, good habits of the will, and avoid all evil courses which would serve to render it callous, stern, and immovable.

These unbending wills are not addressed by simple conviction, because there is not a lively connection maintained between the will and the intellect; nor are they moved by the purest pathos, because they have cut loose from all the finer ties of feeling.

(78.) *Of Exhortation.*

By Exhortation is meant the attempt to excite men's minds to adopt the means proposed, by showing that the end to be attained is desirable and good. It may be best understood by considering the use made of it in religious discourses.

For, in the subject of religion, every one who is *convinced* of its truth, must acknowledge that it is important so to live as to secure eternal life; and so it would seem sufficient for the preacher to *prove* and *convince*, but such is the tenacity of man's will, and

so difficult is it to make him do what he acknowledges to be right, that we know the chief necessity in a sermon is to *exhort* and *persuade* men in beseeching tones; in the words of the apostle, the minister makes his appeal, "As though Christ did *beseech* you by us, we *pray* you, in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." And as there are more who *believe* the doctrine, than live in accordance with its precepts, exhortation must always be a chief part of the preacher's duty. Among the means of exciting the mind used by exhortation, the first to be mentioned is the *appeal to the passions*.

(79.) *Of Appeals to the Passions.*

In this general division of *persuasion*, it must be noticed that there are two distinct kinds of appeal, as to their moral character:—

I. An appeal to human *benevolence* or *love*; the expression of some fond relation, *filial*, *conjugal*, *fraternal*, which awakens a kindred emotion in our hearts; the operation upon the *sympathy* of our hearers, causing them to rejoice with us when we rejoice, and to weep with our mourning, are just and proper kinds of appeal to human passion.

II. But when our *envy* is excited, or our *vanity* pandered to, the appeal is manifestly improper: great injury is done to us, whatever results may

accrue to others. Suppose, for example, some one tells me of the munificent charity of another person, whom I rival in social position, in order to cause my *envy* of his new distinction, and thus to lead me to give more munificently still,—whatever physical good may come to the poor, moral evil is done to me. All charity systems, which are thus based upon a *knowledge of human nature*, or, as it is unjustly called, *knowing our weak side*, deserve to fail entirely of success. So, again, if a person, taking advantage of my weakness, appeals to my feeling of *revenge*, he does me a great wrong, and does violence to the right.

Appeals to the feelings are often used in a *fallacious* manner; to this class of fallacies belong the *argumentum ad hominem*, *ad verecundiam*, and *ad populum*; in which the feelings of *vanity*, *shame*, and *intemperate excitement* are appealed to in place of just *proof*.

It has already been hinted, that there are many minds which have calmly determined to resist all appeals to the passions, because such appeals are so often improperly made. Thus, artful women employ

"The silent Rhetoric of persuading eyes,"

to lure men to evil; falsehood puts on the robes of sentiment to obtain our charity; and oftentimes the orator, who would fail to carry his point in any other

manner, risks all upon the *pathetic*, and carries the will captive against our honest conviction, or without full conviction.

But we should not, for these reasons, disregard such an important part of discourse as *persuasion*, when rightly used. And, besides, it has been well said, that if an orator makes sometimes improper appeals to the passions, he does, quite as frequently, use *fallacious arguments*, by which to deceive us; and if we would give up appeals to the passions for such a reason, we must, for the same reason, resign all argumentation.

To keep the mind in such a healthy and sincere state, that it will not be unduly affected by appeals to the passions; that itself will discriminate the right and wrong of such appeals, is of prime importance; and then to acknowledge all proper drafts upon our finer sensibilities—*gratitude, pity, devotion, and charity*, the greatest of all, and the inspirer of the rest—such is the culture of heart which is potent to “raise a mortal to the skies.”

Let it be observed, that, although the *feelings* or *sensibilities* are not controlled by the *will*, yet there is such a connection between them, as leads to a decided reciprocal influence, and gives each an indirect control over the other. Thus, we cannot, by a simple effort of the will, directly control our *love*, or *fear*, or *anger*; our laughter or tears; but there is a constant effort in well-ordered minds, to make the

will, to some extent, the controller of these; and in many cases, the effort is eminently successful. Conversely, while the *will* is not controlled directly by these various *emotions*, it often yields, willingly and gracefully to their suggestions, and is led to obey their mandates. This is the strong ground taken by *persuasion*, when, in its efforts to influence the will, it subsidizes the feelings and appeals to the passions.

It becomes important to inquire the modes in which the sensibilities are to be reached, if they cannot be reached by an exercise of the will. If you can prove to me that a man suffering is an object of pity; you cannot thereby, perhaps, make me pity him.

The answer is, by leading the mind to candid and secret *reflection* upon the subject of our persuasive discourse. By an array of all the touching circumstances, of all the tender relations, of all the obligations growing out of these relations, the *conscience* as well as the *judgment* is touched and the will is *indirectly* bent to the mode of thought and feeling. Such is the problem which the orator often undertakes to solve. He tells his story in such a way, he portrays his pictures, and dwells upon the pathetic points so as to enlist the feelings, as it were, in spite of the will, and afterwards, by their aid, to enchain the will and lead it in his train. True, he must have much art, and must carry us along with him through-

out the persuasive part of his discourse; for if he fail, we are rudely thrust back upon our former state of insensibility, and are farther from the condition he designed than ever.

And now if we are inclined to think that the orator's persuasion partakes of the nature of trick or stratagem, let us reflect that this is just the stratagem which we practise on ourselves constantly in leading our own minds into phases of benevolence, gratitude, or devotion; and especially in that self-censure which grows out of our constant short-comings in the matter. We may then justly subject ourselves to persuasive discourse, only using our better judgment in determining that it is rightly done, and appeals to right motives.

Of the detailed methods, by which we *persuade* in discourse, very much might be said; as, for instance, of the employment of *sympathy*; of *pathos*, in its various forms; of the contagion of *passion*, by which tears demand tears, rage kindles rage, and desire begets desire; but we must content ourselves with the mention of a few of the general modes in which *persuasion* is used.

Persuasion proper has for its purpose to lead one to the performance of something new, and different from a former course of action.

Dissuasion, which is another class under the general head of Persuasion, is designed to cause a person

to abandon a course already pursued, or to desist from an undertaking which has just been determined upon, and not yet followed.

There is also a third kind of *persuasion* sometimes enumerated, the object of which is to strengthen a person in the continuance of a course already adopted, and thus far persevered in; but from which he is in some danger of falling.

The power of persuasion, in a public speaker, depends much upon the character which he has with his audience; and this character springs from the opinion which they entertain of his *honesty*, *talent*, and *kind intentions* towards them. To this should be added a certain amount of *tact*, by which, while he intends to exert power and influence, always directed with an *honest aim*, he shall seem to leave the natural treatment of the subject to produce the desired effect, rather than himself to be playing upon the sensibilities of the audience; and this brings us to a brief consideration of the manner in which the address to the feelings should be conducted.

(80.) *Of the Feelings.*

The term *Feelings*, thus used, is intended to comprehend the passions and sentiments in all their variety, and thus the kinds of effect to be produced by such an address are widely different; but a few general directions will apply to them all.

When such an appeal is designed it should come without being heralded, spontaneously as it were, or it excites no sympathy. Men, it has been before observed, are impatient upon this point; and dislike to have their feelings forced. And so, if a speaker should by the manner of his address seem to say, "Now I am going to excite your anger; and now I shall claim your pity,"—the heart shuts itself against such a vain-glorious boast, and remains insensible to the appeal. It is, in part at least, upon this ground that what is called *good advice* is often rejected; and many orations and sermons lose their hortatory power because they partake of this fault.

Often it is only necessary for the persuasive part of the discourse to heighten or strengthen the impression made by the conviction of truth; and thus truth itself is eloquent in moving the will. Much, it is clear, depends also upon the illustrations which persuasion uses to effect its purpose. Figures of thought couched in figures of speech, such as *comparisons*, *metaphors*, the *climax*, and others, are used.

Thus, if we would awaken pity for an orphan child, who is in great want, in the breast of one who is herself a mother, let us ask her to imagine her own child deprived of its parents, and thrown upon the mercy of a cold and thoughtless world: let us endeavour to paint such a picture, with glowing words, before her. The illustration is potent, and the words which pre-

sent these may be so chosen as to make the picture a striking one, just as the colours and pencil of the artist embody his great idea with a beautiful garb to greet the eye. Such illustrations are indeed strikingly analogous to pictures. But enough has been said on the general subject of persuasion to show its design, and the general modes in which this end is attained. It constitutes a secondary, but an important object of discourse. It becomes necessary to proceed, without longer explanation upon this point, to the next general division of Rhetoric.

We have discussed INVENTION at length: we come now to consider the ARRANGEMENT of discourse; and this it will be remembered is preparatory to the third and last division, STYLE.

CHAPTER XI.

ARRANGEMENT.

(81.) *The Parts of a Discourse.*

THE second of the great divisions of the rhetorical art, in the construction of discourse, was stated to be *Arrangement*.

It is manifest that in the process of Invention, which has now been fully explained, much partial *arrangement* must have taken place; but the adaptation of the parts of a discourse to each other has led to an examination of these different parts and titles, indicating their places and functions in the discourse taken as a whole.

In this consideration the arrangement of arguments is of the greatest importance; or we pay the greatest respect to those parts of a discourse designed to *convince*. Thus, a proper connection is kept up in the proofs of our original theme.

As a proof of the importance of the arrangement of arguments, we have a story of Demosthenes and Æschines, the two contestants for the palm of oratory

in Athens. In the contest "*De Corona*," Æschines begged the judges to require that Demosthenes should be compelled to answer his arguments in the same order in which he had brought them forward. But the arrangement of Demosthenes showed his skill, and aided in his success. It was entirely different from that which Æschines would have prescribed.

For the sake of convenience, then, in the preparation of a discourse, as well as to establish a general formula of the proper order in a discourse, it has been usually divided into the *Exordium*, *Narration*, *Proposition*, *Discussion*, and *Peroration*. Of these we shall see that the *essential* parts of a discourse are the *Proposition* and the *Discussion*; and the others, though important, are only *subsidiary*. These all, in the order mentioned, constitute the special as well as general arrangement of a discourse: we proceed to explain them in order:—

1. The *Exordium*, otherwise called the *Introduction* or *Proem*, is designed as it were only to open the interview between the speaker and hearer, or between the writer and reader. In this, a general salutation is made, and the occasion and circumstances of the discourse are set forth.

It has been observed by Aristotle, and the same fact has been already mentioned, that the *Exordium* is not one of the *essential* parts of a discourse, since we may enter at once, and often without abruptness,

upon the consideration of the theme of the discourse. In short discourses it is usually very brief, and frequently omitted altogether; in larger works, published in volumes, the Exordium, generally explanatory of the nature of the work, and the circumstances under which it was written, is contained in the *Preface*, or set *Introduction*, which prepares the mind to enter upon the work itself.

Of the Exordium, and especially in that form called the *Preface*, it has been justly said that it should not be composed until after the work is written, because it is only then that any author can declare what its contents are, and the circumstances which attended its production; and there would be danger of announcing too much, and of promising a certain line of treatment which the after circumstances might render impossible.

The *title* of a book is also of the nature of an introduction—that is, it is the *statement of its subject*; and this, although it is known and kept in mind throughout the preparation of the work, in a *general* way, is often *specifically* determined on, after the book is written. Sometimes the introduction is in the form of the correction of an error, on the given subject: it is then called an *introduction corrective*; and thus, too, according to the special design, we have the *introduction narrative*, or *preparatory*, or *inquisitive*.

2. The *Narration* is a setting forth of the facts

connected with the case, which have given rise to the discussion in question. This is very frequently contained or absorbed in the Exordium, and is sometimes included in the *Proposition* itself; but in an artistically constructed discourse it usually enters as a distinct part; and in many kinds of discourse it occupies the chief place; thus, in History and Biography, narration presents men and objects as they move or are acted upon, in a succession of time, sometimes without reference to the existence of the causes or effects.

3. The *Proposition*, which is the first *essential* element of a discourse, is the statement of the particular *theme* or *subject* of the discourse; and it bears of course the closest relation to the special *object* of the discourse. To illustrate this last remark, take any theme, such as “The Force of Habit.”

Before we begin to treat this *theme* it is evident we must know the *object* which the discourse has in view; is it to explain the philosophy of “the force of habit,” or to prove that the law holds good with all our faculties? It may be that we design to take these for granted, and merely to *exhort* the young to cultivate good habits and avoid bad ones. Justly, then, the *proposition* is the *subject* of our discourse, when it is considered in relation to its *object*.

In the statement of the *proposition* it is not unusual to divide it into distinct heads or subordinate

propositions, to be maintained; and it is usual sometimes to state, if it be a matter of controversy, the points of difference between the writer and his opponent.

4. Next in order comes the *Discussion*. This has been divided by some writers into the *Confirmation* and *Refutation*, and has to do with the rhetorical use of arguments, already explained, and with their arrangement, which is also of very great importance.

First, then, as a general rule, the writer *confirms* his proposition—that is, he brings forth his *proofs* of the proposition in the best array and strongest order. This, of course, will depend in some degree upon the person addressed, and the circumstances under which the discourse is prepared.

But, in the second place, he must consider the *relation sustained by the arguments to each other*; some arguments are only of value as connected with others; each link alone may be weak, but put together they may constitute a powerful chain.

With these remarks we proceed to observe, that the most *obvious* arguments should take precedence in a discussion. Of this nature are the *à priori* arguments, or those which reason *from cause to effect*. These attack the mind more readily than others, and engage the attention more easily. They are, indeed, altogether the strongest arguments used.

Next after the *à priori* arguments are ranged those

included under the heads of *Sign* and *Example*; and these, in general, in the order of their strength, for the strong arguments generally prove the *right*, while the weaker only prove the *expediency*. It will be remembered that the whole subject of testimony has been referred to this class. Such being the order of confirmation, what then should be the order of Refutation? It is by no means to be supposed that the *refutation* of an adversary's objections, should always be placed last in the order of arguments. Sometimes, if the opponent have advanced some very strong and apparently unanswerable objections, it is deemed proper to state them *at the outset* of the *discussion*, and to sweep them away by *refutation* before we begin to establish our own *proposition*; otherwise they hang like a cloud over us in our attempt to cast the light of truth upon the subject. In ordinary cases, that is, where the objections are of reasonable strength, it is considered proper to place them about in the *middle of the discussion*. The reason of this is a strong one. If we leave these objections to the last, many persons, who know of their existence, will be affected prejudicially towards our argument, thinking that we are overlooking or neglecting them.

Even when it seems necessary to defer the refutation to the last, it may be well to mention the existence of the objections early in the discourse, and to

promise that they shall be fully refuted before we close.

But it is not only of importance to judge of the proper chain-work of arguments; but also to determine the *order* and *form* of single arguments in our discourse. Sometimes one form is more proper or more courteous than another: as a hypothetical than a categorical; and sometimes it requires a delicate judgment to determine whether we shall state the *conclusion* first, and then proceed to prove it; or announce the *premisses* first, and deduce the conclusion. In many cases, if the conclusion be a proposition well known, whether easy of proof or not; or if it be a new statement, which, when enunciated, will have general claims upon popular belief, it may be stated first, and the premisses may be added as proof, if it be desired. In most cases, indeed, if the proof be forthcoming, this is a *strong* order, because, if by the statement of the proposition, a shadow of doubt for a moment arise in the mind, there is an appearance of moral force exerted in bringing forward premisses to sweep away the doubt, and vindicate the truth of the assertion.

It is also a good rule, in the array of proofs, to state the most general first, and then to come down to particulars, as narrowing the circle of the proof and concentrating it at last upon the given point.

It will be manifest that, in purely argumentative discourse, all *the parts of discourse* enumerated be-

come absorbed in the *proposition* and the *discussion*. They begin with the inquiry as to the *truth of the proposition*, and end when the *array of proofs* and *the refutation of objections* is completed; but in most forms of discourse this is not so. We pass to the last enumerated among the parts of a discourse.

5. The *Conclusion* or ending of discourse was called *peroratio* by the Latins, and *επιλογος*, by the Greeks.

As in the case of argumentative discourse, just mentioned, the conclusion may be sometimes designed to close, and sum up the *arguments*, in which case it is called the conclusion *confirmatory*; sometimes it will, after the completion of the discourse, be in the form of a slight explanation at the close; in this event it is termed an *explanatory* conclusion.

