

ELEMENTS

OF THE

ART OF RHETORIC

ADAPTED FOR USE IN
COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES, AND ALSO,
FOR PRIVATE STUDY.

This is an art
Which doth mend nature, change it rather; but
The art itself is nature.

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PREFACE.

The particulars, in which the Treatise on Rhetoric now offered to the public differs from other works on the same subject in the English language, are chiefly the following:

First, Invention is treated as a distinct and primary department of the art of Rhetoric. From most English treatises this department has been entirely excluded; and rhetoric has been generally regarded as confined almost exclusively to style. If we leave out of view some older and nearly forgotten works that were modeled on the pattern of the Grecian and Roman rhetoricians, Dr. Whately's work furnishes, perhaps, the only exception to this general remark. The work of Dr. Whately, however, embraces but a small portion of what properly belongs to rhetorical invention. The attention of learners has thus been turned chiefly or solely upon style. The consequence has been, as might naturally be expected where manner is the chief object of regard, that exercises in composition have been exceedingly repulsive and profitless drudgeries. On the other hand, experience confirms most fully what was beforehand to be confidently counted on, that if the mind be turned mainly on the *matter*,—*the thought* to be presented and *the design* of presenting it, the exercise of composition becomes a most interesting, attractive and profitable exercise. The mind,

having thought to express, and being animated by a perceived object in expressing it, when furnished with the guiding principles in such expression, acts intelligently, easily, and with satisfaction to itself. Such exercise is, indeed, one of the most pleasing employments of mind. Style, itself, then becomes a matter of interest; for the desire is a natural one to see the thought so expressed as to accomplish the object in expressing it. A foundation is thus furnished for criticism; its principles and the application of them become intelligible, and therefore interesting even to the inexperienced writer. The ancients regarded invention as the soul of the art of rhetoric; and the success of their rhetorical training is to be attributed mainly to the fact that their attention was chiefly directed to this department of the art. The disesteem into which instruction in rhetoric has fallen in modern times, is, perhaps, justly due to the exclusion of invention from our rhetorical text-books.

Secondly, the endeavor has been made, with what success the public will decide, to reduce to a more exact system the principles of rhetoric, in the determination of the proper province of rhetoric, and of its departments, and, also, in the development of the principles involved in both divisions of the art. So far as was deemed compatible with the character of a practical treatise,—of an art as distinguished from a science,—the grounds have been indicated for the development of the art at each successive stage. The divisions, thus, are exhibited as given necessarily on rational grounds. It is a great satisfaction to the mind of a learner to be able to see that the path over which he is conducted is not an arbitrary one, but is determined by the very nature of the subject. Nothing is lost, while much is gained, by a conformity to strict philosophical principles in the construction of text-books for the use even of immature minds.

The author flatters himself that the view presented of the province of Rhetoric, while it will appear in its own light to be philosophically correct, avoids the confusion and difficulties, not to say the contradictions, that have been experienced in other systems. The province of Rhetoric, as the art of oratory, is well defined and philosophically distinguishable from Logic, Grammar, Aesthetics, Poetry, and Elocution. Including, as it must if it be a proper art, both the supply of thought and of language, it is saved from being degraded to a mere negative, critical system;—it becomes a positively invigorating and developing art, most admirably fitted to call forth and discipline the mental powers in a course of rationally prescribed and attractive exercises. Covering the entire field of pure discourse as address to another mind, it is redeemed from the shackles and embarrassments of that view which confines it to mere argumentative composition, or the art of producing Belief. This view of Rhetoric, in which Dr. Whately is followed by the writer of the article in the Encyclopædia Britannica, consistently carried out, excludes all Explanatory Discourse as well as all Persuasion. The allusion to the one, and the fuller consideration of the other, in Dr. Whately's Rhetoric, are justified by the author on grounds that are not tenable for a moment. Argumentative Discourse, the art of producing belief, can not, without violence to the well established import of language, include that discourse, the primary and controlling design of which is to inform or instruct, or that, the end of which is to persuade. Instruction and conviction are as widely distinguished as perception and belief; and it must appear on a very slight investigation of the subject that "generally speaking the same rules will" not "be serviceable for attaining each of these objects." Narration and argumentation have little in common, so far as

the conduct of the thought is concerned. There is very little, accordingly, in Dr. Whately's treatise, except under the head of Style, which has any application to Explanatory Discourse, as History or Description. And Persuasion, although it may make use of Argumentation, does not always require its help, and seeks entirely a different end by an entirely different process.

The distribution of the different forms of discussion, and of the different specific processes in each, will enable the learner not only to obtain a more thorough knowledge of the art of constructing discourse than he could from more general views, but will greatly facilitate the practical application of rhetorical principles to actual composition. In his exercises, he will know precisely what to do; while the supply of the matter of the composition, by being his own work, will give to the whole effort an interest and pleasure which are entirely foreign from exercises in composition as usually directed. It is the utter ignorance of what he is to do when set to the task of writing a composition, as it is called, which makes the task so repulsive. Suppose, for illustration, that "the French Revolution of 1848" be given out as the theme of a composition. No intimation being given in regard to the object in the discussion of the theme, the mind of the pupil is left without an aim, and it cannot work. It will be the merest matter of chance whether he propose to himself any aim at all in the discussion, or whether he do not blindly and confusedly bring together manifold and incongruous aims, and his effort, pursued thus irrationally, give him only disgust from beginning to end. But let him understand that it is as necessary to settle definitely the object as the subject of his composition; to determine that he is to write a narrative of the events of that Revolution, or of its causes or its effects; or a description of its exciting

scenes; or argue its necessity or its righteousness or its expediency; or exhibit it as a political movement fitted to awaken emotions of admiration or of fear and horror; or as a motive to others to seek to gain their liberties or to guard against revolutionary outbreaks, one or another of these objects and but one, and he is at once prepared to proceed rationally in his work. He knows what matter he needs to collect and in what form. He knows when to begin, how to proceed, and where to end. The procedure is now all plain, simple, and satisfactory. He can see now at what points his effort is successful and at what it is deficient. He can receive criticism and profit by it.

A new analysis is given in the work of the properties of style, which, it is hoped, will aid the student in ascertaining what properties should be secured to expression in rhetoric and what faults should be avoided, as well as in understanding on what grounds they are classed, as properties of style. Both in the designation, and in the enumeration and description of the oral properties, there will be observed a departure from former systems which, it is hoped, will commend itself to every candid and thorough investigator. It will be seen that these properties can be classed together and be subdivided on the strictest philosophical principles, and that, consequently, they may and should be carefully distinguished specifically from one another and generically from the other classes of properties. The attempt has been made, also, to reduce to some order and system the "Figures of speech" so called.

Thirdly, the treatise has been prepared with a reference to practical instruction in rhetoric; as an art, and not merely as a science. The principles have been presented with a view to their application in suitable exercises. It is accordingly recommended in the use of the work in instruction, that

exercises be prescribed to the pupil which shall involve the systematic application of the principles. A list of themes has been added in an appendix, designed for exercise on the principles of invention which apply to different kinds of literary composition. It will be found useful to prescribe themes of the different classes separately, and subject the composition when prepared to the test of the principles which apply to it. Thus, the exercises in narrative discourse may be continued till the laws of such discourse shall become practically familiar. The only exercises, perhaps, which the study of style readily admits, are those of correcting faults or of ascertaining the particular excellencies of a given discourse. Particularly, will it be found to be a profitable exercise to the learner to detect and correct, as far as it may be, the faults in the passages selected for exemplification of the principles. The form of the work, it will be observed, contemplates a thorough *studying* of its principles. It is not a work from which a mere cursory perusal will derive much benefit or satisfaction.

It is proper to add here that the original design of preparing the work, as well as the plan of it, have been suggested in the experience of the author as an instructor in rhetoric. The endeavor to teach the art under the guidance of our common treatises on rhetoric, with a predominant view to style or expression, proved so unsatisfactory as to put upon a diligent search after a better method. That method was found in the study of the ancient rhetoricians and particularly in observation on the success of exercises in Homiletics which were mainly exercises in invention; at all events it was found, in actual experience, that the substitution of exercises in rhetorical invention,—exercises in which the theme, the object, and the guiding principles of the composition were prescribed,—in place of mere exercises

in style without well defined object or known law of developing the thought, converted what was a most repulsive and unprofitable drudgery into an attractive and most beneficial intellectual effort.

In the actual construction of the work, free use has been made of the popular works on Rhetoric in the English language, particularly for purposes of exemplification and illustration. Valuable suggestions have, also, been derived from diverse German writers, as Schott, Hoffmann, Richter, Eschenburg, Theremin, Becker and others.

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INTRODUCTION.

OF THE IDEA AND PROVINCE OF RHETORIC.

§ 1. The object of the Art of Rhetoric is TO DEVELOP AND GUIDE THE FACULTY OF DISCOURSE.

An art is essentially distinguished from a science by the circumstance that, while the latter proposes truths and principles only as subjects of knowledge, the former carries them out in application to practice. An art, accordingly, always contemplates the exertion of some power or faculty; and proposes to point out the means and furnish the occasion of developing and regulating that faculty in the best manner. The art of Music, thus, addresses itself to the faculty of song; and unfolds the principles and affords, in suitable exercises, the means by which that faculty is to be cultivated and regulated. Arithmetic, or the art of computation, teaches the principles by which we must compute, and, also, presents examples for exercise, with a view to render the learner dexterous and accurate in computing. In like manner, the art of rhetoric proposes to explain the principles by which we discourse or communicate thought and feeling to other minds, and to furnish the means of acquiring a skill and dexterity in the use of this power.

The more particular determination and development of this general notion of rhetoric will be exhibited in the chapters of the Introduction that immediately follow.*

* It will be observed that the term "discourse" is used here in its more genuine import of 'communication of thought by means of language.' It is used by earlier writers to denote the faculty or attribute itself of thought: as

It adds to my calamity that I have
Discourse and reason.—*Massinger*.

Reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive; *discourse*
Is ofttest yours, the latter most is ours.—*Milton*.

By a common metonymy the word denoting the attribute is used to express the exercise and also the product of the exercise. Thus *Dryden* uses the word to denote the exercise;

The vanquished party with the victors joined
Nor wanted sweet *discourse*, the banquet of the mind.

It is in this sense the term is used in the definition.

The use of the term to signify the product of the exercise is so familiar as to need no illustration.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE LIMITS AND RELATIONS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC.

§ 2. As the various arts are distinguished from each other by the particular faculty or power which they respectively call into exercise, the art of rhetoric has its nature and essential character determined at once from its being founded on the faculty of discourse, or the capacity in man of communicating his own mental states to other minds, by means of language.

Various names are in current use for the designation of this art, conveying, however, slightly different shades of meaning. The term *eloquence* turns the mind on the source, and is equivalent to the phrase *verbal expression*, having no direct reference to the object of speaking. *Oratory*, on the other hand, fixes the attention on the hearer or person addressed, and directly suggests the idea of an effect on his mind. *Rhetoric*, the art of the speaker, expresses the thing itself, *speaking*, with no such reference either to the source or to the effect.

§ 3. Inasmuch as Discourse, in its proper and original import, respects an effect on another mind, and all intentional operations of one mind on another come under the control of moral principles; and, in so far, moreover, as it expresses moral states or aims to excite them, rhetoric bears a close affinity to ETHICS.

The ancient rhetoricians, as for instance, Aristotle, regarded rhetoric as but a specific development and application of ethical science. So, likewise, it is now regarded by some German writers, particularly, by Theremin. This

much, at least, is true. All proper oratory is a *personal* procedure. It implies a person in the concrete fullness of his personal relations addressing other persons in the concrete fullness of their personal relations. So far it is a moral procedure and comes under the supervision of ethics.

Rhetoric is, by no means, however, a part of moral science. If it represent moral states, if it imply a moral aim, if, consequently, it must proceed in conformity to moral principles, still, it does not follow that it is a department of ethics. Every systematic procedure on the part of man partakes of this moral relationship. Rhetoric but takes elements or principles given by ethics and weaves them with others, on principles of its own, into a particular science or art. It is no more a department of ethics than of physiology.

§ 4. In so far as Discourse is a representation of feeling or addresses feeling in another mind, it bears an intimate relation to the SCIENCE OF THE EMOTIONS AND THE PASSIONS.

Rhetoric thus derives from this science the principles by which discourse is to be regulated both in the expression of feeling and in the excitement of feeling. It assumes these principles, however, as known, and does not properly regard the investigation of them as lying within its own province. It takes the analysis of the feelings, the classification, the description, the relations between them, as furnished by the appropriate science, and uses them for its own peculiar ends.

§ 5. Discourse, as the product of a mind working freely, and directly aiming at an effect in another mind similarly constituted, involves and requires the exercise of Taste.

Rhetoric, accordingly, presupposes the science of

TASTE OR AESTHETICS. It assumes aesthetic principles and applies them to the production of discourse.

The relation of Rhetoric to Aesthetics will be more particularly defined under Chapter III.

§ 6. As the art of communicating *thought*, rhetoric presupposes LOGIC, or the science which unfolds the laws of thought, and enumerates and classifies the various conceptions, judgments and conclusions of which the human mind is capable. It, however, merely assumes those laws as known, and does not properly embrace a consideration of them within its own province.

§ 7. As the art of communicating thought by means of language, rhetoric also presupposes GRAMMAR, or the science of language. It takes the results of grammatical investigations and the laws of language as settled, and applies them to its own purpose.

The field of rhetoric is thus seen to be distinctly defined and separated from both Logic and Grammar. That it has ever been suffered to trench on these fields and assume into itself purely logical or grammatical investigations and discussions, is to be attributed only to vague and indefinite views of the proper province of rhetoric. It was from the same vague apprehensions in regard to the proper province of rhetoric that the ancient rhetoricians very generally included in their systems the principles of Ethics and the doctrine of the feelings. Even Aristotle devotes a large part of his treatise on Rhetoric to a discussion of the nature of the different passions or affections.

The distinction between rhetoric on the one hand, and logic and grammar on the other, may, perhaps, be more perfectly apprehended from the following definitions:

Logic, in the more comprehensive view of the science, is the doctrine of ideas, conceptions, and judgments. In other words, logic enumerates the various possible states of the intellect, whether ideas, conceptions, or judgments, classifies them, determines their forms, and shows their relations and the occasions or modes of their appearing.

Grammar is the doctrine of words and sentences. In other words, grammar unfolds the laws by which the various forms of thought appear in language; by which logical ideas and conceptions, in themselves and in their relations, embody themselves in words and logical judgments in sentences.

Rhetoric is the doctrine of discourse. It takes, first, the individual ideas, conceptions and judgments of logic, and unites them into living wholes of thought by penetrating them with a rational aim; and then embodies these concrete wholes into continuous discourse made up of the words and sentences which grammar has furnished.

Logic and grammar thus supply the lifeless and fragmentary elements. Rhetoric takes them and constructs them into discourse; into a living concrete whole, animated with the proper life of feeling, and the proper moral aim which discourse in its original import ever implies.

§ 8. The art of rhetoric cannot in strictness be regarded as having accomplished its end until the mental states to be communicated are actually conveyed to the mind addressed. It, therefore, may properly comprehend *Delivery*.

The mode of communication, however, is not essential. The thought may be conveyed by the pen or by the voice. *Elocution*, or the vocal expression of thought, is not accordingly a necessary part of rhetoric.

Elocution or vocal delivery has, indeed, generally been

esteemed a constituent part of the art of rhetoric. Diverse considerations, however, justify the propriety of separating them.

First, Elocution is not essential to rhetoric in order to constitute it an art; because, as has been already remarked, there are other ways of communicating thought than by the voice.

Secondly, we have a complete product of art when the thought is embodied in a proper form of language. Short of this, of incorporating into language, the artist cannot stop. For no art is complete till its product is expressed, or embodied. Mere invention does not constitute the whole of artistic power, in any proper sense of that expression. But when the thought is invested in language, a work of art is completed. A farther exertion of artistic power is not necessary in order to give it expression. It requires no skill to dictate, no oratorical dexterity, certainly, to commit to writing. We have then the limits of a complete art before elocution.

Thirdly, the arts of rhetoric proper, and of elocution, are so distinct that great excellence in either may consist with great deficiency in the other. There have been many orators who could write good orations but were miserable speakers; and many excellent actors, who were utterly unable to construct an original discourse.

Fourthly, the modes of training in these different arts are so unlike, that convenience, both to the instructor and to the pupil, requires that they be separated.

§ 9. In so far as Discourse is the embodiment of thought in language, Rhetoric and the art of Poetry stand on common ground and are subject to common principles. They may be distinguished from each other by the following specific definitions; viz :

Rhetoric or the art of Oratory is the embodiment of thought in language with a view to an effect on another mind;

Poetry is the embodiment of aesthetic ideas in language simply for the sake of aesthetic expression.

Rhetoric and poetry have, thus, much in common. They both express thought. They are so far subject alike to the laws of logical science.

The medium of expression in both is the same—language. The principles of style, accordingly, apply, to a certain extent, alike to both.

They are both aesthetic arts; and come alike, consequently, under the laws of Taste.

Many of the principles of rhetoric are, therefore, equally applicable to poetry. They admit illustrations, alike, from both of these arts.

But they differ both in content and in form. All thought, all at least, which can be serviceable to the moral effect that either directly or remotely belongs to all oratory, is appropriate to rhetoric, whether purely intellectual, or animated with emotion and fancy. Poetry can properly make use only of aesthetic ideas.

The language of oratory is not confined, as is that of poetry, to mere aesthetic expression. Poetry has a style as well as a content of its own.

Rhetoric, moreover, while proceeding in accordance with aesthetic laws, admits another end which is foreign to aesthetics; and aesthetic laws in their application to it, take direct cognizance of this foreign end, which is possible through the aesthetic element of propriety. See Chap. III. Poetry has no such aim foreign to aesthetic expression.

Rhetoric and poetry, therefore, are distinct arts; differing, essentially, in content, form and law of proceeding. The

ultimate ground of the distinction lies in the aim. The orator seeks an effect in another mind; the poet seeks only to express beautiful ideas in beautiful forms for the sake of the expression itself.

Poetry, thus, has both an *essential nature* and a *form* of its own. The form is the natural product of the peculiar poetic life or spirit. It is only in partial truth that we can say 'mere verse is poetry;' as we can only in partial truth say 'an idiot is a man,' since reason, which the idiot lacks, is the essential attribute of man. So, on the other hand, it is only in partial truth that we can say 'the peculiar poetic spirit without the proper poetic form makes discourse poetry.' It is only as we may call a disembodied spirit a man; it has the essential nature, not the form. As a human spirit and a human body unite in our conception of a man; so the poetic spirit and the poetic form must unite in any just conception of poetry.*

* In a review of Hegel's *Aesthetics* in the *British and Foreign Review* for Feb. 1842, this idea of the nature of poetry is happily developed. "Verse," it is there concluded, "is not synonymous with poetry, but is the incarnation of it; and prose may be emotive—poetical, but never poetry."

The following passages, quoted in this article, will serve still further to sanction and elucidate some of the positions given in the text.

"All emotion which has taken possession of the whole being—which flows irresistibly, and therefore equally—instinctively seeks a language that flows equally like itself, and must either find it, or be conscious of an unsatisfied want, which ever impedes and prematurely stops the flow of feeling. Hence, ever since man has been man, all deep and sustained feeling has tended to express itself in rhythmical language; and the deeper the feeling, the more characteristic and decided the rhythm, provided always the feeling be sustained as well as deep. For a *fit* of passion has no natural connection with verse or music; a *mood* of passion the strongest." *Westminster Review*, April, 1838. The term *rhythm*, here must

CHAPTER II.

OF RHETORIC AS A DEVELOPING ART.

§ 10. As every proper act respects a faculty, (§ 2,) and as every such faculty is susceptible of development and invigoration which the art seeks as its great aim to promote and secure, every true conception of rhetoric must regard it as a *developing and invigorating art*.

There is a most remarkable opposition between the views of the ancients in this respect and the current opinions of the moderns. With the ancients, rhetoric was chiefly prized as an art which *developed* and *cultivated* the faculty of speaking. Their written systems and their teachings in schools were designed and fitted to draw out this faculty, and strengthen and improve it by judicious practice. They sought this even, as there is some reason to believe, at the sacrifice of good taste. They loved luxuriance and labored in every way to promote it. The moderns, on the other hand, have too much regarded rhetoric as a merely critical art. They have directed their attention mainly to pruning,

evidently be taken in its largest import, to include all the various modes in which a recurring uniformity of expression can appear in discourse, whether rhyme or alliteration.

"Poetry and eloquence, are both alike the expression or uttering forth of feeling. * * * Eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself in moments of solitude, and bodying forth itself in symbols, which are the nearest possible representations of the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavoring to influence their belief, or move them to passion or to action."—*Monthly Repository*, Vol. III. p. 64.

repressing, and guiding; and have almost wholly neglected to apply any stimulus to the faculty of discourse itself. Their influence on the student of oratory has been, accordingly, at best but a negative influence; and any thing but fostering and nourishing. This has been an almost unavoidable result from their excluding from their systems the art of invention. For it is here—in invention—that the creative work in discourse mainly lies. Style, considered apart from invention, is lifeless and dead; and can feel no stimulus if applied. It drops, indeed, when thus regarded, from the position of a creative art, to the level of a mere science. It is, thus, not without reason that merely critical systems of rhetoric are generally regarded as of more injury than benefit to the student of eloquence, at least until the faculty of speaking has been considerably developed.

The commonly received maxim, "he who is learning to speak with accuracy and order is learning also to think with accuracy and order," expresses but a part of the truth. The study of style, and especially, the study of style as an art in the exercise of composing, undoubtedly conduces to accurate and methodical habits of thought. But "*to speak with accuracy and order*," including in the expression not only the selection of language, but also the invention of thought, acts more directly on the intellect in determining its habits. The exercise not only disciplines it to regular and accurate thought; it also directly invigorates and develops the intellect itself. Indeed, there is no exercise that more directly and more powerfully tends to mental development and invigoration, when pursued in conformity with the principles of thought and expression. The mental effort called forth in the invention of thought and the embodiment of it in appropriate language, when directed intelligently and correctly, at the same time, the most pleasing and also the most in-

vigorating and fostering that is possible to the human mind. Rhetoric, therefore, studied as an art, in connection with a practical application of its principles, may and should be, one of the most pleasing and one of the most profitable of studies.

§ 11. The faculty of discourse or the power to communicate thought by language is the common attribute of men; and is susceptible of indefinite degrees of improvement and cultivation.

Speech is the distinctive attribute of humanity. This general truth needs no modification to meet the case of deaf-mutes. While, undoubtedly, individuals differ indefinitely in the degrees to which they possess the power of vigorous thought and of forcible expression,—while there are geniuses here as in every other art, still it remains true that this faculty is subject to the laws which regulate all the various activities of our nature. The degree of excellence to be attained in discourse will depend on the training—on its mode and the degree to which it is carried. *Orator fit*—the orator becomes such. There is no such thing as a natural orator in the strict sense of the expression. The most eminent orators and writers have ever been those who have submitted themselves to the most thorough training. Patrick Henry, the most illustrious example of natural oratory, so far as there is any such, went through a course of training in his daily studies of human nature as drawn out by himself in his little shop, his every day trials on his lingering customers of the power of words, his deep and enthusiastic investigations into history, and particularly his patient and continued study of the harangues of Livy, which, to say the least, is very uncommon. The orator is the product of training.

§ 12. The means by which every art seeks its development and improvement are twofold: by a study of the nature and principles of the art, and by exercise.

It is obvious that there can be no true skill or excellence in any art unless its nature and the necessary principles which govern it are understood. It is equally obvious that no amount of this knowledge will, without exercise, secure practical skill in the art.

Obvious and unquestionable as are these remarks, yet the entire force and propriety of each of them are assailed, indirectly and in application, by different classes of minds. One class rejects the study of principles in an art on the ground that the observance of rules at the time will inevitably impede the execution. They ridicule the notion of a poet's asking himself, at the time of composing, what this rule requires and that rule prohibits; of a musician's referring constantly, while performing, to his gamut, to the rules of time, harmony, force, &c., which he finds laid down in his Musical Grammar. They object to the use of Grammars in acquiring any art, whether of poetry, oratory, or music, because, they say, such study makes only stiff and awkward performers.

This view is extremely superficial and partial. It is so far true, indeed, that a conscious observance of rules in composing will impede the free operation of the mind; will make the proceeding mechanical, and hence, awkward and lifeless. But it by no means follows from this, that when the rule has, by study and application, become a principle in the mind, ruling it unconsciously, as is the case with the expert artist, in all its free action, the proceeding will be less free, living, graceful, than it would have been without study, and, of course, in ignorance, or at hap hazard. On the

contrary, all proceeding in art is perfect only in proportion to the intelligence of the artist; and it is the law of the human spirit that it learn slowly, by degrees, and from without. Principles of art are not innate. They spring up only on observation or study. How much more rational it is to receive by study the generalized facts of all perfect proceeding in art with proper illustrations from models, than to work them out, as does the savage so far as he does it, by unaided observation and reflection, it is not necessary to labor in demonstrating.

The whole matter may be exhibited in few words. All art, whether poetry, oratory, music, or printing, as a rational procedure, must be in accordance with certain principles. It must proceed, farther, in intelligence; that is, with an intelligent conformity to those principles, either consciously or unconsciously apprehended. These principles can better be acquired when reduced to a scientific form, that is, to a form adapted to the understanding, than otherwise. Thus intellectually apprehended, as rules prescribed from without, they become, by continued application or in exercise, directing and animating principles, exerting an unconscious control. What is drudgery at first, mere mechanical application, thus, becomes eventually the most free, the most spirited, the most truly artistic creation. The poetry of Goethe, and of Coleridge, is not less perfect, certainly, because they were intellectual masters of the principles of poetry.

The other class reject practice in acquiring an art, because, as regulated step by step by a reference to rules, it is necessarily imperfect and awkward; and, because, practice merely for practice must be mechanical and spiritless. They would master, intellectually, the principles perfectly, and then hope for a perfect proceeding in compliance with them.

While the former class made art independent of intelligence, these make it independent of all training of the creative powers. They occupy, consequently, the opposite extreme.

The truth lies between. It is a law of the human spirit that its highest degree of free spontaneous action can be attained only by previous subjection to rule; and, generally, the severer the labor in the observance of this rule, the freer will be the play of the creating spirit.

*Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte
Quaesitum est. Ego nec studium sine divite vena
Nec rude quid posset video ingenium. Alterius sic
Altera poscit opem res et conjurat amice.*

Horat. Ep. ad Pison.

These rules, of old discovered, not devised,
Are Nature still, but Nature methodized.

Pope, Essay on Crit.

§ 13. The knowledge of the nature and principles of the art of rhetoric is attained chiefly in two ways; viz: by the study of rhetorical systems, and by the study of models in eloquence.

The great use of systems of rhetoric, as of other arts, is to facilitate the acquisition of the principles of the art by a brief, methodical and particular exposition of them. Such systems present the results of the investigations, the experience and observations of many minds. The utility of grammars of music to all learners of that art is at once perceived and appreciated. A similar utility may be expected from correct systems in all the arts.

The study of models is equally important. It is hardly practicable for the human mind to obtain a clear and familiar knowledge of any art without illustrations and exemplifications. This great means of training the ancients

denominated *imitation*.²⁰ In the use of this means, much caution is necessary.

In the first place, discretion and sound judgment are requisite in the selection of models. An immature taste is liable to be pleased with false beauties and excellencies. A corrupt taste will select a model that abounds in the faults which it loves; and thus confirm rather than correct itself. The only safe guide is the established opinion of men of taste and sound judgment. The world has pronounced its sentence in regard to many writers and speakers. This general and united decision it is ever safer to follow than the erratic judgment of an individual.

