THE

ART OF DISCOURSE:

A SYSTEM OF RHETORIC

ADAPTED FOR USE IN COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES,
AND ALSO FOR PRIVATE STUDY.

BY

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"True ease in writing comes from art, not chance."— *Pope.*
"I hope ultimately to advance so far that art shall become a second nature, as polished manners are to well-bred men; then Imagination shall regain her former freedom, and submit to none but voluntary limitations."— *Schiller.*

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PREFACE.

THE present work is a reconstruction of the author's "Elements of the Art of Rhetoric," first published in 1850. The distinctive peculiarities of that work were the elevation of Invention, or the supply of the thought, to the first and commanding rank in rhetorical instruction; the reduction of the principles of Rhetoric to more exact system and method, both in respect of its internal properties and also of its relations to kindred arts and sciences; and the stricter treatment of Rhetoric as an art rather than as a science. The work has been received with great favor in all parts of the country; but both in its outward dress and also in its contents it invited some attempts at improvement. The principal changes in the text will be found in the more definite indications of the relations of Rhetoric to Logic and Æsthetics, and the fuller and clearer application of logical and æsthetic principles to the construction of discourse; the fuller and more definite development of the nature and processes of Explanation, or the unfolding of thought; and the more exact classification of the properties of Style. A leading aim in the reconstruction has been to exhibit the grounds of all the principles of the art in the nature of thought and of language, so as to enable the learner to discern the logical accuracy and completeness of its divisions, its

processes, and its properties; as the design has been not merely to present a collection of doctrines and observations for acquisition as bare knowledge, but to make practical thinkers and writers — to put students of discourse on a course of training which if faithfully pursued shall secure to them a perpetual growth in power as thinkers and also as speakers and writers. An indispensable condition of such continuous growth is an intelligent apprehension of the essential nature and laws of each of the diverse processes in which thought may be presented to other minds. A moment's reflection will satisfy any candid mind that the expectation of reaching any high degree of skill in the construction of discourse, whether written or extempore, without separate study and practice in each of these general processes, is just as preposterous as the expectation of attaining mathematical skill by general practice in computing, without specific study of the elemental principles of quantity, and practice in the fundamental rules of computation. As the only common-sense method of acquiring arithmetical skill is by the study of the ground-rules of arithmetic, one by one and successively, — addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, of reduction of fractions, evolution and involution, proportion, — not by general exercises in computation involving any or all these processes in combination, so the only rational method of acquiring skill in writing and speaking is by the separate study of each process of presenting thought. Having well grounded himself thus in these processes, the student of discourse may go on ever perfecting his skill in the handling of thought, in the shaping of it for the various objects of his discourse, and in the ultimate embodiment of it in fit and effective verbal expression. Proceeding in this way, the training in discourse — in writing compositions — instead of a repulsive drudgery, to be shirked in every way possible, becomes an attractive as it will be felt to be a rational procedure, and of eminent utility.

Exercises have been subjoined to the several departments of Invention and Style, as fully as seemed desirable. They will be found sufficient for private study. In classes under permanent instructors the selections of exercises must necessarily be left to a great extent with the instructor. In the author's "Rhetorical Praxis" may be found two thousand or more themes, with rudimental exercises in all rhetorical processes. His "Art of Composition" contains the principles of proper sentence-construction, presented in progressive method, including an introduction to the use of imagery or rhetorical symbols and to the elementary processes in the unfolding of thought, and accompanied throughout with copious exercises.

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INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION OF RHETORIC.

§ 1. RHETORIC has been correctly defined to be the ART OF DISCOURSE.

This definition presents Rhetoric as an art, in distinction from a science. There are divers fundamental respects in which an art of discourse differs from a science. An art directly and immediately concerns itself with the faculty of discoursing as its proper subject. It fastens upon that and keeps it ever in its view as it teaches how that may be developed, trained, and guided. A science, on the other hand, regards rather the product of this faculty; and, keeping its view directly upon that, proceeds to unfold its nature and proper characteristics. In perfect accordance with this primary distinction, Art aims ever at skill as its one governing end and object; whereas, Science aims only at knowledge. Still further, and in perfect keeping with these distinctions, the method of Art is synthetic, constructive; while that of Science is analytic and critical. Art takes element by element, marks out stage by stage successively, and constructs and develops into a composite, harmonious whole of power and skill; while Science dissects the given whole of discourse, and leaves it unfolded, explicated into its several parts and elements. In outer form there will be much that is common in a true art and a true science of Discourse,

INTRODUCTION.

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inasmuch as all art must proceed in intelligence, that is, in science; the product of a faculty must partake of the proper character of the faculty. Skill involves knowledge; and analysis implies synthesis. But a proper art will be developed in a very different spirit from a science; it will ever be putting the learner upon practice, and abound in cautions and rules, while a science will content itself with mere facts and truths. Accordingly, the most critical and thorough mastery of a science will not suffice to make an artist; and a certain skill and tact may exist in comparative ignorance of principles. There will be more or less of difference, thus, in the matter which makes up the body of an art and that of a science. An art will, in particular, present exercises for the practical application of its rules, which would be entirely foreign to the design and nature of a science. In respect of immediate subject, therefore, as also of aim, of method, and of matter, a proper art will differ from a science.

The definition also presents discourse as the limiting or specific subject-matter of the art of Rhetoric. This term, *discourse*, like many others in language, is used in different connections, for three different purposes: to denote the faculty, the exertion or operation of the faculty, and the result or product of the operation. By earlier writers it was employed to denote the discursive faculty of intelligence, in distinction from the original faculties, — from the presentative, or the intuitive in the broader import of the word as including both the perceptive and the proper intuitive; as

> "It adds to my calamity that I have *Discourse* and *Reason*."
> *Massinger.*
>
> "Reason is her being,
> *Discursive* or intuitive; *discourse*
> Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours." — *Milton.*

The term is used also to denote the exercise of this faculty as thus discriminated from the faculties of original knowledge. Thus Chillingworth: "By *discourse* no man can possibly be led to error; but if he err in his conclusions, he must of necessity either err in his principles, or commit some error in his *discourse;* that is, indeed, not *discourse*, but seem to do so."

The use of the term to denote the product of this faculty is too familiar to require exemplification.

But these uses of the term as so far indicated respect thought rather as internal and unexpressed. The term very naturally has come to denote also objective thought, — thought as uttered, as communicated. Such, indeed, is the more common use of the term at present. And as the natural embodiment of human thought is in language, we ordinarily understand now by the term discourse, *thought communicated in language.*

The more particular determination and development of this general notion of Rhetoric will be presented in the chapters that immediately follow.

THE ART OF DISCOURSE.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PROVINCE AND RELATIONS OF RHETORIC.

§ 2. The proper province of Rhetoric, as also its specific relations to other arts and sciences, are determined at once by the faculty which it immediately and exclusively respects, — the faculty of discourse, or the capacity in man of communicating his mental states to other minds by means of language.

As has been already stated, every art immediately regards a faculty which it is its proper aim and object to develop and train. The art of vocal music fastens thus on the faculty of song; the art of computation, on the faculty of computing by numbers. Rhetoric, as the art of Discourse, in like manner, fastens on the faculty of discourse.

This term — *discourse* — in its more strict and proper import, denotes only the discursive, the reflective faculty of intelligence. It excludes in this stricter import the perceptive and the intuitive faculties, as well as the exercises of the sensibilities and of the will. And it is in a certain sense correct to say that Rhetoric concerns itself only with this faculty — the faculty of comparison, of thought in its narrower import, which is the more recently accepted use of the word. For human speech is properly and strictly the embodiment of thought — of the exercises of the discursive faculty. The feelings and the dispositions of the will find expression in

speech only through the thought. So in all spoken or written discourse, feeling and purpose, passion and determination, appear only through modifications of the thought. This is true also of all those states of the intelligence, all those cognitions which are attained through the faculties of original knowledge — those of perception and intuition. They appear only as modifying proper thought — proper discursive cognitions. But in loose, rude, popular expression, discourse as embodied in language is correctly represented as comprehending the utterances alike of all forms of the intelligence, however modified by the various feelings and states of the will. Rhetoric is thus correctly represented by Dr. Campbell to be "the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes."

Further, human speech has originated not in a mere desire to utter mental states, but rather in the instinctive impulse to communicate to another mind. All language is thus shaped and colored in its essential peculiarities by this reference to another mind to which the thought it embodies is to be imparted. It is essentially an imparting medium, not merely an uttering or expressing body of thought.

Of the various names by which the art is designated, one, *oratory*, expresses this notion of imparting, communicating, implied in all normal discourse, as it points directly to the minds addressed as its object, and at once suggests the idea of an effect to be produced in them. This is, therefore, the more full and proper designation of the art. The name *eloquence* drops this idea of effect on another mind implied in proper rational discourse, and points only to the source — the uttering or communicating mind. Although eloquence is thus distinguished from oratory, and we apply the term to those forms of discourse in which the speaker abandons himself more to the mere outpouring of thought and feeling with seeming forgetfulness of the minds he is addressing, and of any effect he is to produce in them, yet all true ra-

tional discourse must ever be communication, not mere objectless utterance. In like manner, the name *rhetoric*, properly and originally held to denote the art of the speaker, and to limit its view to mere speaking, with no reference to source or to effect, and so specifically differing both from eloquence and oratory, is yet not to be regarded as excluding either. All rational discourse, by whatever name designated, implies a communication from one mind to another. It involves ever the three essential elements of a subject, object, and a relation between them; in other words, of a mind addressing, a mind addressed, and the act itself of addressing.

§ 3. Discourse, as the communication of one's own thoughts, feelings, and dispositions to another by means of language, and under the regulation of the faculty of thought, stands in a vital relation to each of the three great mental sciences of Logic, Æsthetics, and Ethics, and also to Grammar. All discourse should be at the same time logical, æsthetical, and moral, as well as grammatical. But Rhetoric, or the art of Discourse, is not properly to be regarded as a department of either of these sciences. It only presupposes them, assumes them, and develops itself in conformity to their principles. These sciences are hence to be regarded as sciences conditional to Rhetoric.

The three mental sciences — Logic, Æsthetics, and Ethics — have been fitly called by Sir William Hamilton the nomological sciences, inasmuch as their proper object is to present the laws, in other words, the necessary or universal characteristics, of mental phenomena in these several departments. Discourse, as communication of mental states generally, should found itself immediately on these nomological sciences rather than on proper phenomenal psychology. It should take the general forms of these various mental phenomena as determined in respect of their necessary characters and conditions by these sciences respectively. It is plain that Rhetoric must found itself on all — not on one to the exclusion of the others.

This mistake or defect in founding Rhetoric on one to the exclusion of the other nomological sciences has singularly marked leading rhetorical treatises. Dr. Whately thus has regarded Rhetoric as an offshoot of Logic. He accordingly restricts its province to argumentative composition, excluding from it all consideration of judgments and concepts, and admitting only reasonings — in fact, only one and the less important class of reasonings, although all are equally logical products.

Dr. Blair, on the other hand, in his extensive work on Rhetoric, treats it throughout as a mere department of Æsthetics — a purely critical art, lying wholly within the domain of Taste.

Still further, to limit exemplifications to single authors, the able German rhetorician, Theremin, makes the art a purely ethical procedure. Eloquence, he claims, is a virtue.

These views are all of them partially correct. They are, however, all imperfect and one-sided. The more exact relations of Rhetoric to these sciences respectively will be exhibited in the sections that immediately follow.

§ 4. In respect of the matter of discourse, Rhetoric derives its regulative principles more immediately from Logic; in respect of the form of discourse, from Æsthetics; and in respect of the end or object of discourse, from Ethics.

Every rational procedure contains these three elements: matter or content, form, and end. In discourse, the matter or content is thought; and it is the especial function of logical science to prescribe the conditions and forms of thought.

But, in discourse, thought is uttered, expressed. It takes a form; and it is the proper function of æsthetical science to prescribe the conditions and elements of form.

Further, discourse is more than mere thought, more than mere thought uttered or formed; it is thought communicated, implying a mind addressed in the communication. It looks to an end, and it is the proper province of Ethics to prescribe the conditions and forms of all rational procedures as determined by their governing end.

In all discourse, it should be remarked, as in every form of rational activity, the whole spirit moves, as a thinking, feeling, willing power, ever one and undivided. In every thought it thinks, feeling, taste is involved, as is also disposition, purpose, will. We are able, however, to discriminate these several aspects of its complex action, and to regard any of its acts more exclusively as an act of thought, or as a product of taste, or as an expression of purpose. So, likewise, any act of the spirit of man may present one or another of these elements in greater prominence relatively to the others. It may be more predominantly and characteristically an act of thought, an act of taste, or an act of intention or determination. Yet it should never be forgotten that no one of these elements is utterly wanting. In every thought, taste and conscience are really concerned, even when relatively they are only concerned to a slight degree.

§ 5. Rhetoric, in respect of the matter of discourse, more immediately grounds itself on Logic.

Logic, in its stricter and more scientific import, is the science of the conditions and forms of thought; of thought as the product of the discursive faculty of the intelligence — the faculty of thought in the narrower sense. This is the faculty of the True, its essential function being to recognize the true in all objects of human knowledge. As such, it is the highest faculty of human intelligence, and its product the culminating product of our powers of cognition. All perceptions and all intuitions are for this faculty of Thought — the faculty of the True. The mind never rests satisfied with them, but ever presses on from attaining any perception or

intuition to some judgment respecting it, or still further to some derivative from the judgment as a concept or a reasoning. Perceptions and intuitions are the *data* to thought, — seeds, germs, which reach their ultimate form and perfection only as taken up and shaped into this highest form of the intellectual life. Rhetoric grounds itself more immediately on Logic, because this science furnishes to it the various forms of thought, the various forms of the True as the immediate elements of all discourse — its proper subject-matter, in which all sentiment and feeling, as all disposition and purpose, are embodied for communication to other minds. More than this; all discourse effects its object — communicates to others — by means of language; and language is but the creation and instrument of thought. Discourse, therefore, looks to Logic not only for its matter suitably formed and shaped for its use, — for all its forms of thought through which alone it expresses feeling and purpose, — but also for its forms of language, through which alone as its medium and organ it reaches the mind which it addresses.

But although Rhetoric holds thus immediately of Logic, it is no proper department of that science. It bears a relation to it, although far broader and far more comprehensive, similar to that of arithmetic, or the art of computation. When Aristotle says, as quoted by Dr. Whately, that Rhetoric is an offshoot of Logic, we are not to understand him as meaning to teach that it is a department of that science any more than as meaning to teach that it is a department of Ethics, when he says, in the same connection, that it is an offshoot of Political Science.

§ 6. Rhetoric, in respect of the form of discourse, grounds itself more immediately on Æsthetics.

Æsthetics is the science of Form. Otherwise it may be defined, in respect to its proper object, as the science of the Beautiful. Or still further, it may be defined, in respect to the mental experience of the beautiful, as the science of

Taste. The Beautiful is the perfect in form, and bears the same relation to a proper object of the sensibility that the True bears to a proper object of the intelligence. The taste is the culminating form of the sensibility, as the judgment is the culminating form of the intelligence. All other forms of the sensibility stand in the relation of *data*, conditions, germs, to the taste-sensibility, just as all other forms of the intelligence are but *data*, conditions, germs, to the discursive intelligence, or faculty of thought proper.

Inasmuch as discourse necessarily has form, it comes under the control of the science of form — the science of the Beautiful, or of Taste — proper æsthetic science. Rhetoric, accordingly, presupposes and assumes this science. It accepts from it its notion of what form is; of the nature, the elements, the kinds of the Beautiful; of the conditions and gradations of Taste. The construction and the formation of discourse is throughout an æsthetic procedure. Just so far as it proceeds without the control of Taste or in violation of the proper conditions of the Beautiful, it is imperfect, not full, proper discourse. Taste must be exercised in the selection and management of the thought which is the proper matter of discourse. It must, especially and predominantly, control the embodiment of the thought in language; for this is, more essentially and characteristically, an æsthetic procedure. It must, moreover, ever guide in the adaptation of discourse to the mind of the hearer; for all mind is æsthetic in its nature, and, to be properly and effectually moved, must be addressed in accordance with its æsthetic nature. Its taste must not be offended, if the full end and object of discourse is to be realized. We shall find, thus, the principles of Taste appearing all along throughout the entire art of discourse, as rules to guide in its construction.

The same view of the relations of Rhetoric to Æsthetic science will present itself if the matter be regarded from another species of æsthetic nomenclature; for it is to be borne in mind that psychological science is here immature,

and its nomenclature is exceedingly deficient in definiteness and precision. The imagination is very generally recognized in current literature as the proper æsthetic faculty. It is properly defined to be the faculty of form. But this is a view of it taken from the active side. It is not only faculty but capacity of form. It receives as well as offers. It is both *forma formans* and *forma formata*. Its proper function and province as passive, as capacity, is to receive objects so formed as to be in relation to the receiving mind — to receive them, in other words, as forms, and as active, as faculty, to represent objects as formed to other receiving minds; in other words, to present forms. As discourse is, in its proper, essential nature, a communication to other minds, it is the imagination which is the more essential faculty concerned in discourse. Its special province here is to form the thought in such verbal body that it shall be received by the mind addressed. In a true sense, therefore, the construction of discourse is the proper work of the imagination as the faculty of form. It comes, accordingly, under the immediate control of æsthetic principles, which are but the laws of the imagination.

In like manner, if the view be taken from the other side — from the effect of discourse in the mind addressed — it is clear that, only as the discourse is shaped in accordance with the conditions on which the passive imagination, the imagination as the capacity of form, can receive it or be impressed by it, can there be any communication of thought, any discourse. It must, consequently, in order to accomplish its proper end, be æsthetic. It must be regulated throughout by the principles of æsthetic science.

§ 7. Rhetoric, in respect to the end of discourse, grounds itself more immediately on Ethics or moral science.

Ethics, defined in respect to the highest form of the mental faculty which it respects, is the science of the will; or in

respect of the proper object of the will and in its positive and most perfect form, the science of the Good. The human spirit moving towards an object in the necessary activity of its nature moves right or wrong, towards good or evil; and all its proper action participates in a moral nature, as it is the outworking of a proper moral being. Discourse, as communication and address, is so far ethical, moral, in its character.

We shall find, accordingly, the art of discourse assuming and applying proper ethical principles all along. It accepts these principles, as it does those of logic and of æsthetics. It does not profess to investigate and establish them. All this is foreign to it, and it is an error of an imperfect, one-sided, and partial view of the matter, to represent Rhetoric as a department of Ethics, equally as to represent it as a part of Logic or of Æsthetics.

§ 8. Rhetoric, in respect to the outward body of discourse, which is language, grounds itself immediately on the science of Grammar.

Grammar is the science of the sentence, in other words, of the verbal expression of a thought. It takes from logic the various forms of thought, and prescribes the proper forms in which they should be expressed in language. As an art, the proper object of which is to teach how to speak or write correctly and well, and consequently, as constructive in its proper method, it begins with the elemental forms of thought, presenting one by one successively, and indicates the form of word which language furnishes for expressing it, and proceeds thus, step by step, stage by stage, with appropriate exercises for practice precisely as in an art of arithmetic, through all the general forms of thought and all the forms of verbal expression appropriated respectively to those forms of thought, till it has unfolded the whole art of constructing the sentence. Here Grammar, as the science of language, properly stops. Rhetoric, as the art of discourse, begins

just at this point — begins where grammar stops. It accepts the whole doctrine of the sentence as taught in grammar. It does not investigate nor elaborate the principles of the sentence. It is not a department of grammar, as grammar is not of rhetoric. It presupposes grammar, and with these grammatical principles assumed, it proceeds to treat of the communication of thought through language, through the sentence, to another mind. Grammar, thus, is conditional to rhetoric; but not, like logic, æsthetics, and ethics, conditional as a science, but as an art, elementary and constitutive. It stands much in the relation to rhetoric in which arithmetic stands to mensuration. It is rudimental, preliminary, and introductory to the proper art of discourse. It should be familiarly understood by the student of discourse before he commences this art, as arithmetic should be practically mastered before one studies engineering or surveying.

As the common treatises on grammar in the English language are rather sciences than arts, having as their governing end knowledge or science rather than skill, and, being analytic rather than constructive in their method, it will not be out of place here to indicate the proper study of grammar as conditional and introductory to rhetorical studies.

Grammar should be studied as an art rather than as a science, since the more important object, by far, to be attained by the study, especially if the grammar be that of one's vernacular tongue, is skill in speaking and writing the language, not skill in interpreting discourse. The study, therefore, should proceed, as already indicated, by distinct stages, giving opportunity for thorough exercises on each successive element or principle, for acquiring a perfect practical mastery of the whole art of sentence-construction. There are three widely distinguishable stages in the art, bearing a close analogy to those in arithmetical study. There is, first, what may be viewed as grammatical notation, embracing the art of paragraphing, punctuating, and capitalizing. This

should be first and separately mastered, as not only preventing distraction in proper rhetorical practice, but also as positively helpful in working into the mind of the learner that idea of progress by stages which is so essential in all discourse through all its clauses, sentences, and paragraphs, and, moreover, of unity and relative subordination in its parts. The second stage embraces the ground-rules, so to speak, of the sentence, founded on the principles of its constituent elements, — the subject, the predicate, and the copula, with their respective forms and modifications. The third stage embraces the more general processes in sentence-construction, in which the elements of the second stage, the subject, the predicate, and the copula, in their respective forms and modifications, are constructed into proper sentence-form. This stage exactly corresponds to that stage in arithmetic which embraces the doctrines of Fractions, of Roots and Powers, and of Proportion, — it contains the rules of Concord or Agreement, of Arrangement, of Propriety, and of Precision. Here, also, may be properly included a familiar and practical introduction into the use of imagery — the doctrine of symbolism in language. With this thorough methodical grounding in the principles of proper sentence-construction, the learner is prepared intelligently and without distraction to enter upon proper rhetorical studies.

§ 9. The art of rhetoric cannot in strictness be regarded as having accomplished its end until the mental states to be communicated are actually conveyed to the mind addressed. It, therefore, may properly comprehend *Delivery*.

The mode of communication, however, is not essential. The thought may be conveyed by the pen or by the voice. Elocution, or the vocal expression of thought, is not accordingly a necessary part of rhetoric.

Elocution or vocal delivery has, indeed, generally been

esteemed a constituent part of the art of rhetoric. Diverse considerations, however, justify the propriety of separating them.

First, Elocution is not essential to rhetoric in order to constitute it an art; because, as has been already remarked, there are other ways of communicating thought than by the voice.

Secondly, we have a complete product of art when the thought is embodied in a proper form of language. Short of this, of incorporating into language, the artist cannot stop. For no art is complete till its product is expressed, or embodied. Mere invention does not constitute the whole of artistic power, in any proper sense of that expression. But when the thought is invested in language, a work of art is completed. A further exertion of artistic power is not necessary in order to give it expression. It requires no skill to dictate, no oratorical dexterity, certainly, to commit to writing. We have then the limits of a complete art before elocution.

Thirdly, the arts of rhetoric proper, and of elocution, are so distinct that great excellence in either may consist with great deficiency in the other. There have been many orators who could write good orations but were miserable speakers; and many excellent actors, who were utterly unable to construct an original discourse.

Fourthly, the modes of training in these different arts are so unlike, that convenience, both to the instructor and to the pupil, requires that they be separated.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE UTILITY OF RHETORIC.

§ 10. As every proper art respects a faculty, and as every such faculty is susceptible of development and invigoration which the art seeks as its great aim to promote and secure, every true conception of rhetoric must regard it as a *developing and invigorating art.*

There is a most remarkable opposition between the views of the ancients in this respect and the current opinions of the moderns. With the ancients, rhetoric was chiefly prized as an art which *developed* and *cultivated* the faculty of speaking. Their written systems and their teachings in schools were designed and fitted to draw out this faculty, and strengthen and improve it by judicious practice. They sought this even, as there is some reason to believe, at the sacrifice of good taste. They loved luxuriance and labored in every way to promote it. The moderns, on the other hand, have too much regarded rhetoric as a merely critical art. They have directed their attention mainly to pruning, repressing, and guiding; and have almost wholly neglected to apply any stimulus to the faculty of discourse itself. Their influence on the student of oratory has been, accordingly, at best but a negative influence, and any thing but fostering and nourishing. This has been an almost unavoidable result from their excluding from their systems the art of invention. For it is here — in invention — that the creative work in discourse mainly lies. Style, considered apart from invention, is lifeless and dead, and can feel no stimulus if applied.

It is, thus, not without reason that merely critical systems of rhetoric are generally regarded as of more injury than benefit to the student of eloquence, at least until the faculty of speaking has been considerably developed.

The commonly received maxim, "He who is learning to speak with accuracy and order is learning also to think with accuracy and order," expresses but a part of the truth. The study of style, and especially the study of style as an art in the exercise of composing, undoubtedly conduces to accurate and methodical habits of thought. But "*to speak* with accuracy and order," including in the expression not only the selection of language, but also the invention of thought, acts more directly on the intellect in determining its habits. The exercise not only disciplines it to regular and accurate thought; it also directly invigorates and develops the intellect itself. Indeed, there is no exercise that more directly and more powerfully tends to mental development and invigoration, when pursued in conformity with the principles of thought and expression. The mental effort called forth in the invention of thought and the embodiment of it in appropriate language is, when directed intelligently and correctly, at the same time, the most pleasing and also the most invigorating and fostering which is possible to the human mind. Rhetoric, therefore, studied as an art, in connection with a practical application of its principles, may and should be one of the most pleasing and one of the most profitable of studies.

§ 11. The faculty of discourse or the power to communicate thought by language is the common attribute of men, and is susceptible of indefinite degrees of improvement and cultivation.

Speech is the distinctive attribute of humanity. This general truth needs no modification to meet the case of deaf-mutes. While, undoubtedly, individuals differ indefinitely in the degrees to which they rise in the power of vigorous

thought and of forcible expression, while there are geniuses here as in every other art, still it remains true that this faculty is subject to the laws which regulate all the various activities of our nature. The degree of excellence to be attained in discourse will depend on the training — on its mode and the degree to which it is carried. *Orator fit* — the orator becomes such. There is no such thing as a natural orator in the strict sense of the expression. The most eminent orators and writers have ever been those who have subjected themselves to the most thorough training. Patrick Henry, the most illustrious example of natural oratory, so far as there is any such, went through a course of training in his daily studies of human nature as drawn out by himself in his little shop, his every-day trials on his lingering customers of the power of words, his deep and enthusiastic investigations into history, and particularly his patient and continued study of the harangues of Livy and the elaborate translations he made of them, which, to say the least, is very uncommon. Dr. Barrow used to copy out the finest passages of classical and ecclesiastical writers, particularly Demosthenes and Chrysostom; and, we are told, "took infinite pains with his compositions, transcribing them over and over again." The secret history of every speaker and every writer that has attained great success would show them to have been diligent students in private, like William Pinkney of Maryland, the most distinguished lawyer of his time, although they may have done as Goodrich in his "Recollections" says Pinkney did, — "affect to rely chiefly on his native powers." Pinkney was once heard, he says, "about five o'clock of a winter morning, reciting and committing to memory, in his room, the peroration of a plea which he delivered the same day before the supreme court." Goodrich tells a similar anecdote of Daniel Webster, indicating the secret source of his oratorical power. "On a certain occasion Mr. Webster startled the Senate by a beautiful and striking remark in relation to the extent of the British empire, as follows: 'She has dotted the surface of the whole globe with her possessions and military posts, whose morning drum-beat, following the sun and keeping company with the hours, circle the earth daily with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial airs of England.' On going out of the Senate, one of the members complimented Mr. Webster upon this, saying that he was all the more struck with it as it was evidently *impromptu*. 'You are mistaken, said Mr. Webster; 'the idea occurred to me when I was on the ramparts of Quebec some months since. I wrote it down and rewrote it, and after several trials got it to suit me, and laid it up for use. The time came to-day, and so I put it in.'" High oratory is the result ever of study and laborious training.

§ 12. The means by which every art seeks its development and improvement are twofold, — the study of the nature and principles of the art, and exercise.

It is obvious that there can be no true skill or excellence in any art unless its nature and the necessary principles which govern it are understood. It is equally obvious that no amount of this knowledge will, without exercise, secure practical skill in the art.

Obvious and unquestionable as are these remarks, yet the entire force and propriety of each of them are assailed, indirectly and in application, by different classes of minds. One class reject the study of principles in an art on the ground that the observance of rules at the time will inevitably impede the execution. They ridicule the notion of a poet's asking himself, at the time of composing, what this rule requires and what that rule prohibits; of a musician's referring constantly, while performing, to his gamut, to the rules of time, harmony, force, etc., which he finds laid down in his musical grammar. They object to the use of grammars in acquiring any art, whether of poetry, oratory, or music, because, they say, such study makes only stiff and awkward performers.

This view is extremely superficial and partial. It is so far true, indeed, that a conscious observance of rules in composing will impede the free operation of the mind; will make the proceeding mechanical, and hence, awkward and lifeless. But it by no means follows from this, that when the rule has, by study and application, become a principle in the mind, ruling it unconsciously, as is the case with the expert artist, in all its free action, the proceeding will be less free, living, graceful, than it would have been without study, and, of course, in ignorance, or at hap-hazard. On the contrary, all proceeding in art is perfect only in proportion to the intelligence of the artist; and it is the law of the human spirit that it learn slowly, by degrees, and from without. Principles of art are not innate. They spring up only on observation or study. How much more rational it is to receive by study the generalized facts of all perfect proceeding in art with proper illustrations from models, than to work them out, as does the savage so far as he does it, by unaided observation and reflection, it is not necessary to labor in demonstrating.

The whole matter may be exhibited in few words. All art, whether poetry, oratory, music, or painting, as a rational procedure, must be in accordance with certain principles. It must, further, proceed in intelligence — in intelligent conformity to those principles, either consciously or unconsciously apprehended. These principles can better be acquired when reduced to a scientific form, that is, to a form adapted to the understanding, than otherwise. Thus intellectually apprehended, as rules prescribed from without, they become, by continued application or in exercise, directing and animating principles, exerting an unconscious control. What is drudgery at first, mere mechanical application, becomes in this way eventually the most free, the most spirited, the most truly artistic creation. The poetry of Goethe and of Coleridge is not less perfect, certainly, because they were intellectual masters of the principles of poetry.

The other class reject practice in acquiring an art, because, as regulated step by step by a reference to rules, it is necessarily imperfect and awkward, and because practice merely for practice must be mechanical and spiritless. They would master, intellectually, the principles perfectly, and then hope for a perfect proceeding in compliance with them. While the former class made art independent of intelligence, these make it independent of all training of the creative powers. They occupy, consequently, the opposite extreme.

The truth lies between. It is a law of the human spirit that its highest degree of free spontaneous action can be attained only by previous subjection to rule; and, generally, the severer the labor in the observance of this principle, the freer will be the play of the creating spirit.

> Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte
> Quæsitum est. Ego nec studium sine divite vena
> Nec rude quid posset video ingenium. Alterius sic
> Altera poscit opem res et conjurat amice.
>
> HORAT., *Ep. ad Pison.*

> These rules, of old discovered, not devised,
> Are Nature still, but Nature methodized.
>
> POPE, *Essay on Crit.*

§ 13. The knowledge of the nature and principles of the art of rhetoric is attained chiefly in two ways; namely, by the study of rhetorical systems, and by the study of models in eloquence.

The great use of systems of rhetoric, as of other arts, is to facilitate the acquisition of the principles of the art by a brief, methodical, and particular exposition of them. Such systems present the results of the investigations, the experience, and the observations of many minds. The utility of grammars of music to all learners of that art is at once perceived and appreciated. A similar utility may be expected from correct systems in all the arts.

The study of models is equally important. It is hardly practicable for the human mind to obtain a clear and famil-

iar knowledge of any art without illustrations and exemplifications. This great means of training the ancients denominated *imitation*. In the use of this means, much caution is necessary.

In the first place, discretion and sound judgment are requisite in the selection of models. An immature taste is liable to be pleased with false beauties and excellences. A corrupt taste will select a model that abounds in the faults which it loves, and thus confirm rather than correct itself. *Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile.* The only safe guide is the established opinion of men of taste and sound judgment. The world has pronounced its sentence in regard to many writers and speakers. This general and united decision it is ever safer to follow than the erratic judgment of an individual. As says Coleridge: "Presume those to be the best, the reputation of which has been matured into fame by the consent of ages. For wisdom always has a final majority, if not by conviction, yet by acquiescence."

In the next place, caution is necessary in the actual study of even good models. A perfectly faultless model is nowhere to be found. The best poets and the best orators have shone only in particular excellences. As in Nature, perfect beauty is to be found in no one thing, but our conception of it is to be gained only by selection, by combining the particular excellences that are to be found in different objects of the same class, excluding the imperfections of each, in order to obtain a perfect ideal; so in literature and oratory, as in every art, an idea of what is perfect in every feature, is to be gained only by the study of various products. While, accordingly, the best models are to be selected for study, even these should be studied only for their characteristic excellences. Nothing can be more injurious to the taste or to the creative faculty of invention than servilely to copy any one model, however excellent. Such servile imitation will, for the most part, catch up only the faults, while it will fail to reach the virtues of the model, and at the same time prove fatal to all that originality which is the life of every art.

It is the proper function of a system of rhetoric to point out the best models in the several properties of good discourse.

§ 14. Every art as a developing art must rely mainly on judicious exercise as the means of attaining its end.

No knowledge of principles, however thorough, no study of models, however extended, will make an artist without exercise. Indeed, there is a possibility of cultivating the judgment and the taste to an excess as compared with the creative power, so as to impede rather than to aid the exertion of it. A highly refined taste will be offended and disgusted with the imperfect products of a feeble inventive and constructive power; and the work of composing may be made thus a constantly disagreeable and repulsive work. This is experienced by nearly all who have neglected the art of writing or speaking till the taste has become considerably developed and cultivated. They find themselves unable, in writing or speaking, to reach the standard that their refined taste requires them to attain, and they are repelled and disheartened. It is only when the creative power is developed in some proportion to the taste, that there can be that inspiration which fires the true artist, and makes the exertion of his power his highest pleasure and delight. This development of the creative faculty depends on exercise. As with the muscles of the body, so with the faculties of the mind, nothing but exercise can impart vigor and strength. Exercise is the parent of skill and power everywhere, and nowhere more than in writing and speaking. The words of Cicero should be printed in capitals on the mind of every student of eloquence, — STILUS OPTIMUS ET PRÆSTANTISSIMUS DICENDI EFFECTOR AC MAGISTER.

§ 15. Exercise in rhetoric, in order to be most beneficial, must be *intelligent, systematic, critical, and abundant.*

§ 16. INTELLIGENT exercise implies that writing and speaking be pursued in accordance with the known rules and principles of rhetoric.

Little will be accomplished by blind practice in any art. A man may shout and cry, may strain his voice ever so much and make little progress toward becoming a good musician or a good speaker. The practice must be pursued with a clear, conscious knowledge of what the art requires. And here is seen the necessity of systems of rhetoric — to set forth in a convenient form to the learner the necessary principles of the art; to teach him what he is to do in it.

§ 17. SYSTEMATIC exercise implies a regard to the specific functions or duties of the writer or speaker taken one by one successively in regular order.

Every art combines within itself a complication of many particular acts, of which in the exercise of the art there are, at different times, various combinations. The art of music thus embraces the several functions of pitch, time, force; and each of these particular functions may be analyzed into various subordinate particulars. A thorough course of training in this art must proceed by a regular, successive study of each of these particulars, accompanied by a corresponding exercise of the voice in them. There are thus a great diversity of acts requisite in the production of a good discourse. These particular acts may be severally contemplated by themselves; they may be explained as to their nature, and be prepared for exercise singly and successively. This systematic exercise upon particulars is as requisite and as useful in rhetoric as in music.

§ 18. Exercise, further, in order to be most useful,

must be *critical;* in other words, must be subjected to the inspection of a teacher or of the performer himself, for the purpose of removing faults and retaining qualities that are good.

The proper time of criticism is after the performance is finished. To write or to speak with a constant reference to criticism at the time, is to impose on the mind a double labor or occupation, so that neither part of the work can be done well. Such subsequent criticism is shown to be necessary at once by the consideration, that otherwise it cannot be known whether the work has proceeded aright or in accordance with the principles that should regulate it. It also greatly helps to give the principle exemplified in the exercise a practical, controlling existence in the mind.

§ 19. Once more, skill in Rhetoric cannot be attained except by much continued practice.

No illustration is requisite to show the correctness of this principle. It may be remarked here, however, that the labor of writing should not be pursued so continually as to make it a drudgery, awakening no interest and inspiring no enthusiasm. Under proper limitations, skill is dependent on exercise. *Gaudent sudoribus artes.* The general aversion to "composition exercises," so far at least as it is not a bare form of indolence, is chiefly owing to the faulty mode of prescribing such exercises without any indication to the pupil of what he is to do, except in the mere general requisition to furnish a "composition," and before any training in the specific processes of discourse. That the recourse by earnest students of discourse to reading, in consequence of this aversion to writing, is wholly a mistake, is clear, from the reiterated testimony of one who had cultivated this art with the greatest devotion, Jean Paul Richter, who says: "Very often have I said that all hearing and reading does not half so much strengthen or delight the mind as writing and speaking."

CHAPTER IV.

OF DISCOURSE AND ITS KINDS.

§ 20. Discourse, as the communication of thought, implies at once and necessarily, in its primary and complete signification, a speaker and a hearer; — a speaker, who in speaking seeks to produce a certain effect in the mind of the hearer.

This effect is primarily in the intelligence or understanding of the hearer: and secondarily and consequentially in the feelings and the will.

§ 21. Oratory, therefore, or address, is the proper form of discourse in its strictest and fullest import. It constitutes, accordingly, the immediate object of Rhetoric.

The very nature of discourse, thus, marks out the field of rhetoric as the art of discourse; and determines in what light the art should regard other so-called forms of discourse, as history, essay, and the like. These are, strictly speaking, *abnormal* forms of discourse, and want some element which is to be found in proper oratory. Rhetoric, in the unfolding of its principles, should confine its view to oratory, therefore, not only because oratory is the only pure form of discourse, but, also, because in unfolding the principles of oratory, it at the same time unfolds the main principles of the other derival forms of discourse. It is only from considerations of expediency and not of philosophical accuracy that general rhetoric embraces any of these abnormal species. At least, it has fulfilled its office when it has indicated the distinction between pure discourse or oratory, and the several more irregular or derivative forms, and thereby made known the principles which come in to modify the laws of proper rhetoric in its application to them.

§ 22. The primary and essential characteristic of Oratory as distinguished from other forms of discourse lies in its implying the direct opposition of speaker and hearer, and the aim on the part of the former to produce a certain effect in the mind of the latter.

Whenever, accordingly, this opposition is lost sight of by the speaker, his discourse ceases to be oratory. It falls at once into the essay or some other impure form of discourse. Hence the first principle to be observed in all oratory or address — that it ever respect the mind of the hearer, and regard it as present to be influenced by the discourse. THIS IS THE SPECIAL LAW OF ORATORY.

Although it may be difficult, for the most part, to single out the particular forms of expression in which proper oratory may be distinguished from mere essay, still the true oratorical spirit will reveal itself throughout the discourse, and give to the whole a peculiar coloring.

There are, however, some particular expressions that can be named by which oratory is at once distinguished from the essay. Oratory, thus, always conceives of itself as a procedure in time and not as an object in space; and hence avoids the use of the adverbs of place to designate what has preceded or is to follow, and uses those of time. The orator never says, thus, "what I have said *above*," but "what I have said *before*;" the essayist does the reverse. The orator says "I will speak of this *hereafter*," not "*elsewhere*," etc.

Again, the orator does not conceive of himself as the mere mouth-piece of the assembly, and does not, therefore, identify himself with the audience in the use of the plural

prounouns, "*we*," "*our*," etc. It is otherwise in public prayer; it is otherwise, also, with the essayist. The essayist merely *expresses* or utters forth, without the controlling idea of a listener, thoughts or sentiments which he regards as common to himself and the reader. The distinct personality being dropped, the use of the plural becomes easy and natural. Hence, probably, the "we" of editors and critics. They express not individual but common convictions and sentiments.

§ 23. Of the derived species of Discourse, and more immediately subordinate to Oratory, a variety is distinguishable which drops from Oratory only the idea of a present hearer. It is *Epistolary Composition*.

As it differs from proper Oratory only in the circumstance that it addresses an absent mind, Epistolary Composition conforms more closely than other derived species to the principles of Rhetoric. Its chief peculiarity lies in its not contemplating vocal delivery.

It will be remarked that while epistolary composition more frequently respects a single mind, proper oratory respects more commonly a multitude. At least, oratory rises to its highest perfection when addressed to a large assembly; for then the moral elevation, which is the proper soul of oratory, is highest. But epistolary composition, when addressed to multitudes, rises to high degrees of eloquence; as is seen in the epistles of the Apostle Paul.

When the epistolary form is adopted for the form's sake, it then falls into the rank of mere Representative Discourse.

§ 24. The two leading forms of discourse, coördinate with Oratory and differing from that in the circumstance that they drop the idea of a mind addressed as the ruling idea in the representation of thought, are *Poetry* and *Representative Discourse*. In Poetry, the end of the discourse is not characteristically to affect

another mind, but to express the idea in its most perfect form and for the sake of the form. In Representative Discourse, even the form becomes subordinate, as well as the effect on another mind; and the idea is presented for its own sake.

§ 25. We have, thus, the characteristics of the three great divisions of Discourse: —

Oratory represents for the sake of the effect on another mind;

Representative Discourse represents for the sake of the theme itself;

Poetry represents for the sake of the form.

In Oratory, accordingly, the exterior aim rules; in Representative Discourse, the matter; in Poetry, the form.

The intimacy and relationship between these several forms of representation in language are in this view clearly indicated. The intrinsic dependence of the form on the matter, the common attributes of the mind that addresses and of the mind that is addressed, and their common relationship to truth as the matter of discourse, show at once how large a field is common to all these arts. Particularly, is it seen how slight are the modifications of the principles of proper oratory which an art of representative discourse requires. Indeed, as already observed, these modifications are, in the main, such as cannot well be set forth in distinct forms of language.

The great truth that underlies this whole matter is that in all discourse, as, indeed, in every proper movement of man's spirit, his whole nature, as intelligent, feeling, willing, — logical, æsthetic, and ethical or moral, — is concerned. He never utterly sinks or lays aside his feeling or moral nature when he thinks; much less does he drop his intelligent nature when he feels or wills. In other words, his thought is

ever penetrated by sentiment and purpose; as his sentiments and purposes are ever in intelligence. But one or another of these departments of mind may be, relatively, more or less prominent; one may so predominate as to cast the others into the shade. As the intellectual element prevails, man appears as philosopher; as the æsthetic, he is recognized as poet; and as the ethical, he becomes an orator. Or, to present the same truth in the terms of the proper matter of discourse, — idea, which is ever the proper content of all discourse, may be presented in itself irrespectively of all outward relations; it is, then, the True; and where that rules we have proper representative discourse. But idea may be presented as in outward relation, yet without distinct respect to any special end or object, simply as idea expressed, idea formed, and then it becomes the Beautiful or proper Form, and when that rules we have poetical discourse. And, still further, idea may be presented as in movement toward some outward object or end; then it becomes the Good in the larger sense, that is, the Moral; and when that rules we have proper oratory contemplating an end, an effect in another mind.

Inasmuch as the moral in man involves and presupposes feeling and intelligence, this view of the distinctive characteristics and relations of the different forms of discourse corroborates the position before taken that oratory is the highest form of discourse. In oratory the whole man, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral, moves predominantly and characteristically outward and to an end. It is, therefore, more distinctively moral in its proper nature. In a higher sense than in respect to the poet or the philosopher, the maxim so emphatically recognized by the ancient rhetoricians holds of the orator, that he must be a good man in order to his highest success.

The question has been much agitated whether oratory is to be regarded as a proper æsthetic art. It has been raised and discussed in the light of what must be deemed to be a

narrow and defective classification of the arts. This classification recognizes two classes, one of which is denominated the class of the Æsthetic, Free, Liberal, Fine, or Elegant arts; the other, that of the Mechanical or Useful arts. This classification excludes every third class; and necessitates the rejection of oratory from the arts, unless it be either a free art, like poetry and painting, or mechanical, like carpentry or agriculture. Dr. Campbell, however, accepting as the proper distinction of the two classes, that "use is the direct and avowed purpose" in the useful arts, "whereas it is more latently and indirectly" so in the elegant arts, considers eloquence with architecture "as of a mixed nature, wherein utility and beauty have almost equal influence." The source of the confusion and error is in opposing beauty and utility, as if in necessary contradiction to each other. And to attain the truth in the matter, we have only to apply the logical principle of strict contradictory opposition. We may thus classify all arts in reference to beauty as those in which it is free, and those in which it is not free, that is, those in which it is dependent or subservient to another end than mere form. Discourse must be recognized, under this classification, as characteristically free in poetry; but as dependent in oratory, as also in all representative discourse. But as poetry itself may modify its freedom when it enlists in the service of philosophy, as we find to be the case in that species of poetry called Didactic, so oratory and philosophical discourse may, as in the loftier flights of eloquent or imaginative discourse, rise to the æsthetic freedom of true poetry. In a true sense, however, true oratory is ever æsthetic in its character, as has been already indicated; for it expresses and proceeds from an æsthetic nature; effects its end, also, in its addresses to another like æsthetic nature; and as the very essence of oratorical art consists in the embodiment of thought in language, in other words, of idea in form, oratory must be accepted as a true æsthetic procedure. Rhetoric, like architecture, is something more than a decorative art which

adds ornament to something that is not of itself æsthetic, or that may be perfectly adapted to its end without being in taste. It is of its own nature and essentially an æsthetic art, although not lying in the department of free beauty. Oratory must be beautiful in its form in order to its very perfection. This cannot be said of a tool, a machine, a product of any mechanical or any merely useful art. Oratory, therefore, cannot in any truth be classed among the mechanical arts.

§ 26. POETRY is that kind of discourse in which the idea is expressed for the sake of the form. It is one of the arts of Free Beauty.

The special Law of Poetry is, accordingly, that the selection and treatment of the idea to be expressed, of the imagery, and likewise of the diction, all be governed by the principle of Form or Beauty.

This is the proper Law of poetical composition. In the different species there is admissible in different degrees the depression of this as the relatively predominant principle, and the elevation of the principle of exterior aim or effect, so that it approximates so far to proper oratory. But it is ever this characteristic that makes discourse poetical, — that it more or less drops the principle of exterior aim and deviates from the method imposed by such foreign aim in order to be led by the principle of form.

The control of this principle, as has just been remarked, reaches to the idea expressed. as well as to the exterior embodiment of it in imagery and diction. Poetry has an inner essence of its own, a proper spirit and life, as well as a proper body. "Verse," it has been justly observed, "is not synonymous with poetry, but is the incarnation of it; and prose may be emotive—poetical, but never poetry." Both may express feeling. But "eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry lies in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself in

moments of solitude, and bodying forth itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavoring to influence their belief, or move them to passion or to action." Accordingly it is only in partial truth that we can say "mere verse is poetry;" as we can only in partial truth say "an idiot is a man," since reason, which the idiot lacks, is the essential attribute of man. So, on the other hand, it is only in partial truth that we can say "the peculiar poetic spirit without the proper poetic form makes discourse poetry." It is only as we may call a disembodied spirit a man; it has the essential nature, not the form. As a human spirit and a human body unite in our conception of a man, so the poetic spirit and the poetic form must unite in any just conception of poetry.

§ 27. Different kinds of poetical composition may be distinguished on two different leading principles of division, according as we regard the character of the subject or the particular mode or means of representation, — the represented idea or the form representing.

Distributed in reference to the subject or idea represented, as the three species are truth, sentiment, and action, we have the generic division of Poetry into

I. DIDACTIC; II. LYRIC; III. EPIC and DRAMATIC.

Didactic Poetry includes what is sometimes called the Descriptive, the Pastoral, the Satirical, and the like.

Lyric Poetry includes divers subordinate forms of poetical composition, variously modified, and known under the familiar names of the Ode, the Psalm, and the Hymn, implying representation in music, and also the Sonnet and the Elegy.

The third class embraces the two leading forms of the Epic, in which the representation is by means of narration and description, and the Dramatic, in which the representation is by means of proper action and scenery which take the place of narration and description in the Epic. Subordinate divisions of these leading species are of the Epic into the Heroic and the Burlesque or Mock-heroic, and of the Dramatic into Tragedy and Comedy.

§ 28. REPRESENTATIVE DISCOURSE, so far as it diverges from proper oratory in dropping the opposition of speaker and hearer, has for its special law the representation of its theme for its own sake.

All Representative Discourse, as such, accordingly, has for its controlling principle the following, namely: —

That the thought be represented in its utmost clearness, accuracy, and completeness.

§ 29. Representative Discourse is either PURE or MIXED.

It is *pure* when its theme is represented irrespectively of personal modifications, and, accordingly, in its own proper character.

It is *mixed* when it is represented as modified by the peculiarities of personal apprehensions and convictions.

The Epicurean, by Moore, is an exemplification of the mixed form of representative discourse, in which but one mind is introduced by whose personal characteristics the representation is modified. Ancient life is in it represented through the experience of another, not from the direct observations of the author.

Where two or more persons are introduced, the discourse

is called a *Dialogue*. The Dialogues of Plato, of Fontenelle, of Berkeley, are exemplifications of this variety.

§ 30. The special Law of Mixed Representative Discourse is, that the personal characteristics of the speakers introduced, so far as modifying the theme, be carefully exhibited throughout the representation.

The Dialogues of Plato are the most perfectly constructed specimens of the Dialogue, perhaps, that exist, so far as this first law of the discourse is regarded.

If the representation be for the sake of the form, the discourse becomes Poetry. We have, then, the *Monologue*, when but one person is introduced; and the poetic *Dialogue*, when more than one are exhibited. If the representation exhibits an action, it becomes *Dramatic*.

§ 31. Of the Pure Representative Discourse, two general classes, each embracing subordinate varieties, are distinguished according to the character of the subject. We have thus: —

I. HISTORY, the subject of which is some fact or event, single or continuous, in nature, as *Natural History*, or among men, as *History Proper*. Under History is included *Biography*, the subject of which is facts in individual experience; and *Travels*, which is but a more specific department of biography, having facts of a specific character in individual experience for its subject.

II. SCIENTIFIC TREATISES, including the ESSAY or DISSERTATION, the subject of which is some truth, not mere fact, as is the case in History.

It is to be remarked respecting the Pure Representative Discourse, that it easily admits the proper distinguishing characteristic of pure oratory — the opposition of speaker and hearer. Just so far as it does this, the full form of

oratory appears; so far, at least, as address to a locally absent mind will allow. It is not unnatural, thus, that the historian begins his history as an addressing mind, and uses the forms of address. Thus Macaulay begins his history: "I propose to write the history of England." As, however, the idea of representing the facts of history for their own sake and not for the sake of the moral effect on other minds begins to rule in his mind, the oratorical forms, as those of the first person, of time instead of space, fall away, and the discourse approaches to the character of the pure representative.

§ 32. Proper Oratorical Discourse may be distributed into different kinds on either of two different principles, giving rise thus to two distinct sets or classes.

One principle of distribution is found in the specific character of *the ultimate end* of discourse.

The other is found in the specific character of *the immediate end* of discourse.

§ 33. Oratorical Discourse may be distributed, in respect to its ultimate end, into two departments, according as that end lies wholly in the mind addressed or beyond it; in other words, according as the final object of the discourse is attained in the effect produced on the mind addressed or only in some ulterior object through such effect.

In proper pulpit discourse, thus, the preacher seeks, as his final and controlling end, the personal character of his hearer, looking to nothing beyond as more controlling and predominant. In forensic oratory, on the contrary, the advocate seeks to influence the judge only that he may secure a favorable determination through him of some interest of his client. He pleads not to enlighten or convince the judge as his ulterior motive; but to win his case through the decision of the judge.

The fields of oratory are not marked off by very definite boundaries on this principle of distribution. But we have departments of eloquence which are very conveniently distinguished from one another by this characteristic, of the end of the discourse lying wholly within or beyond the effect on the mind addressed.

In the first department, in which the final object of the discourse is found in the mind addressed, the leading branch is that of *Sacred Oratory*, the ultimate end of which is the highest moral or religious elevation and improvement of the hearer.

Here, also, lies all that *Philosophical* or *Didactic Oratory*, which seeks to enlighten or instruct the hearer, embracing the Lecture, the Scientific Discourse, and the like.

Here, too, lies that department classed by the ancients as one of the three leading branches of oratory, called the Demonstrative or Epideictic, embracing the Panegyric or Eulogy, the object in which is to awaken the sentiment of approbation or of censure in the hearer.

Here, moreover, lies all that oratory so common in modern times, the object of which is specially Moral Reform.

In the second department, characterized by its end lying beyond the hearer and to be attained through him, are, prominently, the two great departments of secular eloquence, the *Judicial* and the *Deliberative*. These differ from each other in respect to the governing idea, and also in respect to the field proper to them. Judicial oratory has the idea of the right for its governing idea, and its chief province is in the proceedings of civil judicature. Deliberative oratory has the idea of the good, the useful, the expedient, for its governing idea, and is chiefly found in legislative assemblies.

§ 34. Discourse, distributed in reference to the specific character of its immediate end, comprehends the four kinds of *Explanatory*, *Confirmatory* or *Argumentative*, *Pathetic*, and *Persuasive* Discourse.

The principle of distribution here is the specific effect to be produced by discourse in the mind of the hearer. It is the same principle that determines the mode of discussion in any particular discourse, and will be more fully exhibited in the sequel.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF RHETORIC.

§ 35. RHETORIC, as the Art of constructing Discourse, embraces two processes which are in many respects distinct from each other. The one consists in the provision of the thought variously modified as it may be by feeling and the moral state in its proper form, and is founded more immediately on Logic. The other consists chiefly in the provision of the appropriate language, and rests mainly on Grammar as its foundation.

The two great departments of the art of rhetoric, accordingly, are INVENTION and STYLE.

In many of the most popular treatises on rhetoric in the English language, the first of these processes, invention, has been almost entirely excluded from view. Several causes may be assigned for this deviation from the uniform method of the ancient rhetoricians. The most important one would seem to be the neglect into which logic has fallen; or, perhaps more exactly, the cause is to be found in the hitherto immature and unsettled views of modern writers in this science.