But, in general, the conclusion is the scope and province of *persuasion*; it is here, in general, that after explanation, and argument, and refutation, that the subject of the discourse thus substantiated is applied to the heart, with the design of influencing the will, and leading to some new and specific action.

It has not been unusual to classify, as one of the parts of a discourse, what is called the *Recapitulation*; or a brief but comprehensive *summary* in proper order of the discourse itself: to refresh the mind on all its points, and fix it in the memory. But this is not a necessary part of the discourse, although frequently of good effect.

Sometimes it is very forcibly used just after the *discussion* of the proposition, to state, or rather to enumerate the arguments adduced, in the *inverted order*, running back the chain just linked together, and testing, as it were, its validity and power.

No more than a general idea can be given of this subject of arrangement, for, linked as it is indissolubly with the *invention* of discourse, it depends very much upon the characteristics of judgment and fancy in each individual, and each great genius has *invented*, as it were, an arrangement for himself, which partakes of his own originality.

What has been offered, however, will serve to guide the student in the general structure of discourse, and to give him a set of rules with which to try and practise his own powers.

(82.) *The Three Unities.*

Included in the general subject of Arrangement is the maintenance, throughout a discourse, of what are called the *Three Unities*—of *Action*, *Time*, and *Place*.

This seems to be a French theory, founded upon a passage in the *Poetics* of Aristotle; and it has been applied principally to the Drama. To possess these unities was long regarded as the chief merit of a dramatic composition; and is also to be regarded as of

great importance in works of pictorial art. To explain these, let us consider them in their order. A chain of *connected* facts contains an interest and pleasure which is entirely wanting in an incongruous and disconnected mass. *Unity of action*, then, consists in *having but one main plot*. Take, for example, the events in the life of an individual, as narrated in his biography; they are all united by the single figure which moves with their current; and thus *unity of action* is attained. This kind of unity must be found in the *epic*, the *drama*, and the *fable*, by which the ancients included all that we now express by *romance*, *novel*, and *tale*; and this unity aids in giving to each the Aristotelian requisites of a discourse, viz., the beginning, the middle, and the end, of an entire action.

This is more or less applicable to every discourse; but in History, or at least in the chronicle history, less than in any other form, is the *unity of action* to be found, since such history is the record of many and incongruous events. But in the higher studies of history, to him who is enabled to recognise the invariable laws at work, and to philosophize from remote causes to distant effects, a unity of great action is disclosed, and we are charmed with the power which ranges the myriad events like well-ordered troops into their own places, symmetrically fixed, and presenting beauty and order in the great story.

It is evident that when the plot is determined upon and laid down, all episodes, of whatever degree of interest, mar the unity of action. Such are the tales, bearing no relation to the main story, which are found in Gil Blas, and in certain of Dickens's novels. And thus sometimes this unity of action is a fault, since it interferes with charming episodes which would please by their novelty and freshness. It is characteristic of the present period, that literature is in some degree relieved of the severe trammels of this unity; and that while the general plot is preserved, the incidental interruptions are permitted, and lend the interest of novelty and freshness to the work.

The *Unity of time*, as proposed by the Greeks, and adopted by the French, demanded that the period supposed in the drama should not exceed *twenty-four hours*. This is at present entirely inadmissible, and has marred the beauty and interest, not only of the Greek and Roman drama, but of Addison and the French tragedists, who have imitated the classic models.

The *Unity of place* required that the *same scene* should be kept before the spectator during the entire piece. This most monotonous formula has been disregarded in the modern drama, a chief attraction of which is the presentation of new, varied, and rich scenery, in which art counterfeits nature with rare success. But in a *single Act* of the modern drama, which

demands a close unity of action, it may be doubted whether much is not lost to the illusion, by the shifting of scenes, and the transformations of locality, before the eye of the spectator.

As a remarkable example of the regular construction of the drama, in accordance with the *three unities*, Dr. Blair has mentioned the "Cato" of Addison. "The author," he says, "has limited himself in *time* to a single day; and in *place* has maintained the most rigorous unity. The scene is never changed; and the whole action passes in the hall of Cato's house, at Utica." And, in consequence, the "Cato" is a perfect failure. Some of the best dramatists have failed in unity: among them Shakspeare even is to be found. Preserving the *unity of action* with tolerable care, he has frequently violated the unity of *time* and of *place*. Perhaps he knew little of the nice laws of dramatic discourse; but made for himself laws suited to his own most original and glorious mind.

What has been said has been designed to explain terms so often met with, rather than in any way to enforce these rigorous rules. A proper respect for unity in discourse must be observed by all writers; but they should not, in any form of discourse, allow themselves to be cramped and trammelled by its requisitions. Like the delicate web the discourse should have beauty of design and symmetry of proportion;

the genius of the author, in passing with his subject to its object, should—

“Feel at each thread, and live along the line.”

But nature is a better teacher than even Greek art; and nature, while it originally gave the rule, presents also the caution.

CHAPTER XII.

OF STYLE.

(83.) *Preliminary Inquiries.*

THIS has been stated as our third division of Rhetoric. Having thus far considered only Invention and Arrangement—*i. e.*, the rhetorical preparation of the thought in discourse, we come now to consider the dress of this thought, or rather the *body* of the discourse, of which the subject-matter constitutes the *spirit*: in other words, style has regard to the *language* in which our thoughts, as *invented* and *arranged*, are *expressed* for the purposes of instruction. And here we would recur again to Dr. Campbell's *dictum*. We have shown that the first part of that dictum is true; that “Rhetoric holds of Logic by the sense;” we now enter upon the examination of the second part, and, as we proceed, we shall find it equally true that “Rhetoric holds of Grammar by the *expression*.” Thus, in its *Invention*, discourse demands of *Logic* the proper *arguments*; in its *Style* it subsidizes *Grammar* for the *proper* and *correct language* with which to express these arguments.

By *Style* is meant the mode or manner by which thought is expressed in language; and in our limited scope a special reference to the English language is designed. It is necessary then, at the outset, to say a few words as to the design of language in general, and as to the characteristics of the English language in particular. This must necessarily be very brief.

(84.) *Of Language in General.*

Since, as it has been remarked, Rhetoric makes use of *Grammar*, in its applications of language, a great deal of what comes within the province of Grammar must be either explained in a treatise on Rhetoric, or it must be taken for granted as understood by the student before he undertakes the study of Rhetoric.

It may be well, however, to mention a few of the principal features of language, which belong equally to Grammar and Rhetoric.

Language is the faculty of expressing thought by means of certain sounds, which are used as the *signs of thought*. The sounds which are thus used are called *articulate* sounds, or sounds which are made expressly to set forth thought.

It must be observed that *language*, then, was given to man just as *reason* was bestowed upon him. They *both* distinguish him from the brute creation, and main-

tain an invariable relation to each other: for *reason* is the *principle* of man's *thoughts* or *ideas*, and language is their *expression*.

And, again, it is manifest that man, thus gifted with speech to express his thoughts, puts forth an *arbitrary* power, in order to connect them. For the same objects or thoughts have, in different languages, a different set of articulate sounds to express them: and individuals of different nations cannot understand each other without going through the new mental and mnemonic process of learning the new language.

(85.) *Of Spoken Language.*

It is unnecessary, in this investigation, to discuss the theories which have been brought forward to account for the origin of speech; we content ourselves with the statement found in the Bible, which informs us that God gave to Adam the power of speech—the organs by which articulate sounds are uttered,—*i. e.*, the *thorax*, through which the volume of sound is emitted, and the *teeth*, the *tongue*, the *lips*, the *palate*, which modify the sound and render it articulate in its passage. Besides this complex *power*, God gave to man the *will* to use it; and we are told that, after all this rare gift, God brought the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air, “unto Adam, to see what he would call them; and whatsoever

Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof."

It should be mentioned that many distinguished philologists have endeavoured to discover the law by which language has developed itself; for, even contenting ourselves with the Mosaic account of the divine origin of language, we cannot doubt that, like all other natural gifts, it is subject to improvement and development.

Lord Monboddó, considering man an improved or higher species of ape, corroborates his theory by finding certain resemblances between primitive sounds of the human voice and the chattering of apes.

The discussion of such theories forms no part of our subject, although *speech*, as originally given, was much limited by the *ignorance* and the *want of practice* of the earliest human being; yet, as the *power* and the *will* existed, language increased in its vocabulary as the range of thought and observation became more expanded; and the conventional sounds were commensurate in number and application to the objects and ideas which came crowding in newness of beauty and splendour upon the mind.

Thus, a cry of *passion*, rage, fear, sorrow, love, was an untutored expression of thought which suggested a *word* like itself in sound. Such are still reproduced in what are called *exclamations*. A harsh, or rough, or boisterous subject or person,

would, on the principle of *imitation*, call for a similar sound to express it. This, of course, was easy, when noise or motion were concerned, and thus we may readily trace, to such a source, many common words in use at the present day. The *cuckoo* is named from its own sound; so, also, is the *whip-poor-will*. A stream is said to *flow*, a rifle to *crack*; the wind *whistles* or *moans*; the lion *roars*; the bee *buzzes*; and so for many common words taken evidently from the sound in question.

Such an inquiry may be carried much farther than the limits of this work will permit. The organs of the voice seem *intuitively* to suit themselves to the sound required with strange appropriateness.

Take a few examples:—Words beginning with *sl*, a *liquid* sound, are usually expressive of gentle motion; as *slow*, *sly*, *slit*, *slip*, *slide*, &c.

Those beginning with *st* usually denote firmness and strength, such as might spring from the etymology of the Latin verb, *sto-stare*, *to stand*; for example, *stay*, *stop*, *staff*, *steady*, *state*, &c.

Thus, also, words beginning with *thr*, imply *force*, as *through*, *thrust*, *threaten*; *wr* begins words indicating *obliquity*, as *wrong*, *wrangle*, *wrest*, &c.

The earlier sounds, adopted as signs of the thoughts, became, in process of time, *fixed*, *polished*, and *inflected*, for more distinct and delicate use; and thus

the parts of speech became formed, and the distinct functions of grammar were evolved.

Thus, the necessity of some convention of speech, by which the same thoughts could always be expressed by the same words, was the origin of orthography and syntax; while the gradual process of polishing and refining, what before was aboriginal, harsh, and dissonant, employing for this purpose the principle of harmony, gave rise to *prosody*, and by its aid gave laws of rhythm and versification to *poetry*.

(86.) *Of Written Language.*

As speech could only convey thought as far as the voice—the organ of speech—could be heard, the next problem, which arose to tax the human ingenuity, was the discovery of a mode by which these thoughts might be expressed to a person out of hearing, and at a distance from the speaker. The solution of this problem is *written language*.

There is a story of an Indian who carried from one settlement to another a *letter*, which contained a full account of some crimes he had committed, and was thunderstruck when he found that those who received the letter knew, in detail, all he had done. This wonder is significant of the slow process by which *writing* attained to its present perfect adaptation to sound. And it will be observed that the

written characters are more arbitrary and conventional than the sounds themselves. There are, manifestly, two sorts of written characters, *symbols of the object*, and *signs of the word*. Let us look at both for a moment.

I. Included among those written forms which symbolized the thought, are *pictures* and *hieroglyphs*.

It would appear, from an examination of man's nature, that *pictures* must have been the first attempt to express thought by writing. We find children to make their first efforts in design by imitating things around them, and the history of all savage tribes proves the same fact. The Aztec picture writings formed the written archives of the government, as well as the postal communication found in Mexico, when the Spaniards landed at Vera Cruz, under Cortez. They depicted the cavaliers; the horses, then entirely new to them; the thundering cannon: these pictures, forming in some sort a connected story, were sent at full speed, by the Indian runners, from the coast to the great city of Tenochtitlan—the present Mexico—where Montezuma resided. The plan of expressing thought by pictures has been called the *ideographic* system.

Not unlike the pictures, in their symbolism, were the *hieroglyphical* characters used in the East and in Egypt. But the hieroglyphs were a step in advance of the pictures: they symbolized ideal things that

had no form or semblance. Thus, *knowledge* was portrayed by an *eye*; a *circle* was the symbol of *eternity*; for *wisdom* they drew an *ant*, and for *ingratitude* a *viper*.

But this form was leaving, in some degree, the idea of imitation, and approximating to the entirely conventional system of *alphabetical writing*. Hieroglyphs, from the Greek *ιερος*, *sacred*, and *γλυφω*, *to carve*, originally covered the idea of pictures; but, in their purely symbolic form, they owe their origin to the early Egyptian priests, and were employed, as the name indicates, principally in making sacred records. The task of determining the nature of these records, by an investigation of the system of hieroglyphs, devolved upon Champollion, a French savan, and was very successfully performed.

II. We come now to consider the second kind of writing, which, although it bears no resemblance, or symbolical analogy, to the object or quality which we design to express, gives only the *sign for the word*. Here everything is *conventional* and arbitrary. Sometimes the manner of this presentation of thought is very rude and simple; thus, the aborigines of South America make knots at certain distances, in cords of various colours, and thus write their letters on a string. To a certain extent the North American Indians carry out this principle, in their belts or strings of *wampum*. Of this nature, also, are the

Arabic characters which we use in arithmetic, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c., and which are not only arbitrary signs, but are also entirely *abstract*, representing the numbers of any objects or ideas whatever; thus, we speak of *three men*, or *three houses*, or *three miles*, applying the numeral equally to persons, places, or distances.

The principal progress in the second form of writing, or that in which a *sign* of the thing is made, was in the invention of an *alphabet*. This word is the conjunction of the first two letters of the Greek alphabet—*αλφα βητα*; and the alphabet is a list of arbitrary signs, called *letters*, which are used to form words; but a language may consist, as does the Chinese, of an alphabet of *words*: each *sign* or *figure* being a *word*, instead of a *letter*; or it may be an alphabet of *syllables*, such as is found in the Siamese language, and in the written dialect of Ethiopia.

Our own alphabet of letters comes to us directly from the Romans, but they got it, with slight alteration, from the Greeks; and then we recur to the well known tradition that the Greek alphabet was brought to Greece by Cadmus, more than three thousand years ago; a tradition which is corroborated by the conformity found between the oldest Greek inscriptions and the Phœnician letters. Those who are curious in tracing written language, will find a diversity of interesting inquiries. The old form of writing

was *from right to left*; and it is still seen in the Hebrew writings. The first so called improvement upon this was made by the Greeks, and called *βουστροφηδον*, or *turning like ploughing oxen*. The first line was from right to left, and the second from left to right, and thus they alternated like the furrows in a cornfield. An example of this is to be found in the Sigæan inscription among the Arundel marbles.

There cannot be expected, in a treatise on Rhetoric, a full exposition of Language, which in reality belongs, in its details of structure, to Grammar, and in its expansion, in the province of words, to the larger science of Philology; but the structure of language must be presupposed, and borne in mind, during the study of Rhetoric; for, from *Philology* Rhetoric claims the signification and proper use of *words*, and upon *Grammar* Rhetoric depends for the *structure of sentences*. Both *words* and *sentences* must be kept in view in the consideration of *Style*.

(87.) *Of the English Language.*

Of the English Language, to which the laws of Rhetoric are here applied, it should be remarked, that it has facilities, equalled by no other language, for constructing forcible and elegant discourse. Composed in the main of the Anglo-Saxon, and

the Latin (including the French), it combines the vigour and boldness of the Northern speech, with the harmony and flow of the Mediterranean tongues. In many cases we have two words to express the same object or thought, the one taken from the Saxon and the other from the Latin, and nice shades of difference, analogous to the difference between the Saxon and the Roman mind, are thus obtained; a just proportion of the two produces the happiest effects; and has characterized the best productions of English Literature.

It is evident that the adaptations of Rhetoric are modified essentially by the character of the language; and it is no less true, that the language as to its vigour or poverty reacts upon the intellectual powers of the nation using it. Thus, English Rhetoric will not only differ from the laws laid down by Aristotle for Greek, or by Cicero and Quintilian for the Latin; but we shall find the English Language suggesting and soaring to reach, as it were, the greatest thoughts, and then holding them enchained for ever, as in the splendid imagery of Milton or the immortal philosophy of Shakspeare. If we desire to compare our own with another language, we find Montaigne, in his *Essays*, giving us a well considered opinion of the scope and power of the French, as it flourished in the sixteenth century. "I find it sufficiently abounding, but not sufficiently pliable and vigorous; it

quails under a powerful conception; if you would maintain the dignity of your style, you will oft perceive it to flag and languish under you." Not so the English: the best German philologists, among whom may be mentioned Jacob Grimm, have been found to assert that the English is, taken in all its parts, the finest language ever known; because it has subsidized and combined the best features of the best languages which existed before it. To fashion this language into its best forms for conveying beautiful and vigorous thought; to use its *words* in a proper and precise manner; with them to construct sentences, *clear, strong, and harmonious*;—these are the functions of *Style*, and thus *Style*, while it is sensibly dependent upon the rules and teachings of Grammar, is also an important division of Rhetoric.