In the next place, caution is necessary in the actual study of even good models. A perfectly faultless model is nowhere to be found. The best poets and the best orators have shone only in particular excellencies. As in nature, perfect beauty is to be found in no one thing, but our conception of it is to be gained only by selection—by combining the particular excellencies that are to be found in different objects of the same class, excluding the imperfections of each, in order to obtain a perfect ideal; so in literature and oratory, as in every art, an idea of what is perfect in every feature, is to be gained only by the study of various products. While, accordingly, the best models are to be selected for study, even these should be studied only for their characteristic excellencies. Nothing can be more injurious to the taste or to the creative faculty of invention than servilely to copy any one model however excellent. Such servile imitation will, for the most part, catch up only the faults while it will fail to reach the virtues of the model; and at the same time prove fatal to all that originality which is the life of every art.

It is the proper function of a system of rhetoric to point

out the best models in the several properties of good discourse.

§ 14. Every art as a developing art must rely mainly on judicious exercise as the means of attaining its end.

No knowledge of principles, however thorough, no study of models, however extended, will make an artist without exercise. Indeed, there is a possibility of cultivating the judgment and the taste to an excess as compared with the creative power, so as to impede rather than to aid the exertion of it. A highly refined taste will be offended and disgusted with the imperfect products of a feeble inventive and constructive power; and the work of composing may be made thus a constantly disagreeable and repulsive work. This is experienced by nearly all who have neglected the art of writing or speaking till the taste has become considerably developed and cultivated. They find themselves unable, in writing or speaking, to reach the standard that their refined taste requires them to attain, and they are repulsed and disheartened. It is only when the creative power is developed in some proportion to the taste, that there can be that inspiration which fires the true artist, and makes the execution of his power his highest pleasure and delight. This development of the creative faculty depends on exercise. As with the muscles of the body, so with the faculties of the mind, nothing but exercise can impart vigor and strength. Exercise is the parent of skill and power every where; and nowhere more than in writing and speaking. The words of Cicero should be printed in capitals on the mind of every student of eloquence; *STILUS OPTIMUS ET PRAESTANTISSIMUS, DICENDI EFFECTOR AC MAGISTER.*

§ 15. Exercise in rhetoric, in order to be most bene-

ficial, must be *intelligent, systematic, critical, and abundant*.

§ 16. INTELLIGENT exercise implies that writing and speaking be pursued in accordance with the known rules and principles of rhetoric.

Little will be accomplished by blind practice in any art. A man may shout and cry, may strain his voice ever so much and make little progress towards becoming a good musician or a good speaker. The practice must be pursued with a clear, conscious knowledge of what the art requires. And here is seen the necessity of systems of rhetoric; to set forth in a convenient form to the learner the necessary principles of the art;—to teach him what he is to do in it.

§ 17. SYSTEMATIC exercise implies a regard to the specific functions or duties of the writer or speaker taken one by one successively in regular order.

Every art combines within itself a complication of many particular acts; of which in the exercise of the art there are, at different times, various combinations. The art of music thus embraces the several functions of pitch, time, force; and each of these particular functions may be analyzed into various subordinate particulars. A thorough course of training in this art must proceed by a regular, successive study of each of these particulars accompanied by a corresponding exercise of the voice in them. There are thus a great diversity of acts requisite in the production of a good discourse. These particular acts may be severally contemplated by themselves; they may be explained as to their nature, and be prepared for exercise singly and successively. This systematic exercise on particulars is as requisite and as useful in rhetoric as in music.

§ 18. Exercise, further, in order to be most useful, must be *critical*; in other words, must be subjected to the inspection of a teacher or of the performer himself, for the purpose of removing faults and retaining qualities that are good.

The proper time of criticism is after the performance is finished. To write or to speak with a constant reference to criticism at the time, is to impose on the mind a double labor or occupation, so that neither part of the work can be done well. Such subsequent criticism is shown to be necessary at once by the consideration, that, otherwise, it cannot be known whether the work has proceeded aright or in accordance with the principles that should regulate it. It, also, greatly helps to give the principle exemplified in the exercise a practical, controlling existence in the mind.

§ 19. Once more, skill in rhetoric cannot be attained except by much continued practice.

No illustration is requisite to show the correctness of this principle. It may be remarked here, however, that the labor of writing should not be pursued so constantly as to make it a drudgery, awakening no interest and inspiring no enthusiasm.

CHAPTER III.

OF RHETORIC AS AN AESTHETIC ART.

§ 20. Inasmuch as Discourse proceeds necessarily in conformity with the laws of Taste, (§ 5.), Rhetoric is properly regarded as an Aesthetic Art.*

* The term "Aesthetic" is preferred to "Critical" because the latter is too exclusively negative in its import.

The various arts have been distributed into two classes, one of which has been denominated Free, Liberal, Fine, Elegant, &c; the other, Mechanical, Useful, &c. Free arts are those in which the expression of beauty or the gratification of the taste is the controlling end of the production or proceeding; Mechanical arts are those in which some other end, as of utility, controls the production.

There are two arts, however, Rhetoric and Architecture, which it has been found difficult to embrace under this classification. Authors have differed from one another in assigning them their respective places under it. They both have an end foreign to aesthetics. Hence some have classed them among the unaesthetic or mechanical arts. But Oratory and Architecture certainly of themselves awaken aesthetic emotions, and have accordingly an aesthetic character; other writers have, therefore, ranked them among the aesthetic or elegant arts. A third class of authors, to mediate the controversy, have given them a middle position between the two.

But the true issue is, have these arts essentially an aesthetic aim, even although jointly with another, that is, a useful or mechanical aim? Architecture, certainly, does not exclusively respect a useful end. A Temple, a Dwelling, is not merely a shelter. It is designed to affect the mind as well as the body. It is, in this respect, essentially different from a tool, a machine, a mere mechanical instrument. Much more is this aesthetic character essential to eloquence. As designed to affect another mind, it must affect it in accordance with its nature, that is, in accordance with its aesthetic constitution. As expression, moreover, of one mind to another, it must bear the aesthetic character of the communicating mind. It is therefore essentially aesthetic in its nature, being so distinguished both from its aim and from

its origin. That it has a foreign aim does not, in the least impede the aesthetic procedure. For conformity to end, suitableness, fitness, is itself an aesthetic element.

Rhetoric, consequently, like architecture, is something more than a merely decorative art, which adds ornament to something that is not of itself aesthetic or is perfectly adapted to its end without being in taste. It is, of its own nature and essentially, an aesthetic art; as discourse must be in accordance with principles of Taste, or it cannot be perfect even in reference to its end. Oratory must, therefore, of necessity, express beauty in order to its perfection. This cannot be said of a tool, a machine, a product of any mechanical art.

§ 21. Discourse, as aesthetic in its nature, freely admits all the various elements of Beauty.

These elements are reducible to three, viz: *Absolute Beauty*, *Grace*, and *Propriety*.

The various elements of Beauty are either inherent in the object itself or depend on its relations. All inherent beauty is either absolute, that is, permanent and inseparable from the object, or accidental and contingent. The permanent is denominated *Absolute Beauty*; the accidental or contingent, *Grace*.

Relative Beauty, or Beauty depending on relations merely, is denominated *Propriety*. We have thus the following definitions.

ABSOLUTE BEAUTY is that element which lies in some fixed property of a beautiful object. Thus the brightness of the rainbow, the clearness and stillness of a meadow stream, the fresh verdure of spring, are instances of absolute beauty.

GRACE is that element of beauty which lies in motion, or in repose, the effect of previous motion. The undulations of

a lake when stirred by a gentle breeze, the easy gambolings of a playful lamb, the free motions of supple infancy, are instances of the grace of motion. While the blending of the violet conceived of as nature's penciling, the easy composure of an infant's limbs in sleep, are instances of the grace of repose.

PROPRIETY respects the relations of the object, and consists in conformity to truth in the determination of these relations. It includes the specific elements of fitness, conformity, harmony, symmetry, proportion and the like.

§ 22. ABSOLUTE BEAUTY appears in discourse in *the subject, the form of development* of the subject or any subordinate thought, and also in *the manner of expression*.

1. The *subject* itself of the discourse may often reveal aesthetic beauty. Thus in Biography, a noble or lovely character of itself stirs our admiration, and imparts aesthetic pleasure. The biographer whose very subject is a character vile, corrupt or depraved, labors under a constant difficulty—so far as the gratification of taste is an object of his work. In History, such subjects as the Retreat of the Ten Thousand, the Roman Republic, the German Reformation, are in themselves admirable. The orations of Demosthenes against Philip, aiming at the independence and freedom of the Grecian States, possess intrinsic beauty in their subject. That of Cicero pro Cluentio, admirable as it is, yet has to contend with the difficulties of a subject in itself repulsive.

In fictitious composition, the subject is at the choice of the writer; and in his selection he has the opportunity of displaying the elevation and correctness of his taste. This principle will determine, very justly, the relative character and merits of the fictitious writings of Sir Walter Scott and

of those of the late French school. How ethereal and pure are some of the writings of the Germans in this department of composition!

2. *The development of the theme* in discourse may also contain this element of beauty. There is a singular beauty in the following plan of a discourse by Dr. Sprague,* as thus announced in the partition. "The Christian does not desire to live alway, because he prefers

Perfect light to comparative darkness;
Immaculate purity to partial sanctification;
Immortal strength to earthly weakness;
Cloudless serenity to agitating storms;
The fellowship of the glorified to the society of the imperfect;

The honors of victory to the perils of warfare."

3. *In the manner of expression*, this element of beauty may also very generally be exhibited. In the selection of his images, by the purity of his sentiments, and the refinement of his associations as evinced in his style, there is wide room furnished to the writer for the exhibition of a cultivated and elegant taste. The orations of Demosthenes, of Chatham, and of Henry, abound thus in expressions of lofty sentiments of patriotism and indignation at oppression which impart a peculiar beauty to their eloquence.

§ 23. Grace may appear in the subject itself, or in the working of the speaker's mind in conceiving and representing the particular thoughts of the discourse.

The subject may possess in itself the element of aesthetic grace, so far as it admits of motion or change. Living objects and such as are subject to the influence of causes of

* National Preacher, Vol. 13, p. 129.

any kind, physical or spiritual, furnish themes which admit of grace.

In the particular thoughts and sentiments of the discourse, also, as well as in the style generally, grace appears so far as the mind of the speaker is exhibited moving freely in its conceptions and its representations. In the ready apprehension of the subject, the discovery and use of arguments and illustrations, the easy and natural expression of sentiments in kind and degree appropriate to the occasion—whenever in these there is exercised freedom, skill, dexterity, grace may appear. For grace is but the expression of power working freely.

The parables of our Savior reveal this element to a high degree in the richness and freeness of the illustrative imagery.

The sermons of Jeremy Taylor furnish, also, a happy illustration of this species of grace. Macaulay exhibits this element in his style generally. The expression flows with an ease and a finish that exhibits great power and freeness in representation.

§ 24. RHETORICAL PROPRIETY appears in the speaker's selection of his subject, as well as also in the development of it and in the style of expression, so far as they are conformed to what is required by the occasion, the laws of thought and the principles of discourse.

The writings of Leighton, of Addison, and of Irving, possess this element of beauty in a high degree.

CHAPTER IV.

OF DISCOURSE AND ITS KINDS.

§ 25. Discourse, as the communication of thought, implies at once and necessarily, in its primary and complete signification, a speaker and a hearer;—a speaker, who in speaking seeks to produce a certain effect in the mind of the hearer.

This effect is primarily in the intelligence or understanding of the hearer; and secondarily and consequentially in the feelings and the will.

§ 26. Oratory, therefore, or address, is the proper form of discourse in its strictest and fullest import. It constitutes, accordingly, the immediate object of rhetoric.

The very nature of discourse, thus, marks out the field of rhetoric as the art of discourse; and determines in what light the art should regard other so called forms of discourse, as history, essay, and the like. These are, strictly speaking, *abnormal* forms of discourse; and want some element which is to be found in proper oratory. Rhetoric, in the unfolding of its principles, should confine its view to oratory, therefore, not only because oratory is the only pure form of discourse, but, also, because in unfolding the principles of oratory, it at the same time unfolds the main principles of the other derived forms of discourse. It is only from considerations of expediency and not of philosophical accuracy that general rhetoric embraces any of these abnormal species. At least, it has fulfilled its office when it has indicated the distinction between pure discourse or oratory, and the several irregular forms, and thereby made known

the principles which come in to modify the laws of proper rhetoric in its application to them.

§ 27. The primary and essential characteristic of oratory as distinguished from other forms of discourse lies in its implying the direct opposition of speaker and hearer and the aim on the part of the former to produce a certain effect on the mind of the latter.

Whenever, accordingly, this opposition is lost sight of by the speaker, his discourse ceases to be oratory. It falls at once into the essay or some other impure form of discourse. Hence the first principle to be observed in all oratory or address—that it ever respect the mind of the hearer; and regard it as present to be influenced by the discourse. THIS IS THE HIGHEST LAW OF ORATORY.

Although it may be difficult, for the most part, to single out the particular forms of expression in which proper oratory may be distinguished from mere essay, still the true oratorical spirit will reveal itself throughout the discourse and give to the whole a peculiar coloring.

There are, however, some particular expressions that can be named by which oratory is at once distinguished from the essay. Oratory, thus, always conceives of itself in the forms of time and not of space; and hence avoids the use of the adverbs of place to designate what has preceded or is to follow, and uses those of time. The orator never says, thus, "what I have said *above*," but "what I have said *before*;" the essayist does the reverse. The orator says, "I will speak of this *hereafter*," not "*further on*," &c.

Again, the orator does not conceive of himself as the mere mouth-piece of the assembly, and does not, therefore, identify himself with the audience in the use of the plural pronouns, "*we*," "*our*," &c. It is otherwise in public

prayer; it is otherwise, also, with the essayist. The essayist merely *expresses* or utters forth without the distinct idea of a listener, thoughts or sentiments which he regards as common to himself and the reader. The distinct personality being dropped, the use of the plural becomes easy and natural. Hence, probably, the "*we*" of editors and critics. They express not personal but common convictions and sentiments.

§ 28. Of the derived species of Discourse, two kinds are distinguishable; one which drops from oratory only the idea of a present hearer, as *Epistolary Composition*; the other, which drops also the idea of a direct effect on another mind, as *Representative Discourse* generally.

§ 29. EPISTOLARY COMPOSITION, as it differs from proper Oratory only in the circumstance that it addresses an absent mind, conforms more closely than other derived species to the principles of Rhetoric. Its chief peculiarity lies in its not contemplating vocal delivery.

It will be remarked that while epistolary composition more frequently respects a single mind, proper oratory respects more commonly a multitude. At least, oratory rises to its highest perfection when addressed to a large assembly; for then the moral elevation, which is the proper soul of oratory, is highest. But epistolary composition, when addressed to multitudes, rises to high degrees of eloquence; as is seen in the epistles of the Apostle Paul.

When the epistolary form is adopted for the form's sake, it then falls into the rank of mere Representative Discourse.

§ 30. REPRESENTATIVE DISCOURSE, so far as it

diverges from proper oratory in dropping the opposition of speaker and hearer, has for its highest law, the representation of its theme for its own sake.

All Representative Discourse, as such, accordingly, has for its controlling principle, the following, viz.:

That the thought be represented in its utmost clearness, accuracy and completeness.

§ 31. We have, thus, the characteristics of the several divisions of Discourse, including Poetry.

Poetry represents for the sake of the form;

Representative Discourse represents for the sake of the theme itself;

Oratory represents for the sake of the effect on another mind.

In Poetry, accordingly, the form rules; in Representative Discourse, the matter; in Oratory, the exterior aim.

The intimacy and relationship between these several forms of representation in language are in this view clearly indicated. The intrinsic dependence of the form on the matter, the common attributes of the mind that addresses and of the mind that is addressed, and their common relationship to truth as the matter of discourse, show at once how large a field is common to all these arts. Particularly, is it seen how slight are the modifications which an art of representative discourse requires in the principles of proper oratory. Indeed, these modifications are, in the main, such as cannot well be set forth in distinct forms of language. See § 27.

§ 32. Representative Discourse is either PURE or MIXED.

It is *pure* when its theme is represented irrespectively of personal modifications, and, accordingly, in its own proper character.

It is *mixed*, when it is represented as modified by the peculiarities of personal apprehensions and convictions.

The Epicurean by Moore is an exemplification of the mixed form of representative discourse, in which but one mind is introduced by whose personal characteristics the representation is modified. Ancient life is in it represented through the experience of another, not from the direct perceptions of the author.

Where two or more persons are introduced, the discourse is called a *Dialogue*. The Dialogues of Plato, of Fontenelle, of Berkeley, are exemplifications of this variety.

§ 33. The highest law of Mixed Representative Discourse is, that the personal characteristics of the speakers introduced, so far as modifying the theme, be carefully exhibited throughout the representation.

The Dialogues of Plato are the most perfectly constructed specimens of the Dialogue, perhaps, that exist, so far as this first law of the discourse is regarded.

If the representation be for the sake of the form, the discourse becomes Poetry. We have, then, the *Monologue*, when but one person is introduced; and the poetic *Dialogue*, when more than one are exhibited. If the representation exhibits an action, it becomes *Dramatic*.

§ 34. Of the Pure Representative Discourse, several varieties are distinguished according to the character of the subject, as

HISTORY, the subject of which is some fact or event,

single or continuous, in nature, as *Natural History*, or among men, as *History Proper*;

BIOGRAPHY, the subject of which is facts in individual experience;

TRAVELS, which is but a more specific department of biography, having facts of a specific character in individual experience for its subject;

SCIENTIFIC TREATISES, including the ESSAY or DISSERTATION, the subject of which is some truth, not mere fact as is the case in History.

It is to be remarked respecting the Pure Representative Discourse, that it easily admits the proper distinguishing characteristic of pure oratory—the opposition of speaker and hearer. Just so far as it does this, the full form of oratory appears; so far, at least, as address to a locally absent mind will allow. It is not unnatural, thus, that the historian begins his history as an addressing mind, and uses the forms of address. As, however, the idea of representing the facts of history for their own sake and not for the sake of the moral effect on other minds begins to rule in his mind, the oratorical forms, as those of the first person, of time instead of space, fall away, and the discourse approaches to the character of the pure representative.

§ 35. PROPER ORATORICAL DISCOURSE may be distributed into different kinds on either of two different principles, giving rise thus to two distinct sets or classes.

One principle of distribution is found in the specific character of *the ultimate end* of discourse.

The other is found in the specific character of *the immediate end* of discourse.

§ 36. The ultimate end of all proper oratory being moral in its character § 3, there may be three different kinds of discourse according as one or another of the three different forms or phases of the moral element, viz: the right, the good, and the beautiful or noble in character, governs in the discourse.

The three forms of oratory thus given are THE JUDICIAL, THE DELIBERATIVE and THE SACRED.

These denominations are derived from the fields in which the several kinds of oratory respectively predominate. It must not be inferred from the names that the species are confined to the respective fields from which the name is taken; that the species of oratory, for instance, in which the idea of right is the governing idea of the discourse, is confined to the Bar. The name in each class is taken from the principal species in each.

§ 37. JUDICIAL ORATORY has the idea of the right for its governing idea. Its chief province is found in the proceedings of Civil Judicature.

§ 38. DELIBERATIVE ORATORY has the idea of the good for its governing idea. It is chiefly found in Legislative Assemblies.

Whenever measures, moreover, are urged on the grounds of their expediency or tendency to promote the well being of men, there is found proper deliberative oratory. Parliamentary eloquence is but one, though the most common and familiar variety.

§ 39. SACRED ORATORY has, for its governing idea, the lovely in character. It seeks to effect the perfect in character and is chiefly found in the pulpit.

Under this class is comprehended the panegyric, eulogis-

tic, or epideictic discourse. Only the lower varieties of this class were known to the ancients. The higher species is given in its perfection only with christianity.

§ 40. Discourse, distributed in reference to the specific character of its immediate end, comprehends the four classes of Explanatory, Argumentative, Pathetic, and Persuasive.

The above classification is founded on the several immediate ends of discourse as enumerated, § 54.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE DIVISIONS OF RHETORIC.

§ 41. Rhetoric, as the Art of constructing Discourse, embraces two processes which are in many respects distinct from each other. The one consists in the provision of the thought embracing feeling and the moral state in its proper form, and is founded mainly on Logic. The other consists in the provision of the appropriate language, and rests mainly on Grammar as its foundation.

The two great divisions of the art of Rhetoric, accordingly, are INVENTION and STYLE.

In many of the most popular treatises on Rhetoric in the English language, the first of these processes, invention, has been almost entirely excluded from view. Several causes may be assigned for this deviation from the uniform method of the ancient rhetoricians. The most important one would seem to be the neglect into which logic has fallen,

at least, the discordant and unsettled views of English writers.

Another cause is the change that has taken place in logical science since the times of the Grecian and Roman rhetoricians, which renders their systems of rhetorical invention, founded as they were, to a great extent, on their peculiar logical views, inapplicable to present modes of thought. Their system of topics is, thus, for this and other reasons, wholly unsuited to our times.

The art of invention, moreover, is more essentially modified than style by the particular department of oratory or the kind of discourse to which it is applied. Hence the ancient systems of invention which were constructed in strict reference to the modes of speaking then prevalent, are ill-adapted to present use. The systems of Cicero and Quintilian, for example, are for the most part illustrated from the peculiar practice of the Roman bar. Modern writers on rhetoric, in following the great ancient masters in the art, have hence been reduced to this alternative,—either of leaving out entirely this part of the science, or of constructing an entirely new system. They have, for the most part, in the English language at least, decided on the former branch of the alternative, and have generally excluded almost entirely from their works, the consideration of Invention.

The perversion and abuse of ancient systems in the schools of the middle ages have undoubtedly further contributed to bring this branch of rhetorical science into disrepute and neglect.

It cannot, however, be doubted on a candid consideration of the matter that invention must constitute the very life of an art of rhetoric. It respects the soul and substance of discourse—the thought which is communicated. Quintilian

justly says, "*invenire primum fuit ESTQUE PRAECIPUUM.*" It is in invention that the mind of the learner is most easily interested; most capable of sensible improvement. It is next to impossible to awaken a hearty interest in mere style independent of the thought; as the futile attempts to teach the art of composition as a mere thing of verbal expression have proved. Composing when thus taught must necessarily be regarded as a drudgery and be shunned instinctively with strong aversion. It is otherwise when the thought is the main thing regarded. There is to every mind a pure and elevated pleasure in inventing. There is a pleasure in expressing thoughts that have sprung into being from one's own creative intellect; of embodying them in appropriate forms of language. How different are the feelings with which a school boy contemplates the task of writing a composition which must contain so many words, whatever be true of the ideas, and the work of writing a letter to express some conviction of his own mind, some wish, some intelligence? It cannot be questioned that it is to the exclusion of invention from our systems of rhetoric that the neglect into which the art has fallen is chiefly to be ascribed. The prejudices against it are also mainly to be attributed to this defective and incorrect view of the art.*

* It is worthy of note that the most popular system of rhetoric now in use in the English language, that of Dr. Whately, owes nearly all its excellence and its reputation as an original work to the circumstance that it embraces, in the First Part, a brief and imperfect view of this branch of the Science.

FIRST GENERAL DIVISION.

INVENTION.

GENERAL VIEW.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE AND PARTS OF INVENTION.

§ 42. Rhetorical Invention is the art of supplying the requisite thought in kind and form for discourse.

§ 43. It embraces *Invention Proper* or the mere supply of the thought, and *Arrangement or Disposition*.

The propriety of regarding arrangement as a part of the process of invention may be seen from several points of view.

In the first place, the principle of division that has been adopted, by which rhetoric is regarded as embracing the two principles of *invention* or the supply of thought, and of the expression of thought in language or *style*, at once compels

to this treatment of arrangement. The two elements of thought and verbal expression are both essential elements, and are the only elements of discourse. It would be unphilosophical to introduce another principle of division, which would be necessary in order to admit disposition or arrangement as a distinct constituent part of the art of rhetoric.

Again, the process of invention cannot proceed but by order or method; and the very supply of the thought must therefore include a more or less definite regard to the arrangement. It becomes necessary, thus, to treat of arrangement or disposition, so far as it can be distinctly treated of as a subordinate and constituent part of invention.

The same observations, obviously, are applicable to method in style.

§ 44. The process of invention is applied either to the general theme or topic of the discourse, or to the particular thoughts by means of which that general theme is presented to the mind addressed for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the discourse.

§ 45. The general theme or topic of discourse is sometimes given or furnished in a more or less definite form to the speaker or writer; sometimes is wholly left to his free choice.

In the eloquence of the bar and of the Senate, the topics of discussion are determined beforehand for the most part to the speaker. Even here, however, there is much room for the exercise of invention. The particular theme proposed is to be taken up into the mind of the speaker; it is to be shaped to his habit of thought; it is to be defined and determined so as best to meet his particular purpose in discussing it; it is to be suited to the particular circumstances in which he speaks and to the mode in which he shall determine to

handle it. The same question will thus be stated in very different forms by different speakers; and no small degree of oratorical skill is often displayed in the mode of conceiving and presenting the particular subject of debate. The same observations are applicable to every species of discourse or composition where the subject is proposed to the speaker or writer.

Where the subject is left to the free choice of the speaker, there is room for a still higher display of inventive power. It is with the orator or writer as with the sculptor or painter. The subject itself shows the genius of the artist. The subject is left thus free to a considerable extent in the eloquence of the pulpit, as well as in most occasional addresses, in essays and other compositions.

§ 46. The particular subordinate thoughts by which the general theme is developed and presented to the mind addressed, while they must all lie in the field of the general theme and must likewise consist with the object of the discourse, are, with these limitations, open to the choice of the speaker.

As a rational discourse necessarily implies a unity, this unity must be in the singleness of the theme and of the object of the discourse, (§ 56). Accordingly all thoughts introduced must stand in a subordinate relation to this single theme, and, also, to this single object. Hence the principle, which admits of no exception in rational discourse, that no thoughts be introduced that do not both consist with the theme and the object and, also, tend to develop the one and accomplish the other.

While, thus, the subordinate and developing thoughts must all be found in the field of the one general theme, and of these only such can be taken as consist with the object of

the discourse; within these limits there is free range for invention. The fullness and richness of these subordinate thoughts will display the richness of mental furniture possessed by the speaker, the control he has over this stock of thought, and the fertility generally of his faculties of invention. The selection out of this stock will exhibit the soundness and promptness of his judgment and the power he has of steadily pursuing his object.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE GENERAL THEME OF A DISCOURSE.

§ 47. The process of invention as applied to the general theme of discourse consists in the selection of the theme and in the determination of the particular form in which it is to be discussed.

In the very use of the expression "the theme,"—a singular and not a plural term—is indicated the necessity of singleness in the theme. It seems to border on absurdity to speak of the *themes* of a discourse. Discourse can hardly with propriety be called one which has more than one general theme. The unity of a discourse, in which, indeed, lies its very life, requires that there be but one thought to which every other shall be subordinate and subservient, utterly forbids the introduction of two or more co-ordinate thoughts.

In the singleness of the theme, lies the first and broadest principle of unity. As will be exhibited in the proper place, the broader unity determined by the singleness of the theme will be narrowed by the particular object in the dis-

cussion, and still farther by the process by which the discussion is conducted.

§ 48. The principles which regulate this process regard either the mind of the speaker* himself, the occasion of speaking, the mind addressed, or the object of the discourse.

§ 49. In selecting his theme and determining the particular aspect to be taken of it, the writer has need to consult his own mind chiefly in reference to the capabilities of supplying the particular thoughts and illustrations by means of which his subject is to be presented and developed.

No one in proper discourse writes merely with a view to an effect on himself. Sometimes, indeed, the pen may be employed in investigation. Such compositions, however, are not proper discourse, which always more or less definitely or directly respects another mind. The writer, therefore, will need ever to select a theme on which he is competent to write; respecting which he has ample information and means of illustration within his power.