Another cause is the change that has taken place in logical science since the times of the Grecian and Roman rhetoricians, which renders their systems of rhetorical invention, founded as they were, to a great extent, on their peculiar logical views, inapplicable to present modes of thought. Their system of topics is thus, for this and other reasons, wholly unsuited to our times.

The art of invention, moreover, is more essentially modified than style by the particular department of oratory or the kind of discourse to which it is applied. Hence the ancient systems of invention which were constructed in strict reference to the modes of speaking then prevalent, are ill-adapted to present use. The systems of Cicero and Quintilian, for example, are for the most part illustrated from the peculiar practice of the Roman bar. Modern writers on rhetoric, in following the great ancient masters in the art, have hence been reduced to this alternative, — either of leaving out entirely this part of the science, or of constructing an entirely new system. They have, for the most part, in the English language at least, decided on the former branch of the alternative, and have generally excluded almost entirely from their works the consideration of invention.

The perversion and abuse of ancient systems in the schools of the middle ages have undoubtedly further contributed to bring this branch of rhetorical science into disrepute and neglect.

It cannot, however, be doubted, on a candid consideration of the matter, that invention must constitute the very life of an art of rhetoric. It respects the soul and substance of discourse — the thought which is communicated. One of the most eminent of ancient rhetoricians, Quintilian, justly says, "*Invenire primum fuit* ESTQUE PRÆCIPUUM." And one of the most eminent of modern orators, Webster, to the same effect remarks: "All true power in writing is in the idea, not in the style; — an error into which the *ars rhetorica*, as it is usually taught, may easily lead stronger heads than mine." It is in invention that the mind of the learner is most easily interested and most capable of sensible improvement. It is next to impossible to awaken a hearty interest in mere style independent of the thought, as the futile attempts to teach the art of composition as a mere thing of verbal expression have proved. Composing when thus taught must necessarily be regarded as a drudgery and be shunned instinctively with strong aversion. It is otherwise when the thought is the main thing regarded. There is to every mind a pure and elevated pleasure in inventing. There is a pleasure in expressing thoughts that have sprung into being from one's own creative intellect; of embodying them in appropriate forms of language. How different are the feelings with which a schoolboy contemplates the task of writing a composition which must contain so many words, whatever be true of the ideas, and the work of writing a letter to communicate some conviction of his own mind, some wish, some intelligence! It cannot be questioned that it is to the exclusion of invention from our systems of rhetoric that the neglect into which the art has fallen is chiefly to be ascribed. The prejudices against it are also mainly to be attributed to this defective and incorrect view of the art.*

* It is worthy of note that the most popular system of rhetoric now in use in the English language, that of Dr. Whately, owes nearly all its excellence and its reputation as an original work to the circumstance that it embraces, in the First Part, a brief and imperfect view of this branch of the art.

FIRST GENERAL DIVISION.

INVENTION.

GENERAL VIEW.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE AND PARTS OF INVENTION.

§ 36. RHETORICAL INVENTION is the art of supplying the requisite thought in kind and form for discourse.

§ 37. It embraces *Invention Proper* or the mere supply of the thought, and *Arrangement* or *Disposition.*

The propriety of regarding Arrangement as a part of the process of invention and not as a department of rhetoric, coördinate with Invention and Style, may be seen from several points of view.

In the first place, the principle of division that has been adopted, by which rhetoric is regarded as embracing the two elements of *invention* or the supply of thought, and of *style* or the expression of thought in language, at once compels to this treatment of arrangement. The two elements of thought and verbal expression are both essential elements, and are the only elements, of discourse. It would be unphilosophical to introduce another principle of division, which would be necessary in order to admit disposition or arrangement as a distinct constituent part of the art of rhetoric.

Again, the process of invention cannot proceed but by order or method; and the very supply of the thought must therefore include a more or less definite regard to the arrangement. It becomes necessary, thus, to treat of arrangement or disposition, so far as it can be distinctly treated of, as a subordinate and constituent part of invention.

The same observations, obviously, are applicable to method in style.

§ 38. The process of invention is applied either to the general theme of the discourse, or to the particular thoughts by means of which that general theme is presented to the mind addressed for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the discourse.

§ 39. The general theme of discourse is sometimes given or furnished in a more or less definite form to the speaker or writer; sometimes is wholly left to his free choice.

In the eloquence of the bar and of the senate, the topics of discussion are determined beforehand for the most part to the speaker. Even here, however, there is much room for the exercise of invention. The particular theme proposed is to be taken up into the mind of the speaker; it is to be shaped to his habit of thought; it is to be defined and determined so as best to meet his particular purpose in discussing it; it is to be suited to the particular circumstances in which he speaks and to the mode in which he shall determine to handle it. The same question will thus be stated in very different forms by different speakers; and no small degree of oratorical skill is often displayed in the mode of conceiving and presenting the particular subject of debate. The same observations are applicable to every species of discourse or composition where the subject is proposed to the speaker or writer.

Where the subject is left to the free choice of the speaker,

there is room for a still higher display of inventive power. It is with the orator or writer as with the sculptor or painter. The subject itself shows the genius of the artist. The subject is left thus free to a considerable extent in the eloquence of the pulpit, as well as in most occasional addresses, in essays, and other compositions.

§ 40. The particular subordinate thoughts by which the general theme is developed and presented to the mind addressed, while they must all lie in the field of the general theme, and must likewise consist with the object of the discourse, are, with these limitations, open to the choice of the speaker.

As a rational discourse necessarily implies a unity, this unity must be in the singleness of the theme and of the object of discourse. Accordingly all thoughts introduced must stand in a subordinate relation to this single theme, and, also, to this single object. Hence the principle, which admits of no exception in rational discourse, that no thoughts be introduced that do not both consist with the theme and the object, and also tend to develop the one and accomplish the other.

While thus the subordinate and developing thoughts must all be found in the field of the one general theme, and of these only such can be taken as consist with the object of the discourse, within these limits there is free range for invention. The fullness and richness of these subordinate thoughts will display the richness of mental furniture possessed by the speaker, the control he has over this stock of thought, and the fertility generally of his faculties of invention. The selection out of this stock will exhibit the soundness and promptness of his judgment and the power he has of steadily pursuing his object.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE GENERAL THEME OF A DISCOURSE.

§ 41. The process of invention as applied to the general theme of discourse consists in the selection of the theme and in the determination of the particular form in which it is to be discussed.

In the very use of the expression "the theme" — a singular and not a plural term — is indicated the necessity of singleness in the theme. It seems to border on absurdity to speak of the *themes* of a discourse. Discourse can hardly with propriety be called one which has more than one general theme. The unity of a discourse, in which, indeed, lies its very life, requires that there be but one thought to which every other shall be subordinate and subservient — utterly forbids the introduction of two or more coördinate thoughts.

In the singleness of the theme lies the first and broadest principle of unity. As will be exhibited in the proper place, the broader unity determined by the singleness of the theme will be narrowed by the particular object in the discussion, and still further by the process by which the discussion is conducted.

§ 42. The principles which regulate this process regard either the mind of the speaker* himself, the

* In order to avoid all unnecessary multiplication of words, but one of the specific terms, "writer" and "speaker," will ordinarily be used hereafter, even when the generic notion of the person discoursing, whether through the pen or the voice, is meant.

occasion of speaking, the mind addressed, or the object of the discourse.

§ 43. In selecting his theme and determining the particular view to be taken of it, the writer has need to consult his own mind chiefly in reference to the capabilities of supplying the particular thoughts and illustrations by means of which his subject is to be presented and developed.

No one, in proper discourse, writes merely with a view to an effect on himself. Sometimes, indeed, the pen may be employed in investigation. Such compositions, however, are not proper discourse, which always more or less definitely or directly respects another mind. The writer, therefore, will need ever to select a theme on which he is competent to write, respecting which he has ample information and means of illustration within his power.

It is, nevertheless, a great mistake, although a common one, to suppose that a subject very familiar and at the same time very comprehensive, is most favorable to ease of execution. Invention is an originating, creative process in its essential nature. As such it is the most proper and delightful work of a rational being, and whenever it is pursued, imparts a pleasure which itself fires anew the energy of the inventive faculty. This is the inspiration of original genius — the rapture that necessarily attends the production of new thoughts and forms of thought. Whenever a familiar, and, at the same time, a broad and comprehensive theme is selected, especially if the limits of the composition be narrow, only general, familiar views can be taken, and there is no life of invention. It is a cold, inanimate work of the memory recalling dead thought. There is no inspiration, no satisfaction. There must be some new view taken, something original, or the work of invention must necessarily be laborious and heavy. Now it is specific views that furnish the occasion of original invention. In them the

writer shuns the general commonplace notions that are familiar to all. The more specific and definite, therefore, the theme, the easier will be the work of invention. Caution only is necessary that the field of view be not too limited for the writer's power of invention, since only the most vigorous and practiced writer can take the most minute and particular views.

Young writers should be on their guard against what are called "*fertile subjects.*" They are generally unfavorable to the exercise of invention, and, therefore, most difficult to handle, because they are so comprehensive that only general and commonplace views can be taken.

It may be proper here to put young writers on their guard, also, in selecting themes, against *specious mottoes* or titles. The dress of language in which the theme is invested, is not the theme itself. The one may be rich and gorgeous, while the other is miserably lean and dry. It need hardly be said that the facility with which the work of invention will proceed, will depend on the richness of the thought itself which constitutes the theme, not on the garb it may chance to wear.

§ 44. A proper regard to the occasion of speaking will determine the process of invention not only in reference to the character of the theme to be selected, but also, in reference to the latitude as well as particular field of view that is taken, and the illustrations that are to be presented.

§ 45. There is obviously, likewise, a necessity of consulting the character of the audience, the extent of their information, their peculiar habits of thought, their feelings also, and their relations to the speaker.

There is perhaps no point to which Cicero's fundamental rule in regard to all discourse, that it consist with propriety — "*ut deceat*" — has greater force of application than here.

It cannot be too earnestly inculcated on every speaker to consult carefully the minds and feelings of those whom he is to address, in the selection of his theme, and also in the development of it. Any offense against propriety or decorum here is more fatal to all the ends of speaking than anywhere else.

§ 46. The character of the theme and the particular view that is taken of it, as well as the general mode of developing it, will also be affected by *the particular object* which the writer may wish to accomplish in his discourse.

It is assumed that all proper discourse has an object. A speaker does not speak without an end in view. This end or object lies in the mind addressed, and consists in some change to be effected there by the discourse.

Dr. Whately, indeed, enumerates some species of what he calls "spurious oratory," as where one speaks merely to seem to say something, when there is in fact nothing to be said; or to occupy time; or for mere display of eloquence. The very name, however, "spurious oratory," indicates that all true discourse must have an object or end to be accomplished by the communication of thought to another mind. We must seek, therefore, in the mind addressed the determination of the particular possible objects of discourse.

§ 47. While the ultimate end of all discourse partakes more or less of a moral or ethical character, the immediate objects through which this ultimate end is reached may lie in the understanding, the feelings, or the will of the persons addressed.

§ 48. The possible immediate objects of all proper discourse are but four in number, viz: EXPLANATION, CONFIRMATION, EXCITATION, and PERSUASION.

A change produced by discourse in the understanding may

be either a new or modified conception, or a new or modified judgment. Hence the two forms of address to the understanding.

§ 49. The process by which a new conception is produced, is by *Explanation;* that by which a new judgment is produced is by *Confirmation.* A change in the sensibilities is effected by the process of *Excitation;* and in the will, by that of *Persuasion.*

These processes, it will be observed, are named from the positive species; and the designations given embrace as well them as their opposites. In explanation, thus, we either produce a new conception, or correct or modify one already existing. Confirmation includes both the production of a new opinion or judgment, and the removal or modification of one already existing. So, likewise, excitation embraces the awakening of a new feeling, and the strengthening or allaying of a previous emotion or passion; and in persuasion, we either move to a new choice or dissuade from an existing intention or purpose.

§ 50. The *unity of a discourse* is more narrowly determined by *the singleness of the object* which is pursued in the development of a theme.

In order to unity, there must indeed be a single theme or subject of discourse. Singleness of theme will not, however, of itself secure the highest unity. It is further necessary that there be one leading object proposed to be effected, and that this object be steadily pursued throughout the discourse.

§ 51. The several processes of explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion, are so related to each other that, while they may all concur in the same discourse, they yet can follow only in one single order.

Explanation precedes confirmation, as the truth must be understood before it can be believed; explanation

and confirmation naturally precede excitation, as the object of feeling must be perceived and generally be believed to exist before feeling can be awakened; and persuasion properly follows the other three processes, as in order to a change of will, the feelings are generally to be aroused, the judgment convinced, and the understanding informed.

Unity requires that this order never be reversed, except for the purpose of awakening attention, or disposing for emotion, as will be more particularly remarked hereafter.

§ 52. The work of invention can never proceed with ease or success unless unity is strictly observed — unless the single theme and the single object of the discourse be clearly apprehended, and that object be steadily and undeviatingly pursued.

No principle of invention is more fundamental or practically important than this. Unity in aim is the very life of invention. Unless the object of speaking be distinctly perceived and that object be strictly one, the inventive faculty has no foothold at all, or, at least, no sure standing; and all its operations must be unsteady and feeble. The first work in producing discourse is to obtain a clear view of the single subject which is to be discussed, and then of the one object which is to be attained by the discussion.

It is here, more than anywhere else, that young writers fail. They give themselves to writing with no definite apprehension of the single object for which they write, except perhaps, it is to fill a sheet with words — brilliant if it may be, at all events with words. Having no object in view, the mind has no spring or impulse in the labor, and the task is the most repulsive drudgery. What can be more so than to accumulate dead words — dead because entertaining no living thought that with its one life animates them, and to cement them together by the lifeless rules of grammar? It is its

object or aim which gives discourse its life; and as no one thing can have two lives in itself, there can be but one aim or object in one discourse. It is not in the nature of man to labor without an aim. Certainly the work of invention, the highest and most proper work of man as a rational being, cannot proceed happily without an aim distinctly apprehended. "The main requisite for teaching composition," says one of our most popular authors, "whatever people may think, is to have something which one feels interested to say."

This then is the first thing to be done in the construction of discourse, after the selection of the theme at least, to determine definitely what is the particular object of the discourse: — is the object to explain a theme; to convince of its truth; to excite the feelings in relation to it; or to move to action upon it? This principle cannot be too earnestly inculcated, or too faithfully observed.

As these several acts of explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion may proceed each by several distinct specific processes, it will of course facilitate invention to determine, previously to the construction of a discourse, the particular process which the case may require.

§ 53. Inasmuch as the development of the general theme is determined by the particular object of the discourse, of course, the four processes, by one or other of which this object must be accomplished, namely: those of explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion, constitute the distinct departments of Rhetorical Invention.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE PARTS OF A DISCOURSE.

§ 54. THE development of a theme of discourse for the purpose of explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion, necessarily proceeds by stages, which, in reference to the particular object at the time, may be distinguished from each other. A discourse may thus be conveniently regarded as consisting of parts; some of which are essential to all discourse and others subsidiary or essential only in particular cases.

§ 55. The essential parts of discourse are the PROPOSITION and the DISCUSSION.

§ 56. THE PROPOSITION is the particular theme as modified and determined by the object of the discourse.

The term "proposition," it should be observed, is here used in a sense different from that of the term "theme." The proposition is the theme as determined by the object or end of the discourse. For example, the theme, "the immutability of truth," may be variously discussed in reference to various specific objects. The design of the discussion may be to *explain* what is meant by the phrase; or, it may be to prove the statement that "truth is immutable;" or to awaken confidence in all truth as being in its nature immutable; or to move to zealous effort to acquire truth because immutable. A rhetorical proposition includes thus the theme and the particular design for which it is discussed.

One formal mode of stating the proposition in actual discourse would be as follows: "The object of this discourse is to prove the immutability of truth."

A rhetorical proposition is carefully to be distinguished from a logical proposition. The latter may be defined to be "the verbal statement of a judgment." A logical proposition, accordingly, may constitute the theme of a rhetorical proposition. If this theme be stated together with the use to be made of it in discourse, it will then become a rhetorical proposition.

§ 57. THE DISCUSSION is that part of a discourse in which the subject is unfolded and directly presented to the mind addressed for one of the purposes that have been named.

The discussion is accordingly the main thing in all discourse, and constitutes its body. The proposition sets forth the design of the speaker; and the other parts are merely preparatory and subsidiary to this main design which is directly pursued in the discussion.

§ 58. The general forms of the discussion are determined by the object of the discourse, and are four in number, corresponding to the four main objects that may be aimed at in discourse, § 48.

§ 59. The more specific forms of the discussion are determined by the particular processes in which explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion are respectively carried on.

§ 60. The subsidiary parts of discourse are either *preparatory* or *applicatory;* and may in general terms be denominated THE INTRODUCTION and THE PERORATION.

§ 61. The design and use of THE INTRODUCTION is to prepare the way in the mind addressed for the more

ready and free reception of the proposition and the discussion.

§ 62. As it is obvious that the mind addressed may be favorably or unfavorably disposed for the reception of the proposition and the discussion, either by reason of the degree or kind of information it possesses, or its state of opinion, of feeling, or of purpose, the introduction must, in different cases, be prepared in reference to these diverse states of mind.

The two more generic kinds of introduction will be, accordingly, the *Explanatory* and the *Conciliatory* introduction.

In the former, the object of the introduction will be effected by informing more fully the minds of the hearers; in the latter, by removing prejudice or by enlisting directly a favorable interest.

It is obvious, moreover, that these states of mind may respectively regard different objects, as the speaker or the subject itself. Hence will be determined the still more specific forms of the introduction.

The consideration of the particular kinds of introduction and the laws of its use has, for obvious reasons, its appropriate place under the several general heads of Invention.

§ 63. As the Introduction is only a subsidiary and a preparatory part of a discourse, the topics which it must embrace and the form in which it should appear cannot be fully known until the nature and form of the proposition and of the discussion are well ascertained by the speaker. Hence, the proper time for the invention and the composition of the Introduction is after the subject has been thoroughly studied out, and the general form of the discussion well settled in the mind.

It would obviously be as absurd in a writer to construct an introduction before the plan of the discourse is determined upon, as it would be in an architect to put up a portico before he had determined what kind of a house to attach to it. That this absurdity is frequently committed in writing and in architecture, only shows the necessity of calling particular attention to it. There is no one feature of the introduction which may not receive its determinate character from the proposition and the discussion. The length, the matter, including both the thought and the feeling, and the style cannot be known till the plan of the discussion is fully determined upon.

By this it is not meant that the discussion should be written out or reduced to forms of language; but merely that the whole plan of the discussion be distinctly conceived in the mind before the introduction is composed.

The necessity of thus first studying out and accurately determining in the mind the plan of the discussion before the introduction is commenced, appears not only from the fact that unless this be the case it is all a matter of mere accident whether there be any correspondence between it and the body of the discourse, but also from the consideration that it is only thus that unity, in which lies all the life of invention as well as of discourse, can be secured. The very idea of a discourse, as a product of a rational mind that ever has an aim in its proper workings, involves the necessity of unity; and this unity appears in discourse mainly in the proposition and the discussion as the essential parts. The clear perception of what is needed to be effected in the mind addressed by way of preparation, in order that this aim of the discourse can be attained in it, is absolutely indispensable both to guide invention in constructing the introduction and to stimulate it so that its work shall be easy and successful.

§ 64. The Peroration, as that part of a discourse in which the theme is applied, will vary with the different specific objects aimed at in the application.

Sometimes the application will be in the form of explanation, either for the purpose of correcting erroneous views or for further instruction. This form of the peroration may be denominated the *explanatory*.

Sometimes the object of the peroration may be to correct a wrong opinion, or to confirm a particular truth involved in the general theme, in which case the peroration will be *confirmatory*.

Sometimes the object may be to address the subject more directly to the feelings, which will give rise to the *excitatory or pathetic* peroration.

Or, once more, some action may be proposed, in the peroration, to the mind addressed, and then the *persuasive* peroration will have place.

§ 65. The Recapitulation is a form of peroration common to the various objects mentioned. The respective processes of explanation, conviction, excitation, or of persuasion pursued in the discourse are, in this form, concisely repeated for the purpose of a more full and complete effect.

PART I. — EXPLANATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 66. In Explanation, the object of discourse is to inform or instruct; in other and more technical words, to lead to a new conception or notion, or to modify one already existing in the mind.

§ 67. The work of explanation is accomplished simply by bringing the object of the conception or notion intelligibly and favorably before the mind addressed.

§ 68. Although explanation, properly, is a purely intellectual process, since it aims merely to produce or modify a conception or notion which is a pure intellectual state, still as the understanding itself is influenced by the feelings and the state of the will, reference to these departments of mind is not wholly excluded from explanatory discourse. The passions are, however, to be employed only in strict subordination to the design of the discourse; that is, only for the purpose of facilitating the process of explanation. This is done chiefly or wholly by securing an undivided attention to the object presented.

Hence the necessity that the taste be consulted in all ex

planatory discourse, in order that a fixed attention may be secured. The mind does not perceive well when it is not pleased. Xenophon has well observed that instruction in any case is impossible from one who does not please.*

The attention of the hearer may be disturbed, also, by the existence of some cherished opinion which may be unfavorably affected by the object presented in the discourse, and argumentation may be necessary as a preparatory work even for the purpose of explaining a truth.

So, likewise, the attention may be disturbed by some feeling or purpose in the mind addressed, which must be appropriately managed by the speaker who would secure attention to his explanation.

These processes, however, are not essential, but merely incidental in explanatory discourse. It is sufficient, therefore, here merely to indicate generally the relation of this to the other processes in discourse.

§ 69. THE THEME of explanatory discourse is some object to be apprehended or conceived.

As has been stated, the object of the discourse in explanation is to inform or instruct: to communicate some new view, or to correct, to expand, or to modify in some way one already entertained. Explanation and confirmation both immediately address the intelligence, not the passions or the will, but they differ in this respect, that they respect different states of the intelligence, and aim to effect different kinds of cognitions. The distinction which is originally given in Logic or the science of the laws and forms of thought, is twofold — that of the technical concept and the technical judgment. A concept is a cognition of a mere object; a judgment is a cognition of two related objects in which one of the objects is affirmed or denied of the other. A concept is expressed in language by a noun; a judgment

* Mem. Lib. I. C. II., § 39. *Μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσχοντος.*

by a sentence or proposition. All concepts are, indeed, derived from judgments, and founded upon them; but they drop from view the affirmation or denial which distinguishes all judgments. They constitute a large part of the nouns or terms used in discourse. But perceptions and intuitions resemble concepts in this respect, that they exclude all affirmation and denial. It is convenient, therefore, for rhetorical purposes, to distinguish all cognitions primarily as of the two classes, those expressing and those not expressing affirmation or denial. The first class are judgments; the second class includes the original cognitions given in perception and intuition, and the derivative cognitions given in proper conception. The objects of perception and intuition, [illegible] known, are said to be *presented* or *[illegible]*; objects of conception are said to be *represented* or *[illegible]*.

The term *conception*, it may be observed here, is used like *perception*, to denote the faculty itself, the exertion of the faculty, and the product of the faculty; the derivative word *concept* being used to distinguish the product both from the faculty and also from the act of conceiving. I will here add, it is convenient to use the term *conception* in its proper signification, that is, to include all cognitions of objects, whether perceptions or logical concepts, whether to be apprehended or to be conceived. This is a perfectly legitimate use: for even perceptions of individual objects are introduced into discourse only as they are *thought*; that is, only as they are viewed in relation, in other words, conceived. The term *notion* is synonymous with *conception*. Both terms may be used as convertible one with the other in denoting a cognition of a simple object, in distinction from the cognition termed a judgment.

It should be remarked, moreover, that a logical proposition, in the proper sense, that is, a sentence which expresses a judgment, may be viewed simply as an object of conception. This use of an expressed judgment is denoted by the grammatical term *clause*, which differs from a proper *sentence*

in this, that it expresses a judgment as an object of thought. Thus, "Law is a rule of action" is a proper sentence, expressing a judgment. But in the sentence "That *Law is a rule of action* is assumed by Blackstone in his Commentaries," the words in italic letters constitute a clause which is indicated by the clausal particle *that*. It is here used as a simple object. Judgments thus used as objects or terms are of two classes, *facts* which respect an event, something coming to be, and *truths* which respect what is or exists without reference to its happening or becoming. This distinction is, however, not nicely observed, facts and truths being often confounded.

Still further, the theme in explanation is not necessarily any *real* object or truth. It may be a purely imaginary object not supposed by the writer to have any foundation in reality; or it may be an erroneous conception in his mind of a real object or truth; or, further, it may be a conception founded on reality but modified through the influences of his peculiar habits of observation.

§ 70. Explanation is governed by four general laws which are grounded in its very nature.

These are (1.) THE LAW OF UNITY; (2.) THE LAW OF SELECTION; (3.) THE LAW OF METHOD; (4.) THE LAW OF COMPLETENESS.

1. The necessity of unity is founded in the nature of all discourse as a rational procedure. See §§ 41, 52.

2. The law of selection is grounded in the necessity of excluding some of the infinite variety of subordinate thoughts or views through which the general theme may be developed. The least-informed mind, if capable at all of discourse, must possess manifold particular views or thoughts which may in different degrees be serviceable in the development of the theme. Hence arises the necessity of an intelligent and careful selection of such particular thoughts as will best subserve the particular object of the explanation.

3. The law of method, it is equally obvious, is imposed as a necessity in every rational procedure. The mind can exert its activity freely, fully, and successfully, only as it proceeds methodically, — that is, only as it proceeds in accordance with the laws of its own nature. To these laws of our intellectual nature, all truth, so far as it can be thought, must necessarily correspond; so that the mind, proceeding in accordance with the principles of its own nature, must be proceeding at the same time in accordance with the principles of truth. The eye can no more see distinctly and accurately if the rays of light be bent or discolored in the medium through which it passes, than the mind perceive or apprehend truly and well if the necessary relations of thought are perverted or distorted.

Not only must the mind in all ready and successful invention proceed methodically or in accordance with the fixed laws of thought, but in training, in acquiring skill in constructing discourse, this necessary method must be intelligently apprehended, and, at the outset at least, must be consciously applied. It becomes necessary, therefore, in an art of rhetoric, distinctly to indicate the method applicable to the different forms and particular processes of discussion and furnish the occasion and the inducement for a careful recognition and application of it. The study of method in order to the formation and strengthening of habits of methodical thinking is the indispensable condition of all rational progress. A mind trained to habitual activity in method has reached its true maturity of training. Without this, it is essentially deficient in its culture.

It is obvious that the method, while it must vary with the character of the theme in discourse, must vary also with the object or proposed end of the discourse. It is not sufficient, therefore, in rhetorical training merely to indicate the necessity of method and its general nature. It is necessary to view it in its various modifications as determined by the particular theme, but especially by the particular object of

the discourse, as well as also by the particular process which is adopted in the discussion.

4. The law of completeness is obviously imposed by the very nature of discourse as rational. It requires that all the particular views requisite for a full exhibition of the theme for the object proposed in the explanation, be presented.

§ 71. In order that an object of thought may be intelligibly presented to another mind, two things are requisite that should be carefully distinguished: first, it must be *clearly* presented; secondly, it must be *distinctly* presented.

Clearness and distinctness are the two essential qualities of perfect thought. They are widely distinguishable; and the habitual discrimination of them is of the first importance to the writer. Clearness is that quality of thought which characterizes it when its object is viewed as entirely separated or distinguished from all other objects of thought. Distinctness, on the other hand, is that quality which characterizes thought when its object is viewed in all its own proper parts. As all proper thought views its objects in the relations of wholes and parts, clearness characterizes thought viewing its object as a part of a larger whole and separating it completely from all other parts; while distinctness characterizes thought viewing its object as a whole containing parts and recognizing those parts as together making up or constituting the whole.

§ 72. The process by which clearness is secured to thought is DEFINITION; which may be defined to be the separation of the theme from all other objects of thought.

Rhetorical definition may with no impropriety be considered either as one of the several processes of explanation, or as a precedent condition and introduction to explanation. In the former case, explanation would be taken in a more

comprehensive, in the latter in a more limited import. It will better subserve our purpose to treat it as introducing to proper explanation. No explanation can proceed properly without it. It is indispensable that the writer first obtain a clear view of his theme; that is, that he define it to his own mind by completely separating it in his thought from all other objects.

The particular movement of the thought in defining will vary with the various character of the theme to be defined. The particular explanation of these various processes of definition, with exercises, is properly to be sought in the more rudimentary text-books; and only the general view of its nature and necessity is presented here.

The first thing to be done, then, in undertaking explanatory discourse is to define the theme. This will often cost mental effort, perhaps severe and protracted effort. But all effort thus expended will be abundantly repaid in the greater facility with which the labor that follows will be done, and especially in the greater perfection with which the whole work will be accomplished.

Rhetorical definition is to be distinguished from etymological definition, as also from what is sometimes called logical definition. Etymological definition is the explication of the meaning of a word, which is effected through its etymological origin and history, as *description* is defined to be *a writing down*; or by a synonym, as *remark* is defined through its synonym *observation*. Rhetorical definition is the definition not of a word, but of an object of thought. Logical definition, as sometimes so called, is effected by naming the next higher species and the specific difference, as, *man* is logically defined to be *animal that is rational — rational animal*; or *mammal that is bimanous — bimanous mammal*. Logical definition is but one species of rhetorical definition.

It is obvious that we can separate one object from all others in our thought only as we distinguish the particular kind of whole in which we view it. We must, in order to

define *man*, for example, recognize it either as a word-whole consisting of so many letters; or as denoting a substance consisting of *head, trunk, limbs;* or as having certain attributes, as *heavy, upright*, and the like; or as a cause consisting of certain capabilities or powers, as *locomotive, hearing, seeing*, &c. To attempt defining without such recognition of the kind of whole in which the theme is viewed would lead into inextricable confusion and difficulty. It becomes necessary, therefore, to indicate the kinds of whole in which the theme may be viewed so far as our customary thought and language distinguish them. They are classified in respect to the manner in which they come into our minds as objects of thought. Generally, then, it may be observed that all objects of thought are given to us either by one of the two faculties of original cognition, Intuition and Perception, or by the faculty of Thought proper, otherwise called the Discursive, also the Reflective faculty. Objects given us by the Intuitive faculty are *mathematical wholes*, and are either *numerical* or *spacial*. Objects given us by the faculty of Perception are *integrate wholes*. They are viewed either in the forms of time, that is, as causes, effects, events, as coming to be, as happening, in other words as objects having attributes of action, and are then called *causal wholes;* or in the forms of space, as substances, as simply being, in other words as having attributes of quality, and are then called *substance-wholes*. But objects of either of these kinds of wholes may be increased numerically or spacially, — may be multiplied or may be massed, and thus form *collective wholes* and *mass-wholes*, denoted by words called in grammar *collective nouns* or *nouns of multitude*, as *forest, army*, and *mass-nouns*, as *water, light*.

Objects given us through the faculty of thought are called *logical wholes*. They are formed by combining either the subjects of propositions having the same predicate, or the predicates of propositions having the same subjects. The first class are called *class-wholes:* the second class are called *attribute-wholes*.

In defining a theme, as has been stated, we distinguish it from the other wholes of the class to which it belongs. Thus we define *Mars* as causal whole, as acting, or changing, for instance, by representing it *as reflecting a dusky red light*, distinguishing it thus from the fixed stars, and from other planets. We define Mars as a substance by distinguishing it as *fiery*, by designating it as the *fiery* planet. We define *planet* as a class-noun by naming a higher class, *heavenly body*, under which it belongs, and then indicating the attribute which distinguishes this class from other coördinate classes of heavenly bodies, as *revolving about the sun*. We define *animal* as an attribute-whole, by naming a larger complement of attributes of which *animal* is a part, as *organized*, and then indicating the attribute — *sentient* — which distinguishes animal from *other organized*, as from *vegetable*.

It is true that language does not generally furnish different words for expressing these different kinds of whole which exist in thought. But if not in single words, it will generally, if not always, appear in the extended development of thought in discourse, whether the writer has ready before him the one or the other kind in his view, or has proceeded only in blindness and confusion. The ready discrimination of these kinds of whole in writing is best and easiest acquired by distinct study and by exemplification in specific practice. Just as in music, although it is possible that one may learn to sing or play with tolerable skill with no study of the gamut, no practice on the scale, and no theoretical knowledge of the degrees of pitch and their relations, yet it is easier and better in learning the art to study and practice upon these distinctions separately; so, in writing, the readiest way to proficiency is by thorough study of the elements of thought to be expressed in discourse separately. Until the mind is trained accordingly so as to mark the distinctions in the wholes of thought as it were instinctively, as the proficient musician instinctively and without conscious effort observes the manifold distinctions of pitch and time, the inquiry should be dis-

tinctly raised at the first undertaking to think out the theme: in what kind of whole is it to be viewed? Is it a mere verbal whole or a whole of thought that is to be defined? Is it an integrate whole or a logical whole? Is it, if an integrate whole, a substance-whole or a causal whole? Is it, if a logical whole, a subject-whole or a predicate-whole?

EXERCISES IN DEFINITION. *After defining the words in which they are expressed both etymologically and by synonyms, define the following themes:* —

1. *As causal wholes.* Gold; the loadstone; the sun; electricity; oxygen; the ear; the beaver; barometer; metallurgist; knowledge; courtesy; commerce.

2. *As substance-wholes.* The diamond; gas; ice; a storm; intellect; hope; economy; law; genius; superstition; literature; habit.

3. *As class-wholes.* The oak; the ox; the vulture; the Caucasian; the desires; the virtues; the arts; republics; sects.

4. *As attribute-wholes.* Humanity; intelligence; patriotism; fanaticism; gratitude; instinct; credulity.

REMARK. In order to recognize an attribute-whole, it is necessary to refer to some subject to which it belongs. In defining an attribute of this class, consequently, the inquiry should first be after some subject to which it belongs, and then after the other attributes that belong to this subject. The object of the definition will be to discriminate it from these other attributes.

5. *As wholes in each of the classes named.* Reason; taste; egotism; sagacity; adroitness; reverberation; circumspectness; thralldom; authority; symmetry; casuistry; controversy; fidelity.

§ 73. The chief and more characteristic work in explanation consists in presenting the theme *distinctly;* that is, through the parts which make up the theme.

The particular processes by which this is chiefly effected are six in number, — NARRATION, DESCRIPTION, DIVISION, PARTITION, EXEMPLIFICATION, and COMPARISON AND CONTRAST.

This enumeration of the processes of explanation is founded on the different kinds of whole in which objects of thought may be viewed. The processes which properly belong to intuitive wholes are omitted, as they enter not as characteristic and governing, but only as subsidiary into formal discourse. It will not be amiss, however, to indicate them briefly here, referring to systems of constructive grammar for a more particular and practical description of them.

A leading class of intuitive wholes are called *mass-wholes*. They are wholes of space. They are either abstract, as *acre*, *bushel*, or concrete, as *Africa* viewed as consisting of certain geographical districts, *man* viewed as consisting of special parts as *head*, *trunk*, *limbs*. This process has been called *Rhetorical Disposition*. It consists in an orderly naming of the spacial parts that make up the theme.

These two modes of Explanation, Enumeration and Disposition, it is seen differ from the others, and in strictness on more logical grounds and for completeness, should be enumerated with the others. They enter frequently into the construction of discourse, sometimes furnishing to it the general departments or leading heads, more frequently occurring incidentally in the other processes. But they seem for

rhetorical uses to require no more formal treatment, except as they may be exhibited as rudimentary processes, the one of narration, the other of description.

Of the six processes of explanation named as chief processes, the first two — Narration and Description — regard the theme as an integrate whole, the former under the forms of time, the latter under those of space. The other four regard the theme as a logical whole. The third and fourth — Division and Partition — respect the theme, the former as a subject-whole, or class; the latter as a predicate-whole. An explanation by the one gives as parts lower classes, varieties, or individuals; an explanation by the other gives the constituent attributes that make up the theme. These move in the relationship of whole to part, explaining the whole by all the parts. Of the last two, Exemplification moves in the relationship of whole to part, but explains the theme as a whole by a single part. Comparison and Contrast, on the other hand, move in the relationship of part to part, and explain by exhibiting the theme as a part through a complementary part, either as similar or as different.

§ 74. While these processes may all be combined in certain cases in the same discourse, they are yet easily distinguishable. They may, in some cases, constitute each the single and only process of explanation. They are, also, subject to entirely different principles regulating the use of them in discourse. Hence the propriety and utility of considering them distinctly.

As has been before observed, every art embraces diverse particular processes, all of which, in the more complicated forms of the art, are carried on simultaneously together. In the acquisition of the art, however, these processes are analyzed, and studied and exemplified in practice separately and singly. An extended arithmetical process generally combines the various particular processes of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, if not various other higher processes. In acquiring the art, however, the attention of the learner is advantageously directed to these particular processes singly and successively. Each is studied and exercised upon before the next is taken up. When each several process is thus made familiar by separate and continued study and exercise, the more complicated operations are performed with ease and success. It is so with every art. So self-evident, indeed, is this principle that nothing but the fact of the strange neglect and oversight of it in the art of constructing discourse could justify a repeated reference to it in vindication of the course that is here proposed. The learner cannot be too earnestly or too frequently reminded of the necessity of studying and exercising upon each particular process in discourse separately; and of continuing his study and practice upon each in order, until a perfect practical familiarity with it is acquired.

CHAPTER II.

OF NARRATION.

§ 75. NARRATION is that process of explanation which exhibits the theme in its relations to time.

There are three different views which may be taken of an object in its relations to time, according as the view fastens more directly on the period of time in which the object of thought appears, on the object itself, or on the cause that works in the object. Every event thus has, first, its period, its duration, and its stages or parts of time; secondly, its subject which changes, making up the body of the event, so to speak; and thirdly, the cause which works out the event. The view accordingly may rest more directly on the period of time as filled out by the transpiring event; or on that which is the subject of change in that period; or, finally, on the cause which works out the changes during this period. If, for instance, we take as the theme *England*, we may narrate the theme by taking, first, the period of England and separating it into centuries or the periods covered by successive dynasties or individual reigns, mention the events that transpired in each of these successive portions of time. Such narratives are called *annals* or *chronologies*. Or, in the second place, we may take the subject of change, England, and exhibit that as it changes in the time of its existence. We have then proper *History*. Or, in the third place, we may take the succession of causes that have worked out the changes in English history and make them prominent. We have then what is called a *Philosophical History*. Although all these

forms of narrative agree in this that they alike view the theme under the relations of time, they yet differ specifically in important respects. It is necessary, therefore, that in writing a narrative it be clearly recognized in thought, at least, which view is to predominate, the chronological, the proper historical, or the causal. All the laws of explanation will vary their application, according to the specific view of the theme as here indicated.

The relation between these species of narration is well illustrated both in the changes of individual experience in respect to the degree of interest felt in them respectively, and also in the progress of historical literature. The child notices chiefly and characteristically the events that fill up a period of time. He passes from subject to subject in disregard of all interior connection. His narratives are made up of the series of events that have occurred one after another, to the suppression both of the subject and of the cause. The more advanced mind delights in proper history; it takes little pleasure in mere chronologies; it demands a subject of change and finds the chief interest in its changings, with comparatively slight interest in the causes that work the change. The more mature mind remains unsatisfied till it passes through the chronological succession of events to the one subject, the change in which forms the interior content of those events and the bond of connection between them, and then to the cause that produces those changes.

Corresponding to this changing experience in the individual mind, is the progress of narrative literature. The earlier histories confine themselves mainly to the simple representation of the successive events that fill up the period and the sphere of their narratives. More recent histories present the subject as passing through these changes; while truly causal, that is, philosophical histories, are the production of the most recent times. This progress in historical literature is exemplified in the histories of Herodotus, of Hume, and of Guizot.

§ 76. THE THEME in narration is ever something viewed as becoming, happening, changing. It is either SIMPLE, consisting of what is outward and sensible; or ABSTRACT, consisting of what is internal and spiritual. Examples of Simple Themes are: *the siege of Jerusalem; the Crusades; the battle of Waterloo; the settlement of America; the Athenian Republic;* — of Abstract Themes: *the working of pride; the formation of habit; the progress of art.*

Themes in either class are variously modified according as they are viewed, in more direct reference (1), to time, that is, chronologically; or (2), to the subject of change, that is, historically; or (3), to the cause working in the subject, that is, philosophically.

Narrative themes are distributed also, on a somewhat different principle of division, into —

1. Those of physical nature, narratives of which are styled *Natural Histories*, as of the globe, of plants, of animals.

2. Those of rational life. Themes of this class are subdivided into (*a*), those of individuals, narratives of which are *biographies*, *memoirs*, etc., if they cover personal experience generally, or *travels*, *voyages*, etc., if they embrace only particular kinds of personal experience; and (*b*), those of communities, narratives of which are proper *histories*. They are either (1), religious, or (2), secular or profane. They are also either general, exhibiting the experience generally, or particular, exhibiting only specific phases of it, as political, intellectual, moral, artistic, commercial, etc.

§ 77. The Law of Unity in narration requires, first, that the one theme be presented throughout as a proper narrative theme, that is, in its relations to time; and secondly, that it be presented in but one of the three possible views of a narrative theme, chronological, proper historical, or philosophical, as the predominant and governing view.

Nothing forbids the adoption of one of these views as governing in the distribution of the principal heads and of another in the subordinate development; as a simple history or a philosophical history may very properly adopt purely chronological divisions as its leading divisions.

The life of invention in writing narrative, and the interest in reading it will depend essentially on the firm grasp of the theme proposed by the writer, as the one theme to be developed. Even in chronological and in philosophical narrative, there is a subject of change that must never be lost sight of. It must be a chronology or a philosophy of changes in that one subject. The importance of this principle is illustrated in the wearisome effect of those general histories which take as in succession chapters of [illegible] before our minds any one subject [illegible]. A History of the world's progress which should treat of the one race of men and present the successive changes they have undergone in their common relations, keeping the unity of the theme ever in sight, would be an attractive [illegible] fascinating as most universal histories, so called, that have appeared, are repulsive and wearisome. Such a work of history is a desideratum in our literature.

It will be observed that the comprehensiveness of the theme will not affect the unity. The theme may be the life or the transaction of an individual, the history of a community or nation through the whole or particular stages of its existence; it may be a cause producing its effects on a single individual, a community or state, or the race generally, through greater or less periods of time; it may be an effect experienced over the world, as that of the Christianization of the earth or of a single continent, as the civilization of Europe or of an individual, as the moral greatness of Howard.

Further, as the highest and ultimate aim in all human action is a moral one, and as all discourse has an ultimate end which is moral in its character, although in narration the commanding end is the information of the understand-

ing and thus purely intellectual, still it cannot be regarded as a violation of unity if incidentally the truths thus brought before the understanding be applied to a moral end. The historian, thus, by no means infringes on the law of unity, when he breaks from the strict course of his narration to apply the moral lessons which his narration teaches. This, however, in all proper narration, must never appear as the immediate and commanding, or even as a coördinate aim. If the inculcation of a moral lesson be made the controlling end, the discourse loses its proper character as narration. It then obeys other laws, and narration acts only a subordinate part.

§ 78. The Law of Selection requires that such chronological periods, such stages in the change of the object which constitutes the theme, and such causes that work out the change, be taken as will best secure the end of the narration.

In chronological narrative, the selection is comparatively easy. The earliest exercises in narrative composition should therefore be in this species of narration.

In purely historical narrative the selection is more difficult, for we cannot represent the object which forms the theme as actually changing. All that we can do is to assume successive points of time and mark the particular phases which the object presents at those points respectively, and leave it then to the mind of the reader to fill up the intervening period and imagine the actual progress of the change from one phase to another. The skill of the narrator will be shown in selecting such changes, or more exactly, in selecting such phases of the changing theme as will enable the reader to imagine how the whole change went on. In the history of a nation, thus, the changes that culminate in some great epoch of the nation's life, some great internal or foreign war, some critical change in the administration, some new era of domestic industry, or the like, are changes that

the skillful historian will [illegible] phases in which its whole progress [illegible] He will, of course, ever be careful to exhibit these not as isolated and independent, but as connected and in vital relation to each other.

In philosophical narrative a like difficulty in selection [illegible] encountered. Here the stages to be selected [illegible] workings of the causal influence in producing the change [illegible] the subject.

In abstract and spiritual themes, a still higher [illegible] skill is requisite in the selection of those particular stages in the progress of the object represented which shall most happily exhibit to the reader the actual progress. [illegible] ary in the narration of merely outward events. [illegible] with much difficulty that the naturalist seizes upon those [illegible] of vegetable growth which shall give a clear idea of the entire continuous process. Although the tree is ever growing, and the eye cannot trace from moment [illegible] the actual change that is going on, still the representation of the seed, the germinating state, the woody stage, the [illegible] of decay or of the periodical change, the [illegible] of the sap, the periods of foliage, of flowering, of fruit, and the like, [illegible] easy, because the successive stages or conditions of growth are definitely marked to the eye. In abstract subjects, however, these successive stages are with difficulty discovered; and the mere representation of the succession, [illegible] power, a virtue, a mental habit of any kind, [illegible] time alone, demands nice discernment and sound judgment. When the causal influence is conjoined with this, the difficulty becomes still greater. For the causes that influence [illegible] are not only multiform, but are almost out of the [illegible] tion. Their influence is silent and hidden. Histories of the progress of civilization, of the progress of [illegible] of opinion in every field of knowledge, approach to the more mature developments of mind. Here, too, in moral painting, one variety of this species of narration, in

dicates at once, when only free from obvious faults, the hand of a master.

§ 79. The Law of Method in narration requires that the order of time be ever observed.

This is the one principle of arrangement in all narration. All explanation proceeds by steps, — by exhibition of the theme in its parts, — part by part. The parts in narrative must be given in order of time. This general principle has a slightly varying application to the several species. In chronological narrative, the parts are periods of time, and the order is the order merely of successive time. The notion of time as continuous is dropped, as here there is neither an interior subject, nor a cause working in the subject prominently presented.

In proper historical narrative, the subject of change itself is prominently represented; the parts are the successive phases of the changing subject in the successive stages of time; and here, so far as is practicable, through the exhibition of the successive stages, the principle of time as continuous, as connected in its periodical successions, must be observed. As has been remarked, skill and tact are requisite here in order that the narrative may rise above a dry chronological detail to a proper history. It becomes necessary to apprehend the subject of the change and carry it along through all the successive phases of the changes, never dropping that from view.

In philosophical narrative the causal influence working in the subject of the change is the proper theme. The parts are the outworkings of the cause as seen in the changes of the subject. The cause, however, ever reveals itself to us only as working in successive and continuous time. As before, the subject changing, so now the cause working the change in the subject must be kept steadily and constantly in view. Here not chronological periods nor successive stages of the changing theme, but these stages as best revealing the cause, or as best appearing to be effects of a cause, not as mere events, constitute the grand landmarks of the narration.

§ 80. The Law of Completeness requires that in chronological narrative all the events that mark the period chosen, — in proper historical narrative all the changes in the subject, and in philosophical narrative the entire cause in all its workings, so far as the design of the narrative proposes, — be presented.

EXERCISES IN NARRATION.

1. *Narrate chronologically by suitable distribution of periods the subjoined themes:* (It should be remarked here that the exercise should be carefully criticized by the application of each of the laws of narration separately.) Aristotle; Galileo; Raphael; Louis Philippe; Hortense; Benjamin Franklin: the human race; the Jews; the French; the growth of a vine; the glacier; the crust of the earth; the growth of intelligence.

2. *Narrate historically the following themes:* Zenobia; Dante; Columbus; Richter; Shelly; Robert Bruce; Ledyard; Percival; Sparta; Alexandria; Gibraltar; Mohammedanism; the Papacy; Hungary; Poland; the slave-trade; paper money; English literature.

3. *Narrate philosophically the following themes:* The rise of chivalry; the progress of free institutions; the growth of art; the culture of the taste; the early spread of idolatry; the extinction of the aboriginal tribes of America; the decay of classical learning.

CHAPTER III.

OF DESCRIPTION.

§ 81. DESCRIPTION is that process of explanation which exhibits the theme in the relations of space; that is, as a substance having attributes.

As in narration, so here may be distinguished three species. In the first, bordering on what we have under § 73 called Rhetorical Disposition, the spacial side of the theme is more prominent in the view. The theme is here represented through its spacial parts. The theme, *Great Britain*, thus, is so far described as its parts, *England*, *Wales*, and *Scotland*, are presented in their proper relations to each other in respect of direction, extent, etc.

In the second form of description, the aggregate of attributes, which rightly disposed in their relations to one another represent to us the substance, constitute the more prominent aspect of the theme.

In the third form, the substance itself as the unknown ground of the union of these attributes, is placed foremost in the representation, just as the cause is the real theme in the third form of narration.

But as proper history is the leading form of narration, so the second form indicated is the leading form of description. The first form is serviceable to the second or proper description, as chronology is to history; and the third form presupposes the other, as philosophical history presupposes chronology and proper history. When philosophical speculation applies itself to trace out the relation of substance to

attribute, as it has set itself to trace out the relation of cause to event, descriptions of the third form will naturally appear.

§ 82. The THEME in description is ever an object viewed as simply being or existing, not as in narration, as becoming, or changing.

It is either SIMPLE, consisting of what is outward and sensible; or ABSTRACT, consisting of what is internal and spiritual. Examples of simple themes are *Thebes*, *Mars*, *Alexander;* of abstract themes, *mind*, *logic*, *imagination*.

§ 83. The Law of Unity in description requires first, that the theme be presented throughout as a proper descriptive theme; and, secondly, that it be presented in but one of the three possible aspects in which a descriptive theme may be viewed as the predominant view.

§ 84. The Law of Selection in description requires that such spacial parts, such attributes, or such relations of the substance to its attributes be taken as will best accomplish the special object of the description.

For different objects in describing different sets of parts of which the theme is made up will be preferable, and care and skill are therefore requisite in selecting that kind of parts which will best subserve the special design in writing. For political objects, thus, the theme, *Great Britain*, should be distributed into a very different kind of spacial parts from that which should be taken for geological purposes, or for merely picturesque representation.

In description proper, which presents the aggregate of attributes that represent the substance to us, it will be greatly helpful to a ready and judicious selection,

to have familiarly in mind the four leading classes of attributes, namely: those of quality, of action, of condition, and of relation. The first two of the classes named are attributes of property, and consist of the internal parts of the theme. The last two consist of the external parts of the theme, and exhibit it in its outer relations to space or time, or to other objects of thought. The theme, *Great Britain*, thus, in respect of its attributes of quality, is represented as *enlightened;* of action, as *manufacturing;* of condition, as *insular;* of relation, as *commercial.*

§ 85. The Law of Method in description requires that the parts be placed in the order of affinity.

In the lowest form of description, where only the spacial parts that make up the theme are presented, the general law requires that, beginning with some one part, the selection of which is to be determined by the special object or occasion of the description, we proceed with the next adjacent part, and so on in order, and forbids us to skip over contiguous parts to those that are more remote. The law is easily applied to simple or outward themes; its application to abstract themes is more difficult, but in perfect analogy. To describe the *mind*, thus, by naming its parts as those of *perception, desire, reflection, hope, fear,* would be similarly and equally faulty as to name *Yorkshire, Suffolk, Wales,* etc., as parts of *Great Britain.* We may *map out mind* or any other spiritual or abstract theme, and can thus observe the general law of method applicable to all description.

In description proper, it is at once noticeable that the leading kinds of attributes lie in so many distinct fields. To mingle together attributes of quality and attributes of relation indiscriminately would be in fatal violation of method. In the first place, the internal attributes, or those of property, are more broadly separated from the external attributes, or

those of condition and relation. Hence, method requires that the internal attributes be presented by themselves; the external by themselves. In like manner, the attributes of quality should not be intermingled with those of action; nor, again, those of condition with those of relation. The work of invention generally, indeed, will proceed more easily and more securely if the eye be caused to pass over these several fields of attributes separately and successively, so that the search shall be directed undistractedly, now after attributes of quality by themselves, then after those lying in the other fields.

As in every kind of Explanation, indeed in every presentation of thought, the smaller should always be exhibited in the larger whole to which they belong. To present the *towns of England* confusedly with the *towns of Scotland* or of *Wales,* in a spacial description of *Great Britain,* or to present the *geological parts* confusedly with the *political,* would be in violation of the most fundamental principle of method.

§ 86. The Law of Completeness requires that all the spacial parts or all the attributes requisite for the description be presented, so that whatever set of parts or of attributes be taken, the survey from that point of view may take in the whole field.

EXERCISES IN DESCRIPTION.

1. *Describe spacially the following themes:* The zodiac; Italy; Prussia; Belgium; Gibraltar; the Temple of Solomon; a tree; a flower; a locomotive; the electric telegraph; the British Parliament; the science of chemistry; printing; a well-cultivated mind; the character of George Washington; the modern scholar.

2. *Describe by attributes of quality the following themes:* The elephant; the llama; the upas-tree; the diamond;

Cato; Horace; Samuel Johnson; Hannah More; Byron; true manhood; genius; politeness; the true patriot.

3. *Describe by attributes of action the following themes:* Electricity; hydrogen; ozone; steam; a forgiving spirit; free institutions; national literature; commerce; inflation of paper currency; national indebtedness; a spirit of candor; skepticism; self-reliance.

4. *Describe by attributes of condition the following themes:* The Turkish empire; the temporal power of the Pope; vegetation in spring; the civilization of the last half of the nineteenth century; the arts; the science of mind; the human race in the age of Solomon.

5. *Describe by attributes of relation the following themes:* Egypt in respect to the institutions of Moses; Greece in respect to art and religion; Rome in respect to justice and law; the Crusades in respect to international intercourse; Christianity in respect to other religions; cultivated taste in respect to national morals and freedom; antiquity in respect to the present age; commerce in respect to agriculture; frequency of popular elections in respect to hereditary rule.

CHAPTER IV.

OF DIVISION.

§ 87. DIVISION is that process of explanation which exhibits the theme through its specific or similar parts.

This process often gives the leading departments of a discourse; and the more subordinate development of the theme under the principal departments in all discourse is effected to a great extent through this process. In truth this process and the next to be exhibited — partition — stand in about the same relation to the construction of discourse in which multiplication and division stand to arithmetical computation generally. Of not less service in securing facility and accuracy in writing are these two processes than those two arithmetical rules in all kinds of computation. Richness and fullness of thought, quickness and fertility of invention, are the immediate fruit of skill in these processes. Two eminent writers in English literature, differing greatly in other respects, exemplify alike the ready command of these analytic processes in unfolding thought, — Dr. Barrow and Thomas De Quincey. A close examination of the writings of these authors, and especially of those of Dr. Barrow, will reveal a training of thought, however unconscious, in this direction that is most admirable, and most worthy of imitation by all who covet power in thinking.