(88.) *Of the Diversities of Style.*

From these general remarks on language, we return now in due order to the consideration of *STYLE*.

By *Style* in Rhetoric, it has already been said, is meant the manner in which a writer expresses his thoughts in language. It is derived from the Stylus or iron pen, with which letters were scratched upon the tables of wax used for certain records. *Style*, although of a lower order than Invention in Rhetoric, bearing to it the relation of the body to the spirit, of the

outward form to the inner substance, is still of vital importance, since no thought has value until it is expressed, and *Style* is this very expression of the thought. *Style*, it is evident, varies with many considerations. First it varies with the varieties of language, springing from the varied character of men, whether in nations or as individuals; expressing their peculiarities as essentially as is done by their features or general appearance; again from the divers *subjects* upon which it is employed, and finally from the different *occasions* upon which it is used.

First, then, look at the national differences. The Oriental nations expressed themselves in a diffuse and florid manner, preferring apologue and parable to plain language; and our North American Indian fills his speech, short and pithy as it usually is, with metaphors and illustrations drawn from nature around him. Thus, we say the *English* style is plainer and less inverted than the *French*: and so each nation has its peculiarity, springing from the habits, residence, and historic circumstances of its people.

For *individual* varieties we have coined a number of adjectives to express the marked peculiarities. Thus, Lord Bacon's style, especially that of his essays and letters, and also the aphoristic style, which finds its most thorough illustration in the *Antitheta*, has properties so distinguishing it from all others, that when a writer expresses himself in a similar manner, we

call his style *Baconian*. The style of the best numbers of the "Spectator," distinguished in its day for ease, elegance, and learning, was called *Addisonian*, from their writer. And so highly was it appreciated for nearly a century afterwards, that Dr. Johnson declared that he who would form a good English style must give his days and nights to the study of Addison. Dr. Johnson's own pompous style is now known as *Johnsonian*, while his *Latinistic* language has been humorously called, in certain cases, since his own day, "*Johnsonese*;" and was supposed to need translation into English. So fearful, indeed, did Dr. Johnson seem of using plain Saxon English, that he is said, in more instances than one, to have made a simple entry in a diary, or to have related a circumstance in a private letter, in plain English, while the same facts, dressed out for publication in his "Journey to the Hebrides," are given in his most pompous and foreign language.

In the account of this Journey he states that he found upon "the bed on which he was to repose, a man black as a cyclops from a forge;" which statement he had already made, in a letter to Mrs. Thrale, in the following plainer words: "a dirty fellow bounced out of the bed on which one of us was to lie." This indicates clearly the difference between Johnson's thought, which was clear and simple, and the pecu-

liarity of his expression, or his *style*; which partook so largely of the Latin element in our language.

The *brilliant* style of Macaulay, both in his history and his essays, and the *trenchant* style of Sidney Smith, will sufficiently illustrate all that need be said, in this place, concerning the varieties of style which grow out of individual character. Buffon has said, and the remark has been often quoted: "Style is the man himself."

The question would naturally be asked, if among these numerous variations of style there is a standard of rhetorical style, which, when applied to each individual writer, will establish his claim to goodness and elegance.

To answer this, it must first be observed that different kinds of discourse require different kinds of style. Thus, an *oration* may be written in long flowing periods, suited to the cadences of the human voice, or what the French rhetoricians have distinguished as the *style périodique*; while a brief statement of some exact logical subject will demand short, expressive, exact sentences, forming a *curt* and *epigrammatic* style. With these peculiarities of style, the grammatical structure of sentences, as to their clearness and harmony, has much to do.

Many other circumstances, analogous to these, will affect the choice of words and the structure of sentences; but when these are all duly considered, rhe-

toricians have decided upon a standard scale of style, which is marked in its different degrees and according to its different uses by the adjectives *diffuse*, *concise*, *feeble*, *nervous*, *dry*, *plain*, *neat*, *elegant*, *florid*, &c., denoting at once the character of the writer's mind, the degree of imagination with which he is endowed, and the adaptation of the style to the subject-matter of the discourse. But the distinctions made by these adjective epithets is very vague and indeterminate; for every fancied quality of style a new epithet might be coined, and thus our nomenclature increased *ad infinitum*.

There is, however, a just standard of style, which will be best conveyed by the words *good* and *appropriate* on the one hand, and by *bad* or *inappropriate* on the other.

Since style is that part of Rhetoric which has to do with grammar, it may be said that it is an extension and higher use of grammar itself; or, as Dr. Campbell has well illustrated it, "the grammatical art bears much the same relation to the rhetorical which the art of the mason bears to that of the architect."

It will be well, therefore, to go back a little to the consideration of grammatical purity of language, which is the first requisite of style, without which, indeed, style is rhetorically displeasing and imperfect. It is usual to presuppose it, as a foundation for Rhe-

toric, but it is better to connect it in this work with what has heretofore been deemed purely rhetorical, from that intimate connection between the two arts which makes either useless without the other.

And here it becomes necessary to mention a few of what are called grammatical figures; or designed deviations from grammatical rules, which affect the style of discourse.

I. *Of Orthography*. Those which give a false spelling, as *Mimesis* and *Archaism*.

II. *Of Etymology*. Those which alter the form of the word so as to rob it of the marks of its lineage, thus: *'till* for *until*; *'bove* for *above*, &c. These are very numerous, and include all the recent efforts made to accomplish a system of "phonetic spelling," that is, spelling a word as it is pronounced, and thus losing all marks of its ancestry; as, in many received words, has been already done. "Fancy" gives no trace of its Greek parentage; while "phantasy," its older form, tells us at once that it is derived from *φαντασια*.

III. *Of Syntax*. These errors consist in the altered construction of sentences, by means of the addition or leaving out of words, or by an inverted form of speech. Such are the *Pleonasm*, the *Ellipsis*, *Syllipsis*, &c.

It is only designed to mention the existence and general form of these grammatical figures; all of

which are indeed of importance in the construction of style; but they must be studied at length in grammatical treatises, and presupposed as already known by those who undertake the study of Rhetoric. Of the figures of *Orthography*, the one called *mimesis* consists of false spelling, giving an incorrect pronunciation, as *mischievius*. The second in this class is the *archaism*, or spelling according to *old* forms when new ones have entirely superseded them in good and current usage: such as *Faërie Queene*; *hadde* for *had*; or *a* if we should now adopt the spelling of old Father Chaucer:—

“But Cristes’ love, and his apostles twelve
He taught, but first he folwed it himselve.”

Of the figures of *Etymology*, we may take as examples the *Syncope*, *Diæresis*, and *Paragoge*. *Syncope* is the leaving out of one or more letters in a word, as *e’er* for *ever*, *ne’er* for *never*, *isn’t* for *is not*, &c.

Diæresis is the marking of distinct syllables where two vowels come together, which would otherwise be pronounced as a diphthong; this is indicated by two dots over the second vowel, as in *preëminent*, *aërial*.

Paragoge consists in adding a letter or syllable to a word, as *vasty* for *vast*, *withouten* for *without*.

Of the figures of *Syntax* we mention the *Pleonasm*, or the use of superfluous words; as in the passage:

“They return *back again* to the *same* city from whence they come *forth*; or “I went home *full of a great many* serious reflection. The superfluous words marked in *italics* are quite obvious, and lend nothing to the sense.

The *Ellipsis*, or the omission of words really belonging to the sentence, but which the mind readily supplies, and which are then said to be *understood*.

It is obvious that these errors in Grammar are of chief importance, in their rhetorical use, as marring the excellence of style. They must, of course, be constantly guarded against, because they conflict seriously with the qualities of a good style, now about to be laid down.

Thus, though they are violations of Grammar only, they become corrupters of Rhetoric, and show us how important Grammar is to Rhetoric; Rhetoric being, as has been already suggested, dependent on Grammar in its relation to Style.

To sum up all in a word, then, Rhetoric must presuppose perfect grammatical correctness and propriety, or its own correctness and propriety are invaded, and its own success, as means to an end, sadly endangered.

We pass now to the consideration of the qualities of a good style, and to the proper cautions against the corresponding evils; by means of which we may frame our discourse upon just rules, and guard against error.

CHAPTER XIII.

QUALITIES OF STYLE.

THE distinct qualities, which must always be possessed by a good style, may all be included under the three heads of *Perspicuity*, *Energy*, and *Elegance*.

(89.) *Perspicuity*.

This word meant, originally, capable of *being seen through*, from the Latin *perspicio*.

By *Perspicuity*, in Rhetoric, is meant then such a use of words, phrases, and sentences, as will convey our ideas to others clearly and intelligibly. It will immediately appear that this is the principal quality of Style—for which reason it has been first stated; for, unless we make ourselves distinctly understood, all our *energy* is useless, and the general *appropriateness* of our language, and the adaptation of manner, to the occasion and to the persons addressed, will be unavailing. To be understood is our first aim. And yet, although *perspicuity* is thus of pri-

mary importance, it will be readily perceived that it is entirely relative. That which is perfectly intelligible to some is jargon to others.

Persons of quick apprehension catch the meaning of the speaker, while it is yet enigmatical to others; scientific men apprehend in a few technical terms what would require pages of explanation to make *perspicuous* to the unlearned. And besides thus consulting the character of the audience or the readers; reference must be also made to the circumstances which surround them; to the attention they can be prevailed upon to bestow on the subject-matter presented; and to the manner and duration of that attention. Here nice judgment and tact are necessary.

As in general, however, any rhetorical effort is presented not to single individuals, but to numbers, who include all varieties of mind and all degrees of attention, this quality of style becomes the more important, and must therefore be subjected to some general rules, which will in some degree suit all discourses. And first, it will be observed, from what has been already said, that *perspicuity* has very much to do with Grammar, and that here "Rhetoric holds of Grammar."

Thus the language used must be *correct*, or, to analyze it grammatically, the words must be *pure*, that is, good modern English, as opposed to the *obsolete* and the *new-coined*. They must be *proper*, or so

selected as to convey the exact ideas designed, and the words and sentences must be *precise*, or convey no more than the exact design of the writer.

Now, these two requisites of *purity* and *propriety*, as applied to words and phrases, are sometimes mistaken for each other, or indiscriminately allied: but, as we shall see, they are quite distinct. Purity is entirely a grammatical requisite, Propriety partakes both of Grammar and Rhetoric, while that subdivision of perspicuity which has to do with Rhetoric most strictly, is *precision*.

By *precision*, we mean the *lopping off beforehand*—that is, before we use the sentence—of all superfluous words and phrases, so that the thought be expressed exactly in the number and with the arrangement of words which convey it exactly, and which convey no more and no less than it.

Before proceeding to a consideration of these divisions in the order, a few general remarks as to want of perspicuity, may not be out of place.

Opposed to perspicuity, in its rhetorical sense, is *too great brevity*, which renders the subject unintelligible to the intellectually weaker part of the audience; leaving chasms unbridged, across which they have not the power to spring, and presenting thus a string of disconnected, isolated thoughts, which depend really upon the linking process for their relative value. This linking process, which may be made for them-

selves by the stronger minds in the audience, the speaker should make for the less intelligent himself.

To avoid this error, many writers violate the laws of *perspicuity* by falling into the opposite fault, that of *prolixity*, which so clouds the subject with words as to obscure it by its garb of language. Here, as in most matters of learning, the middle course is the safest; for prolixity not only injures the sense to the attentive hearer, but it wearies most persons so that they become inattentive, and forget the former part of the argument or statement before the whole is presented.

Again: perspicuity is offended by a *bad arrangement* of the discourse, leading us to connect thoughts not designed to be so connected; and by the use of *technical terms* unintelligible to the popular mind.

Of course, what has been said has entire reference to the *honest* purpose of a *well-informed* writer or speaker, whose only aim is to make himself understood.

From the earliest times of its existence, Rhetoric has been made to suffer by those whose purposes were not honest, and who used it as a cloak for falsehood, and as an instrument of self-interest, with which to entangle and deceive honest but not gifted seekers for truth.

Thus, an audience is imposed upon by one kind of empiric, through a want of perspicuity growing out of

the extreme conciseness of his style; and they say, in proportion as he is unintelligible, "he must be very learned and above our comprehension," while he is in reality, by this very means, deceiving them.

Another, who is very diffuse, is highly rated for that minuteness of detail and richness of illustration which are thought to indicate the very careful and studious mind. Thus, a want of perspicuity is made a veil for fallacy and error, which are concealed in the brilliant clouds of his discourse.

Perhaps the absence of perspicuity most thoroughly accomplishes these evil results in houses of legislation; and in questions of factious partisanship, in all kinds of conventions and parliamentary associations.

It is no uncommon thing for a person whose object is to speak against time, to endeavour to mystify the people; simply to occupy a certain time, that it may not be appropriated to another, and, to him, an undesired purpose. As destructive as this would be naturally to perspicuity, it is to be observed that the object of such men is not even to appear perspicuous, but so to confuse their hearers as to keep them in the vain endeavour to determine his meaning, while he is thus accomplishing his purpose.

Where, in houses of legislation or courts of law, there is no limit of time fixed for a speaker on any given subject, like the one-hour law sometimes prescribed in our Congress, this kind of mischief pre-

vails to a great extent. There are many instances of such efforts on record. Whately tells a story of an advocate who spoke thus at random for *six* hours, while a messenger was despatched for an important document, accidentally left behind at a town twenty-five miles off. But this is not confined to oratory in courts or public bodies.

We cannot, I think, sufficiently condemn those so-called philosophers, who, departing from the tenets of Bible Christianity, expressed so clearly in the New Testament, startle the world by astounding dogmas of philosophy, and lead captive men too weak to understand their mischief, but who are dazzled by their arrogance and apparent learning. They are called Thinkers in this age; they were called Freethinkers in times past, and more lately they have given to philosophy the unwelcome systems of Rationalism, Transcendentalism, and Pantheism. In every case we only need demand that they be *perspicuous*; *pure* and *proper* in their words and phrases, and *precise* in their sentences; in other words, that their Rhetoric give clear meaning to the sense, by displaying their invention in all its logical arrangements; and be perspicuous in the style which expresses this sense. When this is demanded, to all men of clear minds and ordinary culture their "occupation's gone;" for their error is exposed.

Combined with much that is really profound, this

want of perspicuity is displayed in the writings of many of the German philosophers whose works form even now the very vanguard of philosophic progress. Nor are England and America without the disciples of this school.

A great English writer has most happily described this school of authors in the following words, which are designed to compare them with the clear and sententious style of Lord Bacon:—

“There are some qualities in Bacon’s writings to which it is important, from time to time, to direct special attention, on account of a tendency often showing itself, and not least at the present day, to regard with excessive admiration writers of a completely opposite character, those of a mystical, dim, half-intelligible kind of affected grandeur.

“It is well known what a reproach to (the English) climate is the prevalence of fogs, and how much more of risk and inconvenience results from that mixture of light and obscurity than from the darkness of night. But let any one imagine to himself, if he can, a mist so resplendent with gay, prismatic colours, that men should forget its inconveniences in their admiration of its beauty, and that a kind of nebular taste should prevail, for preferring that gorgeous dimness to vulgar daylight; nothing short of this could afford a parallel to the mischief done to the public mind by some late writers both in England and America;—a

sort of “children of the mist,” who bring forward their speculations, often very silly, and not seldom very mischievous,—under cover of the twilight. They have accustomed their disciples to admire, as a style sublimely philosophical, what may best be described as a certain haze of words imperfectly understood, through which some seemingly original ideas, scarcely distinguishable in their outlines, loom, as it were, on the view, in a kind of dusky magnificence that greatly exaggerates their real dimensions.”*

It must be premised, before concluding these general remarks on the subject of rhetorical perspicuity, that there are great temptations to its violation, and especially to young writers and speakers in their efforts to display, what is called *eloquence*; to give certain harmony of voice and gesture in public speaking, or to *round a period* gracefully, as it is often called: this is generally done by the use of harmonious but unmeaning words. The young are generally redundant in expression, and if they would cut away all those graceful periods, and forbear that harmony, in most cases, greater perspicuity would be the result. They would find their boasted eloquence *Verba et præterea nihil*, and might be instructed how to conduct a new attempt upon the same theme. But we proceed now to some more detailed consideration

* Archbishop Whately’s annotations of Bacon’s writings—Introduction.

of the special qualities, which range under the generic term *perspicuity*. The first of these has been called *purity*, and is, as has been said, a rhetorical use, of what is truly a function of *grammar*.