It is nevertheless a great mistake, although a common one, to suppose that a subject very familiar and at the same time very comprehensive, is most favorable to ease of execution. Invention is an originating, creative process in its essential nature. As such it is the most proper and delightful work of a rational being; and whenever it is pursued, imparts a pleasure which itself fires anew the energy of the inventive faculty. This is the inspiration of original

* In order to avoid all unnecessary multiplication of words, but one of the specific terms, "writer" and "speaker," will ordinarily be used hereafter, even when the generic notion of the person discoursing, whether through the pen or the voice, is meant.

genius—the rapture that necessarily attends the production of new thoughts and forms of thought. Whenever a familiar and, at the same time, a broad and comprehensive theme is selected, if especially the limits of the composition be narrow, only general, familiar views can be taken, and there is no life of invention. It is a cold, inanimate work of the memory recalling dead thought. There is no inspiration, no satisfaction. There must be some new view taken, something original, or the work of invention must necessarily be laborious and heavy. Now it is specific views that furnish the occasion of original invention. In them the writer shuns the general, common-place notions that are familiar to all. The more specific and definite, therefore, the theme, the easier will be the work of invention. Caution only is necessary that the field of view be not too limited for the writer's power of invention; since only the most vigorous and practiced writer can take the most minute and particular views.

Young writers should be on their guard against what are called "*fertile subjects*." They are generally unfavorable to the exercise of invention, and therefore, most difficult to handle; because they are so comprehensive that only general and common-place views can be taken.

It may be proper here to put young writers on their guard, also, in selecting themes, against *specious mottoes* or titles. The dress of language in which the theme is invested is not the theme itself. The one may be rich and gorgeous, while the other is miserably lean and dry. It need hardly be said that the facility with which the work of invention will proceed will depend on the richness of the thought itself which constitutes the theme, not on the garb it may chance to wear.

§ 50. A proper regard to the occasion of speaking

will determine the process of invention not only in reference to the character of the theme to be selected, but, also, in reference to the latitude as well as particular field of view that is taken, and the illustrations that are to be presented.

§ 51. There is obviously, likewise, a necessity of consulting the character of the audience; the extent of their information, their peculiar habits of thought, their feelings also, and their relations to the speaker.

There is perhaps no point to which Cicero's fundamental rule in regard to all discourse, that it consist with propriety—"*ut deceat*"—has greater force of application than here. It cannot be too earnestly inculcated on every speaker to consult carefully the minds and feelings of those whom he is to address in the selection of his theme and, also, in the development of it. Any offense against propriety or decorum here is more fatal to all the ends of speaking than any where else.

§ 52. The character of the theme and the particular view that is taken of it as well as the general mode of developing it will also be affected by *the particular object* which the writer may wish to accomplish in his discourse.

It is assumed that all proper discourse has an object. A speaker does not speak without an end in view. This end or object lies in the mind addressed, and consists in some change to be effected there by the discourse.

Dr. Whately, indeed, enumerates some species of what he calls "*spurious oratory*," as where one speaks merely to seem to say something, when there is in fact nothing to be said; or to occupy time; or for mere display of eloquence.

The very name, however, "spurious oratory," indicates that all true discourse must have an object or end to be accomplished by the communication of thought to another mind. We must seek, therefore, in the mind addressed the determination of the particular possible objects of discourse.

§ 53. The ultimate end of all discourse partakes of a moral or ethical character; but the immediate objects through which this ultimate end is reached may lie in the understanding, the feelings, or the will of the persons addressed.

§ 54. The possible immediate objects of all proper discourse are but four in number, viz: **EXPLANATION, CONVICTION, EXCITATION, and PERSUASION.**

A change produced by discourse in the understanding may be either a new or modified conception, or a new or modified judgment. Hence the two forms of address to the understanding.

§ 55. The process by which a new conception is produced, is, by *Explanation*; that by which a new judgment is produced, is by *Conviction*; A change in the sensibilities is effected by the process of *Excitation*; and in the will, by that of *Persuasion*.

These processes, it will be observed, are named from the positive species; and the designations given embrace as well them as their opposites. In explanation, thus, we either produce a new conception, or correct or modify one already existing. Conviction includes both the production of a new opinion or judgment, and the removal or modification of one already existing. So, likewise, excitation embraces the awakening of a new feeling, and the strengthening or allaying of a previous emotion or passion; and in persuasion, we either

move to a new choice or dissuade from an existing intention or purpose.

§ 56. The *unity of a discourse* is more narrowly determined by *the singleness of the object* which is pursued in the development of a subject.

In order to unity, there must indeed be a single theme or subject of discourse, (§ 47). Singleness of subject will not, however, of itself secure unity. It is further necessary that there be one leading object proposed to be effected, and that this object be steadily pursued throughout the discourse.

§ 57. The several processes of explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion, are so related to each other that, while they may all concur in the same discourse, they yet can follow only in one single order.

Explanation precedes conviction, as the truth must be understood before it can be believed; explanation and conviction naturally precede excitation, as the object of feeling must be perceived and generally be believed to exist before feeling can be awakened; and persuasion properly follows the other three processes, as in order to a change of will, the feelings are generally to be aroused, the judgment convinced, and the understanding informed.

Unity requires that this order never be reversed; except for the purpose of awakening attention, or disposing for emotion, as will be more particularly remarked hereafter.

§ 58. The work of invention can never proceed with ease or success unless unity is strictly observed—unless the single subject and the single object of the discourse be clearly apprehended, and that object be steadily and undeviatingly pursued.

No principle of invention is more fundamental or practically important than this. Unity in aim is the very life of invention. Unless the object of speaking be distinctly perceived and that object be strictly one, the inventive faculty has no foothold at all, or, at least, no sure standing; and all its operations must be unsteady and feeble. The first work in producing discourse is to obtain a clear view of the single subject which is to be discussed, and then of the one object which is to be attained by the discussion.

It is here, more than any where else, that young writers fail. They give themselves to writing with no definite apprehension of the single object for which they write, except perhaps, it be to fill a sheet with words—brilliant if it may be, at all events with words. Having no object in view, the mind has no spring or impulse in the labor, and the task is the most repulsive drudgery. What can be more so than to accumulate dead words—dead because entertaining no living thought that with its one life animates them, and to cement them together by the lifeless rules of grammar? It is its object or aim which gives discourse its life; and as no one thing can have two lives in itself, there can be but one aim or object in one discourse. It is not in the nature of man to labor without an aim. Certainly the work of invention, the highest and most proper work of man as a rational being, cannot proceed happily without an aim distinctly apprehended.

This then is the first thing to be done in the construction of discourse, after the selection of the theme at least, to determine definitely what is the particular object of the discourse:—is the object to explain a subject; to convince of its truth; to excite the feelings in relation to it; or to move to action upon it? This principle cannot be too earnestly inculcated, or too faithfully observed.

As these several acts of explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion may proceed each by several distinct specific processes, it will of course facilitate invention to determine, previously to the construction of a discourse, the particular process which the case may require.

§ 59. Inasmuch as the development of the general theme is determined by the particular object of the discourse, the four processes, by one or other of which this object must be accomplished, viz: those of explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion, constitute the distinct departments of Rhetorical Invention.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE PARTS OF A DISCOURSE.

§ 60. The development of a theme of discourse for the purpose of explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion, necessarily proceeds by stages, which, in reference to the particular object at the time, may be distinguished from each other. A discourse may thus be conveniently regarded as consisting of parts; some of which are essential to all discourse and others subsidiary or essential only in particular cases.

§ 61. The essential parts of discourse are the PROPOSITION and the DISCUSSION.

§ 62. THE PROPOSITION is the particular subject, as modified and determined by the object of the discourse.

The term "proposition," it should be observed, is here used in a sense different from that of the term "theme." The proposition is the theme as determined by the object or end of the discourse. For example, the theme, "the immutability of truth" may be variously discussed in reference to various specific objects. The design of the discussion may be to *explain* what is meant by the phrase; or, it may be to prove the statement that "truth is immutable;" or to awaken confidence in all truth as being in its nature immutable; or to move to zealous effort to acquire truth because immutable. A rhetorical proposition includes thus the theme and the particular design for which it is discussed.

One formal mode of stating the proposition in actual discourse would be as follows: "The object of this discourse is to prove the immutability of truth."

A rhetorical proposition is carefully to be distinguished from a logical proposition. The latter may be defined to be "the verbal statement of a judgment." A logical proposition, accordingly, may constitute the theme of a rhetorical proposition. If this theme be stated together with the use to be made of it in discourse, it will then become a rhetorical proposition.

§ 63. THE DISCUSSION is that part of a discourse in which the subject is unfolded and directly presented to the mind addressed for one of the purposes that have been named.

The discussion is accordingly the main thing in all discourse, and constitutes its body. The proposition sets forth the design of the speaker; and the other parts are merely preparatory and subsidiary to this main design which is directly pursued in the discussion.

§ 64. The general forms of the discussion are de-

termined by the object of the discourse, and are four in number corresponding to the four main objects that may be aimed at in discourse, § 54.

§ 65. The more specific forms of the discussion are determined by the particular processes in which explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion are respectively carried on.

§ 66. The subsidiary parts of discourse are either *preparatory*, or *applicatory*; and may in general terms be denominated THE INTRODUCTION and THE PERORATION.

§ 67. The design and use of THE INTRODUCTION is to prepare the way in the mind addressed for the more ready and free reception of the proposition and the discussion.

§ 68. As it is obvious that the mind addressed may be favorably or unfavorably disposed for the reception of the proposition and the discussion, either in respect to the degree or kind of information it possesses, or its state of opinion, of feeling or of purpose, the introduction must, in different cases, be prepared in reference to these diverse states of mind.

The two more generic kinds of introduction will be, accordingly, the *Explanatory* and the *Conciliatory* introduction.

In the former, the object of the introduction will be effected by informing more fully the minds of the hearers; in the latter, by removing prejudice or by enlisting directly a favorable interest.

It is obvious, moreover, that these states of mind may

respectively regard different objects, as the speaker or the subject itself. Hence will be determined the still more specific forms of the introduction.

The consideration of the particular kinds of introduction and the laws of its use has, for obvious reasons, its appropriate place under the several general heads of Invention.

§ 69. As the Introduction is only a subsidiary and a preparatory part of a discourse, the topics which it must embrace and the form in which it should appear cannot be fully known until the nature and form of the proposition and of the discussion are well ascertained by the speaker. Hence, the proper time for the invention and the composition of the Introduction is after the subject has been thoroughly studied out, and the general form of the discussion well settled in the mind.

It would obviously be as absurd in a writer to construct an Introduction before the plan of the discourse is determined upon, as it would be in an architect to put up a portico before he had determined what kind of a house to attach to it. That this absurdity is frequently committed in writing and in architecture, only shows the necessity of calling particular attention to it. There is no one feature of the Introduction which may not receive its determinate character from the proposition and the discussion. The length, the matter, including both the thought and the feeling, and the style cannot be known till the plan of the discussion is fully determined upon.

By this it is not meant that the discussion should be written out or reduced to forms of language; but merely that the whole plan of the discussion be distinctly conceived in the mind, before the Introduction is composed.

The necessity of thus first studying out and accurately determining in the mind the plan of the discussion before the Introduction is commenced, appears not only from the fact that unless this be the case it is all a matter of mere accident whether there be any correspondence between it and the body of the discourse, but also from the consideration that it is only thus that unity, in which lies all the life of invention as well as of discourse, can be secured. The very idea of a discourse, as a product of a rational mind that ever has an aim in its proper workings, involves the necessity of unity; and this unity appears in discourse mainly in the proposition and the discussion as the essential parts. The clear perception of what is needed to be effected in the mind addressed by way of preparation, in order that this aim of the discourse can be attained in it, is absolutely indispensable both to guide invention in constructing the Introduction and to stimulate it so that its work shall be easy and successful.

§ 70. THE PERORATION, as that part of a discourse in which the theme is applied, will vary with the different specific objects aimed at in the application.

Sometimes the application will be in the form of explanation, either for the purpose of correcting erroneous views or for further instruction. This form of the peroration may be denominated the *explanatory*.

Sometimes the object of the peroration may be to correct a wrong opinion, or to confirm a particular truth involved in the general theme; in which case the peroration will be *confirmatory*.

Sometimes the object may be to address the subject more directly to the feelings, which will give rise to the *excitatory or pathetic* peroration.

Or, once more, some action may be proposed, in the peroration, to the mind addressed, and then the *persuasive* peroration will have place.

§ 71. THE RECAPITULATION is a form of peroration common to the various objects mentioned. The respective processes of explanation, conviction, excitation, or of persuasion pursued in the discourse are, in this form, concisely repeated for the purpose of a more full and complete effect.

PART I.—EXPLANATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 72. In explanation, the object of discourse is to inform or instruct; in other and more technical words, to lead to a new conception or notion, or to modify one already existing in the mind.

§ 73. The work of explanation is accomplished simply by bringing the object of the conception distinctly and favorably before the mind addressed.

§ 74. Although explanation, properly, is a purely intellectual process, since it aims merely to produce or modify a conception or notion which is a pure intellectual state, still as the understanding itself is influenced by the feelings and the state of the will, reference to these departments of mind is not wholly excluded from explanatory discourse. The passions are, however, to be employed only in strict subordination to the design of the discourse; that is, only for the purpose of facilitating the process of explanation. This is done chiefly or wholly by securing an undisturbed attention to the object presented.

Hence the necessity that the taste be consulted in all explanatory discourse; in order that a fixed attention may be secured. The mind does not perceive well when it is not pleased. Xenophon has well observed that instruction in any case is impossible from one who does not please.*

The attention of the hearer may be disturbed, also, by the existence of some favorite opinion which may be unfavorably affected by the object presented in the discourse; and argumentation may be necessary as a preparatory work even for the purpose of explaining a truth.

So, likewise, the attention may be disturbed by some feeling or purpose in the mind addressed, which must be appropriately managed by the speaker who would secure attention to his explanation.

These processes, however, are not essential, but merely incidental in explanatory discourse. It is sufficient, therefore, here merely to indicate generally the relation of this to the other processes in discourse.

§ 75. The subject or theme of explanatory discourse is some object or truth to be perceived.

The state of mind to be produced by explanation, as has been before observed, is a conception. The term is used in a strictly technical sense, as distinguished from a judgment. As it is important that the meaning of these logical terms should be clearly apprehended, the following definitions will not be out of place here. A *Conception* is that state of the understanding in which an object or truth is simply perceived, without any affirmation or denial respecting it. A *judgment*, on the other hand, is that intellectual state in which an object or truth is not only perceived, but some

* Mem. Lib. I. C. II., § 39. Μηδενι μηδεμιαν ειναι καιδησιν παρα του μη δεξουτος.

affirmation or denial is made respecting it. When I perceive "a tree," I have a conception of it. When I affirm "it is an apple-tree," I have a judgment respecting it.

A logical proposition, in the proper sense, that is, a sentence which expresses a judgment may, nevertheless, be viewed simply as an object of conception. As when it is said "Law is a rule of action," although the sentence contains a judgment or affirmation, still the mind may regard it merely as a thing to be perceived or understood and not as that on which a judgment is to be formed. Logical propositions, thus, as well as mere names of things, may form proper subjects of explanation; since they may be regarded merely as conceptions.

It may be further remarked that the object which constitutes the theme of explanation is not necessarily any *real* object or truth; but only one as so regarded by the writer. It may be a purely imaginary object not supposed by him to have any foundation in reality; or it may be an erroneous conception in his mind of a real object or truth; or, farther, it may be a conception founded on reality but modified through the influences of his peculiar habits of observation.

Explanation is, in this respect of its subject or theme, distinguished from conviction. In explanation, the subject is ever an object of a conception. In conviction, it is ever a judgment.

§ 76. The unity of explanatory discourse, so far as it is determined by the theme, requires that the conception which forms the theme, be one. This one conception, however, may be simple or complex; may embrace but one individual or a class.

In order to insure this broader unity the writer should ever carefully see whether the particular topics which he is

to treat of can be embraced in one complex conception. If not, he has reason to suspect that unity will be sacrificed. If he is unable to reduce the specific topics of his discourse under a single class, he will be in danger of violating unity. It must not be supposed, however, that because the proposition as stated includes two or more topics, for that reason alone, unity must necessarily be sacrificed. Thus, the subject of an essay may be "the causes and effects of the Crusades." This theme, although, as stated, it embraces more than one topic, may be discussed with a perfect observance of unity. The crusades, as a single class of events, may be presented concretely in their historical relations, that is, in the single relation of time, or abstractly under the single causal relation to antecedent and subsequent events.

§ 77. The particular processes by which the explanation of an object or truth may be effected, are five in number, viz: NARRATION, DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, EXEMPLIFICATION, and COMPARISON or CONTRAST.

All objects, even such as are purely abstract or spiritual, as represented in discourse, must be contemplated under the relations either of time or of space. Hence, the original and proper processes of explanation are but two in number; one, in which the object is viewed under the relations of time, the other, in which it is regarded under the relations of space.

But an object viewed in its relations to time may also be contemplated in its relations to its own parts or to other objects of the same class. And an object existing in space may be represented by a designation of the adjoining parts. Thus, the mammoth, an extinct species of animals, may be represented either under the idea of time, giving rise to classification by the indication of its varieties, or under the

idea of space, by the indication of its component parts, as head, body, limbs, &c.

Or, again, it may be represented by the exhibition of one of the species taken as an example. The account of the mammoth found entire in a frozen state by a Tungusian, named Schumachoff, in 1799, furnishes thus the best representation of this extinct species of the Elephant.

Or, farther, the object may be designated through its relations to other individuals of the same class. We represent, thus, by comparing objects through the points of resemblance or by contrasting them through the points of diversity or opposition.

We have thus the five different processes of explanation enumerated, viz:

1. *Narration*, when the object viewed as a whole, is represented in continuous time or as in succession;
2. *Description*, when the object, viewed as a whole, is represented in space generally;
3. *Analysis*, when the object is regarded as consisting of parts related either to time or to space;
4. *Exemplification*, when the object is regarded as generic, including species or individuals under it, and is represented through one of the class; and
5. *Comparison and Contrast*, when the object is regarded as belonging to a class, and is represented through its resemblance or opposition to others of the same class.

§ 78. While these processes may all be combined in certain cases in the same discourse, they are yet easily distinguishable. They may in some cases, each, constitute the single and only process of explanation. They are, also, subject to entirely different principles regulating the use of them in discourse.

Hence the propriety and utility of considering them distinctly.

As has been before observed, every art embraces diverse particular processes, all of which, in the more complicated forms of the art, are carried on simultaneously together. In the acquisition of the art, however, these processes are analysed, and studied and exemplified in practice separately and singly. An extended arithmetical process generally combines the various particular processes of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, if not various other higher processes. In acquiring the art, however, the attention of the learner is advantageously directed to these particular processes singly and successively. Each is studied and exercised upon, before the next is taken up. When each several process is thus made familiar by separate and continued study and exercise, the more complicated operations are performed with ease and success. It is so with every art. So self-evident, indeed, is this principle that nothing but the fact of the strange neglect and oversight of it in the art of constructing discourse could justify a repeated reference to it in vindication of the course that is here proposed. The learner cannot be too earnestly or too frequently reminded of the necessity of studying and exercising upon each particular process in discourse separately; and of continuing his study and practice upon each in order, until a perfect practical familiarity with it is acquired.

CHAPTER II.

OF NARRATION.

§ 79. NARRATION is that process of explanation which presents an object in its relations to continuous time.

Strictly speaking, narration proper presents an object only in the several successive forms which it assumes at successive periods of time. History, in which only the chain of events is exhibited, affords one of the most perfect exemplifications of pure narration.

The human mind, however, in its maturer development, can hardly avoid, when it contemplates events transpiring in succession, conceiving of a *cause* which binds those events together. The operation of a cause, moreover, we ever represent to ourselves as taking place in succession of time. Cause is thus the law or internal principle of succession; and succession of events is the outward manifestation of the operation of that law.

This relation of cause to the succession of events in time, shows at once the philosophical propriety of regarding the relation of cause and effect as the true governing principle in narration. It determines, at the same time, the proper subjects of narrative discourse and the laws which regulate it.

It will be convenient to exhibit the specific processes of narration, according as they include distinctly or not the idea of a cause—in other words, regard mere outward succession or not—separately and successively.

§ 80. The simplest process in narration consists in the exhibition of an object in the different forms which

it presents in successive periods of time without distinct reference to the connecting causes.

§ 81. The principle of arrangement in this process is simple succession of time.

In all simple narration, the explanation is effected by the exhibition of the object represented in the successive changes. We cannot exhibit the object as literally changing; we can only assume different points of time and mark the particular phases the object presents at those points respectively, and leave it to the mind of the hearer to fill up the intervening period and imagine the actual progress of the change from one aspect or phase to another.

As it is possible in discourse, thus, only to present the object at successive stages, passing over the intermediate intervals, judgment is necessary in the selection of those phases of the object which are most important. In the history of a nation, the most important changes in the direction of its exertions, whether abroad as in wars, or towards its internal affairs as in the modifications of its government and the cultivation of the various arts, may, thus, be selected as the points to be exhibited to view.

Still the order of time furnishes the law of arrangement. When the continuity of succession is broken, the mind of the reader is liable to be offended; and his interest is at once weakened. This truth is illustrated in the wearisome effect of those treatises on general history, which take us, in successive chapters, to different countries, and thus are ever interrupting the continuous succession of events.

§ 82. The simple process of narration is at once rendered complex by the distinct exhibition of the relation of cause and effect in the events described.

In this process more ripeness of judgment, greater skill

and power of discernment, in short, a higher maturity and wider reach of intellect are requisite. The child, in his narrations, can give only the events as they occurred to his view with hardly any reference to a cause that connects them. The more important he makes no more prominent than the less. Although the circumstance that he is offended and loses his interest in the narration, when the order of time is disregarded, shows that the idea of cause secretly influences him, still the idea is so little developed that it exerts little control over him when he himself narrates to others. The maturer mind takes no interest in a chain of mere events, but as the connecting cause is seen. The detection of this cause and the clear exhibition of it to view, at once, determines the rank of his intellect and the correctness of his idea of a proper history, in the historian.

In confirmation of this view, it may be observed here, that the more philosophical idea of a history is the product only of a highly advanced state of society. The early historians, beautiful and rich as they are in style, are yet greatly defective in this respect. They confine themselves mainly to the simple exhibition of the sequences of events. So far as invention is concerned, they display but little power except in the mere selection of the events. Such are the histories of Herodotus, Livy, and indeed, most of the histories that have been written. Truly philosophical histories are the production of the most recent times.

§ 83. The principle of arrangement in this process of narration is furnished in the relation of cause and effect.

Here the causal relation is every thing. Even succession in time is freely sacrificed to it when necessary. As various causes frequently conspire to produce a single effect, it be-

comes necessary often to trace in the order of succession the operation of one cause after another; going back in time repeatedly to exhibit the different chains of causes from their origin. In the determination of the place for the introduction of each particular topic or event, the writer should carefully deliberate with himself, how the causal connection in the events will be most clearly presented to view, since in this is found the sole determining principle of arrangement and law of development.

§ 84. The process of narration is applied not only to outward events represented in simple succession of time, § 80, or in the light of the causal relation, § 82, but also to all such abstract and spiritual subjects as may be conceived of under the idea of succession or the relation of cause and effect.

We have, in this class of narrative subjects, a subdivision corresponding to that which has been pointed out in respect to such as are merely outward or sensible. All abstract things or objects which may be regarded as *becoming, changing, growing*, and the like, while they, and they only, constitute proper subjects of narrative discourse, may, also, be represented either in their successive stages or changes, or in connection with the cause that connects them.

In the former case, the principle of arrangement and, indeed, the general law of development of the theme is furnished in the order of succession in time. In the latter case, it is furnished in the relation of cause and effect.

Instances of this class of subjects are "the spread of Idolatry in the world," "the progress of vice in the heart," "the development of taste," and the like.

It is obvious that all such subjects may be represented either simply in respect to the successive forms that may be

assumed by the object or thing to be represented, or in unison with the cause of those modifications or in dependence upon it.

In this class of subjects, a still higher tact and skill is requisite in the selection of those particular stages in the progress of the object represented which shall most happily exhibit to the reader the actual progress, than is necessary in the narration of merely outward events. It is not with much difficulty that the naturalist seizes upon those stages of vegetable growth which shall give a clear idea of the entire continuous process. Although the tree is ever growing and the eye cannot trace momentarily the actual change that is going on, still the representation of the seed, the germinating state, the woody stage, the condition of decay; or of the periodical changes, the ascent of the sap, the periods of foliage, of flowering, of fruit and the like, is easy because the successive stages or conditions of growth are definitely marked to the eye. In abstract subjects, however, these successive stages are with difficulty discovered; and the mere representation of the successive development of a vice, a virtue, a mental habit of any kind, in respect to time alone, demands nice discernment and sound judgment. When the causal influence is conjoined with this, the difficulty becomes still greater. For the causes that influence here are not only multifarious, but are, also, not easy of detection. Their influence is silent and hidden. Hence, histories of the progress of civilization, of the progress of science, of opinion in every field of knowledge, appear only in the more mature developments of mind. Hence, too, moral painting, one variety of this species of narration, indicates at once, when only free from obvious faults, the hand of a master.

§ 85. The principles of narration apply in their full

force only where the object of the discourse is explanation under the form of succession or the relation of cause and effect; they have an application, however, where narrative is introduced in other forms of discourse, but in subordination to the particular principles that govern in them.

In argumentation, thus, narrative is often necessary. So far as it is narrative, the principles that have been set forth in this chapter apply. But the narrative is introduced only as subsidiary to another object, viz: conviction. The modification requisite in such particular uses of narrative will, however, be obvious; and needs no distinct illustration here.

It may be farther remarked, here, that narration is often mingled with description and other processes of explanation. So far as it is narrative, however, it observes its own laws.

§ 86. THE LAW OF UNITY in narration becomes more precisely determined and restricted by the particular view that is taken of the theme, whether it is regarded as merely subject to a succession of changes or whether the causal relation is exhibited.

In the former case, unity is preserved if the one object of the discourse be the only thing presented, and be presented only as subject to a continuous succession of changes.

In the latter case, the principle of unity may lie in the single cause whose operation is traced out in its successive effects; or in the development of the single effect from the combined operation of the several causes.

It will be observed that the simplicity or complexity of

the theme will not affect the unity. The theme may be the life or the transaction of an individual; the history of a community or nation through the whole or particular stages of its existence; it may be a cause producing its effects on a single individual, a community or state or the race generally, through greater or less periods of time; it may be an effect experienced over the world as that of the christianization of the earth, or of a single continent, as the civilization of Europe, or of an individual, as the moral greatness of Howard.

Farther, as the highest and ultimate aim in all human action is a moral one, and as all discourse has an ultimate end which is moral in its character, although in narration the commanding end is the information of the understanding and thus purely intellectual, still it cannot be regarded as a violation of unity if incidentally the truths thus brought before the understanding be applied to a moral end. The historian, thus, by no means infringes on the law of unity, when he breaks from the strict course of his narration to apply the moral lessons which his narration teaches. This, however, in all proper narration, must never appear as the immediate and commanding, or even as a co-ordinate aim. If the inculcation of a moral lesson be made the controlling end, the discourse loses its proper character as narration. It then obeys other laws, and narration acts only a subordinate part.

§ 87. COMPLETENESS, in simple narration, requires that the theme be presented in all those phases or changes of the event which are necessary to give to the mind addressed a full conception of its progress to its termination.

In complex narration, completeness requires that

the cause in its entire efficiency be exhibited and in reference to the entire series of events which it occasions.