§ 88. THE THEME in Division is ever a class, and its parts are denoted by the logical terms *species*, *varieties*, *individuals*.

The first thing, accordingly, to be done in explaining by this process is to obtain a firm grasp of the theme as a generic whole — as a class.

The parts of a class — species, varieties, individuals — stand in the relation of subordination to one another; *species* being higher than *variety*, and lower than *class*; *variety* next higher than *individuals*. There are, of course, manifold intermediate divisions. Natural History, which furnishes the best exemplifications of Division, makes use of the following distinctions, and even others than these, in subdivision of one or other of these named, as *sub-class*, for there is no necessary limit in thought to them in number: Kingdom, Class, Order or Family, Tribe, Genus, Species, Variety, Individual. This last is the lowest part attainable in Division, and cannot be subdivided.

The theme is either *simple*, that is a class of outward and sensible objects, or *abstract*, that is, a class of internal and spiritual objects.

§ 89. The Law of Unity in Division requires that the theme be a single class, and that all the parts in each set be given by one principle of division.

By principle of division is meant the attribute or complement of attributes in respect of which the division is made. This will, perhaps, be better understood by recurring to the logical genesis of all generic forms of thought — the logical account of the origin of all classes in thought. Every such form of thought, every class, then, arises by combining the subjects of different judgments having the same predicate. Thus the class of objects denoted by the term *man* is formed from judgments having primitively individuals as subjects with a common predicate, — *John is rational animal, James is rational animal, Peter is rational animal*, and then combining these several subjects, and marking the combination by applying a single name, *man*. *Man* is now a class including all objects having the attribute of *rational animal*. To

explain *man* as such a class would be simply to name the individuals which, as subjects of the several primitive judgments, — John, James, Peter, — were combined to form the class. These subjects which are thus combined into a class, it should be remarked, are not limited to individuals; they may be varieties, or species, that is, previous combinations into classes of individual subjects; but, whether individuals or classes they are combined only as they have the same predicate, that is, the same attribute or complement of attributes. The principle of division, now, is this common attribute or complement of attributes. Inasmuch as the same class of objects may have a great diversity of attributes alike belonging to each of the class, the necessity arises, in order to that distinctness which is the one object of explanation, of fixing upon one or another of these several attributes, and naming the parts — the species, the varieties, or the individuals — given by that one. Otherwise the result would be only confusion. Thus *man* has the attribute of *color* belonging to the class as a part of the attribute *animal;* also, the attribute *intelligent* as a part of the attribute *rational.* The confused division of the class at the same time into species with reference to *color* and species with reference to *intelligence*, giving as the result *black men, ignorant men, white men, tawny men*, would be no proper explanation. The attribute *color* should be the principle of division for one explanation; the attribute *intelligence* for another. Nothing forbids a second division under another principle or attribute subordinate to the first. But in the same single division there should be but one principle. This principle of division is ever to be found in some attribute that was the common predicate in the judgments from which the class was formed by combining the subjects.

The principle of division, then, must be single; and it is ever to be found in some attribute of the theme. After apprehending the theme as a generic whole or class composed of different subjects of such judgments as have a common

predicate, the next thing is to apprehend the particular composite attribute which is to furnish the single principle of division. We have thus the next law, that of Selection in division, as formally stated in the following section.

§ 90. The Law of Selection in Division requires that such attribute of the theme be selected as the principle of division, and that such subdivisions shall be given as shall best subserve the particular design of the discourse.

For different objects in writing, it is obvious, different sets of parts will need to be exhibited. For one purpose, the theme *man* would be explained through the different species or varieties given by the attribute *rational*, such as *logical, æsthetic*, or *practical;* as *thinkers, artists, benefactors;* as *learned, rude;* as *civilized, barbarous;* for another purpose through species given by the attribute *animal*, which is another part of the composite attribute *rational animal* belonging to the class man, such as *sanguine, bilious, lymphatic, black, white, tawny*, and the like; for another purpose through species given by an attribute of condition, as *young, old, African, Asiatic, European, American, Australian*, and the like; or still again through species given by an attribute of relation, as *citizens, aliens, slaves, freemen*, and the like. As the purposes of discourse vary indefinitely, so the principle of division will vary. Aptness to seize the principle of division and to effect the division correctly and fully under it, perhaps more than any other specific capability, marks the degree of ability in the construction of discourse. And this aptness, it may be again remarked, is the result of intelligent practice, precisely as the musician's aptness in using the elements of melody, harmony, modulation, force, is the fruit of careful training. It may be so perfect as to seem instinctive — genius; it is nevertheless, as is all skill everywhere, the product of intelligent, discriminating practice.

When it is necessary to carry the explanation to a further degree than the first division, the principle selected for the successive subdivisions may be the same as in the higher division, or it may be different. In the subdivisions, also, the principle of division will vary with the more specific design in that part of the discourse. It is, however, always the design of the discourse, not any thing in the nature of thought, that governs the selection.

§ 91. The Law of Method in Division requires that the subdivisions, or the lower grades of parts, be presented under the higher species to which they respectively belong.

The order of subordination in the different gradations given by division appears in the enumeration under § 88, the highest being *kingdom*, the next *sub-kingdom*, then *class, sub-class*, etc.

The strictest logical method of proceeding in division, and that which should be practiced carefully and thoroughly, is what is called in logic *dichotomous*, or in two parts, the one of which is complementary of the other. These parts are contradictory to each other and exhaust the theme. Thus a dichotomous division of *man*, under the attribute *rational*, is into *rational* and *irrational; intelligent*, and *non-intelligent* or *ignorant*. Each of these first two parts is then taken as a whole to be divided, and is separated into two parts, the one of which is complementary of the other; and so on successively, as far as the subdivisions are carried. It is frequently the case that language does not furnish suitable expressions for denoting the higher species. In such cases such species are often omitted in the enumeration. Sometimes, too, the purposes of the discourse require only the distinct mention of certain of the parts given in a complete division. Thus we often find divisions with three parts instead of two. *Angles*, for instance, are completely divided into *right, acute*, and *obtuse*. But a strictly logical dichoto-

mous division fully expressed would have given as the first division *right* and *not-right*, this last species being subdivided into *acute* and *obtuse*, these varieties being complementary of each other and making up the whole species *not-right*. A good exemplification of a strict dichotomous division with omission in the final result of the distinct mention of parts really given in the process but afterward subdivided, and therefore not needing to be enumerated, may be taken from Aristotle's divisions of the grounds of human action contained in Book II. chapter x. of his Rhetoric. All things, he says, are done by men either *not of themselves* or *of themselves*. Of things not done by men of themselves, some they do *from necessity*, others they do *of chance*. Of those done from necessity, a part are from *external force;* the others are from *force of natural constitution*. So that all that men do not of themselves are either *of chance*, or *from nature*, or *from force*. On the other hand, what they do of themselves are partly *through habit*, partly *through impulse;* and these last, partly through *rational impulse* or *will*, and partly *through irrational impulse*, which is either *anger* or *appetite*. So that all things whatsoever men do, they of necessity do on seven grounds, — *chance*, *force*, *natural constitution*, *habit*, *reason*, *anger*, *appetite*.

The law of method in all single division, is that of subordination. If, however, in the same discourse for any purpose divisions be needful into two or more sets of parts, that is, on two or more principles of division, then the law of method in reference to the arrangement of these divers sets of parts, is that of coördination, which requires that the various sets of parts be kept by themselves. If it happen, as it has been remarked it often does happen, that language furnishes no convenient designations for the higher parts, then the lower parts must be grouped together, and not intermingled with those of other sets. Thus it would be in violation of this law of coördination to present the parts of *angles* as *acute*, *right*, and *obtuse;* or of *man* as *intelligent*, *sanguine*, *bilious*, *æsthetic*, etc.

§ 92. The Law of Completeness in Division requires that all the parts which make up the class under the assumed principle of division be presented; and that such successive subdivisions be given as the purpose or occasion of the discourse may prescribe.

There would be no full entire explanation obviously, if any coördinate part were omitted in the division. This part of the law of completeness in division is definite and peremptory in all discourse, for the thought would not be complete otherwise. But as to the other part of the law which respects the number of successive subdivisions, it is evident that as there is no limit in thought to the number of such subdivisions, only the occasion of the discourse can furnish a limit.

EXERCISES IN DIVISION.

1. *Divide the theme*, man, *as a species, on the principle of division given by the attribute of quality*, color; *also, by the attribute of action*, pursuit *or* occupation; *also, by that of condition*, country; *also, by that of relation*, rule *or* domination.

2. *Divide* the animal kingdom *in respect of the attribute of quality*, structure; *also, in respect of the attribute of condition*, place of life.

3. *Divide* plants *in respect of attributes of quality and of condition.*

4. *Divide* winds *in respect of condition of* time.

5. *Divide* governments *in respect of attribute of* freedom.

6. *Divide* sciences *in respect of attributes of relation:* (1.) *their* matter; (2.) *their* utility.

7. *Divide* mental phenomena *in respect of relation of* primitive *or* consequent.

8. *Divide* duties *in respect of relation of* object; *also, in respect of* priority of obligation.

9. *Divide the following themes in respect of some attribute*

of quality, action, condition, and relation: Languages; arts; poetry; history; virtues; instincts; races of men.

10. *Divide* the carnivorous family; the ruminants; the thrushes; the mollusks; insects; flowering shrubs; the lilies; the rocks; the metals; physical forces; colors; the alkalies; resins; cognitions; feelings; human societies; forms of religion; civilizations; governments; laws; customs; tenures of property; fine arts; objects of thought; attributes; occupations; mechanic arts; divisions of time; educational institutions; wars; international alliances; human relationships; social conditions; diversities of genius; systems of unbelief; monotheistic systems; phases of religious character; influences on the formation of character.

CHAPTER V.

OF PARTITION.

§ 93. PARTITION is that process of explanation which exhibits the theme through its component attributes.

Language furnishes only to a limited extent peculiar forms of expression to distinguish a logical subject-form of thought from a predicate-form. *Man* is a proper subject-word — a class-noun; but we habitually use the word to denote a complement of attributes, as synonymous with *humanity*. Indeed, Logic instructs us in interpreting such a simple proposition as *man is mortal*, that we may equally interpret *man* as a term in comprehensive quantity or as a term in extensive quantity — that is, equally as a term denoting a certain union of attributes, or as one denoting a certain union of individual objects. Thus we may interpret it: *man* is as to one of his attributes *mortal;* or *man* is one species of the class *mortal*. *Humanity* is a proper attribute-word. It is, however, allowably used to denote the combination of subjects to which the attribute it expresses belongs. In Division, as we have seen, the theme, however expressed, is ever to be viewed as a subject-word denoting a class — is ever to be taken, logically speaking, in its extensive quantity; and the parts through which the theme is explained are similar parts, that can be designated by such terms as *species, varieties, individuals*. In Partition, on the other hand, the theme is ever to be viewed as an attribute-word — is to be viewed, in other words, in its comprehensive or intensive quantity. It is ever a composite attribute, a complement of attributes; and the parts are in the broader partition other composite attributes

or complements of attributes, and in the narrowest and ultimate partition simple attributes that cannot in our thought be further analyzed. In explaining *man*, thus, by partition, we must take the word as an attribute-word — as synonymous with *humanity* in its broader sense, as denoting all that properly belongs to *man*. We must further regard it as a composite attribute, containing in it other component attributes; and the process of partition consists in a proper exhibition of these component attributes. *Man*, for example, is composed of the attributes *rational* and *animal*. We have so far explained *man* when we have presented these component attributes. But we may go further and explain *rational* in the same way. *Rational* is composed of *intelligence, sensibility, will*. Each of these, still further, may be viewed as a composite attribute and be resolved by another partition.

Such is a general view of the nature of this process. It is essentially different from analysis by division. They are as much unlike as the arithmetical processes of Reduction of Fractions and Involution; and the thinker and writer who should undertake to explain a theme in ignorance of the distinction would fall into as great confusion and trouble as an arithmetician who should confound a fraction with a root of a number.

§ 94. The Theme in Partition is ever an attribute containing in it other component attributes.

It is either an external and sensible attribute, or an internal and spiritual attribute.

§ 95. The Law of Unity in Partition requires that the theme be a single complement of attributes; and that the parts that are attained in the partition be all attributes of one subject.

Of the first part of this law of partition requiring singleness in the theme as one complement of attributes, no further

illustration is necessary. The second part of the law is the logical principle of congruence applied to discourse. Its necessity and validity are grounded in the nature of the theme, as ever a product of the faculty of thought consisting in the union of attributes found to belong to the same individual object. In more precise and technical phrase, the object of thought which forms the theme in partition is the combination of the predicates of several judgments having the same subject. In the analysis of the theme, accordingly, as a complement of attributes that have been found in several judgments to belong to the same subject, we violate the very nature of the theme if we bring in attributes that do not belong to it. There would be little danger of this, however, were it not that language uses the same term or the same form of expression for denoting very diverse kinds of attributes. It becomes necessary, therefore, to confine the enumeration of parts within that particular view which is taken of the theme. If *man*, thus, is taken as a theme to be explained by partition as a complement of attributes belonging to the subject in physiological views, we must not mix up in one partition *physiological* attributes with those of another kind, as *social, political*, etc. Unity requires us ever to keep within that particular circle of attributes of which the theme is taken at the time to be composed.

It does not lie within the scope of a general rhetoric to unfold its principles to each one severally of all the possible objects of discourse. It cannot, therefore, legitimately undertake to specify the different kinds of attributes of which a theme may be regarded as composed, so as to lay down the special application of the law of unity to every such view of the theme. It can only accept from Logic the enumeration of the different kinds of attributes and enjoin a careful discrimination of these leading kinds, that unity may not be violated by confounding them. These have already been stated to be four in number: Qualities, Actions, Conditions, and Relations; the first two being called Essential Attributes or

Properties; the two last being Relative Attributes. Of the Essential Attributes or Properties, Qualities belong to an object so far as it is viewed as a substance; and Actions, so far as it is viewed as a cause. Of the Relative Attributes, those of Condition belong to the object so far as it is viewed in its relations to space and time, and derivatively so far as it is modified in space or time, as *sleep*, *health*, which are relative attributes of condition; while the attributes of Relation proper belong to an object so far as it is viewed in connection with other objects.

The Law of Unity, in its stricter application, forbids the intermingling of these attributes confusedly together. In order to correctness, facility, and freedom of invention, the mind must move on in clear discrimination of these several classes of attributes, and shun mingling the attributes of an object so far as a substance with its attributes so far as a cause; as also mingling attributes of condition with attributes of relation. Skill and dexterity in constructing discourse, as also perfection in the discourse itself when constructed, depend on the observance of the principle of unity as thus applied in partition. Much time and practice devoted to the partition of themes in respect of their general classes of attributes will be most abundantly remunerated in the increased facility with which the progressive development of an object of thought will proceed after such training. Abundant practice here is as needful as in a ground-rule of arithmetic. For not only does partition furnish the great leading heads of discourse, but, as before observed, all along in every part of the discussion this process is to be applied, precisely as the arithmetical rule of involution not only is the governing rule in some simpler arithmetical problems, but in more complicated problems is to be incidentally applied here and there in different stages of the solution. It may be observed in reiteration, that the two rhetorical processes of Division and Partition bear to each other a relation analogous in importance to that between the two arithmetical processes of

evolution and involution. Not to be practically familiar with the differences between them is as fatal to correct and facile thought in invention as to confound evolution and involution in computation. So the different modifications of partition in reference to the four different kinds of attributes, — it is as important for the writer to be practically familiar with them as for the mathematical analyst to be practically familiar with the different modes of evolving numbers of different powers.

§ 96. The Law of Selection in Partition requires that such a class of attributes belonging to the theme and such narrower partitions be given as the particular object of the discourse shall prescribe.

As elsewhere, the Law of Selection here looks directly to the object and occasion of the discourse. It is necessary to inquire of that, both what shall be the selection, and how far it shall proceed in the partition of successive grades of attributes. The limit here is not in the objective possibilities of thought, but only in the subjective capacities of the individual mind or the allowances of the occasion. The law applies as well to the process when employed in the progressive development of the theme in the discussion as to the primary laying out of the subject in the larger divisions. The particular object at that stage of the discussion in which the partition is to be employed, must determine the selection.

So, likewise, in the determination of which and how many of the four generic kinds of attributes mentioned are to be employed, whether in the first laying out of the theme or in the subsequent development of some part of it, we must look to the especial object of the discourse, or of the discussion at that particular stage, for the guiding principle.

§ 97. The Law of Method in Partition requires that the attributes in each several set be presented by themselves, and that the simpler attributes be placed in connection with those of which they are the immediate parts.

In respect to the arrangement of the attributes that are obtained by the partition, whether, for instance, the attributes of Quality, or those of Relation, should be placed first, the guiding principle must be found in the accidental characteristics of the discourse, — as those of the theme, the occasion, the hearers, the object of the discourse, — not in the essential nature of thought. The law of thought requires that the attributes of each several class be presented in connection with one another; it forbids, for instance, that attributes of quality should be intermingled with those of action, or those of either of these classes with those of condition or relation. This is the law of coördination; and the other part of the law, requiring that when the partition is carried beyond the constituent attributes of the first degree, the involved attributes thus obtained be arranged under the more comprehensive attributes of which they are parts, is the law of involution, corresponding to that of subordination in division.

§ 98. The Law of Completeness in Partition requires that all the attributes that make up the theme in the particular view taken of it, be presented; and that the more minute partitions be given to the extent that the purposes or occasion of the discourse shall prescribe.

As in division, so here, it is to be remarked that while thought itself imposes the necessity of completeness in the enumeration of all the parts making up the theme, it admits an indefinite extension of the process in analyzing into minuter parts. The limit here must be found consequently in the occasions or objects of the discourse.

EXERCISES IN PARTITION.

1. *Analyze by partition the theme* humanity *as an attribute of quality — in other words, so far as comprehending attributes of quality; also, as comprehending attributes of action; also, as comprehending attributes of condition; and moreover, of relation.*

2. *Analyze* intelligence, *as a comprehensive attribute of quality; also, as one of action.*

3. *Analyze* barbarism, *as attribute of quality, and also as one of relation.*

4. *Analyze* patriotism *into component attributes of quality and of action.*

5. *Analyze* politeness *into attributes of quality and of action.*

6. *Analyze* gratitude *into attributes of quality and relation.*

7. *Analyze* mercy *into attributes of action and relation.*

8. *Analyze* decision *as attribute of action and relation.*

9. *Analyze the following themes into two or more classes of attributes:* Contrition; contempt; mirth; manliness; beauty; loyalty; malignity; comity; genius; docility; credulity; foresight; raciness; forgiveness; wisdom; justice; confidence.

CHAPTER VI.

OF EXEMPLIFICATION.

§ 99. EXEMPLIFICATION is that process of explanation which exhibits the theme through one of its specific parts.

This process differs from Division in this, that instead of presenting all the specific parts that make up the theme, it presents only one. The logical validity of the process is seen at once in the very nature of a class or a generic form of thought, as shown in the previous chapter on Division. This form of thought, as there shown, arises by combining more or less subjects of different judgments having the same predicate, or what amounts to the same thing, by combining more or less individual objects having a common attribute. Every individual in the class, or, to speak generally, the whole class consequently have this common attribute, — the whole generic form of the thought must have this common predicate. By taking, therefore, any individual of the class and indicating the attribute in that which has constituted the common base in forming the class, we explain the class. Exemplification, accordingly, is founded on the same relationship in thought as Division — the relationship of a logical whole to its parts. But the movement of thought is in the opposite direction, as we look here at the whole from the part; there, at the parts from the whole.

Exemplification is one of the most interesting and effective processes of Explanation, and at the same time one of the most familiar and common. Instruction in Natural

History and Experimental science is chiefly given through this process. The naturalist in explaining any class of objects in Nature as substances, exhibits one of the class as a specimen. The botanist explains a whole genus, a species, a variety of plants by showing the one property in an individual plant which is the common property of the class. The whole class is known when that generic property which was the base of the classification, which as such characterizes the class, — when that common attribute is known. In like manner, in experimental science, the nature of an object as a cause, in other words, the working of a force or power, is explained by exhibiting a single instance of its working in an experiment. The chemist explains thus the nature of heat as a cause or force expanding material bodies, by exhibiting the working — the influence of heat on the length or the diameter of an iron rod. The experiment here does in reference to the object as cause, what the specimen does in natural history in reference to the object as substance. The exhibition of a quality in one of a class of substances, explains the whole class of substances combined on the basis of that quality; and the exhibition of an action, a force acting, in an object viewed as cause, explains the whole class of objects as causes combined on the basis of that acting force. The range and extent of this process are commensurate with the classifications possible to human thought. Whatever can be viewed as generic, as a class, can be explained through it. It is the earliest process of instruction. Nature, Providence, man, all teach through example, and begin their teachings with it after the first knowledge both rude and crude, both unscientific and incomplete, which mere perception and intuition impart.

§ 100. THE THEME in Exemplification is ever a generic form of thought, — a class, as in Division.

It is either simple, that is outward and sensible, or abstract, that is internal and spiritual.

The first thing, accordingly, to be done in exemplification, is to seize firmly in thought the theme as a generic object or class, and then to view it as that which is to be explained by the common attribute of the class as found in an individual specimen or experiment.

It is obvious that the process is equally applicable to spiritual and abstract objects as to material and sensible; to objects classed in respect to attributes of condition and of relation as to those classed in respect to attributes of quality and action.

In exemplification, thus, a general principle of conduct is explained by the exhibition of a particular act in which it was manifested. The principle of patriotism is exemplified in the self-devotion of a Spartan hero; of justice, in the stern decision of a Brutus; of Christian heroism, in the martyr at the stake.

General truths, also, are exemplified by some particular truth which they comprehend. That virtue is its own reward is exemplified, thus, in the elevated peace and happiness which follow a particular deed of self-denying benevolence. General facts, likewise, are exemplified in some particular instance. The circulation of the sap in vegetation is explained by an exhibition of it in a single plant.

§ 101. The Law of Unity in Exemplification requires singleness in the theme as a class, and also singleness in the individual part which is taken as the example.

This law, like all the others applied to this and the other processes of explanation, must of course be interpreted as applied to a single process. Nothing forbids repeating the process in the same discourse. We may accordingly, in perfect consistency with rhetorical unity, in the same discourse introduce divers examples in explanation of the same theme. But the law forbids, alike, using the example, except incidentally and subserviently, to explain any other theme than

the one proposed for the discourse; and also forbids mingling together two or more examples to explain the theme. If, for illustration, the theme *fortitude* were to be explained by exemplification in the case of Regulus, and the exhibition of the attribute in the story of Regulus were to run off into the presentation of manners and customs prevalent in Rome or Carthage, however well exemplified in the story, the first part of the law of unity, which requires singleness in the theme, would be violated. And the second part, requiring singleness in the example, would be violated, if other instances of fortitude, although partaking of common characteristics, were adduced besides that of Regulus. If other such examples are to be given, they should be treated as distinct exemplifications, or confusion and distraction must result.

It is to be observed that not uncommonly the theme, as a class, is to be explained only in respect to a part of the composite attribute that characterizes the class, — one or more of the component attributes that make up this common class-character. In this case, the principle of unity requires that the example be exhibited only as having that one of these component attributes. It would be in violation of unity, thus, in explaining *gold* in respect of the general property of *specific gravity*, to present the specimens for the purpose of showing its *ductility* or other property.

§ 102. The law of Selection in Exemplification requires that that one of the class constituting the theme be taken as the example, which shall best exhibit in the circumstances of the discourse the common attribute of the class.

In the application of this law, reference being ever had in it to the object of the discourse, the mind addressed must needs be consulted. What will engage the attention and excite the interest of an immature mind and be within its capacity to comprehend, might be of no interest to a mind informed and disciplined. The occasion, also, the various cir-

cumstances of condition, will need to be consulted in the selection of the particular example; as well as, also, the writer's own intellectual command of his theme, and the individual objects through which it may be exemplified.

§ 103. The Law of Method in Exemplification applies to the arrangement either when more than one example is introduced, where the method in Division is to be observed, or when more than a single attribute is to be exhibited, where the method in Partition is to be observed.

In all processes of explanation applied to logical wholes, — the artificial wholes of thought, — the two logical laws of coördination and subordination in subject-wholes, that is in extensive quantity, constitute the principles of method; while in attribute-wholes, that is in comprehensive quantity, the analogous laws of coördination and involution give the principles of method. Inasmuch as we may exemplify a class through one or more individuals of the class and also in respect to one or more of the attributes of the class, we can at once recognize the grounds of the twofold character of the law of method. If more than one example be presented, the laws of coördination and subordination apply; if the exemplification be extended beyond a single attribute, the laws of coördination and involution have application.

§ 104. The Law of Completeness in Exemplification requires that all the examples and all the component attributes be presented which are necessary to exhibit the entire composite attribute characterizing the theme as a class.

No illustration either of this law or of that of method seems to be necessary. The distinct and formal mention of them is given that they may be ever kept before the mind in performing the exercise. The general remark may be repeated here that in training to the construction of discourse, all the

exercises should be carefully criticized in reference to each of the general laws of explanation.

EXERCISES IN EXEMPLIFICATION.

1. *Exemplify the theme* plant, *in respect of its attribute of* growth, *by the example of* a vine.
2. *Exemplify the theme* intelligence, *in respect of its attribute of* growth, *by the same example.*
3. *Exemplify* gravitation by *the revolution of* a planet.
4. *Exemplify* instinct *by the bee.*
5. *Exemplify* patriotism *by the story of Regulus.*
6. *Exemplify* filial affection *in* Ruth.
7. *Exemplify* philanthropy *in* Howard.
8. *Exemplify* luxury *in* Rome.
9. *Exemplify by instances to be selected, the following themes:* Fickleness of fortune; danger of parleying with temptation; growth of corruption in republics; timidity of guilt; respect for law in free republics; force of example; female heroism; insecurity of arbitrary power; power of habit; the rewards of honesty.

CHAPTER VII.

OF COMPARISON AND CONTRAST.

§ 105. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST is that process of explanation which exhibits the theme in the light of its resemblances or differences in reference to another object of the same class.

The precise relationship in which this process stands to the other processes of explanation, it will not be difficult, after the expositions that have been given of those others, to determine. The first two of those processes, narration and description, respect objects as they are given us by the faculties of original cognition — perception and intuition. The other four respect cognitions that are the pure product of thought, being formed by the combination of the subjects of several judgments having a common predicate, or of the predicates of judgments having a common subject; in other words, by the combination into classes of objects having a common attribute, or into a composite attribute, of attributes belonging to a common object. Notions so formed by combination, may be explained by exhibiting the individual objects which, being combined, formed the class, or the simple attributes which by their union formed the composite attribute. In the one case, we have the process called Division; in the other case, that called Partition. But it is obvious that the class may be explained by the indication of the common attribute of the class as it is found in some individual of the class familiarly known. This process is Exemplification. Still further, it is obvious that the individuals

which compose the class must have some attribute or attributes in common; in respect of which they so far resemble one another. The indication of this common attribute in one of the class is so far an explanation of any other of the class, the attribute in one being the same as in the other. This process is rhetorical Comparison. But as no two objects are alike in all respects, any two in a class must have differences as well as resemblances; and the indication of these differences is a kind of negative explanation. This process is rhetorical Contrast.

Besides these processes, it is clear that there can be no others, unless, indeed, there be modifications of one or another of these, or a notion given us by some other faculty than those named, — the perceptive, the intuitive, and the discursive. Some psychologists, indeed, seem to have reckoned among the faculties of the intelligence, also, the faculty of imagination. But the objects that come into our minds through the agency of this faculty, are simply the wholes of form, the three constituent elements of which are the idea, embodied in the form, the matter in which it is embodied, and the embodiment itself as the act of the imagination. The nature of this process, so far as it demands consideration in an art of rhetoric, will be discussed elsewhere. But so far as a product of this faculty is a theme for explanation, it seems unnecessary to make it the ground of admitting a distinct process, for any important rhetorical purpose. Besides, the present immature condition of psychological science in reference to this faculty forbids any proper treatment in the art of rhetoric which presupposes psychological science as settled, and grounds itself upon it. It must suffice simply to indicate this other kind of whole in thought which the processes enumerated do not directly respect.

§ 106. In Comparison the theme is explained by the exhibition in another individual belonging to the class of the attribute or attributes common to the class, the

attention being turned on the resemblances between the two.

In Contrast, the theme is explained by the exhibition in another individual belonging to the class of the attribute or attributes which do not belong in common to them, the attention being turned on the differences between the two.

In other words, the process is by Comparison when the resemblances are given in the explanation; by Contrast, when the differences are presented.

The chief magistracy of a republic may thus be explained *in comparison* by an exhibition of the functions, relations, and influences of the kingly office in unlimited monarchy, so far as they are common to both. It represents the nation; is the center of unity to them; is first among them; leads them; administers law for them, and the like. It may be explained *in contrast* by the points of opposition. The king in a pure monarchy is the end, and the state the means; the president in a republic is the means, the state the end. The one absorbs the state in himself; the other is absorbed in it. The one uses all the energies of the state for his own pleasure; the other uses his for the state.

Thus, also, truth and error may be compared as states of mind, occasioned and determined by similar causes, etc. They may be contrasted in their opposite natures and influences.

§ 107. In Comparison and Contrast, the resemblance in the one case and the opposition in the other may lie in the *constituent natures*, the *properties* of the objects compared or contrasted, or in the *relations* which they sustain. In the former case the process is denominated DIRECT COMPARISON AND CONTRAST; in the latter case, it is denominated ANALOGICAL COMPARISON AND CONTRAST, or generally, ANALOGY.

Virtue and vice are compared or contrasted *directly* when represented as moral states resembling or differing from each other in respect of their essential character or properties. As virtue, thus, implies intelligence and free choice, so also does vice. But as virtue consists in a regard paid to the principles of rectitude, vice consists in a disregard of them.

They are *analogically* compared or contrasted when exhibited in their relations to some third thing. Virtue is related to happiness as its appropriate and natural consequence; vice to misery.

§ 108. THE THEME in Comparison and Contrast is ever a part of a class, — a species, a variety, or an individual.

This character of the theme suggests at once the necessity of apprehending the theme in this light in order to recognize the attribute or attributes belonging to the class through which the theme is to be explained. The first thing to be done in undertaking explanation by this process, is to get a clear notion of the class to which the two objects of thought compared and contrasted alike belong. The common attributes that belong to the class will be the resemblances or points of comparison; the others will be the differences or particulars of contrast.

§ 109. The Law of Unity in Comparison and Contrast requires, besides singleness in the theme, singleness also in the other part of the class through which it is explained.

This law is not to be understood as requiring strictly individuals in the theme and in the object through which it is explained. They must be single parts — single species, single varieties, or individuals. The logical principle in which the law is grounded, is that any part of a generic whole may be represented by any complementary part. The planet *Uranus*, thus, may be explained through any other one or through

all the others of the class *planets*, as *shining by reflected light, revolving round the Sun*, etc. But unity would be destroyed by varying either the theme or the object or group of objects with which the theme is compared or contrasted.

§ 110. The Law of Selection in Comparison and Contrast requires that such object or objects in the class to which the theme belongs, and such attributes of resemblance or difference be selected as will best accomplish the end of the discourse.

This law, as in the case of the other processes, looking to the end or object of the discourse, or the regulative principle in the selection, embraces the consideration of the writer's capacity, the capacity of the mind addressed, and the occasion of the discourse.

In applying the law, it may be suggested here, those objects in the same class as the theme which are most unlike it should generally be selected in comparison; while in contrast, those most like it are to be preferred. The reason is, that when there are relatively but few points of resemblance in comparison, or of difference in contrast, the attention is more easily fastened upon them and is less distracted and embarrassed than if the great multitude of attributes were crowded at the same time upon it.

§ 111. The Law of Method in Comparison and Contrast requires that the more specific processes by exhibition of resemblances in Comparison, and of differences in Contrast, and also of attributes of property in Direct, and of those of relation in Analogical Comparison and Contrast, be distinctly presented.

This law does not forbid presenting together both the direct resemblances and indirect, in regard to the same attribute, or even the resemblances and differences as to any one attribute, instead of invariably presenting all the direct resemblances in respect of all the points of comparison, and

then all the direct differences. But where direct and analogical resemblances and differences are exhibited together, they should be presented in such a way that there shall be no liability to confusion or mistake.

§ 112. The Law of Completeness in Comparison and Contrast requires that so many resemblances and differences, direct and analogical, be presented, as shall be necessary fully to explain the theme.

EXERCISES IN COMPARISON AND CONTRAST.

1. *Compare in respect of properties or attributes of quality and action*, electricity *and* magnetism.
2. *Compare in respect of essential attributes*, the British Parliament *and* the Congress of the United States.
3. *Compare* music *and* painting.
4. *Compare* reason *and* instinct.
5. *Compare* hope *and* fear.
6. *Compare* a state *and* a family.
7. *Compare* wisdom *and* learning.
8. *Compare* science *and* art.
9. *Compare* logic *and* ethics.
10. *Contrast each of the above pairs of objects.*
11. *Compare and contrast* plant-life and animal life; air and water; heat and light; desire and will; imagination and taste; architecture and sculpture; Judaism and Christianity; Homer and Dante; Chaucer and Gower; Spenser and Milton; Pope and Cowper; Schiller and Goethe; talent and genius.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN EXPLANATORY DISCOURSE.

§ 113. THE EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION, § 62, will often be useful in this species of discourse for the purpose of bringing the theme more directly before the mind, or for facilitating the ready apprehension of the discussion itself.

In a history of Greece it may be necessary, in order to exhibit more distinctly to the reader of what people the history is to treat, to describe the country itself geographically which the people inhabit. Such a geographical description may also help the reader to understand the narrative itself. The introduction might also properly explain the mode of constructing the history.

In a description of the virtue of "discretion," an explanatory introduction may usefully indicate the relation of this to other virtues, or exhibit an occasion of its exercise for the purpose of a more explicit statement of the theme. It may appropriately, also, so far exhibit the light in which the theme is to be contemplated, or explain the particular mode of practicing the virtue, as that the whole description shall be more fully and correctly understood.

§ 114. THE INTRODUCTION CONCILIATORY will respect the occasion of the discourse, the theme itself, the mode of discussing it, or the speaker personally; as it is evident that from these various sources either a favorable or an unfavorable disposition may arise in the minds of the hearers.

It is less often the case in explanatory than in any other species of discourse that this kind of introduction is necessary. Still it will be well ever to inquire whether from any of the sources enumerated there can arise any feeling or opinion unfavorable to the full understanding of the discussion, or any interest to be awakened from any one of them that shall secure a more earnest attention.

§ 115. THE PERORATION in explanatory discourse may be in any of the particular forms enumerated in § 64.

The peroration explanatory will apply the representation either to some particular theme contained in the more general one that has been discussed, or to some kindred subject.

The peroration confirmatory will be in the form of an inference readily deduced from the view that has been given.

The peroration excitatory will apply the general theme or some view taken of it to the excitement of the appropriate feelings.

The peroration persuasive will address the theme or some view taken of it to the will as an inducement to some act.

§ 116. If various forms of the peroration be employed, the principle laid down in § 51 requires that the respective forms employed succeed each other in the order in which they are stated in the preceding section.

PART II. — CONFIRMATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 117. In Confirmation, the object of discourse is to convince; in other words, to lead to a new belief or judgment, or to modify one already existing in the mind.

Here lies the essential difference between explanation and confirmation. While both processes address the understanding, the former seeks to produce a new or different notion or conception, the latter, a new or different belief or judgment.

§ 118. As a judgment is ever expressed in a logical proposition, the theme in Confirmation must ever be such as will admit of being expressed in the form of a logical proposition, the truth of which is to be established in the mind of the hearer.

In this respect confirmatory discourse differs from all other kinds, as in those the theme is always a notion or conception.

It may be observed here that while the theme in confirmation must always admit of being expressed in the form of a logical proposition, having subject, predicate, and copula, and so far as stated must imply this, it is not necessary always that it be actually expressed in discourse in the strict technical form of such a proposition. Thus the theme of a discourse, the object of which is to prove that "the soul is immortal," may be stated in the form of "the immortality of the soul."

§ 119. Confirmation in rhetorical invention agrees with the process of Investigation in the particulars that both processes properly respect a judgment, and that both are controlled by the same logical principles. It differs from Investigation in the respect that the judgment is already known in Confirmation both in its matter and in its truth, while in Investigation either the truth or both the matter and the truth of the judgment are unknown.

In undertaking the work of confirmation or convincing, the speaker must of course know the matter of the judgment which he is to establish. He must be regarded, also, as believing it himself and of course as knowing the evidence on which it rests. He professes this in undertaking to convince. He must know, thus, both the matter of the proposition and its truth.

In investigation, on the other hand, it may be wholly unknown whether there is such a truth as the process of investigation may lead to as its proper result. Known truths may be taken, and by the application to them of various principles of reasoning entirely new truths may be ascertained and proved in the very process of investigation. The mathematical analyst, thus, applies to an assumed formula certain processes by which its members are changed in their form, and comes thus to new truths — to truths, perhaps, of which he had never dreamed until they stood out proved before his eye.

More commonly, however, in investigation the truth is at least guessed at, or conceived as possible. The matter of the judgment is before the mind, and the process of investigation consists in the discovery of the proof on which the truth of it rests.

Confirmation employs the results of this discovery for the

conviction of another mind. This latter species of investigation, therefore, which respects the proof on which an assumed or conjectural truth rests, coincides to a certain degree with invention in confirmation. For it is the proper office of invention here to furnish the proof for a given asserted judgment. It differs from this process of investigation only in the circumstance that it directs all its operations with a view to an effect on another mind. Investigation might rest satisfied with any adequate proof; invention seeks the best. Invention explores the whole field of proof and then selects; investigation is content to take what is at hand, provided it be sufficient to establish the truth proposed. Investigation implies a candid mind, ready to be convinced by the proof discovered; invention in rhetoric regards a mind possibly prejudiced against the truth, and struggling against every fresh charge of proof.

§ 120. The mind addressed in Confirmation may be regarded as in either one of three different states; either without any belief in regard to the proposition to be confirmed, or in weak faith, or in positive disbelief. The processes in Confirmation, although in the main alike, will yet vary in some slight respects in the different cases.

The speaker will need ever to have a distinct regard to this diversity of mental state in his hearers, and always to know whether he is to produce an entirely new conviction or to strengthen or remove one already existing. Different kinds of arguments often, or a different arrangement of them even when the same in kind, will be requisite in the different cases.

§ 121. Belief admits of degrees; and may vary from a faint probability to absolute certainty. The degree of belief in regard to a given proposition will be affected both by the character of the evidence on which

it is perceived to rest and by the state of the mind in which it is entertained, both as it respects its feelings, and its opinions on other related subjects.

The distribution of proofs in regard to their respective power in commanding belief will be exhibited in Chap. IV.

§ 122. As in Explanation, so still more in Confirmation it is requisite that the speaker regard the taste, the opinions, and the feelings of his hearers; not merely in the exordium and the peroration, but also in the general conduct of the discourse.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN CONFIRMATION.

§ 123. As the Theme in this species of discourse is ever a judgment, it will always admit of being expressed in a logical proposition (§ 118).

The ancient rhetoricians carefully distinguished between the general subject or theme of the discourse, the particular question discussed arising out of the theme, and the point on which the question turned. Quintilian, thus, in his work *De Institutione Oratoria*, Book Third, distinguishes the *thesis* or *causa* from the *quæstio* and both from the *status causæ*. Common language recognizes a like distinction. We speak of the *subject* of discussion, the *question* raised, and the *point at issue*. The subject of a given discussion, we might thus say, was "*The right of suffrage.*" The question raised was, "*Ought suffrage to be universal?*" The *point at issue*, on which the question was made to turn, was, "*Ought property to be made a test in the extension of this privilege?*" These terms are not, however, used with great precision. Notwithstanding this looseness, it may be correct to say that *the subject* indicates nothing in regard to the object of the discourse, whether it be to explain, confirm, excite, or persuade; *the question*, while it indicates the object of the discourse, does not determine necessarily the one point on which the decision shall turn; *the point at issue* determines all these.

Confirmation, so far as it is concerned in the exhibition of proof, looks directly at the point at issue. And this may always be expressed in a logical proposition with its subject, copula, and predicate; as, "*Property ought*, or *ought not to be, made a test in the extension of the right of suffrage.*"

§ 124. While the proposition to be proved should always be formally stated at the outset in the mind of the speaker himself, it will depend on several different principles, whether and how it should be stated to the hearer.

If no reason appear to the contrary, both facility of apprehension and the increase of interest felt in knowing exactly what is under discussion require that the proposition be stated to the hearers at the outset.

When, however, the proposition is complex, embracing several parts, both clearness and interest may be promoted by the successive statement of the several parts.

If there be a repugnance to any discussion of the subject on the part of the hearers, the statement of the general subject may, in some cases, be postponed till an interest is awakened by such considerations as may bear on the proposition but are general in their nature.

If there be a prejudice against the truth to be established, likewise, it is sometimes better to postpone the direct formal statement of the proposition, and merely indicate at first the subject, or propose the question for investigation.

CHAPTER III.

OF PROOF.

§ 125. CONFIRMATION effects its object — conviction — by the exhibition of those conceptions or judgments on which the proposition to be confirmed depends; — in other words, BY THE EXHIBITION OF PROOF.

Proof consists, sometimes, of mere conceptions. All that is necessary in such a case is to exhibit those conceptions distinctly to view, and the work of conviction is completed, so far as the mere proof is concerned. When I am to prove that "the setting fire to an outhouse in a given case is arson," I have only to resolve the term *arson* into its constituent conceptions, and exhibit them in order. If arson be defined to be "the malicious setting fire to any thing combustible whereby human life is endangered," then, if in the case supposed, the setting fire be admitted to be malicious, and a dwelling was consumed in consequence, the proof is made out on exhibiting the essential constituents of arson. So in proving faith to be a virtue, I have only to analyze faith and exhibit its component parts as a moral exercise put forth in accordance with an intellectual assent to truth. The terms of the proposition *faith* and *virtue* being understood, the mind instantly passes into a belief of the proposition. This process, according to the universally admitted use of language, is rightly denominated *proof;* although this term may have been by some writers and in some cases restricted in its application to that species of reasoning in which the conclusion depends on judgments. The importance of this

distinction in regard to the means of proof will be seen in the classification of arguments.

It follows from the view of confirmation presented in this section that invention in this part of discourse will consist mainly in finding proof.

It should be remarked that while the distinctive work of confirmation consists in exhibiting proof, the mere exhibition of proof is not to be regarded as all that enters into this process, as will be seen more specifically in a following section.

In confirmatory discourse, accordingly, proof constitutes the body of discussion (§ 57).

§ 126. Proof is either DIRECT or INDIRECT. It is *direct*, when it is applied immediately to the establishment of the proposition.

It is *indirect*, when it is applied to the overthrow of objections. In the latter case it is called REFUTATION.

§ 127. A complex proposition, embracing several constituent propositions, may be proved by the separate and successive proof of each constituent part.

Although sometimes a complex proposition may best be proved without such analysis and separate proof of the parts, as, for instance, when the proofs are applicable alike to every part, still generally it will prevent confusion and conduce to clearness and force in the reasoning to analyze the proposition and establish each part separately. In order to secure this advantage the proposition should be carefully studied at the outset, to see whether it be complex or not, and if complex, whether the proof can be best applied to the whole or to each part separately.

A proposition may be sometimes best analyzed through the subject, sometimes through the predicate, sometimes through both. Further, the analysis may be either by division or by

partition. The proposition, *Free institutions are favorable to literature*, may be analyzed for proof, thus, through the subject *free institutions*; as, (1.) Free political institutions are favorable to literature; (2.) Free religious institutions are favorable to literature; (3.) Free educational institutions are favorable to literature; (4.) Free social institutions are favorable to literature: or, through the predicate, — Free institutions are favorable (1.) to oratory; (2.) to poetry; (3.) to scientific discussion; (4.) to history; (5.) to criticism.

§ 128. The work of proving a particular simple proposition or a complex proposition regarded as simple, so far as invention is concerned, consists in the selection and arrangement of the proofs on which assent to the proposition depends. This part of rhetorical invention was denominated by the ancients "THE TOPICAL ART," or "THE TOPICS."

This department of the art of rhetoric was regarded by the ancient rhetoricians and orators as one of the most important in the whole province of rhetoric. Aristotle and Cicero wrote separate treatises upon it. It entered largely into every regular treatise on the art, and into every system of instruction. That it has fallen so much into disuse is to be explained from the causes that have led to the neglect of the department of invention generally. It forms a necessary, constituent part of this branch of rhetoric. A distinct view of the Topics will accordingly be presented in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE TOPICS.

§ 129. IT is the object of the Topical art to facilitate and guide rhetorical invention in confirmation by a distribution of the different kinds of proofs into general classes.

The name originally signifies *places*, *τόποι*; the Latin of which was *loci*. The whole field of proofs was divided off into several parts, to which the invention was directed as the *seats* or places of arguments. They were hence called sometimes *sedes argumentorum*. The topics proper constituted a species of the *loci communes*, which included not only arguments but truths used for illustration, embellishment, or other purposes in discourse, and are generally by the ancient writers thus distinguished from the topics proper.

The specific practical utility of a system of topics consists chiefly in the following particulars, namely:

1. It facilitates the search for proof generally; inasmuch as it exhibits in systematic arrangement the few general classes into which all possible proofs may be reduced. The search is thus rendered direct, definite, and intelligent.

2. By the distribution of proofs into classes according to the intrinsic nature of the proofs, the topics show at once the comparative weight and value of the different arguments that bear upon the same question. The selection is thus made easy; certain kinds of sophistry, and those of the most dangerous kind, are at once detected; and the number of arguments necessary in a given case is evinced. As will

appear more clearly hereafter, some propositions can be proved only by a certain class of arguments. The arguments of one class, moreover, are intrinsically more weighty than those of another. Some compel belief irresistibly, others only establish a degree of probability greater or less. It is one of the most common and at the same time most successful arts of sophistry to put off the less for the more weighty, the merely probable for the absolutely demonstrative proof.

3. The topics furnish at once the main principles of arrangement.

4. By directing the attention of the learner to definite parts of the whole field of arguments successively, they furnish the means of a more thorough and familiar acquaintance with their respective nature and use.

§ 130. The first general division of proofs is into those which are given in the very terms of the proposition to be proved, and those which are to be sought out of it.

The former class may be denominated ANALYTIC, the latter SYNTHETIC proofs.

All propositions, susceptible of proof, contain the proof within themselves, or depend on some truth or conception out of themselves. The former class are denominated by logicians *analytic*, the latter *synthetic* propositions. The proposition *all trees are organic* is analytic, since from the very analysis of the terms *trees* and *organic*, the conceptions are given on which the truth of the proposition rests. So likewise, the proposition *dueling is murder* is analytic, as an analysis of the terms furnishes the proof.

On the other hand, the proposition *dueling is a relic of barbarism* is synthetic, since here no analysis of terms would furnish the proof of the truth affirmed. Something is added to the subject in the predicate and the ground for this affirmed addition must be sought out of the proposition.

Analytic proofs correspond very nearly, but not exactly, to those denominated by Aristotle and Cicero *intrinsic*. They include, thus, the species of arguments enumerated by them *from definition; from the relation of species and genus; from partition or enumeration of parts*. They do not embrace, however, all those which are derived *from things bearing some affinity to the matter of the proposition*. Indeed, they take in but a part of one variety of this species, namely, that from conjugates or words derived from the same root.*

§ 131. Analytic proofs, being derived from the very terms of the proposition, need not, for any practical purpose of invention be further subdivided; the search being at once definitely directed and the weight and relation of all arguments of this class being indicated in the very nature of analytic proofs as such.

The terms of the proposition may be analyzed by partition or by division, and the character of the proof will vary in a certain respect with the nature of the proposition. But it is obviously of no importance how the analysis is made or what is the form of the proof thus obtained so far as it respects any purpose of invention.

§ 132. Analytic proofs carry with them the highest validity and force in all confirmation.

There can clearly be no higher or stronger proof than that which is contained in the very statement of the proposition. In this case, the proposition is only to be placed before the mind and assent is necessary. There may be need of proof of other kinds to show that the terms of the proposition actually contain the conceptions or truths on which the truth of the proposition depends. But these con-

* See Cic. Top. 2–4.

ceptions being admitted to be there, the exhibition of them compels assent. In proving that the malicious setting fire to an outhouse whereby a dwelling is accidentally consumed is arson, it may be necessary to prove, by testimony or otherwise, that arson necessarily includes the idea of malice, the overt act of setting fire, the endangering of human life. But if these are admitted to be constituent ideas of the complex notion *arson*, the proof is conclusive.

§ 133. The principle of this most generic division of proofs into analytic and synthetic indicates the first step to be taken in the invention of arguments. It is, *study carefully the terms of the proposition itself.*

This is a fundamental and all-important rule in all confirmation. Many questions, not to say most that are controverted, are resolved at once by the explication of the meaning of the terms employed to express them. They are controverted only because the parties see them in different aspects. But even where the question is viewed in the same light, the explication of the meaning of the terms is often the effectual method of deciding the controversy. And where not, where synthetic proofs are requisite, the mind is, by the thorough examination of the question in all possible lights, furnished with the best helps and guides to invention.

§ 134. Synthetic proofs, being derived from without the proposition, are either such as are given by the mind itself acting under the necessary laws of its being, or such as are derived from without the mind.

The former species may be denominated INTUITIVE; the latter, EMPIRICAL proofs.

In demonstrating the truth of a mathematical proposition we can trace out the steps from the premise to the conclusion without aid from external proof. The diagrams

and numerical figures or alphabetical symbols which we often or generally make use of in mathematical reasoning, merely facilitate our mental operations. A Newton or a Pascal could reason out the theorem independently of such aids. In other words, the mind in this case intuitively perceives the connection between the subject and the predicate. And it matters not whether the reasoning be more or less simple or brief. No mere analysis of the terms of the proposition, however, can give the proof. The mind intuitively, necessarily, adds the predicate to the subject. The quotient of $a\ b$ divided by a is seen unavoidably by every one so soon as he understands what is meant by the statement. Yet no mere analysis could give the proof. While they are therefore in their very nature distinguishable from analytic proofs, being apprehended at once by the mind, they may be denominated *intuitive.*

Empirical proofs, being derived from without the mind, come to it only through experience, and hence obtain their name.

Intuitive, like analytic proofs, need no subdivision. They include among others all those proofs which constitute what are called in logic *immediate reasonings*, such as logical *conversion of terms*, *restriction*, *transference of quality*, *hypothetical* and *disjunctive syllogisms.*

§ 135. Intuitive, like analytic proofs, possess apodictic or demonstrative certainty.

Unless there be inaccuracy in the application of them, they must always compel assent. Hence, it would be entirely unnecessary for conviction to advance any other arguments, were it not that, in the first place, there may be suspicion of inaccuracy in the application of the proof; and, secondly, that the human mind has passions as well as intellectual powers, and in respect to both is subject to the laws of habit, and hence

"convinced against its will
Is of the same opinion still."

Hence the necessity of superadding other proofs; mainly that the native love of truth may have opportunity of rising by the contemplation of proof and triumphing over prejudice and aversion.

§ 136. Empirical proofs are divided into three general classes: I. ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY; II. SIGNS. III. EXAMPLES.

The grounds of this classification may be thus exhibited. The empirical is either substance or cause. Empirical proofs, consequently, are those which lie in those relations of thought which are proper to an object viewed as substance or those proper to an object viewed as cause. The essential relations proper to a substance are those of substance and attribute; those proper to a cause are cause and effect; attributes being logical parts of a substance-whole, and effects logical parts of a causal whole. Now as all the movements of thought are in the relations of wholes and parts, and as these movements lie in one or the other of the two coördinate relations, either between whole and part, or between part and complementary part, we have two general movements of thought, — the one between the whole and the part, called the *deductive:* the other between the part and complementary part, called the *inductive.* But under the general deductive movement we have two specific forms of thought, as we may think in either direction from the whole to the part or from the part to the whole. It is plain that if there is a whole there are parts, and if there is a part there is a whole of which it is a part. If, for instance, we can exhibit a whole — *man* — as *rational*, we can exhibit it as proof that a part of that whole, say *Hottentot*, is *rational.* Or in the causal relation, if we can exhibit *the sun* as *earth-illuminating*, we can use that as proof that *the sun must illuminate any part of the earth, as New Holland*, that is turned *towards the sun.* We may likewise reason

from a part to the whole; we may infer a substance, an aggregate of attributes from a single attribute recognized but as a part; or infer a cause from an effect. The existence of an attribute proves a substance; the existence of an effect proves a cause. We have thus under the general movement of thought between whole and part, a class of proofs which Aristotle denominated generally *Signs.* Further, we may infer from one part to another part. For example, if this magnet, being a part of a whole class of bodies called *magnets*, attract, this other *magnet*, which is also a part of the class, likewise *attracts.* This last class of proofs, from part to complementary part, Aristotle called *Examples.*

Inasmuch as there are but the two general forms of mediate reasonings mentioned, the deductive and the inductive, we can recognize but these two general classes of empirical proofs, each however admitting divers subdivisions.

Mediate reasonings are in Logic termed *syllogisms.* When fully expressed, they necessarily require two propositions called *premises*, which together constitute what is called the *antecedent* of the reasoning, and a third proposition, which is the *consequent* or *conclusion;* and there can be but these three propositions in any simple syllogism. The reason of this is, that in every mediate reasoning, in every syllogism, we attain the conclusion which asserts a relation between its terms — its subject and predicate — only as we see a like relation between each of these terms and a third term. This relation between each of these terms and the third term respectively, is expressed in the two premises. But in discourse it is seldom necessary to set forth in form both of the premises, the other being readily supplied in thought. Thus in the syllogism or mediate reasoning, *All magnets attract iron; this body is a magnet; therefore, this body attracts iron*, either premise may remain unexpressed, as it would be sufficient to argue, *This is a magnet; therefore, it attracts iron;* or, *All magnets attract iron; therefore, this body attracts iron.* Every one would readily supply the suppressed

premise in the first case, *all magnets attract iron ;* and, in the second case, *this body is a magnet.* A mediate reasoning thus incompletely expressed, if deductive, is called an *enthymeme,* — a Greek word, signifying *something in the mind, something understood.*

In the same way, in the inductive syllogism, either premise may be suppressed; as, in the syllogism fully stated, *This magnet attracts iron; that new-found mineral is a magnet; therefore, that new-found mineral attracts iron,* we may give the conclusion, *This new-found mineral attracts iron,* with either premise added, to the exclusion of the other, *for this magnet attracts iron,* or, *for this new-found mineral is a magnet.* The incompletely expressed inductive syllogism is in rhetoric called an *example ;* as Aristotle in his " Rhetoric," Book I. Chapter 2, teaches: " Syllogism is in rhetoric the enthymeme, and induction the example."