(90.) *Of Purity, as one of the Elements of Perspicuity.*

Purity, as an element of perspicuity, consists in the choice of *words* and *idioms* belonging to the language as correctly used. Thus Purity is violated:—

I. By the use of words once good, but now grown *obsolete*, or, as this word indicates, out of the *custom* of use. As examples of this form of violation, we have the singular phrases and words of our old English writers: *eftsoons*, *erst*, *sel*, *rivage*, *childe*, *yclept*, &c., which may be found in Spenser, and were imitated by Lord Byron. Although some freedom may be granted in the use of such words by the poets, in prose they are entirely inadmissible. Under this same head may be included words, which are only partially obsolete, such as *lore*, *ken*, and similar words, which are to be used with caution, as they endanger the purity of style.

There are also among these words of doubtful purity, a class which is, according to a vital law of language, coming back from this partial obsolescence into full use, because of their real value and our need of them. Akin to these obsolete words are provincial

words and idioms, usually an older form which the provinces have retained, while the Metropolitan language has progressed, and left them behind as half obsolete.

II. Purity, as a quality of style, is violated by the use of new words, not warranted by the necessity of the times, and not framed according to the linguical law of coining new words. Such are *energize*, *deputize*, *declinature*, *residenter*, *obnoxious*, when used for *noxious* or *disagreeable*, *philosophism*, &c.

It must be remembered, that as science expands, and is divided and classified, new words must be made to express and fix the new ideas thus developed: but even this should follow the *law of formation*, or we shall have monstrous words belonging to no system, but fixed unfortunately and unduly upon the language by custom, before we are aware of it, and so strongly that they cannot be rooted out.

So copious is our English language in words which express all forms of ideas, that no educated writer would seek to make new ones, except at the demand of science. Conservatism in language is the rule by which purity is insured.

III. Words and idioms from foreign languages, are opposed to purity of style. Whenever our own language gives us the words necessary for conveying our ideas, it is wrong to seek for foreign words for the purpose; since, to those who understand the

foreign tongue, it will seem *affectation* and *pedantry*, and to those who do not we shall be unintelligible, and thus the very purpose of our discourse be defeated.

While it must be admitted, that there are a few ideas better expressed in foreign languages than in our own, such as *ennui*, *prestige*, *à propos*, *hors de combat*, which indeed are becoming incorporated into English, and in a few years will belong to its recent gains; and, while certain Latin and French phrases, proverbs, or epigrams, recur to and open to our memory a whole field of thought and former research; yet, these exceptions only strengthen the rule that we should abstain from foreign words and idioms, if we would preserve the purity of an English style.

(91.) *Of Propriety, as an Element of Perspicuity.*

It is evident that however *pure* our words and phrases may be, free from all obsolescence, all foreign taint, all provincial usage, there is something still necessary to make them the proper vehicles of thought—this quality is *propriety*; or we may define propriety to consist in using *pure* English words in their *proper* sense, avoiding a *vulgar* use of words, and choosing among *paronymous* words, or words springing from the same root, the one which alone expresses the term we would use.

As examples of the vulgar use of words, we would point out all social or conventional slang, the use of superlative words and phrases, to express simple and positive ideas. Thus, a good thing is “the best in the world;” a fine day is “the most superb since the creation;” slight pain is “perfect torture;” and thus language is robbed of its power. We “love” a certain food: “What more,” said a just critic, “could you do to your father and mother?” We “admire” to do a certain thing. “Quiz, bamboozle, come it over,” are other examples of words at once impure and improper.

But, among the improper uses of paronymous words, there are still more dangerous errors, because no allowance is made for them, and they are often unnoticed. *Convince* and *convict*, *presume* and *presumption*; the great numbers of twin nouns ending in *ance* and *ation*, and analogous terminations, give rise to these violations of propriety in paronymous words. Thus, we have *observation* used instead of *observance*; and sometimes a more obvious error in such words as *duration* and *endurance*, because they both have reference to prolonged time.

If from *propriety* in words we come to consider propriety in *phrases*, we shall here find great scope for criticism. Thus, we are told that the “university is the best of *all other* institutions;” when the proper construction is that it is *better than* all others.

A number of similar errors are to be found in Milton, for example:—

“Adam,
The comeliest man of men, *since born*
His sons; the fairest of *her daughters*, Eve.

In most of these cases there is no doubt as to the real meaning of the author; but this only renders the error more apparent.

(92.) *Of Precision, as an Element of Perspicuity.*

Precision of Style, as its derivation assures us— from the Latin *præ* and *cædo*—consists in so pruning and casting off all unnecessary words, phrases, and parts of sentences, as to convey to the reader the exact meaning of the writer.

This goes one step beyond propriety, in that it passes from the mere use of *words* and *phrases*, according to the laws of grammar, and deals with the *words* and structure of *sentences* as to their exact fitness to the thought.

And first, of precision in words.

As we have already seen, the two great components of our language, the *Latin* and the *Anglo-Saxon*, furnish us with pairs of words, originally designed, in many cases, to express the same meaning, but in the process of time they have deviated from this first identical meaning, and now are different. Other

causes have given to words in our language meanings nearly the same, and yet essentially different. Among these it is the office of rhetorical precision to choose in each case the word conveying the exact meaning, and this rule is violated when any other is chosen. Such also is the case when we use superfluous words, as for instance, in speaking of an action as *utterly*, *entirely*, and *absolutely* wrong, one adverb has expressed the whole; and the others are superfluous.

This nearness of meaning in two or more words brings us to the subject of Synonyms, which must be partially developed in this place. Our space will only admit a general outline of the divisions and characteristics of synonymous words.

(93.) *Of Synonyms.*

The Greek words, *συν*, *with*, and *ονομα*, *a name*, which make up our English word *synonym*, are intended to express an exact identity in the meaning of the two words which we call synonymous; and, at first, doubtless such was the case. Thus, to trace an example: our Saxon word *neighbour* was exactly translated by the French word *voisin*, and the derived word *neighbourhood* by *voisinage*. When, then, the English words taken from the Norman French, *vicinage* and *vicinity* began to be used, they were identical in meaning with *neighbourhood*. But circum-

stances soon began to give a distinct meaning to each of these words. *Neighbourhood* still referred to people; *all the neighbourhood* meaning all the people; *vicinity* lost the element of person and referred to things. *Neighbourhood* became a more immediate *vicinity*. We speak of houses and streets in the *neighbourhood*; but of places in the *vicinity* of Philadelphia or New York. Such a process is continually going on with synonymous words; and those but lately of very nearly the same meaning, are deviating daily farther and farther from each other. And the philosophy of this movement is quite apparent. By a natural law of language, where two words existed of the same signification, they were not permitted to be idlers, or to do half duty, but a special service and meaning was given to each.

By another equally instinctive law, words nearly alike in meaning were ranged, when practicable, the one above the other—the one as *genus* and the other as *species*, and thus were distinguished by their comprehension. Thus the synonymous words, *answer* and *reply*: *answer* is the *general* term, *reply* the *specific* kind of *answer*. We *answer* any question; we *reply* to a controversial one. An *answer* informs an inquirer; a *reply* refutes or rebuts an opponent. We speak, now, of course, critically, for we know that in common conversation the two words are used

indiscriminately; and this is the case with most synonyms. And this brings us to the present definition of a *synonym*. It consists in the similarity or likeness in meaning of two or more words, by reason of which they may be mistaken for each other. Nowhere is the error more apparent than in rhymed poetry; for here, often the verse suggests the sequent, because it demands the use of a word which shall rhyme with its last word.

It may be said, and with justice, that there are some words, which are so nearly the same in meaning, that they may sometimes be properly used for each other; as for example: *almighty* and *omnipotent*; *happiness* and *felicity*; *forerunner* and *precursor*; *pastor* and *shepherd*; but even in these, a ready eye will detect such difference as would render it improper under all circumstances to interchange them. Thus, while we do sometimes call a clergyman a careful *shepherd*, it would not do to speak of an ordinary keeper of sheep as a *pastor*. It is good Latin but poor English. John the Baptist was the *forerunner* of Christ; it would sound strangely to call him the *precursor*.

It is not within the scope of this work to enter at length into the history of English synonymy, as to the sources from which such words have sprung, and the modes in which they have become *synonymous*. The existence of several *radix* languages in our own, is the largest *source*, and the changing circumstances

and relations at home and abroad, of the English people, have supplied the *modes*. One very suggestive instance may be borrowed from an eminent philologist, as an illustration, in the synonyms of our English word *trick*. The word is from the Saxon, and has the following *synonyms*: *artifice*, (artificium, Latin); *device* (devisa, Italian); *stratagem* (στρατηγημα, Greek); *finesse*, French. Here are five words, sometimes, at least, used interchangeably. It concerns us however more, to observe a practical division of synonyms, arranged according to their quality. The best division is as follows, and many examples, which we have not time to give, will readily suggest themselves to the student.

- I. Generic and specific.
- II. Active and passive.
- III. Intensity (greater or less).
- IV. Positive and negative.
- V. Miscellaneous.

I. Under the head of *Generic* and *Specific*, a much larger number of words may be placed than at first would seem practicable. A *genus*, it will be observed, is always placed above, and comprehends the *species*.

A few examples will best illustrate our meaning: Take the words *applause* and *praise*; an examination of these will prove that *praise* is the *general* expression, and *applause* the particular kind of *praise*. We may in our hearts *praise* God for his mercy and

loving kindness, but we do not *applaud* him; our *applause* is confined to public demonstrations of praise to man.

So the verbs *to do* and *to make*, which in many languages are expressed, in part at least, by the same word,—(*facio* in Latin; *faire* in French; *hacer* in Spanish, &c.), are justly in English ranged under this head; *to do* being the *general* term, of which *to make* is the particular kind of *action* or *doing*. We *do good* or *evil*; we *make houses* or *plans*.

Bonds (Ang. Sax., *bindan*, to bind), are whatever restricts our liberty: *fetters* (Sax. *fæter*), means what binds the *feet*. Additional examples, which the student may explain, are found in the words *booty* and *prey*; *conduct* and *behaviour*; *haste* and *hurry*; *news* and *tidings*; *safety* and *security*; *shape* and *form*; *to bring* and *to fetch*; *to expect* and *to hope*.

II. In using the words *active* and *passive*, to indicate a division of synonyms, we reject the exact grammatical meaning of these words, and refer to the sense of the words as implying a power *to do* or *to receive* by another's action.

Thus, a *reasonable* being is one who *acts* according to the dictates of his *reason*; a *rational* being is one only who *possesses* reason, not considered as using it. *Ability* means power *to do*, *capacity* power *to receive*, and yet both are used as implying *active* talent.

Keep and *retain*. We are said to *keep* a thing by

the use of our own sagacity and strength; we *retain* it because of a want of sagacity and strength in others to take it from us. Further examples are as follow:—*aversion* and *antipathy*; *intellect* and *understanding*; *to eat* and *to feed*; *to persevere* and *to persist*; *likely* and *probable*; *poetic* and *poetical*; *historic* and *historical*; *thankful* and *grateful*.

III. The natural principle of *greater or less intensity* has been mentioned as a practical division of synonymy. Without dwelling upon the fact that everywhere in nature this principle presents itself to us; in the changing temperature, the force of the air, the violence of the storm, the fury of ocean, we shall only illustrate it by mentioning a few words which mark its presence. *Grand* and *sublime*; *bright* and *brilliant*; the words used in climax in Lord Byron's line;—"breeze, or gale, or storm;" *to see* and *to look*; *to hear* and *to listen*.

The pageant was *grand*; but the thunder-storm in the Alps was *sublime*; I *saw* the man, but did not *look* at him carefully; I *heard* them talking, but did not *listen* to what they were saying. As examples for practice, take the words *anguish* and *agony*; *compunction* and *remorse*; *pertinacity* and *obstinacy*; *servant* and *slave*; *to lament* and *to deplore*; *to satisfy* and *to satiate*; *silent* and *taciturn*; *by* and *with*; *middle* and *midst*.

IV. Under the head of *positive* and *negative* syno-

nymy, we range words in which the same idea exists, but positively in one, and negatively in the other; thus, we *shun* a thing upon which we have absolutely come, by a positive act; we *avoid* it by *not* going near it, or in its way. A *fault* is a positive error; a *defect* is something wanting in the nature of construction of a man or machine; and the want of which makes an error. *Despair* is positive, at least in its present meaning, for its etymology would teach us otherwise; *hopelessness* is negative. He who despairs, once was possessed of hope, now lost; the hopeless man may have been always without it as he is now. Additional examples are found in the following words:—*Disability* and *inability*; *disbelief* and *unbelief*; *freedom* and *liberty*; *to permit* and *to allow*; *to prevent* and *to hinder*; *barbarous* and *inhuman*; *excessive* and *immoderate*.

V. The last category in which synonyms may be placed for purposes of reference, is that of *miscellaneous*, which is evidently an arrangement for the sake of convenience; in this will be included those words of like meaning which baffle all our efforts to classify them under the preceding heads. Thus: *brute* and *beast*; *consequence* and *result*; *contest* and *conflict*; *discretion* and *prudence*. Every wild animal is, in common language, a *brute*; a tame one is a *beast*. A *consequence* follows an event, or an action as an antecedent, as necessary to it: a *result* is an

expected or sought-after production of a combination designed to produce it. Disgrace is the *consequence* of intemperance; but 20 is the result of 10 + 10. As further examples we may state, a *fault* and a *mistake*; an *idea* and a *notion*; to *abbreviate* and to *abridge*; *vengeance* and *revenge*; to *conjecture* and to *guess*; *hurry* and *despatch*; to *copy* and to *imitate*; *every* and *each*; *alone* and *only*.

It has only been deemed necessary to give here a brief outline of synonymy, in order to proceed intelligently to the consideration of rhetorical *precision* as belonging to a *perspicuous* style. The extended study of synonyms opens to us the study of the languages from which our own is derived, and the philology of these languages, and presents a field to cultivate, which demands labour, time, and difficulty; but enough may be learned by the use of any good etymological dictionary, and a strict attention to the usage of those who are the best speakers and writers in modern times, to make us habitually precise in our language, and to insure, thus far at least, perspicuity to our style. A habitual effort to be precise in speech begets such a delicacy of critical observation that we find it difficult and painful to be otherwise than precise.

To return now to the laws of *precision* as an element of perspicuity in style, we remark, that the first violation of it consists in the misuse of synonymous terms;

this has been clearly indicated in the preceding pages; let us give a few examples;—If we should say the great *fault* in Cæsar's character was a want of humanity, and his ambition was an equally great *defect*; we should have misused the words *fault* and *defect*. The words *teach* and *learn*, are very frequently misapplied, although in more modern times this misapplication is unpardonable. We *teach* a *lesson* to a person; we *learn* a *lesson* from a person. In the time of Shakspeare, the two words were used interchangeably, as, in the *Tempest*, Caliban is made to say:—

“You *taught* me language; and my profit on't
Is, I know how to curse; the red plague rid you,
For *learning* me your language.”

But modern usage, finding two distinct fields for these words, has given them, each, its separate service. But these are suggestive only of the many instances of words in the English language, which are used indiscriminately as synonyms, by careless and ignorant writers, and which rob their productions of that *precision* necessary to their entire *perspicuity*.

But again, since precision requires that the language used, do no more nor less than convey the exact thought of the writer, it seems evident as an axiom, that all unnecessary words should be rejected; thus;—*entirely perfect*, would imply that there might

be things *perfect* and still not *entirely* so: "The cup was as full as it could hold," is a common phrase, in which the latter words are manifestly unnecessary, since if it be *full* it *can hold no more*, and the one word *full* describes its condition entirely.

It is evident that two things are requisite to the attainment of precision in writing:—First, to understand clearly the subject to be presented; to state clearly in the mind every proposition and argument which make up the discourse, before couching it in language; and Second, to understand perfectly the meaning, force, and comprehension of the words which we use in expressing them.