CHAPTER III.

OF DESCRIPTION.

§ 88. DESCRIPTION is that process of explanation in which the object is represented, mediately or immediately, under the relations of space.

§ 89. The subjects appropriate to this species of discourse are either *external or sensible objects existing in space*, or such *abstract and spiritual objects* as are conceived of under relations analogous to those of space.

In truth, description embraces all subjects proper to be presented as themes for explanation which are not embraced under narration; in other words, all such as are not regarded under the relations of time, as subject to succession or the influence of a cause.

In description, the subject is, thus, represented not as *becoming*, as *beginning to be, growing, advancing*; but only as *being*, entirely irrespectively of time. Even events may be proper subjects of description where their relations to time or to a cause are dropped from view. Thus the conflagration of a city may be the proper theme of description when the aim of the writer is to set it forth as an object of contemplation in its several features of horror; when not the progress of the flames and the successive ap-

pearances which the burning city assumes, but the several constituent elements of the scene, as the dismay of the inhabitants, the terrific ravages of the flames, the crashing of walls, and the like, are the particular objects of the representation.

This illustration will serve to show how closely connected are the processes of narration and description. They perhaps more commonly are found combined in the same discourse, just as multiplication and division are often combined in the same arithmetical process. Still they are essentially distinct processes; and must be governed by very different principles. Even when combined, it is indispensable to the perfectness of the representation that one be made the predominant and controlling process, and the other be kept in strict subordination and subserviency; that the laws of the one or the other be made the directing principles in the development and arrangement.

The essential nature of this process of explanation is exemplified in the case of the description of any particular object that appears to the senses. If a field, thus, were to be described, a point of view would first be selected the most favorable for presenting the whole distinctly and fully; and then from this point of view the various outlines and boundaries, as they might be traced from some one point easily distinguished and remembered around the whole circumference to the place of commencement, would be delineated. In this way the exact spacial dimensions and relations of the field would be clearly and exactly pointed out.

§ 90. The principle of arrangement in this process is simple JUXTA-POSITION.

§ 91. Hence in description, the attention is first directed to some one prominent point in the theme and

then the view is directed successively from point to point along the entire line.

In some cases, it will be sufficient merely to trace the outline. Generally, however, the filling up of this outline will be necessary to a clear and vivid representation. In all cases, however, the theme is conceived of as mapped out before the mind; and the description must set forth the exact outlines and so much of the contents as shall be necessary to the object of the explanation. The principle of method—juxta-position—forbids any such leaps in the continuous representation of the object as would prevent the hearer from perceiving the entire boundary of the survey. This is the great essential thing in description, that the view given be continuous. Here, however, as in narration, § 81, only points here and there can be taken which the hearer must connect by running the line, as it were, in his own mind. The speaker must take such points as are sufficiently vicinuous—near each other to enable him to do this.

Description, in its strictest use, is confined to the delineation of the theme conceived as a whole. But the simple tracing of the outlines of an object will seldom answer the aim of the discourse. The process by which the filling up of the outline is accomplished, is, however, essentially distinct from that of pure description. It is, indeed, different in different cases; and will be particularly considered under the following chapters.

The delineation of a sensible object existing in space is sufficiently intelligible without further explanation. The delineation of an abstract or spiritual theme is more obscure, perhaps, but perfectly analogous. The more proper form of it is definition, of which Blackstone's definition of Municipal law will afford a happy illustration. "Law," he says, "is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme

power of a state commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." These more general boundaries, traced out more fully and completely, make up his explanation of Municipal Law.

§ 92. Unity in pure description requires not only that one object be exhibited as the sole thing in the representation, but also that the point of view from which the theme is regarded, be maintained throughout the representation; or at least, that the reader be sufficiently advised of the change in the point of view. Such change can be justified only when necessary to the completeness of the view.

It is obvious that sometimes it may be necessary to survey an object from different points in order to obtain a complete view of the whole. In that case, however, care should be taken that the entire survey be one; the outlines all harmonizing with one another. Unity thus would have been at once violated, if into the definition of law given above there had been introduced any view of its relations to other things, of its particular departments, of its actual forms in different nations, or the like; as for illustration, if the definition had been constructed thus; "Law is a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power of a State commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong and is made in the nature of things obligatory on all the subjects of the State." Another view is now presented which it is impossible for the mind to conceive of as forming a constituent part in the same picture with the parts before indicated.

In the case of the description of sensible objects, the learner will experience little difficulty in acquiring the habit of representing to his own mind the entire outline of the

object to be described. He should carefully accustom himself to this mode of picturing before his own mind such objects; and before entering upon the work of composition he should follow round the outline of the picture till he becomes familiar with its entire contour and satisfy himself that every feature to be given is embraced in the view from a single point.

In the case of abstract objects and truths, a higher power of abstraction and a higher exertion of the imagination is requisite. Still it lies within the capabilities of the mind to acquire the power of picturing before itself even abstract objects; of placing their outlines in proper order of juxtaposition in a single mental picture. This is the actual attainment of an accomplished writer. It is the aim which every student of rhetoric should propose to himself and steadily pursue in continued and laborious practice till he is conscious of having fully achieved his object.

It may assist the full apprehension of what is meant by this mental picturing, to present the following illustration from Dr. Barrow's description of "contentedness." He describes this quality chiefly by its 'acts.' In other words, the "acts" in which the practice of the virtue consists furnish the point of observation from which he views it. And the point of departure in tracing his mental survey is one of the exercises of the understanding. This class of exercises constitute one outline of the feature. A second side is then run consisting of the exercises of the will or appetite. And the third side completing the view is the outward demeanor. The particulars which fill up this general survey are on the first side, or acts of the understanding, 1. a belief that all events are ordered by God; 2. that they are consequently good and fit; 3. that they are conducive to our particular welfare; 4. that our present condition, all things

considered, is the best for us. On the second side, or the exercises of the will or inclination, are the particulars of 1. submission to the will of God; 2. calmness and composure; 3. cheerfulness in bearing the worst events; 4. hope of the timely removal or alleviation of affliction; 5. yielding to no faintness or languishing; 6. endeavors against becoming weary of our condition; 7. meekness and pliancy of temper; 8. kindness; 9. freedom from solicitude and anxiety. On the third side, or particulars of outward practice and endeavor, are 1. suppression of unseemly expressions; 2. forbearing complaint or murmuring; 3. declarations of satisfaction with the allotments of providence; 4. abstaining from improper attempts to remove or remedy our crosses; 5. discharge of our duties with alacrity; 6. fair and kind behavior towards the instruments or abettors of our adversity. This description, it will be remarked, is susceptible of being pictured as a single although complex object before the mind. It has unity; it has method; it has completeness.

§ 93. It is essential to the completeness of the description that the survey of the object be also complete; that no side, as it were, of the field, be left out of view, or be imperfectly represented.

In the definition given of Municipal Law from Blackstone, if any part, as for instance, the phrase, "prescribed by the supreme power of a state," or, "forbidding what is wrong," had been omitted, the description would have been incomplete. One side of the survey would have been omitted.

CHAPTER IV.

OF ANALYSIS.

§ 94. THE ANALYTIC PROCESS of explanation consists in the resolving or separating of the theme into its component parts and the successive enumeration of these parts.

§ 95. THE SUBJECTS appropriate to this process are all themes which can be regarded as composed of parts. Both events and operations of causes, as well as objects conceived of under the relations of space or irrespectively of time, provided they may be regarded as consisting of parts, are accordingly embraced in the themes appropriate to this process.

This process differs essentially from narration and description in this respect, that in the two latter processes, the object whether regarded in time or space, is viewed as one undivided whole; while in analysis it is viewed in its parts. In regard to outward sensible objects the distinction is generally wide and obvious. In the discussion of abstract or spiritual themes, the processes will often be the same whether regulated by the laws of narration or division; of description or partition.

§ 96. Analysis is frequently combined with the processes of narration and description in the same discourse. It is, however, distinct from them for the most part, and precedes those processes, observing its own laws. The theme is thus first analysed; and then the processes of narration and description are applied to the parts as they are successively presented; or if it occur in the course of the narration or description, it

is applied to some subordinate part of the explanation which is then, under this analysis, narrated or described. The particular parts are narrated or described, moreover, in analysis, in reference to the entire effect of the representation of the one theme analysed; and not exactly as they would be narrated or described if represented separately and for their own sake.

The explanation of the theme may be, to a certain degree, complete even when the process stops with the analysis and enumeration of the parts. The anatomist may thus properly regard his work as completed, if he analyse the body into its constituent parts, and then exhibit the parts one by one in order. He may, however, carry the explanation still farther. He may *describe* singly each part as it is presented to view in a process of pure description. Or again, as a physiologist, he may *narrate* the development and growth of each particular part presented.

He must, however, first analyse; and his description or narration of each particular part must, obviously, be made in reference to the combined effect of the whole explanation. Otherwise he would not only fall into useless and tedious repetitions, but his explanation would be multiform, irregular and out of proportion. It would rather be a collection of independent and unrelated explanations than one continued and entire, although complex, process of explanation.

§ 97. Analysis embraces two distinct specific processes which rest ultimately on the distinctive natures of narration and description. They are *division* and *partition*.

§ 98. In *DIVISION* the theme is regarded as composed of *similar* parts; and the analysis is into *genera, species, varieties*.

Thus the analytic explanation of the theme "animal" by division would be effected by the successive enumeration of the different genera which it embraces, as fish, fowl, beast, &c., or, if the process were carried farther, of the species and varieties under these respective genera or classes.

The relation of division to narration is seen in this, that both involve an ultimate reference to a cause. Since that similarity in different individuals or species which enables us to classify them into species or genera, we necessarily regard as the effect of the same or a similar cause.

§ 99. In PARTITION, the theme is regarded as made up of parts lying in juxta-position merely, without reference to any similarity in their nature.

In partition, thus, "animal" would be analysed into head, body, limbs, and the like. In this kind of analysis, no reference is had to the similarity of structure in the analysis; but merely to the juxta-position of the parts.

The affinity of this process to description is obvious from the very terms which we find it necessary to employ in order to explain it. Both processes regard objects in space. The one, description, regards them as individual wholes, the boundaries or outlines of which are to be marked out in order to explain them. The other, partition, contemplates them as filling a certain extent of space; and enumerates successively the portions that occupy it. We describe "a tree" by delineating its form and shape. In partition, it is represented as composed of trunk and limbs and foliage; its various shades and hues are exhibited. In description, the object is represented by the lines that bound it—by its periphery; in partition, by the parts that compose it—by its segments.

§ 100. THE UNITY IN DIVISION consists in the

singleness of the class which is to be divided into its species and varieties and in the singleness of the principle of division.

That the theme must be but one whole to be divided is too palpable a truth to need any proof or illustration. There is little danger that this more general unity will be violated by any one who has any conception whatever of unity in discourse.

But mere unity in the theme, or in the general process of explaining it is not enough. It is necessary in this process of explication that there be but one principle of division; that is, that the species into which the whole is divided all stand in the same generic relation to the whole. Every generic or "common" term may be distributed into diverse series of species. "Man," thus, may be distributed into one set of species in reference to color; into another, in reference to place of habitation or to lineage; into a third in reference to sex or condition, &c. Unity forbids the distribution into different sets of such species.

This, at least, is the strictest unity in division. If for any purpose, it is necessary to represent the theme in respect to several sets of species, that is, adopt more than one principle of division, the two divisions should be kept carefully distinct; and the discourse must find its principle of unity in some higher point than the division.

In abstract subjects, especially in the explication of truths or propositions, there is a peculiar liability to a neglect of unity in division. It becomes necessary in order to avoid this fault to seize firmly the particular principle of division that is adopted in the case and carefully inquire, in the analysis into the several species, whether each one is determined by that principle or belongs to that set of species which the adopted principle of division will furnish.

It will be observed that unity does not forbid the application of different principles to different grades of species. "Duties," may thus be classed, first, in reference to the object to which they are rendered; as to God, to fellow-creatures, to one's self; or religious, social, and personal. These species, further, may be divided in respect to the occasions of their performance or the powers concerned in them. Religious duties may thus be subdivided into private and public. The object to which the duty is to be paid is here the principle of division into the higher species; the occasion of its performance, that of division into the lower species. There is in such a division, evidently, no confusion, and no violation of unity.

§ 101. **COMPLETENESS** in division requires that all the species of varieties which are furnished by the principle of division be distinctly enumerated.

If thus in the enumeration of the varieties of mixed governments only those of the monarchical and aristocratic, the monarchical and democratic, and the aristocratic and democratic were enumerated, the Spartan constitution and those like it which embrace the features of all the three pure forms of government would be omitted. The division would not be complete.

§ 102. **THE PRINCIPLE OF ARRANGEMENT** in division lies in the relation of the species or varieties furnished in the division to each other and to the particular object of the discourse.

As the parts sustain the same relation to the whole, it is clear, that we can find here no guide to arrangement.

Generally in division there will be found some one species or part which will rank first in importance, in interest, in obviousness. Around this, in respect to their approxima-

tions to it; the other parts should be arranged. In the enumeration of duties in reference to the object to which they are rendered, those to God, are, thus, evidently of the highest rank. This class, therefore, will determine the mode of arrangement in reference to the order in which they should be presented.

The object of the discourse, however, will determine whether the most prominent or important part should be made the first or the last of the series. If the writer wishes to leave the mind of the reader peculiarly interested in one particular part, even although it be the least important considered merely in relation to the parts themselves, it will naturally be exhibited last in the series. In the example given above, for instance, if the object of the speaker were to leave the duties to God impressed most strongly on the mind, he would name this species last. If, on the other hand, the personal duties were those to be more distinctly impressed at the time, this species would occupy the last place.

The relation of the parts to each other, thus, determines *the order* of the series; the object of the discourse, whether the order in which they shall be presented be *direct* or *inverse*.

§ 103. **THE UNITY IN PARTITION** consists in the singleness of the object to be analysed, and, more narrowly, in the singleness of the point of view from which the object is regarded.

The same observations apply here as to description. While in order to unity there must be a single object, there must, at the same time, be one point selected from which the parts shall be exhibited to view.

The theme, even although abstract or spiritual, is here

regarded under the analogy of the relations of space. It is laid out as a field before the view. The lines of partition need to be run from one point, or there will be confusion and perplexity.

If for any purpose different views of the object be needful, the first view should be completed, and then advice be given of the change of position. Still further, the different views should be complements of one another, so that all taken together shall constitute one whole.

If "prudence" thus be taken as the theme of explanation by analysis, unity requires first, that the general view to be given of it be determined, whether in reference to its essential nature, its rank among the virtues, its importance or some other particular aspect of it: in the next place, that for this particular view, one point be chosen from which the survey shall be made. If the *nature* of prudence be the more closely defined theme of the discussion, then it should be viewed either from its constituent properties, as wakefulness, observation, deliberation and the like; or from its origin and development, as constitutional temperament, experience, discipline; or from its effects on personal happiness or efficiency.

§ 104. COMPLETENESS in partition requires a survey of the entire field which the theme occupies and a distinct representation of every part.

A partition which should merely enumerate a part of the constituent properties of "prudence" would thus be faulty in respect of completeness.

§ 105. THE PRINCIPLE OF ARRANGEMENT in partition, as in division, is to be found in the relations of the parts to each other and to the particular object of the discourse.

In partition, the relations of the parts to each other will be those of space or, in abstract and spiritual themes, such as are analogous. Thus in the enumeration of the constituent properties of "prudence," the parts will be conceived of as pictured out before the eye and arranged in regard to position according to the order of dependence, as wakefulness, observation, deliberation, &c.

Whether the series should be presented directly or inversely must be determined by the object of the discourse.

§ 106. From the very nature of the two processes of analysis, by division and partition, it will be evident that while only generic or "common" terms are appropriate subjects for division, only individual terms belong to partition. If a "term" which may in one aspect be correctly regarded as "common" be analysed by partition, it will nevertheless in the analysis be viewed only as individual. This principle will, to a certain extent, determine the boundaries between the two classes of subjects.

All *events*, as they are individual although complex, can be analysed only by partition. So, likewise, all individual *objects in space*, as a tree, a landscape, a city, belong to partition. *Words, phrases*, generally all *exegetical themes*, as of Scripture texts and *propositions* to be explained as to their terms and the nature of the judgment expressed in them, likewise belong to this class.

Other themes may be analysed by division or by partition, according as they are viewed generically or not.

CHAPTER V.

OF EXEMPLIFICATION.

§ 107. EXEMPLIFICATION is that process of explanation in which the theme regarded as a whole is represented through one of its parts taken as an example of the whole.

As this process rests ultimately on our belief that nature works uniformly, or that similar causes are connected with similar effects, it bears a close affinity to narration, and also to analysis by division. Indeed it might, with some propriety, be regarded as an imperfect species of division. It differs from it in this respect that, while in division *all* the parts are enumerated, in exemplification only *one* is presented. This process, is, however, widely distinguished from proper division in regard to the principles which govern it and the form which it takes.

Exemplification is one of the most effective and interesting processes of explanation. Almost all our knowledge comes in this way. It corresponds to the process of induction in conviction. From observing the manner in which one particular seed germinates and grows and matures its fruit, we learn how vegetation proceeds generally. Understanding how one process in mathematical science is performed, we understand how all processes governed by the same principle may be performed. We learn from the exercise of a virtue in one set of circumstances what its nature and power and beauty must be in other circumstances. As thus the most familiar process and the best adapted to the human mind, it is most readily apprehended.

§ 108. From the nature of this process it is evident that THE SUBJECTS appropriate to it must be general

or "common" which are to be explained by more specific or individual truths or facts.

In exemplification, thus, a general principle of conduct is explained by the exhibition of a particular act in which it was manifested. The principle of patriotism is exemplified in the self-devotion of a Spartan hero; of justice in the stern decision of a Brutus; of christian heroism in the martyr at the stake.

General truths, also, are exemplified by some particular truth which they comprehend. That virtue is its own reward is exemplified, thus, in the elevated peace and happiness which follow a particular deed of self-denying benevolence. General facts, likewise, are exemplified in some particular instance. The circulation of the sap in vegetation is explained by an exhibition of it in a single plant.

§ 109. Exemplification readily combines with other processes in explanation without involving much liability to a loss of unity.

Perhaps the only liabilities to a violation of unity lie in the possibility of selecting an example which does not properly fall within the general truth to be explained; or in the multiplication of examples to such a degree as to hide from view the real truth to be explained.

§ 110. In the selection of examples, such as are most striking, most intelligible, most interesting to the hearer are ever to be preferred; since by such the object of speaking is best accomplished, which is to secure the clear and full understanding of the theme by the hearer.

§ 111. When the example has been selected and the general form in which it may be best introduced

to accomplish the object of the speaker has been determined, the actual exhibition of the example will be effected by some other process of explanation, as of narration, description or analysis. It will accordingly conform to the principles that control those processes.

CHAPTER VI.

OF COMPARISON AND CONTRAST.

§ 112. While in exemplification, a more generic truth or fact is explained by a more specific or an individual truth or fact embraced under it, in COMPARISON AND CONTRAST a truth or fact is explained by another of the same class.

If this process be investigated in its fundamental principles, it will be found that it necessarily rests on the idea of a similarity in things which may furnish a foundation for arranging them into classes. It presupposes, indeed, a class, to which the themes compared or contrasted alike belong. In comparison these points of resemblance are directly presented. In contrast, there must be a resemblance or similarity in some respect or there can be no ground on which the contrast can rest. We cannot contrast an eruption of Vesuvius with the proposition that the angles of a triangle are equivalent to two right angles, because they cannot be arranged together under any class or any similarity between them of which use can be made in discourse.

This process differs, thus, from exemplification in the circumstance that while in the latter, the relation of the genus to the species or individual is involved, in the former, there

is involved the relation of one individual or species to another through the class to which they both belong. The relation in the one case is single; in the other it is double.

Skill in the use of this process will, accordingly, depend chiefly on a clear and firm apprehension of the common class to which the things compared or contrasted alike belong.

§ 113. In comparison the theme is represented in the exhibition of those particulars in another of the same class which are common to the two; and the attention is directed to the points of resemblance.

In contrast the two objects of the same class are represented in the light of the opposition which in some respect they bear to each other.

The chief magistracy of a republic may be explained *in comparison* by an exhibition of the functions, relations and influences of the kingly office in unlimited monarchy, so far as they are common to both. It represents the nation; is the center of unity to them; is first among them; leads them; administers law for them, and the like. It may be explained *in contrast* by the points of opposition. The king in a pure monarchy is the end, and the state the means; the president in a republic is the means, the state the end. The one absorbs the state in himself; the other is absorbed in it. The one uses all the energies of the state for his own pleasure; the other uses his for the state.

Thus, also, truth and error may be compared as states of mind, occasioned and determined by similar causes, &c. They may be contrasted in their opposite natures and influences.

§ 114. In comparison and contrast, the resemblance in the one case and the opposition in the other, may

lie in the *constituent natures or properties* of the objects compared or contrasted, or in the *relations* which they sustain. In the former case the process is denominated **DIRECT OR SIMPLE COMPARISON OR CONTRAST**; in the latter case, it is denominated **ANALOGICAL COMPARISON OR CONTRAST**, or generally, **ANALOGY**.

Virtue and vice are compared or contrasted *directly* when represented as moral states resembling or differing from each other in respect of their essential character or properties. As virtue, thus, implies intelligence and free choice, so also does vice. But as virtue consists in a regard paid to the principles of rectitude; vice consists in a disregard of them.

They are *analogically* compared or contrasted when exhibited in their relations to some third thing. Virtue is related to happiness as its appropriate and natural consequence; vice to misery.

§ 115. In the selection of the objects of comparison or of contrast, the same principles apply as in the case of exemplification, § 110. They should be striking, familiar, interesting.

Farther, in comparison, those objects of the same class should be selected which are most unlike the theme to be explained; while in contrast, it is conducive to clearness and effect to select those most resembling it.

The principle in the latter directions of this section is the same in the two cases. The mind, when there are but few points of resemblance, in comparison, or of opposition in contrast, is not disturbed and perplexed by many features crowding on the view.

§ 116. This process readily mingles in the same discourse with the other processes. It is commended by the same advantages generally that attend exemplification. It is sometimes the only convenient process of explanation.

§ 117. The subjects appropriate to this process are either generic or individual. The exhibition of the object with which the theme is compared or contrasted is effected by the processes before described.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN EXPLANATORY DISCOURSE.

§ 118. **THE EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION** § 68, will often be useful in this species of discourse for the purpose of bringing the theme more directly before the mind; or for facilitating the ready apprehension of the discussion itself.

In a history of Greece, it may be necessary in order to exhibit more distinctly to the reader of what people the history is to treat, to describe the country itself geographically, which the people inhabit. Such a geographical description, may, also, help the reader to understand the narrative itself. It may, moreover, explain the mode of constructing the history.

In a description of the virtue of "discretion," an explanatory introduction may usefully indicate the relation of this to other virtues, or exhibit an occasion of its exercise for

the purpose of a more explicit statement of the theme. It may appropriately, also, so far exhibit the light in which the theme is to be contemplated, or explain the particular mode of discharging it, as that the whole description shall be more fully and correctly understood.

§ 119. THE INTRODUCTION CONCILIATORY will respect the occasion of the discourse, the theme itself, the mode of discussing it, or the speaker personally; as it is evident that from these various sources either a favorable or an unfavorable disposition may arise in the minds of the hearers.

It is less often the case in explanatory than in any other species of discourse that this kind of introduction is necessary. Still it will be well ever to inquire whether from any of the sources enumerated there can arise any feeling or opinion unfavorable to the full understanding of the discussion, or any interest to be awakened from any one of them that shall secure a more earnest attention.

§ 120. THE PERORATION in explanatory discourse may be in any of the particular forms enumerated in § 70.

The peroration explanatory will apply the representation either to some particular theme contained in the more general one that has been discussed, or to some kindred subject.

The peroration confirmatory will be in the form of an inference readily deduced from the view that has been given.

The peroration excitatory will apply the general theme or some view taken of it to the excitement of the appropriate feelings.

The peroration persuasive will address the theme or some view taken of it to the will as an inducement to some act.

§ 121. If various forms of the peroration be employed, the principle laid down in § 57, requires that the respective forms employed succeed each other in the order in which they are stated in the preceding section.

PART II.—CONFIRMATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 122. IN CONFIRMATION, the object of discourse is to convince; in other words, to lead to a new belief or judgment, or to modify one already existing in the mind.

Here lies the essential distinction between explanation and confirmation. While both processes address the understanding, the former seeks to produce a new or different perception, the latter, a new or different belief or judgment.

§ 123. As a judgment is ever expressed in a logical proposition, the theme in confirmation must ever be in the form of a logical proposition; the truth of which is to be established in the mind of the hearer.

In this respect confirmatory discourse differs from all other kinds; as in those the theme is always a conception.

It may be observed here that while the theme in confirmation must always admit of being expressed in the form of a logical proposition, having subject, predicate and copula, and so far as stated must imply this, it is not necessary always that it be actually expressed in discourse in the strict technical form of such a proposition. Thus the theme of a

discourse, the object of which is to prove that "the soul is immortal," may be stated in the form of "the immortality of the soul."

§ 124. Confirmation in rhetorical invention agrees with the process of investigation in the circumstances that both processes properly respect a judgment, and that both are controlled by the same logical principles. It differs from investigation in the respect that the judgment is already known in confirmation both in its matter and in its truth, while in investigation either the truth or both the matter and the truth of the judgment are unknown.

In undertaking the work of confirmation or convincing, the speaker must of course know the matter of the judgment which he is to establish. He must be regarded, also, as believing it himself and of course of knowing the evidence on which it rests. He professes this in undertaking to convince. He must know, thus, both the matter of the proposition and its truth.

In investigation, on the other hand, it may be wholly unknown whether there is such a truth as the process of investigation may lead to as its proper result. Known truths may be taken, and by the application to them of various principles of reasoning, entirely new truths may be ascertained and proved in the very process of investigation. The mathematical analyst, thus, applies to an assumed formula certain processes by which its members are changed in their form and comes thus to new truths—to truths, perhaps, of which he had never dreamed until they stood out proved before his eye.

More commonly, however, in investigation the truth is at least guessed at, or conceived as possible. The matter of

the judgment is before the mind, and the process of investigation consists in the discovery of the proof on which the truth of it rests.

Confirmation employs the results of this discovery for the conviction of another mind. This latter species of investigation, therefore, which respects the proof on which an assumed or conjectural truth rests, coincides to a certain degree with invention in confirmation. For it is the proper office of invention here to furnish the proof for a given asserted judgment. It differs from this process of investigation only in the circumstance that it directs all its operations with a view to an effect on another mind. Investigation might rest satisfied with any adequate proof; invention seeks the best. Invention explores the whole field of proof and then selects; investigation is content to take what is at hand provided it be sufficient to establish the truth proposed. Investigation implies a candid mind ready to be convinced by the proof discovered; invention in rhetoric regards a mind possibly prejudiced against the truth, and struggling against every fresh charge of proof.

§ 125. The mind addressed in confirmation may be regarded as in any one of three different states; either without any belief in regard to the proposition to be confirmed, or in weak faith, or in positive disbelief. The processes in confirmation, although in the main alike, will yet vary in some slight respects in the different cases.

The speaker will need ever to have a distinct regard to this diversity of mental state in his hearers, and always to know whether he is to produce an entirely new conviction, or to strengthen or remove one already existing. Different kinds of arguments often, or a different arrangement

of them even when the same in kind, will be requisite in the different cases.

§ 126. Belief admits of degrees; and may vary from a faint probability to absolute certainty. The degree of belief in regard to a given proposition will be affected both by the character of the evidence on which it is perceived to rest; and by the state of the mind in which it is entertained, both as it respects its feelings, and its opinions on other related subjects.