It may be observed here that that term which appears in the expressed premise, and does not appear in the conclusion, is often called *the argument.* Thus in the example given above of an enthymeme, the term appearing in the expressed premise but not in the conclusion is the whole class *magnet.* This is *the argument* in the reasoning. Argumentation is accordingly well explained to mean *using the middle term in discourse,* that is, using it in its proper relations to the two terms of a proposition as a ground of their agreement or disagreement.

Further, signs, as the term was used by Aristotle, the father of Rhetoric as of Logic, being reasonings in the general relationship of whole and part, and, as already observed, the movement of thought being indifferent in either direction, either from the whole to the part or from the part to the whole, as the occasions of our thinking may dictate, we have a twofold distinction of signs. When we reason from the whole to the part, the proof has been called by some modern writers an *antecedent probability* proof, but is more familiarly known under the name of *a priori* proof; and the term

sign, also more familiarly known as *a posteriori,* has been restricted to the other movement, or to that from the part to the whole. The name of the first class is objectionable both because it is a clumsy word, and also because it is too narrow in its scope. It seems to exclude all reasonings in a whole of substance or attribute, and to embrace only events, things happening or becoming; in other words, only reasonings in a causal whole. The origin of the nomenclature seems to have lain in a strange misinterpretation of Aristotle. Yet in his " Prior Analytics," Book II. Chapter 29, Aristotle in express terms includes under signs both kinds of whole, — substance and cause, — both attribute-relations and events; and in his " Rhetoric," his examples may, as is very often the case, be interpreted either as in the one or as in the other relation. As no exactly appropriate term is in use, however, the uncouth designation *antecedent probability,* or what is little better, *a priori,* may be retained. But it must be understood that these are names derived from a part only of this class of proofs — those which respect events — while they really embrace the two classes, causal wholes, composed of events, and substance-wholes, composed of attributes. Thus in the enthymeme, *Caius is mortal for he is a man,* the proof lies not in a causal whole, does not respect an event, but lies in a whole of substance, and respects an attribute *mortal* as belonging to *Caius* or to the argument *man.* The terms *sign* and *a posteriori* have been used in like error as if applicable to proofs in causal wholes only. Indeed, logicians and rhetoricians have in general failed to distinguish the movements of thought in the relations of substance and attribute from those in the causal relations.

There is no occasion for subdividing the second great class of proofs — Examples — in respect to the alternative direction in which the thought may move, for here the relation is ever between part and part. In the sign the alternative movement was between whole and part, being either from whole to part or from part to whole.

We have thus the three general classes of empirical proofs named, Antecedent Probability, otherwise called *a priori* proofs; Signs, otherwise called *a posteriori* proofs, and Examples.

§ 137. ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY, OR A PRIORI proofs, are those in which an attribute is inferred from a given substance, or an effect from a cause.

In this kind of proofs, as indeed in all empirical proofs, the fundamental truth is assumed that every substance has its proper attributes, and every cause its proper effects, as a necessity of our thinking. Wherever, accordingly, we recognize a substance, we are authorized to infer its proper attributes; and wherever we recognize a cause, to infer its proper effects. As these two relations, of substance to its attributes on the one hand, and of cause to its effects on the other, are not only in themselves radically different, but are also expressed, in all their multitudinous modifications in thought, in ways more or less different in language, it will greatly facilitate invention in all argumentative discourse to make the distinction practically familiar by habituating the thought to seek out proofs in the two different fields in consciously distinct efforts, by inquiring first what proofs the one relation will furnish; and then what the other will furnish. When the mind has trained itself to pursue these inquiries thus distinctly with readiness, it will, on the occasions of actual argumentation, be likely at once and without conscious effort to enter the field which will yield the proofs most effective for its purposes at the time. At all events, its searches for proofs will be more likely to be ready, thorough, and successful.

These two more generic kinds of antecedent probability proofs comprise divers subdivisions. Of these the higher and more common varieties will be described. Language has not yet furnished a full nomenclature in this department

of rhetorical science, and therefore only descriptions can be given without names for the several varieties.

§ 138. From a given substance there may be inferred both the aggregate of its attributes and also any one attribute.

From the existence of *man*, thus, we infer all that can be attributed to man as essential to his being as man, — that there is *reason*, that there is *animal body*. Not only this, but any constituent attribute of either of these composite attributes down to the last degree; as, for instance, that there is *intelligence, feeling, will;* that there is *perception, intuition, thought;* that there are, moreover, all *material attributes*, and also *organization;* that there is, further, *life, growth*, etc., etc., in short any one of all the manifold capacities and qualities inherent in *man, as man*. The proof is equally valid whether we stop with the first and highest gradation or with any subsequent and lower gradation; and also whether we choose to infer all or but a part or but one of the particular constituent attributes. It is also equally valid if we begin with some composite attribute instead of the primitive substance, if, for instance, we begin with *intelligence*, and reason that there is *perception* because there is *intelligence;* or that there is *circulation* because there is *vital organization*. All proofs of this kind, so common, so familiar, are of the same essential nature as those in which attributes are inferred from substance. They are all of the deductive nature of thought, the movement of thought being from the whole to the part. They include the proofs generally known as those which lie in the relation of a *law* to what exists under it; a law in this connection being understood to be merely a general fact. Thus it is said, *It is the law of material bodies that they gravitate, that they are heavy*. Gravitation, heaviness, is the attribute, the law of material bodies. Whatever is an attribute of a class is

thus the law of the class; it is in fact the base in part or in whole on which the class is formed.

The relative attributes, those of *condition* and of *relation proper*, as well as the essential attributes of quality and action, afford familiar instances of proofs of this species. Examples of proofs of condition are: *Wickliffe and Chaucer were contemporaries, for the former died in* 1384, *the latter in* 1400; *Sir Philip Sidney witnessed the massacre of St. Bartholomew; for he was then at Paris on his journey on the Continent; He must be unconscious of crime, for he sleeps quietly; There is need of laborers, for the harvest is ripe.* In all of these examples we have conclusions founded on attributes of condition, the first two being those of primitive condition or of relation to time or space, the last two of derivative condition — *sleep* and *ripeness.* The force of the proof in each case lies in this, that the attribute which is the matter of the proof contains or involves the truth of the conclusion — thus in the second example, presence in Paris during August, 1572, involving presence at the massacre August 24th of that year, and in the last, ripeness involving the condition of fitness for the reaper.

The attributes of relation proper are used in like frequency as proofs, wherever one relationship involves another, — in other words, stands in the general relation to it of whole to part. Thus Addison infers from the omnipresence of God — from this relation to men — his merciful regard toward them; the relation of personal presence, that is, in all his attributes, involving the relation of his presence in each of his attributes, and consequently in his attribute of mercy. Of this variety of proof, also, is that which Bentley urges against the imposition of religious dogmas as articles of faith, on the ground that religion lies beyond the sphere of reason. His argument is: True reason is never deceived nor ever deceives; therefore whatsoever is inconsistent with natural reason can never be justly imposed as an article of faith. The general attribute of reason in its relation to truth — never deceived nor deceiving — involves this particular attribute of reason in relation to all religious teaching.

This, then, is a general view of the first leading species of *a priori* or antecedent probability proofs, in which from a proper substance-whole we infer the aggregate of attributes, or any particular attribute, whether it be attribute of quality, of action, of condition, or of relation proper.

§ 139. In the second place, from a given cause we may infer either the entire effect or any part of it.

From the rise of the sap in the tree, thus, we infer that there will be foliage, bloom, fruit, and other particulars of vegetable growth — all or any one. The circulation of the sap is, in this instance, that which we represent to ourselves as the cause which, unless something interfere to hinder its operation, necessarily involves these effects. So, observed diligence and integrity excite the confident expectation of thrift and success. These are known causes of such a result.

This species of proof is frequently employed in questions of fact. Thus, that the burning of Rome under Nero was actually caused by that unscrupulous tyrant, is inferred from his known character. Such a man would, in working out his proper disposition, do such a deed as that. So Mr. Curran, in his defense of Finney, who was tried for treason, employed with much force the perjured and corrupt character of the informer in the case, in proof of the groundlessness of the charge. Such a man would fabricate such an accusation. The existence of the cause, in other words, is urged by Mr. Curran in proof of the corruption and perjury in which the false charge of treason against his client originated.

§ 140. The proof is of the nature of an antecedent probability or *a priori* proof when the absence of a suf-

ficient operative cause is urged against the belief of a supposed event.

While from the laws of the mind we necessarily anticipate the appropriate effect from the observed operation of a cause, so likewise, on the other hand, we reject the supposition of an event having occurred, if there be no proper cause to produce it. The absence of all motive to commit an imputed crime is thus esteemed a strong proof against the fact of its having been committed.

There is, properly speaking, no cause existing of a supposed event, when there is no opportunity afforded for its operation. In such a case, the cause is virtually wanting. If, thus, there be a known ground for the probability of the commission of the crime in the character of the accused, yet if there be no possible opportunity for committing it, there is no operating cause; and the proof is as valid in this form as in the other where the non-existence of the cause itself is presented.

Criminal trials abound with instances of this species of proof in both of its forms. A single exemplification will suffice to illustrate its nature and application. In the "Goodridge case" so called, Mr. Webster urges the want of all possibility of previous arrangement and concert, which the circumstances of the alleged crime presupposed, in proof of the innocence of the accused; while, on the other hand, he feels himself called to rebut the proof arising from the want of motive on the part of the prosecuting witness to feign a robbery.*

§ 141. The force of any given antecedent probability proof of this species will depend on the degree of certainty in the connection between the cause and the effect.

* Webster's *Speeches*, Vol. II. In this case two men were tried on a charge of robbery committed on the person of Goodridge, who was the prosecuting witness. The main reliance of the defense was that the robbery was a pretense.

If the cause be adequate to the effect and actually operate, or no hinderance intervene, the proof is conclusive. If, on the other hand, there be uncertainty whether the cause actually operate, or whether it operate free from hinderance or interruption, the force of the proof will be so far impaired.

Where the proof lies in the absence of all cause for the supposed effect, the conclusion will be more or less certain according to the degree in which all causes or occasions possible in the case are excluded.

An important distinction is to be made between those antecedent probability proofs which are purely physical and such as are moral. A physical cause *must* operate when the occasion is presented. We infer with absolute certainty that water exposed will freeze when the temperature is below the freezing point. We cannot so certainly infer that a covetous man will steal or defraud when an opportunity is afforded; or that a threat of vindictive passion was actually followed by murder when occasion of executing it was presented.

§ 142. SIGNS, or A POSTERIORI proofs, are deductive proofs in which the whole is inferred from the part, — either the substance or the law from the particular attribute, or the cause from the effect.

This proof, as has been already stated, consists in a movement of thought directly opposite to that in the former species. There the substance or the cause was given, and the attribute or the effect inferred; here the attribute or the effect is given, and the substance or the cause is inferred. The validity of the proof is obvious. It will be readily seen, also, that the search for proofs will be greatly facilitated by having the distinct classes familiarly present in the mind, so that the inquiry may be definitely directed over the several fields successively.

Inasmuch as all qualities of objects are made known to us by some effect on our organs, and are thus known by us as effects, it is generally immaterial whether we regard the proof as one of attribute or effect, and so the conclusion as law or cause, and it is often equally easy to represent it in actual discourse in the one form as in the other. There is, however, a true distinction in the respective natures of these species of proofs.

Exemplifications of these proofs are familiar. The mariner infers, thus, from the increasing blue of the ocean, the decreasing depth of the water, and so his approximation to the coast. We infer, too, from the presence of ice, that the temperature must have fallen below the freezing point. The discovery of a bloody weapon in the hands of a man after a murder known to have been perpetrated by such an instrument, is a strong sign or proof against him as the cause. What is called circumstantial evidence in judicial procedures is for the most part of this kind of proofs. It is often fallacious, but only because there may be divers specific causes or antecedents of the same effect. Of the reality of *some* cause, the existence of the effect leaves no room for question; but of the particular cause in the case there may be room for doubt. When many circumstances point in the same direction as signs of a particular cause, the concurrence has frequently led to error. Thus, to take a single instance from the history of judicial mistakes in following circumstantial evidence; a man of the name of Shaw was convicted and executed in Edinburgh in 1721, for the murder of his daughter, — the signs of guilt in the case being his having been heard to use violent language toward her for opposing his wishes, just before she was found weltering in her blood with a knife beside her; her having been heard to complain of his barbarity, and to say just as she was dying, that he was the cause of her death; the agitation he showed on being brought into the presence of his daughter; and the discovery of blood on his shirt. It was ascertained before

his body was taken from the gibbet, that the daughter was a suicide, and that the agitation of the father was only a sign of his grief and horror, not of his conscious guilt; and the blood on his shirt was from his own arm, having been bled some days before, and therefore not from the body of his daughter. Signs are not infallible proofs of any supposable law or cause, but only of some law, of some cause. The error in this and other like cases does not lie in the inference of a cause from a given effect, but in the acceptance of the wrong cause.

§ 143. Signs are proofs not only of a substance, or a cause of which they are respectively the attributes or the effects, but also of the conditions in which the substance or the cause must have existed or operated.

Every substance must have an existence and every cause operate in some space and time, and in concurrence with other substances, with other causes, with other circumstances generally. It often happens that from the attribute or the effect we wish to prove, not the law or the cause, but these conditions of their existence or operation. And the proof, it is clear, although mediate, is equally valid as the immediate proof of a law or a cause. Thus in the trial of Knapp at Salem, Massachusetts, Mr. Webster argued from the fact of the house having been entered without violence, that there was concert with some one who had access within, the quiet entrance by the assassin being a sign of that condition, — the concerted understanding with an inmate. Wheresoever, accordingly, the existence of an attribute or an effect implies an occasion or a condition of its existence or operation, it is a sign, and valid proof of the occasion or condition.

There are a number of varieties of signs partaking of the character of one or the other of the classes mentioned, both attributes and effects, and which are valid proofs both of substance or cause, and also of occasion or condition, several

of which warrant a distinct notice. They will accordingly be considered in the following sections.

§ 144. TESTIMONY is a variety of signs, the validity of which as proof consists in this — that the testimony presupposes the fact testified to as the condition without which it would not have been given.

The credibility of a witness does not always depend on his character for veracity. The testimony of a notorious liar and perjurer is sometimes conclusive; and on this principle, that we cannot believe he should so testify — we cannot account for his testimony, unless the events testified to were facts. The testimony is, in other words, a sign of the facts as condition.

The degree of weight to be attributed to testimony is always to be estimated by this view of the nature of testimony — that it is a sign, implying the facts to which it testifies as more or less necessary conditions of its having been given. Whenever, therefore, occasions or motives exist in the case for giving the testimony other than the truth, the credibility of the witness will be so far impaired. We are thus to judge of the credibility of historians. The historian of a sect or of a party must be received as a credible witness only so far as it may appear that truth was the condition of his speaking as he does. All admissions against his own sect or party, unless made as baits and lures, will be received as honest testimony.

It is from this view of the nature of testimony as proof, that we see why *opportunity and capability of observing* come in to affect the credibility of a witness. If these qualifications are wanting, the necessary conditions of all testimony are wanting, and there is nothing on which the testimony can rest.

§ 145. AUTHORITY is a variety of signs; and is distinguished from testimony by the circumstance that

authority respects matters of opinion, while testimony respects matters of fact.

The opinions of competent men weigh as proof inasmuch as we cannot conceive how such men should entertain those opinions unless they were founded on truth. If, however, we can discover the influence of other causes to determine their opinions, their authority weighs less with us. The opinions of legal tribunals, pronounced after the fullest discussions on both sides by interested and able men, under the solemnities of a judicial trial, are weighty authority; because it is not conceivable that such opinions can rest on any other foundation than truth. Such opinions are to be regarded as effects which could not be supposed to have existence except on condition of truth. They are thus valid signs.

The validity of legal precedents may properly be subjected to this test. An independent and intelligent judge will set aside a precedent on proof that the decision was determined by other motives than love of truth or rectitude.

§ 146. CONCURRENT TESTIMONY AND CONCURRENT AUTHORITY belong also to this species of proofs. The mere concurrence of witnesses or judges, apart from all consideration of their personal claims to credibility, is a sign, often conclusive, that the fact or opinion is truly as represented.

Previous concert, or common interest, at once impairs the force of this proof. For then a cause or occasion is furnished to account for the fact of the testimony other than the actual truth.

§ 147. EXAMPLES are inductive proofs which rest on the resemblance or the common property or relation that exists between parts of the same whole. One is taken, and from something found to be true of that, an inference is drawn to one or all of the others.

The naturalist, thus, having discovered by analysis the inorganic constituents of a particular plant, infers from this example that any other of the same species will contain the same constituents. Mr. Burke, in his Speech on the East India Bill, sustains his charge of hypocrisy against the East India Company by adducing as examples their treatment of Mr. Hastings, on the one hand, whom they reprehended with unparalleled asperity, and yet continued to trust with the entire control of their affairs in India; and of Colonel Munson, General Clavering, and Mr. Francis, on the other, whom they "ruined by their praises." To prove that the rate of wages does not depend on the severity of the labor, but on the value of the work done, the examples have been urged that a carpenter earns more than a plowman, and a watch-maker more than either. So Hooker in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," Book III., urges an invented example to show that "we must acknowledge even heretics themselves to be, though a maimed part, yet a part of the visible Church." "For," he adds, "if an infidel should pursue to death a heretic professing Christianity, only for Christian profession sake, could we deny unto him the honor of martyrdom? Yet, this honor all men know to be proper unto the Church. Heretics therefore," he concludes, "are not utterly cut off from the visible Church of Christ." Sydney Smith, also, in showing that mind is transmissible, urges analogically the examples, that some ill-tempered horses constantly breed ill-tempered colts, and that if the eggs of a wild duck be hatched under a tame duck, the young brood will be much wilder than any common brood of poultry.

The force of the example, as a proof, rests ultimately upon the principle that the parts of the same whole are in some respects similar, in other respects different from each other. The two triangles formed by bisecting a square by a diagonal are similar in so far as they participate of the whole. They have sides respectively equal, they contain alike right angles, for the square has equal sides and right angles.

They are different in so far as they are parts complementary of each other. One is at the right, the other at the left of the bisecting diagonal; they are different in this respect. So, likewise, from one part of a material substance — from one attribute, as an example — we may infer the same of another part in respect of the common whole of which they are attributes and the different in respect of their being complementary of each other. Thus, *brightness* and *roundness* are attributes of the *sun*, a visible body. They are alike visible in so far as they are parts of a visible substance; they are different in respect of their being complementary of each other — one being a visible attribute of form, the other, one of degree or intensity. In like manner in the case of a causal whole, any two effects are alike so far as proceeding from the same cause, and different so far as complementary. This is the general logical ground of the validity in this class of proofs. It points at once to the different leading species and also to the tests of their validity.

As empirical proofs may be applied both to a substance and to a cause, we have the two different species which are distinguished from each other as attributes and effects. It is not necessary for practical utility further to consider this distinction already made familiar in the view we have taken of the former classes of proofs. It is pertinent to remark that the name, *example*, is derived rather from the causal relation or the relation of effects to each other.

Next we have the two kinds of examples as proofs distinguished by the nature of the inference, as in the one kind we infer the same, in the other, the different. While we accept as a principle not to be questioned that the same cause produces ever the same effect — that "like causes work like effects," we accept the correlative principle as equally unquestionable, that the same cause works different effects in different conditions — that "circumstances alter cases." The radiation of heat changes the condition of both the

body from which and of the body to which it passes; one is cooled, the other warmed; one is contracted, the other expanded. There is thus ever a same and a different between the two complementary effects of any operating cause.

There is a difficulty, however, in applying the principle. Heat, we observe, expands iron; it contracts clay. Both the iron and the clay change form and size; the effects so far are the same, but they are opposite in character — one being increase, the other diminution. It would seem at first view that the principle of like causes producing like effects fails here. But it is the presence of another cause only that has made the difference; the heat has expanded and so evaporated and driven off the water in the clay, so that the whole body now has less matter than before; it has shrunk under the force of heat that ever expands the material bodies which it enters. The difficulty that always attends the rigid application of the principle lies precisely here, — that manifold causes are ever conspiring in their operation, and we are often unable to discriminate the several effects so as to refer them to their respective causes on the one hand, and on the other to discriminate the several causes so as to trace out each to its respective effect. Only so far as in the complication of causes and effects we can connect the effect with its own cause, can we have decisive proof. We have thus the first general test of the validity of examples as proofs, — *That the example and that of which it serves as the proof be connected with the same cause.*

This fundamental principle of induction furnishes the answer to the question: How many examples are necessary to validate the inference? One is sufficient if but one cause can be supposed to operate; the only necessity for others lies in the fact of the great complication of causes and effects in the world around us. Hence it is that examples must be multiplied to eliminate all foreign causes and show the two effects — the example and that to which we induce — to have

been produced by the same cause. The philologist might safely infer from observing in a given language a single instance of a second-future tense, that this tense-form was a general feature of the language, since the single cause that could have originated the use of it lies in the primitive nature of the language. He could not, however, infer from observing that in a particular case this species of time was expressed by auxiliaries, that the language contained no proper tense-form for this time; for accidental causes may have produced exceptions to a general law.

So one observed instance of a particular metal sinking in water might authorize the conclusion that the specific gravity of the metal generally was greater than that of water — that all pieces of the same metal would sink in the same fluid; for but one cause can here be supposed to act in determining the metal to sink. But one could not properly infer that all ores of the metal would be of grayish color, from observing a single specimen of that color; since, in this case, a diversity of causes may exist in different localities to determine the color of an ore.

But as any two complementary effects of the same cause are, as we have seen, in some respects different as well as in other respects the same, we may as legitimately infer this different as the same; and we need to be guided by a valid test which shall discriminate when we are to infer the same and when the different. This test is this, — *Any two complementary effects of the same cause are the same in essential properties, whether of quality or of action; they are different in their conditions and relations to each other.*

It is not within the proper province of rhetoric either on the one hand to demonstrate the validity of these principles regulating the use of examples as proofs, nor on the other hand to show their application to all the diversities of objects and events presented to our experience. Its task is fulfilled by the exhibition of the general grounds on which the validity of examples as proofs rests, with sufficient illus-

trations of their use to show their proper nature, and so guide to a ready and intelligent selection of them.

It is pertinent to remark here that it is important carefully to distinguish the different purposes for which an example may be introduced into discourse. It is used not only as proof in argumentation, but also as mere illustration, and likewise for ornament. It may subserve, moreover, any two or more of these purposes at the same time. An argument consequently may be disguised under what appears to be a mere illustration or embellishment, and may thus have force as proof which it could not have had if exhibited in its own form and dress, as then its weakness or unsoundness would have been detected. So, likewise, a solid argument may be taken for a mere ornament or illustration.

§ 148. Examples may be used as proofs of attributes, or of changes or events.

The grounds of this general division of examples have already been sufficiently exhibited. From the attributes of *being organized*, and *having a circulating system belonging to the boughs* as proofs, we infer the same attributes as belonging to *the leaves* or other parts of the same substance — *tree*. From the effects of *destitution* and *ignorance* — of *physical and mental hunger* — in degrading one community of men, as an example, we infer the degradation of other communities where the same cause prevails.

§ 149. Examples may be used as proofs in relation to one or more other parts of the same substance, or of the same complement of attributes; and also to one or more other effects of the same cause.

Arguments from induction have sometimes been received as a distinct variety of proofs from examples. But the movement of the thought is essentially the same. Induction is ever from the part to the part, as Aristotle says;* "not

* Rhet., I. 2.

from part to whole, nor from whole to part, nor from whole to whole; but as part to part, like to like." In strictest logic it is from one of two parts to the other complementary part; in looser movements of thought, and generally in empirical matter, it is from one part to any one or more of many complementary parts. But it is clear that if the induction is valid in reference to one part, it is equally valid in reference to any other, and so to all. As we start with what is true of one part, and then by induction attain to what is true of the rest, we have, by putting our antecedent and conclusion together, a truth embracing all. Having the fact attested to us that intelligence betters the condition of communities, so far as we are acquainted with them, we infer from this example that it will likewise improve the condition of other communities. We only combine the truth with which we started with that which we have induced, when we conclude that intelligence improves the condition of men generally.

§ 150. Examples are founded either on resemblance of *properties* or on resemblance of *relations*. Those of the latter kind are denominated ARGUMENTS FROM ANALOGY.

While an argument from analogy differs thus from other examples in the circumstance that the former is founded on a resemblance of relations, while the others rest on a resemblance of properties, yet the same principle gives alike to both varieties all their force as proofs, namely, our conviction of the uniformity of Nature.

§ 151. Analogical reasoning is SIMPLE when the two things compared bear a similar relation to a third.

As when from the relation of the earth to its uses, it is inferred that other planets, from the same relation, may be inhabited. Or, when it is inferred, from the fact that virtue affects our well-being, that vice must likewise; virtue and

vice being both moral habits and dispositions, and the relation being the same — both alike affecting condition.

§ 152. Analogical reasoning is COMPLEX when two different relations are introduced.

Thus it may be argued from the fact that virtue tends to happiness, that vice must tend to misery. In this case, the whole analogical proof rests on the similarity of relation between virtue and vice, respectively, and welfare. This is the generic relation. Another specific relation is introduced as belonging to each of the terms — that of virtue to happiness, and of vice to misery. These are dissimilar relations. It is by another principle of proof that the tendency to affect welfare common to virtue and vice is believed to be in the one case salutary, in the other pernicious. This is an instance of Aristotle's argument from contraries — ἐξ ἐναντίων.

In a complex analogical argument, however, it is not always necessary that the second relations should be to opposites. As from the relation of a seed to the plant we may argue in respect to the relation of an egg to the fowl. The relations of a germ to the parent and to the living product are common to the seed and to the egg. These are the generic relations. The specific relations of the egg to the fowl and of the seed to the plant are dissimilar, but are not proper opposites. The force of the analogy reaches only to the similarity or resemblance of the relations.

§ 153. Examples may be REAL or INVENTED.

Real examples, or such as are taken from actual observation or experience, carry with them their own evidence.

Invented examples must possess intrinsic probability or be credible in themselves; otherwise they evidently can have no weight as arguments.

Aristotle instances, as an invented example, that employed

by Socrates, of the mariners choosing their steersman by lot. The case, probably, never in fact occurred; but it clearly might occur, and it well illustrates the possibility of the lot falling upon an unskillful person; and, therefore, was a valid argument as used by Socrates against the practice, then common, of appointing magistrates by lot.

Dr. Whately has well observed that while a fictitious case which has not this intrinsic probability has absolutely *no* weight whatever, any matter of fact, on the other hand, however unaccountable it may seem, has some degree of weight in reference to a parallel case. "No satisfactory reason," he proceeds to remark, "has yet been assigned for a connection between the absence of upper cutting teeth, or of the presence of horns, and rumination; but the instances are so numerous and constant of this connection, that no naturalist would hesitate, if on examination of a new species he found those teeth absent and the head horned, to pronounce the animal a ruminant."

§ 154. As the points of resemblance between different objects are diverse, and things most unlike may yet have some resemblance to each other, and therefore be embraced under the same class, it becomes important in the use of this kind of argument, on the one hand, carefully to set forth the particular point of resemblance on which the argument rests; and, on the other, in estimating the weight of the argument to reject from the estimate those points in which there is no resemblance.

While those arguments which rest on resemblances in objects most unlike are generally in themselves more striking and forcible, they are yet often sophistically invalidated and rejected, because in most respects the objects compared are so dissimilar. On the other hand, no sophistry, perhaps, is more common than that of assuming a resemblance in all

points where there is such resemblance in many. In the use of this species of argument, it becomes, then, of the utmost importance to bear in mind both that the most similar things differ in some respects, and perhaps in that very point on which the argument in a given case depends; and, also, that the most dissimilar things may have some properties or relations in common, and may therefore furnish foundations for valid reasoning.

The decisive test of the soundness of all arguments founded on resemblance, is furnished in the inquiry, *Do the particulars of resemblance owe their existence to the same cause?* As the whole force of examples as arguments rests on the sameness of the cause, or of the law or general attribute in the proof and the conclusion on which the classification depends, the detection of this cause, where possible, will ever discover the validity or invalidity of the example as an argument. Just so far as there remains a doubt of the sameness of the cause or law, so far must there be weakness in the argument.

§ 155. While all simple arguments may be referred to some one of the foregoing classes, many complex arguments partake of the nature of two or more; their force in reasoning is consequently modified in reference to the respective character of the classes of arguments of the nature of which they partake.

What is often called *a priori* reasoning not unfrequently includes in itself not only an antecedent-probability argument, but also a sign or an example. From the falling of the barometer we infer *a priori* that there will be a change of the weather; not because we suppose the fall of the mercury to be the cause of the change, but because it is *the sign* of the existence of the cause. We in this case, in truth, first argue by a sign, to the existence of a cause, and then by an antecedent-probability argument, to its effect, namely, a change of the weather. In the argument in "the Goodridge case," before referred to, § 140, several circumstances are advanced as *signs* in proof of a cause or motive to feign a robbery; from which cause, thus proved, the inference is that the prosecution was groundless.

Lord Chatham, in his speech "on removing the troops from Boston," argues the continued and determined resistance of the Americans to an arbitrary system of taxation from the spirit of liberty which animated them in common with all Englishmen; and the existence of this spirit is proved by *an example* — the proceedings of the General Congress at Philadelphia. This would ordinarily be called an *a priori* argument, inasmuch as the force of it rests mainly on the existing cause to produce the continued resistance. But *an example* is introduced to prove the existence of the cause, and the intermediate step of the argument, the cause itself, is not expressed but only implied.

In the same speech we have another form of the combination of the antecedent-probability argument with the example. The example is introduced, not, as in the other case, to prove the antecedent-probability argument itself, but to confirm it as proof of the main proposition. The speaker exemplifies the working of that spirit of liberty in the effectual opposition to "loans, benevolences, and ship-money in England," in the procuring of "the bill of rights," etc. The reasoning, as a whole, is *a priori*, but is complex, consisting of an antecedent-probability argument and examples.

By an *a priori* argument, the fact of a revelation from Heaven is inferred from the general corruption of the human race. The argument consists of an antecedent-probability argument — the determination of God to do all that is necessary to effect the recovery of the race — and of a sign, the corruption of the race, to prove the necessity of such an interposition by revelation.

A posteriori reasoning, also, often includes arguments of different classes. From the migration of birds to the north, we infer that some of the various effects of spring have

appeared in the place of their hibernation. From the migration of birds, as a sign, we infer the return of warm weather as its cause; and from this we infer again, by an antecedent-probability argument, the usual effects of the return of spring.

While both *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning thus often contain arguments of two or more classes, there is yet an obvious distinction between them. In the former, the antecedent-probability argument is the one on which the force of the reasoning mainly depends; in the latter, the sign or the example is the prominent argument.

The analysis of complex arguments will often discover the precise amount of validity due to them. It will disclose also the point where the sophistry of a suspected proof enters.

Testimony and authority, also, often combine arguments of different species, and are themselves frequently combined together in the same process of reasoning.

What is often called *reasoning from experience*, is distinguished from other species of reasoning only by the source from which the arguments are derived.

The argument from progressive approach, so called, is but a species of induction, in which we argue from the increase or diminution in the effect according as a particular cause is increased or diminished in several examples, to the perfect completeness, or the entire removal of the effect when the cause is perfectly operative or wholly removed: *e. g.*, if we put a ball in motion on a rough surface, its motion soon ceases; on a smoother surface, its motion is proportionally prolonged: hence, we infer that if there were no resistance at all the motion would be perpetual. A sophistical use of this argument has been made by some enthusiastic advocates of temperance. They have assumed that disease and death are the consequence exclusively of a corrupt constitution inherited from parents who have violated the laws of health, or of a transgression of those laws by the individual himself.

They then urge the facts that temperance and correct regimen promote health and long life, just in proportion as the constitution is free from original corruption and the laws of health are observed. They hence infer that a perfect and universal observance of the laws of health will in time purify the stock itself, the human constitution will be restored to its perfect state, and disease and death will disappear.

§ 156. EMPIRICAL proofs never carry with themselves necessary certainty, although they possess all degrees of probability, from mere probability to full but not necessary certainty.

Antecedent-probability arguments sometimes produce full certainty. If the cause certainly exists and no hinderance can arise, the effect is certain, and the proof is decisive of belief. Just so far as doubts may arise in regard to the sufficiency of the cause or the opportunity of its operating, just so far will the reasoning from this class of proofs be invalidated.

Signs possess full certainty, or higher or lower degrees of probability, according as the cause or occasion to be proved by them is more or less necessary to their existence.

The conclusiveness of examples as proofs depends on the question whether in the particular character in which they are presented as proofs, they are included in the same general law, or are determined by the same cause which is supposed in the thing to be proved. From observing the organic structure in one plant, the naturalist will safely conclude in regard to any other plant of the same species. He cannot, however, so conclude in regard to the color. But one cause can be supposed to operate in the former case; in the latter, various causes may have influence.

§ 157. From the diverse nature of the different kinds of arguments enumerated it will appear at once

that while some are applicable to all subjects, others are adapted only to particular kinds of subjects.

Analytical proofs are applicable to every kind of subject, as is obvious from their nature.

Of *Synthetical proofs*, the intuitive class belong distinctively to mathematical reasoning or pure science. They are employed, however, in all kinds of discourse.

Empirical proofs are employed in all reasoning that respects matters of experience, whether the reasoning terminates on facts or on general truths.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 158. THE importance of attention to arrangement in confirmation depends mainly on two principles.

The first respects the state of the mind addressed. The method suited to a mind favorably disposed will generally be unsuitable to a mind opposed to conviction, and *vice versa*.

The second principle respects the dependence of the proofs on one another. Some proofs are explained by others, which must be previously exhibited in order to the full effect of the reasoning. Some proofs presuppose others. Some, once more, have great weight if preceded by certain others, and are of little moment unless preceded by them.

The force and effect of reasoning depend, indeed, hardly less on the order than on the matter of the proofs. Arguments perfectly conclusive when presented in the proper order may lose all their force if advanced in a different order.

§ 159. If the reasoning embrace arguments of distinct classes, the principle of arrangement is to be sought, first, in the state of the mind addressed.

If there be already a state of belief, and the object of the discourse is to confirm and strengthen it, then the weaker arguments will generally need to be placed first, and the stronger ones last. In this way the deepest and strongest impression will be the last.

If there be an opposing belief to be set aside, it will be better to advance the stronger first, in order to overthrow opposition at once. The weaker may follow, which will serve to confirm when they would be of no avail in the first assault. In order to leave, however, a strong impression, some of the stronger should be reserved to the close; or, what is equivalent, the arguments may be recapitulated in the reverse order.

Although this principle of arrangement, derived from a consideration of the state of the mind addressed, is not the higher and more controlling one, but must generally give way to the next to be named, still the state of the mind addressed must be first consulted, for that will often determine what kind of arguments are to be employed, as well as the order of arrangement.

This principle, it will be observed, respects only the comparative strength of the arguments.

§ 160. The second principle to be regarded in the arrangement of proofs respects the dependence of the arguments on one another.

This principle requires, in the first place, that the *analytic proofs precede all others.*

The reason of this rule is obvious. As in exhibiting a proof of this class, the proposition itself must necessarily be explained, the relevance and force of every other proof will be more clearly seen after such an explanation. In a judicial question, for example, whether certain specified acts constitute legal murder, after the definition of murder has been given, the arguments from authority or "legal precedents" will obviously be more intelligible and also of more force as confirmatory.

§ 161. This principle requires, in the second place,

that *antecedent-probability arguments precede examples and signs.*

The example, introduced after the antecedent-probability argument, will serve both to illustrate and also to confirm it. Indeed, in this order, they reflect light on each other. Mr. Burke, in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, in endeavoring to prove that India had been reduced to a condition of extreme want and wretchedness, first presents *the causes* in operation to produce it; then, *examples* of the operation of those causes; and finally particular *signs* of the fact. The mind very readily receives the whole statement, because, from the view of the cause, the effects are naturally anticipated.

In Dr. Barrow's discourse on the Divine Impartiality, the *a priori* arguments are with obvious propriety presented first; and then the *a posteriori* arguments. If the order had been reversed the force of the reasoning would have been greatly weakened.

A charge of fraud against a man generally reputed to be of upright character would need a strong array of proof from signs, as testimony and the like, to substantiate it. But let a spirit of covetousness be first proved in him, and especially if a single example be adduced in which that spirit has led aside from what was upright and manly, and a very small amount of proof will suffice to establish the charge.

In like manner the proof of the divine authenticity of the Bible is conclusive when sufficient cause is first shown for such an interposition from God, and then the arguments from testimony and the internal evidence are presented. But without such cause being first shown, scarcely any amount of testimony will be sufficient to overcome the repugnance of the mind to believe that a miracle has been wrought.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PRESUMPTION; OR, THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

§ 162. It is of great importance in argumentation to determine at the outset both in reference to the main proposition, and also in reference to the particular facts or truths assumed as proofs, whether they may be fairly *presumed* or taken for granted until disproved. This is called determining on which side the PRESUMPTION is, or on which the BURDEN OF PROOF — *onus probandi* — lies; the burden of proof always resting on the side opposite to that in favor of which the presumption exists.

The importance of determining this point consists not merely in the fact that thereby the labor of proof may often be saved, but still more in the fact, that the mere undertaking to prove what ought to be *presumed*, will often throw doubt upon what was clear and unquestionable. The veracity of a witness is ever to be taken for granted until it is impeached. If one were to volunteer a defense of the character of a witness before it had been questioned, the very attempt would excite a suspicion that the character needed some bolstering, and that the advocate was influenced by his own distrust to make the attempt. So, likewise, if a man, who had been slandered, were to undertake a defense against the slanderer, instead of throwing the whole burden of proof on the slanderer, and putting him to the task of making out a case, even perfect innocence, and that which

otherwise would appear so to all, might be blackened by suspicion.

The great advantage that the side on which the presumption lies has over the opposite, consists in this, that it must triumph unless a decisive case is made out against it: — it has all the benefit of a doubtful result. If the course of procedure were reversed, and the criminal were required to prove his innocence instead of the government being required to establish his guilt, few that are accused would probably escape condemnation. As it is, a slight shade of doubt as to the guilt, even although the probability is altogether against him, results for the benefit of the accused.

The discussions that have arisen on the laws providing for the imprisonment of debtors, have exhibited most forcibly of how great advantage it is to be relieved from the *onus probandi*. It has been strenuously insisted by some that the creditor should take all the burden of proof on himself, and make out a clear case of fraud, before compulsory process against the person of the debtor shall be issued. The extreme difficulty of proving fraud in many cases has led others to take the ground that a failure to pay an honest debt raises a presumption of fraud which the debtor may reasonably be held to remove by oath or evidence. It is obvious that the adoption of the one or the other of these principles would greatly affect the facility of enforcing the payment of debts. Here not only will the creditor or the debtor have the advantage of a doubtful case according as the presumption is on one side or the other, but the decision of this point will determine to a great extent on what kind of evidence the question of fraud shall turn — upon that which is in the possession of the creditor, or upon that in possession of the debtor. It will not unfrequently occur thus that the decision of the question will go one way or the other according as the evidence or proof is derived from this side or from that side; and this is determined by the question, Where lies the presumption in the case?

Although it will generally be easy to determine on which side the burden of proof lies, it may be of service to lay down some general principles which regulate the determination of this matter.

§ 163. The first general principle in regard to the burden of proof is, that *the affirmative of every issue is to be proved.*

This is a principle in English jurisprudence derived from the maxim of the civil law: "*Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.*"

This is not, however, a principle of universal application, and must often give way to some others to be named in the following sections.

In the interpretation of this principle it should be borne in mind that the stress is to be laid on the fact of alleging or affirming, not on the form of the proposition itself as affirmative or negative. The principle is, *He who alleges must prove.* If the allegation be in the negative form, it does not shift the burden of proof. The fundamental ground on which the principle rests is, that whatever is new shall be accounted for. He who makes an allegation puts into being a statement that did not exist before. He is properly called upon to account for it — prove it and thus make it a truth.

§ 164. The presumption, further, is generally in favor of what already exists and against a change, whether the question be one of truth, of right, or of expediency.

There is a presumption, thus, in favor of prevailing opinions and sentiments. They are not to be rejected until evidence has been advanced against them. Even such as seem at first sight absurd or ridiculous are sometimes found afterward to be founded in truth. The Indians living in the vicinity of the North American Lakes generally entertained the opinion that those lakes were subject to a periodical rise

and fall. This was ridiculed at one time as an absurd superstition; subsequent observations, however, seem to countenance the Indian tradition.

On the other hand, the proposer of new opinions may be justly called upon to present evidence in their favor; and may be properly regarded as unworthy of credit until such evidence be produced. He cannot even claim that the public mind should be in a state of impartial equilibrium. His opinions must be rejected until positive evidence be adduced.

So, likewise, there is a presumption in favor of existing institutions; — that they are founded in truth and reason, and are for the public benefit. The fact that they exist creates a claim in their favor, which cannot be overbalanced by evidence against them that would suffice in a case exactly poised in the opinions of men. The reformer is required to make out a clear, positive case, before he can expect to be credited. In like manner, possession is presumptive title to property. In contests of title, accordingly, the burden of proof rests on the party that is not in possession. In case of uncontested occupancy for twenty years, under the English law, the presumption was held to be so strong that that title could not be assailed by any proof.

§ 165. The presumption, moreover, is in favor of rectitude; in other words, should be charitable.

It is a reasonable principle in law, thus, that a man be accounted innocent of crime until he be proved guilty. A witness is to be believed, unless evidence is furnished of falsehood. A man's integrity, generally, may not be questioned until proof appears against him. His motives, also, are to be regarded as pure until impeached by positive evidence.

This is a principle, not only supported by considerations of expediency, since the charitable man generally succeeds best in avoiding the ills and securing the enjoyments of life, but founded in abstract truth and reason.

§ 166. Once more, the presumption is on the side of whatever promotes the well-being of men, and against whatever is restrictive or injurious.

There is a presumption, thus, in favor of Christianity, because it is favorable, as is admitted even by its enemies, to the best interests of human society. The presumption, on the other hand, lies against whatever retards the progress of society, restricts or confines the energies of men, or injuriously affects their best interests.

The ultimate general principle on which these last particular maxims of presumption rest, seems to be this: that the world is governed by infinite intelligence controlled by perfect rectitude and goodness. In respect to this, the sentiment is true, that "whatever is, is right"; and the proper and the genuine results of goodness and truth harmonize with each other, and also with what, for the most part, transpires in Providence. In all cases of presumption, consequently, whatever accords with the natural laws of Providence is to be presumed to be true, right, or expedient, as the case may be.

§ 167. One presumption may sometimes be opposed by another, when the circumstances of the case must determine which shall outweigh the other.

Mohammedanism, thus, exists; and so far a presumption lies in its favor. With those who know of nothing existing in incompatibility with it, and who are not informed or convinced in regard to its evil effects, perhaps, this fact of its existence would furnish a strong presumption in favor of continuing it. But its allowance of violence, and its evil effects generally, are to those who are convinced of this, a sufficient *rebutter* against the presumption drawn from the fact of its existence.

CHAPTER VII.

OF REFUTATION.

§ 168. By REFUTATION, in its more limited sense, is meant the overthrow of opposing arguments.

Refutation is sometimes taken in the sense of *defense* generally. Thus the argument of the defendant in a judicial trial has been denominated a refutation. But in the more proper use of the word, refutation has been restricted to the overthrow of objections or opposing arguments.

§ 169. Refutation proper consists in the overthrow either of one of the premises on which an objection rests, or of the conclusiveness of the reasoning.

While refutation is governed by the same general principles that apply to all argumentation, and has to do with the same arguments or kinds of proof, it possesses the peculiarity, that it is applied to the overthrow of opposing arguments. Hence, a more direct call is made in it on the logical principles for the detection of sophistical reasoning. The overthrow of a premise falsely or incorrectly assumed in an objection, may, indeed, be accomplished in other methods common to all reasoning; but the detection of error in the course of the reasoning is to be effected in accordance with the principles of logic, which expose the possible modes of sophistical argumentation.

§ 170. As all evidence does not possess the character of absolute certainty, it is possible, in some cases, that there may be real evidence, or valid arguments,

on both sides of the question. In such cases, it is not indispensably necessary to refute the opposing arguments; but it may be sufficient, while allowing them their proper weight, to overbalance them with arguments of greater weight.

This is a principle ever to be borne in mind, that, in cases of probable reasoning generally, arguments really valid may be advanced on both sides. The existence of such unanswerable arguments should not confound or disconcert. The opposite side may still be that of truth. In such case, it seems important to apply the principles of the Topics; to determine carefully the degree of weight to be allowed the objection, and to oppose to it an argument of a higher rank, or an accumulation of arguments of the same class.

§ 171. It is always sound policy to state objections fairly, and to allow them all the force to which they are entitled.

Nothing is more opposed to persuasiveness in reasoning, than the appearance of unfairness. Sound principle was accordingly reckoned by the ancients among the three essential requisites in the character of the orator. Where the speaker is to appear before the same audience frequently, or to address one acquainted with his character as a candid and honest reasoner, the necessity of observing this principle is manifest. And even where the general character of the speaker can have no influence in favorably disposing the minds of the hearers, still, as unfairness is with difficulty disguised, and even suspicion of it is exceedingly prejudicial; as, moreover, the consciousness of candor and fairness will give the speaker himself a tone of confidence and authority, itself most favorable to effect, it is ever safest, as a matter of policy, to conduct the argumentation in perfect fairness.

§ 172. The principles of arrangement in regard to refutation are substantially the same as those which

apply to direct confirmation, Chapter V. As subordinate and incidental to confirmation, however, the application of those principles to refutation becomes slightly modified.

In the first place, if the arguments to be refuted are sufficiently met in the main direct arguments, the proper place to refute them is in the course of presentation of those direct arguments.

In the next place, if the objections are independent of the direct chain of reasoning, they should be answered at the commencement, if already weighing in the minds of the audience; and at the close, if they are anticipated as about to arise in the mind, or are to be presented by an adversary.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN CONFIRMATION.

§ 173. THE Introduction Explanatory in confirmation may respect the proposition itself, the particular mode of discussion to be pursued, or some circumstances connected with the occasion of speaking.

It is unnecessary to particularize the several topics proper for an introduction explanatory in confirmation. It is sufficient to turn the attention of the speaker to those general fields of view which it may be important for him to survey, that he may ascertain what points will require elucidation in order to prepare the way for the ready apprehension of his discourse.

§ 174. The Introduction Conciliatory in confirmation will respect the person of the speaker and of the hearer, the character of the proposition, the mode of discussion, or the circumstances of speaking.

§ 175. The several points in reference to the person of the speaker, to which attention may need to be directed in conciliation, are the relation of the speaker to the audience, to his opponent, to the question to be discussed, and to the occasion of speaking.

§ 176. The three qualities requisite in the speaker in reference to the audience, as prescribed by the ancients, are GOOD SENSE, GOOD PRINCIPLE, and GOOD WILL.

Good sense is requisite, because an audience will deem itself insulted if a speaker presumes to come before it but ill-informed in regard to the matter to be discussed. The speaker, from his very office, professes his ability to enlighten and inform his audience. Negligence to obtain a proper understanding of the subject, shows at once a want of capacity to speak, or a high contempt of the audience.

A character for integrity is necessary, inasmuch as just so far as the speaker shows himself unworthy of confidence, will every thing he says be received with misgivings and suspicions; while the bare assertions of a reputedly honest man will often be received with the submission which is due to actual demonstration.

If, further, the audience be convinced that the speaker is actuated by good-will to them, all the influence of the feelings over the movements of the intellect will be favorable to his designs.

While general reputation or character in regard to these qualities will be most serviceable in effecting conciliation so far as it depends on them, the speaker may do much in removing an unfavorable impression from the minds of his hearers, or in producing one that is favorable, by his manner at the time. The character of his discourse, as marked by the particular features of intelligence, familiarity with the subject, gravity, modesty, pure moral sentiment; by kindness, deference, and respect for his hearers, will conduce greatly to awaken a favorable disposition in them toward himself. At the same time, indirect professions together with allusions to facts in his history which may present his character favorably in these respects, may be often beneficially employed.

It is obvious that the same general means are to be made use of as well when an unfavorable disposition is to be set aside as when a favorable sentiment is to be awakened.

§ 177. The speaker's relation to his opponent will

need to be regarded by him, whenever the character of his opponent in respect to the three points before named may influence the mind of the hearer; and also, whenever the personal relation existing between them may favorably or unfavorably affect the disposition of the hearer.

Advantage, thus, may be taken of the character of the adversary as being ill-informed in the case, wanting in principle, or unkindly disposed to the hearers. Or the advantage which an opposite character may give an opponent will need to be set aside or lessened by counter considerations.

The personal relations subsisting between the speaker and his opponent will frequently affect the disposition of the hearers in reference to the discourse. To speak in opposition to one closely allied in any of the social relations of life, will create a favorable or unfavorable disposition in the minds of the hearers, according as it may appear to them to have been prompted by principle or by selfishness or malice.

§ 178. The speaker's relations to the subject of discussion or to the side of the question which he maintains, also, may obviously present him to the audience favorably or otherwise; in either case, they will demand his attention.

Exemplifications of this kind of introduction are to be found in Demosthenes' Oration on the Crown, where he maintains his right to be heard as one equally interested with Ctesiphon in the issue of the trial; in Cicero's Oration for Cluentius, against whom he had previously spoken with great severity; and in Erskine's speech on the trial of Thomas Paine.

§ 179. Once more, the occasion of speaking will often, in some relation which the speaker may bear to it, affect the minds of the hearers and render necessary suitable means of conciliation.

Cicero thus in his oration against Cæcilius commences with an exposition of the reasons which induced him, who had never before appeared except in defense, now to become a prosecutor against Verres.

§ 180. The character of the proposition will demand a conciliatory introduction when either the subject generally, or the particular view taken of it by the speaker at the time, is likely to be offensive to the hearers.

The advantage which a speaker addressing those of his own party or sect, or generally those of the same principles with himself, on a topic of common interest to them, has over his opponents, must obviously be great; and while it becomes him to turn this advantage to good account, it is still more necessary to his opponent to lessen, so far as practicable by any of the various means of conciliation, this prepossession against himself. In the famous Orations on the Crown, Demosthenes had to encounter the natural repugnance which men feel against hearing a man commend his own actions; while Æschines labored under the conviction that the judges were of the party of his adversary. Each orator, accordingly, in his introduction, endeavored to lessen the difficulty which he had in this respect to encounter.

§ 181. The mode of discussion imposed on the speaker may be such as to call for some effort at conciliation in the Introduction when it requires him to treat of topics offensive to the audience or to make use of terms or a course of reasoning not easily intelligible to them.

In Judicial Eloquence, thus, arguments embodying pure legal principles are generally uninviting and with difficulty intelligible to a jury; and the advocate who would secure a favorable hearing, will need to use much address and art. So, purely metaphysical discussions on religious subjects before a popular audience generally repel and offend. Men, moreover, are loath to hear of their own faults or weaknesses; and the speaker who is obliged to recur to them has reason to fear that, unless due precaution is taken, their unwillingness to hear will entirely prevent the intended effect of his discourse.

§ 182. In the same way, the circumstances in which the speaker appears before his audience may render them indisposed to a favorable hearing, in which case the arts of conciliation suitable to the case will be needful.

The military array which Pompey had thrown around the tribunal on the trial of Milo so influenced the minds of the judges that Cicero felt it necessary, at the commencement of his oration, to allay their fears and turn to his own account the influence of Pompey, which at first seemed to the judges to be arrayed against him.

§ 183. Several of these varieties of Conciliatory Introduction, it may often happen, must be combined in the same action.

The speeches of Demosthenes on the Crown, and of Cicero in the case of Milo, alluded to above, are examples of the various combinations of these different kinds of introduction.

§ 184. Confirmation admits all the various kinds of Peroration enumerated in § 64. Recapitulation, moreover, will here be especially useful.

EXERCISES IN CONFIRMATION. *Prove the following propositions by resolving their subjects, or their predicates, or both:*—

National prosperity depends on a pure morality.
Geological science corroborates the Mosaic history of creation.
The press ought to be free.
Free institutions must triumph in Europe.
Labor is a blessing.
Scientific culture is favorable to the arts.
The fine arts are favorable to morality.
Popular favor is precarious.
Models are necessary to culture.

Find a priori *proofs of the following propositions:*

Rotation in office is expedient.
Games of chance are hurtful to character.
There is more happiness in a civilized than in a savage state.
Immigration should be encouraged in a new country.
Genius is irritable.
Levity of manners is hostile to virtue.
Self-respect wins the respect of others.
Relaxation is necessary.
Bad manners make bad morals.
Virtue is its own reward.

Find a posteriori *proofs of the following propositions:*

The work of creation was progressive.
The feudal system was favorable to civilization.
The human race was one in its origin.
Aaron Burr was a traitor to his country.
The book of Job was written before the time of Moses.
The Epistle to the Hebrews was written by the Apostle Paul.

The "Iliad" and the "Odyssey" were composed by Homer.

Warren Hastings was guilty of the charges brought against him by Burke.

Brutus was a true patriot.

The exodus of the Jews from Egypt was miraculous.

Mohammed was an impostor.

Find examples *as proofs of the following propositions:*

Populous cities are dangerous to national morality.

Men of genius are deficient in conversational power.

What is once known is never wholly obliterated from the mind.

Great diversity of pursuits is fatal to success.

Knowledge is power.

Necessity is the mother of invention.

Conscience makes cowards of us all.

Sumptuary laws are unwise.

PART III. — EXCITATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 185. In Excitation the object of discourse is to move the feelings, either by awakening some new affection, or by strengthening or allaying one already existing.