But it has been also said, that precision has to do with the structure of sentences, as well as the use of words. Not only, then, must a sentence be grammatically correct, but it must also convey the *exact meaning* of the author in this grammatical language. We shall only lay down a few general rules on this subject.

(94.) *Of the Structure of Sentences.*

Precision demands, that there be no *ambiguity* in the sentence; and this ambiguity arises, as we have seen from the use of improper words, or, as we now proceed to show, from their being so put together as to confuse or deceive. It is this putting together which we consider in the structure of sentences.

By a sentence is meant, a *collection of words containing a finished sense, and ended with a colon or period*; and a paragraph is a collection of sentences bearing upon the same immediate topic of the discourse. But sentences are *simple* or *compound*; *long* or *short*; and these characteristics affect style. Short epigrammatic sentences, each containing an independent proposition, give a cheerfulness and even brilliancy to composition. Long and complex sentences sometimes impart dignity to discourse, but often weary the hearer. Sentences fail of attaining perspicuity in many ways; some of these we shall now explain.

I. By a *bad arrangement* of the words, perspicuity is lost. The placing of a qualifying clause or member of the sentence, in a wrong place, alters the meaning; or at least, if we understand it, makes a glaring fault: thus: "I set out upon the road, which my brother had taken, with four post horses." This should have been rendered: "I set out, with four post horses, upon the road my brother had taken."

II. The perspicuity of a sentence is destroyed by using the same word more than once in different senses. Thus: "*They* were persons of such moderate intellects before *they* were impaired by their passions." The second *they* refers to *intellects*; but it might be referred to *persons*; and thus the sense is doubtful.

III. The misuse of the relative pronouns, *who*, *which*, *what*, *whose*, gives rise to obscurity. Thus

in the Nicene Creed, we have the confession made: "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and giver of Life, *who* proceedeth from the Father and the Son; *who*, with the Father and Son together, is worshipped and glorified; *whose* kingdom shall have no end."

The ambiguity here is the more astonishing, when we remember that one design of the council in making this creed was to prove the personality, divinity, and co-equality of the Holy Spirit, and the boundless scope of his unending kingdom.

Analogous to this is the question put by Our Lord to Simon Peter, in the words: "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me more than *these*?" Here the sense is extremely doubtful, for it may mean to ask, whether Simon loved Christ better than he did his fellow disciples, or whether he loved his Lord better than they did. The inflection, which marks the *case* in the original Greek, removes the ambiguity. An example of this is also found in Wolsey's repentant speech:—

"Had I but served my God with half the zeal
I served my king, *he* would not, in mine age,
Have left me naked to mine enemies."

No one doubts that the reference of the pronoun *he* is to "my God;" but there is another meaning, and it is that the king had such a regard for others who *served God properly*, that if Wolsey had done so, the *king* would have protected him in his afflictions.

IV. But the perspicuity of a sentence or a paragraph is also dependent upon its *unity*. This implies a clear connection between the principal governing word and the rest of the sentence. Take the following as a violation:—

"When we were about to go, *they* put into my hands a bundle of books, and when I undid *them*, *they* proved to be exactly what I wanted."

V. What remains to be said concerning the structure of a sentence is but little. It should not be too *long* and *crowded*: the parts of it should be distinct and clearly consecutive, and those subjects or thoughts which are in any degree disconnected from each other, and incongruous, should be kept apart; in all such cases, let a long and crowded sentence be cut up into shorter and more congruous ones, and the perspicuity is increased at once. It should also be observed, that what is purely *parenthetical*, comes in only occasionally with pleasure to the hearer; a parenthetical style offends by its disjointed character, and should be carefully avoided. And finally, a sentence should be *fairly and completely finished*; and when brought to what may be deemed the proper close, the sense of the sentence is injured, and the taste of the reader displeased, by some weak afterthought which is lugged in to spoil a well arranged close.

Some writers have thought necessary, after dwell-

ing upon the necessity of precision, to give a kind of counter-warning to their pupils against such a *cutting away* of words and phrases, as to make their diction barren and dry. It must be observed that this is not only an unnecessary caution, but an evil one; for precision has no quarrel with *elegance* and *energy*, but is compatible with proper ornaments, and only guards against the improper use of words and phrases in the expression of thought.

And here it should be said, that different kinds of discourse, that is, designed for different purposes, and requiring different styles, might seem so to treat the laws of precision as to make that a violation in one instance, which in another would not be so. Thus an abstract statement of a scientific problem would require the greatest conciseness, and would admit of no repetition; while a discourse to little children or uneducated people, would abound in repetitions and recurrences; would require several ways or modes of expressing the same truth, and the *trial* of various words to express the same thought, until the one *which would convey it* to the hearer should be happily found. All this circumlocution would, in such a case, be an attempt to be precise. It is true, in this latter case, the general laws of precision are violated; but even in their violation, they are kept ever in sight, and the whole discourse being an *experimental* attempt to convey instruction, the *result* only must be sub-

jected to criticism, and not the *mode* of reaching it. A rhetorical standard is designed only for finished compositions, and it gives laws for the invention of thought, the procurement of language, as to its signification, its structure, and its harmony, in order to produce finished compositions. A remarkable instance of this *experimental* and yet beautiful style is to be found in the exhortation of the English liturgy; in which, since it was designed as well for the ignorant as the educated, many words taken from the Norman-French are first given, and then, as it were, *translated*, by the Saxon word immediately following, thus: *acknowledge* and *confess*; *sins* and *wickedness*; *dissemble* and *cloak*; *humble* and *lowly*; *goodness* and *mercy*; *assemble* and *meet together*, &c.

In the three methods indicated, we attain then to what we have called the first quality of a good style, perspicuity. We must use *pure* English, make a *proper* choice of words, and be *precise* in using them and forming them into *sentences*, according to their significations, and we shall be *perspicuous* in conveying our thoughts to the hearer or reader.

The next quality of a good style is *Energy*.

(95.) *Energy*.

By *Energy* is meant that characteristic of a writer or speaker which interests and fixes the attention

of his audience, and gives a forcible presentation of his subject. In its purely technical sense, it has been adopted by modern writers from the *Ἐνεργεῖα* of Aristotle; but it has been differently named by some writers *vivacity*, and as such, its name perhaps more nearly indicates its meaning. For as a *vivacious* person is one who so impresses our attention, and keeps up our interest by his constant stream of living thought in conversation, so *vivacity* of style is but the rhetorical expression of such thoughts, in the best manner, to impress them upon us.

But there is in the word *energy* an expression of *strength*, which is the true secret of such an influence as is exerted in style, and which is not as well expressed by the word *vivacity*; hence we have retained the Greek term.

The question naturally arises, how is this energy of style to be attained? to what is it due? At first sight it seems a natural gift rather than a rhetorical acquirement. And here we would seem to go over much of the same ground as that already assumed in treating of perspicuity as a quality of style; for as does perspicuity, so also does energy depend upon the choice of *proper* words, upon their *arrangement*, and upon their *number*; but with the essential difference of purpose, that while in the one case we design only to express our meaning *clearly*, in the other

the object is to interest and enchain the attention of our hearers.

Under each of these heads many subdivisions might be made, and most writers, from the time of Aristotle, have thus divided them; but observing the simplest arrangement yet given, viz., that of Doctor Campbell, we shall divide the first of these topics into two parts.

In the choice of proper words to promote energy of style, we consider words as used either in their *proper* meaning, or as *tropes*, *i. e.*, words *turned from* their proper meaning to a figurative sense. And our next consideration will be rhetorical figures.

1. *Proper terms.* In choosing such we observe, first, that it is better to use a *species* than a *genus*, where either would be sufficiently perspicuous, and that thus energy of style is promoted. Such uses are characteristic of all the sermons and addresses of our Saviour, and constitute a great charm in them. Such are all his injunctions in the Sermon on the Mount: giving to his teaching a minuteness of detail, and robbing it of that generality which is pointless and inapplicable, since men will bear to be rebuked and condemned in company with many, or as belonging to a class rather than as individuals. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father;" is a simple statement of God's goodness.

Let the idea be generalized: suppose it to have been, "The feathered tribes are considered of small importance, and yet they share the protection of Providence;" and the energy, the searching sense of the appeal is gone. Every such paraphrase causes a loss of meaning. So, again, what a never-ceasing lesson is taught us by his special assertion, "Even the very hairs of your head are numbered." No other words could indicate this minute care equally well.

This use of *special* terms and *particular* instances for *general* assertions, is the distinguishing mark of all good writers: it becomes with them a habit, and contributes at once to perspicuity and energy of style. Milton is full of such descriptions as employ specific terms. His Satan sits "like a cormorant," or is found at the ear of sleeping Eve "squat like a toad." To most minds this specific description is more beautiful as well as energetic. And even where the splendid imagination of Milton would idealize so as to leave great images in the mind, it is by *special* terms as distinguished from *general* that he effects his purpose. Satan's spear is as large as a Norwegian pine, fit "to be the mast of some great admiral."

In his colossal proportions—

"He stood
Like *Teneriffe* or *Atlas*, unremoved;
His stature reached the sky."

Reference has already been made to our Saviour's

language, but it is equally true that all parts of the Holy Scriptures are pervaded with this spirit.

St. Paul, preaching on Mars' Hill, points to the "altar," which told that they were "too superstitious," raises his hand towards the magnificent Parthenon which held the splendid ivory statue of their protecting divinity, when he tells them that "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that *He* is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands." In their view were those beautiful "graven images" which were the glory of Minerva's shrine, when he declared that "we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device."

Many illustrations of such a use of terms might be given from all parts of the Bible, and in each they would be found to add to the energy and vivacity of the style. In this scene at Athens the audience supplied for themselves, with their own eyes, the specific and proper objects which St. Paul's gestures and discourse displayed to them.

But there are occasions, it must in justice be observed, where we desire to make the impression fainter, and where we wish to avoid, for known reasons, an absolute allusion or a vivid impression.

This is often done to avoid a disgusting or shocking impression, and is shown in the use of such words in

times of rebellion, as to *suffer* instead of *to be executed*, and *homicide* instead of *murder*, *misfortune* for *crime*, in which cases a certain sympathy with humanity in its suffering, leads to the softening of the offensive word.

Such, too, is the language of innuendo, where it is designed, by a sweeping general assertion, in reality to reach one, and only one particular example, without so exciting the anger or self-love of the individual aimed at, as to cause him to repel and punish the assailant.

While, then, it is evident that a certain latitude is allowed to an author in this regard, the general rule remains the same; and as it has been clearly expressed, "the more *general* the terms are, the picture is the fainter; the more *special* they are, the brighter." Teachers, especially moralists, are apt to err by reasoning with *abstractions*, by warning their pupils against *vice* and *crime* in *general*, and urging them to a career of *virtue*, which shall be *honourable* here, and bring them to *glory* hereafter. The vagueness of these terms is neither instructive nor impressive; the honest learner only knows that there is *something* to be striven for, opposed by *something* to be shunned, and remains without guidance or shield against the *real* and *special* evils which surround his path. Dr. Whately applies this, and justly, to "inexperienced preachers," of whom the world is full, and who should learn in order to teach.

(96.) *Of Rhetorical Tropes.*

By a trope (Greek, *τροπεω*, *to turn*,) is meant a term *turned* out of its proper significance, and applied to another; thus, if we call a statesman the *pillar* of the state, we turn the word *pillar* from its proper original meaning of a prop to a building, and apply it to a *man*.

Tropes, or figures of speech, grow out of the readiness of the human mind to find resemblances or analogies between things not immediately connected; sometimes, indeed, between ideas as unconnected as *mind* and *body*, *nature* and *art*. Our language, like most others, is full of these figures of speech; our ordinary conversation abounds with them; the plainest and driest discourse cannot be constructed without them; and when we rise to the consideration of what interests and pleases us in poetry, we find that figures of speech have usurped the place of plain language, even in the works of those who affect entire baldness and self-denial in the use of language. Thus Wordsworth, the chief of the revolutionary school of modern poetry, began a striking sentence, in unfigurative verse:—

“——The good die first;”

but immediately fell upon a combination of *comparison* and *metaphor* in the lines which follow:—

“But they whose hearts are dry as summer dust,
Burn to the socket.”

And here it should be observed, that the just division of tropes, should be constantly kept in view.

First. Where the figure resides in the *words* employed, *i. e.* in the use of these *words* to express other things than those which they properly signify, for which reason we call these *verbal figures*.

Second. Where the words are used in their ordinary and proper significance, and the *things* or *persons* for which they stand are employed out of their proper sphere, or to represent some *thing* or *person* other than themselves. Of a *verbal figure*, examples would be: “The waves dancing;” “*the laughing fields* ;” in which waves and fields are made to do things belonging to man’s nature. And of the second form the following is an example: *Attila came upon south-western Europe like a thunder-storm from Asia*. In this the *person* becomes a *storm*. A *figurative phrase* or *sentence* is one in which any trope or figure occurs; and the recurrence of these in a discourse gives rise to the general phrase, “figurative language.” Thus, the Song of Solomon is said to abound in *figurative language*; and by reason of the ardent imagination of the oriental nations, the Bible is full of imagery or figurative language. From what has been said, it is evident that figures of speech grow out of man’s nature, which attempts to illustrate his thoughts by reference

to objects around him: thus, the same spirit which prompts the Indian to call a brave warrior the *Great Bear*, or his beautiful maiden *Minnehaha*, *the laughing water*, led the Normans to call their English king *Cœur-de-Lion* or *Lion-Hearted*.

Bringing two objects before the mind by a real or fancied resemblance, they augment the power of expression, and thus give richness and abundance to style. In general, too, they exalt the simpler and plainer by thus joining it with the loftier and more dignified—and in this way style is elevated and improved. We shall also see that the subject of our discourse is often much more forcibly presented by figurative illustration than by plain language; and thus it must be allowed that it aids *perspicuity*. In all these ways, it is evident that figurative language conduces particularly to the energy or vivacity of style; and for this reason it has been introduced under this head. It cannot be doubted that it is also an aid to appropriateness or elegance, since it adorns a subject, and sets it forth in a pleasing and proper light. But it is mainly as conducive to *energy* that it is to be regarded.

A single hour spent in looking over a book of collected *poetry*, will prove how fully tropes are part of the woof of *verse*.

As a remarkable example of successive and world-

renowned figures, every one will turn to Gray's
"Elegy written in a Country Churchyard ;"

"—The knell of parting day,"

is a fine figure in which the day is fancied to die at evening.

"The moping owl doth to the moon complain,"

is a vigorous attribution of sadness to the bird of night, seeking relief from the Queen of night.

Nearly every line of this carefully elaborated poem contains a trope, and owes its charm to this rhetorical figure. But, besides simply pleasing or giving interest, the trope is often more forcible as an illustration, than the statement of the bare fact, however striking in itself. Thus, what power is conveyed in the following figure:—

"God answers sharp and sudden on some prayers,
And thrusts the thing we have prayed for in our face,
A gauntlet with a gift in't. Every wish
Is like a prayer with God."

Again: there is a piquancy in the satire of these lines, which makes their truth more striking:—

"Young men, ay, and maids,
Too often sow their wild oats in tame verse,
Before they sit down under their own vine,
And live for use."

The fine figures, which give effect to the following description of the power of Christ in restoring man from the fall of Adam, bring to sight a vivid and enduring picture.

"Earth, shut up
By Adam, like a fakir in a box
Left too long buried, remained stiff and dry,
A mere dumb corpse till Christ the Lord came down,
Unlocked the doors, forced open the blank eyes,
And used the kingly chrisms, to straighten out
The leathery tongue turned back into the throat;
Since when, she lives, remembers, palpitates
In every limb, aspires in every breath,
Embraces infinite relations."

Here the glorious power by which the world, dead in trespasses and sins, is brought to life by Christ, is epitomized, and thus rendered stronger and more striking, by its being narrowed down to an actual application.

All the various kinds of figures of speech—and they run out into very minute divisions—may be classified under twelve heads, to which we shall limit ourselves, by giving a brief description of each. They are:

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Comparison. | 7. Personification. |
| 2. Metaphor. | 8. Apostrophe. |
| 3. Synecdoche. | 9. Allegory. |
| 4. Metonymy. | 10. Antithesis. |
| 5. Hyperbole. | 11. Onomatopœia. |
| 6. Hypocatastasis. | 12. Climax. |

(97.) *Comparison.*

1. *Comparison*, or *Simile*, as it is also called, is the expression of a resemblance between two or more objects. Thus: "Pitt, in his government of England, during the turbulent period of Napolcon's rule in France, was *like* a skilful pilot in a stormy sea."