The distribution of proofs in regard to their respective power in commanding belief will be exhibited in Chap. IV.

§ 127. As in explanation, so still more in confirmation it is requisite that the speaker regard the taste, the opinions and the feelings of his hearers; not merely in the exordium and the peroration, but also in the general conduct of the discourse.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN CONFIRMATION.

§ 128. As the theme in this species of discourse is ever a judgment, it will always admit of being expressed in a logical proposition, § 123.

The ancient rhetoricians carefully distinguished between the general subject or theme of the discourse; the particular question discussed arising out of the theme; and the point on which the question turned. Quintilian, thus, in his work *de Institutione Oratoria*, Book Third, distinguishes the *thesis* or *causa* from the *quaestio* and both from the

status causae. Common language recognizes a like distinction. We speak of *the subject* of discussion, *the question* raised, and *the point at issue*. The subject of a given discussion, we might thus say, was '*the right of suffrage.*' The question raised was, '*ought suffrage to be universal?*' The *point at issue*, on which the question was made to turn, was, '*ought property to be made a test in the extension of this privilege?*' These terms are not, however, used with great precision. Notwithstanding this looseness, it may be correct to say that *the subject* indicates nothing in regard to the object of the discourse, whether it be to explain, confirm, excite or persuade; *the question*, while it indicates this, does not determine on what mode of proof the decision shall rest; *the point at issue* determines all these.

Confirmation, so far as it is concerned in the exhibition of proof, looks directly at the point at issue. And this may always be expressed in a logical proposition with its subject, copula and predicate. As '*property ought, or ought not to be made a test in the extension of the right of suffrage.*'

§ 129. While the proposition to be proved should always be formally stated at the outset, in the mind of the speaker himself, it will depend on several different principles, whether and how it should be stated to the hearer.

If no reason appear to the contrary, both facility of apprehension and the increase of interest felt in knowing exactly what is under discussion require that the proposition be stated to the hearers at the outset.

When, however, the proposition is complex, embracing several parts, both clearness and interest may be promoted by the successive statement of the several parts.

If there be a repugnance to any discussion of the subject on the part of the hearers, the statement of the general subject may, in some cases, be postponed, till an interest is awakened by such considerations as may bear on the proposition but are general in their nature.

If there be a prejudice against the truth to be established, likewise, it is sometimes better to postpone the direct formal statement of the proposition, and merely indicate at first the subject, or propose the question for investigation.

CHAPTER III.

OF PROOF.

§ 130. Confirmation effects its object—conviction—by the exhibition of those conceptions of judgments on which the proposition to be confirmed depends;—in other words, BY THE EXHIBITION OF PROOF.

Proof consists, sometimes, of mere conceptions. All that is necessary in such a case is to exhibit those conceptions distinctly to view, and the work of conviction is completed, so far as the mere proof is concerned. When I am to prove that '*the setting fire to an outhouse in a given case is arson,*' I have only to resolve the term "*arson*" into its constituent conceptions, and exhibit them in order. If arson be defined to be the '*malicious setting fire to any thing combustible whereby human life is endangered,*' then, if in the case supposed, the setting fire be admitted to be malicious, and a

dwelling was consumed in consequence, the proof is made out on exhibiting the essential constituents of arson. So in proving faith to be a virtue, I have only to analyse faith and exhibit its component parts as a moral exercise put forth in accordance with an intellectual assent to truth. The terms of the proposition 'faith' and 'virtue' being understood, the mind instantly passes into a belief of the proposition. This process, according to the universally admitted use of language, is rightly denominated "*proof*;" although this term may have been by some writers and in some cases restricted in its application to that species of reasoning in which the conclusion depends on judgments. The importance of this distinction in regard to the means of proof will be seen in the classification of arguments.

It follows from the view of confirmation presented in this section that invention in this part of discourse will consist mainly in finding proof.

It should be remarked that while the distinctive work of confirmation consists in exhibiting proof, the mere exhibition of proof is not to be regarded as all that enters into this process, as will be seen more specifically in a following section.

In confirmatory discourse, accordingly, proof constitutes the body of discussion, § 63.

§ 131. Proof is either DIRECT or INDIRECT. It is direct, when it is applied immediately to the establishment of the proposition.

It is indirect, when it is applied to the overthrow of objections. In the latter case it is called REFUTATION.

§ 132. A complex proposition, embracing several constituent propositions, may be proved by the sepa-

rate and successive proof of each constituent part.

Although sometimes a complex proposition may best be proved without such analysis and separate proof of the parts, as, for instance, when the proofs are applicable alike to every part, still generally it will prevent confusion and conduce to clearness and force in the reasoning to analyse the proposition and establish each part separately. In order to secure this advantage the proposition should be carefully studied at the outset, to see whether it be complex or not, and if complex, whether the proof can be best applied to the whole or to each part separately.

§ 133. The work of proving a particular simple proposition or a complex proposition regarded as simple so far as invention is concerned, consists in the selection and arrangement of the proofs on which assent to the proposition depends. This part of rhetorical invention was denominated by the ancients "THE TOPICAL ART," or "THE TOPICS."

This department of the art of rhetoric was regarded by the ancient rhetoricians and orators as one of the most important in the whole province of rhetoric. Aristotle and Cicero wrote separate treatises upon it. It entered largely into every regular treatise on the art, and into every system of instruction. That it has fallen so much into disuse is to be explained from the causes which have led to the neglect of the department of invention generally. It forms a necessary, constituent part of this branch of rhetoric. A distinct view of the Topics will accordingly be presented in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE TOPICS.

§ 134. It is the object of the Topical art to facilitate and guide rhetorical invention in confirmation by a distribution of the different kinds of proof into general classes.

The name originally signifies "places," τόποι; the Latin of which was "loci." The whole field of proofs was divided off into several parts, to which the invention was directed as the "seats" or places of arguments. They were hence called sometimes "*sedes argumentorum*." The topics proper constituted a species of the "*loci communes*," which included not only arguments but truths used for illustration, embellishment, or other purposes in discourse, and are generally by the ancient writers thus distinguished from the topics proper.

The specific practical utility of a system of topics consists chiefly in the following particulars, viz:

1. It facilitates the search for proof generally; inasmuch as it exhibits in systematic arrangement the few general classes into which all possible proofs may be reduced. The search is thus rendered direct, definite, and intelligent.

2. By the distribution of proofs into classes according to the intrinsic nature of the proofs, the topics show at once the comparative weight and value of the different arguments that bear upon the same question. The selection is thus made easy; certain kinds of sophistry, and those of the most dangerous kind, are at once detected; and the number of arguments necessary in a given case is evinced. As will appear more clearly hereafter, some propositions can be proved only by a certain class of arguments. The argu-

ments of one class, moreover, are intrinsically more weighty than those of another. Some compel belief irresistibly, others only establish a degree of probability greater or less. It is one of the most common and at the same time most successful arts of sophistry to put off the less for the more weighty; the merely probable for the absolutely demonstrative proof.

3. The topics furnish at once the main principles of arrangement.

4. By directing the attention of the learner to definite parts of the whole field of arguments successively, they furnish the means of a more thorough and familiar acquaintance with their respective nature and use.

§ 135. The first general division of proofs is into those which are given in the very terms of the proposition to be proved; and those which are to be sought out of it.

The former class may be denominated ANALYTIC; the latter SYNTHETIC proofs.

All propositions, susceptible of proof, contain the proof within themselves, or depend on some truth or conception out of themselves. The former class are denominated by logicians, *analytic*; the latter, *synthetic* propositions. The proposition "all trees are organic" is analytic; since from the very analysis of the terms "trees" and "organic," the conceptions are given on which the truth of the proposition rests. So likewise, the proposition "dueling is murder" is analytic; as an analysis of the terms furnishes the proof.

On the other hand, the proposition "dueling is a relic of barbarism" is synthetic; since here no analysis of terms would furnish the proof of the truth affirmed. Something is added to the subject in the predicate and the ground for

this affirmed addition must be sought out of the proposition.

Analytic proofs correspond very nearly, but not exactly, to those denominated by Aristotle and Cicero "intrinsic." They include, thus, the species of arguments enumerated by them 'from definition,' 'from the relation of species and genus,' 'from partition or enumeration of parts.' They do not embrace, however, all those which are derived from 'things bearing some affinity to the matter of the proposition.' Indeed, they take in but a part of one variety of this species, viz: that from conjugates or words derived from the same root.*

§ 136. Analytic proofs, being derived from the very terms of the proposition, need not, for any practical purpose of invention be farther subdivided; the search being at once definitely directed and the weight and relation of all arguments of this class being indicated in the very nature of analytic proofs as such.

The terms of the proposition may be analysed by partition or by division, § 97, and the character of the proof will vary in a certain respect with the nature of the proposition. But it is obviously of no importance how the analysis is made or what is the form of the proof thus obtained so far as it respects any purpose of invention.

§ 137. Analytic proofs carry with them the highest validity and force in all confirmation.

There can clearly be no higher or stronger proof than that which is contained in the very statement of the proposition. In this case, the proposition is only to be placed before the mind and assent is necessary. There may be

* See Cic. Top. 2-4.

need of proof of other kinds to show that the terms of the proposition actually contain the conceptions or truths on which the truth of the proposition depends. But these conceptions being admitted to be there, the exhibition of them compels assent. In proving that the malicious setting fire to an outhouse whereby a dwelling is accidentally consumed is arson, it may be necessary to prove, by testimony or otherwise, that arson necessarily includes the idea of malice, the overt act of setting fire, the endangering of human life. But if these are admitted to be constituent ideas of the complex notion—arson—the proof is conclusive.

§ 138. The principle of this most generic division of proofs into analytic and synthetic indicates the first step to be taken in the invention of arguments. It is, *study carefully the terms of the proposition itself.*

This is a fundamental and all-important rule in all confirmation. Many questions, not to say most that are controverted, are resolved at once by the explication of the meaning of the terms employed to express them. They are controverted only because the parties see them in different aspects. But even where the question is viewed in the same light, the explication of the meaning of the terms is often the effectual method of deciding the controversy. And where not, where synthetic proofs are requisite, the mind is, by the thorough examination of the question in all possible lights, furnished with the best helps and guides to invention.

§ 139. Synthetic proofs, being derived from without the proposition, are either such as are given by the mind itself acting under the necessary laws of its being, or such as are derived from without the mind.

The former species may be denominated INTUITIVE; the latter, EMPIRICAL proofs.

In demonstrating the proof of a mathematical proposition, we can trace out the steps from the premise to the conclusion without aid from external proof. The diagrams and numerical figures or alphabetical symbols which we often or generally make use of in mathematical reasoning, merely facilitate our mental operations. A Newton or a Pascal could reason out the theorem independently of such aids. In other words, the mind in this case intuitively perceives the connection between the subject and the predicate. And it matters not whether the reasoning be more or less simple or brief. No mere analysis of the terms of the proposition, however, can give the proof. The mind intuitively, necessarily, adds the predicate to the subject. The quotient of a/b divided by a is seen unavoidably by every one so soon as he understands what is meant by the statement. Yet no mere analysis could give the proof. While they are therefore in their very nature distinguishable from analytic proofs, being perceived at once by the mind, they may be denominated *intuitive*.

Empirical proofs being derived from without the mind come to it only through experience, and hence obtain their name.

Intuitive, like analytic proofs, need no subdivision. They are chiefly employed in mathematical reasoning.

§ 140. Analytic and intuitive proofs possess apodictic or demonstrative certainty.

Unless there be inaccuracy in the application of them, they must always compel assent. Hence, it would be entirely unnecessary for conviction to advance any other arguments, were it not that, in the first place, there may be suspicion of inaccuracy in the application of the proof; and, secondly, that the human mind has passions as well as in-

tellectual powers and in respect to both is subjected to the laws of habit, and hence

“convinced against its will
Is of the same opinion still.”

Hence the necessity of superadding other proofs; mainly that the native love of truth may have opportunity of rising by the contemplation of proof and triumphing over prejudice and aversion.

§ 141. Empirical proofs are divided into the following varieties:

- First, EXPERIENCE;
- Second, ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY;
- Third, SIGNS;
- Fourth, EXAMPLES.

§ 142. Of Empirical proofs, those from experience are the most weighty and decisive; but the use of them in reasoning is very limited.

The principal uses of this variety of proofs are 1. as materials for other varieties of proofs;

2. In rare cases to prove the particular facts to which they relate.

It will sometimes be the case that a speaker will need to prove a fact which has come within the personal experience of his hearers. In regard to intellectual and moral exercises as distinguished from mere sensations this appeal to such personal experience will ordinarily consist in a reference to the occasion on which the exercise was experienced; as the occasion may be remembered while the exercise itself may have escaped the notice of consciousness. Demosthenes thus proves to the Athenians that the policy which had in fact occasioned their disasters in the contest with Philip was

still a noble, just, worthy policy, by referring to the occasions on which the feelings of the citizens actually burst out in generous indignation at the supposed treachery and artful ambition of Philip.

This variety of proofs is more commonly used as materials for other varieties of proof. They are thus used in two different ways; first, as distinct and independent proofs; secondly, as component parts of a complex body of proof. Thus the necessity of religion to the civil welfare and security of a nation might be forcibly proved to those in France who had lived through the terrific scenes of the Revolution by appeals to their own personal experience. One instance of such experience, perhaps, might not suffice for the proof. The repetition of those instances day after day for years would afford proof almost irresistible. Another illustration may be taken from Dr. South's argument to prove that other forms of government insensibly partake of monarchy and slide into it. He says, "For look upon any aristocracy or democracy, and still you shall find some one ruling active person among the rest who does every thing and carries all before him. Was not De Witt amongst our neighbors a kind of king in a commonwealth? And was not that usurper here amongst ourselves a monarch in reality of fact, before he wore the title or assumed the office?"

§ 143. PROOFS FROM ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY are founded on the relations of a cause to its effect or of a general law to its particular results.

From the rise of the sap in the tree, thus, we infer, that there will be foliage, bloom, fruit and other particulars of vegetable growth. The circulation of the sap is, in this

* Discourse on Ps. 144, 10.

case, the cause which, unless something interfere to hinder its operation, will produce those effects. So observed diligence and integrity excite the confident expectation of thrift and success. These are known causes of such a result.

Again, we believe from our knowledge of the laws of gravitation, that a heavy body unsupported will fall to the earth. Here we have no distinct perception of the particular cause of gravitation; we refer the phenomenon only to a law; and from our knowledge of the existence of the law, we affirm with unhesitating confidence that when the fit occasion is presented the proper operation of the law will be witnessed.

Whether the cause in operation or the law regulating it in this kind of proof, is more prominent in view, the nature of the proof is the same. There is, in both cases, ever implied a cause operating and a law governing its operations. Reference is generally made to the cause when it is known; to the law when the cause is unknown.

The validity of this proof rests on our conviction of the uniformity of the course of nature.

This variety of proof is frequently employed with great effect in questions of fact. It is the main reliance of Mr. Curran in his argument in defense of Finney. He employs with much force the perjured and corrupt character of the *informer* in the case as antecedent probability proof that the charge was groundless.

§ 144. The proof is of the nature of an antecedent probability proof when the absence of a sufficient operative cause is urged against the belief of a supposed event.

While from the laws of the mind we necessarily anticipate the appropriate effect from the observed operation of

a cause, so likewise, on the other hand, we reject the supposition of an event having occurred, if there be no proper cause to produce it. The absence of all motive to commit an imputed crime is thus esteemed a strong proof against the fact of its having been committed.

There is, properly speaking, no cause existing of a supposed event, when there is no opportunity afforded for its operation. In such a case, the cause is virtually wanting. If thus, there be a known ground for the probability of the commission of the crime in the character of the accused, yet if there be no possible opportunity for committing it, there is no operating cause; and the proof is as valid in this form as in the other where the non-existence of the cause itself is presented.

Criminal trials abound with instances of this species of proof in both of its forms. A single exemplification will suffice to illustrate its nature and application. In the "Goodridge case" so called, Mr. Webster urges the want of all possibility of previous arrangement and concert, which the circumstances of the alleged crime presupposed, in proof of the innocence of the accused; while, on the other hand, he feels himself called to rebut the proof arising from the want of motive on the part of the prosecuting witness to feign a robbery.*

§ 145. The force of any given antecedent probability proof will depend on the degree of certainty in the connection between the cause and the effect.

If the cause be adequate to the effect and actually

* Webster's Speeches, Vol. II. In this case two men were tried on a charge of robbery committed on the person of Goodridge who was the prosecuting witness. The main reliance of the defense was that the robbery was a pretense.

operate, or no hindrance intervene, the proof is conclusive. If, on the other hand, there be uncertainty whether the cause actually operate, or whether it operate free from hindrance or interruption, the force of the proof will be so far impaired.

Where the proof lies in the absence of all cause to the supposed effect, the conclusion will be more or less certain according to the degree in which all causes or occasions possible in the case are excluded.

An important distinction is to be made between those antecedent probability proofs which are purely physical and such as are moral. A physical cause *must* operate when the occasion is presented. We infer with absolute certainty that water exposed will freeze when the temperature is below the freezing point. We cannot so certainly infer that a covetous man will steal or defraud when an opportunity is afforded; or that a threat of vindictive passion was actually followed by murder when occasion of executing it was presented.

§ 146. SIGNS are proofs which derive their force from the necessary dependence of one thing upon another. This dependence may be that of an event on its cause, or on the occasion or condition which is necessary in order to the operation of the cause to produce the supposed effect.

The sign is thus the dependent event or effect; the thing to be proved is the cause or occasion on which it depends.

The validity of this species of proof rests ultimately on the principle, received unhesitatingly by every mind, that every effect presupposes a cause and an occasion of its

operating. In the former species—antecedent probability proofs, the argument is from the cause to the effect; in this, it is from the effect to the cause.

We infer from the freezing of water that the temperature has fallen below the freezing point. This is a certain sign. The discovery of a bloody dagger in the possession of a man after a murder known to have been committed by such an instrument, is a strong sign or proof against him. Here we infer a cause from an effect. We find it difficult or impossible to admit the effect and at the same time to reject the cause.

In the same way we infer that if a dwelling, which had been carefully secured, has been entered without violence and robbed, there must have been concert with some one from within. The cause could not have operated without such an occasion.

Signs include a number of varieties which it is unnecessary to consider in order separately. There are several of these varieties, however, for reasons in part common, in part peculiar to each variety, which seem to warrant a distinct notice.

§ 147. TESTIMONY is a variety of signs; the validity of which as proof consists in this—that the testimony presupposes the fact testified to as the condition without which it would not have been given.

The credibility of a witness does not always depend on his character for veracity. The testimony of a notorious liar and perjurer is sometimes conclusive; and on this principle, that we cannot believe he should so testify, unless the events testified to were facts.

The degree of weight to be attributed to testimony is always to be estimated by this view of the nature of testimony—that it is a sign, implying the facts to which it tes-

tifies as more or less necessary conditions of its having been given. Whenever, therefore, other occasions or motives exist in the case for giving the testimony than the truth, the credibility of the witness will be so far impaired. We are thus to judge the credibility of historians. The historian of a sect or of a party must be received as a credible witness only so far as it may appear that truth was the condition of his speaking as he does. All admissions against his own sect or party, unless made as baits and lures, will be received as honest testimony.

It is from this view of the nature of testimony as proof, that we see why *opportunity and capability of observing* come in to affect the credibility of a witness. If these qualifications are wanting, the connection between the testimony as a sign, and the facts testified to as conditions, which constitutes the very nature of this proof, is destroyed and there is nothing on which the testimony can rest.

§ 148. AUTHORITY is a variety of signs; and is distinguished from testimony by the circumstance that authority respects matters of opinion, while testimony respects matters of fact.

The opinions of competent men weigh as proof inasmuch as we cannot conceive how such men should entertain those opinions unless they were founded on truth. If, however, we can discover the influence of other causes to determine their opinions, their authority weighs less with us. The opinions of legal tribunals, pronounced after the fullest discussions on both sides by interested and able men, under the solemnities of a judicial trial, are weighty authority; because it is not conceivable that such opinions can rest on any other foundation than truth.

The validity of legal precedents may properly be subjected

to this test. An independent and intelligent judge will set aside a precedent on proof that the decision was determined by other motives than love of truth or rectitude.

§ 149. CONCURRENT TESTIMONY and CONCURRENT AUTHORITY belong also to this species of proofs. The mere concurrence of witnesses or judges, apart from all consideration of their personal claims to credibility, is a sign, often conclusive, that the fact or opinion is truly as represented.

Previous concert, or common interest at once impairs the force of this proof. For then another cause or occasion is furnished to account for the fact of the testimony than the actual truth.

§ 150. EXAMPLES are proofs which rest on the resemblance or common property or relation that exists between individuals of the same class. One is taken, and from something found to be true of that, an inference is drawn to one or all of the others.

The naturalist, thus, having discovered by analysis the inorganic constituents of a particular plant, infers from this example that any other of the same species will contain the same constituents. Mr. Burke, in his Speech on the East India Bill, sustains his charge of hypocrisy against the East India Company by adducing as examples their treatment of Mr. Hastings, on the one hand, whom they reprehended with unparalleled asperity, and yet continued to trust with the entire control of their affairs in India; and of Col. Munson, Gen. Clavering, and Mr. Francis, on the other, whom they "ruined by their praises."

The force of the example, as a proof, rests ultimately upon the principle that like causes produce like effects; for,

as has before been observed, § 98, the notion of a cause lies at the foundation of all classification. The force of this proof is, consequently, impaired precisely in the degree that more than one cause may possibly have operated in the case. In nature, the proof is generally conclusive; for we can conceive of but one general cause. In conduct, however, we cannot safely take the actions of one man as exemplifications of the actions of another; for we cannot determine that the same motives have influenced in the two cases.

It is important carefully to distinguish the different purposes for which an example may be introduced into discourse. It is used not only as proof in argumentation, but, also, as mere illustration, and likewise for ornament. It may subserve, moreover, any two of all these purposes at the same time. An argument consequently may be disguised under what appears to be a mere illustration or embellishment, and may thus have force as proof which it could not have received if exhibited in its own dress and form, as then its weakness or unsoundness would have been detected. So, likewise, a solid argument may be taken for a mere ornament or illustration.

§ 151. We argue from example either to the whole class or to other individuals of the class. The former species are, for the sake of distinction, denominated ARGUMENTS FROM INDUCTION.

From observing that heavy bodies fall to the earth, we infer, by induction, the general principle of gravitation. Whether one or more examples, or, generally, how many examples are necessary in order to warrant the inference, depends on the question, how many are necessary in order to show that but one cause has produced the result. The philologist might safely infer from observing in a given

language a single instance of a second future tense, that this tense-form was a general feature of the language, since the single cause that could have originated the use of it lies in the primitive nature of the language. He could not, however, infer from observing that in a particular case this species of time was expressed by auxiliaries, that the language contained no proper tense-form for this time; for accidental causes may have produced exceptions to a general law.

So one observed instance of a particular metal sinking in water, might authorize the conclusion that the specific gravity of the metal generally, was greater than that of water; that all pieces of the same metal would sink in the same fluid. For but one cause can here be supposed to act in determining the metal to sink. But one could not properly infer that all ores of the metal would be of a greyish color, from observing a single specimen of that color. Since, in this case, a diversity of causes may exist in different localities to determine the color of an ore.

§ 152. Examples are founded either on resemblance of *properties* or on resemblance of *relations*. Those of the latter kind are denominated ARGUMENTS FROM ANALOGY.

While an argument from analogy differs thus from other examples in the circumstance that the former is founded on a resemblance of relations, while the others rest on a resemblance of properties, yet the same principle gives alike, to both varieties, all their force as proofs, viz: our conviction of the uniformity of nature.

§ 153. Analogical reasoning is SIMPLE when the two things compared bear a similar relation to a third.

As when from the relation of the earth to its uses, it is

inferred that other planets, from the same relation, may be inhabited. Or, when it is inferred, from the fact that virtue affects our well-being, that vice must likewise; virtue and vice being both moral habits or dispositions, and the relation being the same—both alike affecting condition.

§ 154. Analogical reasoning is COMPLEX when two different relations are introduced.

Thus it may be argued from the fact that virtue tends to happiness, that vice must tend to misery. In this case, the whole analogical proof rests on the similarity of relation between both virtue and vice, and welfare. This is the generic relation. Another specific relation is introduced as belonging to each of the terms—that of virtue to happiness, and of vice to misery. These are dissimilar relations. It is by another principle of proof that the tendency to affect welfare common to virtue and vice is believed to be in the one case salutary, in the other pernicious. This is an instance of Aristotle's argument from contraries—ἐξ ἐναντιῶν.

In a complex analogical argument, however, it is not necessary that the second relations should be to opposites. As from the relation of a seed to the plant we may argue in respect to the relation of an egg to the fowl. The relations of a germ to the parent and to the living product are common to the seed and to the egg. These are the generic relations. The specific relations of the egg to the fowl and of the seed to the plant are dissimilar, but are not proper opposites. The force of the analogy reaches only to the similarity or resemblance of the relations.

§ 155. Examples may be REAL OR INVENTED.

Real examples, or such as are taken from actual observation or experience, carry with them their own evidence.

Invented examples must possess intrinsic probability or be credible in themselves; otherwise they evidently can have no weight as arguments.

Aristotle instances as an invented example that employed by Socrates, of the mariners choosing their steersman by lot. The case, probably, never in fact occurred; but it clearly might occur, and it well illustrates the possibility of the lot falling upon an unskillful person; and, therefore, was a valid argument as used by Socrates against the practice, then common, of appointing magistrates by lot.

Dr. Whately has well observed that while a fictitious case which has not this intrinsic probability has absolutely no weight whatever, any matter of fact, on the other hand, however unaccountable it may seem, has some degree of weight in reference to a parallel case. "No satisfactory reason," he proceeds to remark, "has yet been assigned for a connection between the absence of upper cutting teeth, or of the presence of horns, and rumination; but the instances are so numerous and constant of this connection, that no Naturalist would hesitate, if on examination of a new species he found those teeth absent and the head horned, to pronounce the animal a ruminant."

§ 156. As the points of resemblance between different objects are diverse, and things most unlike may yet have some resemblance to each other, and therefore be embraced under the same class, it becomes important in the use of this kind of argument, on the one hand, carefully to set forth the particular point of resemblance on which the argument rests; and, on the other, in estimating the weight of the argument to reject from the estimate those points in which there is no resemblance.

While those arguments which rest on resemblances in objects most unlike are generally in themselves more striking and forcible, they are yet often sophistically invalidated and rejected, because in most respects they are so dissimilar. On the other hand, no sophistry, perhaps, is more common than that of assuming a resemblance in all points where there is such resemblance in many. In the use of this species of argument, it becomes, then, of the utmost importance to bear in mind both that the most similar things differ in some respects, and perhaps in that very point on which the argument in a given case depends; and, also, that the most dissimilar things may have some properties or relations in common, and may therefore furnish foundations for valid reasoning.

The decisive test of the soundness of all arguments founded on resemblance, is furnished in the inquiry: do the particulars of resemblance owe their existence to the same cause; or, where the cause is not known, to the same law? As the whole force of examples as arguments rests on the sameness of the cause, or of the law which has given origin to the resemblances on which the classification depends, the detection of this cause or law, where possible, will ever discover the validity or invalidity of the example as an argument. Just so far as there remains a doubt of the sameness of the cause or law, so far must there be weakness in the argument.

§ 157. While all simple arguments may be referred to some one of the foregoing classes, many complex arguments partake of the nature of two or more; their force in reasoning is consequently modified in reference to the respective character of the classes of arguments of the nature of which they partake.