The propriety of ranking excitation among the several objects of discourse, and of founding upon this object a distinct species governed by its own laws and characterized by peculiar features, will hardly be questioned by any who recognize the feelings or affections as a distinct class of mental phenomena. In fact, we find a class of discourses constructed in particular reference to this object, and distinguished from all others by peculiar characteristics. To this class belong most of what have been denominated *demonstrative* discourses, particularly those pronounced on funeral and triumphal occasions, in which the object is to awaken admiration, joy, grief, or other emotion. Here belongs, likewise, a considerable part of pulpit oratory, namely, that part the object of which is to awaken or cherish some Christian affection or grace, or to allay or remove some improper passion in actual indulgence.

That this object has not been distinctly recognized in systems of general rhetoric as one of those which give specific character to discourse and furnish the grounds of classifica-

tion, is to be attributed mainly to the fact that in deliberative and judicial eloquence this can seldom if ever be proposed as a leading object, and such systems have been constructed chiefly in reference to those departments of oratory.

In forensic speaking, however, excitation often enters in a subordinate office; and there continues subject to its own regulating principles, although modified somewhat by the controlling aim of such discourse. Indeed, as has been observed elsewhere, the various forms of oratory, as explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion, often mingle together, each retaining its characteristic features in the same discourse; while, still, it remains true that one or the other must in every case predominate and give character to the whole discourse, and the others be only subservient to this main design.

§ 186. The work of excitation is accomplished either by the appropriate presentation of the object of feeling merely, or by this combined with the power of sympathy.

The two departments of excitation are, accordingly, PATHETIC EXPLANATION and EMPLOYMENT OF SYMPATHY.

The feelings, like the intellect, belong to the spontaneities of the mind; and are only indirectly controlled by the will. They move necessarily more or less on the presentation of their appropriate objects. They are, nevertheless, as phenomena of the same mind, subject to an influence from the will and the understanding, as well as from the general tone and habits of the mind.

It will sometimes be necessary in excitation to prove a fact or truth. But this process is only incidental; whereas explanation is the direct means of awakening feeling.

§ 187. The more general unity of the discourse in excitation will consist in the singleness of the theme;

the narrower unity, in the singleness of the feeling or affection to be addressed.

It will be observed that the theme, as well as the feeling addressed, may be individual or generic, — may embrace a single object or feeling, or a class of objects or of feelings. Generally, where the feeling to be excited is made the germ of development, the theme will embrace the several particulars addressed to the feeling.

It is of importance to distinguish carefully between the theme and the feeling addressed in excitation. They are not unfrequently confounded in popular discourse. We say, thus, in loose language, that the theme of a discourse, the design of which is to awaken *hope*, is the affection itself — hope. Properly speaking, this is the object of the discourse, while the theme embraces the considerations presented for the purpose of awakening the affection.

§ 188. The form of the discourse in excitation will vary according as the theme or the feeling addressed is made the germ of the development. If the feeling addressed furnish the germ, the discourse will be more purely excitatory in its character; if the theme, the discourse will have more of an explanatory form.

In a pulpit discourse, thus, the passion of Jesus Christ might be exhibited as a single fact fitted to excite various emotions, as of gratitude, love, confidence. In this case the development of the discourse might naturally spring from the particular feelings addressed. They would constitute accordingly the leading heads of the discourse.

On the other hand, the same fact might be exhibited as bearing, in several distinct aspects, on a single emotion or grace of character. Then these several aspects of the fact might naturally furnish the ground of distribution and arrangement in the discourse.

So in Panegyrics, sometimes, the character as one com-

plex whole or a single feature is presented with the design of moving the affections generally; and sometimes a single affection is addressed by the exhibition of such traits as are adapted to awaken it.

§ 189. In excitation it is more necessary than in explanatory or argumentative discourse to have regard to the feelings of those addressed; since ignorance or mistake here may occasion an entire failure in the very object of the discourse.

§ 190. The mind addressed may be either favorable or unfavorable or indifferent in respect to the object of the speaker.

If the mind be favorable or indifferent, the object may be directly presented with exhibitions of feeling corresponding in degree to the state of feeling in the hearer.

§ 191. If the mind addressed be influenced by a feeling opposed to that which the speaker desires to awaken, great caution is necessary in undertaking to remove it, as a direct opposition will generally only irritate or inflame it the more.

The allaying of such unfavorable feeling may be accomplished indirectly by first exhibiting such views of the object as will not so directly oppose the existing state of feeling, and then, as interest shall be awakened, by passing gradually to other views more favorable to the object of the speaker.

Or other feelings, in their nature incompatible with those to be allayed, and yet not directly opposed to them, may be awakened, and thus the unfavorable feelings be displaced.

The speeches of Antony in the "Julius Cæsar" of Shakes-

peare furnish fine exemplifications of the first of these methods of allaying an unfavorable state of feeling. Antony finds the populace triumphing over the death of Cæsar and cheering the conspirators. He does not at once present himself in opposition. He appears, at first, as the friend of Brutus. He disclaims all intentions of praising Cæsar. He thus gets their attention, fixes it on Cæsar, and then proceeding to speak of his faults, gradually passes to defend his character, at the same time mingling in high professions of respect for the conspirators, till finally, the rage of the hearers at Cæsar's usurpations and tyranny having been allayed, he presents the proper matter for turning their feelings in the opposite direction, and leaves them clamoring furiously for the destruction of all Cæsar's enemies.

In Brutus's speech just preceding, the second of the methods indicated is exemplified, and the love of the populace for Cæsar is artfully displaced by their love to their country; a sentiment, as here exhibited, incompatible with attachment to Cæsar.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN EXCITATION.

§ 192. As the theme in excitation is a notion or a conception, it must ever appear under that form.

If, consequently, a judgment — a fact or truth — be presented as the object in reference to which the feelings are to be excited, it will appear in the form of a clause, and not in that of a principal sentence.

Generally language will allow the expression of a fact or truth, when used as a theme, in discourse, either in the form of a verb or of a noun. We may equally represent the theme, "the death of Christ," under this form or under the form, "that Christ died." The latter form turns the mind more directly and unequivocally on the fact as an actual occurrence; and, when this is desired, this form is preferable to the other.

It is of advantage to represent the theme in its appropriate form; as, otherwise, the mind might unconsciously be drawn off to a proof of the fact or truth instead of a simple exhibition of it for the purpose of exciting feeling.

§ 193. The theme, in excitation, further, must embrace the object of the feeling addressed, or the views which are fitted to awaken the feeling.

Although men may, possibly, be excited to a blind passion, so to speak, that is, be aroused by sympathy or otherwise in reference to no distinctly apprehended object, it can yet never be regarded as a proper aim of rational discourse to

produce such unintelligent excitement. It is true, indeed, that the passions never move, except as addressed through the intellect, and even in the ravings of a mob there is some intelligence; still rational discourse will not be contented with this, but will ever aim to present distinctly the particular object in reference to which the feelings are to be moved.

§ 194. The general principle that governs in regard to the statement of the proposition in excitation is this: that clearness of apprehension and impressiveness require the statement, unless reasons are seen to exist which forbid.

The question has been much agitated, whether it be proper at all to avow beforehand addresses to the feelings. Some writers have disapproved of all such avowals altogether. "The first and most important point to be observed in every address to any passion, sentiment, feeling," etc., says Dr. Whately, "is that it should not be introduced as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure if not entirely, lost. . . . When engaged in reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not only need not be concealed, but may, without prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared; on the other hand, even when the feelings we wish to excite are such as ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of the endeavor thus to influence the hearers, still, our purpose and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet not openly declared and made prominent." Even when the sentiments to be awakened are recognized as proper and right, he thinks "men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they are not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments," and "cannot but feel a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority, in a speaker, who seems to say, 'Now I will exhort you to feel as you ought on this occasion; I will endeavor to inspire you with

such noble and generous and amiable sentiments as you ought to entertain.'"

It must be admitted that *such* avowals of intention are to be rejected on every principle of correct taste. But it is difficult to see in what respect they are more faulty than precisely similar avowals of intention in pure argumentative or explanatory discourse; as "I will instruct you to think in accordance with truth on this subject;" "I will endeavor to convince you of the truth on this question." The whole force of the objection lies not against *the thing itself* — the statement of the theme and object of the discourse — but against an improper *form* of stating it.

It certainly cannot be laid down as a universal rule that, in an address to the feelings, it must ever be wrong to state the object in respect to which the feelings are to be moved. That in pronouncing a eulogy it would be improper for the speaker to inform the audience, at the outset, of the subject of the eulogy in reference to which their feelings of admiration are to be excited; that in endeavoring to inspire sentiments of confidence and courage it would be improper for a statesman to mention beforehand those circumstances and facts which warrant confidence and tend to awaken courage; that in seeking to strengthen the sentiment of Christian gratitude for the blessings of the gospel, it would be improper for the preacher distinctly to propose the richness or the freeness of those blessings in reference to which the sentiments of gratitude are to be called forth, no one surely can maintain.

How can it appear more improper to add, also, that the particular subject is to be presented with a view to awaken suitable feelings of admiration, confidence, or gratitude, etc. — in other words, to state the design of the discourse? What impropriety can there be in a Christian preacher's distinctly stating that he proposes the gift of Jesus Christ to men as a ground and reason of gratitude to God? Who will venture to reprehend the following statement of Demosthenes in his second Philippic: "First, then, Athenians, if there be a man who feels no apprehension at the view of Philip's power, and the extent of his conquests, who imagines that these portend no design to the state, or that his designs are not all aimed against you, I am amazed! and must entreat the attention of you all while I explain those reasons briefly which induce me to entertain different expectations."

It is difficult to perceive on what different ground addresses to the feelings stand in this respect from addresses to the understanding or reason. While in both kinds of address, it may be unadvisable in some cases to state the theme beforehand, and while propriety is ever to be observed in the manner of statement, it cannot, any more in one kind than in the other, be laid down as a universal principle that such statements should be avoided. In both kinds, the speaker must consult the relation of the theme to the supposed state of feeling in his audience, and by that determine as to the expediency of distinctly presenting or of withholding it.

§ 195. If, however, the theme itself is likely to give offense, then it may, in part or in whole, be kept back till interest is awakened and a favorable disposition on the part of the hearers secured.

§ 196. If the theme be not likely to give offense but the feelings already entertained by the hearers in regard to it are opposed to the speaker's aim, the theme may be stated, but the particular object in presenting it suppressed.

This rule is exemplified in the speech of Antony before alluded to, § 191.

§ 197. It may be well, moreover, for the sake of variety, especially in a speaker who is called frequently to address the same audience, occasionally to deviate from the general rule.

CHAPTER III.

OF PATHETIC EXPLANATION.

§ 198. The exhibition of feeling in excitation is governed by the general principles of explanatory discourse, but is modified by the particular design in this species of discourse of moving the feelings. It is effected by any of the various processes of explanation.

As the ultimate aim in excitation is not to enlighten or inform the understanding, but this is done only for the sake of exciting the feelings, the process of explanation will need here to be carried on in a somewhat different manner from that appropriate to purely explanatory discourse. The principal modifications which this difference in the ultimate aim of the discourse will require, will be specified in the following sections.

§ 199. As an accurate acquaintance with the object embraced in the theme is not the particular aim in excitation, the first modification of the general principles of explanation demanded here is, that *only those points or features in the object be selected which are adapted to the feelings or sentiments to be awakened.*

Some regard must be had, in applying this principle of pathetic explanation, to the design of the discourse,—whether it be to produce an immediate and temporary effect, or to excite and confirm a permanent and controlling sentiment. If the latter, then care must be taken to communicate such a view of the object as will be retained in the memory, and

thus be long present to influence the feelings. In other words, the explanation must be more full and complete, and conform more closely to the general principles of explanatory discourse. Thus, that kind of preaching which gives clear, full, and rational exhibitions of religious truth, will be better adapted to secure a permanent high degree of Christian feeling than that which, by selecting only the more striking views, aims at the highest degree of excitement at the moment.

The speech of Antony may be again cited here as affording a happy exemplification of this principle in producing a higher immediate excitement. In exhibiting the character of Cæsar, he only selects those features which were adapted to stir up a strong passionate regret for his death, and a stormy indignation against the conspirators.. He artfully alludes to his public largesses, his sympathy with the poor, his rejection of the proffered diadem, and especially to his love of the people as shown in his will.

§ 200. A second rule in Pathetic Explanation is, that *particular* rather than general views be taken of the object.

As vivid rather than correct impressions are aimed at in excitation, the process of explanation will need to be modified so far as to secure those strong and lively apprehensions which are necessary to deep emotion.

§ 201. Thirdly, Pathetic Explanation requires that *the more prominent and striking* features and outlines be presented; while such as are less easily apprehended, however important in an accurate representation to the understanding merely, are dropped from view.

The following extract from Sheridan's Invective against Warren Hastings will serve to exemplify this rule. The

orator, instead of going through an orderly detail of the sufferings of the oppressed nations of India, merely presents one or two of the most prominent features in the scene of desolation and horror. "When we hear the description of the paroxysm, fever, and delirium into which despair had thrown the natives, when on the banks of the polluted Ganges, panting for death, they tore more widely open the lips of their gaping wounds, to accelerate their dissolution, and, while their blood was issuing, presented their ghastly eyes to heaven, breathing their last and fervent prayer, that the dry earth might not be suffered to drink their blood, but that it might rise up to the throne of God, and rouse the eternal Providence to avenge the wrongs of their country, will it be said that this was brought about by the incantations of these Begums in their secluded Zenana?"

§ 202. Fourthly, instead of the clear and distinct exhibitions which are proper in mere addresses to the understanding, it is often conducive to passionate impressiveness to leave something to the imagination of the hearers, by only obscure and imperfect delineations.

Antony, instead of at once telling the citizens how much Cæsar in his will had ordered to be distributed among the people, set their imaginations all on fire by only vague and obscure intimations of the richness of the legacy.

The aid of the imagination in heightening the effect of passionate representation is likewise employed when, instead of the object of feeling itself, something connected with it — as causes, effects, results and the like — is presented, and from that the hearers are left to conjecture the real character of the object. It should be observed here, that there is combined with this appeal to the imagination to aid the effect, a figure of speech. The speaker seems to shrink, as feeling himself inadequate to the task, from the direct exhibition of the object. The terrors of the desolation caused by the

irruption of Hyder Ali could hardly be more vividly represented than they were by Burke in simply pointing to a single result. "When," he says, "the British armies traversed as they did the Carnatic for hundreds of miles in all directions, through the whole line of their march they did not see one man, not one woman, not one child, not one four-footed beast of any description whatever."

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF SYMPATHY IN EXCITATION.

§ 203. It is indispensable in excitation that the speaker himself appear to be affected in the same way in which he wishes his audience to be affected, and, likewise, to a degree at least as high.

This is a principle everywhere recognized. The lines of Horace are familiar to all:—

> "Ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adsunt
> Humani vultus. Si vis me flere, dolendum est
> Primum ipsi tibi."

Emotion is necessary in the speaker not only because the absence of it would render all efforts to excite feeling in the audience futile; but because, from the law of sympathy, emotion is communicated directly from one bosom to another. Shakespeare had a just conception of human nature when he put the following words into the lips of Antony:—

> "Passion, I see, is catching; for mine eyes,
> Seeing those beads of sorrow stand in thine,
> Began to water."

In all pathetic discourse, the speaker must manifest the suitable kind and degree of feeling in all the possible modes of expressing it; in the form of the thought, the language, the voice, countenance, and gesture. To secure this, he must feel himself. Hypocritical expressions of feeling will seldom escape detection. The human breast instinctively discerns between true and false emotion. Even trained stage-actors, when they succeed perfectly in their art, are infected themselves by the passion the contagion of which they wish to extend to the spectators. For the time they feel as if they were in reality the characters they personate. They accomplish this, perhaps the most difficult attainment of their art, by a close and thorough study of the causes of feeling supposed to operate in the scene which they represent. Mere natural sensibility, although not indispensable, is not enough. The heart, by close contemplation, must be brought into contact with the object of feeling. The speaker and the writer need equally to kindle the fire of feeling in themselves by long and close contemplation of the truth to be expressed in the discourse.

§ 204. The modes of expressing passion in discourse are direct or indirect.

In the direct exhibition of feeling the speaker allows the passion to appear in its own natural form and way.

§ 205. In the indirect expression of passion, the speaker, instead of giving vent to his emotions in the natural ways of expression, and making a free exhibition of them, veils them in part and only suffers occasional glimpses of them to be seen.

In this indirect expression of feeling, the power of imagination is called in aid, see § 202. The hearers observe, by the gleams through the disguise here and there, a fire of passion in glow; but obtaining no definite determination of the extent and degree, it appears to them the more deep and strong; as the outlines of objects seen in the mist being indeterminate, the imagination easily swells them into monsters. Such partial eruptions of passion are common in real life, and often impress more deeply than the pure and unsuppressed overflow of feeling. The mourner in public, observing the proprieties of conduct, who only allows a broken sob to escape her, moves the heart of sympathy more deeply than do even continued and unchecked wailings and

loud lamentations. The maniac duelist, who would break suddenly away from any pursuit he was engaged in, as if forced by some demon of passion, and, pacing off a certain distance on the floor, repeat the significant words, "One, two, three, fire; he's dead!" then wring his hands and turn abruptly to his former pursuits, gave a more touching exhibition of the deep agony which was ever preying on his spirit, than if he had vented it in constant howlings of remorse. It is with that admirable insight into Nature and conformity to truth which has before been noticed, that Shakespeare thus makes Antony give but occasional signs of grief for Cæsar's death. While generally the passion is suppressed, now and then it seems to force itself out; and this very circumstance, that it seems forced, makes it appear stronger and deeper. Thus he apologizes for any escape of sorrow, and tells the citizens that he cannot properly allow the true and adequate expression of his feelings.

"Bear with me;
My heart is in the coffin there with Cæsar;
And I must pause till it come back to me."

"O masters! if I were disposed to stir
Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,
I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong,
Who, you all know, are honorable men:
I will not do them wrong; I rather choose
To wrong the dead, to wrong myself and you,
Than I will wrong such honorable men."

This partial disguising of passion on the part of the speaker has this further advantage, that the determination being left to the imagination of the hearer, it can never seem to the latter disproportionate — either too weak or too strong.

§ 206. The degree of feeling expressed by the speaker must ever be moderated in reference to the supposed feelings of the hearer.

Unless there may appear to the audience a probable cause

of strong feeling, as was the case in the first Oration of Cicero against Catiline, the speaker should commence with only a moderate degree of passion; and should suffer it to increase only in proportion as it may seem natural to the audience. He must of course ever keep in advance of them; but must take care never to get beyond the reach of their sympathy. The effect of this will be not only to annihilate the whole power of sympathy, but also to occasion dissatisfaction and disgust.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN EXCITATION.

§ 207. EXCITATION admits both kinds of Introduction; the Explanatory and the Conciliatory.

In reference to the management of the Introduction Explanatory see §§ 113, 173.

The Introduction Conciliatory will require in pathetic discourse peculiar attention and care, as it is more important here than in explanation or confirmation to secure a favorable disposition toward the speaker on the part of the hearers. Where, especially, either the speaker is himself personally repulsive to them, or his subject offensive, or the sentiment which he would awaken incompatible with their present feelings and views, he has need to make the best use of his power and skill.

The laws which govern pathetic discourse generally will come in also to regulate and modify the Introduction, and especially when it is of the conciliatory kind.

§ 208. Excitation admits only the *excitatory* or *pathetic*, and the *persuasive* forms of peroration, with the *recapitulation*.

The explanatory and confirmatory forms of peroration are inadmissible here, because addresses to the pure intellect can never properly come after an address to the feelings. Certainly, to close a discourse the object and aim of which is to awaken a certain kind or degree of feeling with cold intellectual inferences or remarks, is to defeat the very design of the discourse. Even the form of recapitulation, when introduced, must conform to the peculiar principles of pathetic discourse; and will differ somewhat from that appropriate to explanation or confirmation. The aim of the peroration here must be to make a more direct or specific application of the subject to the feelings addressed; or to make the excitement of feelings effected in the discourse as its main object conducive to some action of the will.

EXERCISES IN EXCITATION. *Find, in the following themes, considerations or grounds for the feelings named:* —

Gratitude to a favoring Providence, in the history of our country.

Commiseration, in the subjugation of the Poles.

Hope, in the deliverances of the nation from past dangers.

Equanimity, in the fact of a universal Providence.

Admiration, in the heroism of William Tell.

Fear, in the downward tendencies of vicious indulgence.

Patriotism, in the condition and prospects of our country.

Generosity, in the comparative happiness of our lot.

Cheerfulness, in the abundance and richness of our blessings.

Forgiveness, in the consciousness of our own failings.

Candor, in the esteem and confidence it wins from others.

PART IV. — PERSUASION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 209. In Persuasion, the object of discourse is to move the will, either by leading it to a new act or purpose, or by dissuading it from one already adopted.

Persuasive discourse is, in this, clearly and definitely distinguished from the species already considered. Explanatory discourse respects as its end a new notion or conception; Confirmatory, a new conviction; Pathetic, a new feeling; Persuasive, a new action or purpose. This classification, evidently, covers the field. If there are any other species of discourse, founded on the immediate object to be accomplished in the mind addressed, it must be a subdivision of one of those enumerated; unless, indeed, mental science reveal new classes of phenomena in the mind of man not included in those of the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will.

§ 210. As the mind addressed may be in either one of three different states — may be already decided in purpose but may need confirmation, or although decided, may be decided in the opposite direction, or without any choice, or voluntary preference in regard to the subject — the specific objects of the discourse will vary in different cases, and the discourse be modified in reference to these different specific ends.

Persuasion, thus, differs specifically from *dissuasion*, as well as from *encouragement* or *animation;* although the general means to be employed are the same in the different cases. The difference in the specific processes will consist mainly in the arrangement and means of conciliating and explaining.

§ 211. The specific objects of persuasive discourse admit of a still further division in reference to the character of the action proposed; whether an individual act or a controlling purpose — a determination to do a particular thing or the adoption of a principle of conduct having respect to a series of acts or a course of life.

Hence will arise another specific diversity in the conduct of the discourse. When a permanent state of will is aimed at, it is evident, those considerations are to have the preeminence which will remain in the mind, — in other words, truths addressed to the understanding or reason. Where, on the other hand, the object of the discourse is to produce a merely temporary effect, as that of a general exhorting his soldiers on the eve of a battle, those motives which respect more directly the feelings as the immediate incentives to action, will have the preference.

It will often be the case that both objects will be combined; that the speaker will aim to bring his hearers not only to adopt a general course of conduct or pursuit, but also to commit themselves to it at the moment by some particular act. The temperance reformers, thus, in seeking to induce and secure a permanent reform, press the inebriate to an immediate committal by some particular act, as signing a pledge or the like. In this case, the principles of conduct will need to be unfolded clearly and convincingly to the understanding, and, also, excitingly to the feelings.

§ 212. The work of persuasion is effected by the

EXHIBITION OF THE ACTION OR COURSE to be chosen, and THE PRESENTATION OF MOTIVES fitted to incite to the determination proposed.

The work of persuasion, thus, admits all the processes before described of explanation, conviction, and excitation.

The act to be done will often need to be explained. The Christian preacher will need, thus, in order to make his exhortation effectual, to explain the nature of the duty proposed, as faith, repentance, and the like. The statesman will likewise need to unfold the course of policy he desires to be adopted to the clear apprehension of his hearers, as a failure to understand what is to be done must so far be an insuperable obstacle to decision. The process of explanation will also often be requisite in the presentation of motives.

It may be necessary, moreover, to convince the judgment in persuasion. The action proposed must be shown to be practicable, or the motives presented to be true and real and pertinent.

Excitation, once more, is often requisite in persuasion, as the passions are the more immediate springs of action.

All these processes, however, receive a slight modification in reference to the ultimate end of persuasion, and must be introduced only in entire subserviency to that end — the moving of the will.

§ 213. The theme in persuasion is ever a conception which embraces the action or course proposed.

§ 214. The more general unity of persuasive discourse consists in the singleness of the theme; the narrower unity, in the singleness of the motive or class of motives addressed to the various activities of the hearer.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN PERSUASION.

§ 215. THE Theme in persuasive discourse being ever a conception, it must always be apprehended under that form.

As the discourse will vary specifically in its form according as the motive or the action be made the germ of development, it becomes important that the speaker settle definitely in his own mind beforehand which shall preside over the arrangement and development, and govern himself by the decision in the whole conduct of the discourse.

§ 216. The question, whether the proposition should be stated, is to be determined by the same general principles which govern in the other species of discourse.

The general rule is that it should be stated unless positive reasons be seen to exist against it. If the general theme of the discourse be supposed likely to give offense, the definite statement may be deferred to the end, or be gradually unfolded in the progress of the discourse, as the minds of the hearers may be prepared for it.

A variation from the usual method of proceeding in this case, may be justified sometimes, moreover, for the sake of variety, or on other similar grounds.

It is unnecessary to detail at any further length the diverse applications of these general principles according as the motive or the action itself is made the principle of development in the discourse.

CHAPTER III.

OF PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION, CONFIRMATION, AND EXCITATION.

§ 217. In Persuasive Discourse, the various processes of explanation may be requisite either to set forth the proper theme of the discourse or the motives presented.

§ 218. In explanation applied to the motives, the application of the principles of explanation proper must be modified so far as may be necessary in order to exhibit them merely as grounds, or reasons, or inducements to action; that is, merely as motives.

Hence an object or truth presented as a motive will not necessarily be surveyed in its whole extent. Only those aspects will be taken of it which bear directly on the action proposed; and of these, while at the same time false impressions in regard to the state of the case are to be guarded against, only such should be presented as are favorable to the speaker's object. Great art and practiced judgment are often requisite here.

Exemplifications of these methods of modifying the principles of explanation proper are furnished in the orations of Demosthenes against Philip. The orator in them with great skill seizes hold of those particulars in the relations of the Athenians to the Macedonian power, and in the condition of Athens, which were fitted to inspire the Athenians with confidence in their own strength, and with contempt and resentment toward Philip, that he might thus incite them to a vigorous and efficient maintenance of hostilities. The ex-

planations that are given, whether narrations of events or descriptions of places, of resources, etc., are all made from this one point of view, and are colored throughout by this one persuasive character. Nothing is said that does not bear directly on this single end; nothing is omitted that could promote it. The processes of explanation, it is however pertinent to observe here, are all very different from what would be proper in a purely explanatory discourse; very different, for example, from what are found in the histories of those times.

It should be remarked, in this connection, that it will frequently be necessary to construct the explanation in persuasive discourse in reference both to the motives and the action, as possibly the nature of the action may best be understood from a clear view of the motives.

§ 219. The explanation of the particular action urged in the discourse will conform more closely to the general principles of explanation; since, generally, it will be needful to unfold the nature of the action or course proposed more or less fully and distinctly.

§ 220. Confirmation enters into persuasive discourse whenever it is necessary to prove any allegation in reference to the theme, the practicability of the action proposed, or the connection between the motives and the action. Like explanation, in persuasive discourse, confirmation suffers important modifications.

It is not necessary to point out in particular detail the modifications which confirmation proper receives in persuasion. It is sufficient to remark generally that the whole work of confirmation here is regulated by a strict regard to the great object of the discourse, which is to move the will. Fine exemplifications of persuasive confirmation may be found in many of the political orations of Demosthenes, and the

speeches of Lord Chatham, Burke, Sheridan, and Patrick Henry.

§ 221. Excitation is necessary in persuasive discourse so far as the excitement of the feelings is relied upon for influencing the will. Like explanation and confirmation, however, it is modified in important features in respect to the particular end of persuasion. Only such feelings are to be awakened, and those to such degrees only, as are fitted to lead to the action desired.

It is important to be borne in mind in persuasive excitation, that the same object may awaken two or more different kinds of feelings, some of which may be favorable to the end proposed, and others adverse. Thus the increase of the Macedonian power, the multiplicity of its conquests and alliances, were fitted to excite the fear as well as the resentment of the Athenians. It was necessary, therefore, that the orator, whose design was to arouse the Athenians to a bold and vigorous prosecution of the war against Philip, should give only such a view of Philip's successes as would excite indignation and not desponding alarm. The orator is careful, accordingly, to attribute all these successes to fortune and to the supineness of the Athenians, artfully keeping back those causes of his prosperity which might awaken terror, and thereby dispose the Athenians to an inglorious peace.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MOTIVES.

§ 222. By a Motive is meant whatever occasions or induces free action in man.

In strictness, motives are conditions on which the free self-activity is called forth in some one or other of its various specific forms. Mind is in its essential nature active; but the determination of its activity is through some object presented to it. When it is determined in its action by any object thus presented to it, such object is a motive — it determines the mind in this or that direction, it moves the mind in this way or that. Whatever object thus moves it or determines it, must respect some one or more of the various tendencies, proclivities, of the mind. A motive, accordingly, is that which arouses or animates or depresses any such tendency. These various tendencies, proclivities, these specific springs or principles of action which motives respect, are of various distinguishable kinds. We have, first, the two kinds of activity distinguished; 1, as that which is general and constitutional under the law of habit; and 2, those which are specific in reference to particular ends and objects. Specific activities are further distinguished; (1) as animal; and (2) as spiritual. Spiritual activities are still further distinguished: (1) as to ultimate objects or ends; (2) as to adjuncts which may be either antecedent as means and conditions of attaining these ultimate ends, or consequent as the results and consequences. And once more, besides these, which are all absolute and irrelative as it respects degree, there are those which

respect comparative degree or extent. We have therefore six classes of motives, distributed in reference to the activities or proclivities in the nature of man, general or specific, simple or comparative. They all have their subdivisions; particularly is it worthy of distinct remark, they are each subdivided into the positive and negative in the different forms of good and bad, more and less, etc. The six great fields distributed in respect to the activity addressed in which motives are to be sought, accordingly, are (1) The general activity under the law of habit in man's nature; (2) animal instincts; (3) spiritual aspirations and tendencies; (4) pursuit of means and conditions; (5) pursuit of results and consequences; and (6) love of superiority and its opposite.

§ 223. The first class of motives in respect of activity addressed, embraces (1) those which are addressed to the general activity of the mind; and (2) those addressed to its acquired habits.

It is sufficient often simply to propose something to be done. In its discontented restlessness, its dissatisfaction with things or events, its *ennui*, the mind is often ready to adopt any thing, any act, any measure, any course, any policy; and the skillful orator in persuasion has only to ascertain the particular sphere of its discontent, and whatever may be the course he may open, he may calculate on its being adopted.

The mind moves, moreover, with readiness in the channel of its habitual activity. Hence the importance of the speaker's informing himself of the habits of those whom he addresses, as he may reasonably expect that so far as he can enlist them his success is more sure and complete.

§ 224. The second class of motives indicated, the animal instincts, comprises those which address the love of life and of health, and the several appetites.

Here as elsewhere are to be recognized the positive and the negative — those which promote life and health and

gratify appetite, and those which are of the opposite character. In this field lie also those which are to be addressed to acquired and perverted as well as to constitutional appetites.

§ 225. The third class of motives, spiritual aspirations and tendencies, embraces those which respect the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, — the ultimate ends of pursuit.

In this class are to be found those which address the desire of knowledge — the active principle of *curiosity*, and the principle of *communicativeness*. This last principle, of great power and extent, Guizot well recognizes when he remarks that if a man makes a mental advance, some mental discovery, if he acquires some new idea, the desire takes possession of him at the very moment he makes it, to promulgate and publish his thought.

Here are also to be found the love of the Beautiful, as object, and the strong principle of artistic endeavor, — *the impulses of creative genius*, often so irrepressible and so inextinguishable.

Moreover, in this class are comprised the love of the Right and of the Good; the active principle of *beneficence;* and, still again, the desire that the Right be done and maintained, including the principles of *anger, resentment, revenge.*

§ 226. The fourth class of motives embraces the desires for *means and conditions* of the higher ultimate ends just enumerated, as the desire of *wealth*, of *station, social position, friendship.*

§ 227. The fifth class of motives, which respect results and consequences attending the ultimate ends of pursuit, includes those which appeal to *self-complacency, pride, shame, remorse;* to the *love of esteem, of fame, glory*, and the *fear of disesteem, reproach, disgrace;*

to the *hopes and fears of the divine favor or displeasure, and of consequent providential good and evil.*

The subdivisions of this class of motives will be readily recognized as grounded on the relations of our conduct and experience to ourselves, our fellows, or our Creator, as sympathizing and rewarding observers. We desire the approval of our own consciences, we dread shame and remorse; we equally seek the favorable opinion and regards of our fellowmen. "A good name is rather to be chosen than riches." The love of adulation, of undeserved commendation, honor, or favor, is a perverted form of this constitutional tendency. So, likewise, the desire of the divine approval and favor, the hopes of good, and the fears of evil that come in the flow of his Providence, are powerful impulses of our nature, which may be appropriately addressed by motives.

§ 228. The sixth class of motives embraces those which are founded on comparative attainment of ends, which appeal to the *love of superiority, of eminence*, above our fellows, and includes *emulation* and the perverted forms of this principle of our nature, *jealousy* and *envy*.

§ 229. Motives admit of a gradation in strength either in respect of their own essential purity and excellence, or in respect of the condition of the mind addressed by them.

Motives that concern more nearly spiritual interests outrank those which respect only our animal nature and condition; and tendencies to ends outrank those to means and conditions. Those which address legitimate constitutional tendencies are higher than those which address perverted or immoderate habits or propensities. The love of the purely right and good is a higher principle than the love of knowledge. Properly base motives are excluded from the sphere of all true oratory.

The strength of a motive may also be estimated in reference to the particular character or condition of the mind addressed. The purely virtuous man can be influenced by considerations that would be utterly lost on the unprincipled and depraved. One activity, one proclivity, is predominant in the same individual to-day, another to-morrow. The political community is moving at one time in one direction, at another time in quite a different, perhaps opposite direction. The same religious association as a whole, is at one time excessively active or inert in relation to this, at another in relation to that department of Christian living. These different gradations suggest the following rules or guiding principles for the selection of motives.

§ 230. In selecting motives the following principles should guide : —

First, the higher in their own purity and excellence are ever to be preferred; and when lower are to be employed, it is better even for oratorical effect and success to subordinate them to the higher, and as far as may be embody them in the higher.

Secondly, the more numerous the assembly addressed, the more freely may the higher motives be urged, since the higher are the more universal.

Thirdly, the specific tendencies of the minds addressed should be carefully explored as far as may be, and the selection of motives be ever determined in reference to them.

CHAPTER V.

OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF PERSUASION.

§ 231. WHILE the term Persuasion is applied in its more general import to all those kinds of discourse the object of which is to move the will, in its narrower sense it is distinguished from both Dissuasion and Incitement.

As thus distinguished, PERSUASION, in its more restricted sense, will regard the production of a new purpose or act;

DISSUASION, the removal of a purpose or act already determined upon;

INCITEMENT, confirmation of a purpose or course already adopted.

§ 232. Although these several acts of persuasion are effected by the general processes mentioned, of exhibition of the act or course to be adopted and the presentation of suitable motives, yet these processes will be considerably modified in reference to these several more specific ends.

CHAPTER VI.

OF ARRANGEMENT IN PERSUASION.

§ 233. The principles of arrangement in persuasion will vary according as the motives or the action proposed is made the leading principle in the development of the discourse.

It is obvious that a speaker in persuasion may make the action to which he wishes to incite his hearers the proper germ of development in his discourse, which he may exhibit either in its various parts or its relations. In this case, the arrangement will be for the most part conformed to the principles of explanatory arrangement. The action will be exhibited in its parts, and the motives applied to each in succession.

On the other hand, it may be better in some cases, and perhaps generally, to make the motives the principle of development and arrangement. When this is done, the rules stated in the following sections are to guide.

§ 234. In the presentation of motives in persuasive discourse, three things are to be regarded: —

First, the specific object of the discourse, whether persuasion in its strict sense, dissuasion, or incitement;

Secondly, the comparative strength of the motives estimated in reference to the mind addressed;

Thirdly, the relation of the motives to one another.

§ 235. If the specific object of the discourse be persuasion proper, it is evident that those motives which

lie in conceptions and convictions of the intellect should precede; and when the understanding is properly enlightened and convinced, the way will be open for the addresses to the feelings. In case the action proposed is embraced within the general course or purpose already adopted by the mind addressed, it will often at the outset be sufficient to prove this. If, however, it be an act repulsive in itself, although conducive to a chosen end, it will be advisable to animate that general purpose in reference to this specific application of it at the close, in order to give it efficiency in the direction desired.

In persuasion proper, moreover, the stronger motives should be presented first.

§ 236. On similar grounds, the same rules of arrangement are to be observed in Dissuasion as in Persuasion proper.

In this case, more caution is necessary, as, instead of indifference merely, direct opposition is to be encountered.

§ 237. In Incitement, the weaker motives should generally be presented first, and the discourse be closed with such as are fitted to incite to the highest degree of determination.

§ 238. The principle which respects the relation of the motives to one another is to be observed for the most part only in subordination to the other two.

Inasmuch as every thing unnatural is adverse to the highest end of persuasion, motives that are closely connected with each other should not be disconnected, even when the second principle named, that which respects the strength of the motive, may in itself require it. Much less should arguments that are presupposed in others be postponed, even although the other principles may demand it.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN PERSUASION.

§ 239. Both kinds of Introduction, the Explanatory and the Conciliatory, in their several varieties, are admissible in Persuasive Discourse.

The same cautions and suggestions are needful here as were presented in the corresponding chapter on Excitation. Part III. Chap. v.

§ 240. Only the Persuasive Peroration with the Recapitulation is admissible in this kind of discourse.

Persuasive Discourse should ever leave the mind addressed ready for the action proposed and urged in it. Where the body of the discourse has consisted of the exhibition of the motives, and, for any reason, the particular action has been suppressed, it will of course be necessary to state the action at the close. This, for a single example, was done by Demosthenes in his oration generally denominated the Third Philippic. In the main discussion, he unfolds the considerations which should influence the Athenians — the existing state of affairs; and at the close briefly suggests what he thinks ought to be done.

If the action has constituted the body of the discussion, the peroration will generally consist of a strong and vivid exhibition of the motives.

If the action has been stated, but the motives that urge it have filled up the body of the discourse, the peroration may

be by direct appeal or address, or more close application of the motives.

Recapitulation is admissible in either case.

Exercises in Persuasion. — *Find in the following themes motives for the actions named: —*

The sturdy resistance to the first enticements of vicious pleasure, in the power of evil habit.

The choice of a high standard of living, in the rewards of conscious approval.

The willing encountering of difficulties and trials, in their needfulness to the best character.

The rigid observance of method in all thinking, in its importance to high intellectual culture.

The preference of mental to physical affluence, in the superior serenity and satisfactoriness of the former.

SECOND GENERAL DIVISION.

STYLE.

GENERAL VIEW.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF STYLE.

§ 241. STYLE is that part of Rhetoric which treats of the expression of thought in language.

No process of art is complete until its product appears in a sensible form; and language is the form in which the art of discourse embodies itself, as sound furnishes the body in the art of music and color in that of painting. Style is, therefore, a necessary part of the art of rhetoric. "Inventio sine elocutione non est oratio." It is not, however, all of the art, just as the laws of sound do not cover the entire province of music, or the principles of coloring exhaust the art of the painter.

Style in its broader import includes all forms of expression, the form of the thought, the form of feeling, the form of purpose or endeavor. But these forms are themselves in discourse finally embodied in language. And it is this last form — the form of thought and feeling as shaped in language — to which it is more strictly applied.

While it presupposes Invention as a distinct branch of the art, style is yet involved even in that; as the exercises

of invention cannot proceed but in the forms of language. The two branches of the art of Rhetoric, accordingly, while they may easily be conceived of as distinct, and in practice predominant attention may be given to either at will, are nevertheless bound together by an essential bond of life.

This second division of Rhetoric has been variously denominated; and the terms employed to designate it have been used, sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a more restricted sense. The term "*elocution*" was formerly more commonly used by English writers. It was suggested by the use of the Roman rhetoricians, and was sanctioned and supported by its etymology. It has, however, in later times become more commonly appropriated to denote *oral delivery*. The term "*style*," although not strictly a technical word, was used by Latin writers as synonymous with "elocution," and has been, both among English and continental writers, more generally of late applied to this use. It has been employed, however, with more or less latitude of meaning. But the prevailing use of the best writers authorizes the appropriation of the term to denote the entire art of verbal expression.

Cicero and others of the ancient rhetoricians made here, also, two divisions; the one of elocution or style proper, or the choice of words in the expression of thought; the other of the arrangement of words, or composition. As in invention, however, so perhaps still more obviously in style, there appears to be no good reason for making this division.

§ 242. The analysis of style, for the purpose of systematic study, must respect the various classes of properties which by necessity or possibility belong to it.

We cannot consider style, as we have considered invention, in reference to the different processes concerned in its

production. For some of the properties of style, or modes of expression, are common and necessary in all kinds of discourse and every expression of thought, while others are determined by the nature of the thought itself. If we except the application of some of the rules of mere grammar, the best method of pursuing the culture of style, will be by the successive study of the varieties of forms which thought may assume when expressed in language, in order that whatever may secure beauty and force to the expression may be intelligently communicated to it, and whatever may mar or weaken the expression may be avoided.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE GENERAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 243. THE first generic distinction of the properties of style is into THE ABSOLUTE and THE RELATIVE.

§ 244. THE ABSOLUTE properties of style are founded in the nature and laws of language itself.

THE RELATIVE properties are those which are determined by the state of the speaker's mind or by that of the mind addressed.

There are these three things which come in to determine the character of the expression, — the thought to be expressed; the object for which it is expressed; and the medium of expression.

The last of these, language, has laws and properties of its own which are fixed and invariable, and, as such, independent of the individual speaker who uses it. The properties thus determined to style may be denominated *the absolute properties* of style. They correspond for the most part to what Dr. Campbell calls "the essential properties of elocution."

Again, language, as the body of thought, is affected by the state of the speaker's mind. It is not merely the expression of thought, but of his thought. It partakes of his individuality, and is, as it were, an expression of his life. We recognize, thus, at once, as a beauty in style, *naturalness* in expression. The class of properties thus determined to

style, may be denominated *the relative-subjective*, or, more briefly, *the subjective* properties.

Further, the speaker, in pure discourse, speaks to effect an object in the mind of another. He must necessarily, therefore, have respect to that mind, and modify his style accordingly. The mere embodying in language of his own thoughts will not of course accomplish his object in the mind addressed. It may be necessary to labor more at perspicuity in the expression than would be requisite for the mere utterance of thought. He may be under the necessity of consulting force or energy in the expression, or of adorning it. Hence we have another distinct class of properties. They may be denominated *the relative-objective*, or, more briefly, *the objective* properties. The last class corresponds nearly with Dr. Campbell's "discriminating properties of elocution." It is the only class which Dr. Whately takes into view in his treatise on style.

PART I. — ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND ITS PROPERTIES.

§ 245. LANGUAGE may be defined to be THE VERBAL BODY OF THOUGHT.

Language is not, as sometimes represented in loose expression, the mere *dress* of thought. It has a vital connection with thought; and is far more truly and appropriately conceived of as the living, organic body of thought, interpenetrated throughout with the vitality of the thought, as the natural body with the life of the spirit, having living connections between its parts giving it unity and making it a whole, than as a mere dress having no relation to thought and no organic dependence in its parts.*

* "The production of speech proceeds by an internal necessity out of the organic life of man; for man speaks because he thinks; and with the production of thought is given at the same time the production of speech. It is a general law of living Nature that each activity in it comes forth into appearance in a material, each spiritual in a bodily; and in the bodily appearance have their limitation and form. In accordance with this law, the thought necessarily comes forth also in the appearance, and becomes embodied in Speech." — K. F. Becker's *Organism of Speech*, pp. 1, 2.

"The origin of speech," says Solger to the same effect, "is one with the origin of thought, which is not possible in reality without speech. Thought is subjective speech, as speech is objective thought — the outward appearance of thought itself. Neither is possible without the other; and both reciprocally condition each other." — *Æsthetics*, p. 266.

In like manner, Aristotle distinguishes thought and speech, as ὁ ἔξω λόγος and ὁ ἔσω λόγος. — *Anal. Post.* I. x. 7.

The embodying of thought into language must necessarily be affected by three different things: —

First, *the material of the body which it takes.* Vocal language differs, in many respects, from a language of signs. A language, even, formed more directly under the influence of the ear, as for instance the ancient Greek, possesses peculiar features which distinguish it clearly from a language formed more or less under the influence of the pen. Some of the characteristics of the English language may be traced to the fact that the language was developed and formed by writers as well as by speakers; by those who were influenced more by the form of the word as presented to the eye than by its effect on the ear as a sound. And generally the nature of the material out of which the body is formed must evidently affect the process of embodying. The marble gives a different form to the embodiment of the same sentiment or character from that given by color as in painting, or by sound and language as in poetry and music.

Secondly, *the character of the thought to be embodied.* The thought must never lose its distinctive character and life. On the other hand, as the human spirit in its fleshly body, and the life of a plant in its vegetable structure, it enters its material, disposes it, shapes it, animates it, and altogether determines its outward form and character. Thought, in other words, is the organizing element. It, consequently, when the process of embodying is perfect, manifests itself in every part. This is true, more emphatically, of each particular thought expressed by the individual speaker in the form of oral language. That thought, as a life-giving and disposing element, enters the body of sounds which is furnished to the individual speaker in the language that he uses, and impresses its own character upon it. But language generally, or the fixed language of a people is organized, so to speak. Its properties are determined by the character of the thought that has, in being expressed, given it existence. Hence the languages of different nations are different, because the thought that has characterized the nation at the formation of the language has been different.

Thirdly, *the natural relationship between thought and articulate sound.* Certain sounds are the natural expression of certain feelings and sentiments. Cheerfulness, sadness, exultation, despondency, love, anger, each has its own tone or oral expression.

Further than this, in the original construction of language, outward sensible events or objects are taken to represent mental states. For the most part, indeed, language is thus symbolical in its very nature; — it represents thought through some external object or event either naturally or by accident associated with it. And although, in the progress of scientific culture, it becomes more and more abstract, — that is, words having no obvious connection with the thoughts are used to represent them more and more arbitrarily, just as numerical or algebraical signs represent numbers or mathematical relations, — still language never loses entirely its original symbolical character. It will ever be regarded, accordingly, as a great excellence of style that the thought is represented by means of pictures or images of sensible scenes or events. The sound, then, points to the external object or event, or some sensible property or characteristic of it; and this, again, to the mental state or thought which it is taken to represent. So far, now, as this object or event is fitted in its own nature to suggest the thought, the indication of the thought is more easy; the language is more perfectly adapted to its end.

This twofold relationship between thought and the means of representing it, namely, between the thought and the sound on the one hand, and between the thought and the sensible object indicated by the sound on the other, we should expect beforehand, would determine to some extent the construction of language; and in point of fact we find it does so control it to such a degree as to give rise to a class of properties which are considered necessary or highly auxiliary to the great ends of language.

This general view of the nature of language furnishes the ground for the classification of the properties of language or the absolute properties of style.

§ 246. The absolute properties of style may be distributed into three classes, as they respect more directly the nature of the material of language — articulate sounds; the relation of that material to the content of language or the relation of articulate sounds to thought; or the laws of thought itself.

These several classes may be denominated the ORAL, the SUGGESTIVE, and the GRAMMATICAL properties of style.

Language, as the *verbal* body of thought, consists of articulate sounds. These form the material of which it is made. It is obvious, hence, that a proper regard to the essential nature of articulate sounds is requisite in the formation of style.

Again, it is plain that articulate sounds are not taken at random for use in speech. All are not equally adapted for this use; and the selection is not a matter of pure accident or caprice. On the other hand, through the closer affinity which some sounds have, either directly or through the object they are taken to represent, to certain thoughts, or through the more intimate association which experience has created between them and such thoughts, the selection is found, on a nice inspection of language as it is, to have been made on certain natural and easily defined principles. These principles, derived either from the inherent relationship of the sound to the thought, or of the object taken to represent the thought to the thought itself, thus come in to give shape and form to language.

Once more, thought itself has its own laws. It has its own relations, which must ever be observed in the construction of language and ever be correctly represented in it.

So far as these laws and relations belong to thought as thought, they furnish the foundation for the science of *universal grammar*, or grammar in the abstract. So far as the thought to be expressed is modified by the condition and circumstances of the people that frame a language, these accidental relations and forms of thought furnish the foundation for a grammar of a particular language, or, as it may be called to distinguish it from abstract grammar, *historical or inductive grammar*.

We have thus the definitions that are contained in the following sections.

§ 247. The ORAL PROPERTIES of style are those which are determined from the nature of language as consisting of articulate sounds.

§ 248. The SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES of style are those which are determined from the relations of articulate sounds or of the symbols of thought to the thought to be represented by them.

Dr. Whately has applied the term "suggestive" to that kind of style which "without making a distinct though brief mention of a multitude of particulars, shall put the hearer's mind into the same train of thought as the speaker's, and suggest to him more than is actually expressed." Of course, what are here called "the suggestive properties" of style are to be widely distinguished from Dr. Whately's "suggestive style."

§ 249. The GRAMMATICAL PROPERTIES of style are those which are determined by the necessary or accidental forms and relations of the thought to be expressed.

These properties are comprehensively embraced by Dr. Campbell under the head of "grammatical purity."

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ORAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 250. THE oral properties of style include those of EUPHONY and HARMONY.

The ultimate distinction between euphony and harmony as properties of language consists in this; — that euphony respects the sound or the phonetic side of language exclusively, while harmony regards the sound only in relation to the thought or to the logical side. Euphony has respect to the sounds of words as they affect the ear, and are regarded merely as sounds, and independently of any signification they may have. In harmony, sounds are regarded in relation to the thought which they express. Hence the effect of euphony is a mere sensation on the outward ear; while that of harmony is an emotion and springs directly from an intellectual perception. Euphony addresses the lowest form of the sensibility — the animal sense; harmony the highest — the passive imagination.

Another distinction, growing out of the one already named, is this; — that euphony respects chiefly single words, while harmony respects only a succession of words. In some cases, indeed, euphony is violated in the combination of words, when the effect of the enunciation is disagreeable merely because of the succession of particular sounds. Thus the sentence, "The hosts stood still," is in violation rather of euphony than of harmony, — the offensiveness to the ear arising out of the difficulty of enunciating the elemental sounds here brought into proximity. The expression of thought, on the

other hand, being ever continuous, harmony appears only in a succession of words. The sentence, "He behaved himself exceedingly discreetly," is faulty in harmony, not in euphony; for while it is offensive to the ear, it is not as mere sounds. The enunciation of the sentence is easy and the sounds themselves rather pleasant than otherwise. But in the communication of thought, we demand variety and distinctness in the expression of all its various relations. In this sentence, the similarity of sound in the last two words indicates a similarity of relation, and we are disappointed and so far offended in not finding the sense answering to the sound in this respect.

Hence it may sometimes happen that euphony must be sacrificed in order to the most perfect harmony. As in music the fullest harmonious effect of a whole strain requires sometimes the introduction of discords, so in speech, the most perfect expression of the sentiment may demand the selection of words that in comparison with others are more harsh and difficult of utterance.

Practically, whether the fault in a sentence offensive to the ear be one against euphony or one against harmony may be determined by the circumstance that a sentence deficient in euphony is always difficult of enunciation; an inharmonious sentence is not necessarily difficult of utterance.

It should be observed, moreover, that euphony is sometimes a constituent of harmony.

§ 251. The oral properties of style, being founded on the nature of language as consisting of sounds, strictly belong only to spoken discourse. Yet as in the silent perusal of written discourse the mind translates the characters into the sounds which they represent, even such discourse must be pronounced defective unless these properties appear in it.

As the practiced musician instantly detects any defect in

the harmony while his eye runs silently over the pages of written music, so even in silent reading we are unpleasantly affected by any violation of the oral properties of style. We experience a sensation of weariness from the silent perusal of a work deficient in these properties precisely like that felt after an audible reading. Language never entirely conceals this peculiarity of its nature as made up of sounds, or as oral, even when it appears in the form of a visible symbol addressed to the eye alone.

§ 252. The oral properties of style can be best acquired only under the influence of the ear while listening to the audible pronunciation of discourse.

It is difficult to comprehend how a deaf-mute can ever be sensible of the euphony or harmony of discourse; although experience shows that even he may write poetry, which, more than any other form of discourse, as involving at least rhythm and rhyme, seems to require the superintendence and guidance of the ear. It is safe, notwithstanding, to assume that the writer who neglects to cultivate the ear in reference to the construction of his sentences must be liable to fail in these properties of style. The importance of them, even to written discourse, may be seen in the fact that the writings of Addison owe no small part of their attractiveness to the musical structure of his style. The public speaker especially needs to subject himself to much training of the ear, in order to give it such a control over his style of expression that his sentences, without conscious design, shall as it were form themselves in accordance with the principles of euphony and harmony.

Next to the study of discourse as pronounced by living orators, may be recommended recitation from the best poets and orators. Every student of oratory should devote a portion of time daily to this exercise or to that of reading aloud composition excelling in musical properties. The speeches of eminent orators generally possess these excellences in a

higher degree than other classes of prose composition. The various writings of Burke, of Milton, and of Addison furnish, however, excellent studies for the acquisition of these properties. The Greek and Latin languages, also, having been formed, in a preëminent degree, under the influence of the ear, inasmuch as poetry and oratory were the earlier forms in which they developed themselves, may be profitably studied for this purpose.

As studies of this kind respect immediately the culture of the ear alone, it should ever be remembered that they can be prosecuted to best advantage only by audible pronunciation.

CHAPTER III.

OF EUPHONY.

§ 253. EUPHONY in style respects the character of the sounds of words regarded merely as sounds without reference to any thought which they may express.

The sounds of words vary only in four different ways, namely in respect to pitch, force, time, and quality. But it is obvious euphony has nothing to do with variations of pitch, any further at least than this, that it requires the successions of pitch to be not monotonously uniform. This part of the field, however, is so entirely included within the province of harmony that it may here with propriety be wholly passed over.

Neither has euphony any thing to do with the time of sounds, with quantity, except so far as quantity is a constituent of accent.

The only points to be considered here, therefore, are force as it appears in accent, and quality of sound.

§ 254. Euphony requires the avoidance of such words and expressions as are difficult of utterance on account of the succession of unaccented syllables.

There are many words in our language which it is difficult to enounce on account of the number of unaccented syllables occurring in immediate succession, as, for instance, *meteorological, desultoriness, imitativeness, imprecatory.* Such words, so far as practicable, should be avoided in all elevated discourse. They are, for the most part, of Greek or Latin origin.