This can hardly be called with justice a trope, because we do not put the one for the other, but simply declare the resemblance between the conduct of Pitt, and the skill of the pilot; between the nation in its critical condition and a ship in a stormy sea.

The simile or comparison is expressed by the words *like*, *as*, and *so*; and frequently by the combined use of *as* and *so*.

The Scriptures abound with comparisons, as indeed they do with every known figure of speech; and this is due to the peculiar genius of the oriental people, and in consequence of the oriental languages from whom they had their origin.

A comparison may simply state the likeness of one thing to another, as:

"———The apostles,
And the martyrs, wrapped in mantles,
Stand as warders at the entrance,
Stand as sentinels o'erhead."

But sometimes the simile not only states the resem-

blance, but explains the reasons for it, or the consequences of it; as when the Psalmist declares of the righteous man, that he "shall be like a tree planted by rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season. His leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper." This extended comparison is valuable for illustration, and often renders clear and interesting a fact which, without it, might be of difficult expression.

Of the power of a comparison to illustrate, take an example from Macaulay: "We are inclined to think that, with respect to every great addition to the stock of human knowledge, the case has been similar; that without Copernicus we should have been Copernicans; that without Columbus, America would have been discovered; that without Locke we should have possessed a just theory of the origin of human ideas. Society, indeed, has its great men and its little men, as the earth has its mountains and valleys. But the inequalities of intellect, like the inequalities of the surface of our globe, bear so small a proportion to the mass, that in calculating its great revolutions, they may be safely neglected. The sun illumines the hills while it is still below the horizon; and truth is discovered by the highest minds a little before it becomes manifest to the multitude. This is the extent of their superiority. They are the first to catch and reflect a light, which, without their assist-

ance, must, in a short time, be visible to those who lie far beneath them."

Here the general comparison is twofold; the mind of men are likened to the elevations of the earth's surface, and Truth is felicitously compared to the rising sun.

Comparison, being the simplest of the figures of Rhetoric, abounds even in our ordinary speech, and is of constant and most effective use among the best writers in prose and poetry, to illustrate, as has been already explained, and to give those delicate touches of thought which invoke the fancy for their delineation. Thus Shelley, in his *Adonäis*, brings together by a simple comparison, a delicate picture of life contrasted with the vastness of eternity; it forms a striking figure:—

"Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of eternity."

And in its very vagueness it conveys a grand idea of *existence in unlimited space*.

Sometimes a comparison is a literal explanation of a fact, and ceases to be a rhetorical figure. Thus: *as green as grass; red, like a rose*; the staff of his spear was *like a weaver's beam*. These only define the colour, shape, or size of an object in the simplest manner; and yet, as in the cases already mentioned, although these are not in reality tropes, they are

figures of speech, for the two objects are brought together by means of a common quality.

A comparison is often implied, the mind being easily carried to it without the word *like*, or other index of comparison. Thus:—

"Weep no more, lady, weep no more,
Thy sorrow is in vain;
For violets plucked, the sweetest showers
Will ne'er make grow again."

The tears here implied as shed for earthly loss, are likened to sweet showers, pouring in vain on dead violets.

But it will be unnecessary to dwell longer upon *the comparison*; it will be obvious to the student wherever it occurs; and his practice will be aided by observing,

I. That there should be a striking and pleasing resemblance between the objects compared;

II. That they should be worthy of the comparison; and,

III. That the comparison should be clearly stated, for the purposes of illustration.

There are many violations, even among the best poets, of these rules:—

Thus Wordsworth writes,

"Calm is all nature as a resting wheel;"

in which the first rule is violated.

But frequently mean comparisons are used by comic writers, purposely to degrade the subject they have chosen. Butler's *Hudibras* is full of examples of this kind; and Dr. Holmes has been particularly happy in witty similes of this description; for example in his "Treadmill" Song:—

"The stars are rolling in the sky,
The earth rolls on below,
And we can feel the rattling wheel
Revolving as we go.

Then tread away, my gallant boys,
And make the axle fly;
Why should not wheels go round about,
Like planets in the sky?"

(98.) *Of Metaphor.*

Metaphor is in reality a trope, and consists in the *substitute of one word for another*, either on account of its *resemblance*, or on account of the analogy between them—by analogy we mean a *resemblance of ratios, relation or purposes*. Thus, if the metaphor turn upon *resemblance* alone, an illustration would be calling a *fort* a *priest cap*, or a *leaf* of grass a *spear* or *blade*. If upon *analogy*, we might take the example given above with a slight alteration. "Pitt was the pilot, who guided the ship of state through a stormy sea." Here he is not said to be *like* a pilot, but is the pilot himself. The Metaphor, and in

especial that which is based upon analogy, is of great importance in conducing to the energy of style: and is in this respect far better than the simile or comparison, which, by stating the resemblance, robs the mind of the pleasure of detecting and employing it. Thus an American poet says, of the death of a president in the White House,

"What! soared the old Eagle to die in the Sun?
Lies he stiff with spread wings at the goal he had won?"

and his greatness and death are beautifully contrasted; but let the mind be stopped in the contemplation of this bold figure, to consider that the president in his elevation was *like* an eagle who had reached the sun, and all the energy is lost, the whole being greatly enfeebled by the trammelling process, which insists upon our taking those intermediate steps, over which the mind would naturally leap.

It will be observed, that while metaphors are commonly used to ennoble the style, as well as to give it energy, they may be equally used to degrade it; when instead of the resemblances being sought among the pleasing and beautiful images around us, they are found in low and vulgar objects.

To this latter class belong those degrading epithets which are often applied to men, as *hound*, *ass*, *monkey*, *beast*, *brute*, and the adjectives formed from them. I have said that such metaphors degrade style; it is

true, they are originally designed to degrade the persons spoken of, but it is equally true, that low words and low thoughts are incompatible with dignity of style, however much they may promote its energy.

Keats has conceived in all his poems, but, perhaps, with the most exquisite grace in St. Agnes' Eve, beautiful metaphors, which give delight to the mind by the extreme and yet graphic delicacy of their expression. The wax taper extinguished in the moonlight,

“Its little smoke in pallid moonshine died.”

Thus, too, in describing sounds in lonely spots, he says they

“Come a-swooning over hollow grounds,
And wither drearily on barren moors.”

A figure forcible but not very clearly illustrative.

A fine figure, too, is expressed in the line,

“Or blind Orion hungry for the morn.”

But such figures are, in some degree, removed from popular taste by their classical allusions, in which are contained to the instructed, indeed, the chief charm of the metaphor. Some persons have classed the “allusion” among the figures of speech; but it is evidently a metaphor which, besides bringing two

objects into pleasant relation, renders that relation more striking, by the character and interest of one of the objects as part of another connected story. Like the simile, the metaphor is so simple a figure, and so abounds in discourse, that we need not dwell longer upon it.

But as it has been observed that the *simile* is often very useful in illustration, so it is also evident that some of the most delicate and beautiful thoughts are conveyed by the use of *metaphor*, causing a gleaming radiance in the style which lends very much to its vivacity; thus, a poet, in speaking of Columbus, as he watched the moving light on shore, while the darkness of night veiled from his eyes the long-sought new world which was to burst in beauty upon his sight when morning should dawn, compares him and his grand achievement to another hero contemporary with himself, and to an achievement of rival greatness, although purely of a moral character:—

“Thou, *Luther* of the darkened deep,
Nor less intrepid too than he,
Whose *courage* woke earth's bigot sleep,
Whilst thine *unbarred* the sea.”

Perhaps any change of word in the following matchless line of Keats, would destroy the beauty of the metaphor:—

“A *thing of beauty* is a joy for ever.”

Often a Metaphor and Comparison combined give still greater vivacity to style. Moore, in speaking of the towers of ruined Baalbec, has this very pleasing figure, or rather succession and combination of figures:—

“ Whose lonely columns stand sublime,
Flinging their shadows from on high,
Like dials, which the wizard Time
Has reared, to count his ages by.”

(99.) *Of Synecdoche.*

The Synecdoche (Greek, *συν*, together with, and *εκδεχομαι*, to take), consists in placing the whole to express a part, or a part to express the whole. This is evidently a figure residing in the word itself, and expresses no resemblance.

1. *The whole to express a part.* This is done when the *genus* is put for the *species*, or for the *individuals* ranged under it. Our western hunters chase the *buffalo* and the *bear*. These classes stand for the individual animals hunted. “*The man is gray*,” is used to express that *his head is gray*. *Man* is born to trouble. The *brute* is under the dominion of man. “*Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.*”

2. *A part for the whole.* The ocean swarms with *sails*, instead of ships. They shall beat their *swords* into *ploughshares*, and their spears into pruning-

hooks. In this latter Synecdoche, *swords* and *spears* stand for all weapons of war; and *ploughshares* and *pruning-hooks* for the implements of peace.

Myriad, in its original meaning is *ten thousand* (*μυριοι*), and is used now, by synecdoche, for an *immense number*, that is, more than ten thousand; in the plural, *myriads*, it implies numbers so great as to be beyond the computation of human arithmetic. The Synecdoche is not so frequently used as the other figures, among modern writers, but the Scriptures contain many examples of it. Thus we have the reverse of the form just mentioned; in Joel: Beat your ploughshares into swords, and your pruning-hooks into spears.

The coming of the Son of God to put to confusion the rebellious hosts of Satan, as described by Milton, contains also a Synecdoche in numbers:—

“ Attended with ten thousand thousand saints,
He onward came; far off his coming shone.”

It may also be supposed that this figure is used by our Saviour in his answer to St. Peter's question: “How oft shall my brother sin against me and I forgive him? until seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee until seven times: but until *seventy times seven.*” This *partial* number is meant to stand for as many times as our brother shall sin,

and thus claim from us that charity of forgiveness which the apostle assures us “*never faileth.*”

(100.) *Of Metonymy.*

Metonymy (Greek, *μετα*, *together*, and *ονομα*, *a name*,) is much better known in its use than by its name. It consists in placing one word for another, which does not express or define it, but to which it is related, as, for instance, the name of a *cause* for the *effect*; or of the *effect* for the *cause*; the *source*, for *that which flows from it*; the *place or scene* for *something enacted there*; the *name of a place* for *the people*. In general, it is the interchange of names between things having some connection.

Thus we speak of Homer, Virgil, Milton, when we mean their works.

Our Saviour makes frequent use of this figure:—“They have,” he said, “*Moses and the prophets*, let them hear them.” Of course, the reference is to *their writings*. Prophetic language is rendered more sublime by the use of Metonymy. “*Ephraim* is joined to idols;” “*Assyria*, the rod of mine anger;” “*Rachel* mourning for her children.” “*Gilead* is mine, and *Manasseh* is mine. *Ephraim* also is the strength of my head, *Judah* is my lawgiver, *Moab* is my wash-pot. Over *Edom* will I cast out my shoe. *Philistia*, triumph thou because of me.”

The connection or relation indicated by this figure should be clear and distinctly expressed, to render it an effective rhetorical aid, or to conduce to the energy and vivacity of style, which these figures principally seek. Thus, the prophecy that “the sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come,” borrows much of its fine effect from the use of *sceptre* for *regal dominion*, of *Judah* for the *tribe and people* from whom Christ should be descended; *lawgiver* stands for the maintenance and preservation of *the law of Moses*, or the first dispensation, until the coming of the Saviour.

The Psalms are full of the use of this beautiful figure, and in many cases it runs like a thread of gold through a whole chapter. It is found at the beginning of the eightieth Psalm: “Give ear, O Shepherd of Israel, thou that leadest *Joseph* like a flock; thou that dwellest between the cherubim, shine forth. Before *Ephraim, Benjamin, and Manasseh*, stir up thy strength, and come and save us.”

In the following lines we have *states* of mind and body, put for the persons who are in them:—

“In these green days,
Reviving *sickness* lifts her languid head,
Life flows afresh, and young-eyed *health* exalts
The whole creation round; *Contentment* walks
The sunny glade, and feels an inward bliss
Spring o’er his mind, beyond the power of kings
To purchase.”

(101.) *Of Hyperbole.*

The next of the rhetorical tropes to be considered is *Hyperbole*. This word (Greek, *υπερ βαλλω*, to throw beyond, or exceed) has also been translated into English by the plain word *Exaggeration*.

Hyperbole consists in representing an object or emotion as of greater dimensions and greater extent than it really is, much better, or much worse, in order to produce a striking effect. This figure is of frequent and lamentable use in ordinary conversation; and has brought into misuse all our adjectives and adverbs expressing size, extent, or degree: *immense*, *huge*, *vastly*, are applied to small and unimportant things; *unbounded*, *interminable*, to really finite and perhaps quite limited extension.

We speak of the sun burning like *fire*; we are ourselves as *cold as ice*. While these are in reality verbal figures, they depend also very much upon the imagination, and are in so much purely figures of thought. The design of their legitimate use is to magnify the object before us, and give it additional interest and energy, by thus increasing its size and its extension. Thus, a large man, whether in mind or body, is a *giant*; a fine house is a *palace*; a beautiful child is an *angel*. We might continue to draw examples of this, as of the other figures, from the Bible, and here, indeed, its use is always beautiful and interesting; but

it is a figure by no means so frequently used as the others; and even where it has been used, it has been a stumbling-block to some. Thus, the phrase the *everlasting hills*, has led to a doubt concerning the use of this word everlasting, and its companion word *eternal*, in other places in the Bible, where it is of vital concern. Again, it is asserted that the seed of Abraham should be as "sands on the sea-shore." "The land is full of idols."

It has been justly observed that nations, in their early periods, when every manifestation of God in nature must strike them with awe and astonishment, are most apt to use this figure, partly as a vent to their surprise, and partly because, in the dim light through which they see objects, they do in reality loom up in exaggerated proportions. This is pre-eminently the case with the Oriental nations, who dwell in the vicinity of the cradle of the world.

It must also be remarked that children and youth indulge in hyperbolical language to a much greater extent than persons of maturer age. The reason is analogous to the one just given; the exuberance of spirits lends itself to all around them, and gives vigour and proportions to the world, commensurate with their own thoughts and hopes. Children's eyes are magnifying glasses, which lose their powers as they grow older.

Strictly speaking, the hyperbole is an improper

figure, since it ostensibly deviates, whenever used, from the exact truth; but the conventions of society have agreed upon a scale of exaggerations and superlatives, and consent to understand them as not really expressing the true meaning of the words used: in other words, due allowance is made for the hyperbole, and the truth is *understood*, though *not expressed*. The *qualities* ascribed to a certain object in the hyperbole, do really belong to it, but not in the *degree* expressed. Literary criticism abounds in exaggeration; an author's excellencies are magnified, his defects rendered greater and more glaring, by being detached from his beauties, and thus garbled: one is the *most splendid orator* of the period; another absolutely the poorest speaker in the world. And thus the unfortunate necessity, which seems forced upon us by the conventions of the world, that we should take one or the other side in every question involving partisanship, seems to demand the use of hyperbole in praising our partisans and abusing our opponents. And besides all this it is more lamentable still that exaggeration in speech sometimes becomes a fashion, a social convention, and that conversation is considered tame without it.

(102.) *Of Hypocatastasis.*

This figure (Greek, *υπο, κατα, ιστημι, to substitute*) consists in substituting, without any previous state-

ment of such a design, one act, or object, for another; in order, by a resemblance, to illustrate that for which the substitution is made.

Thus, we speak of a person "rowing against the tide," to illustrate one who is encountering serious obstacles.

The Scriptures have many fine examples of the use of this figure: "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters." "Taking up the cross" is an illustration in constant use. When we speak of a person who is approaching the end of his life, we say, "he is near his journey's end;" and so also we pray that he may reach "the haven of eternal rest," in allusion to the *voyage* of life. So also the prophet, speaking of the judgments of God, says, "Behold, all ye that kindle a fire, that compass yourselves about with sparks: walk in the light of your fire, and in the sparks ye have kindled. This shall ye have at my hand; ye shall lie down in sorrow."

(103.) *Personification.*

This figure ascribes to *inanimate* objects the attributes of *animate* beings; or to *brutes* and *inferior animals* the powers of *men*; in a word, it invests with *personal* dignity anything which is before *impersonal*. Thus, an American poet addresses our flag as though it were endowed with life:—

“Bright flag at yonder tapering mast,
Fling out your field of azure blue.”