What is often called *a priori* reasoning not unfrequently includes in itself not only an antecedent probability argument, but also a sign, or an example. From the falling of the barometer, we infer *a priori* that there will be a change of the weather; not because we suppose the fall of the mercury to be the cause of the change, but because it is *the sign* of the existence of the cause. We in this case, in truth, first argue by a sign, to the existence of a cause, and then by an antecedent probability argument, to its effect, viz: a change of the weather. In the argument in "the Goodridge case," before referred to, § 144, several circumstances are advanced as *signs* in proof of a cause or motive to feign a robbery; from which cause, thus proved, the inference was that the prosecution was groundless.

Lord Chatham in his speech "on removing the troops from Boston," argues the continued and determined resistance of the Americans to an arbitrary system of taxation from the spirit of liberty which animated them in common with all Englishmen; and the existence of this spirit is proved by *an example*—the proceedings of the General Congress at Philadelphia. This would ordinarily be called an *a priori* argument, inasmuch as the force of it rests mainly on the existing cause to produce the continued resistance. But an "example," which is of the nature of an *a posteriori* argument, is introduced to prove the existence of the cause, and the intermediate step of the argument, the cause itself, is not expressed but only implied.

In the same speech we have another form of the combination of the antecedent probability argument with the example. The example is introduced, not as in the other case, to prove the antecedent probability argument itself, but to confirm it as proof of the main proposition. The speaker exemplifies the working of that spirit of liberty in the effec-

tual opposition to "loans, benevolences, and ship-money in England," in the procuring of "the bill of rights," &c. The reasoning, as a whole, is *a priori*; but is complex, consisting of an antecedent probability argument and examples.

By an *a priori* argument, the fact of a revelation from heaven is inferred from the general corruption of the human race. The argument consists of an antecedent probability argument—the determination of God to do all that is necessary to effect the recovery of the race; and of a sign—the corruption of the race, to prove the necessity of such an interposition by revelation.

A posteriori reasoning, also, often includes arguments of different classes. From the migration of birds to the north, we infer that some of the various effects of spring have appeared in the place of their hibernation. From the migration of birds, as a sign, we infer the return of warm weather as its cause; and from this we infer again, by an antecedent probability argument, the usual effects of the return of spring.

While both *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasoning thus often contain arguments of two or more classes, there is yet an obvious distinction between them. In the former, the antecedent probability argument is the one on which the force of the reasoning mainly depends; in the latter, the sign or the example is the prominent argument.

The analysis of complex arguments will often discover the precise amount of validity due to them. It will disclose also the point where the sophistry of a suspected proof enters.

Testimony and authority, also, often combine arguments of different species, and are themselves frequently combined together in the same process of reasoning.

What is often called *reasoning from experience*, is dis-

tinguished from other species of reasoning only by the source from which the arguments are derived. It comprehends mainly those arguments which are in § 139 denominated empirical.

The argument from progressive approach, so called, is but a species of induction, in which we argue from the increase or diminution in the effect according as a particular cause is increased or diminished in several examples, to the perfect completeness, or the entire removal of the effect when the cause is perfectly operative or wholly removed. *E. g.* If we put a ball in motion on a rough surface, its motion soon ceases; on a smoother surface, its motion is proportionally prolonged: hence, we infer that if there were no resistance at all, the motion would be perpetual. A sophistical use of this argument has been made by some enthusiastic advocates of Temperance. They have assumed that disease and death are the consequence exclusively of a corrupt constitution inherited from parents who have violated the laws of health, or of a transgression of those laws by the individual himself. They then urge the facts that temperance and correct regimen promote health and long life, just in proportion as the constitution is free from original corruption and the laws of health are observed. They hence infer that a perfect and universal observance of the laws of health will in time purify the stock itself; the human constitution will be restored to its perfect state, and disease and death will disappear.

§ 158. **EMPIRICAL** proofs never carry with themselves necessary certainty; although they possess all degrees of probability, from mere probability to full but not necessary certainty.

Proofs derived from our own experience we can never

question. They are decisive so far as they go; but the certainty which they produce is very different from that which is produced by analytic and intuitive reasoning.

Antecedent probability arguments sometimes produce full certainty. If the cause certainly exists and no hindrance can arise, the effect is certain; and the proof is decisive of belief. Just so far as doubts may arise in regard to the sufficiency of the cause or the opportunity of its operating, just so far will the reasoning from this class of proofs be invalidated.

Signs possess full certainty, or higher or lower degrees of probability, according as the cause or occasion to be proved by them is more or less necessary to their existence.

The conclusiveness of examples as proofs depends on the question whether they are determined; in the particular character in which they are presented as proofs, by the same cause which is supposed to produce the thing to be proved, § 156. From observing the organic structure in one plant, the naturalist will safely conclude in regard to any other plant of the same species. He cannot, however, so conclude in regard to the color. But one cause can be supposed to operate in the former case; in the latter, various causes may have influence.

§ 159. From the diverse nature of the different kinds of arguments enumerated it will appear at once that while some are applicable to all subjects, others are adapted only to particular kinds of subjects.

Analytical proofs are applicable to every kind of subject, as is obvious from their nature.

Of *Synthetical proofs*, the intuitive class belong to mathematical reasoning or pure science.

Empirical proofs are employed in all reasoning

that respects matters of experience, whether the reasoning terminates on facts or on general truths.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 160. The importance of attention to arrangement in confirmation depends mainly on two principles.

The first respects the state of the mind addressed. The method suited to a mind favorably disposed, will generally be unsuitable to a mind opposed to conviction, and *vice versa*.

The second principle respects the dependence of the proofs on one another. Some proofs are explained by others, which must be previously exhibited in order to the full effect of the reasoning. Some proofs presuppose others. Some, once more, have great weight if preceded by certain others, and are of little moment unless preceded by them.

The force and effect of reasoning depends, indeed, hardly less on the order than on the matter of the proofs. Perfectly conclusive arguments when presented in the proper order may lose all their force if advanced in a different order.

§ 161. If the proof advanced be single but susceptible of analysis, the principle which regulates the arrangement of the parts will obviously be the same as that in analytic explanation, §§ 94—106.

For illustration, Dr. Barrow, in his discourse on the Divine Impartiality, presents in the *a priori* part of his reasoning the following arguments from the divine attributes as analysed by *division*, viz: 1. From God's wisdom; 2.

his righteousness; 3. his power; 4. his goodness. These arguments from God's attributes, together with those from his relations, form the heads of his *a priori* reasoning.

His *a posteriori* argument is analysed by *partition*. The parts given are 1. God has proposed the same terms to all of obtaining his favor; 2. He has furnished the same means and aids to all; 3. He has provided the same encouragements; 4. He watches over all alike in his providence; 5. He has conferred on Christians the same privileges; 6. He holds all alike subject to the same final retribution.

§ 162. If the reasoning embrace arguments of distinct classes, the principle of arrangement is to be sought, first, in the state of the mind addressed.

If there be already a state of belief, and the object of the discourse is to confirm and strengthen it, then the weaker arguments will generally need to be placed first and the stronger ones last. In this way the deepest and strongest impression will be the last.

If there be an opposing belief to be set aside, it will be better to advance the stronger first, in order to overthrow opposition at once. The weaker may follow which will serve to confirm when they would be of no avail in the first assault. In order to leave, however, a strong impression, some of the stronger should be reserved to the close; or, what is equivalent, the arguments may be recapitulated in the reverse order.

Although this principle of arrangement, derived from a consideration of the state of the mind addressed, is not the higher and more controlling one, but must generally give way to the next to be named, still the state of the mind

addressed must be first consulted, for that will often determine what kind of arguments are to be employed as well as the order of arrangement.

This principle, it will be observed, respects only the comparative strength of the arguments.

§ 163. The second principle to be regarded in the arrangement of proofs respects the dependence of the arguments on one another.

This principle requires, in the first place, that the *analytic proofs precede all others*.

The reason of this rule is obvious. As in exhibiting a proof of this class, the proposition itself must necessarily be explained, the relevance and force of every other proof will be more clearly seen after such an explanation. In a judicial question, for example, whether certain specified acts constitute legal murder, after the definition of murder has been given, the arguments from authority or "legal precedents" will obviously be more intelligible and also of more force as confirmatory.

§ 164. This principle requires, in the second place, that *antecedent probability arguments precede examples and signs*.

The example, introduced after the antecedent probability argument, will serve both to illustrate and also to confirm it. Indeed, in this order, they reflect light on each other. Mr. Burke, in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, in endeavoring to prove that India had been reduced to a condition of extreme want and wretchedness, first presents the *causes* in operation to produce it; then, *examples* of the operation of those causes; and finally particular *signs* of the fact. The mind very readily receives the whole statement,

because, from the view of the cause, the effects are naturally anticipated.

In Dr. Barrow's discourse on the Divine Impartiality, the *a priori* arguments are with obvious propriety presented first; and then the *a posteriori* arguments. If the order had been reversed the force of the reasoning would have been greatly weakened.

A charge of fraud against a man generally reputed to be of upright character would need a strong array of proof from signs, as testimony and the like, to substantiate it. But let a spirit of covetousness be first proved in him, and especially if a single example be adduced in which that spirit has led aside from what was upright and manly, and a very small amount of proof will suffice to establish the charge.

In like manner the proof of the divine authenticity of the Bible is conclusive when sufficient cause is first shown for such an interposition from God, and then the arguments from testimony, and the internal evidence, are presented. But without such cause being first shown, scarcely any amount of testimony will be sufficient to overcome the repugnance of the mind to believe that a miracle has been wrought.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PRESUMPTION, OR THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

§ 165. It is of great importance in argumentation to determine at the outset both in reference to the main proposition, and also in reference to the particular facts or truths assumed as proofs, whether they

may be fairly *presumed* or taken for granted until disproved. This is called determining on which side the PRESUMPTION is, or on which THE BURDEN OF PROOF—*onus probandi*—lies.

The importance of determining this point consists not merely in the fact that thereby the labor of proof may often be saved, but still more in the fact, that the mere undertaking to prove what ought to be *presumed*, will often throw doubt upon what was clear and unquestionable. The veracity of a witness is ever to be taken for granted until it is impeached. If one were to volunteer a defence of the character of a witness before it had been questioned, the very attempt would excite a suspicion that the character needed some bolstering, and that the advocate was influenced by his own distrust to make the attempt. So, likewise, if a man, who had been slandered, were to undertake a defence against the slander, instead of throwing the whole burden of proof on the slanderer, and putting him to the task of making out a case, even perfect innocence, and that which otherwise would appear so to all, might be blackened by suspicion.

The great advantage that the side on which the presumption lies has over the opposite, consists in this, that it must triumph unless a decisive case is made out against it:—it has all the benefit of a doubtful result. If the course of procedure were now reversed, and the criminal were required to prove his innocence instead of the government being required to establish his guilt, few that are accused would probably escape condemnation. As it is, a slight shade of doubt as to the guilt, even although the probability is altogether against him, results for the benefit of the accused.

The discussions that have arisen on the laws providing for

the imprisonment of debtors, have exhibited most forcibly of how great advantage it is to be relieved from the *onus probandi*. It has been strenuously insisted by some that the creditor should take all the burden of proof on himself, and make out a clear case of fraud, before compulsory process against the person of the debtor shall be issued. The extreme difficulty of proving fraud in many cases has led others to take the ground that a failure to pay an honest debt raises a presumption of fraud which the debtor may reasonably be held to remove by oath or evidence. It is obvious that the adoption of the one or the other of these principles, would greatly affect the facility of enforcing the payment of debts. Here not only will the creditor or the debtor have the advantage of a doubtful case according as the presumption is on one side or the other, but the decision of this point will determine to a great extent on what kind of evidence the question of fraud shall turn—upon that which is in the possession of the creditor, or upon that in possession of the debtor. It will not unfrequently occur thus that the decision of the question will go one way or the other according as the evidence or proof is derived from this side or from that side; and this is determined by the question, where lies the presumption in the case?

Although it will generally be easy to determine on which side the burden of proof lies, it may be of service to lay down some general principles which regulate the determination of this matter.

§ 166. The first general principle in regard to the burden of proof is, that *the affirmative of every issue is to be proved.*

This is a principle in English jurisprudence derived from

the maxim of the civil law: '*Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.*'

This is not, however, a principle of universal application, and must often give way to some others to be named in the following sections.

In the interpretation of this principle it should be borne in mind that the stress is to be laid on the fact of alleging or affirming, not on the form of the proposition itself as affirmative or negative. The principle is, *he who alleges must prove*. If the allegation be in the negative form, it does not shift the burden of proof. The fundamental ground on which the principle rests is, that whatever is new shall be accounted for. He who makes an allegation puts into being a statement that did not exist before. He is properly called upon to account for it—prove it and thus make it a truth.

§ 167. The presumption, farther, is generally in favor of what already exists and against a change, whether the question be one of truth, of right, or expediency.

There is a presumption, thus, in favor of prevailing opinions and sentiments. They are not to be rejected until evidence has been advanced against them. Even such as seem at first sight absurd or ridiculous are sometimes found afterwards to be founded in truth. The Indians living in the vicinity of the North American Lakes, generally entertained the opinion that these lakes were subject to a periodical rise and fall. This was ridiculed at one time as an absurd superstition; subsequent observations, however, seem to countenance the Indian tradition.

On the other hand, the proposer of new opinions may be justly called upon to present evidence in their favor; and may be properly regarded as unworthy of credit until such

evidence be produced. He cannot even claim that the public mind should be in a state of impartial equilibrium. His opinions must be rejected until positive evidence be adduced.

So, likewise, there is a presumption in favor of existing institutions;—that they are founded in truth and reason, and are for the public benefit. The fact that they exist, creates a claim in their favor which cannot be overbalanced by evidence against them, that would suffice in a case exactly poised in the opinions of men. The reformer is required to make out a clear positive case, before he can expect to be credited.

§ 168. The presumption, moreover, is in favor of rectitude; in other words, should be charitable.

It is a reasonable principle in law, thus, that a man be accounted innocent of crime until he be proved guilty. A witness is to be believed, unless evidence is furnished of falsehood. A man's integrity, generally, may not be questioned until proof appears against him. His motives, also, are to be regarded as pure until impeached by positive evidence.

This is a principle, not only supported by considerations of expediency, since the charitable man generally succeeds best in avoiding the ills and securing the enjoyments of life, but founded in abstract truth and reason.

§ 169. Once more, the presumption is on the side of whatever promotes the well-being of men, and against whatever is restrictive or injurious.

There is a presumption, thus, in favor of christianity, because it is favorable, as is admitted even by its enemies, to the best interests of human society. The presumption, on the other hand, lies against whatever retards the progress

of society, restricts or confines the energies of men, or injuriously affects their best interests.

The ultimate general principle on which all these particular maxims of presumption rest, seems to be this: that the world is governed by infinite intelligence controlled by perfect rectitude and goodness. In respect to this, the sentiment is true, that "whatever is, is right"; and the proper and the genuine results of goodness and truth harmonize with each other, and also with what, for the most part, transpires in providence. In all cases of presumption, consequently, whatever accords with the natural laws of providence is to be presumed to be true, right, or expedient, as the case may be.

§ 170. One presumption may sometimes be opposed by another: when the circumstances of the case must determine which shall outweigh the other.

Mahomedanism, thus, exists; and so far a presumption lies in its favor. With those who know of nothing existing in incompatibility with it, and who are not informed or convinced in regard to its evil effects, perhaps, this fact of its existence would furnish a strong presumption in favor of continuing it. But its allowance of violence, and its evil effects generally, are to those who are convinced of this, a sufficient *rebutter* against the presumption drawn from the fact of its existence.

CHAPTER VII.

OF REFUTATION.

§ 171. By REFUTATION, in its more limited sense, is meant the overthrow of opposing arguments.

Refutation is sometimes taken in the sense of *defense* generally. Thus the argument of the defendant in a judicial trial, has been denominated a refutation. But in the more proper use of the word, refutation has been restricted to objections or opposing arguments.

§ 172. Refutation proper consists in the overthrow either of one of the premises on which an objection rests, or of the conclusiveness of the reasoning.

While refutation is governed by the same general principles that apply to all argumentation, and has to do with the same arguments or kinds of proof, it possesses the peculiarity, that it is applied to the overthrow of opposing arguments. Hence, a more direct call is made in it on the logical principles for the detection of sophistical reasoning. The overthrow of a premise falsely or incorrectly assumed in an objection, may, indeed, be accomplished in other methods common to all reasoning; but the detection of error in the course of the reasoning is to be effected in accordance with the principles of logic, which expose the possible modes of sophistical argumentation.

§ 173. As all evidence does not possess the character of absolute certainty, it is possible, in some cases, that there may be real evidence, or valid arguments, on both sides of the question. In such cases, it is not indispensably necessary to refute the opposing arguments; but it may be sufficient, while allowing it its

proper weight, to overbalance it with arguments of greater weight.

This is a principle ever to be borne in mind that, in cases of probable reasoning generally, really valid arguments may be advanced on both sides. The existence of such unanswerable arguments should not confound or disconcert. The opposite side may still be that of truth. In such case, it seems important to apply the principles of the Topics; to determine carefully the degree of weight to be allowed the objection, and to oppose to it an argument of a higher rank, or an accumulation of arguments of the same class.

§ 174. It is always sound policy to state objections fairly, and to allow them all the force to which they are entitled.

Nothing is more opposed to persuasiveness in reasoning, than the appearance of unfairness. Sound principle was accordingly reckoned by the ancients among the three essential requisites in the character of the orator. Where the speaker is to appear before the same audience frequently, or to address one acquainted with his character as a candid and honest reasoner, the necessity of observing this principle is manifest. And even where the general character of the speaker can have no influence in favorably disposing the minds of the hearers, still, as unfairness is with difficulty disguised, and even suspicion of it is exceedingly prejudicial; as, moreover, the consciousness of candor and fairness will give the speaker himself a tone of confidence and authority, itself most favorable to effect, it is ever safest, as a matter of policy, to conduct the argumentation in perfect fairness.

§ 175. The principles of arrangement in regard to

refutation, are substantially the same as those which apply to direct confirmation, Chap. V. As subordinate and incidental to confirmation, however, the application of those principles to refutation becomes slightly modified.

In the first place, if the arguments to be refuted are sufficiently met in the main direct arguments, the proper place to refute them is in the course of presentation of those direct arguments.

In the next place, if the objections are independent of the direct chain of reasoning, they should be answered at the commencement, if already weighing in the minds of the audience; and at the close, if they are anticipated as about to arise in the mind, or are to be presented by an adversary.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN CONFIRMATION.

§ 176. The Introduction Explanatory in confirmation may respect the proposition itself, the particular mode of discussion to be pursued, or some circumstances connected with the occasion of speaking.

It is unnecessary to particularize the several topics proper for an introduction explanatory in confirmation. It is sufficient to turn the attention of the speaker to those general fields of view which it may be important for him to survey, that he may ascertain what points will require elucidation.

tion in order to prepare the way for the ready apprehension of his discourse.

§ 177. The Introduction Conciliatory in confirmation will respect the person of the speaker, the character of the proposition, the mode of discussion or the circumstances of speaking.

§ 178. The several points in reference to the person of the speaker, to which attention may need to be directed in conciliation, are the relation of the speaker to the audience; to his opponent; to the question to be discussed, and to the occasion of speaking.

§ 179. The three qualities requisite in the speaker in reference to the audience, as prescribed by the ancients, are GOOD SENSE, GOOD PRINCIPLE, and GOOD WILL.

Good sense is requisite, because an audience will deem itself insulted if a speaker presumes to come before it but ill-informed in regard to the matter to be discussed. The speaker, from his very office, professes his ability to enlighten and inform his audience. Negligence to obtain a proper understanding of the subject, shows at once a want of capacity to speak, or a high contempt of the audience.

A character for integrity is necessary, inasmuch as just so far as the speaker shows himself unworthy of confidence, will every thing he says be received with misgivings and suspicions; while the bare assertions of a reputedly honest man will often be received with the submission which is due to actual demonstration.

If, further, the audience be convinced that the speaker is actuated by good will to them, all the influence of the feel-

ings over the movements of the intellect will be favorable to his designs.

While general reputation or character in regard to these qualities will be most serviceable in effecting conciliation so far as it depends on them, the speaker may do much in removing an unfavorable impression from the minds of his hearers, or in producing one that is favorable, by his manner at the time. The character of his discourse, as marked by the particular features of intelligence, familiarity with the subject; gravity, modesty, pure moral sentiment; by kindness, deference, and respect for his hearers, will conduce greatly to awaken a favorable disposition in them towards himself. At the same time, indirect professions together with allusions to facts in his history which may present his character favorably in these respects, may be often beneficially employed.

It is obvious that the same general means are to be made use of as well when an unfavorable disposition is to be set aside as when a favorable sentiment is to be awakened.

§ 180. The speaker's relation to his opponent will need to be regarded by him, whenever the character of his opponent in respect to the three points, before named, may influence the mind of the hearer; and also, whenever the personal relation existing between them may favorably or unfavorably affect the disposition of the hearer.

Advantage, thus, may be taken of the character of the adversary as being ill-informed in the case, wanting in principle, or unkindly disposed to the hearers. Or the advantage which an opposite character may give an opponent will need to be set aside or lessened by counter considerations.

The personal relations subsisting between the speaker and

his opponent will frequently affect the disposition of the hearers in reference to the discourse. To speak in opposition to one closely allied in any of the social relations of life, will create a favorable or unfavorable disposition in the minds of the hearer, according as it may appear to them to have been prompted by principle, or by selfishness or malice.

§ 181. The speaker's relations to the subject of discussion or to the side of the question which he maintains may, also, obviously favorably present him to the audience or otherwise; in either case, they will demand his attention.

Exemplifications of this kind of introduction are to be found in Demosthenes' Oration on the Crown where he maintains his right to be heard as one equally interested with Ctesiphon in the issue of the trial; in Cicero's Oration for Cluentius, against whom he had previously spoken with great severity; and in Erskine's speech on the trial of Thomas Paine.

§ 182. Once more, the occasion of speaking will often in some relation which the speaker may bear to it, affect the minds of the hearers and render necessary suitable means of conciliation.

Cicero thus in his oration against Cæcilius commences with an exposition of the reasons which induced him who had never before appeared except in defence, now to become a prosecutor against Verres.

§ 183. The character of the proposition will demand a conciliatory introduction when either the subject generally or the particular view taken of it by the speaker at the time is likely to be offensive to the hearers.

The advantage which a speaker addressing those of his own party or sect or generally those of the same principles with himself on a topic of common interest to them, over his opponents, must obviously be great; and while it becomes him to turn this advantage to good account, it is still more necessary to his opponent to lessen, so far as practicable by any of the various means of conciliation, this prepossession against himself. In the famous orations on the crown, Demosthenes had to encounter the natural repugnance which men feel against hearing a man commend his own actions; while Aeschines labored under the conviction that the judges were of the party of his adversary. Each orator, accordingly, in his introduction, endeavored to lessen the difficulty which he had in this respect to encounter.

§ 184. The mode of discussion imposed on the speaker may be such as to call for some effort at conciliation in the Introduction when it requires him to treat of topics offensive to the audience or to make use of terms or a course of reasoning not easily intelligible to them.

In Judicial Eloquence, thus, arguments embodying pure legal principles are generally uninviting and with difficulty intelligible to a jury; and the advocate, who would secure a favorable hearing, will need to use much address and art. So purely metaphysical discussions on religious subjects before a popular audience generally repel and offend. Men, moreover, are loath to hear of their own faults or weaknesses; and the speaker who is obliged to recur to them has reason to fear that, unless due precaution is taken, their unwillingness to hear will entirely prevent the intended effect of his discourse.

§ 185. In the same way, the circumstances in which

the speaker appears before his audience may render them indisposed to a favorable hearing, when the arts of conciliation suitable to the case will be needful.

The military array which Pompey had thrown around the tribunal on the trial of Milo so influenced the minds of the judges that Cicero felt it necessary, at the commencement of his oration, to allay their fears and turn to his own account the influence of Pompey, which at first seemed to the judges to be arrayed against him.

§ 186. Several of these varieties of conciliatory Introduction, it may often happen, must be combined in the same action.

The speeches of Demosthenes on the Crown, and of Cicero in the case of Milo, alluded to above, are examples of the various combinations of these different kinds of Introduction.

§ 187. Confirmation admits all the various kinds of peroration enumerated in § 70. Recapitulation, moreover, will here be especially useful.

PART III.—EXCITATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 188. In Excitation the object of discourse is to move the feelings, either by awakening some new affection, or by strengthening or allaying one already existing.

The propriety of ranking excitation among the several objects of discourse, and of founding upon this object a distinct species governed by its own laws and characterised by peculiar features, will hardly be questioned by any who recognize the feelings or affections as a distinct class of mental phenomena. In fact, we find a class of discourses constructed in particular reference to this object, and distinguished from all others by peculiar characteristics. To this class belong most of what have been denominated *demonstrative* discourses, particularly those pronounced on funeral and triumphal occasions, in which the object is to awaken admiration, joy, grief, or other emotion. Here belongs, likewise, a considerable part of pulpit oratory, viz: that part, the object of which is to awaken or cherish some christian affection or grace, or to allay or remove some improper passion in actual indulgence.

That this object has not been distinctly recognised in sys-

tems of general rhetoric as one of those which give specific character to discourse and furnish the grounds of classification, is to be attributed mainly to the fact that in deliberative and judicial eloquence this can seldom if ever be proposed as a leading object, and such systems have been constructed chiefly in reference to those departments of oratory.

In forensic speaking, however, excitation often enters in a subordinate office; and there continues subject to its own regulating principles, although modified somewhat by the controlling aim of such discourse. Indeed, as has been observed elsewhere, the various forms of oratory, as explanation, confirmation, excitation, and persuasion, often mingle together, each retaining its characteristic features in the same discourse; while, still, it remains true that one or the other must in every case predominate and give character to the whole discourse, and the others be only subservient to this main design.

§ 189. The work of excitation is accomplished either by the appropriate presentation of the object of feeling merely, or by this combined with the power of sympathy.

The two departments of excitation are, accordingly, **PATHETIC EXPLANATION** and the **EMPLOYMENT OF SYMPATHY**.

The feelings, like the intellect, belong to the spontaneities of the mind; and are only indirectly controlled by the will. They move necessarily more or less on the presentation of their appropriate objects. They are, nevertheless, as phenomena of the same mind, subject to an influence from the will and the understanding, as well as from the general tone and habits of the mind.

It will sometimes be necessary in excitation to prove a

fact or truth. But this process is only incidental; whereas explanation is the direct means of awakening feeling.

§ 190. The more general unity of the discourse in excitation will consist in the singleness of the theme; the narrower unity, in the singleness of the feeling or affection to be addressed.

It will be observed that the theme as well as the feeling addressed, may be individual or generic; may embrace a single object or a class of objects. Generally, where the feeling to be excited is made the germ of development, the theme will embrace the several particulars addressed to the feeling.

It is of importance to distinguish carefully between the theme and the feeling addressed in excitation. They are not unfrequently confounded in popular discourse. We say, thus, in loose language, that the subject or theme of a discourse, the design of which is to awaken "hope," is the affection itself—hope. Properly speaking, this is the object of the discourse, while the theme embraces the considerations presented for the purpose of awakening the affection.

§ 191. The form of the discourse in excitation will vary according as the theme or the feeling addressed, is made the germ of the development. If the feeling addressed furnish the germ, the discourse will be more purely excitatory in its character; if the theme, the discourse will have more of an explanatory form.

In a pulpit discourse, thus, the passion of Jesus Christ might be exhibited as a single fact fitted to excite various emotions, as of gratitude, love, confidence. In this case the development of the discourse would more naturally spring

from the particular feelings addressed. They would constitute accordingly the leading heads of the discourse.

On the other hand, the same fact might be exhibited as bearing, in several distinct aspects, on a single emotion or grace of character. Then these several aspects of the fact would more naturally furnish the ground of distribution and arrangement in the discourse.