Not only words but phrases having a number of unaccented syllables may be objectionable on this account. The phrase, "The obstinacy of his undutiful son," contains six unaccented syllables in succession, and cannot well be pronounced without interposing a pause where the sense forbids. The following sentence from Tillotson is liable to the same censure: —

"When a man hath once forfeited the reputation of his integrity, nothing will then serve his turn."

In reading it the voice labors, and seeks to relieve itself by pausing slightly after *forfeited,* and also after *reputation.* The pause supplies the accent that is missed.

§ 255. Euphony requires, in the second place, that those words and phrases be avoided which are harsh and disagreeable in respect of quality of sound.

The words of a language are faulty in euphony in respect of quality only by reason of derivation or composition. Euphony presides over the formation and development of language, and watchfully guards against the introduction of offensive combinations either in roots or general forms of derivation and inflection. The radical words of all languages are hence euphonious. But it will sometimes happen that the general laws of derivation and composition will bring together vocal elements which, taken together, are harsh and difficult to utter. So, likewise, foreign words, containing elements not belonging to the indigenous tongue, may be difficult to pronounce, and, therefore, to a native ear be wanting in euphony.

Further, individual habits or physical defects may render certain combinations difficult which are not so to others of the same country.

While occasionally offenses against euphony may be suffered for the sake of force or clearness, the excessive repetition of them gives to style a forbidding character.

The following sentences are faulty in this respect: —

Thou form'dst me poor at first and keep'st me so.

The hosts stood still in silent wonder fix'd.

After the most straitest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee.

As far as respects the affairs of this world.

For the peace and good of the Church is not terminated in the schismless estate of one or two kingdoms.

CHAPTER IV.

OF HARMONY — HARMONY PROPER.

§ 256. HARMONY in style respects the character of the sounds of words as expressions of thought.

Harmony, as a property of style, lies between euphony, which regards sounds as sounds merely, on the one side, and the suggestive properties of style, which regard the image presented to the mind by the word, on the other, as in a painting we readily discriminate between the pleasing nature of the colors as they affect the eye of a child, and such a disposition of them as will express real objects; and again between this and the representation of character, which is fully appreciated only by a matured taste; or as, in music, we distinguish between the sounds that a child elicits as he runs his fingers at random over the keys of a piano-forte and those which a master produces while, without designing to express a particular sentiment, he yet instinctively obeys the fixed principles of melody and harmony, and again between these and the sounds which he elicits when intently bent on the expression of a sentiment; so we may distinguish between euphony and harmony, and again between harmony and those properties which are more directly founded on the thought to be expressed. We have in these several processes of art, first, the mere outward material — the color or the sound; secondly, the body as the organized expression of an internal and spiritual principle, but regarded still as body addressed to the senses; and thirdly, the sentiment or thought revealed in the body. The fuller development of these different

classes of properties will indicate not only the fundamental grounds of distinction between them, but also the practical utility of discriminating between them in the study of style.

§ 257. Harmony, in the wider sense, includes *Harmony proper*, *Rhythm*, and *Melody*.

This subdivision of harmony is founded on the distinction of vocal utterances into those belonging to the four different functions of voice, namely, pitch, force, time, and quality of voice. Pitch is the constituent of melody; force and time give accent — the constituent of rhythm; and quality of voice lies at the foundation of harmony proper.

§ 258. Harmony Proper is founded on the quality of sounds, and requires that the succession of sounds in a sentence be in unison with the thought, and a fitting embodiment of it.

The quality of sounds can be regarded in style only so far as the elemental sounds, of which words are composed, are concerned. In this respect, — the character of the elemental sounds which enter into their structure, — different languages differ greatly, as well as the styles of different writers in the same language. The Italian language, thus, has in its alphabet fewer vowels than the English, yet the vowel sounds have a great relative predominance in the actual structure of the language as compared with the English. There are in English discourse but about three fourths as many vowels as in Italian; that is, while in an English sentence of eight hundred letters there are not far from three hundred vowels, in an Italian sentence of as many letters there are nearly four hundred. The Italian language, in harmonious effect, differs from the English in this particular, that as composed of a large portion of vowels, it is more open, smooth, and flowing; while the English has the peculiar strength and expressiveness which a highly consonantal character imparts.

There is, moreover, a wide difference in the character of different consonants. Some have vocality, others are mere aspirations. In some languages, also, the same consonant has less, in others more, of a proper consonantal character. The lower Germans are more open in their pronunciation — that is, compress with less force the articulating organs in forming consonants — than the English.

If it be borne in mind, now, that harmony never loses sight of the character of the thought to be expressed, it will at once be perceived that in respect to certain kinds of thought the peculiar alphabetic structure of our language will be more favorable to harmony, while in respect to others, it will be less so. The following lines from Coleridge's "Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni," strike the ear pleasantly and excite the emotion of harmony: —

> "And you, ye five wild torrents, fiercely glad!
> Who called you forth from night and utter death,
> From dark and icy caverns called you forth,
> Down those precipitous, black, jagged rocks,
> Forever shattered, and the same forever!"

The sounds, however, particularly in the last two verses, are far different in quality from those in the following, which are equally harmonious: —

> "'God!' sing, ye meadow streams, with gladsome voice!
> Ye pine groves, with your soft and soul-like sounds."

Of a still different character are the following remarkably harmonious lines from Gray's "Elegy in a Country Churchyard": —

> "The breezy call of incense-breathing morn,
> The swallow twittering from the straw-built shed,
> The cock's shrill clarion or the echoing horn
> No more shall rouse them from their lowly bed."

The English language is peculiarly favorable to that species of harmony which may appear in union with strength and energy; the Italian, to that which is combined with calm elevation and dignity as well as grace and elegance.

The following are illustrations of this property of style in prose discourse: —

"Truth, indeed, came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape, most glorious to look on; but when he ascended, and his apostles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, nor ever shall do, till her Master's second coming: he shall bring together every joint and member, and shall mold them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection." — *Milton.*

"But so have I seen a harmless dove made dark with an artificial light, and her eyes sealed and locked up with a little quill, soaring upward and flying with amazement, fear, and an undiscerning wing: she made toward heaven, but knew not that she was made a train and an instrument, to teach her enemy to prevail on her and all her defenseless kindred. So is a superstitious man; zealous and blind, forward and mistaken, he runs toward heaven, as he thinks; but he chooses foolish paths, and out of fear takes any thing that he is told." — *Jeremy Taylor.*

§ 259. Harmony proper may be violated either generally (1), by discordant and jarring combinations of sounds in the sentence, or specifically (2), by an imperfect adaptation of the sounds to the particular character of the thought.

Language, as the body of thought, should ever evince the presence of the organizing principle generally, by assuming a form pleasing to the sense, as throughout homogeneous and accordant expression of thought. There is beauty in a clear complexion, smooth skin, and nicely rounded features, as the proper expression of a sound mental condition.

There is a beauty, too, entirely distinct from this, in the flashing eye of excited hope, the crimson flush of offended modesty, the languor and paleness of pining grief, as the expressions of the inward spirit. If they have a beauty in themselves, it is entirely lost in the greater and more absorbing beauty which they possess as mental expressions. So there is a harmony in the adaptation of language, as consisting of diverse sounds, to the particular thought to be expressed; to be distinguished from mere euphony, or the agreeableness of the sounds regarded as mere sounds, on the one hand, and from the general beauty which a perfect expression of thought in language imparts, on the other.

The style of Barrow, with all its excellences, is often faulty in respect to harmony. The following extracts are deficient in general smoothness. We feel in reading them that the expression does not flow in easy utterance of the thought.

"When sarcastical twitches are needful to pierce the thick skins of men, to conceal their lethargic stupidity, to rouse them out of their drowsy negligence, then may they well be applied: when plain declarations will not enlighten people to discern the truth and weight of things, and blunt arguments will not penetrate to convince them or persuade them to their duty, then doth reason freely resign its place to wit, allowing it to undertake its work of instruction and reproof."

"Their eminency of state, their affluence of wealth, their uncontrollable power, their exemption from common restraints, their continual distractions and encumbrances by varieties of care and business, their multitude of obsequious followers, and scarcity of faithful friends to advise or reprove them, their having no obstacles before them to check their wills, to cross their humors, to curb their lusts and passions, are so many snares unto them: wherefore they do need plentiful measures of grace, and mighty assistances from God, to preserve them from the worst errors and sins; into which otherwise it is almost a miracle if they are not plunged."

Archbishop Tillotson's style is also exceedingly defective in respect to harmony. The following is an extract: —

"One might be apt to think at first view, that this parable was overdone, and wanted something of a due decorum; it being hardly credible that a man, after he had been so mercifully dealt withal, as, upon his humble request, to have so huge a debt so freely forgiven, should, whilst the memory of so much mercy was fresh upon him, even in the very next moment, handle his fellow-servant, who had made the same humble request to him which he had done to his lord, with so much roughness and cruelty, for so inconsiderable a sum."

CHAPTER V.

OF RHYTHM.

§ 260. RHYTHM in style is founded on accent; and requires that the succession of accented and unaccented syllables be such as will suitably express the thought.

Among the ancients rhythm was regarded as the prominent thing in harmony of style; and much attention was given to it in the study of oratory. The structure of the Greek and Latin languages admitted, to a much greater degree than our own, the application of the principles of rhythm to the formation of style. Yet in the English language rhythm plays an important part; and in no point are the writings of different men more easily distinguishable from one another than in respect to rhythm, nor is there scarcely any other property more missed in oratory, when wanting.

The ancient rhetoricians endeavored earnestly to ascertain and settle the laws of rhythm; that is, determine in what particular successions of accent, or in what feet oratorical rhythm consists. The endeavor seems to have been fruitless, as the results of their investigations were widely variant. Indeed, from the very nature of oratory as distinguished from poetry, and yet proceeding from a mind formed in feeling and taste as well as in intelligence, and also from the nature of harmony as a concord of sound and thought, we might have anticipated a failure in such an effort. The rugged oak, with its heavy, abrupt, and open arms and its scanty spray and foliage, has a harmony, so to speak, of its own; and there is, too, a harmony peculiar to the willow with its long and slender branches and pendent foliage.

The diverse character of the thought gives a diverse character to the rhythm. Strength and vehemence delight in the frequent concurrence of heavy accents; tenderness and familiarity avoid them. Yet the oak is not all heavy, jagged boughs; nor is the willow all twig and leaf. There are extremes in both directions; and against these the following rules are given as the only ones which the nature of the case allows.

It should be ever borne in mind that while there is such a thing as rhythm, it is ever determined by the character of the thought; else rhythm would be mere euphony. The rhythm of Demosthenes would not be rhythm in Cicero.

§ 261. First, Rhythm forbids the excessive recurrence both of accented and of unaccented syllables.

This rule is founded in the very nature of rhythm, which is constituted of an intermixture of accented and unaccented syllables. A style that offends against this rule must be pronounced to be so far wanting in rhythm. The writings of Tillotson, characterized generally for want of harmony, furnish abundant exemplifications of this fault in style. It will be remarked in the following extracts from this in many respects excellent writer, that the ear demands a heavy accent on the italicized words so much that such an accent is thrown on a word which should not regularly receive it. In this we find a proof that harmony ever respects the thought, and not the sound merely in which it is embodied.

"Consider that religion is a great and a long work, and asks so much time that there is none left for the delaying *of it*."

"But then I say withal, that if these principles were banished out of the world, Government would be far more difficult than *now it is*, because it would want its firmest basis and foundation; there would be infinitely more disorders in the world, if men were restrained from injustice and violence only by humane laws, and not by principles of conscience, and the dread of another world."

If the word *humane* in this last extract be pronounced as it is here spelt, the ear will instantly detect the want of

rhythm in the sentence. The offense is indeed so great that we cannot doubt the word was pronounced in the time of Tillotson as it is now, with the accent on the first syllable, and that in dropping the final *e* we have only conformed the orthography to the pronunciation.

In striking contrast with the style of Tillotson in respect to all the oral properties, and particularly that of rhythm, is the style of Milton, of which the following are beautiful exemplifications: —

"I shall detain you now no longer in the demonstration of what we should not do, but straight conduct you to a hill-side, where I will point you out the right path of a virtuous and noble education, laborious indeed at the first ascent, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects and melodious sounds on every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not more charming."

By a slight change in the rhythm, without affecting the sense, this sentence may lose all its beauty. By substituting, for instance, in the last part of it *at first* for *at the first ascent*, *on all sides* for *on every side*, and *sweet* for *charming*, the rhythm is greatly marred; as will be seen from a mere perusal of it as thus altered: —

I will point you out the right path of a virtuous and noble education, laborious indeed at first, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects and melodious sounds on all sides, that the harp of Orpheus was not more sweet.

"When a man hath been laboring the hardest labor in the deep mines of knowledge, hath furnished out his findings in all their equipage, drawn forth his reasons as it were a battle ranged, scattered and defeated all objections in his way, calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please, only that he may try the matter by dint of argument; for his opponents then to skulk, to lay ambushments, to keep a narrow bridge of licensing where the challenger should pass, though it be valor enough in soldiership, is but weakness and cowardice in the wars of Truth. For who knows not that Truth is strong, next to the Almighty? She needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings, to make her victorious. Those are the shifts and the defenses that Error uses against her power." — *Of Unlicensed Printing.*

§ 262. Secondly, Rhythm forbids an excessive recurrence of metrical feet which shall suggest the suspicion that the speaker has become poet.

This is a fault in style into which immature writers are liable to fall; especially if accustomed much to the exclusive recitation of poetical compositions. While it implies a musical ear, it is yet a fault of excess; and in pure oratory is inadmissible. The fault more commonly appears in the more elevated parts of discourse, when the speaker, as it were, absorbs the audience into himself, and imagines himself no longer an orator, in address to others, but their mouth-piece, in the mere utterance or pouring out of their common thoughts and feelings. As words of foreign origin do not readily fall in with those of native stock in rhythmical harmony,* writers who are liable to this fault of excess in rhythm are generally characterized for their preference of Anglo-Saxon words.

The following passage, from a popular author in the lighter departments of literature, might be reduced to the form of regular blank verse: —

"Then when the dusk of evening had come on, and not a sound disturbed the sacred stillness of the place — when the bright moon poured in her light on tomb and monument, on pillar, wall, and arch, and most of all it seemed to them, upon her quiet grave — in that calm time, when all outward things and inward thoughts teem with assurances of immortality, and worldly hopes and fears are humbled in the dust before them — then, with tranquil and submissive hearts they turned away and left the child with God. Oh! it is hard to take to heart the lesson that such deaths will teach, but let no man reject it, for it is one that all must learn, and is a mighty, universal truth. When Death strikes down the innocent and young, for every fragile form from which he lets the panting spirit free, a hundred virtues rise in shapes of mercy, charity, and love, to walk the world and bless it. Of every tear that sorrowing mortals shed on such green graves, some good is born, some gentler nature comes. In the destroyer's steps there spring up bright creations that defy his power, and his dark path becomes a way of light to heaven."

Twining, in his "Notes on Aristotle's Poetics," quotes the

* In the last extract from Milton, it will be seen at once that "ambushments" mars the rhythm. And in the next quotation, under this section, the phrase "assurances of immortality" is almost the only one that interrupts the poetical structure.

following from "Smith's System of Optics," as a striking instance of involuntary versification:—

"When parallel rays || come contrary ways || and fall upon opposite sides."

§ 263. A correct or faulty rhythm appears most conspicuous at the termination of sentences or phrases, as the character of a strain of music is most affected by the cadence.

In the cadence of a sentence, or member of a sentence, is concentrated its entire musical effect. Hence, in the study of rhythm, the chief attention has been given to the construction of the cadence.

The style of Addison owes its easy flow in a great measure to the fact that, while trochaic cadences, or such as end with an unaccented syllable, predominate, the heavy effect of an invariable sameness is avoided by a due interspersion of iambic endings. A spondaic cadence rarely occurs in the compositions of this author. The style of Middleton, the author of the "Life of Cicero," is also excellent in this property.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MELODY.

§ 264. MELODY is founded on pitch; and requires that the phrases or members of a sentence be so constructed and disposed that, in a suitable pronunciation, the successions of pitch be pleasing to the ear.

The term *melody*, as applied both to style in composition and to elocution, has, for the most part, been used in a vague and indeterminate sense. Its use in music is, however, fixed; and there is obviously every reason for preserving to it the same radical import in all its various applications. In song, it denotes pitch in succession, and is clearly distinguished from rhythm, which respects accent in succession. In elocution, we perceive the necessity of maintaining the same distinction, and need, for this purpose, the same precision in the distinct use of the terms. The same necessity, likewise, exists in style.

The exact relations of pitch to style are indicated in the fact that, in the oral delivery of discourse, the mutual dependence and connection of the particular constituents of the complex thought are expressed chiefly, although not exclusively, through the variations of pitch. While it belongs to elocution to define precisely what these variations are, it is the appropriate province of rhetoric to describe how the sentence shall be constructed so as to meet these qualities of an easy and agreeable elocution.

More particularly, every constituent part of a complex thought, or the expression of it in a particular phrase, has,

in a correct elocution, a pitch of its own by which it is distinguished from the other constituent parts. In passing from one phrase to another, the voice changes its pitch for the purpose often simply of making the transition, and with no reference to any emphatic distinction. These successive ranges of pitch, given respectively to the several phrases, may obviously be such as to be offensive to a musical ear. So far, therefore, as they are determined by the structure of the sentence, they need to be regarded in style.

But, further than this, the relations between the constituent thoughts are indicated, in delivery, chiefly by the pitch of the voice. If, accordingly, the sentence be so constructed that these relations cannot appropriately be expressed with ease and agreeable effect under the limitations of the laws of vocal sounds, it is so far faulty; and the prevention or correction of the fault comes within the proper purview of rhetorical style.

How far, and in what particular respects, the principles of melody in elocution may thus affect the style of discourse, will be exhibited in the sections which follow.

§ 265. Melody in style may be distinguished into two kinds: *the melody of proportion*, and *the melody of arrangement.*

A fault in melody may be either in the time of the variations of pitch, — the variations being too frequent or the contrary; or in the character of the variations themselves, being in their own nature unmusical.

That species of melody which is founded on the frequency or infrequency of the variations, or what amounts to the same thing, on the length of the phrases, is denominated the melody of proportion. The melody of arrangement respects the character of the variations themselves, as judged by a musical standard.

§ 266. *The melody of proportion* is founded on the

relative length of the phrases or clauses in a sentence; and requires that the discourse be neither fragmentary and abrupt, on the one hand; nor on the other be made up of members too extended for easy elocution.

The abrupt and fragmentary style is more tolerable in essays; and is more frequent in this department of writing. The following extract from Lord Bacon, however excellent in other respects, is deficient in melody: —

"Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment and disposition of business; for expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars one by one, but the general counsels, and the plots and marshaling of affairs come best from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules is the humor of a scholar: they perfect Nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men contemn studies, simple men admire, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation."

The opening sentence in Hooker's "Ecclesiastical Polity," as well as the succeeding extract from Middleton, labor from being broken up by numerous qualifying clauses.

"Though for no other cause, yet for this, that posterity may know we have not loosely, through silence, permitted things to pass away as in a dream, there shall be for men's information extant thus much concerning the present state of the Church of God established among us, and their careful endeavor which would have upheld the same."

"And that it was not peculiar to the gift of language or tongues only, to be given at the moment of its exertion, but common likewise to all the rest, will be shown, probably, on some other occasion, more at large in a particular treatise, which is already prepared by me, on that subject." — *Middleton.*

The style of Ossian and of Young in his "Night Thoughts" is also deficient in this species of melody.

"Leave, blue-eyed Clatho, leave thy hall. Behold that early beam of thine. The host is withered in its course. No further look — it is dark. Light trembling from the harp, strike, virgins, strike the sound. No hunter,

he descends from the dewy haunt of the bounding roe. He bends not his bow on the wind; or sends his gray arrow abroad." — *Temora, B.* v.

"Sense! take the rein; blind passion! drive us on;
And Ignorance! befriend us on our way;
Ye new, but truest patrons of our peace!
Yes, give the pulse full empire; live the brute,
Since as the brute we die: the sum of man,
Of God-like man! to revel and to rot."

Night Thoughts.

The opposite fault of this kind may be exemplified in the following extracts from John Howe: —

"If we can suppose an offense of that kind may be of so heinous a nature and so circumstanced as that it cannot be congruous it should be remitted without some reparation to the prince and compensation for the scandal done to government, it is easy to suppose it much more incongruous it should be so in the present case." — *Living Temple.*

"And no doubt so large and capacious intellects may well be supposed to penetrate far into the reason and wisdom of his dispensations; and so not only to exercise submission in an implicit acquiescence in the unseen and only believed fitness of them, but also to take an inexpressible complacency and satisfaction in what they manifestly discern thereof, and to be able to resolve their delectation in the works and ways of God into a higher cause and reason than the mere general belief that he doth all things well, namely, their immediate delightful view of the congruity and fitness of what he does." — *Ibid.*

In this class of faults — those against melody of proportion — may be included, also, the joining together of disproportionately long and short members. The ear demands not only variety, but also a harmonized variety of proportion between the members of a sentence. The following sentence from Sterne is in this respect highly melodious: —

"The accusing spirit, which flew up to Heaven's Chancery with the oath, blushed as he gave it in; and the recording angel, as he wrote it down, dropped a tear upon the word and blotted it out forever."

By simply altering the length of one or two of the clauses, the melody may be entirely destroyed through a mere change of proportion between the parts. This may be done by leaving out in the last clause the phrase *upon the word*, and also the word *forever*, thus: *and the recording angel, as he wrote it, dropped a tear and blotted it out.*

§ 267. THE MELODY OF ARRANGEMENT is founded on the variations of pitch which are requisite for expressing the proper relations between the constituent parts of a complex sentence, or more directly on those relations themselves; and requires that the sentence be so constructed that those relations may be easily expressed by the voice.

It has been remarked, under § 264, that the vocal expression of the relations between the different parts or phrases of a complex sentence, or the grouping of speech, as it is called, is mainly effected by the function of pitch. In a melodious style, accordingly, the sentence must be so constructed that these relations may be easily expressed; in other words, so that there may be no confusion in the indication of the relations on the one hand, and no laborious effort be imposed on the voice in effecting this indication, on the other.

In the following selections, although the sentences are more or less complex, they are yet so arranged that the relations between the parts are easily indicated by the voice; and the effect on the ear is consequently pleasing in a high degree.

The first are from Dugald Stewart, whose style in this respect is highly finished.

"The most trifling accident of scenery, it is evident, at least the most trifling to an unskilled eye, may thus possess, in his estimation, a value superior to that which he ascribes to beauties of a far higher order."

By simply transposing the second and third clauses of this sentence, the melodious flow is broken up and its music is lost.

The most trifling accident of scenery, at least the most trifling to an unskilled eye, it is evident, may thus possess, in his estimation, a value superior to that which he ascribes to beauties of a far higher order.

"If the one party should observe, for instance, to his companion that the minute parts of the tree, which the latter affirms to be the most remote; —

that its smaller ramifications, its foliage, and the texture of its bark are seen much more distinctly than the corresponding parts of the other; he could not fail in immediately convincing him of the inaccuracy of his estimate."

In this sentence the leading thought is placed last. The voice, accordingly, in pronouncing it, naturally rises to a higher pitch and swells into a larger volume; and thus leaves upon the ear at the close an agreeable fullness and force of sound. At the same time, the less important explanatory and modifying clauses are so thrown in, as both to break up the monotonousness of a direct assertion, and also to furnish the proper occasion of a pleasing variety in the successions of pitch. Change the order of almost any two members of the sentence and the melody will be destroyed.

The style of Addison is more direct and less diversified with dependent modifying clauses. It exhibits this species of melody — that of arrangement — in the disposition of the leading thought in the sentence; which is generally so placed as, in a reading correctly adapted to the sense, to leave the ear impressed with an agreeable elevation and body of sound.

"We are obliged to devotion for the noblest buildings that have adorned the several countries of the world. It is this which has set men at work on temples and public places of worship, not only that they might, by the magnificence of the building, invite the Deity to reside within it, but that such stupendous works might, at the same time, open the mind to vast conceptions, and fit it to converse with the divinity of the place." — *Spectator*.

"It seeks not to bereave or destroy the body; it seeks to save the soul by humbling the body, not by imprisonment or pecuniary mulct, much less by stripes or bonds or disinheritance, but by fatherly admonishment and Christian rebuke to cast it into godly sorrow whose end is joy and ingenuous bashfulness to sin. If that cannot be wrought, then as a tender mother takes her child and holds it over the pit with scaring words, that it may learn to fear where danger is; so doth excommunication as dearly and as freely, without money, use her wholesome and saving terrors. She is instant; she beseeches; by all the dear and sweet promises of salvation she entices and wooes: by all the threatenings and thunders of the law and rejected gospel, she charges and abjures: this is all her armory, her munition, her artillery: then she awaits with long-sufferance and yet ardent zeal." — *Milton*.

"Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy." — *Hooker*.

§ 268. Faults in respect to the melody of arrangement are either in the adoption of the loose, in preference to the periodic structure of a sentence, or of the parenthetical as opposed to the compact structure.

The periodic and the compact structure is as favorable to clearness and to energy as to melody; and hence it will be again noticed in the chapters on those properties of style. It has a more intimate and vital connection, however, with melody; since a sentence may be perspicuous or energetic which is not periodic in its structure, whereas this structure is indispensable to melody.

§ 269. A PERIODIC STRUCTURE is one in which the leading thought of the sentence is presented in the closing member.

A LOOSE STRUCTURE, as opposed to the periodic, is one in which the sentence terminates with one or more dependent members.

This definition is given in preference to that adopted by Dr. Campbell and after him by Dr. Whately, which is as follows: "A period is a complex sentence in which the meaning remains suspended till the whole is finished." It is easy to construct a sentence which shall be exceedingly loose while it yet accords precisely with this definition. For example: "One party had given their whole attention, during several years, to the project not only of enriching themselves and impoverishing the rest of the nation; but, also, by these and other means, establishing their dominion under the government and with the favor of a family who

were foreigners that they might easily believe they were established on the throne by the good-will and strength of this party alone." This sentence must be denominated exceedingly loose, and yet, to apply Dr. Campbell's criterion, there is no "place before the end, at which, if you make a stop, the construction of the preceding part will render it a complete sentence."

Why the periodic structure is favorable to melody may be seen in the fact, that the leading thought being presented in whole or in part in the closing member, that member must receive vocal distinction in the enunciation, which is indicated by the pitch; and consequently the sentence closes with a full and strong impression on the ear. In a loose sentence, on the contrary, ending with a dependent clause, the voice is abated upon it, and the effect is analogous to that of ending a strain of music on some other than the key-note.

Examples of a periodic structure are given under § 326. The following are instances of a loose structure: —

"And here it was often found of absolute necessity to influence or cool the passious of the audience, especially at Rome, where Tully spoke; and with whose writings young divines, I mean those among them who read old authors, are more conversant than with those of Demosthenes; who, by many degrees, excelled the other, at least as an author." — *Swift.*

It would be difficult, perhaps, to find in the writings of a reputable author, a sentence more loosely constructed than this. The leading thought terminates with the first member; and there are five modifying clauses appended, at each of which the voice seems ready to rest, but is called up anew by another connective bringing in a new member. While it is not destitute of clearness or strength, it is exceedingly difficult to express the relations between the members by any pleasing management of the voice.

The following stanza from Byron, whose poetry is not remarkable for excellence in this kind of properties, is also

exceedingly loose, while not wanting in other qualities of an elegant diction: —

"And Ardennes waves above them her green leaves,
Dewy with Nature's tear-drops, as they pass,
Grieving — if aught inanimate e'er grieves —
Over the unreturning brave, — alas!
Ere evening to be trodden like the grass
Which now beneath them, but above shall grow
In its next verdure, when this fiery mass
Of living valor rolling on the foe,
And burning with high hope, shall molder cold and low."

"To this succeeded that licentiousness which entered with the Restoration; and, from infecting our religion and morals, fell to corrupt our language; which last was not like to be much improved by those who at that time made up the court of King Charles the Second; either such who had followed him in his banishment, or who had been altogether conversant in the dialect of those fanatic times; or young men, who had been educated in the same company; so that the court, which used to be the standard of propriety and correctness of speech, was then, and I think hath ever since continued, the worst school in England for that accomplishment; and so will remain till better care be taken in the education of our young nobility, that they may set out into the world with some foundation of literature, in order to qualify them for patterns of politeness." — *Swift.*

"The first could not end his learned treatise without a panegyric of modern learning and knowledge in comparison of the ancient; and the other falls so grossly into the censure of the old poetry and preference of the new, that I could not read either of these strains without indignation, which no quality among men is so apt to raise in one as self-sufficiency, the worst composition out of the pride and ignorance of mankind." — *Temple.*

§ 270. An antithetic structure, so far as it is periodic, is peculiarly favorable to this kind of melody.

Where the main member of the antithesis, or that to which the writer wishes to give peculiar prominence, is placed last, the antithesis is periodic, and so far melodious. Where this order is reversed, the melody is marred or destroyed. The following extract has this quality in a high degree, although the members are too uniformly short to give it the highest melodious effect: —

"If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not

found in the registers of heralds, they felt assured they were recorded in the Book of Life. If their steps were not accompanied by a splendid train of menials, legions of ministering angels had charge over them." — *Macaulay.*

§ 271. Parenthetical sentences are opposed to melody, when the parentheses are of excessive length, or when parentheses are included within other parentheses.

The reason of this is that when the parenthetical part is long, a great part of the sentence must be pronounced with an abatement of the voice; and when parentheses are included within parentheses, the voice, in the endeavor to express the relations correctly, sinks too far for melodious effect.

The following sentences are faulty in this respect: —

"For we here see, that before God took any people to be peculiar to him, from the rest of men, the reason which he gives, why his Spirit should not always strive with man, in common (after an intimation of his contemptible meanness, and his own indulgence toward him notwithstanding, and instance given of his abounding wickedness in those days) was because 'all the imaginations of the thoughts of his heart were only evil continually.'" — *John Howe: Living Temple.*

"Yet because it may be grateful when we are persuaded that things are so, to fortify (as much as we can) that persuasion, and because our persuasion concerning those attributes of God will be still liable to assault unless we acknowledge him everywhere present; (nor can it well be conceivable otherwise, how the influence of his knowledge, power, and goodness can be so universal as will be thought necessary to infer a universal obligation to religion;) it will be therefore requisite to add somewhat concerning his omnipresence, or because some, that love to be very strictly critical, will be apt to think that term restrictive of his presence to the universe, (as supposing to be present is relative to somewhat one may be said present unto, whereas they will say without the universe is nothing,) we will rather choose to call it immensity." — *Ibid.*

A very common variety of faults of this class occurs where, by the interposition of a long parenthetical clause, a just reading must throw an excessive stress on a portion of the sentence.

Thus in the following sentences, the subjects *they, which,*

who, being separated from their respective verbs, require a heavy accent followed by a pause which destroys the melody.

They, going about to work a righteousness of their own, are not wise.

Which, as it standeth with Christian duty in some cases, so in common affairs to require it were most unfit.

Who, aiming only at the height of greatness and sensuality, hath in tract of time reduced so great and goodly a part of the world to that lamentable distress and servitude, under which, to the astonishment of the understanding beholders, it now faints and groans.

EXERCISES ON THE ORAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

Name and correct the faults in the following extracts: —

They conducted themselves wilily.

Tranquillity, regularity, and magnanimity reside with the religious and resigned man.

Were really radically opposed. Usually falsely assigned. Usually specifically called. Extremely nearly. Giving being to abstractions. It was almost equally generally admitted. It is generally sufficiently palpable.

A most arbitrary requisition.

Tediousness is the most fatal of all faults.

Throughout it there is an air of matured power.

Thou act'st the fool as it were natural to thee.

He, though we must ever keep in mind that he does not represent exactly the language of his time, affecting a certain archaism both in words and forms, continually uses it.

Andrès, with a partiality to the Saracens of Spain, whom, by an old blunder, he takes for his own countrymen, manifested in every page, does not fail to urge this.

The Greeks and Romans certainly normally articulated the Grecian rough breathing and the Latin *H.*

As the people were carrying by, down below in the street, an old man fast asleep, into whose strongly marked face the setting sun cast fire and life, and who was, in short, a corpse borne uncovered, after the Italian custom, suddenly, in a wild and hurried tone, he asked his friends: "Does my father look thus?"

"But the power of Greek radiance Goethe could give to his handling of Nature, and nobly too, as any one who will read his 'Wanderer'—the poem in which a wanderer falls in with a peasant woman and her child, by their hut, built out of the ruins of a temple near Cuma—may see."

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 272. THE SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES of style include those that are founded on the relationship between the sound and the thought, and those that are founded on the relationship between the object that represents the thought and the thought. The former may be denominated *the Imitative*, the latter, *the Symbolical Properties* of style.

It was observed, in treating of the nature of language, § 245, that language is representative or suggestive in its nature in a twofold respect. In the first place, a sensible object is taken to represent the thought, if abstract, and in the second place, a sound or word is applied as indicative of that object, or of the mental state itself. Hence the ground of distinguishing these two varieties of suggestive properties.

§ 273. The functions of voice on which the Imitative Properties of style are founded, are those of quality and time; pitch and force, except as the latter is connected with accent, not admitting any consideration in this department of style.

§ 274. Words regarded as sounds are imitative of three different classes of thoughts: (1.) Sensations of sounds; (2.) Other sensations analogous to those of sound; (3.) Mental states analogous to these sensations.

§ 275. All languages contain words which, in their

very structure as composite sounds, more or less perfectly resemble in quality, as soft or harsh, etc., the sounds which they designate. Such are, in our own language, *hiss*, *buzz*, *murmur*, *gurgle*, *dash*, *rattle*.

The following extracts are familiar exemplifications of the beauty and force imparted to style by the adaptation of the sounds to the objects represented.

"The pilgrim oft
At dead of night mid his oraison hears
Aghast the voice of time-disparting towers,
Tumbling all precipitate down-dashed
Rattling around, loud thundering to the moon." — *Dyer.*

"Loud sounds the air, redoubling strokes on strokes;
On all sides round the forest hurls her oaks
Headlong. Deep echoing groan the thickets brown,
Then rustling, crackling, crashing, thunder down."
Pope's Iliad.

§ 276. Not only single words but the entire structure of the sentence may bear a resemblance to the sound represented.

"Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,
The hoarse rough verse should like the torrent roar."
Pope: Essay on Criticism.

"What! like Sir Richard, rumbling, rough, and fierce,
With arms, and George, and Brunswick crowd the verse,
Rend with tremendous sounds your ears asunder,
With gun, drum, trumpet, blunderbuss, and thunder?
Then all your muse's softer art display,
Let Carolina smooth the tuneful lay,
Lull with Amelia's liquid name the Nine,
And sweetly flow through all the royal line." — *Id.: Sat.* I.

§ 277. In so far as the sensations of sound resemble in their effects on the mind, or in other relations, those of the other senses, words, regarded merely as sounds, may be imitative also of such other sensations.

In this case, the imitation is not direct, as in the case of

sounds; but only indirect, as it is not founded immediately on the qualities of the sensation, but on the relations. This analogy between the sound and the object represented greatly assists the impression to be made in the representation.

Of the sensations susceptible of this analogous imitation in style, those of sight are the most common; and of the latter class, those of motion.

Here the imitation is more frequently effected by connected than by single words. The following will serve as exemplifications: —

"Deep in those woods the black-cap and thrush still hooted and clang unweariedly; she heard also the cawing of crows, and the scream of the loon; the tinkle of bells, the lowing of cows, and the bleating of sheep were distinctly audible. Her own robin, on the butternut below, began his long, sweet, many-toned carol; the tree-toad chimed in with its loud, trilling chirrup; and frogs from the pond and mill brook, crooled, chubbed, and croaked." — *Margaret.*

"While the cock, with lively din,
Scatters the rear of darkness thin,
And to the stack or the barn-door,
Stoutly struts his dames before."
Milton: L'Allegro.

"Oft on a plat of rising ground,
I hear the far-off curfew sound,
Over some wide watered shore,
Swinging slow with sullen roar:"
Id.: Il Penseroso.

"With easy course
The vessels glide; *unless their speed be stopped*
By dead calms, that oft lie on these smooth seas,
When every zephyr sleeps."

§ 278. Mental states, in so far as they may be conceived of as analogous to the sensations of sound, may also be imitated in language.

The range of this species of imitation is very wide; although the imitation is less direct and obvious than in the other species. As all those words in language which denote mental states as well as all abstract terms were, originally, expressive only of objects of sense, and could be transferred

to this abstract use only on condition of a correspondence between the world of thought and the world of sense, we might rationally expect that language would furnish frequent instances of this species of imitation. In point of fact, we find that in able writers the style is ever colored by the mental state. Anger, kindness, vehemence, gentleness, and the like, have each a language, a style of expression peculiar to themselves. And this peculiarity of expression is to be traced in the character of the language regarded as a complication of sound merely. The following will serve as illustrations of this correspondence in the sound to the sense : —

" In those deep solitudes and awful cells,
Where heavenly pensive Contemplation dwells,
And ever-musing Melancholy reigns."
Pope : Eloise to Abelard.

" With eyes upraised, as one inspired,
Pale Melancholy sat retired,
And from her mild, sequestered seat
In notes by distance made more sweet,
Poured through the mellow horn her pensive tone."
Collins : Ode to the Passions.

" But O, how altered was its sprightlier tone,
When Cheerfulness, a nymph of healthiest hue,
Her bow across her shoulders flung,
Her buskins gemmed with morning dew,
Blew an inspiring air, that dale and thicket rung, —
The hunter's call, to Faun and Dryad known." — *Ibid.*

" Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Jest and youthful Jollity,
Quips and cranks and wanton wiles,
Nods and becks and wreathèd smiles,
Such as hang on Hebe's cheek,
And love to live in dimple sleek;
Sport that wrinkled Care derides,
And Laughter holding both his sides;
Come, and trip it as you go,
On the light fantastic toe;
And in thy right hand lead with thee
The mountain-nymph, sweet Liberty."
Milton : L'Allegro.

" Nor shall the wisdom, the moderation, the Christian piety, the constancy of our nobility and commons of England be ever forgotten, whose calm and temperate connivance could sit still and smile out the stormy bluster of men more audacious and precipitant than of solid and deep reach, till their own fury had run itself out of breath, assailing by rash and heady approaches the impregnable situation of our liberty and safety, that laughed such weak enginery to scorn, such poor drifts to make a national war *of a surplice frabble, a tippet scuffle.*" — *Milton : Reformation in England.*

" As one
That listens near a mountain-brook
All through the crash of the near cataract hears
The drumming thunder of the huge fall
At distance." *Tennyson.*

To this class of properties may be referred the grammatical figures of alliteration and paronomasia ; the one a play upon the form of the word, — its orthography ; the other, on its meaning. These figures owe their peculiar beauty to the fact that in using them the speaker indicates a controlling reference to the nature of language as consisting of sounds, — the sound of the word suggesting the use of them.

§ 279. ALLITERATION is the repetition of the same letter in successive words ; as " Apt alliteration's artful aid." — *Churchill.*

" The abundant Latin then old Latium lastly left." — *Drayton.*

" Already doubled is the cape: the bay
Receives the prow that proudly spurns the spray." — *Byron.*

" Non potui paucis plura plane proloqui." — *Plautus.*

" O Tite, tute Tati, tibi tanta, tyranne, tulisti." — *Ennius.*

Alliteration was a chief element in Anglo-Saxon and the earliest English poetry. It was a law of the verse that at least one accented syllable in each of three successive measures should begin with the same letter. Thus in the beginning of the " Vision of Piers Ploughman " : —

" In a somer seson whan softe was the sonne,
I shoop me into shroudes as I a sheep werre,
In habite as an heremite unholy of werkes,
Wente wide in this world wondres to here."

It has continued to be a favorite element with all writers sensitive to sound, although not elevated to the rank of a reg-

ular constituent characteristic of verse-form. It abounds in Spenser, and also in some of our more recent poets.

"But direful deadly black both leaf and bloom,
Fit to adorn the dead and deck the dreary tomb."
Faerie Queen.

"She, of naught afraid,
Through woods and wasteness wide him daily sought." — *Ibid.*

"But welcome now, my Lord, in wele or woe;
Whose presence I have lackt too long a day;
And fye on fortune mine avowed foe,
Whose wrathful wreakes themselves do now allay." — *Ibid.*

"Danger and death a dread delight inspire." — *Rogers.*

"And fairy forests fringed the evening sky." — *Id.*

"To muse with monks and meditate alone." — *Id.*

"With treasured tales and legendary lore." — *Id.*

In the same author we find it everywhere: "The heart's light laugh;" "wildest wing;" "Giants and Genii;" "forest feats;" "startling step;" "infant innocence;" "weary wing;" "wakes to weep;" "that musing, melancholy mood."

This figure is doubtless often unconsciously used by writers and speakers whose ears have become attuned to such assonances; and if not excessive, is ever agreeable. It is also often elaborated with patient effort, as in the following verse composed in 1800, on the occasion of a gentleman by the name of Lee planting a lane with lilacs: —

"Let lovely lilacs line Lee's lonely lane."

Shakespeare ridicules pedantic alliteration in his "Holofernes": —

"The preyful princess pierced and pricked a pretty pleasing pricket."

§ 280. The PARONOMASIA is the use of words in connection that are different in sense but similar in sound; as —

"Fortune foretuned the dying notes of Rome,
Till I thy consul sole consoled thy doom." — *Dryden.*

"O fortunatam natam, me consule, Romam." — *Juvenal.*

"Nam inceptio amentium non amantium." — *Terence.*

The Pun consists in the use of a word in a double sense. It is sometimes regarded as a species of paronomasia; but it differs from it in this respect, that the play of thought turns more exclusively on the sense, while in the paronomasia the similarity in sound is the prominent characteristic. The pun has been abundantly decried as a low species of wit; but it was formally treated by Aristotle and Cicero as legitimate and worthy of rhetorical consideration, and is found in our best modern authors. Used with moderation, and without show of labor and effort, it is an unquestionable ornament of discourse. It abounds in Shakespeare, and is sanctioned by the severe taste of Milton.

"Lastly, he has resolved 'that neither person nor cause shall improper him.' I may mistake his meaning, for the word ye hear is 'improper.' But whether, if not a person, yet a good parsonage or impropriation bought out for him would not 'improper' him, because there may be a quirk in the word, I leave it for a canonist to resolve.

"And thus ends this section, or rather dissection of himself, short ye will say, both in breadth and extent, as in our own praises it ought to be." — *Milton.*

In humorous discourse it naturally finds a more ready use; as —

"A second Thomas, or, at once,
To name them all, a second *Duns*." — *Hudibras.*

"Hard is the job to launch the desperate pun,
A *pun-job* dangerous as the Indian one." — *Holmes.*

Very closely allied to this figure is the use of a word in different meanings in different relations in the same sentence; as —

"Cold sprinkling hardens men and cabbage." — *Richter.*

§ 281. Words are SYMBOLICAL when they designate sensible objects or scenes which symbolize or image forth the sense.

Words generally, as before observed, are originally symbolical. This is true even of such as denote spiritual objects and conditions. Some sensible object or scene is taken as

the mirror of the thought to be conveyed. How the mind is enabled to discern a purely mental object or relation in this reflection, whether by some analogy of the scene or object to the thought, as, for instance, a similarity in the effect upon the mind, or by association or otherwise, it is not necessary here to explain. It is sufficient to note the fact that sensible scenes and objects do reflect spiritual objects and states, as also abstract relations; and especially when, as in language, the attention is set to discern the thought revealed in the symbol. The symbolism of thought is treated in detail in the author's "Art of Composition," Part VII., where are presented all the classes of symbols in discourse, with copious exercises in each, and the laws regulating their use.

The peculiar force and beauty imparted to style by this use of words may be accounted for, in part at least, by several distinct considerations. First, this use of words is in accordance with the proper nature of language. Language, originally and properly, is not a mere collection of arbitrary signs, like those of algebra, which in themselves import nothing. Words are more like the diagrams of geometry, in which, without previous explanation, may be perceived the truth of the propositions which they severally exemplify. Although, in the process of language, it becomes more and more like algebraic signs and less and less symbolical and picture-like, it yet retains to a greater or less extent this original characteristic; and so far as language is used in accordance with its primitive and uncorrupted nature, it pleases and impresses.

Secondly, in this use of language, the imagination is directly addressed and put in play. The hearer fixes his eye on the sensible object or scene, and his imagination forms the picture of the thought. He thus becomes himself a creative artist; and the forms, to which his own imagination gives birth, gratify at once the instinctive dotings of paternity and the love of originating, inherent in our nature. In-

terpreting a mere language of signs, where words only stand for ideas, and do not represent them through sensible objects, is, on the other hand, a dull exercise of memory. If the language of modern civilization, in which science prevails over poetry, is more precise, more exact and unambiguous, it is yet less pleasing and less impressive than the rich imagery and life of earlier dialects. It is the high prerogative of an accomplished speaker to unite the precision of the modern with the vivid beauty and force of the primitive diction.

§ 282. In the selection of words with a view to this beauty of style, the more specific are to be preferred to the more generic.

In the following extract from Mr. Sheridan's speech against Hastings, it will be apparent that, instead of the specific or individual objects which are so forcibly presented to the mind in it, and by which the sentiment is so vividly communicated, the whole thought might be as fully and accurately exhibited in more generic language, but the force and richness of the expression would be lost: —

"It is true he did not direct the guards, the famine, and the bludgeons; he did not weigh the fetters, nor number the lashes to be inflicted on his victims: but yet he is equally guilty as if he had borne an active and personal share in each transaction."

The thought would have been as fully conveyed if he had simply said: It is true he did not give out the orders for the arrest and the torture of his victims; nor himself carry these orders into execution; but yet &c.

§ 283. It is necessary, in securing this property to style, that truth to the actual object or scene used to symbolize the thought be strictly observed.

This implies exactness in the particular representations of an object, and congruousness in its parts if complex.

In the following extract the mind labors to conceive the

representation in consequence of being unable to unite the incongruous features of the heterogeneous objects presented : —

"Though in their corrupt notions of divine worship, they are apt to multiply their gods, yet this earthly devotion is seldom paid to above one idol at a time, whose ear they please with less murmuring and much more skill than when they share the lading or even hold the helm."

The following are examples of an opposite character in this respect, in which the sensible representation is exact and congruous throughout : —

"For Truth, I know not how, hath this unhappiness fatal to her, ere she can come to the trial and inspection of the understanding: being to pass through many little wards and limits of the several affections and desires, she cannot shift it, but must put on such colors and attire as those pathetic handmaids of the soul please to lead her in to their queen; and if she find so much favor with them, they let her pass in her own likeness; if not, they bring her into the presence habited and colored like a notorious falsehood. And contrary, when any Falsehood comes that way, if they like the errand she brings, they are so artful to counterfeit the very shape and visage of Truth, that the understanding, not being able to discern the fucus which these enchantresses with such cunning have laid upon the features sometimes of Truth, sometimes of Falsehood interchangeably, sentences for the most part one for the other at the first blush, according to the subtle imposture of these sensual mistresses that keep the ports and passages between her and the object." — *Milton.*

"So is the imperfect, unfinished spirit of a man. It lays the foundation of a holy resolution, and strengthens it with vows and arts of persecution: it raises up the walls, — sacraments and prayers, reading and holy ordinances. And holy actions begin with a slow motion, and the building stays, and the spirit is weary, and the soul is naked and exposed to temptation, and in the days of storm takes in every thing that can do it mischief; and it is faint and sick, listless and tired, and it stands till its own weight wearies the foundation, and then declines to death and sad disorder." — *J. Taylor.*

A very common fault in respect of these properties is in attributing to an object properties or relations that do not belong to it. Thus De Quincey says: "The hoar of ages may have withdrawn some of these models from active competition." *Withdrawing* is not a congruous attribute of the *hoar of ages.* So in the sentence, "These perplexities depend for their illumination on the style," there is the same

fault of incongruousness in representing *perplexities* as susceptible of *illumination.*

EXERCISES ON THE SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES. *Point out and correct the faults in the following extracts : —*

The seeds of a noble ambition were extinguished.

There is a time when factions, by the vehemence of their own fermentation, stun and disable one another.

The great Byron wept in faultless meter.

"She was a very beautiful woman, of a noble spirit, and there was a dignity in her grief amidst all the wildness of her transport, which, methought, struck me with an instinct of sorrow, that, before I was sensible of what it was to grieve, seized my very soul, and has made pity the weakness of my heart ever since." — *Steele.*

"Having been so frequently overwhelmed with her tears, before I knew the cause of my affliction, I imbibed commiseration, remorse, and an unmanly gentleness of mind, which has since ensnared me into ten thousand calamities." — *Ibid.*

"Mr. Shenstone was possessed of that warm imagination which made him ever foremost in the pursuit of flying happiness." — *Goldsmith.*

"He views beneath him all the combat of the elements, clouds at his feet, and thunders darting upward from their bosoms." — *Ibid.*

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE GRAMMATICAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 284. THE GRAMMATICAL PROPERTIES of style may be distributed into three species, according as they respect *the forms of words*, *their connection*, or *their meaning*.

The departments of grammar which respectively treat of these several species are Etymology, Syntax, and Lexicography. Etymology presides over the words introduced into the language and the forms which they take; syntax, over the arrangement and relations of words; and lexicography assigns to them their meaning. The several species of the grammatical properties of style are founded, accordingly, on these departments of grammar, and derive from them their regulative principles.

Inasmuch as these grammatical principles are fixed and imperative, the observance of them in style is indispensable. Hence it is more convenient to consider these properties in their negative aspect; and to exhibit them not in the forms in which, as observed, they impart beauty to discourse, but in which, as they are disregarded, the discourse becomes thereby faulty.

Before illustrating the several faults against grammatical purity in style, it becomes necessary to ascertain the standard of purity. Numerous and weighty authorities determine this to be *good use*. The language of Horace is: —

"Usus
Quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi."

Quintilian only says use is the most certain rule: "Certissima regula in consuetudine."

Dr. Campbell is earnest in maintaining that use is necessarily the sole criterion.

It has been before observed, § 246, that grammatical science is either abstract or historical. The laws of thought, on the one hand, and the laws of articulate sounds, on the other, impose certain necessary conditions on the formation of language. These laws being given, it may be determined beforehand, to a certain extent, what must be the properties of language, or, in other words, the principles of grammar. No use can be characterized as good that violates these universal principles of language.

But, again, there is such a thing as grammatical science, regarded as historical, and founded on inductive grounds. There are in every language certain general laws which control and regulate its development. There are general principles of etymology and syntax, violations of which must be regarded as faults. It is true that sometimes the different principles that preside over the formation of language come in collision with one another, and thus grammatical rules frequently have exceptions. The principles of euphony, thus, frequently, occasion deviations from the common laws of derivation. So, likewise, more purely rhetorical or logical principles modify the operation of proper grammatical rules. Such exceptions are not, however, properly violations of the laws of language. Now no "use" can be allowed to transgress these general principles. If grammatical monstrosities by any mishap exist, a correct taste will shun them, as it does physical deformities in the arts of design.

Back then of use we have both the abstract principles of universal language, and also the inductive principles of particular languages, as guides and criteria of grammatical purity. By these principles use itself must be tried.

Good use is, therefore, only a proximate and presumptive test of purity. While generally its decisions are authoritative, they admit, in their nature, of being questioned, and must themselves submit to higher authority. The expressions

"Xerxes his host" and "had wore" have had all the prescribed characteristics of good use, "reputable, national, and present." No good writer would now admit them into elevated discourse. We may accordingly lay down the principle which regulates this matter as it is expressed in the following section.

§ 285. THE STANDARD OF GRAMMATICAL PURITY is to be found proximately in good use; but ultimately in the fixed principles of grammatical science, that is, in the principles of etymology, syntax, and lexicography.

§ 286. That use alone is to be regarded as good which possesses the following characteristics, namely, that it is *national*, as opposed to provincial and technical; *reputable*, or sanctioned by the best authors; and *present*, as opposed to what is obsolete.

§ 287. Offenses against grammatical purity may be distributed in reference to their occasions into the following species, namely,

1. *Archaism*, or obsolete use;
2. *Provincialism*, or the use of what is not national, or is confined to a district or province;
3. *Idiotism*, or the use which is confined to an individual;
4. *Technicality*, or use peculiar to a science, a pursuit, a sect, or trade;
5. *Alienism*, or use derived from a foreign language.

It is to be remarked that each of these species includes offenses against any of the departments of grammar, whether etymology, syntax, or lexicography. An archaism, thus, may either be a barbarism, solecism, or impropriety.

§ 288. A fault in respect to the settled forms of words, that is, an offense against the etymology of a language, is denominated a BARBARISM.

§ 289. A barbarism may lie in the use of a radical word not sanctioned by the etymology of a language; or in an unauthorized mode of deriving, inflecting, or compounding words.

The English language admits more freely the introduction of new radical words than most other languages. Words of Latin or Greek origin it receives without hesitancy, and subjects them in the process of naturalizing to but trifling modifications. So common has this adulteration of the language been, that a barbarism of this species is hardly reckoned a fault, and the preservation of a pure Anglo-Saxon style has consequently become a positive excellence.

The following are barbarisms in respect to the use of WORDS NOT AUTHORIZED: *Approbate, eventuate, heft, jeopardize, missionate, preventative, reluctate, repetitious, peek* for *peep, numerosity, finity, effluxion, inchoation, anon, erewhile, whenas, peradventure, obligate, memorize, bating, pending, hearken, excogitate, markedly, resurrect.*

Barbarisms in INFLECTION: *Stricken* * for *struck, het* for *heated, pled* for *pleaded, lit* for *lighted, proven* † for *proved, had n't ought* for *ought not, had rather have gone* for *would rather have gone, have drank* for *have drunk, have began, invinciblest, successfulest.*

Barbarisms in DERIVATION: *Systemize, deputize, happify, firstly* for *first, illy* for *ill, behooveful, securement, forgetable, indebtment.*

Barbarisms in COMPOUND WORDS: *Sidehill* ‡ for *hill-side, sundown* ‡ for *sunset, fellow-countrymen* for *countrymen; pre-seeing, foredetermine, free-volitional, unfurthersome, secundogeniture.*

Among barbarisms are to be enumerated unauthorized derivatives and compound words the parts of which are from

* Poetic use. Many words are admissible in poetry which must be pronounced barbarisms in prose.
† Technical use.
‡ Colloquial use.

different languages. Many words of this class, chiefly Latin or French combined with original English or Anglo-Saxon words, are in approved use. Indeed, so thoroughly naturalized are many affixes and prefixes, as well as stem-words of Latin origin, that they are freely joined with those of Anglo-Saxon origin. To the same stem we often find in fact affixes from both languages, forming pairs of words with slightly varying import, as *rigidness, rigidity; nobleness, nobility; humaneness, humanity; laxness, laxity; effeminateness, effeminacy; matronly, matronal.* The general rule is to avoid hybrid compounds unless of undoubted authority.