In Longfellow's “Midnight Mass for the Dying Year,” there is a fine succession of personifications:—

“Yes, the year is growing old,
And his eye is pale and bleared!
Death with frosty hand and cold,
Plucks the old man by the beard,
Sorely,—sorely!”

This figure is of constant occurrence in Holy Writ, and is especially to be found couched in prophetic language:—

“Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth!”
“Awake, awake! put on thy strength, O Zion; put on thy beautiful garments, O Jerusalem, the holy city; for henceforth there shall no more come unto thee the uncircumcised and the unclean.”

Such, too, is the nature of our Saviour's address to Jerusalem, when he wept over the city; but here, in addition to the Personification, we have also the use of Metonymy by which *Jerusalem*, thus personified, stands for the *people* who live in Jerusalem.

(104.) *Apostrophe.*

Apostrophe (Greek, *απο* and *στροφω*, to turn from) signifies a turning away from the general current of the discourse, to make a direct address to some per-

son or object; this is of a digressive character, and is usually imaginative in its aim; thus, we may speak to a person absent or dead, as though present; or it may be an appeal made by the counsel to a judge in the midst of his speech to the jury. Thus, too, God is constantly apostrophized in prayer.

But it is not necessary that what we apostrophize should be a living or an animate being; the apostrophe is also used in conjunction with the figure of personification, in an address to that which is inanimate and impersonal. Such is Milton's “Address to Light:”—

“Hail! Holy light! offspring of Heaven first born,
And of the eternal, coeternal beam.”

Indeed these figures, joined in the form of an address to those things destitute of life, are of frequent recurrence in Milton, and form one great charm of his poetry. Thus, in “*Lycidas*” he begins:—

“Yet once more, O ye laurels, and once more
Ye myrtles brown, with ivy never sere,
I come to pluck your berries harsh and rude.”

And again:—

“O fountain Arethuse, and thou honoured flood,
Smooth-sliding Mincius, crowned with vocal reeds!”

Ideal personages are often thus addressed:—

“Hence, loathed melancholy,
Of Cerberus and blackest midnight born!”

Or again, in “L’Allegro:”—

“Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Jest and youthful jollity,
Quips, and cranks, and wanton wiles,
Nods, and becks, and wreathed smiles.”

Collins, in his beautiful “Ode to Evening,” uses the Apostrophe with fine effect:—

“O Nymph reserved, while now the bright-haired sun
Sits in yon western tent, whose cloudy skirts,
With brede ethereal wove,
O’erhang his wavy bed,

Now teach me, maid composed,
To breathe some softened strain.”

The Apostrophe is one of the most natural of figures, and is especially the language of an excited fancy. It imparts an exaltation to style which gives additional energy. What is finer, in effect, than Byron’s “Apostrophe to Ocean?”—

“Thou glorious mirror, where the Almighty’s form
Glasses itself in tempests! In all time
Calm or convulsed, in breeze, or gale, or storm,
Icing the pole, or in the torrid clime
Dark heaving; boundless, endless, and sublime!”

(105.) *The Allegory.*

This word, derived from the Greek *αλλος*, *another*, and *αγορευω*, *to speak*, means, literally, *saying one thing and meaning another*. As a figure it implies telling a story, the events and personages of which are fictitious, but which in their combination illustrate what is true and important. It is evidently a kind of continued metaphor. The Bible is full of the use of the Allegory: of this nature were our Saviour’s parables, in which, under the guise of “the field,” “the good seed,” “a flock,” “a grain of mustard seed,” &c., he spoke of the Jews, and his own disciples, the Gentiles, and the spread of his kingdom. The Song of Solomon is a series of high-wrought allegories. In the eightieth Psalm may be found one of the finest and most beautifully illustrative; in which the children of Israel are compared to a *vine*, and the metaphor is kept up in explanation of God’s gracious dealings with them. The allegory has been used by great writers as the means of inculcating truth. Very frequently it is found as a pleasant episode in a long discourse, lending interest and energy to the style, as in Milton’s “*Areopagitica* :”—

“Truth, indeed, came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape, most glorious to look on; but when he ascended, and his apos-

bles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes, of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds."

But sometimes the entire discourse is an Allegory. Such is the case in Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," a book universally known, admired, and understood. So also Spenser's "Faërie Queene" is, in its plan, an organized allegory, carried out in many diversified allegories. Dante's "Divina Commedia," if not what we would call a continued allegory, is full of smaller allegorical events and descriptions. Thus Beatrice represents, when taken literally, the soul of Dante's earthly love; but, in the figurative sense, *Theology* is personified, and by her assistance the poet is made to comprehend the mysteries of religion. The allegorical character of the poem Dante has made known to us, in a letter to a friend, in these words:—"The first sense is that which it derives from its language, and another is that which it derives from the things signified by the language;—the one literal; the other, allegorical."

Of the nature of allegory are also those exquisite poems, "The Ancient Mariner," by Coleridge, and "St. Agnes' Eve," by Keats. Those who would read them only for the apparent story, as literally told,

will indeed be charmed with the beautiful diction, but will lose the entire design of the writers.

There is a striking allegory contained in a short poem by Poe, called "The Haunted Palace." In the first part, the poet intends to describe a man in mental and physical health, the embodiment of the maxim *mens sana in corpore sano*; but in the second he portrays the same goodly structure stricken by insanity:—

"But evil things in robes of sorrow,
Assail the monarch's high estate;
(Ah! let us mourn, for never morrow
Shall dawn upon him desolate!)
And round about his home the glory,
That blushed and bloomed,
Is but a dim remembered story
Of the old time entombed.

"And travellers now within that valley,
Through the red-litten windows see,
Vast forms that move fantastically
To a discordant melody;
While like a rapid ghastly river,
Through the pale door,
A hideous throng rush out for ever,
And laugh, but smile no more."

In the last stanza, "the red-litten windows," to represent the *eyes* of a madman, form a strong figure; and the *mouth*, with its "discordant" words, "a hideous throng," is powerfully portrayed in "the pale door" of the palace.

Allegory is the common form in use among the eastern story-tellers. There is something akin to wit in telling a man what is personal, and leaving it to himself to make the application of it; and if, as in the powerful story of David and Nathan, it is so adroitly done that the meaning remains hidden until the moral has been inculcated in an *impersonal* manner, the application, "Thou art the man," is all the more forcible and complete.

(106.) *Antithesis.*

By Antithesis (Greek, *αντι* and *τιθημι*, to place opposite or against, is the placing of two objects in themselves *contraries* or *contradictories*, so that each is rendered more striking and distinct by the contrast. Thus, "The *wicked* flee when no man pursueth; but the *righteous* is bold as a lion." By the use of this figure we exalt what is truly great, and belittle what is already low and mean. In discourse, as in painting, as everything is drawn with relative proportions, it is by antitheses that we determine these proportions.

In many instances, antithesis is the principal element in wit; the unexpected contrast of objects.

This figure seems to be, in effect, the opposite of comparison and metaphor, designed to show, not resemblance or similitude, but difference and contrast.

It is this which gives point to the epigram in many cases; not by bringing together objects in themselves unlike, but by stating, as a conclusion, *something entirely different from what we expected.*

Such points are found in some of the stanzas of Dr. Holmes's spirited poem "On Lending a Punch-Bowl:"—

"That night affrighted from his nest the screaming eagle flew,
He heard the Pequot's ringing whoop, the soldier's wild halloo;
And there the Sachem learned the rule he taught to kith and kin,
'Run from the white man when you find he smells of Holland Gin.'"

Not less striking is the contrast between what is expected and what occurs in the last stanza:—

"Then fill a fair and honest cup, and bring it straight to me,
The goblet hallows all it holds, whate'er the liquid be;
And may the cherubs on its face protect me from the sin,
That dooms one to those dreadful words—'My dear, where have
you been?'"

It is by means of the Antithesis that the best results are obtained by writers in their passage

"From grave to gay, from lively to severe."

Truth appears more beautiful when we turn directly to it from the contemplation of error; beauty shines more brightly when arranged side by side with deformity. The long and dark night is the best usher of the glorious day.

(107.) *Onomatopœia.*

This figure (Greek, *ονομα*, a name, and *ποιειν*, to make) consists in the *making* or invention of words to imitate sounds; as *hurly-burly*, to indicate confused but turbulent sounds; *did-der-rum-dum-dum*, to express the sound of a drum; *mew* and *purr*, to imitate a cat; *bow wow*, for a dog; *rat-tat-tat*, to mark the knocking at a door. It is by the use of this figure that words were originally formed in imitation of the sound, as the *roar* of the tempest, or *whistle* of the wind; the *buzzing* of the bee; the *booming* of the cannon, &c.; and some persons have the faculty, in the use of this figure, of coining such words for present use. It is, however, a dangerous power, and should be very sparingly used.

(108.) *Climax.*

The last figure mentioned, and the one which will close our consideration of figurative language as conducive to the *energy* of style, is *Climax*. This word is derived from the Greek word *κλιμαξ*, which means a *stair* or *ladder*. It consists in passing from the weakest or least striking statements, the words or members of a sentence or paragraph, successively to those which are stronger, and reserving the strongest for the last.

When the reverse of this process is made, the figure is called an *anti-climax*. Sometimes the short succession of sentences, in which the last idea is constantly repeated in connection with a new one, called in logic a *chain argument*, is denominated a climax.

A fine illustration of this figure, is found in a recent volume of Bancroft's History of the United States. It is the effect of the battle of Lexington:—

“Darkness closed upon the country and upon the town, but it was no night for sleep. Heralds on swift relays of horses transmitted the war-message from hand to hand, till village repeated it to village; the sea to the backwoods; the plains to the highlands; and it was never suffered to droop, till it had been borne north, and south, and east, and west, throughout the land. It spread over the bays that receive the Saco and the Penobscot. Its loud reveille broke the rest of the trappers of New Hampshire, and ringing the bugle notes from peak to peak, overleapt the Green Mountains, swept onward to Montreal, and descended the ocean river, till the responses were echoed from the cliffs of Quebec. The hills along the Hudson told to one another the tale. As the summons hurried to the south, it was one day at New York; in one more at Philadelphia; the next it lighted a watch-fire at Baltimore; thence it waked an answer at Annapolis. Crossing the

Potomac near Mount Vernon, it was sent forward without a halt to Williamsburgh. It traversed the Dismal Swamp to Nansemond along the route of the first emigrants to North Carolina. It moved onwards and still onwards through boundless groves of evergreen to Newbern and to Wilmington. 'For God's sake, forward it by night and by day,' wrote Cornelius Harnett, by the express which sped for Brunswick. Patriots of South Carolina caught up its tones at the border, and despatched it to Charleston, and through pines, and palmettoes, and moss-clad live-oaks, still further to the south, till it resounded among the New England settlements beyond the Savannah. Hillsborough and the Mecklenburg district of North Carolina rose in triumph, now that their wearisome uncertainty had its end. The Blue Ridge took up the voice and made it heard from one end to the other of the valley of Virginia. The Alleghenies, as they listened, opened their barriers that the 'loud call' might pass through to the hardy riflemen on the Holston, the Watauga, and the French Broad. Ever renewing its strength, powerful enough even to create a commonwealth, it breathed its inspiring word to the first settlers of Kentucky; so that hunters who made their halt in the matchless valley of the Elkhorn, commemorated the nineteenth day of April by naming their encampment LEXINGTON."

Some writers have included among the figures of

speech, the *Interrogation*, the *Exclamation*, and the *Repetition*; but they are only inverted or excited forms of plain speech, and can hardly be, in justice, classed under the head of figurative language. The *Interrogation* is, indeed, more forcible than the mere *indicative* form:—

"In joyous youth, what soul hath never known
Thought, feeling, taste, harmonious with his own?"

And so in the Bible this figure imparts energy and animation to the style:—"Who hath believed our report? and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?"

Here it is designed to express how few have believed or seen the power of God.

The *Exclamation* is a very natural form expressing astonishment, fear, or high emotion; it is used in apostrophe constantly, and sometimes merely to give greater force to the expression; as in the sentence, "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him who bringeth glad tidings, who publisheth peace!"

The *Repetition* consists in saying, with vigour of language and manner, the same word or sentence over again; implying that it is of such great importance as to demand a special consideration and reception.

From what has been said, it will be seen that figu-

rative language is not only conducive to the beauty of style, and thus forms a part of rhetorical æsthetics, but, what is of more importance, that it aids in the clear and energetic expression of our thoughts.

A knowledge of the proper use of figures, and the laws which govern them, is of great importance in determining the exact meaning of the author. Thus without such knowledge it is impossible justly to appreciate the prophetic language of the Bible, couched, as it usually is, in terms of all the figures we have mentioned. And as we have shown, most of our Saviour's teaching while on earth was also given in the form of allegory or parable, and abounds with the other figures of speech.

In many cases, in poetry, the whole meaning of the poem is made to turn upon one prominent figure; as in the beautiful verses of Longfellow, entitled "Sea Weed," in which the first part describes the stormy deep:—

"When descends on the Atlantic,
The gigantic
Storm wind of the equinox,
Landward in his wrath he scourges
The toiling surges,
Laden with sea-weed from the rocks;

And in the second we have this applied as a companion to the action of the poet's mind:—

"So when storms of wild emotion,
Strike the ocean
Of the poet's soul, ere long
From each cave and rocky fastness,
In its vastness,
Floats some fragment of a song.

"From the far-off isles enchanted,
Heaven has planted
With the golden fruit of Truth;
From the flashing surf, whose vision
Gleams Elysian,
In the tropic clime of youth."

Another of Longfellow's poems, "The Occultation of Orion," abounds with mixed figures, similes, metaphors, classical allusions; and the whole is a beautiful allegory: for he pictures to us the moon as she passes between the earth and Orion, destroying his brightness, as some fair saint to whom is given power to put an end to the reign of violence on earth and in the heavens:—

"Then through the silence overhead,
An angel with a trumpet said:
'For evermore, for evermore,
The reign of violence is o'er!'
And like an instrument that flings
Its music on another's strings,
The trumpet of the angel cast
Upon the heavenly Lyre its blast,
And on from sphere to sphere the words,
Reëchoed down the burning chords—
'For evermore, for evermore,
The reign of violence is o'er!'"

The moral lesson contained in the structure and growth of "The Chambered Nautilus," is beautifully conveyed by Holmes in the poem with that title, to be found in his "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table;" and it forms another proof of the charms which lie in well invented and properly applied figures of thought and of speech.

(109.) *Elegance.*

There remains yet the third and last quality of a good style to be considered; and this is Elegance.

A discourse may be *perspicuous*, and perfectly intelligible; it may be *energetic* and forcible; without being *elegant*. And if it lack *elegance*, to most minds it will be displeasing.

This branch of our subject will need, however, much less consideration here; because many of the rules before laid down for attaining *perspicuity* and *energy*, really apply to the attainment of *Elegance*; and further, because in the general subject of rhetorical æsthetics, although the reference was to thought and invention rather than to language, still elegance of expression is so indissolubly allied to beauty and sublimity of thought, that we could only illustrate the fine thoughts by elegant and graceful language.

Under this head it has been thought best to consider the general *appropriateness* of the language to

express the thought; and, apart from this, the *beauty* or *grace* of the expression.

Fitness is, as has been remarked in the chapter on Æsthetics, a decided element of beauty, and thus conduces to Elegance. And this fitness or appropriateness implies that a writer should have something to say, and means to proceed at once to say it in the most proper language. This appropriateness is lost when it appears as though a person only wanted to say something, and was at a loss what to say, as well as how to say it.

It is further evident that the nature of the discourse will determine, according to the laws of fitness, the character of the expression: A plain mathematical disquisition will need no graces of language or figures of speech, while a poetic thought will claim a more ornate and romantic expression. It is evident without further illustration that a different style must be used in the treatment of the various kinds of discourse; to this we shall devote a few lines before closing.

But elegance of style also depends upon the graces of expression, as to the *choice of words*, which has already been spoken of in treating of *purity* and *propriety*, and in the *structure of sentences*, as to the *euphony* and *harmony* of diction, and in the general arrangement of the discourse, with a reference to the

beauty of its entire construction. To these latter we shall now refer.

(110.) *Euphony and Harmony.*

By Euphony (Greek, *ευ*, *well*, and *φωνη*, *the voice*), is meant a *pleasantly voiced* sound, and has reference only to sound, and not to sense.