So in Panegyrics, sometimes, the character as one complex whole or a single feature is presented with the design of moving the affections generally; and sometimes a single affection is addressed by the exhibition of such traits as are adapted to awaken it.

§ 192. In excitation it is more necessary than in explanatory or argumentative discourse to have regard to the feelings of those addressed; since ignorance or mistake here may occasion an entire failure in the very object of the discourse.

§ 193. The mind addressed may be either favorable or unfavorable or indifferent in respect to the object of the speaker.

If the mind be favorable or indifferent, the object may be directly presented with exhibitions of feeling corresponding in degree to the state of feeling in the hearer.

§ 194. If the mind addressed be influenced by a feeling opposed to that which the speaker desires to awaken, great caution is necessary in undertaking to remove it, as a direct opposition will generally only irritate or inflame it the more.

The allaying of such unfavorable feeling may be accomplished indirectly by first exhibiting such views

of the object as will not so directly oppose the existing state of feeling and then, as interest shall be awakened, by passing gradually to other views more favorable to the object of the speaker.

Or other feelings, in their nature incompatible with those to be allayed, and yet not directly opposed to them, may be awakened and thus the unfavorable feelings be displaced.

The speeches of Anthony in the Julius Cæsar of Shakspeare furnish fine exemplifications of the first of these methods of allaying an unfavorable state of feeling. Anthony finds the populace triumphing over the death of Cæsar and cheering the conspirators. He does not at once present himself in opposition. He appears, at first, as the friend of Brutus. He disclaims all intentions of praising Cæsar. He thus gets their attention; fixes it on Cæsar and then proceeding to speak of his faults gradually passes to defend his character, at the same time, mingling in high professions of respect for the conspirators, till finally, the rage of the hearers at Cæsar's usurpations and tyranny having been allayed, he presents the proper matter for turning their feelings in the opposite direction, and leaves them clamoring furiously for the destruction of all Cæsar's enemies.

In Brutus' speech just preceding, the second of the methods indicated is exemplified, and the love of the populace for Cæsar is artfully displaced by their love to their country; a sentiment, as here exhibited, incompatible with attachment to Cæsar.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN EXCITATION.

§ 195. As the theme in excitation is a conception, § 123, it must ever appear under that form.

If, consequently, a judgment or truth be presented as the object in reference to which the feelings are to be viewed, it will appear in the form of a dependent and not of a principal clause.

Generally language will allow the expression of a fact or truth, when used as a theme, in discourse, either in the form of a verb or of a noun. We may equally represent the theme, "the death of Christ," under this form or under the form, "That Christ died." The latter form turns the mind more directly and unequivocally on the fact as an actual occurrence; and, when this is desired, this form is preferable to the other.

It is of advantage to represent the theme in its appropriate form; as, otherwise, the mind might unconsciously be drawn off to a proof of the fact or truth instead of a simple exhibition of it for the purpose of exciting feeling.

§ 196. The theme, in excitation, farther, must embrace the object of the feeling addressed.

Although men may, possibly, be excited to a blind passion, so to speak, that is, be aroused by sympathy or otherwise in reference to no distinctly apprehended object, it can yet never be regarded as a proper aim of rational discourse to produce such unintelligent excitement. It is true, indeed, that the passions never move, except as addressed through the intellect, and even in the ravings of a mob there is some intellectual perception, still rational discourse will not

be contented with this; but will ever aim to present distinctly the particular object in reference to which the feelings are to be moved.

§ 197. The general principle that governs in regard to the statement of the proposition in excitation is this: that clearness of apprehension and impressiveness require the statement, unless reasons are seen to exist which forbid.

The question has been much agitated, whether it be proper at all to avow before hand addresses to the feelings. Some writers have disapproved of all such avowals altogether. "The first and most important point to be observed in every address to any passion, sentiment, feeling, &c.," says Dr. Whately, "is that it should not be introduced as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure if not entirely, lost. * * When engaged in reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not only need not be concealed, but may, without prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared; on the other hand, even when the feelings we wish to excite are such as ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of the endeavor thus to influence the hearers, still, our purpose and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet not openly declared, and made prominent." Even when the sentiments to be awakened are recognized as proper and right, he thinks "men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they are not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments," and "cannot but feel a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority, in a speaker, who seems to say, 'now I will exhort you to feel as you ought on this occasion; "I will endeavor to inspire you with such noble and generous and amiable sentiments as you ought to entertain.'"

It must be admitted that *such* avowals of intention are to be rejected on every principle of correct taste. But it is difficult to see in what respect they are more faulty than precisely similar avowals of intention in pure argumentative or explanatory discourse; as "I will instruct you to think in accordance with truth on this subject"; "I will endeavor to convince you of the truth on this question." The whole force of the objection lies not against *the thing itself*—the statement of the theme and object of the discourse—but against an improper *form* of stating it.

It certainly cannot be laid down as a universal rule that, in an address to the feelings, it must ever be wrong to state the subject in respect to which the feelings are to be moved. That in pronouncing a eulogy it should be improper for the speaker to inform the audience, at the outset, of the subject of the eulogy in reference to which their feelings of admiration are to be excited; that in endeavoring to inspire sentiments of confidence and courage it should be improper for a statesman to mention before hand those circumstances and facts which warrant confidence and tend to awaken courage; that in seeking to strengthen the sentiment of christian gratitude for the blessings of the gospel, it should be improper for the preacher distinctly to propose the subject, as the richness or the freeness of those blessings in reference to which the sentiments of gratitude are to be called forth, no one surely can maintain.

How can it appear more improper to add, also, that the particular subject is to be presented with a view to awaken suitable feelings of admiration, confidence, or gratitude, &c.—in other words, to state the design of the discourse? What impropriety can there be in a christian preacher's distinctly stating that he proposes the gift of Jesus Christ to men as a ground and reason of gratitude to God? Who will venture

to reprehend the following statement of Demosthenes in his second Philippic: "First, then, Athenians, if there be a man who feels no apprehension at the view of Philip's power, and the extent of his conquests, who imagines that these portend no design to the state, or that his designs are not all aimed against you, I am amazed! and must entreat the attention of you all while I explain those reasons briefly which induce me to entertain different expectations."

It is difficult to perceive on what different ground addresses to the feelings stand in this respect from addresses to the understanding or reason. While in both kinds of address, in some cases, it may be unadvisable to state beforehand the subject or the object, and while propriety is ever to be observed in the manner of statement, it cannot, any more in one kind than in the other, be laid down as a universal principle that such statements should be avoided. In both kinds, the speaker must consult the relation of the subject or object to the supposed state of feeling in his audience, and by that determine as to the expediency of distinctly presenting or withholding the subject or object of the discourse.

§ 198. If, however, the subject itself is likely to give offense, then it may, in part or in whole, be kept back till interest is awakened and a favorable disposition on the part of the hearers secured.

§ 199. If the subject be not likely to give offense but the feelings already entertained by the hearers in regard to it are opposed to the speaker's aim, the subject may be stated but the particular object suppressed.

This rule is exemplified in the speech of Anthony before alluded to, § 194.

§ 200. It may be well, moreover, for the sake of

securing variety, especially in a speaker who is called frequently to address the same audience, occasionally to deviate from the general rule.

CHAPTER III.

OF PATHETIC EXPLANATION.

§ 201. The exhibition of feeling in excitation is governed by the general principles of explanatory discourse, but is modified by the particular design in this species of discourse of moving the feelings. It is effected by any of the various processes of explanation, viz: Narration, Description, Analysis, Exemplification, or Comparison and Contrast.

As the ultimate aim in excitation is not to enlighten or inform the understanding, but to do this only for the sake of exciting the feelings, the process of explanation will need here to be carried on in a somewhat different manner from that appropriate to purely explanatory discourse. The principal modifications, which this difference in the ultimate aim of the discourse will require, will be specified in the following sections.

§ 202. As an accurate acquaintance with the object is not the particular aim in excitation, the first modification of the general principles of explanation demanded here is, that only those points or features in the object be selected which are adapted to the feelings or sentiments to be awakened.

Some regard must be had, in applying this principle of

pathetic explanation, to the design of the discourse, whether it be to produce an immediate and temporary effect; or to excite and confirm a permanent and controlling sentiment. If the latter, then care must be taken to communicate such a view of the object as will be retained in the memory, and thus be long present to influence the feelings. In other words, the explanation must be more full and complete, and conform more closely to the general principles of explanatory discourse. Thus, that kind of preaching which gives clear, full and rational exhibitions of religious truth, will be better adapted to secure a permanent high degree of christian feeling than that which, by selecting only the more striking views, aims at the highest degree of excitement at the moment.

The speech of Anthony may be again cited here as affording a happy exemplification of this principle in producing a high immediate excitement. In exhibiting the character of Cæsar, he only selects those features which were adapted to stir up a strong passionate regret for his death, and a stormy indignation against the conspirators. He artfully alludes to his public largesses, his sympathy with the poor, his rejection of the proffered diadem, and especially to his love of the people as shown in his will.

§ 203. A second rule in pathetic explanation is, that *particular* rather than general views be taken of the object.

As vivid rather than correct impressions are aimed at in excitation, the process of explanation will need to be modified so far as to secure those strong and lively apprehensions which are necessary to deep emotion.

§ 204. Thirdly, pathetic explanation requires that *the more prominent and striking* features and outlines be

presented; while such as are less easily apprehended, however important in an accurate representation to the understanding merely, are dropped from view.

The following extract from Sheridan's *Invective against Warren Hastings* will serve to exemplify this rule. The orator, instead of going through an orderly detail of the sufferings of the oppressed nations of India, merely presents one or two of the most prominent features in the scene of desolation and horror. "When we hear the description of the paroxysm, fever and delirium into which despair had thrown the natives, when on the banks of the polluted Ganges, panting for death, they tore more widely open the lips of their gaping wounds, to accelerate their dissolution, and, while their blood was issuing, presented their ghastly eyes to heaven, breathing their last and fervent prayer, that the dry earth might not be suffered to drink their blood, but that it might rise up to the throne of God, and rouse the eternal Providence to avenge the wrongs of their country, will it be said that this was brought about by the incantations of these Begums in their secluded Zenana?"

§ 205. Fourthly, instead of the clear and distinct exhibitions which are proper in mere addresses to the understanding, it is often conducive to passionate impressiveness to leave something to the imagination of the hearers, by only obscure and imperfect delineations.

Anthony, instead of at once telling the citizens how much Cæsar in his will had ordered to be distributed among the people, set their imaginations all on fire by only vague and obscure intimations of the richness of the legacy.

The aid of the imagination in heightening the effect of passionate representation is likewise employed when, instead

of the object of feeling itself, something connected with it—as causes, effects, results and the like—is presented, and from that the hearers are left to conjecture the real character of the object. It should be observed here, that there is combined with this appeal to the imagination to aid the effect, a figure of speech. The speaker seems to shrink, as feeling himself inadequate to the task, from the direct exhibition of the object. The terrors of the desolation caused by the irruption of Hyder Ali could hardly be more vividly represented than they were by Burke in simply pointing to a single result. "When," he says, "the British armies traversed as they did, the Carnatic for hundreds of miles in all directions, through the whole line of their march they did not see one man, not one woman, not one child, not one four-footed beast of any description whatever."

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF SYMPATHY IN EXCITATION.

§ 206. It is indispensable in excitation that the speaker himself appear to be affected in the same way in which he wishes his audience to be affected, and, likewise, to a degree, at least, as high.

This is a principle every where recognized. The lines of Horace are familiar to all:

Ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent
 Humani vultus. Si vis me flere, dolendum est
 Primum ipsi tibi.

Emotion is necessary in the speaker not only because the

absence of it would render all efforts to excite feeling in the audience futile; but because, from the law of sympathy, emotion is communicated directly from one bosom to another. Shakspeare had a just conception of human nature when he put the following words into the lips of Anthony:

Passion, I see, is catching; for mine eyes,
Seeing those beads of sorrow stand in thine,
Began to water.

In all pathetic discourse, the speaker must manifest the suitable kind and degree of feeling in all the possible modes of expressing it; in the form of the thought, the language, the voice, countenance, and gesture. To secure this, he must feel himself. Hypocritical expressions of feeling will seldom escape detection. The human breast instinctively discerns between true and false emotion. Even trained stage-actors, when they succeed perfectly in their art, are infected themselves by the passion, the contagion of which they wish to extend to the spectators. For the time they feel as if they were, in reality, the characters they personate. They accomplish this, perhaps, the most difficult attainment of their art, by a close and thorough study of the causes of feeling supposed to operate in the scene which they represent. Mere natural sensibility, although not indispensable, is not enough. The heart, by close contemplation, must be brought into contact with the object of feeling. The speaker and the writer need equally to kindle the fire of feeling in themselves by long and close contemplation of the truth to be expressed in the discourse.

§ 207. The modes of expressing passion in discourse are direct or indirect.

In the direct exhibition of feeling the speaker al-

lows the passion to appear in its own natural form and way.

§ 208. In the indirect expression of passion, the speaker, instead of giving vent to his emotions in the natural ways of expression, and making a free exhibition of them, veils them in part and only suffers occasional glimpses of them to be seen.

In this indirect expression of feeling, the power of imagination is called in aid, see § 205. The hearers observe, by the gleams through the disguise here and there, a fire of passion in glow; but obtaining no definite determination of the extent and degree, it appears to them the more deep and strong; as the outlines of objects seen in the mist, being indeterminate, the imagination easily swells them into monsters. Such partial eruptions of passion are common in real life, and often impress more deeply than the pure and unsuppressed overflow of feeling. The mourner in public, observing the proprieties of conduct, who only allows a broken sob to escape her, moves the heart of sympathy more deeply than do even continued and unchecked wailings and loud lamentations. The maniac duelist, who would break suddenly away from any pursuit he was engaged in, as if forced by some demon of passion, and, pacing off a certain distance on the floor, repeat the significant words, "one, two, three, fire; he's dead;" then, wring his hands and turn abruptly to his former pursuits, gave a more touching exhibition of the deep agony which was ever preying on his spirit, than if he had vented it in constant howlings of remorse. It is with that admirable insight into nature and conformity to truth which has before been noticed, that Shakspeare thus makes Anthony give but occasional signs of grief for Cæsar's death. While generally the passion is

suppressed, now and then it seems to force itself out; and this very circumstance, that it seems forced, makes it appear stronger and deeper. Thus he apologizes for any escape of sorrow, and tells the citizens that he cannot properly allow the true and adequate expression of his feelings.

Bear with me;

My heart is in the coffin there with Cæsar;
And I must pause till it come back to me.

O masters! if I were disposed to stir
Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,
I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong,
Who, you all know, are honorable men:
I will not do them wrong; I rather choose
To wrong the dead, to wrong myself and you,
Than I will wrong such honorable men.

This partial disguising of passion on the part of the speaker has this further advantage, that the determination being left to the imagination of the hearer, it can never seem to the latter disproportionate—either too weak or too strong.

§ 209. The degree of feeling expressed by the speaker must ever be moderated in reference to the supposed feelings of the hearer.

Unless there may appear to the audience a probable cause of strong feeling, as was the case in the first oration of Cicero against Cataline, the speaker should commence with only a moderate degree of passion; and should suffer it to increase only in proportion as it may seem natural to the audience. He must of course ever keep in advance of them; but must take care never to get beyond the reach of their sympathy. The effect of this will be not only to annihilate the whole power of sympathy; but also to occasion dissatisfaction and disgust.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN EXCITATION.

§ 210. Excitation admits both kinds of Introduction; the Explanatory and the Conciliatory.

In reference to the management of the Introduction Explanatory see §§ 118, 176.

The Introduction Conciliatory will require in pathetic discourse peculiar attention and care; as it is more important here than in explanation or confirmation to secure a favorable disposition towards the speaker on the part of the hearers. Where, especially, either the speaker is himself personally repulsive to them, or his subject offensive, or the sentiment which he would awaken incompatible with their present feelings and views, he has need to make the best use of his power and skill.

The laws which govern pathetic discourse generally will come in also to regulate and modify the Introduction, and especially when it is of the conciliatory kind.

§ 211. Excitation admits only the *excitatory* or *pathetic*, and the *persuasive* forms of peroration, with the *recapitulation*.

The explanatory and confirmatory forms of peroration are inadmissible here, because addresses to the pure intellect can never properly come after an address to the feelings. Certainly, to close a discourse, the object and aim of which is to awaken a certain kind or degree of feeling with cold intellectual inferences or remarks is to defeat the very design of the discourse. Even the form of recapitulation, when introduced, must conform to the peculiar principles of

pathetic discourse; and will differ somewhat from that appropriate to explanation or confirmation. The aim of the peroration here must be to make a more direct or specific application of the subject to the feelings addressed; or to make the excitement of feelings effected in the discourse as its main object conducive to some action of the will.

PART IV.—PERSUASION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 212. In persuasion, the object of discourse is to move the will; either by leading it to a new act or purpose, or by dissuading it from one already adopted.

Persuasive discourse is, in this, clearly and definitely distinguished from the species already considered. Explanatory discourse respects as its end a new conception; Confirmatory, a new conviction; Pathetic, a new feeling; Persuasive, a new action or purpose. This classification, evidently, covers the field. If there are any other species of discourse, founded on the immediate object to be accomplished in the mind addressed, it must be a subdivision of one of those enumerated; unless, indeed, mental science reveal new classes of phenomena in the mind of man not included in those of the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will.

§ 213. As the mind addressed may be in either one of three different states—may be already decided in purpose, but may need confirmation, or although decided, may be decided in the opposite direction, or without any choice, or voluntary preference in regard to the subject; the specific objects of the discourse will vary in different cases, and the discourse be modified in reference to these different specific ends.

Persuasion, thus, differs specifically from *dissuasion*, as well as from *encouragement* or *animation*; although the general means to be employed are the same in the different cases. The difference in the specific process will consist mainly in the arrangement and means of conciliating and explaining.

§ 214. The specific objects of persuasive discourse admit of a still further division in reference to the character of the action proposed; whether an individual act or a controlling purpose—a determination to do a particular thing or the adoption of a principle of conduct having respect to a series of acts or a course of life.

Hence will arise another specific diversity in the conduct of the discourse. When a permanent state of will is aimed at, it is evident, those considerations are to have the pre-eminence which will remain in the mind,—in other words, truths addressed to the understanding or reason. Where, on the other hand, the object of the discourse is to produce a merely temporary effect, as that of a general exhorting his soldiers on the eve of a battle, those motives which respect more directly the feelings as the immediate incentives to action, will have the preference.

It will often be the case that both objects will be combined; that the speaker will aim to bring his hearers not only to adopt a general course of conduct or pursuit, but also to commit themselves to it at the moment by some particular act. The Temperance reformers, thus, in seeking to induce and secure a permanent reform, press the inebriate to an immediate committal by some particular act, as signing a pledge or the like. In this case, the principles of conduct will need to be unfolded clearly and convincingly to the understanding, and, also, to the feelings.

§ 215. The work of persuasion is effected by THE EXHIBITION OF THE ACTION OR COURSE to be chosen, and THE PRESENTATION OF MOTIVES fitted to incite to the determination proposed.

The work of persuasion, thus, admits all the processes before described of explanation, conviction, and excitation.

The act to be done will often need to be explained. The christian preacher will need, thus, in order to make his exhortation effectual, to explain the nature of the duty proposed, as faith, repentance, and the like. The statesman will likewise need to unfold the course of policy he desires to be adopted to the clear apprehension of his hearers; as a failure to understand what is to be done must so far be an insuperable obstacle to decision. The process of explanation will also often be requisite in the presentation of motives.

It may be necessary, moreover, to convince the judgment in persuasion. The action proposed must be shown to be practicable; or the motives presented to be true and real and pertinent.

Excitation, once more, is often requisite in persuasion, as the passions are the more immediate springs of action.

All these processes, however, receive a slight modification in reference to the ultimate end of persuasion; and must be introduced only in entire subserviency to that end—the moving of the will.

§ 216. The theme in persuasion is ever a conception which embraces the motive or motives addressed to the activity to be awakened.

§ 217. The more general unity of persuasive discourse consists in the singleness of the motive or class of motives addressed to the various activities of the

hearer; the narrower unity, in the singleness of the action itself.

According as the motive or the action to be prompted by it is adopted as affording the principle of development and arrangement, the discourse will be modified specifically in its form and be more or less strictly persuasive in its character. If the theme, which here embraces the motives presented, furnish the principle of development, the discourse will be more explanatory in its character. If the action proposed be made the germ of development, the discourse will be of a more strictly persuasive nature.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN PERSUASION.

§ 218. The theme in persuasive discourse being ever a conception, § 123, must always appear under that form.

As the discourse will vary specifically in its form according as the motive or the action be made the germ of development, it becomes important that the speaker settle definitely in his own mind before hand which shall preside over the arrangement and development, and govern himself by the decision in the whole conduct of the discourse.

§ 219. The question, whether the proposition should be stated, is to be determined by the same general principles which govern in the other species of discourse.

The general rule is that it should be stated unless

positive reasons be seen to exist against it. If the general subject of the discourse be supposed likely to give offense, the definite statement of both the subject and the action may be deferred to the end, or be gradually unfolded in the progress of the discourse, as the minds of the hearers may be prepared for it.

If the subject be not offensive but the action proposed be likely to be repugnant to the feelings of the hearers, the subject may be stated and the action upon it proposed be for a while concealed from view.

A variation from the usual method of proceeding in this case, may be justified sometimes, moreover, for the sake of variety, or on other similar grounds.

It is unnecessary to detail at any further length the diverse applications of these general principles according as the motive or the action itself is made the principle of development in the discourse.

CHAPTER III.

OF PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION, CONFIRMATION AND EXCITATION.

§ 220. In Persuasive discourse, the various processes of explanation may be requisite either to set forth the proper subject of the discourse or the action proposed to be effected by it, § 215.

§ 221. In the explanation of the subject, the application of the principles of explanation proper, must be modified so far as may be necessary in order to ex-

hibit it merely as a ground or reason, or motive of action.

Hence the subject will not necessarily be surveyed in its whole extent. Only those aspects will be taken of it which bear directly on the action proposed; and of these, while at the same time false impressions in regard to the state of the case are to be guarded against, only such should be presented as are favorable to the speaker's object. Great art and practiced judgment are often requisite here.

Exemplifications of these methods of modifying the principles of explanation proper, are furnished in the orations of Demosthenes against Philip. The orator in them with great skill seizes hold of those particulars in the relations of the Athenians to the Macedonian power, and in the condition of Athens, which were fitted to inspire the Athenians with confidence in their own strength, and with contempt and resentment towards Philip, that he might thus incite them to a vigorous and efficient maintenance of hostilities. The explanations that are given, whether narrations of events or descriptions of places, of resources, &c., are all made from this one point of view; and are colored throughout by this one persuasive character. Nothing is said that does not bear directly on this single end; nothing is omitted that could promote it. The processes of explanation, it is however pertinent to observe here, are all very different from what would be proper in a purely explanatory discourse; very different, for example, from what are found in the histories of those times.

It should be remarked, in this connection, that it will frequently be necessary to construct the explanation in persuasive discourse in reference both to the motives and the action; as possibly the nature of the action may best be understood from a clear view of the motives.

§ 222. The explanation of the particular action urged in the discourse will conform more closely to the general principles of explanation. Since, generally it will be needful to give a clear idea of the nature of the action proposed.

§ 223. Confirmation enters into persuasive discourse whenever it is necessary to prove any allegation in reference to the theme, the practicability of the action proposed, or the connection between the motives and the action. Like explanation, in persuasive discourse, confirmation suffers important modifications.

It is not necessary to point out in particular detail the modifications which confirmation proper receives in persuasion. It is sufficient to remark generally that the whole work of confirmation here is regulated by a strict regard to the great object of the discourse, which is to move the will. Fine exemplifications of persuasive confirmation may be found in many of the political orations of Demosthenes; the speeches of Lord Chatham, Burke, Sheridan and Patrick Henry.

§ 224. Excitation is necessary in persuasive discourse so far as the excitement of the feelings is relied upon for influencing the will. Like explanation and confirmation, however, it is modified in important features in respect to the particular end of persuasion. Only such feelings are to be awakened, and those to such degrees only, as are fitted to lead to the action desired.

It is important to be borne in mind in persuasive excitation, that the same object may awaken two or more different kinds of feelings, some of which may be favorable to the

end proposed, and others adverse. Thus the increase of the Macedonian power, the multiplicity of its conquests and alliances, were fitted to excite the fear as well as the resentment of the Athenians. It was necessary, therefore, that the orator, whose design was to arouse the Athenians to a bold and vigorous prosecution of the war against Philip, should give only such a view of Philip's successes as would excite indignation and not desponding alarm. The orator is careful, accordingly, to attribute all these successes to fortune and to the supineness of the Athenians, artfully keeping back those causes of his prosperity which might awaken terror and thereby dispose the Athenians to an inglorious peace.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MOTIVES.

§ 225. By a motive is meant whatever occasions or induces free action in man.

In strictness, motives are conditions on which the free self-activity is called forth in some one or other of its various specific forms.

§ 226. Motives may be distributed into several classes in reference to the department of mind in which they respectively have their seat.

There are thus, First, Those seated in the intellect, mere conceptions or convictions;

Secondly, Those which are seated in the susceptibilities of the mind;

Thirdly, Those which arise from voluntary states.

§ 227. Actions are often induced by mere views of truth. Here are to be found convictions of duty, of interest, of fitness and congruity, and the like.

The work of persuasion thus often consists merely in producing these states in the understanding or practical reason.

§ 228. The second class of motives includes those which lie in *the senses*, as appetites and pleasures of sense generally; *the affections or sentiments*, whether personal or social, as joy, grief, love, hatred, disgust, and the like; and the *emotions proper*, or those states of soul which are awakened by views of what is true, beautiful, right and good.

To this class belongs, also, that common and principal motive which lies in sympathy.

§ 229. The third class consists of permanent generic states of the will.

The nature of this class of motives as distinguished from the others, may be thus illustrated. If a miser in passing should observe a person in extreme suffering, and at the sight should thrust his hand into his pocket and hand out a shilling, we should not hesitate to ascribe the act to the natural affection of pity or compassion as the motive cause. If, again, in passing on, he should observe a customer whose patronage it would be for his interest to secure, and should tender him an invitation to dinner, we should attribute this act to his purpose of accumulating money as the motive cause. His governing purpose to acquire wealth rules him in this step; and while the former act of charity possesses necessarily no moral character,—proves him neither a good nor a bad man, but merely a man—the latter act is an indication of character, inasmuch as it shows a governing purpose.

The last class of motives are the only ones which can be denominated morally right or wrong. The others have no such moral character, and, consequently, impart none to the act which they prompt.

The motives of this class include all those which are embraced under the general term, *consistency*, so far as it applies to action. We appeal to a man to adopt a certain course or perform a certain act on the ground of consistency, when we urge it either because it is necessarily involved in a more generic purpose or course already adopted by him, as when we urge him to vote for a measure necessary to carry out the principles he has maintained, or because to decline it would be incompatible with another specific course or policy he is already pursuing. In the former case, the motive is obviously one of the class under consideration. In the latter case, it is really, if not so apparently, of this class: since there is an implication of a principle in the course adopted which is common to it and the action urged; otherwise, there would be no inconsistency between the two.

§ 230. It is to be remarked respecting these different classes of motives, that while the first may influence the will independently of the others, the second and third classes always presuppose the first; since there can be no feeling or state except upon some truth perceived. Moreover, a voluntary motive may include a feeling and also a perception or judgment.

CHAPTER V.

OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF PERSUASION.

§ 231. While the term, persuasion, is applied in its more general import to all those kinds of discourse the object of which is to move the will, in its narrower sense it is distinguished from both dissuasion and incitement.

As thus distinguished, PERSUASION, in its more restricted sense, will regard the production of a new purpose or act.;

DISSUASION, the removal of a purpose or act already determined upon;

INCITEMENT, confirmation of a purpose or course already adopted.