The same principle applies to phrases. When there is liberty of choice, principal words and modifying words should be of kindred origin. Thus Macaulay writes "felicity of expression," although *happiness* is in itself, being of Anglo-Saxon origin, preferable.

§ 290. A fault in respect to the grammatical construction of the sentence is called a SOLECISM.

There are recognized four principles of sentence-construction, — two regulating the agreement in inflection and the arrangement of the words, and two regulating the kind and number of words to be supplied.

1. *Grammatical Concord*, including agreement and government, requires the proper grammatical inflections in the use of words related to one another in the sentence. Instances of faults are: —

The diversity of these two remarkable cases occurring so nearly at the same time and in such similar circumstances are yet very apparent.

Whom do they calculate will be appointed?

They could not prevent his name being brought before the convention.

I knew it was them.

The "Lives of the Poets" were written by Johnson at a later date.

The army were sick from fevers contracted by their long campaign in the lowlands.

The jurisdiction of the higher and of the lower courts in this class of cases are concurrent.

Good order in our affairs, not mean savings, produce great profits.

Each of the four leading writers had their productions recited.

The winter has not been so severe as we expected it to have been.

Was he ever so great, such conduct would debase him.

One of the most difficult and formidable parts of the Alps that is ever passed over by mortal men.

It has generally been observed that the European population of the United States is tall and characterized by a pale and sallow countenance.

Who ever thinks of learning the grammar of their own tongue before they are very good grammarians?

2. *Grammatical Arrangement* requires the proper grammatical order in the use of both the principal and also the subordinate elements of the sentence. Instances of faults are: —

Than the analogies just given I know of none stronger.

Study to unite with firmness gentle manners.

It was a case of unpardonable breach of trust and gross disregard of official duty, to say the least.

The good man not only deserves the respect but the love of his fellow-beings.

In that event most of the buildings in the vicinity would have been undoubtedly destroyed.

3. *Grammatical Propriety* requires the use of the proper grammatical element. Instances of faults are: —

This is a very different case than that.

The general was attended with his staff.

Such proceedings are nothing else but treason.

No sorrow is so bitter but it can be mitigated by sympathy.

They were arrived within three days' journey of the spice country.

The works of Deity; better, of the Deity.

Vices in community; better, in the community.

4. *Grammatical Precision* requires that the just number of words to express the thought be employed, and no more. It forbids excess and deficiency. The two opposite faults under this rule accordingly are *pleonasms* and *ellipses*. Faults are: —

The business of the government engrossed the whole of his attention.

He treated them with the most supreme contempt.

We need not, nor do not, confine his operations to narrow limits.

When he was retired to his tent, they sat silently a long time.

Had he have laid low he would not have been wounded.

The rich and poor are alike mortal.

They may now bring themselves to a better end than ever France would have brought them.

It is better to live on a little than outlive a great deal.

She was really in that sad condition that her friend represented her.

There are principles in man which ever have, and ever will, incline him to offend.

§ 291. A fault in regard to the settled meaning of words, that is, an offense against the lexicography of a language, is denominated a LEXICAL IMPROPRIETY.

§ 292. Improprieties are either in single words or in phrases.

I. IMPROPRIETIES IN SINGLE WORDS.

1. *Adjectives.*

"The *alone* principle," for "the sole principle."

"A *likely* boy," for "promising."

"This wilderness world."

"He did not injure him *any*," for "at all."

"The work was *incident* to decay," for "liable."

"Such words were *derogatory*," for "degrading."

"*Obnoxious* doctrines," for "hurtful doctrines."

2. *Nouns and Pronouns.*

"The *observation* of the rule," for "the observance."

"He was in *a temper*," for "bad temper" or "passion."

"The *balance* of them," for "remainder."

"At a wide *remove*," for "distance."

3. *Verbs.*

"I *admire* to hear," for "I like to hear."

"I *admire* that he should do it," for "I wonder," etc.

"I *expect* he did it," for "suspect."

"He does not *fellowship* with him," for "hold fellowship."

"I *learned* him the lesson," for "I taught."

"He was *raised* in China," for "brought up."

"Mr. L. *supplied* at Kingston," for "preached."

"They *calculate* to go," for "intend."

"There let him *lay*," for "lie."

"The council was *setting*," for "sitting."

"To *fall* trees," for "to fell."

"I *reckon* he did."

"He *conducts* well," for "conducts himself."

"It was *predicated* on other grounds."

"The work *progresses* rapidly."

"Such doctrines *revolt* us."

"The proceedings of the cabinet have not *transpired*," for "been made public."

"Property *appreciates*," for "rises in value."

4. *Conjunctions and Adverbs.*

"*Like* he did," for "as he did."
"*Directly* they came, I went away," for "as soon as."
"He was *quite* sick," for "very."
"I feel as *though*," for "if."
"Equally *as* well," for "equally well."
"*As* old or older than tradition."
"He is *usually* well," for "as well as usual."
"*Measurably* rich," for "considerably rich."

5. *Prepositions.*

"Averse *from*," instead of "averse to."
"In comparison *to*," for "with."
"In accordance *to*," for "with."
"Militate *with*," for "against."
"Confide *on*," for "in."
"Independent *on*," for "of."

II. Improprieties in Phrases.

Celebrates the Church of England as the most perfect of all *others*.

I had like to have gotten *one or two* broken heads.

It approaches nearly twice as near the sun as the earth is.

Exercises on the Grammatical Properties. *Name and correct the faults in the following extracts:* —

Indeed it would go hard but a Spaniard would make out a pedigree for his hero.

It is yet more marked so day by day.

Ending their game under another sky than had witnessed its commencement.

Let you and I be happy.

It is no good to watch for it any more.

"We might ask with much more propriety at him the question which a reviewer asked at Carlyle." — *Gilfillan.*

He calculates to return next autumn.

The oligarchy of the royal council, of which he reproved the vices and resisted the selfishness.

The opportunity of fame, of which the love is not the exclusive infirmity of noble minds, was placed, etc.

The purpose of discovering the Mississippi, of which the tales of the natives had published the magnificence, sprung from Marquette himself.

Her uncle would be pleased for her to marry him.

How noble is it in comparison to eloquent words without heroic insight.

I expect that the ship had sailed.

He was considerable of a musician.

Newton has the glory of inventing the law of gravitation; while to Davy belongs the glory of discovering the safety-lamp.

We consider that the bank was solvent at the time.

"Would soon give pleasure to and be required by the ear." — *Hallam.*

"Known in our finity." — *Id.*

"Nor had they partaken in the love of antiquity." — *Id.*

"Roger Bacon has ever been supposed by some to have divined the method of its restoration, which has long after been adopted." — *Id.*

"He is quite of another order of scholars from his predecessors." — *Id.*

The historian considers no amount of courage and ability should win forgiveness for willful oppression.

The name of Macaulay will have no lowly place in the long roll of English worthies.

"A certain twinkle in the eyes of him." — *Carlyle.*

"He was got poisoned." — *Id.*

"Recognizable as one of the remarkablest of mankind." — *Id.*

"We have said nothing of the Ascanier Markgraves, Electors of Brandenburg, all this while, nor in these limits can we now or henceforth say almost any thing." — *Id.*

"With all-its-in-that-day almost unexampled simplicity and naturalness, his [Cowper's] style is the very reverse of a slovenly or irregular one." — *Craik.*

"Squeezed out his eyes at such a rate as one could see nothing but the white." — *Swift.*

"It was among the great misfortunes of Jack to bear a huge personal resemblance with his brother Peter." — *Id.*

"In comparison of the former." — *Addison.*

Elizabeth stood excommunicated of the Pope.

With qualifications different to his.

Nor doth vice only thin a nation, but also debaseth it by a puny, degenerate race.

In that mighty struggle between the first intellects of this or any other country.

"I confess myself to have one of those dull souls that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas." — *Locke.*

What an inferior creature is not the mussel clinging to the rock on the sea-shore, when compared to the May-fly rising on golden wings through the balmy air of spring!

One is just as abhorrent in the eyes of all intelligent and Christian men as the other.

"The baron looked eagerly round for some one at whom he might inquire the cause of this alarming novelty." — *W. Scott.*

"Of whose judgment he had nearly an opinion as high as of his valor." — *Id.*

The ostrich supposes by burying her eyes in the sand to avoid the huntsman's arrow.

"I had some opinion of my son's prudence." — *Goldsmith.*

"Mr. Burchell dissuaded her with great ardor." — *Id.*

"Let us not increase the hardships of life by dissension among each other." — *Id.*

Most all the members had now assembled.

It would not be safe to do it in almost any case.

In many of his observations we cordially agree.

The former is the true hypothesis of this subject.

They adopted such an enormous multitude as entirely to innovate the condition of the country.

Her mind was almost distraught by the sudden reverse in her fortunes.

I do not remember one regrettable passage in the letter.

It is well worth all the labor it costs to resolutely be resigned.

The Thirty Years' War had the effect of uniting the most different people.

He eats, sleeps, and shares all the privations to which his men may be subjected.

The commander of a division or separate brigade may appoint general courts-martial, and confirm, execute, pardon, and mitigate their sentences.

One, though he be excellent and the chief, is not to be imitated alone.

The deserts are entirely barren, except where they are found to produce serpents, and in such quantities that some extensive plains are almost entirely covered with them.

He was equally afraid to offend the Emperor, of whose power he had recently had so painful an experience, or the English king, whose support he desired to secure in case of future dangers.

That ruling of the spirit which is needful to rightly meet disappointment, brings out the best qualities that can be found in man.

It is much talked of by leading men of the necessity of changing the mode of proceeding.

An assault was made upon his conjugal feelings by the sudden at the moment, though from lingering illness often previously expected, death of Mr. Burney's second wife.

"Removing the term from Westminster, sitting the Parliament, was illegal." — *Macaulay.*

"We need not, nor do not, confine the purposes of God.' — *Bentley.*

"I shall endeavor to live hereafter suitable to a man in my station." — *Addison.*

"He behaved himself conformable to that blessed example." — *Sprat.*

"I can never think so very mean of him." — *Bentley.*

"The chiefest of which was known by the name of Archon among the Grecians." — *Dryden.*

"The author is informed, that the bookseller has prevailed on several gentlemen to write some explanatory notes, for the goodness of which he is not to answer, having never seen any of them, nor intends it, till they appear in print." — *Swift.*

"Nor is it then a welcome guest, affording only an uneasy sensation, and brings always with it a mixture of concern and compassion." — *Fielding.*

"Base, ungrateful boy! miserable as I am, yet I cannot cease to love thee. My love even now speaks in my resentment. I am still your father, nor can your usage form my heart anew." — *Goldsmith.*

"But the temper, as well as knowledge, of a modern historian, require a more sober and temperate language." — *Gibbon.*

"Neither death nor torture were sufficient to subdue the minds of Cargill and his intrepid followers." — *Fox.*

Each of these words imply some pursuit or object relinquished.

"'T is observable that every one of the letters bear date after his banishment." — *Bentley.*

"Magnus, with four thousand of his supposed accomplices, were put to death." — *Gibbon.*

"These feasts were celebrated to the honor of Osiris, whom the Greeks called Dionysius, and is the same with Bacchus." — *Swift.*

Whether one person or more was concerned in the business was not ascertained.

Those sort of favors do real injury under the appearance of kindness.

Every person, whatever be their station, is bound by the duties of morality and religion.

He dare not do it at present, and he need not.

Whether he will or no, I care not.

We do those things frequently that we repent of afterward.

Many persons will not believe but what they are free from prejudices.

"I am equally an enemy to a female dunce or a female pedant." — *Goldsmith.*

"King Charles, and more than him, the duke and the Popish faction, were at liberty to form new schemes." — *Bolingbroke.*

"The drift of all his sermons was, to prepare the Jews for the reception of a prophet, mightier than him, and whose shoes he was not worthy to bear." — *Atterbury.*

"He whom ye pretend reigns in heaven, is so far from protecting the miserable sons of men, that he perpetually delights to blast the sweetest flowers in the garden of Hope." — *Hawkesworth.*

"The only actions to which we have always seen, and still see all of them intent, are such as tend to the destruction of one another." — *Burke.*

"To which, as Bishop Burnet tells us, the Prince of Orange was willing to comply." — *Bolingbroke.*

"The discovery he made and communicated with his friends." — *Swift.*

"The people being only convoked upon such occasions, as, by this institution of Romulus, fell into their cognizance." — *Id.*

"The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness or derogation to their sufficiency to rely upon counsel." — *Bacon's Essays.*

"The esteem which Philip had conceived of the embassador." — *Hume.*

"The Christians were driven out of all their Asiatic pos-

sessions, in acquiring of which incredible numbers of men had perished." — *Robertson.*

"I do likewise dissent with the 'Examiner.'" — *Addison.*

"Dr. Johnson, with whom I am sorry to differ in opinion, has treated it as a work of merit." — *Scott.*

"The memory of Lord Peter's injuries produced a degree of hatred and spite, which had a much greater share of inciting him, than regards after his father's commands." — *Swift.*

You stand to him in the relation of a son; of consequence you should obey him.

It is no more but his due.

The ship lays in the harbor.

"He will become enamored for virtue and patriotism, and acquire a detestation of vice, cruelty, and corruption." — *Goldsmith.*

"Having been for a fortnight together, they are then mighty good company to be sure." — *Id.*

PART II. — SUBJECTIVE PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW.

§ 293. THE SUBJECTIVE PROPERTIES of style are those which are determined to discourse by the mental condition of the speaker. § 244.

Speech is the expression of thought, not as abstract and, so to speak, separate from the thinking mind, not of mere truth or of ideas, but rather of the thinking states of the living speaker. Just so far as it becomes the mere representative of abstract propositions, it sinks from its proper character and elevation. On the other hand, just so far as it is an expression of the thinking mind itself, partaking of its individual life and glow, it fulfills more perfectly its proper object, and consequently is more pleasing and more impressive.

§ 294. The mental condition of the speaker is determined by different conspiring influences; as, —

1. By the natural and acquired characteristics of his own mind, whether common to all mind or peculiar to himself;

2. By his physical structure and habits;

3. By the relations which he sustains to those whom he addresses; and,

4. By the particular subject and occasion of his discourse.

Mind has properties as mind; and discourse as the expression of mind must exhibit, more or less, these properties. There are only two, however, which demand particular consideration here. They are these, — that mind is a thinking activity; and that it thinks continuously.

The analogies of external Nature, which is ever multifarious and diverse, lead us at once to the conjecture that there are also native idiosyncrasies of mind; that each thinking, like each material existence, has peculiarities of its own. At all events, in the development of mind under diverse influences, there arises a great diversity of mental habits.

The physical structure has its influence, not only in determining the mental habits and modes of thought generally, but, also, particularly in the framing of thought for expression. A narrow chest and weak lungs reject long periods and vehement harangue.

Further, *the professional standing* and *official character* of the speaker should be regarded in style. There is a proper dignity belonging to the pulpit; and the elevated and commanding tones of the general would be ludicrous in the familiar discourse of colloquial equality.

The subject, likewise, and *the occasion* generally of the discourse naturally impress themselves on the mind of the speaker and leave on it their own peculiar characters. The style, consequently, ever shaping itself by the state of the speaker's mind at the time, should be modified by these outward circumstances.

§ 295. The Subjective Properties of style include those of Significance, Continuousness, and Naturalness.

The first two of these properties are founded on the nature of mind itself. So far as discourse is an expression of mind, it must be significant or expressive of thought.

Thought, moreover, is continuous. The mind, and more especially when cultivated and disciplined, does not act by

sudden impulses in irregular, disconnected thoughts: the unity of its aim imposes on its movements the character of progressiveness and consecutiveness.

The property of naturalness is founded on the individuality of thought as the product of one distinct mind peculiar in its native structure and its acquired habits, and influenced in its action by peculiar circumstances of place and time.

CHAPTER II.

OF SIGNIFICANCE IN STYLE.

§ 296. SIGNIFICANCE in style implies two things: —

First, That the speaker have some thought to communicate; and,

Secondly, That the words employed actually express some meaning.

Sometimes a speaker has no desire to communicate any thought; but speaks for some other object, as to occupy time, or to amuse or astonish his audience. This kind of discourse has been denominated *spurious oratory*.

It sometimes happens, moreover, that through mere vagueness or vacuity of thought a speaker or writer will use the forms of speech with no thought or sentiment expressed in them. This kind of style is termed *the nonsensical*.

§ 297. SPURIOUS ORATORY, or discourse in which the speaker does not design to communicate any thought, is either,

For the purpose of appearing to say something;

For occupying time; or

For entertaining his audience with words of lofty pretensions, but of no significance.

The first species named is a kind of verbal or rhetorical sophistry, in which want of argument is disguised under the mere dress of words.

The second is very common in deliberative bodies where,

to prevent immediate action and delay a decision, a speaker occupies the attention of the assembly with the show of discussion.

The third is a species of rhetorical jugglery, and sometimes appears even in parts of grave and serious discourse, when vanity and love of applause, or perhaps a worse principle, lead to a sacrifice of the high end of speaking to the gratification of a low personal feeling.

§ 298. THE NONSENSICAL in style proceeds from vacuity of thought. The various species of it are *the puerile*, *the learned*, *the profound*, and *the marvelous*.

Dr. Campbell, in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," has ably treated of this part of style; and has indicated at length the causes of it. The species enumerated are those described in his work. The following extracts will exemplify them: —

1. *The Puerile.* "If 't is asked whence arises this harmony or beauty of language? The answer is obvious. Whatever renders a period sweet and pleasant makes it also graceful: a good ear is the gift of Nature; it may be much improved but not acquired by art. Whoever is possessed of it will scarcely need dry critical precepts to enable him to judge of a true rhythmus, and melody of composition. Just numbers, accurate proportions, a musical symphony, magnificent figures, and that *decorum* which is the result of all these, are *unison* to the human mind; we are so framed by Nature, that their charm is irresistible. Hence all ages and nations have been smit with the love of the muses." — *Geddes on the Composition of the Ancients.*

"The cadence comprehends that poetical style which animates every line, that propriety which gives strength and expression, that numerosity which renders the verse smooth, flowing, and harmonious, that significancy which marks the passions, and in many cases makes the sound an echo to the sense." — *Goldsmith.*

2. *The Learned.* "Although we read of several properties attributed to God in Scripture, as wisdom, goodness, justice, etc., we must not apprehend them to be several powers, habits, or qualities, as they are in us; for as they are in God, they are neither distinguished from one another, nor from his nature or essence in whom they are said to be. In whom they are said to be; for, to speak properly, they are not in him, but are his very essence or nature itself; which acting severally upon several objects, seems to us to

act from several properties or perfections in him; whereas, all the difference is only in our different apprehensions of the same thing. God in himself is a most simple and pure act, and therefore cannot have any thing in him, but what is that most simple and pure act itself." — *Beveridge's Sermons.*

3. *The Profound.* "'T is agreed that in all governments there is an absolute and unlimited power, which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole body wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal spirits in general, the body moves and acts by a consent of all its parts." — *Swift.*

4. *The Marvelous.* "Nature in herself is unseemly, and he who copies her servilely and without artifice will always produce something poor and of a mean taste. What is called loads in colors and lights can only proceed from a profound knowledge in the values of colors, and from an admirable industry which makes the painted objects appear more true, if I may say so, than the real ones. In this sense it may be asserted, that in Rubens' pieces, Art is above Nature, and Nature only a copy of that great master's works." — *Dr. Piles.*

The nonsensical appears not unfrequently in translations in which the words and grammatical construction of the original are followed only in respect to the form; and the particular thought of the author escapes attention.

The following will serve for illustration: —

"Let Rhetoric therefore be a power or faculty to consider in every subject what is therein contained proper to persuade."

This sentence extracted from a translation of Aristotle's "Rhetoric" by the translators of the "Art of Thinking," conveys no meaning. Rhetoric is not a power or faculty to *consider* in any sense that can be attached to the expression; and we can form no notion of what it is to "consider *in a subject* what is contained in it."

The following is another extract from the same work, and is liable to the same censure: —

"Wherefore also Rhetoric seems to personate politics; and they who challenge the knowledge of it, claim that knowledge partly through ignorance, partly through arrogance, and partly upon other human reasons; for it is a kind of particle and similitude of logic, as we have said in the beginning."

The nonsensical in verse is well satirized by Pope in

his "Song by a Person of Quality." The last stanza is as follows: —

"Thus when Philomela drooping,
Softly seeks her silent mate,
See the bird of Juno stooping,
Melody resigns to fate."

CHAPTER III.

OF CONTINUOUSNESS IN STYLE.

§ 299. CONTINUOUSNESS is that property of style which represents the thought as connected and flowing.

All thought in a cultivated and disciplined mind is continuous, and consequently should be so represented in discourse so far as language will allow. There are limits, indeed, to the degree in which this property can be secured to style. When the mind is roused to a high pitch of passion, and the thoughts come strong and quick, language becomes too inflexible and awkward to serve as its ready expression. Then the thought bursts out, as it best can, in dissevered fragments of speech. It leaps like the electric fluid from cloud to cloud, manifesting itself here and there at wide intervals of space. And yet even then it properly maintains something of the appearance of continuousness, and does not offend the hearer by its violent leaps; but by the very velocity of its movement prevents the notice of its successive radiations, and, like the lightning, gives to its separate flashes the effect of a continuous sheet of light.

Although, thus, strong, impassioned thought leads to a sententious style, and, therefore, such a style becomes highly beautiful, as natural and proper to it, the affectation of such a style when the thought is of the opposite character is extremely disgusting.

The speeches of Lord Chatham and Patrick Henry furnish abundant examples of a sententious expression which, as

warranted by the character of the thought, are fine illustrations of its nature and its proper function.

The following are examples of a style faulty in this respect. The first is an extract from the Euphues of John Lyly; from which romance the name of Euphuism has been derived for this species of style. This kind of writing is not uncommonly combined with labored antithesis and affected quaintness of expression.

A burnt child dreadeth the fire. He that stumbleth twice at one stone is worthy to break his shins. Thou mayest happily forswear thyself, but thou shalt never delude me. I know thee now as readily by thy visard as by thy visage. It is a blind goose that knoweth not a fox from a fern-bush; and a foolish fellow that cannot discern craft from conscience, being once cozened.

§ 300. For expressing this continuity in the thought, language provides, —

In the first place, a great variety of words designed for this very purpose;

Secondly, It allows the use of many forms for this object that are also employed for other purposes of speech; and,

Thirdly, It admits of a peculiar structure of the sentence which is adapted to this sole end.

How great an excellence this is in speech is shown at once in the fact that the human reason in the framing of speech has contrived and furnished so many expedients for binding discourse together, which without them is justly compared to "sand without lime."* It is one of the peculiar excellences of the Greek tongue that it abounds in such connectives, which, while they show the relations of the thought, at the same time give to the expression of it cohesion and compactness.

Of proper connectives we have in language, —

1. Conjunctions of the different species, as copulatives,

* Arena sine calce. — *Seneca.*

disjunctives, adversatives, conditionals, illatives, comparatives, etc.;

2. Relatives of all kinds, whether pronouns or such adverbs as *accordingly*, *thus*, etc., and adjectives of order and others;

3. Forms of expression appropriated to this object, as "*to continue*," "*to add*," etc.

In the general structure of the sentence, also, the property of continuousness or its opposite may be represented to a great degree. The length, the implication, and interdependence of the parts, the arrangement of the several members, the imagery, whether derived more from individual objects or extended scenes, from particular features or connected parts — all these various aspects of the sentence may exhibit, more or less, the continuous or the fragmentary character of the thought.

It should be observed, in this connection, that much will depend on the particular habits of the individual speaker whether his style will more naturally be continuous or sententious and abrupt. Simplicity, earnestness, and directness incline more to short, disconnected expressions. Expanded views, fullness of thought, cautiousness, and wariness lead to a more extended, connected, and continuous style. Continuousness is an excellence only when it is natural. A broken, abrupt, saltatory style, unless obviously determined by the character of the thought, never pleases long. Even the pithy sententiousness of Lord Bacon's style wearies. Strong thought may save such a style; it is not commended by it.

CHAPTER IV.

OF NATURALNESS IN STYLE.

§ 301. NATURALNESS is a property which appears in style so far as it represents the particular state of the speaker's mind at the time of speaking.

The other two subjective properties of style are general, being founded on the nature of thought. Naturalness is founded on the peculiar mental condition of the individual speaker.

Every one has his own modes of thinking. He has his own modes of viewing truth. His feelings have their own peculiar characteristics. The same ideas, even, passing through two different minds, or through the same mind at different times and in different circumstances, become to a considerable degree modified in their character.

Every one has, also, his own manner of expression. His range of words is peculiar. The structure of his sentences is peculiar. His forms of illustration, his images are peculiar.

Every writer and every speaker, thus, has his own manner. One is more diffuse, another more concise; one more lean and jejune, another more copious and luxuriant; one is more florid, another more plain; one more dry, another more rich and succulent; one more nervous or vehement, another more feeble or tame; one more neat and elegant, another more careless and loose; one more elevated and stately, another more familiar and free. The speaker's own manner best becomes him. While he is careful to avoid positive faults, and particularly those of excess, to vary and

enrich with all the various excellences that can be admitted into his style, he should still preserve his own manner, as scarcely any thing is more offensive than a strained, affected, unnatural style of expression. For the purpose of *forming* a style, it may be safe to select a model and strive to imitate. This may, indeed, be recommended within certain limits and in strict subjection to certain principles. Even here, however, the better course is to study the different elements of expression or properties of style, and exercise on those especially in which there is consciousness of deficiency, using other writers or speakers remarkable for those properties rather as exemplifications than as models for imitation. But when actually engaging in the work of conveying thought and feeling to others, the speaker or writer should banish from his mind all thought of this or that style or manner, and allow a free, spontaneous expression to his thoughts. Reason must, indeed, preside over all discourse. But its influence in securing rational discourse should be exerted rather in determining and shaping the mental habits, and thus impressing its high character on every exertion of the mind while the life and beauty of spontaneous action is still preserved. This is, indeed, the end and object of all true intellectual discipline. Excessive care, at the time of constructing discourse, to preserve from every thing faulty, may be injurious. In writing, at least, it is better to write freely and correct afterward. In training, this freedom can be secured only by confining the study and practice to specific elements and processes. Each should be practiced by itself, till it shall be fully mastered and so cause no distraction in subsequent practical efforts.

§ 302. Naturalness in style respects the person, the official character and standing of the speaker, and the subject and occasion of his discourse.

§ 303. *The personal characteristics* of style are determined either more directly by the habits of thought,

however formed, peculiar to the individual speaker, or more indirectly by his physical habits.

There is a singular beauty in that style which is the free and unforced expression of the speaker's own thoughts, with all their peculiar characteristics. It must yet be ever borne in mind that low thoughts and low imagery, even although expressed naturally, must necessarily be offensive. It cannot therefore be too earnestly enjoined on the mind that is forming its habits and character to shun with the utmost care every thing that can vitiate its taste, debase its sentiments, or corrupt the verbal and sensible material in which its thoughts are to embody themselves; and to cultivate assiduously, on the other hand, familiarity with all that is pure and ennobling in thought and sentiment, and all that is lovely and beautiful in language and in the various kinds of sensible imagery employed in expression. Both of these objects should be kept distinctly in view, namely, the purity and elevation of the thought itself, and the material which is used for embodying thought. Every man has, in an important sense, a language of his own. Both the range of words, and the sensible objects and scenes, as well as all the various means of communicating and illustrating thought, are, within certain limits, peculiar to the individual. Hence arises the imperative necessity of care and labor in providing for a pure and elegant as well as a natural expression of thought by avoiding all low associations both of words and images.

The physical condition and habits of the speaker have much to do with his style. Speech is, materially, a physical effort; and must, consequently, be vitally affected by the condition of the body. Especially do the more proper vocal organs, or those parts of the body which are more directly concerned in speaking, exert an influence on style. The culture of the voice in elocution is, therefore, important to the highest skill in constructing discourse for delivery. In preparing such discourse the writer will ever, even if un-

consciously to himself, consult his powers of utterance. Observation abundantly shows how a naturally imaginative and highly impassioned style may be gradually changed into one that is dry and tame by the continued influence of the conviction of an inability appropriately to deliver strongly impassioned discourse. A conscious power and skill to express with effect the most highly wrought discourse will, on the other hand, ever be stimulating to the production of it. Indeed, the imagined effect of his writing as pronounced by himself will ever control the writer in preparing thought for communication to others. He will not write sentences that he cannot pronounce, on the one hand; and, on the other, he will be secretly prompted to write in such a manner as best to display his skill in delivery.

While naturalness requires that discourse be a free representation of the speaker's own mind and character, it forbids all ostentation of peculiarities. This fault of *mannerism* is always exceedingly offensive.

§ 304. *The official character and standing* of the speaker should ever so control style as that while it is not suffered to predominate in his attention at all over his subject or the design of his discourse, it yet shall prevent every thing incompatible with such official standing.

The regard which the speaker must pay to his official standing and relations must be a controlling one; and yet only in subordination to that which he is to pay to other things. Official propriety is only one, and a subordinate one, of those species of propriety which must appear in discourse.

§ 305. *The subject* and *the occasion* of the discourse, as they must affect strongly the mind of the speaker, will also leave their impressions on his style, in rendering it more earnest and elevated, more stately and dignified, or more light and familiar.

The distinction of the high, the low, and the middle styles of oratory recognized by the ancients was founded mainly on the subject and the occasion of the discourse. Other things, it is true, were regarded in the distinction, as personal peculiarities. Homer thus distributes the different styles among three of his leading characters.* Still, when the attempt was made by rhetoricians to determine the province of these separate styles, they generally fell back on the subject. Thus Cicero: "Is erit igitur eloquens, qui poterit parva summisse, modica temperate, magna graviter dicere." — *Orat.* 29.

The following will serve to illustrate what different character the occasion or the subject will impress on style even when the same thought is to be conveyed. Homer thus describes the morning: —

> "The saffron morn, with early blushes spread,
> Now rose refulgent from Tithonus' bed,
> With new-born day to gladden mortal sight,
> And gild the course of heaven with sacred light."

Butler, in his "Hudibras," thus describes the same scene: —

> "The sun had long since in the lap
> Of Thetis taken out his nap;
> And, like a lobster boiled, the morn
> From black to red began to turn."

Burke, in his speech on "Conciliation with America," was led to speak in the following terms of the rapid increase of population in the colonies: —

"I can by no calculation justify myself in placing the number below two millions of inhabitants of our own European blood and color; besides at least five hundred thousand others, who form no inconsiderable part of the whole. This, sir, is, I believe, about the true number. There is no occasion to exaggerate, when plain truth is of so much weight and importance.

* Ea ipsa genera dicendi jam antiquitus tradita ab Homero sunt tria in tribus; magnificum in Ulyxe et ubertum, subtile in Menelao et cohibitum, mixtum moderatumque in Nestore. — *Gell.* VII., 14. See also Quint. *Inst. Orat.* II., 17, 8; XII., 10, 63, 64. Cic. *Orat.* 23–29.

But whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is a matter of little moment. Such is the strength with which population shoots in that part of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood, than they spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations."

Dr. Johnson, in his pamphlet entitled "Taxation no Tyranny," aiming at an entirely opposite object, to disparage the colonies, uses the following language in respect to the same point: —

"But we are soon told that the continent of North America contains three millions, not of men merely, but of whigs, — of whigs fierce for liberty, and disdainful of dominion; *that they multiply with the fecundity of their own rattle-snakes*, so that every quarter of a century doubles their numbers."

PART III. — OBJECTIVE PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW.

§ 306. THE OBJECTIVE PROPERTIES of style are those which are determined to discourse by a regard to the effect on the mind addressed. § 244.

The objective properties presuppose the other two classes of properties, and are founded, in part at least, upon them. They differ, sometimes, only in degree; as clearness, which is an objective property, may often be only significance in a higher degree, which is a subjective property. Energy, also, another objective property, presupposes harmony, an absolute property, as well as others of that class. But it may be necessary, however, for the sake of effect, often to regard those other classes of properties more than would otherwise be required by any consideration of the nature of style.

But this objective use of language, for effect on other minds, requires some characteristics of style that are distinguished from the absolute and subjective properties, not in degree merely, but also in kind. Many of the figures of speech, so called, for instance, are of this character.

The circumstance that the objective properties presuppose those of the other classes, and are founded in part upon them, will account for the fact that, in some cases, the consideration of the same property may belong in common to

different parts of rhetoric.* There is, notwithstanding, an obvious and radical distinction between the classes.

§ 307. The Objective Properties are all in their nature relative, and must vary with the various character of the mind addressed.

It is hardly necessary to advance any formal illustrations of the truth of this proposition. What is clear to one mind may be obscure to another. What is impressive and beautiful to one may be dull and dry to another.

It is still to be observed that all minds have common properties; and there are laws applicable to all alike, which control the exercises of the intellect, the feelings, and the taste. There are, consequently, principles of style which are founded on the general and invariable character of the human mind. Those characteristics which render a discourse clear to one mind will, to a certain extent, be requisite to make it so to every other mind.

§ 308. The Objective Properties of style are CLEARNESS, ENERGY, and BEAUTY.

It is obvious that in order to affect another mind to the highest degree by discourse, it must not only contain thought, — be significant — but also be susceptible of ready interpretation. It must be *clear*.

In order, further, to a vivid effect upon the intellect and feelings, discourse must bear on its face the character of life and vigor. The thought must be addressed in lively, glowing language. Discourse must be *energetic*.

Once more, the same end of discourse cannot well be effected without regard to the æsthetic properties of the mind; in other words, without regarding the taste of those addressed. Discourse must be *in taste* or *beautiful*.

* It may be proper to remark here, that in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, some observations are made under one class of properties which might properly fall under another.

These three properties are all which a consideration of the effect of discourse requires in style, exclusive of those which the nature of language and the mental condition of the speaker impose.

§ 309. Of the three Objective Properties of style, Clearness is, in order of importance, the first and most indispensable; Energy is next in importance; and Elegance last and lowest.

Clearness is most indispensable, since if discourse is not understood, it cannot be felt. Just so far as it is unintelligible, it fails of its very end. Wherever, therefore, clearness comes into collision with energy, it should have the precedence. But yet, as clearness is a property that admits of degrees, and what is slightly obscure may be still intelligible, although only with effort, a high degree of energy may sometimes be properly preferred to a slightly increased degree of clearness.

Further, energy must be obviously regarded, in all proper oratory, as of superior importance to elegance; while, at the same time, it may be expedient to sacrifice a little energy to gain a high degree of beauty.

The character of the discourse will, however, affect the relative properties. In explanatory discourse, where the object is to inform, clearness is decidedly the ruling property; and its claims far outweigh all others. In conviction, energy rises relatively in importance, and may properly require some sacrifice of clearness. Still more is this the case in excitation and persuasion. Passion, here, sometimes triumphs over reason; and sympathy outruns argument. Wherever, again, vehement feeling enters into discourse, energy should strongly prevail over mere elegance. On the other hand, in gentle excitement of feeling, elegance is elevated, relatively, to a higher rank.

CHAPTER II.

OF CLEARNESS IN STYLE.

§ 310. CLEARNESS in style requires that the thought be so presented that the mind addressed shall apprehend it readily and without labor.

It is not enough that the speaker himself readily apprehend the thought, or that the discourse be clear to himself; or that it may be readily intelligible to a certain class of minds. Clearness, as a relative property of style, (§ 307,) requires that the particular mind addressed be regarded. and that care be taken to adapt the discourse to its capacity of apprehension.

Nor, further, is it enough that even the mind addressed shall, on sufficient study and reflection, be able to make out the sense. The discourse, says Quintilian, should enter the mind, as the sun the eye, even although not intently fixed upon it; so that pains are necessary not merely that the hearer may be able to understand it, but that he can in no way fail to understand it.*

§ 311. Clearness depends on a right consideration of four different things in discourse, namely: —

1. The kind of words employed;
2. The number of words;
3. The representative imagery; and
4. The structure of the sentence.

* Ut in animum ejus oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat. Quare non, ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere, curandum. — *Orat. Inst.* III., 2, 23. 24.

§ 312. The kinds of words to be preferred for the sake of securing clearness, are —

1. Such as are grammatical, in opposition to barbarisms;
2. Anglo-Saxon words;
3. Such as are not equivocal or ambiguous; and,
4. Simple and specific, in distinction from the more generic.

All the varieties of barbarisms enumerated in § 289, are to the popular mind generally obscure or unintelligible, just so far as not in use. It should be remarked, however, that whether barbarisms are clear or otherwise to a particular mind, depends on the circumstance of its having been familar with them or not. To the scholar, archaisms are not always obscure; nor to the man versed in a particular art or science are the technicalities of that art obscure. They may be to him, indeed, the clearest of all classes of words. But so far as discourse is intended for the popular mind generally, all barbarisms should, for the sake of clearness, be avoided.

When, on the other hand, the discourse is addressed to a particular class of minds, the words more familiar to that class are preferable as conducive to clearness. An address to sailors may, thus, consistently with clearness, abound with nautical terms.

The following sentences are faulty in respect to the use of this species of words: —

"Tack to the larboard and stand off to sea,
Veer starboard sea and land." — *Dryden's Æneid.*

"He that works by Thessalic ceremonies, by charms and nonsense words, by figures and insignificant characterisms, by images and by rags, by circles and imperfect noises, hath more advantage and real title to the opportunities of mischief, by the cursing tongue." — *J. Taylor's Sermons.*

"God begins his cure by caustics, by incisions and instruments of vexation, to try if the disease that will not yield to the allectives of cordials and

perfumes, frictions and baths, may be forced out by deleterics, scarifications, and more salutary but less pleasing physic." — *Id.*

Anglo-Saxon words, as belonging to the original stock of our language and constituting the truly vernacular part of it, so to speak, are more significant and intelligible to the English mind than those of Latin or French origin, and are on this account to be preferred. Even radical words of Latin origin with Anglo-Saxon terminations are, often, more expressive and clear than those regularly formed with Latin terminations. Hence, perhaps, it is we find so many hybrid terms in our language, such as *lucidness*, *passiveness*, *tardiness*, instead of *lucidity*, etc.

It is to be observed, however, that in order to greater precision and exactness in the use of language, words of different stocks have become appropriated, respectively, to different shades or applications of the general idea denoted by the original word. Words of Latin derivation have, thus, in many cases, been introduced for the purpose of denoting only one specific shade of the general meaning which is expressed by the proper word, both in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin language. Hence, inasmuch as precision is an element of clearness, a Latin word denoting such a particular aspect of the general idea may be more clear than the corresponding term of Anglo-Saxon origin. Thus the words *human*, *humane*, and *manly* have originally the same signification; so also, *journal*, *diary*, and *daily*; *igneous* and *fiery*.

In such cases, the Latin word will often be found to be most perspicuous.

Equivocal words are found in four different classes of words: 1. *Primitives*, to which use has somehow appropriated different significations, of which kind of words the number is considerable in all languages; as *coin*, which signifies a corner or wedge, and also a die, or money stamped by a die; *helm*, which denotes both a defense for the head and the instrument by which a ship is steered.

The relative pronouns *who*, *which*, and *that* are used both to limit and also to explain the word or words to which they refer. They are used in definitives or in epithet clauses, and are either *definitive* or *explicative*.

They are *definitive* or *determinative* in the following: —

The man that endureth to the end shall be saved.

The remorse, which issues in reformation, is true repentance.

They are *explicative*, that is *epithets*, in the following sentences: —

Man, who is born of woman, is of few days and full of trouble.

Godliness, which with contentment is great gain, has the promise of the present life and of the future.

They are more or less equivocal in the following: —

I know that all words which are signs of complex ideas furnish matter of mistake and cavil.

2. *Derivatives* and *compounds*; as *mortal*, which has both an active and a passive sense, as in the sentence, "As for such animals as are mortal or noxious, we have a right to destroy them;" *consumption*, as, "Your majesty has lost all hopes of any future excises by their consumption;" and in compounds, *overlook*, as, "The next refuge was to say, it was overlooked by one man, and many passages wholly written by another;" *discharge*, as, —

"'T is not a crime to attempt what I decree,
Or if it were, discharge the crime on me."
Dryden's Æneid.

3. *Inflected* words, or those which are equivocal in consequence of a similarity of inflection in different words; as, "She united the great body of the people in *her* and their common interest;" "I have long since learned to like nothing but what you *do*."

4. Words which, unequivocal in themselves, become equivocal *by their connection in the sentence*, as in the following instances: —

The argument is very plausible, certainly, *if not* entirely conclusive.

The lecture was well attended and *generally* interesting.

Equivocal words are either properly ambiguous, or homonymous. A *properly ambiguous* word is one which has come to be used in different significations, as, *nervous*, which means either *of strong nerves* or of *weak nerves*. *Homonyms* are words which, of a different origin, have accidentally assumed the same form, as *mass*, a heap, and *mass*, a Catholic religious service.

Individual and more specific words are to be preferred to those which are more generic, because individual and specific objects are more easily apprehended than abstract and generic.

§ 313. Clearness, as depending on the number of words, requires the least number that will fully express the thought.

While brevity in expression is thus favorable to clearness, as the mind more readily grasps what is presented to it in a narrower compass, still this principle is not to be accepted as of absolute and unqualified authority. While mere multiplication of words — mere verboseness — is opposed to clearness, expansion of the thought is not unfavorable, but often necessary.

Brevity, thus, is opposed to clearness whenever —

1. Through want of copious and ample illustration, the thought is not held up sufficiently long before the mind for thorough apprehension; or,

2. For want of completeness, the whole thought is not presented.

Different minds differ much in regard to quickness of apprehension. The speaker should, therefore, inquire carefully of himself, whether through natural dullness of apprehension, or through want of familiarity with the subject, the mind addressed requires more or less time for contemplating the thought in order to apprehend it; and amplify or

expand it accordingly. He should, likewise, consult the state of the hearer's mind at the time. When the mind is excited and attentive, the apprehension is quicker than when it is dull and uninterested. In the more animated parts of the discourse, accordingly, greater brevity is admissible. It is then less necessary to amplify the thought — to carry out the expression to perfect completeness. Brief hints and suggestions may be sufficient to put the hearers in possession of the entire thought.

Repetition is generally to be preferred to obscurity or ambiguity. Dr. Campbell exemplifies this principle by the following passage, in which the words *his father* are repeated three times without disagreeable effect: "We said to my lord, The lad cannot leave his father; for if he should leave his father, his father would die."

The following sentences are faulty in this respect: —

If he delights in these studies, he can have enough of them. He may bury himself in them as deeply as he pleases. He may revel in them incessantly, and eat, drink, and clothe himself with them.

How immense the difference between the pious and profane [instead of *the* profane].

§ 314. The representative imagery employed for the communication of thought should, for the purpose of clearness, be derived from such objects and truths as are familiar to the mind addressed, and also be in itself susceptible of a ready interpretation.

This element of clearness is founded upon the symbolical properties of language, § 281. From the very nature of language, regarded as symbolical or picture-like, it will be obvious that the symbol or picture itself must be known by the hearer or he cannot interpret it. Here the same observations apply to some extent that have been already made in reference to words of popular use. While all minds may be supposed to be conversant with the great phenomena of Nature that daily exhibit themselves to the senses, yet even

these specifically differ in different parts of the earth. Hence the inhabitant of sunny Greece may readily understand language that pictures the thought and sentiment through images drawn from his own daily observation, which would be unintelligible to one who dwells under a colder and a cloudier sky. The representative imagery of the Bible was doubtless clear to the orientalist for whom more immediately it was written, while it is often extremely obscure and unintelligible to others. A style that abounds in classical imagery is clear to the scholar, but unmeaning to the uneducated. The sermons of Jeremy Taylor, which employ this kind of representative imagery to a great extent, would entirely fail of effect, from their unintelligibleness, on a common audience. Those discourses, also, which, to an audience familiar with the Scriptures, are perfectly clear, we know from actual occurrences are unmeaning even to an intelligent mind that has not been conversant with the Bible.

Further, even when the mind addressed may be supposed to be familiar with the sources of the imagery, care is necessary to present it in such a manner as that it shall be easily intelligible.

The following are exemplifications of offenses against these principles of clearness: —

"They thought there was no life after this; or if there were, it was without pleasure, and every soul thrust into a hole, and a dorter of a span's length allowed for his rest, and for his walk; and in the shades below, no numbering of healths by the numeral letters of Philenium's name, no fat mullets, no oysters of Lucrinus, no Lesbian or Chian wines. Therefore now enjoy the delicacies of Nature, and feel the descending wines distilled through the limbeck of thy tongue and larynx, and suck the delicious juices of fishes, the marrow of the laborious ox, and the tender lard of Apulian swine, and the condited bellies of the scarus; but lose no time, for the sun drives hard, and the shadow is long, and 'the days of mourning are at hand,' but the number of the days of darkness and the grave cannot be told." — *J. Taylor.*'

"So neither will the pulse and the leeks, Lavinian sausages, and the Cisalpine suckets and gobbets of condited bull's-flesh, minister such delicate spirits to the thinking man; but his notion will be flat as the noise of the Arcadian porter, and thick as the first juice of his country lard, unless he makes his body a fit servant to the soul, and both fitted for the employment." — *Id.*

§ 315. Clearness, as depending on the structure of the sentence, is affected —

1. By the use of the relative words in it;
2. By the arrangement of the different members; and,
3. By the interposition of parenthetical clauses.

§ 316. Relative words may hinder clearness either by being too remotely separated from their antecedents, or by being of ambiguous reference.

The following are examples of this class of faults: —

a. Too remotely separated;

God heapeth favors on his servants ever liberal and faithful.

b. Of ambiguous reference; *

Lysias promised to his father never to abandon his friends.

Dr. Prideaux used to relate that when he brought the copy of his "Connection of the Old and New Testaments" to the bookseller, he told him it was a dry subject, and the printing could not be safely ventured upon unless he could enliven the work with a little humor.

Thus I have fairly given you, sir, my own opinion as well as that of a great majority of both houses here, relating to this weighty affair; upon which I am confident you may securely reckon.

They were summoned occasionally by their kings, when compelled by their wants and by their foes to have recourse to their aid.

He conjured the senate, that the purity of his reign might not be stained by the blood even of a guilty senator.

He atoned for the murder of an innocent son by the execution perhaps of a guilty wife.

* Reinhard in his *Memoirs and Confessions* says, "I have always had considerable difficulty in making a proper use of pronouns. Indeed, I have taken great pains so to use them that all ambiguity by the reference to a wrong antecedent should be impossible, and yet have often failed in the attempt. . . . That it is difficult to avoid all obscurity of this kind I am ready to acknowledge. It can often be done only by completely changing the train of thought and casting it into another form." — *Letter* III., Boston ed. pp. 102, 103.

Their intimacy had commenced in the happier period, perhaps, of their youth and obscurity.

We do those things frequently that we repent of afterwards.

"Sixtus the Fourth was, if I mistake not, a great collector of books at least." — *Bolingbroke.*

"It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of our Heavenly Father." — *Sherlock.*

"Men look with an evil eye upon the good that is in others, and think that their reputation obscures them, and that their commendable qualities do stand in their light; and therefore they do what they can to cast a cloud over them, that the bright shining of their virtues may not obscure them." — *Tillotson.*

"This work in its full extent, being now afflicted with an asthma, and finding the powers of life gradually declining, he had no longer courage to undertake." — *Johnson.*

§ 317. In respect to the *arrangement of the members* of a sentence, clearness requires —

1. That the parts of the complex thought be presented in their relative prominence and dependence;

2. That all modifying words and clauses be kept in close proximity with the principal words to which they belong;

3. That the order be such as to indicate the dependence and connection.

1. *Relation of leading and subordinate thoughts.* This relation is not regarded in the following sentences: —

After we came to anchor, they put me on shore, where I was welcomed by all my friends, who received me with the greatest kindness.

In this sentence it is difficult to tell which is the leading thought, or on which circumstance the writer intended to fix the attention of his readers. The unity of the sentence, by the failure to express the due subordination of the parts, is destroyed. The same fault is seen in the following sentences: —

"The usual acceptation takes profit and pleasure for two different things, and not only calls the followers or votaries of them by several names of busy and idle men, but distinguishes the faculties of the mind that are conversant about them, calling the operations of the first wisdom, and of the other wit, which is a Saxon word, that is used to express what the Spaniards and Italians call *ingenio*, and the French *esprit*, both from the Latin; but I think wit more peculiarly signifies that of poetry, as may occur upon remarks on the Runic language." — *Temple.*

"He is supposed to have fallen, by his father's death, into the hands of his uncle, a vintner, near Charing Cross, who sent him for some time to Dr. Busby, at Westminster; but, not intending to give him any education beyond that of the school, took him, when he was well advanced in literature, to his own house, where the Earl of Dorset, celebrated for patronage of genius, found him by chance, as Burnet relates, reading Horace, and was so well pleased with his proficiency, that he undertook the care and cost of his academical education." — *Johnson's Life of Prior.*

2. *Proximity of related elements.* The following sentences offend against this principle of clearness: —

The moon was casting a pale light on the numerous graves that were scattered before me, as it peered above the horizon, when I opened the small gate of the church-yard.

There will, therefore, be two trials in this town at that time, which are punishable with death, if a full court should attend.

Mr. Dryden makes a very handsome observation on Ovid's writing a letter from Dido to Æneas, in the following words.

3. *Order of dependence.* In the following sentences it is difficult to determine which is the subject and which the object of the the verb: —

And thus the son the fervent sire addressed.

The rising tomb a lofty column bore.

In the following, the dependence of the italicized clause is obscurely represented: —

As it is necessary to have the head clear as well as the complexion, *to be perfect in this part of learning*, I rarely mingle with the men, but frequent the tea-tables of the ladies.

In the following sentence, obscurity is occasioned by the position of the relative word before its antecedent: —

When a man declares in autumn, when he is eating *them*, or in the spring, when there are *none*, that he loves *grapes*.

§ 318. Clearness is often violated by the introduction of long *parenthetical clauses*, and especially of parentheses containing other parentheses within themselves.

The writings of the Apostle Paul, which are characterized more by energy than by clearness, are remarkable for this introduction of long and involved parentheses. A remarkable instance occurs in his Epistle to the Ephesians. The subject of the verb is in the first verse of the third chapter, the verb itself in the first verse of the fourth. The following extracts furnish further exemplifications of the same fault:

"It was an ancient tradition, that when the capitol was founded by one of the Roman Kings, the god Terminus, who presided over boundaries, and was represented according to the fashion of that age, by a large stone, alone, among all the inferior deities, refused to yield his place to Jupiter himself." — *Gibbon's Rome.*

"The description Ovid gives of his situation, in that first period of his existence, seems, some poetical embellishments excepted, such as, were we to reason *a priori*, we should conclude he was placed in." — *Lancaster on Delicacy.*

CHAPTER III.

OF ENERGY IN STYLE.

§ 319. ENERGY is that property in style by means of which the thought is impressed with a peculiar vividness or force on the mind addressed.

This property of style has been variously denominated, as vivacity, strength, and energy; all which terms, from their etymology, point at once to the nature of the property designated by them.

For the sake of clearness it will be convenient to consider this property in respect to its two species; as secured to style in accordance with the other properties, or only by a certain deviation from these properties. See § 306.

§ 320. Energy is either *proper* or *figurative*.

PROPER Energy is secured to style in accordance with the other properties;

FIGURATIVE Energy, by a greater or less deviation from them.

Without going out of the range of the other properties enumerated, it is obvious style may be more or less modified in accordance with their principles with a view to energetic effect. Such modifications, made with a view to such a vivid impression, come properly into consideration under the head of energy.

But discourse admits of modifications with a view to energy, which are not properly dictated by any principles that belong to these other properties. It is often *turned* from

the direction in which it would flow if those properties alone controlled it. The verbal expression of thought, as thus turned from its natural course, is termed *figurative* expression.

§ 321. Proper Energy, like Clearness, depends on the kind and number of words employed, the representative imagery, and the structure of the sentence.

§ 322. Energy requires, in respect to *the kinds of words* employed, that —

Those of Anglo-Saxon origin be preferred to others;

Those of national and popular use to barbarisms, whether foreign or technical; and,

The more specific to the more generic and abstract.

It is unnecessary to add to the remarks already made under the head of Clearness, § 312, in order to illustrate the truth and importance of this principle of style. It is sufficient to observe here that style admits of great modifications in respect to the kind of words habitually employed by the speaker, and that even great energy of thought may be lost in the selection of words that are wanting in this element of expression. It cannot, therefore, be too earnestly enjoined on the forming speaker to study those authors assiduously who are distinguished for their use of Anglo-Saxon, the strictly vernacular, and the specific words of our language. It will generally be found that the same taste and the same training which have led to the habitual preference of one of these classes of words, have made, also, the others most familiar and pleasing. Care should be taken to make these classes of words form the body of sound, — the material in which the thoughts most easily and spontaneously invest themselves. That this is practicable is proved by the fact that men learn universally to think in the language which is spoken around them. As we have authors who are characterized by this excellence and others who abound in Latin and French

words and idioms, it is obvious the former should be habitually studied and committed to memory, while the others should be left for maturer reading. Conversation generally prefers Anglo-Saxon words. Even Dr. Johnson himself, in the familiarity and earnestness of his ordinary conversation, employed Anglo-Saxon words, which in his written discourse he unhappily translated into a Latinized dialect.* Hence the study of language as employed in common life is highly useful to the orator in this respect.

§ 323. In respect to *the number of words*, the principle of energy is, that the utmost brevity consistent with clearness and with the other principles of energy, be preserved.

In the application of this principle, not only redundant words and phrases are to be avoided, but also, the more direct and simple forms of expression are to be preferred to the more circuitous and prolix. Hence, often, the sentence should be wholly recast.

The following sentences are faulty in respect to this principle: —

I went home full of *a great many* serious reflections.

I shall suppose, then, in order to try to account for the vision without a miracle, that as Saul and his company were journeying *along in their way* to Damascus, an extraordinary meteor really did happen.

Neither is any condition of life more honorable in the sight of God than another; otherwise he would be a respecter of persons, *which he assures us* he *is not*.