Such words as are easily pronounced, and make a pleasant, gliding, or flowing sound to the ear, are called euphonious.

Euphony, then, which is one of the essential or absolute properties of style, is to be attained in various ways; thus, the loudness of sound concerns its euphony; so does the clearness, the pitch, the time, &c.; indeed, the consideration of the musical gamut is the true key to the euphony of style.

I. Euphony in style consists, first, in the choice of pleasant-sounding words; and the ear will readily aid us in such a choice; most persons agreeing very easily upon this point. Harsh, guttural sounds, are unpleasing; sharp and hissing sounds pain the ear; words ending in two or three consonants, as *lovedst*, *strikest*, are also uneuphonious.

II. But upon the arrangement of words in sentences, quite apart from the sense, the euphony of style depends. When, for example, many words similar to those just mentioned are brought together,

the euphony is destroyed. Tautology, or the repetition of the same word in a sentence, is also injurious to the euphony.

III. But the most important consideration of the pleasantness of sound, is its adaptation to the sense. This adaptation is called Harmony; and it has been incidentally referred to already in the subject of rhetorical æsthetics. Harmony requires that the words in a sentence shall make a pleasing sound to the ear, *analogous to the effect of the thought upon the mind*. But in every case the sound must be *suited to the sense*; and if the thought be a painful and disagreeable one, the words may also be harsh and ill-sounding. Milton is full of such charming analogies. Gray's Elegy abounds in them, and these attract the interest of many persons, who are not aware why they are pleased with these charming verses.

A fine example of Harmony may be found in Dryden's Ode on St. Cecilia's Day, in which music's power is used to excite varied moods in the mind of the great conqueror. And in the other ode, "To St. Cecilia," there is a wonderful flow and sweetness in the opening lines:—

"From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began.
From harmony to harmony,
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in Man."

Perhaps there is no more striking illustration of the adaptation of sound to sense, than the following :—

“The trumpet’s loud clangor,
Excites us to arms,
With shrill notes of anger,
And mortal alarms.
The double, double, double beat
Of the thundering drum,
Cries, Hark! the foes come;
Charge, charge, ’tis too late to retreat.”

As a very successful attempt in this study of Harmony, we may cite Poe’s “Bells.” One almost hears the

“Sledges with the bells—
Silver bells—
What a world of merriment their melody foretells!
How they tinkle, tinkle, tinkle,
In the icy ear of night!”

And then

“The mellow wedding bells,
Golden bells!”

But we should transcribe the whole poem if we endeavoured to select special passages illustrative of harmony—“The brazen bells” which tell of fire, and the “iron bells” “moaning” and “groaning” in the silence of the night.

The English language is peculiarly adapted to the

cultivation of harmony; and we should be at no loss for the richest examples of its use.

Akin to this is the subject of Rhythm, or the accentuation of syllables to produce the cadence of verse. But this subject belongs to Prosody and to Poetry, and leads, consequently, to another field of investigation.

With these remarks we close the consideration of the qualities of style.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE APPLICATIONS OF STYLE AND THE FORMS OF
COMPOSITION.

IT has been already stated, incidentally, that different kinds of style must be used in the treatment of the different kinds of discourse. It is not within the scope of such a work as this to give rules and illustrations of these adaptations of style. They are to be found in the standard works of every department of English literature, and to be learned by training our native talents on the model of the best speakers and writers, and by developing and polishing what is natural, without detriment to its soundness and simplicity. In particular, it resides with the teacher, by his constant and judicious criticisms of the compositions of his pupils, to give them those just ideas which can never be entirely inculcated by books.

There is much judgment required with pupils of different degrees and directions of talent, as to how often they should be required to write, and what length of composition should be demanded. Some

are quick in thought and slow in expression; some the reverse; some are full of ornament; others too plain and bald in speech. It would be well, after judiciously adopting the exercise to the powers of the individual pupil, not to let him sit down to write until he had taken time and opportunity to reflect carefully upon the subject, that is, to *invent* and *arrange* the discourse in the mind, before putting it upon paper. Nothing can be more perplexing to a beginner than to require him, at a moment's warning, to produce an essay on a subject upon which he has never thought; and nothing can lead more surely to a false and affected array of high-sounding words, in which *euphony* is made to take the place of *argument* and *fact*. This remark, of course, applies to stated and continuous instruction. As a trial of the readiness of the best writers in a class, it may be well sometimes to cause them to write what may be called *extemporaneous* essays upon a given subject; which will test the amount and the methodical arrangement of their knowledge, and the readiness of their powers of expression in words.

In many collegiate institutions it is usual to cause the lower classes to begin with *translations* from Latin and Greek authors; and this is an excellent course, since they are at once exercised in the study of the classics, and in the translation of the foreign idioms into our own language. It is worthy of remark

that this is the form of discourse to be observed in the beginnings of modern literature. Chaucer's first efforts were translations, and the early English poets have followed his example in a greater or less degree.

Sometimes compositions are made to include *paraphrases*, or the rendering in our own language the thoughts of another already expressed in the same language. Occasionally the paraphrase of prose, by putting it into a poetic form, gives us a pleasing metrical form, and an adaptation to music, as in Addison's paraphrases of some of the Psalms, which are now used in most collections of hymns for public worship; but the paraphrase is usually a weak and unsatisfactory imitation of the original, in which all the effective, individual, and idiomatic points are lost, and the faults are exaggerated. Many examples of the truth of this remark might be cited from high authority. Thus, we have the fine rebuke to the sluggard, in the original: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise!" It is thus translated by Dr. Johnson:—

"Turn on the prudent ant thy heedless eyes,
Observe her labours, sluggard, and be wise;"

in which every additional word is an injury to the sense and to the force of the appeal.

The same truth is made manifest in Dryden's paraphrase of Milton's "Paradise Lost;" and in many

verses of Pope's "Messiah," as rich and elevated as that poem really is.

In many essays or compositions, *quotations* are largely employed, and it is a question of some importance when and where they may be profitably used. In the main, we would advise that, except where an illustration is required, the writer should express the thoughts in his own words, and avoid quotations; but there must constantly occur exceptions to such a rule. Sometimes the passage quoted expresses the thought in a manner more felicitous than any other words will do; sometimes the *authority* of the quotation is valuable, as when it is taken from some very famous author; and sometimes it is used to enliven discourse, as in the occasional introduction of a few lines of exquisite poetry, which are appropriate to the current of discourse: this latter use of quotations also introduces the element of harmony, and conduces to the elegance of style.

Quotations from the Scriptures are always forcible, for a reason beyond those just given; it is because they seem to corroborate that which is only of the nature of *human* wisdom, by the testimony of *divine* wisdom; and, well introduced, they produce the excellent effect of giving to the discourse a religious spirit, which elevates and purifies itself and its influence.

Of the *forms* of composition, as to the subjects,

the lengths required, and the details of manipulation, the use of paper, &c., each instructor will form his own system. It should, when made, be uniform. Perhaps the forms of public documents in our own country give us the easiest and best models, especially for large classes, where compositions are written frequently, and accumulate in large numbers on the instructor's desk for examination. Following this pattern, they should be written upon Congress letter-paper (in size), folded three times across the sheet, and endorsed on the back, beginning at the top with the name of the place or institution; then the date; then the name of the student and his class; and, in the middle, the subject. When compositions thus endorsed are tied together in file, the instructor can glance over the endorsements, and, after having examined them, make his remarks in the form of an additional endorsement.

In official papers, which are regularly filed away, this system is invaluable; in the place of the *subject*, we have in such documents a *brief of the contents*, as a part of the endorsement.

(111.) *The Rhetoric of Conversation.*

There remains but one topic upon which a few remarks seem requisite; it is an inquiry to what extent the laws of discourse laid down in the foregoing pages, apply to our ordinary conversation.

No one who will reflect can deny the great importance of conversation in the affairs of life; not merely to settle the concerns of the family, the market the social circle, but in the higher walks of professional life, of diplomacy, and statesmanship; and yet there are in society thousands who regard it as but a pastime, amenable to no rigorous laws, and by no means to be subjected to harsh judgment.

The subject of conversation has many and most interesting points of consideration. Its *moral* character is of vast importance. Measured by that standard which declares that an account will be required for "every *idle* word;" and which will be, of course, more exacting for every *false* and *evil* word, it is of great moment how we speak.

But again, considered in the light of *social* convention, it forms a most interesting topic. This view discloses to us the many forms which make up the varied talk of society.

This man deals in hyperbole or exaggeration, in a manner which would never pass current in written discourse; his reason is to make himself the more strikingly interesting; and his excuse is that the proper allowance will be made, and he will, after all, be rightly understood. Another annoys us with his constant egotism, at variance alike with truth and taste, and with true modesty.

Perhaps the most disagreeable of all is the man

who monopolizes the conversation, forcing all others into the position of listeners, and actually haranguing and lecturing those who are unprepared for such an infliction. Notable historic examples of this class are found in Dr. Johnson, Coleridge, and Macaulay.

And so we might refer to the *slippant* talker; the *scientific* talker, whose whole nomenclature astonishes without instructing; and the *gossip*, who lives to spy out the faults of others, that he may tell of them.

But we come finally to the *rhetorical view* of conversation, and we are ready to declare that all the rules laid down for discourse apply to our ordinary talk in full force. We should always speak grammatically and rhetorically well.

We should be careful in *inventing* the subject-matter of our conversation; we should arrange it duly, and our language should be a just, full, and pleasing expression of our thoughts.

The habit of speaking in a vulgar manner to ignorant people, and thus lowering ourselves, as it is supposed, to their standard, is wrong. We may, it is true, find a plainer word to express our thought than we might ordinarily use; but it should be *pure, proper, and precise*. In many cases of this kind the value of rhetorical rules is manifested by the fact that in our efforts to be *very clear*, we apply those rules with a minuteness which, perhaps, we do not always use when we are talking at random, or are indifferent as

to making ourselves intelligible. Particularly, too, should we avoid all slang phrases. Apart from their inelegance, they foist upon the language new and vulgar words and idioms which it is far better without.

To "talk like a book," is frequently used to express a fault; but it is the fault of *pedantry*, and not of *rhetorical exactness*.

The errors of a conversational style are not so easily marked, of course, as those in a set discourse. Many a man of few ideas has an elegance of language, which, to the unobservant mind, causes his platitudes to sound like wisdom; while the taciturnity and bald speech of the philosopher have become proverbial. The faulty speech of many persons, even among those who call themselves educated, is a lamentable proof how necessary a branch of our subject is the *Rhetoric of conversation*.

(112.) *Conclusion.*

In bringing this work to a close, it has been thought best to supply a short list of subjects, upon which the student may be required to compose essays. It is intended rather as suggestive than complete, and the instructor will readily supply many excellent topics, under the various heads referred to.

Historical and Biographical Themes.

The last days of Queen Elizabeth.
 Spenser's Three Elizabeths.
 John Milton, the statesman, the poet, the theologian.
 Aristotle and his times.
 Cicero the orator.
 Quintilian the rhetorician.
 George III., his policy and his mind.
 Historic nights.
 Historic mountains.
 Historic rivers.
 Pompeii and its fate.
 St. Paul before Nero.
 Luther at the Diet of Worms.
 Milton visiting Galileo in prison.
 Spenser and Sir Philip Sidney as friends.
 Copernicus on his death-bed.
 The battle of the Nile.
 Nelson at the battle of Trafalgar.
 Homer and his poems.
 Robert Burns.
 The Rosicrucians.
 The Scandinavian Vikings.
 Cardinal Richelieu and his policy.
 Alexander Hamilton.
 The Moravians in history.
 Palissey the potter.
 Berthold Schwartz.
 God in history.
 Saratoga and Yorktown.
 The Gnostics.
 The sources of history.
 National sports.
 Ancient and modern modes of warfare.
 Supposed degeneracy of the present period.
 Eloquence in history.

Charles I. and Cromwell.
 The English revolution of 1688.
 The first French revolution.

Aphorisms and Maxims.

Manners are the shadows of virtues.
 Worth makes the man.
 The rank is but the guinea's stamp.
 Labor ipse voluptas.
 Post tenebras lux.
 Illa mihi patria est, ubi pascor, non ubi nascor.
 It is an ill-will that blows nobody good.
 It is a long lane that has no turning.
 Non habet anguillam, per caudam qui tenet illam.
 Femina, ridendo, flendo, fallitque canendo.
 Few persons know how to be old.
 Time assuages grief.
 Enough is as good as a feast.
 Festina lente.
 Look before you leap.
 Hunger is the best sauce.
 Anger furnishes weapons.
 Account no man happy till his death.
 Truth is the daughter of time.
 A bet is a fool's argument.
 Ever vigilant but never suspicious.
 Usury is the daughter of avarice.
 Action is the shortest answer.
 When the cat is away the mice will play.
 The workman is worthy of his hire.
 Handsome is that handsome does.

Honour and Fame from no condition rise,
 Act well your part; there all the honour lies.
 Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
 As to be hated, needs but to be seen;
 But seen too oft, familiar with her face,
 We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

Fas atque nefas, exiguo fine,
Libidinum discernunt avidi.

Non aliter cineres mando jacere meos.
Catus amat pisces, sed non vult tangere plantas.
Keep to the right, as the law directs.
Non sibi sed aliis.
Non sibi sed bono publico.

Narratives True and Fictitious.

The story of a shipwreck.
Only one night at sea.
A journey in an omnibus.
The field of Cerro Gordo.
The battle of Monmouth.
Crossing of the Delaware at Trenton.
The fate of the Templars.
The fountain of youth.
A retrospect of youth.
The history of a writing-table.
The needle and its story.
What becomes of the pins.
Dollars and cents.
A visit to St. Peter's.
Life on the ocean wave.
How we roughed it on the prairies.
Travels with a knapsack.

Parallels and Contrasts.

Town and country.
Balaclava and Valley Forge.
Lexington and Waterloo.
Eloquent silence and silent eloquence.
The deaths of Napoleon and John Quincy Adams.
Science and faith.
Marengo and Waterloo.

Luther and Columbus.
John Locke and William Penn.
The logic of intolerance and the rhetoric of persuasion.
Pericles and Lorenzo de Medici.
Washington and Franklin.
Chivalry mediæval and modern.
Cæsar and Napoleon.
Zoroaster and Mahomet.
St. Paul and Seneca.
The Christian martyrs and their Roman persecutors.
The revolutions of England and France.
American wars and European struggles.
Wars of Independence, in Europe and America.
The war of 1812, and the peace of 1815.

Forensics, or Subjects for Debate.

Which is the strongest element in forming character, education or constitution?
Whether an uninterrupted condition of peace or war, in the present state of man, is most conducive to national prosperity?
The right of visitation and search.
Is genius hereditary?
Who are most to blame for the disorders in India, the English or the Sepoys?
Did Homer write the Iliad?
Cuba.
Is success a test of effort?
Should beards be worn or shorn?
The relative merits of written and extemporaneous oratory.
The cavaliers and the Puritans.
Was Frederick of Prussia greater in the cabinet or the field?
Should capital punishment be abolished?
The sword and the pen.
Which is the best form of government, a monarchy or a republic?
Which is the best seat for an institution of learning, the city or the country?
Is the influence of parties in a state beneficial?

Essays, Moral, Didactic, and Literary.

The paramount claims of duty.
 Evil habits, and good intentions.
 Moral power gained by good habits.
 The Christian soldier.
 The Christian gentleman.
 Mind-wrecks, by madness, excess, and overwork.
 Respectability.
 Compensation.
 Friendship.
 Neighbours.
 Perseverance.
 Money-making.
 Memory.
 Importance of an aim in life.
 Influence of foreign travel.
 Table talk.
 Peasant heroes.
 Bibliomania.
 Gothic art.
 Norman architecture.
 The elixir of life.
 The philosopher's stone.
 Home sickness.
 Hospitality.
 Futurity.
 Time.
 Eternity.
 Enterprize.
 Amusement.
 Fatalism.
 Government.
 Discipline.
 Physical causes and effects.
 Nobody.
 Somebody.
 Something strange.

Paul Morphy in Europe.
 Fanaticism.
 Egyptian hieroglyphs.
 Heroism.
 Patriotism.
 Charity.
 Moral courage.
 Constitutional timidity.
 The madness of Lear.
 Othello.
 Old age and its comforts.
 Honourable rivalry.
 The progress of peace.
 Architecture.
 Duelling.
 Ambition.
 The dew-point.
 The freezing-point.

THE END.

23 Jan. 1860.