It will often be greatly conducive to the energetic effect

* Macaulay, in an article in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1831, gives the following exemplifications. In one of Johnson's familiar letters he says, "When we were taken up-stairs, a dirty fellow bounced out of the bed on which one of us was to lie." He records this incident in his *Journey to the Hebrides* thus: "Out of one of the beds on which we were to repose, started up at our entrance, a man black as a Cyclops from the forge." Sometimes he translated aloud. "*The Rehearsal*," he said, "has not wit enough to keep it sweet;" then, after a pause, "it has not vitality enough to preserve it from putrefaction."

of the whole expression, after having presented the thought for the sake of clearness in a more extended form, to repeat it in a more condensed sentence.

The following extract from Burke will furnish an exemplification: —

"When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of *fealty*, which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and subjects from the precaution of tyranny, shall be extinct in the minds of men, plots and assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation, and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims, which form the political code of all power, not standing on its own honor, and the honor of those who are to obey it. *Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle.*"

§ 324. Energy requires the freest use of proper representative imagery.

No principle of proper energy is more important than this. Yet after what has been said on this element of style under the heads of Symbolical Properties, §§ 281–284, and Clearness, § 314, little need be added either to illustrate its proper character or its claims to distinct and thorough study. Effective oratory depends more, perhaps, than on any other element, on the free use of sensible images, representing abstract objects or truth to the imagination through concrete objects and scenes. In his "Art of Composition, or Proper Sentence Construction," the author has classified the various kinds of symbols of thought, and presented the principles that govern them with copious exercises. The training in style thus rudimentally commenced should be prosecuted by the diligent study of the best orators and poets, for the special purpose of acquiring a command of imagery. In this study the imagery employed should be marked, reduced to its class, worked into the memory, impressed every way on the forming mind. There should be connected with this the diligent, habitual study of sensible objects and scenes as imaging thought. The writings of Jean Paul Richter, who made this study of natural imagery a special object, are worthy of a careful study with reference to this property of style. The books of Job, of the Psalms, and of Isaiah, are also characterized by it.

The following are exemplifications of this species of Energy: —

"But while I expected in his daring flight his final ruin and fall, behold him rising still higher, and coming down souse upon both houses of parliament. Yes, he did make you his quarry, and you still bleed from the wounds of his talons. You crouched, and still crouch, beneath his rage." — *Burke.*

"I have not allowed myself, sir, to look beyond the Union, to see what might lie hidden in the dark recess behind. I have not coolly weighed the chances of preserving liberty, when the bonds that unite us together shall be broken asunder. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below." — *Webster.*

"When the soul, resting as it were under the willows of exile, breathes out its longing for its distant home, what else but melancholy can be the key-note of its song?" — *A. W. Schlegel.*

"If a man meets with injustice, it is not required that he shall not be roused to m[illegible] it; but if he is angry after he has had time to think upon it, that is sinful. The flame is not wrong, but the coals are." — *H. W. Beecher.*

"The world is not a platform where you will hear Thalberg piano-playing. It is a piano manufactory, where are dust, and shavings, and rasps, and sand-papers. The perfect instrument and the music will be hereafter." — *Id.*

"Because they cannot bail out the ocean with the hollow of their hand, the ocean becomes to them a thing of doubtful existence."

"The wound of conscience is no scar; Time cools it not with his wing, but merely keeps it open with his scythe." — *Richter.*

"In the burning-glass and magnifying-mirror of consequences, fate shows us the light, playing worms of our inner man as grown-up and armed furies and serpents." — *Id.*

"His hours were no more harmoniously sounded out by the chime of love and poesy, but monotonously by the steeple-clock of every-day routine." — *Id.*

§ 325. Energy, in *the structure of the sentence*, depends, —

First, On the preservation of unity in the general form of the sentence;

Secondly, On the right disposition of the capital words and members; and,

Thirdly, On the disposition of coördinate or correlative words or members.

§ 326. UNITY in a sentence is preserved by the presentation of but one leading subject, § 317, and by the binding together of all the parts in one compact whole.

The first element of unity here mentioned — singleness of leading subject — has been sufficiently considered under the head of clearness.

The second — compactness — appears in style in the periodic structure, § 269, in which the leading member of the sentence, being placed last, binds the whole together into one compact whole.

The following are examples of the periodic structure: —

While all the Pagan nations consider Religion as one part of Virtue, the Jews, on the contrary, regard Virtue as a part of Religion.

"For as guilt never rose from a true use of our rational faculties, so it is very frequently subversive of them. God forbid that prudence, the first of all the virtues, as well as the supreme director of them all, should ever be employed in the service of any of the vices." — *Burke.*

"There is something in the present business, with all that is horrible to create aversion, so vilely loathsome as to excite disgust. It is, my lords, surely superfluous to dwell on the sacredness of the ties, which those aliens to feeling, those apostates to humanity thus divided. In such an assembly as the one before which I speak, there is not an eye but must look reproof to their conduct; — not a heart but must anticipate its condemnation." — *Sheridan.*

§ 327. The most conspicuous parts of the sentence being the commencement and the close, these parts should, when energy of expression is aimed at, be given to the capital or leading words and members.

This principle forbids commencing or closing a sentence with circumstantial words or clauses, unless it is desired to give them an emphatic distinction. In merely didactic discourse, such clauses are admissible because they often conduce to clearness and readiness of apprehension. In earnest oratory they can never be justified except, as has been just

observed, when they are made emphatic. In this case, placing them at the beginning or the close at once gives them a high degree of force and impressiveness.

We find in the Latin language a happy exemplification of this principle of energy. When Mucius Scævola in Livy wishes to turn the attention of Porsenna on the fact that he was a Roman, he says, *Romanus sum civis.* On the other hand, when Gavius in Cicero's Oration against Verres was urging his rights as a citizen, not merely as a Roman, he says, *Civis Romanus sum.* Although the words are the same, the leading thought being different in the two cases, Livy places one word at the beginning of the sentence, and Cicero another; and both clearly from mere reference to energetic effect.

The following sentences are faulty in this respect: —

The other species of motion are incidentally blended *also.*

Every nature you perceive is either too excellent to want it, or too base to be capable of it.

Seeing the delay of repentance doth mainly rely upon the hopes and encouragement of a future repentance, let us consider a little how unreasonable these hopes are, and how absurd the encouragement is which men take from them.

"But it is absurd to think of judging either Ariosto or Spenser by precepts which they did not attend to." — *Watson.*

"There need no more than to make such a registry only voluntary, to avoid all the difficulties that can be raised, and which are not too captious or too trivial to take notice of." — *Temple.*

"In like manner, if a person in broad daylight were falling asleep, to introduce a sudden darkness would prevent his sleep for that time, though silence and darkness in themselves, and not suddenly introduced, are very favorable to it. This I knew only by conjecture on the analogy of the senses when I first digested these observations; but I have since experienced it." — *Burke.*

The following extracts, on the other hand, furnish instances of this kind of energy: —

In their prosperity my friends shall never hear of me; in their adversity, *always.*

True liberty, in my opinion, can only exist when justice is equally administered to all, to the king and to the beggar.

Never, so clearly as in the present instance, have I observed that safeguard of justice which Providence has placed in the nature of man.

No: I am no emissary — my ambition was to hold a place among the deliverers of my country — not in power, not in profit, but in the glory of the achievement! Sell my country's independence to France! and for what? A change of masters? No: but for ambition!

Under this species of energy may be ranked what has been denominated *the Climax;* or that structure of the sentence in which the different members succeed each other in order of strength or importance, the most impressive being placed last.

The following are examples: —

In the middle of the day, at the moment of divine worship, when the miserable husband was on his knees, directing the prayers and the thanksgiving of his congregation to their God — that moment did the remorseless etc.

Impose upon me whatever hardships you please; give me nothing but the bread of sorrow to eat; take from me the friend in whom I had placed my confidence; lay me in the cold hut of poverty and on the thorny bed of disease; set before me death in all its terrors; do all this, only let me trust in my Saviour, and I will fear no evil — I will rise superior to affliction — I will rejoice in my tribulation.

§ 328. In the arrangement of the sentence, further, coördinate and correlative words and members should be placed in corresponding parts, so as to answer to each other and reflect on each other, so to speak, their own force.

The Latin and Greek languages, through the variety of their inflections, admitted this species of energy to a much greater degree than most modern tongues. Cicero says that the following expression drew forth wonderful applause from the audience: —

"Patris dictum sapiens, temeritas filii comprobavit." *

* *Orator*, 63. Hoc dichoreo tantus clamor concionis excitatus est, ut admirabile est. If the double trochee at the close had its effect, it is yet questionable whether the energy of the expression is not owing still, more to the admirable arrangement of the words, which are made most perfectly to answer to each other. "Patris" and "filii" are at the extremes; "sapiens" and "temeritas" in the middle in juxtaposition, and the one at the close, the other at the commencement of the respective members to which they belong; and the unrelated word "dictum" thrown as far as possible out of view. The whole sentence is bound together by the verb, which, as the most important word, occupies the last place in the sentence. We have, besides, the inversion of the object before the subject. To all this is to be added the harmony of the whole. There is here a combination of many excellences of style.

The following are from his orations; the first from that for Ligarius, the second from the oration for Roscius Amerinus: —

"Nihil habet nec fortuna tua majus quam ut possis, nec natura tua melius quam ut velis, conservare plurimos."

"Accusant ii, quibus occidi patrem Sexti Roscii bono fuit; causam dicit is, cui non modo luctum mors patris attulit, verum etiam egestatem. Accusant ii, qui hunc ipsum jugulare summe cupierunt; causam dicit is, qui etiam ad hoc ibidem ante oculos vestros trucidetur."

In our own language, the following sentences may be given as illustrations: —

Never before were so many opposing interests, passions, and principles committed to such a decision. On one side an attachment to the ancient order of things, on the other a passionate desire of change; a wish in some to perpetuate, in others to destroy every thing; every abuse sacred in the eyes of the former, every foundation attempted to be demolished by the latter; a jealousy of power shrinking from the slightest innovation, pretensions to freedom pushed to madness and anarchy; superstition in all its dotage, impiety in all its fury.

Sullen and severe without religion, profligate without gayety, you live like Charles the Second, without being an amiable companion; and, for aught I know, may die, as his father did, without the reputation of a martyr.

§ 329. As frequently it may be desired to weaken and soften rather than to strengthen the expression, this object may be effected, for the most part, by means just the reverse of those which have been prescribed for imparting energy.

The English language, from the very heterogeneousness of its origin, allows, more than most other languages, this

variation in the degrees of energy. The same object may be represented by a skillful orator in the strongest vividness and force or in the most indifferent tameness, simply by means of a different selection from those words which are grammatically proper to the object. Here belong those expressions usually denominated *Euphemisms*, which are employed to soften or weaken the impression made by the more appropriate representation. Here, also, belongs the *anti-climax*. The following are exemplifications: —

1. *In the kind of words:*

The toast concludes with a patriotic wish for all his persuasion, by the consummation of which there can be no doubt the hempen manufactures of this country would experience a very considerable consumption.

For when the restless Greeks sat down
So many years, before Troy town,
And were renowned, as Homer writes,
For well-soled boots, no less than fights.

Often a very small matter takes away the mark of that beast whose name shall not be mentioned here.

2. *In the number of words:*

"They did that which every master would have wished his servants to do in such an exigency:" instead of, "They killed Clodius."

3. *In the arrangement of words:*

Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

§ 330. Figurative energy is founded either, —
1. On the kind and number of words employed;
2. On the representative imagery; or,
3. On the structure of the sentence.

The most strictly philosophical treatment of figurative energy, as well as of clearness, would represent it in the light of the absolute and subjective properties of style, and follow the method furnished by the analysis of those properties. But both to prevent repetition and for convenience and simplicity, it may, perhaps, better be exhibited under the three heads named above.

§ 331. Those forms of figurative energy which depend on the kind of words employed, are denominated *Tropes*, which may be defined as follows: —

A TROPE is a word employed for the sake of energy in a different import from that which is proper to it.

It is obvious to remark that tropes are figurative uses of *the proper import* of words. A tropical *impropriety* is denominated a *catachresis*.

A trope presupposes two objects which when compared resemble each other in some respect. The name appropriated to the one is used to denote the other object. A trope is thus, as its name imports, a turn or change in the use of a word.

§ 332. Tropes impart energy to style by representing the object in a more individual or sensible form than the proper denomination of it; and thus bringing it more impressively before the imagination, as *scepter* instead of *dominion; Homer* instead of *the Homeric poems; Britain* instead of *the government of Great Britain.*

§ 333. Tropes may be distributed into two classes according as they are founded on a resemblance of properties, or a resemblance of relations.

The former class may be denominated *simple tropes;* the latter are called *metaphors.*

All tropes are founded on resemblance, or, more philosophically speaking, on a more or less perfect identity. This partial identity or resemblance can always be traced even in the most remote cases. When we say, thus, "The crescent wanes," instead of, "The Mohammedan power declines," we first conceive of the flag of that power from its characteristic symbol; and then of the power itself from the flag which represents it; and in both cases the conception is founded

on a species of local identity. The place of the crescent is in the flag; and of the flag with the presence of the power or authority. Without this identity, the mind has no power to conceive of the object represented. If the identity respect only one or two obscure particulars, or, in other words, if the resemblance be but faint and dim, the trope is *catachrestic* — harsh and far-fetched. The explanation of tropical energy is hence obvious. By the trope, the mind addressed is placed in a certain place or time or analogous relation, from which it views the object represented; as in the trope "a *boisterous* multitude," the mind is referred to a furious wind swelling and roaring, and in that sensible image perceives the characteristic given in the epithet to the "multitude."

Hence, when a word originally tropical ceases, from familiar use, to call up the sensible or singular object or scene to which it properly refers, it loses its tropical character. It is no longer *turned* from its accepted import. Such is the tendency in the progress of language with all tropes.

Here we find the explanation of the fact that the same discourse pleases an imaginative mind skilled in the use of language and accustomed to refer the words to the sensible object which they originally represented, that, to another mind, seems wholly destitute of beauty. Here, too, is found the explanation of the peculiar energy and beauty of that species of style which puts the imagination of the reader constantly in the way of making this reference.

These general observations apply with equal force to the second class of figures or those founded on the representative imagery.

§ 334. Simple Tropes are of two species: —

1. Those in which the objects compared differ in quantity, whether of extent or degree; and,

2. Those in which the objects differ in kind.

A Trope of the former species is termed a *Synecdoche*,

as "Cicero" instead of "orator;" "a sail" for "a vessel."

A trope of the latter species is called a *Metonymy;* as "the father of Jupiter" for "Saturn;" "the grave" for "death."

§ 335. SYNECDOCHE is a trope in which either the part is put for the whole, or a species or individual for the class.

Examples of the former variety are: —

"*England* is still flourishing for the instruction of the world," for "Great Britain." — *Mirabeau.*

"By *thousands*," for "great numbers."

The following are instances of the latter variety: —

Romanus proelio victor, for *Romani.*

"Some village *Hampden* that, with dauntless breast,
The little tyrant of his fields withstood;
Some mute inglorious *Milton* here may rest,
Some *Cromwell*, guiltless of his country's blood." — *Gray.*

So thought the countries of Demosthenes and the Spartan: yet *Leonidas* is trampled by the timid slave, etc.

§ 336. When the whole is put for a part, or the class for the species or individual, the trope is still called a synecdoche. In this case, for the most part, the energy of the expression is weakened.

"To appropriate to one's self," is more general language and less forcible than "to steal." "He went to his rest," is a softer expression than "he died." The use of the plural "we" is thus less egotistical than the singular "I."

§ 337. A METONYMY is a trope in which the object is represented by a word properly applied to something else that differs in kind from the represented object.

The additional energy imparted to the expression by this trope is owing to the circumstance that the object is repre-

sented by means of one more familiar, or more readily conceived, in consequence of its being single or cognizable by the senses.

The different varieties of this trope may be thus classified:—

1. Cause represented by the effect, or *vice versa;* as "gray hairs" for "old age;" "Milton" for "Milton's writings."

This variety is ultimately founded on identity of time, as the following is on that of place.

2. Substance by quality, property, or accident, and *vice versa*; as, "the sun" for "the heat of the sun;" "Brutus" for "inflexible firmness;" "wealth counts its cattle" for "the man of wealth."

Here belongs the metonymy of the sign for the thing signified, and the reverse; as "scepter" for "dominion."

3. The time, for what existed or transpired in it, and *vice versa;* as, "antiquity" for "the men of antiquity;" "posterity" for "the future."

Under this variety is included the metonymy founded on proximity of time.

4. The place, for what is in it or associated with it, and *vice versa;* as "Greece" for "the Greeks;" "the forum" for "a judicial tribunal," or "judicial business."

By the use of an epithet the trope is made more significant and vivid, as:—

Streaming grief his faded cheek bedewed.

Here *grief*, the cause, is tropically used for *tears*, the effect — the epithet *streaming* — properly characterizing only the latter.

§ 338. A METAPHOR is a trope in which the representation of the object is effected by the use of a word properly denoting something analogous; and is founded on a resemblance or identity of relations.

A metaphor being founded on an identity of relation is by

this distinguished from simple tropes, (§ 333.) The nature of the metaphor may be seen from the following illustrations:—

"Time had *plowed* his venerable front."

The word "plowed" is here used metaphorically. The use of it is justified on the ground of the analogy of the effect of literal plowing to that of time. In other words, what the driving of the plow is to the soil, time was to the forehead. The resemblance on which the metaphor is founded is obviously one of relation and not of properties.

Oh! when the growling winds contend, and all
The sounding forest fluctuates in the storm,
To sink in warm repose and hear the din
Howl o'er the steady battlements —

There is in these lines an accumulation of metaphors, all clearly distinguishable by the characteristic named from the simple trope. The winds are said to growl from the analogy of the effect on the mind to the growls of a wolf. What growling is to the wolf, the noise of the storm is to the wind. So the motion of the forest is to the trees what the *fluctuation* of the water is to the waving sea. The same remark is applicable to "the howling of the din over the battlement." It is to be observed that in the first and last of these metaphors there is, besides the metaphor, also, the figure of personification.

Metaphors, like simple tropes, are of two classes, which may be called Metaphors of Synecdoche and Metaphors of Metonymy. Thus in the distich:—

Apollo bade me check my fond desire,
Nor on the vast Tyrrhenian spread my little sail.

"Tyrrhenian" is a metaphorical synecdoche, being used for any large sea; which is to a little bark what epic themes were to the lyric spirit of Horace.

The following is a metaphor of metonymy:—

Or have ye chosen this place
After the toils of battle, to repose
Your *wearied virtue?*

"Virtue" is here used for the persons to whom it belongs, and "wearied virtue" is a metaphor.

§ 339. Figurative Energy as depending on *the number of words* consists in a repetition or an omission of certain words which the ordinary forms of expression do not admit or require.

§ 340. This class of figures includes *Figurative Repetition* and *Ellipsis*.

FIGURATIVE REPETITION includes *Epizeuxis* where the word is immediately repeated without any intervening word or clause, as, "The introducers of the now-established principles of political economy may fairly be considered to have made a great *discovery; a discovery* the more creditable," etc.; and *Epanalepsis*, where a word or clause intervenes, as, "The persecutions undergone by the Apostles furnished both a trial to their faith, and a confirmation to ours: *a trial* to them," etc.

The repetition of connectives belongs to this class, and is called *Polysyndeton;* as, "Such a man might fall a victim to power; but truth and reason and liberty would fall with him."

And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief-captains, and the mighty men, and every bond-man, and every free-man, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains.

ELLIPSIS is the omission of a word or words which would be supplied in the ordinary form of expression; as, —

Hereditary bondmen! know ye not,
Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow?

The Ellipsis of connectives is termed *Asyndeton;* as, Veni, vidi, vici.

§ 341. Those forms of Figurative Energy which depend on *the representative imagery* include three species: —

1. Those figures which consist in a change fo the nature or relations of the represented object;

2. Those which consist in comparison or contrast; and,

3. Those which consist in a deviation from the ordinary mode of expressing the mental condition of the speaker.

§ 342. The first class of Representative Figures includes those of *Vision*, *Personification*, and *Hyperbole*.

VISION is a figure in which the object, although really remote, is represented as present in time or place.

This figure, which is founded on a represented change in the relations of the object to time or place, is exceedingly common; and is found in style of all degrees of energy and vehemence. The following are illustrations: —

"He was chosen: his forces were collected with the utmost diligence: he marched as if toward Cyrrha. But now, farewell at once to all regard either to the Cyrrheans or the Locrians! He *seizes* Elatea." —*Demosthenes on the Crown.*

"The unhappy man, arrested as he was going to embark for his native country, is brought before the wicked prætor. With eyes darting fury, and a countenance distorted with cruelty, he orders the helpless victim of his rage to be stripped, and rods to be brought; accusing him, but without the least shadow of evidence, or even of suspicion, of having come to Sicily as a spy." — *Cicero against Verres.*

"Advance, then, ye future generations. We would hail you, as you rise in your long succession, to fill the places which we now fill, and to taste the blessings of existence, where we are passing, and soon shall have passed our own human duration. We bid you welcome to this pleasant land of the Fathers." — *Webster.*

The figure in this last example is specifically denominated an *apostrophe*. It is in truth, however, a combination of vision and apostrophe. § 344.

PERSONIFICATION is a figure in which inanimate objects and qualities are represented as living beings.

This likewise is a very common figure. Indeed, as many words in every language which were originally applied to

inanimate objects or mere qualities only figuratively, have, by use, dropped their personifying character and are regarded as proper terms; so, likewise, phrases and extended forms of representative imagery have become the ordinary and proper modes of representation.

It is often conjoined with vision, and especially with apostrophe.

"But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad,
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill." — *Shakespeare.*

"With such delay
Well pleased, they slack their course, and many a league,
Cheered with the grateful smell, *old Ocean smiles.*" — *Milton.*

"Ye woods and wilds, whose melancholy gloom
Accords with my soul's sadness, and draws forth
The tear of sorrow from my bursting heart,
Farewell awhile." — *Home.*

The peculiar nature of the English language, which applies no distinctions of gender to objects destitute of sex, makes the use of this figure at once easy and forcible. The simple application of a personal pronoun implying sex to an inanimate object at once invests it with personality.

"In like manner, Liberty herself, the last and best gift of God to his creatures, must be taken just as she is. You may pare her down into bashful regularity, and shape her into a perfect model of severe, scrupulous law; but she will be Liberty no longer." — *Erskine.*

"When Natural Religion has thus viewed both, ask her, Which is the prophet of God? But her answer we have already had, when she saw part of this scene through the eyes of the centurion who attended at the cross. By him she spoke, and said: 'Truly this man was the Son of God.'" — *Comparison of the Religion of Christ and of Mohammed in Sherlock's Sermons.*

The opposite of this figure, where a person is represented as a thing, has a similar energy in exposing a character to scorn and contempt.

How in the name of soldiership and sense,
Should England prosper, when such things, as smooth
And tender as a girl all essenced o'er
With odors and as profligate as sweet;
Who sell their laurel for a myrtle wreath,
And love when they should fight: when such as these

Presume to lay their hand upon the ark
Of her magnificent and awful cause?

HYPERBOLE is a figure in which the object is represented as magnified or diminished beyond reality.

As vision is founded on a change *in the relations* of the represented object, and personification on a change in its *nature* or *kind*, hyperbole is founded on a change in *the degree* of some of its properties or qualities.

"I saw their chief, tall as a rock of ice; his spear, the fir; his shield, the rising moon: he sat on the shore, like a cloud of mist on the hill." — *Ossian.*

"A lover may bestride the Gossamer,
That idles in the wanton summer air,
And yet not fall — so light is vanity." — *Shakespeare.*

He was the owner of a bit of ground not larger than a Lacedemonian letter.

The minds of the aged are like the tombs to which they are approaching; where, though the brass and the marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery has moldered away.

§ 43. The second class of Representative Figures, being founded on a comparison of one object with another, includes those of *Comparison Proper* and *Simile*, *Contrast*, *Allegory*, and *Allusion*.

This class of figures differs from the first class in this, that while the latter confine the view to the object itself and only represent it as changed in its relations, in its nature, or its degree, those of the second class go out from the object itself and represent it only through the light of some other to which it bears some resemblance.

The COMPARISON PROPER is a figure in which the properties or relations of the object are represented by means of similar properties or relations in another object of the same class.

The comparison differs from the metaphor chiefly in being more extended. It is not essential to the comparison that the words of comparison, "like," "as," "so," etc., be actually expressed; although the term "metaphor," or "meta-

phorical comparison," is more commonly applied when those words are omitted. The figure is in this case bolder and makes a stronger demand on the imagination of the reader; as all the properties of the representative object are in form attributed to the other, and the reader is left to distinguish and select from among them such as may be appropriate. The use of the comparative particles and words, on the other hand, indicate only a partial resemblance. If the poet had said, "Be not dumb, driven cattle," the expression, if allowed by the meter, would be felt at once to be stronger and bolder than the comparative form which he adopts, — "Be not like dumb, driven cattle."

The SIMILE differs only in form from the comparison. The term "simile" turns the mind on the object to which the theme is likened as the prominent thing. In the simile, accordingly, the representative object is presented as the leading theme; and the represented as the subordinate one. In the comparison, on the other hand, the represented object is made the leading theme. Thus, a comparison would be in this form: "As when the thunder rolls in peals; the lightning glances on the rocks; spirits ride on beams of fire; and the strength of the mountain-streams comes running down the hills: so was the voice of battle." In the simile, the representative object would be presented as the leading theme; as, "Thou hast seen the sun retire red and slow behind his cloud; night gathering round on the mountain; while the unfrequent blast roared in narrow vales. At length the rain beats hard, and thunder rolls in peals. Lightning glances on the rocks, spirits ride on beams of fire, and the strength of the mountain-streams comes roaring down the hills. Such was the noise of battle." Differing thus slightly, the simile and the comparison are very commonly confounded.

The comparison is happily employed to introduce metaphorical expression, as: "Every action, like a statue, must first be modeled in the miserable wax of words."

CONTRAST is a figure in which the object is represented

by another similar object, but the attention is turned on the opposition or points of difference between them.

Contrast thus involves comparison, since there can be no contrast between things entirely dissimilar. It differs from comparison in this, that while it assumes the resemblance it goes further and dwells on the points of opposition or dissimilarity.

The destruction of a dangerous error which had widely extended its dominion is a glorious victory won by the friends of truth, armed only with the weapons of faith. Such a conqueror no streams of blood accompany: in his train are no desolated fields.

The ALLEGORY is but an extended simile, in which the comparative words are omitted.

The allegory, the parable, and the fable belong to the same class of figurative forms of representation; and their distinctions are not nicely observed in the common use of language. It is sufficient to remark of them that the fable is distinguished from the proper allegory by being shorter and also by being narrative or historical. It is founded on an imaginary event; whereas an allegory may be descriptive. The term parable is more strictly confined to allegories which are either narrative or descriptive, of a moral or religious character; which are, moreover, founded on real scenes or events, as those of Christ.

One of the finest examples of the allegory is in the eighteth Psalm, from the eighth verse to the sixteenth inclusive.

The "Pilgrim's Progress," by Bunyan, is another fine exemplification of the extended allegory.

Of the allegory Felltham has well said: — "Truth may dwell more clearly in an allegory or a moraled fable than in a bare narrative."

The ALLUSION is a species of comparison in which, while the comparative words are omitted, the represented object is still made the leading theme.

By this last characteristic it is distinguished from the allegory, in which, as in the simile, the representative object is

the leading theme. It differs from one class of metaphors only in being more extended. Indeed, this class of metaphors, referring to a real scene or event, are denominated *metaphorical allusions*, or *allusive metaphors ;* as, "The self-seeking will betray his friend or brother with a Judas-kiss." "The invisibility of the knight constituted a part of his greatness; and the Moses-veil doubled the glory which it concealed."

The following are additional illustrations of this class of figures: —

"He [the small poet] will take three grains of wit like the elixir, and projecting it upon the iron age, turn it immediately into gold. All the business of mankind has presently vanished; the whole world has kept holiday; there have been no men but heroes and poets, no women but nymphs and shepherdesses; trees have borne fritters, and rivers flowed plum-porridge. When he writes, he commonly steers the sense of his lines by the rhyme that is at the end of them, as butchers do calves by their tails. For when he has made one line, which is easy enough, and has found out some sturdy hard word that will but rhyme, he will hammer the sense upon it, like a piece of hot iron upon an anvil, into what form he pleases." — *S. Butler.*

"Some are called at age at fourteen, some at one-and-twenty, some never; but all men late enough; for the life of a man comes upon him slowly and insensibly. But as when the sun approaches toward the gates of the morning, he first opens a little eye of heaven, and sends away the spirits of darkness, and gives light to a cock, and calls up the lark to matins, and by and by gilds the fringes of a cloud, and peeps over the eastern hills, thrusting out his golden horns, like those which decked the brows of Moses when he was forced to wear a veil, because himself had seen the face of God; and still, while a man tells the story, the sun gets up higher, till he shows a fair face and a full light, and then he shines one whole day, under a cloud often, and sometimes weeping great and little showers, and sets quickly; so is a man's reason and his life." — *J. Taylor.*

We reckon more than five months to harvest.

That Marah was never dry. No art could sweeten, no draught could exhaust its perennial waters of bitterness.

§ 344. The third class of Representative Figures, or those in which the mental condition of the speaker is represented as different from the reality, may be distributed into three species, according as they respect the personality of the speaker, that of the hearer,

or the nature of the thought or feeling represented itself.

The first species is PROSOPOPŒIA, in which the speaker personates another; as where Milo is introduced by Cicero as speaking through his lips: "Attend, I pray; hearken, O citizens: I have killed Publius Clodius by this sword and by this right hand; I have kept off his rage from your necks, which no laws, no courts of judicature, could restrain," etc.

It is sometimes joined with personification, in which case inanimate or irrational things are represented as speaking; as in Cicero's first oration against Catiline, the republic is made the speaker and addresses Cicero himself: "What are you doing? Are you suffering him whom you have found to be an enemy, who you see is to be at the head of the war, whom you perceive our enemies wait for in their camp as their general, who has been the contriver of this wickedness, the chief of the conspiracy, the exciter of slaves and profligate citizens, to leave the city which is rather to bring him in than let him out? Will you not order him to be imprisoned, condemned, and executed?"

Sometimes this figure takes the form of a colloquy or a dialogue. This was the ancient *sermocinatio.*

How does God reveal himself in Nature? She answers thee with loud voices, with a thousand tongues: God is love.

The second species is APOSTROPHE, in which the speaker, instead of addressing directly his proper hearer, turns himself to some other person or thing, either really or only in imagination present.

This figure abounds in the orations of Cicero. Thus in his first against Catiline: "I desire, senators, to be merciful, but not to appear negligent in so great dangers of the State; though at present I cannot but condemn myself of remissness. There is a camp formed in Italy at the entrance of Etruria, against the State; our enemies increase daily; but we see the commander of the camp and general of the ene-

mies within our walls, in the very senate, contriving some intestine ruin to the State. If, now, Catiline, I should order you to be seized and put to death," etc.

Again, in his defense of Milo, he turns to his brother Quintus and addresses him as if present: "And how shall I answer it to you, my brother Quintus, the partner of my misfortunes, who art now absent?"

The third species of figures of this class which respect a change in the represented conception of the object by the speaker from the reality, includes *irony, doubt*, and *interrogation.*

IRONY is a figure in which the speaker represents his thought in a form that properly expresses the directly opposite of his opinion. It is employed mostly for purposes of playfulness or scorn and contempt.

> "Silence at length the gay Antinous broke,
> Constrained a smile, and thus ambiguous spoke:
> What god to you, untutored youth, affords
> This headlong torrent of amazing words!
> May Jove delay thy reign, and cumber late
> So bright a genius with the cares of state!"
>
> *Odyssey*, I. 490.

But, Mr. Speaker, "we have a right to tax America." O inestimable right! O wonderful, transcendent right! the assertion of which has cost this country thirteen provinces, six islands, one hundred thousand lives, and seventy millions of money. O invaluable right! for the sake of which we have sacrificed our rank among nations, our importance abroad, and our happiness at home!

DOUBT, also called *aporia* and *dubitatio*, is a figure in which the speaker represents himself as in doubt, for the purpose of winning a stronger confidence from the hearers. Thus, Cicero in his oration for Cluentius: —

"I know not which way to turn myself. Shall I deny the scandal thrown upon him of bribing the judges? Can I say, the people were not told of it?" etc.

INTERROGATION is a figure in which a strong and confident assertion is represented under the form of an inquiry or demand.

Have any alarms been occasioned by the emancipation of our Catholic brethren? Has the bigoted malignity of any individuals been crushed? or has the stability of the government or that of the country been weakened? or is one million of subjects stronger than four millions.

§ 345. Those forms of Figurative Energy which depend on *the structure of the sentence* respect either the order and connection of the parts, or the completeness and length of the entire sentence.

They include *Inversion* and *Anacoluthon*, *Aposiopesis* and *Sententiousness.*

346. INVERSION is a figure in which the arrangement of the parts of a sentence is changed from the usual syntactical order.

The general principle of energy in regard to the arrangement of the parts of a sentence is, that the more important words or phrases be placed first or last, and the less important be thrown into the middle. This principle, indeed, applies also to the arrangement of words in the members. Words of transition, of every class, as "however," "besides," "therefore," and the like, should in accordance with this principle be thrown, whenever practicable, into the middle of the sentence; — should be, in other words, *postpositive* and not *prepositive.* So, likewise, merely explanatory members or phrases should be neither the first nor the last on the mind, unless they are to be made emphatic.

But the unbending syntax of our language allows but little liberty to the orator in this respect. It is here incomparably inferior to the ancient languages which, by the multiplicity of their inflections, admitted readily any desired arrangement of the words and phrases. It is, however, even here superior to some other modern languages; and without offending against its essential principles, the orator may impart much energy to discourse by authorized deviations from the ordinary structure of the sentence.

As the subject is naturally the first thing to be presented

to the mind, our language requires that ordinarily it be placed first in the sentence. But sometimes it is the predicate in whole or in part, or the mode of the copula, upon which the orator wishes the attention more particularly to be fixed. To accomplish this inversion, in the first place, we have certain words and forms of expression which are used for this purpose alone and are in themselves utterly destitute of meaning; such as, *there, there is, it is.*

There is a feeling of the sublime in contemplating the shock of armies' just as *there* is in contemplating the devouring energy of a tempest; and this so elevates and engrosses the whole man, that his eye is blind to the tears of bereaved parents, and his ear is deaf to the piteous moan of the dying, and the shriek of their desolated families. *There* is a gracefulness in the picture of a youthful warrior burning for distinction on the field, etc.

It gives me pleasure to advance a further testimony in behalf of that government with which it has pleased God, who appointed to all men the bounds of their habitation, to bless that portion of the globe that we occupy.

It is the gospel of Jesus Christ which has poured the light of day into all the intricacies of this contemplation.

Again, when the predicate is separated in part or in whole from the copula, the predicate or a part of it may be placed first.

"Great is Diana of the Ephesians."

His faithful dogs howl on his hills, and his boars which he used to pursue, rejoice. *Fallen* is the arm of battle; the mighty among the valiants is low!

Further, the qualifying parts of a sentence, when they are to be made emphatic, may be placed first without violating the principles of the language.

So deeply were they impressed with the sense of their wrongs, that they would not even accept of life from their oppressors.

Once more, in the objective relation of the sentence, our language ordinarily requires that the object follow its verb. For the sake of energy, however, inversion is often allowable here.

All that I have and all that I am and all that I hope in this life, I am now ready here to stake upon it.

§ 347. ANACOLUTHON is a figure in which, for the sake of energy, the orator drops the grammatical form with which he had commenced and adopts another not syntactically reconcilable with it.

This figure, common in the classical writings, is rarely allowable in our language. Only strong passion can warrant it, as it seems to imply such a degree of emotion in the speaker as to destroy the recollection of grammatical forms.

These forms in the English language are so few and simple compared with the number in the Greek and the Latin, that the emotion must be extreme indeed, which could be supposed violent enough to supplant the knowledge of them.

§ 348. APOSIOPESIS is a figure in which the feelings of the speaker induce him to interrupt the expression and leave the sentence incomplete.

This figure, by its direct address to the imagination of the hearer, is often one of great power.

Demosthenes employs it frequently with much effect; as in his address to Æschines: "O thou — by what name can I properly call thee?"

Must I remember? why she would hang on him
As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on; yet, within a month —
Let me not think — Frailty thy name is woman.

§ 349. SENTENTIOUSNESS is a deviation from that continuousness in style which thought naturally requires, (§ 295.) It characterizes that discourse which is broken up into short and abrupt sentences.

The women, in their turn, learned to be more vain, more gay, and more alluring. They grew studious to please and to conquer. They lost somewhat of the intrepidity and firmness which before were characteristic of them. They were to affect a delicacy and a weakness. Their education was to be an object of greater attention and care. A finer sense of duty was to arise.

After all, what is high birth? Does it bestow a nature different from that of the rest of mankind? Has not the man of ancient line, human blood in his veins? Does he not experience hunger and thirst?

"Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery. Our chains are forged. Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston. The war is inevitable, and let it come. I repeat it, sir, let it come."

§ 350. There are certain general principles which apply to the use of figures and which should be carefully observed.

The first respects the occasion of using them; it requires that they never be introduced unless there be fit and suitable ground for them in the feelings of the speaker.

So far as figures appear to be sought after, they indicate labor and affectation which are in themselves most hostile to energy. The proper rule to be observed in reference to propriety in the use of figures, is that, while familiarity be obtained by previous study with the various kinds of figures, such only be actually employed in discourse as spring up naturally at the time.

§ 351. The second principle respects the number of figures; it forbids a too frequent repetition of them, and, especially, the frequent repetition of the same figure.

§ 352. The third principle respects the relation to the ordinary essential properties of style; it requires that figurative expressions should be in conformity with the necessary principles that govern those properties.

Figures are deviations from the ordinary forms of speech, but can never be properly violations of its essential properties. In the use of figures, accordingly, the principles of etymology, syntax, and lexicography, for example, should never be violated. No real energy is gained to discourse by the introduction of a figure which is unintelligible or obscure.

§ 353. The fourth principle respects the quality of the figure itself; it requires that it be ever congruous and complete in itself; and at the same time be extended no further than is necessary for distinct apprehension.

The liability to an offense against this principle is greatest in the case of the representative figures. Whenever these are presented confusedly and with incongruous features they offend rather than impress. So, also, while offensive abruptness and incompleteness are to be avoided, the figure should never be extended further than the imagination of the hearer needs in order to grasp it intelligibly and fully. In the simile or comparison, for instance, to carry out the figure into every possible resemblance weakens as well as disgusts, and is fatal to energy.

The following extracts exemplify violations of this principle: —

"There is not a single view of human nature which is not sufficient to extinguish the seeds of pride." — *Addison.*

"Men must acquire a very peculiar and strong habit of turning their eye inwards, in order to explore the interior regions and recesses of the mind, the hollow caverns of deep thought, the private seats of fancy, and the wastes and wildernesses, as well as the more fruitful and cultivated tracts, of this obscure climate." — *Shaftesbury.*

"These are the first-fruits of my unfledged eloquence, of which thou hast oft complained that it was buried in the shade."

"Upon thy mirror, earth's majestic view,
To paint thy presence, and to feel it too."

CHAPTER IV.

OF BEAUTY IN STYLE.

§ 354. BEAUTY in style is that property by virtue of which the discourse is commended to the taste of the hearer.

The general relations of discourse to beauty, to taste, to the imagination as both faculty and capacity of form, were summarily indicated in §§ 4, 6. We have found the principles of beauty — the principles of æsthetic science — in application everywhere throughout the whole procedure in the production of discourse; more prominently, indeed, in some departments than in others, as in excitation, persuasion, in the use of imagery, yet in some degree in all. We have now to view them as they apply themselves only in another specific relation — to the taste of the hearer; and the inquiry which presents itself is simply this: what attention to taste is requisite in the construction of discourse from mere consideration of the mind addressed beyond that already recognized as necessary in the provision of the thought and outward expression of it in language.

Beauty in style, it may be again remarked, is a relative property, (§ 307.) Hence arises the necessity that the orator carefully consult the taste of his hearers, that he may properly meet its degrees of culture and other peculiarities which determine or modify taste. He must never lose sight of that — the æsthetic nature of his hearers. And although that nature is generically the same in all men, there are infinite diversities in the degrees of culture, particularly in respect to the diversity of objects in respect to which the taste may specifically be exercised or cultivated.

The particulars in the construction of discourse to be attended to in order to conform it properly to the taste of the hearer may be ascertained at once from the analysis of beauty or form as the proper object of the taste or passive imagination. In all objective beauty or form, then, there are to be recognized at once three essential constituents, — something revealed, something in which it is revealed, and the revelation itself; just as in a judgment there are the three elements, — that of which something is thought, that which is thought of it, and the more vital element of the judging act itself. Now nothing can be revealed to mind save mind itself; and if we may use the term in its widest, yet a legitimate, import, as denoting any form of the mind whatever, including forms of the mind as feeling and willing as well as those of knowing, we may call that which is revealed in all beauty or form *idea*. The elements of beauty depending on its idea — its proper content revealed in any object of beauty according as it is a form of the intelligence, the sensibility, or the will, — are *propriety*, *tone of sentiment*, and *grace*.

Of these elements, propriety is founded on the unity and harmony of the parts and relations of an object which are the indispensable conditions of our intelligently apprehending it. We cannot know an object except so far as it is one the internal parts of which are in congruence or harmony, so that they can be grasped together in thought, and the external relations of which are in like congruence or harmony with all surrounding objects of our knowledge. The word *tone* is fitly and eminently in the literature of art applied to the expression of feeling. And the term *grace* is as fitly and currently applied to an object of beauty so far as apprehended as activity; grace is the form of activity as perfect, that is, as free, unshackled, and unconstrained by outer force.

The matter in which the idea or content in beauty is revealed, so far as discourse is concerned with it, is of three

gradations. In the first place, the idea to be expressed shapes itself ever in some specific form — some *ideal* which is rightly viewed as the internal matter in which thought and feeling and purpose express themselves. In the next place, as has been repeatedly represented already, this ideal to be communicated to another mind is invested more or less in what we have called the *representative imagery* of thought. Still further, we have the third gradation of human speech consisting of audible, articulate sounds, in which thought in discourse finally embodies itself. Lastly, the revealing act itself, which is the vital element of beauty, as it incorporates the given idea in these various kinds of matter freely and perfectly, imparts a peculiar beauty to discourse.

That discourse, then, meets all the demands of taste, which throughout expresses perfect propriety, perfect tone of sentiment, and perfect grace, wherever intelligence, feeling, or free activity is expressed, which expresses such idea in perfect ideals embodied in fitting imagery and diction, and finally, expresses such idea in such matter-form with a perfect revealing or rendering power — in perfect freedom. But it will appear on reflection that these elements of beauty in discourse may all be comprehended under the three enumerated as founded in the idea; for in oratory, as we have seen, the idea revealed is the speaking mind itself. Proper oratory is a personal procedure; it is the revelation of the person, and in its highest, most perfect forms — it is the whole man in the highest exertion of all his powers of thought and feeling and purpose, through all the modes of outward expression. Such is the view given of it by one who among the best knew and possessed himself its power — a view caught, it would seem, in a moment of special inspiration. "The clear conception, out-running the deductions of logic, the high purpose, the firm resolve, the dauntless spirit, speaking on the tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every feature, and urging the whole man onward, right onward to his object — this, this is eloquence." The person is, consequently, to discourse, what the theme is to a poem, the character to a portrait or a statue, the subject or content to any product of art. The person is revealed as well in the choice of imagery and of diction and in the rendering power as in the theme or the object of his discourse. Hence, in the two latter sources of beauty named — the matter-form and the rendering skill — we demand, as the governing characteristics, perfect propriety, pure tone of sentiment, and grace. These three may be accepted, consequently, as the comprehensive elements of beauty in discourse.

§ 355. The elements of Beauty in style are *Propriety*, *Tone*, and *Grace*.

These properties should characterize the entire production of discourse — its style in its broader import — the shaping of the thought, the expression of feeling, and of aim. They should mark the whole discourse, as the style of the whole man himself is necessarily given forth more or less in all discourse, and more fully in the higher and more perfect forms of oratory, in which the discoursing mind impresses itself more directly and completely on the soul of the hearer through his passive imagination.

§ 356. Rhetorical Propriety is that element of beauty in discourse which is founded in the harmony or congruence of its properties and of its relations.

The term *propriety*, it will have been observed, is used in various applications in rhetoric. We have already recognized grammatical propriety, denoting in its narrower import, as etymological propriety, a congruence between the use of words and their function as parts of speech; also, another species of the more generic grammatical propriety, lexical propriety, a congruence between the use of words and their established meaning. We have now a proper rhetorical propriety as congruence between the discoursing mind in the movements of thought and feeling, and the use of imagery

and of diction on the one hand, and the true nature of discourse on the other. As the word itself signifies, rhetorical propriety is but the giving to discourse what belongs to it — what is proper to it — that without which it cannot be perfectly apprehended as true discourse. And this is but that internal and external harmony or congruence in all properties and relations which is the condition of all intelligent apprehension.

Rhetorical propriety requires an observance of the conditions of internal congruence — of harmony in all the properties of discourse. The theme must be in harmony with the discussion, the discussion with the proposed object of discourse, the process of discussion with the more specific end of the discourse, the subsidiary parts with the principal parts. And in like manner, the style must be congruous with the theme and the discussion, and with each part and stage of the discussion, as, also, in its parts, in the imagery, and the diction in all their modifications.

Rhetorical propriety requires, also, a congruence or conformity in the whole structure of the discourse to all related objects — to the character, personal and official, of the speaker and of the hearers, and to the occasion and all the circumstances of speaking.

The gradations of propriety, both in respect to extent and importance, vary from its highest forms in proper oratory where it is both indispensable to success and ranges throughout the whole procedure in speaking, ruling thought and passion and purpose, and shaping the whole body of expression in imagery and diction, down to its lowest forms in mere representative discourse, in which the proprieties attaching to the person both of writer and readers and to the occasion and circumstances of writing, which are the higher proprieties in pure oratory, sink relatively and become almost obscured in the lower proprieties that attach to the conduct of the thought and use of diction. The orator must be in harmony with himself, with his theme and discussion, and with all that is

about him; suiting himself in all to the various and fluctuating demands of the taste of his hearers at the time. Cicero does not hesitate to call propriety in this, its full and legitimate import, the chief thing in the art, the one essential element of oratorical power: "Is erit eloquens, qui ad id quodcunque decebit, poterit accommodare orationem." To the same purpose, Milton speaks of "decorum," a term used in the same sense, as "the grand masterpiece to observe."

Indispensable as it is, and therefore imperatively demanding the earnest and assiduous study of all who would excel in discourse by the careful, separate study of each one of its manifold requirements, it is yet that one property which Cicero says it is impossible to communicate: "Caput esse artis, decere; quod tamen unum id esse, quod tradi arte non possit."

§ 357. RHETORICAL TONE is that element of beauty in discourse which consists in the expression of the sentiment of the speaker.

Tone in art-literature is the proper symbol of the sensibility — of feeling, in distinction from propriety, which is the proper symbol of intelligence, and from grace, which is the symbol of power or freedom. But the highest form of the sensibility is the passive imagination — the capacity of form, as the judgment is the highest form of the intelligence. Rhetorical tone, therefore, is the expression in discourse of the speaker's mind as it has been impressed and shaped from whatever source or cause. It legitimately includes the expression of character, as that which has been shaped and formed by the conspiring work of the individual himself and of all the outward influences which have left their impress upon him. It was thus on good grounds that the ancients urged so earnestly the importance of character to success in oratory; for, as Quintilian reasons, "discourse reveals character and discloses the secret disposition and temper; and not without reason did the Greeks teach that as a man lived so

he would speak." "Profert enim mores plerumque oratio, et animi secreta detegit. Nec sine causa Græci prodiderunt, ut vivat, quemque etiam dicere."

Tone, therefore, as the revelation of the soul and character of the speaker, must characterize discourse everywhere. They give a peculiar color and hue to it in every element — in the shaping of the theme and through the discussion, but more fully and impressively in the more outward embodiment of the thought in the imagery and diction. The purity and elevation of soul in the speaker, the habits of thought which they occasion and determine, the wonted associations with objects as high or base, the imagery with which the mind from allowed disposition and habit has become conversant, and even the language which has become most familiar from being the allowed embodiment of the wonted tenor of thought and feeling, are distinct elements which impart to its discourse its proper tone. As purity, nobleness, generosity, kindliness, are in their own nature winning and impressive, the orator who would aim at the highest success will need to see to it that the feeling, the soul that he necessarily reveals in his discourse, be such as the higher and more dominant nature of man shall approve and love.

§ 358. RHETORICAL GRACE is that element of beauty in discourse which is found in the rendering power or skill of the speaker.

Grace, as has already been remarked, is the revelation or symbol of free activity. In style, accordingly, it is the expression of the activity of the speaker as being free and untrammeled. It is the highest characteristic of genius in discourse. It is the predominant characteristic of Shakespeare, who outranks all writers, not in the extent of his learning or richness of his intelligence nor in the intensity of his feeling, but in his wonderful power and freedom in rendering, in revealing or embodying. Everywhere do we stand in admiration of it in his dramas — in the rendering of

historic fact and of historic character through the development of the plot, the selection and grouping of personages and their utterances. Every word, every sentence, every image, every scene is the most perfect revelation of whatever idea was to be brought forth in it. Well has it been said: "You cannot change a word but for the worse; the embodiment, the rendering, would be marred by the change."

Grace — freedom in rendering — must characterize discourse everywhere. We can put up with almost any thing in discourse but imbecility, — impotence in conceiving and developing the theme, and in the representation in imagery and language. As the highest characteristic of oratorical genius it demands special study and training. It should be remarked that grace respects continuous and sustained power, rather than that which is fitful, which is merely impetuous and violent. Abruptness and sententiousness in style imply, indeed, power. So far as abrupt and broken, however, discourse implies a broken or impeded energy. The roar and foam of a mountain torrent dashing against rocks and trees display force; it is force, however, checked, impeded, and out-mastered. The easy, gentle flow of the majestic river, that quietly takes into its current and bears along without a ripple every obstacle that comes in its way, is a more perfect emblem of unimpeded power, and in its motion we see grace exemplified. Mere impulsive, jetting oratory is so far deficient in grace as it implies impeded and resisted power.

§ 359. In the acquisition of this general property — Beauty in style — three means are essential: —

First, Mental culture;

Secondly, Study of art, including both its principles and its exemplifications in models; and,

Thirdly, Exercise with judicious criticisms.

§ 360. *Mental culture* is essential for that intelligence

which is the ground and condition of propriety, for acquiring those habits and associations which are necessary for the expression of right sentiment, and also for the attainment of that power and freedom which is the foundation and source of grace.

§ 361. *The study of art* is directly beneficial in cultivating propriety, in forming the sentiments, and in developing power of expression.

Every species of art may be turned to useful account in the formation of oratorical taste. While in no one are all the forms of beauty perfectly revealed, there is none, perhaps, which is not distinguished above every other in its adaptedness to develop some one or another particular element of beauty.

The term *art* is here employed in its most comprehensive import, and is intended to include every exertion of power under the control of taste. Nature itself in this view is but the workmanship of a most perfect artist, and is hence a most appropriate model for the study of oratory in all its various forms of skill and beauty. Manners and morals, also, lie within the domain of art; and for many reasons demand the close and constant study of the orator, not for the mere information of the understanding only, but as furnishing the means of developing and forming the taste.

In the study of discourse itself, the best means of cultivating taste are to be found. The principle to guide in selecting models is well given by Coleridge: — "Presume those to be the best, the reputation of which has been matured into fame by the consent of ages. For wisdom always has a final majority, if not by conviction, yet by acquiescence."

§ 362. *Exercise* in oratory is the chief and indispensable means of developing and strengthening power of execution; and, combined with judicious criticism, aids in the cultivation of all the elements of oratorical taste.

In applying criticism to oratorical compositions, the caution given in § 18 in regard to the time of criticism needs carefully to be observed; as nothing more fatally chills and enervates inventive and expressive power than the indulgence of an undue critical spirit at the time of composing or speaking.

Hence the indispensable necessity to the best culture in discourse, of the study of one process of invention, of one property of style, at a time, till each successively is thoroughly mastered. Skill in one process or in regard to one property helps to training in every other, and moreover saves from that distraction and consequent confusion and conscious weakness which are so fatal to freedom and so to all success in constructing discourse.

EXERCISES ON THE OBJECTIVE PROPERTIES. *Name and correct the faults in the following extracts:* —

London was inferior in most material respects to Paris and Lisbon.

The French wits have for the last age been in a manner wholly turned to the refinement of their language, and indeed with such success that it can hardly be excelled, and runs equally through their verse and prose.

No laws are better than those of this remarkable code.

After we had been some time at the house of Gaius mine host and of the whole church.

These two elements are always in a certain inverse proportion to each other.

It is extraordinary that there is not more than one accident a day here.

Every one who puts on the appearance of virtue is not virtuous.

This fallacious art debases us from enjoying life instead of lengthening it.

Hence is necessitated a radical difference in the kind of agency which he exerts upon man and upon the material world.

So there is that in the nature of the infinite God which no copy graven on a finite soul, however noble, can in the very nature of things fully render.

If kept in ignorance of the truth, if error is constantly inculcated, and all the powers of education be brought to bear in favor of evil, it is almost unavoidable that the judgment will be perverted and the mind corrupted.

I have before not erred in my opinion.

Such were very nearly the words and such the manner in which Miss J. expressed her determination.

"By her own internal schisms, the church was rehearsing those vast rents in her foundation which no man should ever heal." — *De Quincey.*

"This reproach might justly fall on many of the learned of that age, as with less excuse it has often done upon their successors." — *Hallam.*

That then and still unfortunate country.

The room where this vista Nature in her genuine English aspect opens, is the same, etc.

We can scarcely doubt that it is idle to deny that this race has deeply affected our destiny.

We think more highly of his sketches of the social and ecclesiastical condition of England than of the improvements in her laws and constitution.

"This, though men make a shift with in the ordinary occurrences of life where they find it necessary to be understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this insignificancy in their words, when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon. Especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them." — *Locke.*

I could draw out a frightful picture of human suffering, and without going beyond the actual experience of multitudes, against which no sagacity or virtue of man could guard.

"I was once extremely fond of my pencil, and it was a great mortification to me when my father turned off my master, having made a considerable progress for the short time I learned." — *Lady Montagu.*

Mrs. Cibber herself he considered as a pattern of perfection in the tragic art, from her magnetizing power of harrowing and winning at once every feeling of the mind.

THE END