§ 232. Although these several acts of persuasion are effected by the general processes mentioned, of exhibition of the act or course to be adopted and the presentation of suitable motives, yet these processes will be considerably modified in reference to these several more specific ends.

CHAPTER VI.

OF ARRANGEMENT IN PERSUASION.

§ 233. The principles of arrangement in persuasion will vary according as the motives or the action proposed is made the leading principle in the development of the discourse. § 217.

It is obvious that a speaker in persuasion may make the action to which he wishes to incite his hearers the proper germ of development in his discourse, which he may exhibit either in its various parts or its relations. In this case, the arrangement will be for the most part conformed to the principles of explanatory arrangement. The action will be exhibited in its parts, and the motives applied to each in succession.

On the other hand, it may be better in some cases, and perhaps generally, to make the motives the principle of development and arrangement. When this is done, the rules stated in the following sections are to guide.

§ 234. In the presentation of motives in persuasive discourse, three things are to be regarded :

First, the specific object of the discourse, whether persuasion in its strict sense, dissuasion, or incitement ;

Secondly, the comparative strength of the motives estimated in reference to the mind addressed ;

Thirdly, the relation of the motives to one another.

§ 235. If the specific object of the discourse be persuasion proper, it is evident that those motives which lie in perceptions and convictions of the intellect should precede ; and when the understanding is properly enlightened and convinced, the way will be open for the addresses to the feelings. In case the action proposed is embraced within the general course or purpose already adopted by the mind addressed, it will often at the outset be sufficient to prove this. If, however, it be an act repulsive in itself, although conducive to a chosen end, it will be advisable to animate that general purpose in reference to this specific application

of it at the close, in order to give it efficiency in the direction desired.

In persuasion proper, moreover, the stronger motives should be presented first.

§ 236. On similar grounds, the same rules of arrangement are to be observed in dissuasion as in persuasion proper.

In this case, more caution is necessary, as, instead of indifference merely, direct opposition is to be encountered.

§ 237. In Incitement, the weaker motives should generally be presented first, and the discourse be closed with such as are fitted to incite to the highest degree of determination.

§ 238. The principle which respects the relation of the motives to one another is to be observed for the most part only in subordination to the other two.

In as much as every thing unnatural is adverse to the highest end of persuasion, motives that are closely connected with each other should not be disconnected, even when the second principle named, that which respects the strength of the motive, may in itself require it. Much less should arguments that are presupposed in others be postponed, even although the other principles may demand it.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN PERSUASION.

§ 239. Both kinds of Introduction, the Preparatory and the Conciliatory, in their several varieties, are admissible in Persuasive Discourse.

The same cautions and suggestions are needful here as were presented in the corresponding chapter on Excitation. Part III. chap. v.

§ 240. Only the Persuasive Peroration with the Recapitulation is admissible in this kind of discourse.

Persuasive Discourse should ever leave the mind addressed ready for the action proposed and urged in it. Where the body of the discourse has consisted of the exhibition of the motives, and, for any reason, the particular action has been suppressed, it will of course be necessary to state the action at the close. This, for a single example, was done by Demosthenes in his oration generally denominated the Third Philippic. In the main discussion, he unfolds the considerations which should influence the Athenians—the existing state of affairs; and at the close briefly suggests what he thinks ought to be done.

If the action has constituted the body of the discussion, the peroration will generally consist of a strong and vivid exhibition of the motives.

If the action has been stated, but the motives that urge it have filled up the body of the discourse, the peroration may be by direct appeal or address, or more close application of the motives.

Recapitulation is admissible in either case.

SECOND GENERAL DIVISION.

STYLE.

GENERAL VIEW.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF STYLE.

§ 241. Style is that part of Rhetoric which treats of the expression of thought in language.

No process of art is complete until its product appear in a sensible form, § 8; and language is the form in which the art of discourse embodies itself, as sound furnishes the body of music and color that of the art of painting. Style is, therefore, a necessary part of the art of rhetoric. "Inventio sine elocutione non est oratio." It is not, however, all of the art, just as the laws of sound do not cover the entire province of music, or the principles of coloring exhaust the art of the painter.

While it presupposes Invention as a distinct branch of

the art, it is yet involved even in that; as the exercises of invention cannot proceed without the use of language. The two branches of the art of Rhetoric, accordingly, while they may easily be conceived of as distinct, and in practice predominant attention may be given to either at will, are nevertheless bound together by an essential bond of life.

This second division of Rhetoric has been variously denominated; and the terms employed to designate it have been used, sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a more restricted sense. The term "*elocution*" was formerly more commonly used by English writers. It was suggested by the use of the Roman rhetoricians, and was sanctioned and supported by its etymology. It has, however, in later times become more commonly appropriated to denote *oral delivery*. The term "*style*," although not strictly a technical word, was used by Latin writers as synonymous with "*elocution*," and has been, both among English and continental writers, more generally of late applied to this use. It has been employed, however, with more or less latitude of meaning. But the prevailing use of the best writers authorises the appropriation of the term to denote the entire art of verbal expression.

Cicero and others of the ancient rhetoricians made here, also, two divisions; the one of *elocution* or style proper, or the choice of words in the expression of thought; the other of the arrangement of words, or composition. As in invention, however, so perhaps still more obviously in style, there appears to be no good reason for making this division. See § 43.

§ 242. The analysis of style, for the purpose of systematic study, must respect the various classes of properties which by necessity or possibility belong to it.

We cannot consider style, as we have considered inven-

tion, in reference to the different processes concerned in its production. For some of the properties of style, or modes of expression are common and necessary in all kinds of discourse and every expression of thought, while others are determined by the nature of the thought itself. If we except the application of some of the rules of mere grammar, the only proper method of pursuing the culture of style, must be by the study of the varieties of forms which thought may assume when expressed in language, in order that whatever may secure beauty and force to the expression may be intelligently communicated to it, and whatever may mar or weaken the expression may be avoided.

Practice, therefore, in this branch of the art, is to be conducted only in reference to the known properties of style generally, and not by exercises on the specific properties. It would be ridiculous to undertake a course of exercises with the single view of acquiring command of a class of figures; or of avoiding a barbarism or a solecism.

At the same time, it may be a very useful exercise to detect the faults in ill-constructed sentences or compositions designedly prepared or selected for this purpose. Such exercises in grammar are common and beneficial. In regard to some properties of style, however, as especially those of naturalness, dignity, and the like, while the fault may easily be detected, the correction will be difficult. For in good style the thoughts of the individual appear in the discourse, tinged by all his peculiarities and habits; and the critic who would correct or improve must throw himself into the speaker's train of thoughts and associations and feelings.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE GENERAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 243. The first generic distinction of the properties of style is into THE ABSOLUTE and THE RELATIVE.

§ 244. THE ABSOLUTE properties of style are founded in the nature and laws of language itself.

THE RELATIVE properties are those which are determined by the state of the speaker's mind or by that of the mind addressed.

There are these three things which come in to determine the character of the expression; the thought to be expressed; the object for which it is expressed; and the medium of expression.

The last of these, language, has laws and properties of its own which are fixed and invariable, and, as such, independent of the individual speaker who uses it. The properties thus determined to style may be denominated *the absolute properties* of style. They correspond for the most part to what Dr. Campbell calls "the essential properties of elocution."

Again, language, as the body of thought, is affected by the state of the speaker's mind. It is not merely the expression of thought, but of his thought. It partakes of his individuality, and is, as it were, an expression of his life. We recognize, thus, at once, as a beauty in style, *naturalness* in expression. The class of properties thus determined to style, may be denominated *the relative subjective*, or, more briefly, *the subjective* properties.

Farther, the speaker in pure discourse, speaks to effect an object in the mind of another. He must necessarily, therefore, have respect to that mind; and modify his style

accordingly. The mere embodying in language of his own thoughts will not of course accomplish his object in the mind addressed. It may be necessary to labor more at perspicuity in the expression than would be requisite for the mere utterance of thought. He may be under the necessity of consulting force, or energy in the expression, or of adorning it. Hence we have another distinct class of properties. They may be denominated *the relative-objective*, or more briefly, *the objective* properties. The last class corresponds nearly with Dr. Campbell's "discriminating properties of elocution." It is the only class which Dr. Whately takes into view in his treatise on style.

PART I.—ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND ITS PROPERTIES.

§ 245. Language may be defined to be THE VERBAL BODY OF THOUGHT.

Language is not, as sometimes represented in loose expression, the mere *dress* of thought. It has a vital connection with thought; and is far more truly and appropriately conceived of as the living, organic body of thought, interpenetrated throughout with the vitality of the thought, as the natural body with the life of the spirit, having living connections between its parts, giving it unity and making it a whole, than as a mere dress having no relation to thought and no organic dependence in its parts.*

* The production of speech proceeds by an internal necessity out of the organic life of man; for man speaks because he thinks; and with the production of thought is given at the same time the production of speech. It is a general law of living nature that each activity in it comes forth into appearance in a material, each spiritual in a bodily; and in the bodily appearance have their limitation and form. In accordance with this law, the thought necessarily comes forth also in the appearance, and becomes embodied in Speech.—*C. F. Becker's Organism of Speech*, pp. 1, 2.

The origin of speech, says Solger to the same effect, is one with the origin of thought, which is not possible in reality without speech.

The embodying of thought into language, must necessarily be affected by three different things:

First, *the material of the body which it takes*. Vocal language differs, in many respects, from a language of signs. A language, even, formed more directly under the influence of the ear, as for instance the ancient Greek, possesses peculiar features which distinguish it clearly from a language formed more or less under the influence of the pen. Some of the characteristics of the English language may be traced to the fact that the language was developed and formed by writers as well as by speakers; by those who were influenced more by the form of the word as presented to the eye than by its effect on the ear as a sound. And generally the nature of the material out of which the body is formed must evidently affect the process of embodying. The marble gives a different form to the embodiment of the same sentiment or character from that given by color as in painting, or by sound and language as in poetry and music.

Secondly, *the character of the thought to be embodied*. The thought must never lose its distinctive character and life. On the other hand, as the human spirit in its fleshly body, and the life of a plant in its vegetable structure, it enters its material, disposes it, shapes it, animates it, and altogether determines its outward form and character. Thought, in other words, is the organizing element. It, consequently, when the process of embodying is perfect, manifests itself in every part. This is true, more emphatically, of each particular thought expressed by the individual speaker in the form of oral language. That thought, as a

Thought is subjective speech, as speech is objective thought—the outward appearance of thought itself. Neither is possible without the other; and both reciprocally condition each other.—*Aesthetics*, p. 265.

life-giving and disposing element, enters the body of sounds which is furnished to the individual speaker in the language that he uses, and imposes its own character upon it. But language generally, or the fixed language of a people is organized so to speak. Its properties are determined by the character of the thought that has, in being expressed, given it existence. Hence the languages of different nations are different, because the thought that has characterised the nation at the formation of the language, has been different.

Thirdly, *the natural relationship between thought and articulate sound*. Certain sounds are the natural expression of certain sensations; other sounds bear a more or less direct analogy to certain other states of mind.

Farther than this, in the original construction of language, outward sensible events or objects are taken to represent mental states. For the most part, indeed, language is thus symbolical in its very nature;—it represents thought through some external object or event either naturally or by accident associated with it. And although, in the progress of scientific culture, it becomes more and more abstract,—that is, words having no obvious connection with the thoughts are used to represent them more and more arbitrarily, just as numerical or algebraical signs represent numbers or mathematical relations, still language never loses entirely its original symbolical character. It will ever be regarded, accordingly, as a great excellence of style that the thought is represented by means of pictures or images of sensible scenes or events. The sound, then, points to the external object or event, or some sensible property or characteristic of it; and this, again, to the mental state or thought which it is taken to represent. So far, now, as this object or event is fitted in its own nature to suggest the thought, the indi-

cation of the thought is more easy; the language is more perfectly adapted to its end.

This two-fold relationship between thought and the means of representing it, viz: between the thought and the sound on the one hand, and between the thought and the sensible object indicated by the sound on the other, we should expect beforehand, would determine to some extent the construction of language; and in point of fact we find it does so control it to such a degree as to give rise to a class of properties which are considered necessary or highly auxiliary to the great ends of language.

This general view of the nature of language furnishes the ground for the classification of the properties of language or the absolute properties of style.

§ 216. The absolute properties of style may be distributed into three classes, as they respect more directly the nature of the material of language or articulate sounds; the relation of that material to the content of language or the relation of articulate sounds to thought; or the laws of thought itself.

These several classes may be denominated THE ORAL, the SUGGESTIVE and the GRAMMATICAL properties of style.

Language, as the *verbal* body of thought, consists of articulate sounds. These form the material of which it is made. It is obvious, hence, that a proper regard to the essential nature of articulate sounds is essential in the formation of style.

Again, it is plain that articulate sounds are not taken at random for use in speech. All are not equally adapted for this use; and the selection is not a matter of pure accident or caprice. On the other hand, through the closer affinity

which some sounds have, either directly or through the object they are taken to represent, to certain thoughts, or through the more intimate association which experience has created between them and such thoughts, the selection is found, on a nice inspection of language as it is, to have been made on certain natural and easily defined principles. These principles, derived either from the inherent relationship of the sound to the thought, or of the object taken to represent the thought to the thought itself, thus come in to give shape and form to language.

Once more, thought itself has its own laws. It has its own relations which must ever be observed in the construction of language and ever be correctly represented in it. So far as these laws and relations belong to thought as thought, they furnish the foundation for the science of *universal grammar* or grammar in the abstract. So far as the thought to be expressed is modified by the condition and circumstances of the people that frame a language, these accidental relations and forms of thought furnish the foundation for a grammar of a particular language, or, as it may be called to distinguish it from abstract grammar, *historical or inductive grammar*.

We have thus the definitions that are contained in the following sections.

§ 247. The **ORAL PROPERTIES** of style are those which are determined from the nature of language as consisting of articulate sounds.

§ 248. The **SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES** of style are those which are determined from the relations of articulate sounds, or of the symbols of thought to the thought to be represented by them.

Dr. Whately has applied the term "suggestive" to that

kind of style which "without making a distinct, though brief, mention of a multitude of particulars, shall put the hearer's mind into the same train of thought as the speaker's, and suggest to him more than is actually expressed." Of course, what are here called 'the suggestive properties' of style are to be widely distinguished from Dr. Whately's 'suggestive style.'

§ 249. The **GRAMMATICAL PROPERTIES** of style are those which are determined by the necessary or accidental forms and relations of the thought to be expressed.

These properties are comprehensively embraced by Dr. Campbell under the head of "grammatical purity."

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ORAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 250. The oral properties of style include those of **EUPHONY** and **HARMONY**.

The ultimate distinction between euphony and harmony as properties of language consists in this;—that euphony respects the sound or the phonetic side of language exclusively, while harmony regards the sound only in relation to the thought or to the logical side. Euphony has respect to the sounds of words as they affect the ear and are regarded merely as sounds and independently of any signification they may have. In harmony, sounds are regarded in relation to the thought which they express. Hence the effect of euphony is a mere sensation on the outward ear; while that

of harmony is an emotion and springs directly from an intellectual perception.

Another distinction, growing out of the one already named, is this;—that euphony respects chiefly single words, while harmony respects only a succession of words. In some cases, indeed, euphony is violated in the combination of words, when the effect of the enunciation is disagreeable merely because of the succession of particular sounds. Thus the sentence, "The hosts stood still," is in violation rather of euphony than of harmony:—the offensiveness to the ear arising out of the difficulty of enunciating the elemental sounds here brought into proximity. The expression of thought, on the other hand, being ever continuous, harmony appears only in a succession of words. The sentence, "He behaved himself exceedingly discreetly," is faulty in harmony, not in euphony; for while it is offensive to the ear, it is not as mere sounds. The enunciation of the sentence is easy and the sounds themselves rather pleasant than otherwise. But in the communication of thought, we demand variety and distinctness in the expression of all its various relations. In this sentence, the similarity of sound in the last two words indicates a similarity of relation; and we are disappointed and so far offended in not finding the sense answering to the sound in this respect.

Hence it may sometimes happen that euphony must be sacrificed in order to the most perfect harmony. As in music the fullest harmonious effect of a whole strain requires sometimes the introduction of discords, so in speech, the most perfect expression of the sentiment may demand the selection of words that in comparison with others are more harsh and difficult of utterance.

Practically, whether the fault in a sentence offensive to the ear be one against euphony or one against harmony

may be determined by the circumstance that a sentence deficient in euphony is always difficult of enunciation; an inharmonious sentence is not necessarily difficult of utterance.

It should be observed, moreover, that euphony is sometimes a constituent of harmony.

§ 251. The oral properties of style, being founded on the nature of language as consisting of sounds, strictly belong only to spoken discourse. Yet as in the silent perusal of written discourse the mind translates the characters into the sounds which they represent, even such discourse must be pronounced defective unless these properties appear in it.

As the practiced musician instantly detects any defect in the harmony while his eye runs silently over the pages of written music, so even in silent reading we are unpleasantly affected by any violation of the oral properties of style. Language never entirely conceals this peculiarity of its nature as made up of sounds, or as oral, even when it appears in the form of a visible symbol addressed to the eye alone.

§ 252. The oral properties of style can be best acquired only under the influence of the ear while listening to the audible pronunciation of discourse.

It is difficult to comprehend how a deaf-mute can ever be sensible of the euphony or harmony of discourse; although experience shows that even he may write poetry, which, more than any other form of discourse as involving at least rhythm and rhyme, seems to require the superintendence and guidance of the ear. It is safe, notwithstanding, to assume that the writer who neglects to cultivate the ear in reference to the construction of his sentences, must be liable to fail in these properties of style. The importance of them,

even to written discourse, may be in the fact that the writings of Addison owe no small part of their attractiveness to the musical structure of his style. The public speaker especially needs to subject himself to much training of the ear, in order to give it such a control over his style of expression that his sentences without conscious design, shall, as it were, form themselves in accordance with the principles of euphony and harmony.

Next to the study of discourse as pronounced by living orators, may be recommended recitation from the best poets and orators. Every student of oratory should devote a portion of time daily to this exercise or to that of reading aloud composition excelling in musical properties. The speeches of eminent orators generally possess these excellencies in a higher degree than other classes of prose composition. The various writings of Burke, of Milton and Addison furnish, however, excellent studies for the acquisition of these properties. The Greek and Latin languages, also, having been formed, in a pre-eminent degree, under the influence of the ear inasmuch as poetry and oratory were the earlier forms in which they developed themselves, may be profitably studied for this purpose.

As studies of this kind respect immediately the culture of the ear alone, it should ever be remembered that they can be prosecuted to best advantage only by audible pronunciation.

CHAPTER III.

OF EUPHONY.

§ 253. EUPHONY in style respects the character of the sounds of words regarded merely as sounds, and requires that they be such as will affect the ear in oral pronunciation agreeably. § 250.

The sounds of words vary only in four different ways, viz: in respect to pitch, force, time, and quality. But it is obvious euphony has nothing to do with variations of pitch, any farther at least than this; that it requires the successions of pitch to be not monotonously uniform. This part of the field, however, is so entirely included within the province of harmony that it may here with propriety be wholly passed over.

Neither has euphony any thing to do with the time of sounds, or quantity, except so far as quantity is a constituent of accent.

The only points to be considered here, therefore, are force as it appears in accent, and quality of sound.

§ 254. Euphony requires the avoidance of such words and expressions as are difficult of utterance on account of the succession of unaccented syllables.

There are many words in our language which it is difficult to enounce on account of the number of unaccented syllables occurring in immediate succession, as for instance, meteorological, desultoriness, imprecatory. Such words, so far as practicable, should be avoided in all elevated discourse. They are, for the most part, of Greek or Latin origin.

Not only words but phrases having a number of unaccent-

ed syllables may be objectionable on this account. The phrase, "The obstinacy of his undutiful son," contains six unaccented syllables in succession, and cannot well be pronounced without interposing a pause where the sense forbids. The following sentence from Tillotson is liable to the same censure:

"When a man hath once forfeited the reputation of his integrity, nothing will then serve his turn."

In reading it the voice labors, and seeks to relieve itself by pausing slightly after "forfeited," and also after "reputation." The pause supplies the accent that is missed.

§ 255. Euphony requires, in the second place, that those words and phrases be avoided which are harsh and disagreeable in respect of quality of sound.

The words of a language are faulty in euphony in respect of quality only by reason of derivation or composition. Euphony presides over the formation and development of language, and watchfully guards against the introduction of offensive combinations either in roots or general forms of derivation and inflection. The radical words of all languages are hence euphonic. But it will sometimes happen that the general laws of derivation and composition will bring together vocal elements which, taken together, are harsh and difficult to utter. So, likewise, foreign words, containing elements not belonging to the indigenous tongue, may be difficult to pronounce, and, therefore, to a native ear, be wanting in euphony.

Farther, individual habits or physical defects may render certain combinations difficult which are not so to others of the same country.

While occasionally such offenses against euphony may

be suffered for the sake of force or clearness, the excessive repetition of them gives to style a forbidding character.

The following sentences are exceptionable in this respect:

Thou form'd'st me poor at first and keep'st me so.

The hosts stood still in silent wonder fix'd.

After the most straitest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee.

As far as respects the affairs of this world.

For the peace and good of the church is not terminated in the schismless estate of one or two kingdoms.

CHAPTER IV.

OF HARMONY—HARMONY PROPER.

§ 256. HARMONY in style respects the character of the sounds of words as expressions of thought; and requires that they be such as, in the audible pronunciation of discourse, will awaken agreeable emotions.

§ 250. Harmony, as a property of style, lies between euphony, which regards sounds as sounds merely, on the one side, and the suggestive properties of style, which regard the image presented to the mind by the word, on the other, as in a painting we readily discriminate between the pleasing nature of the colors as they affect the eye of a child, and such a disposition of them as will express real objects; and again between this and the representation of character, which is fully appreciated only by a matured taste; or as, in

music, we distinguish between the sounds that a child elicits as he runs his fingers at random over the keys of a piano-forte and those which a master produces while, without designing to express a particular sentiment, he yet indistinctly obeys the fixed principles of melody and harmony, and again between these and the sounds which he elicits when intently bent on the expression of a sentiment, so we may distinguish between euphony and harmony, and again between harmony and those properties which are more directly founded on the thought to be expressed. We have in these several processes of art, first, the mere outward material,—the color or the sound; secondly, the body as the organized expression of an internal and spiritual principle, but regarded still as body addressed to the senses; and, thirdly, the sentiment or thought revealed in the body. The fuller development of these different classes of properties will indicate not only the fundamental grounds of distinction between them, but also the practical utility of discriminating between them in the study of style.

§ 257. Harmony, in the wider sense, includes *Harmony proper*, *Rhythm*, and *Melody*.

This subdivision of harmony is founded on the distinction of vocal utterances into those belonging to the four different functions of voice, viz: pitch, force, time, and quality of voice. Pitch is the constituent of melody; force and time give accent—the constituent of rhythm; and quality of voice lies at the foundation of harmony proper.

§ 258. HARMONY PROPER is founded on the quality of sounds, and requires that the succession of words in a sentence, in union with the thought which is expressed, fall smoothly and gratefully on the ear.

The quality of sounds can be regarded in style only so far

as the elemental sounds, of which words are composed, are concerned. In this respect,—the character of the elemental sounds which enter into their structure, different languages differ greatly, as well as the styles of different writers in the same language. While the Italian language, thus, has in its alphabet fewer vowels than the English, yet the vowel sounds have a great relative predominance in the actual structure of the language as compared with the English. There are in English discourse but about three-fourths as many vowels as in Italian; that is, while in an English sentence of eight hundred letters there are not far from three hundred vowels, in an Italian sentence of as many letters there are nearly four hundred. The Italian language, in harmonious effect, differs from the English in this particular: that as composed of a larger portion of vowels, it is more open, smooth and flowing; while the English has the peculiar strength and expressiveness which a highly consonantal character imparts.

There is, moreover, a wide difference in the character of different consonants. Some have vocality, others are mere aspirations. In some languages, also, the same consonant has less, in others more, of a proper consonantal character. The lower Germans are more open in their pronunciation,—that is, compress with less force the articulating organs in forming consonants, than the English.

If it be borne in mind, now, that harmony never loses sight of the character of the thought to be expressed, it will at once be perceived that in respect to certain kinds of thought the peculiar alphabetic structure of our language will be more favorable to harmony, while in respect to others, it will be less so. The following lines from Coleridge's "Hymn before Sunrise in the vale of Chamouni,"

strike the ear pleasantly and excite the emotion of harmony.

And you, ye five wild torrents, fiercely glad!
Who called you forth from night and utter death,
From dark and icy caverns called you forth,
Down those precipitous, black, jagged rocks,
Forever shattered, and the same forever!

The sounds, however, particularly in the last two verses, are far different in quality from those in the following which are equally harmonious:

"God!" sing, ye meadow streams, with gladsome voice!
Ye pine groves, with your soft and soul-like sounds.

Of a still different character are the following remarkably harmonious lines from Gray's *Elegy in a country Church-yard*:

The breezy call of incense-breathing morn,
The swallow twittering from the straw-built shed,
The cock's shrill clarion or the echoing horn
No more shall rouse them from their lowly bed.

The English language is peculiarly favorable to that species of harmony which may appear in union with strength and energy: the Italian to that which is combined with calm elevation and dignity as well as grace and elegance.

The following are illustrations of this property of style in prose discourse:

Truth, indeed, came once into the world with her divine master, and was a perfect shape, most glorious to look on; but when he ascended, and his apostles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body

of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, nor ever shall do, till her master's second coming: he shall bring together every joint and member, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection.—*Milton*.

But so have I seen a harmless dove made dark with an artificial light, and her eyes sealed and locked up with a little quill, soaring upward and flying with amazement, fear, and an undiscerning wing: she made towards heaven, but knew not that she was made a train and an instrument, to teach her enemy to prevail on her and all her defenceless kindred. So is a superstitious man; zealous and blind, forward and mistaken, he runs towards heaven, as he thinks, but he chooses foolish paths; and out of fear takes any thing that he is told.—*Jeremy Taylor*.

§ 259. Harmony proper may be violated either by rough and harsh combinations of sounds in words; or by an imperfect adaptation of the sounds to the particular character of the thought.

Language, as the body of thought, should ever evince the presence of the organising principle generally, by assuming a form pleasing to the sense. There is beauty in a clear complexion, smooth skin, and nicely rounded features, as the proper expression of a sound mental condition.

There is a beauty, too, entirely distinct from this, in the flashing eye of excited hope, the crimson flush of offended modesty, the languor and paleness of pining grief, as the expressions of the inward spirit. If they have a beauty in themselves, it is entirely lost in the greater and more absorbing beauty which they possess as mental expressions. So there is a harmony in the adaptation of language, as consisting of diverse sounds, to the particular thought to be expressed; to be distinguished from mere euphony, or the beauty of the sounds regarded as mere sounds, on the one

hand, and from the general beauty which a perfect expression of thought in language imparts, on the other.

The style of Barrow with all its excellencies is often faulty in respect to harmony. The following extracts are deficient in general smoothness. We feel in reading them that the expression does not flow in easy utterance of the thought.

When sarcastical twitches are needful to pierce the thick skins of men, to conceal their lethargic stupidity, to rouse them out of their drowsy negligence, then may they well be applied: when plain declarations will not enlighten people to discern the truth and weight of things, and blunt arguments will not penetrate to convince them or persuade them to their duty; then doth reason freely resign its place to wit, allowing it to undertake its work of instruction and reproof.

Their eminency of state, their affluence of wealth, their uncontrollable power, their exemption from common restraints, their continual distractions and encumbrances by varieties of care and business, their multitude of obsequious followers, and scarcity of faithful friends to advise or reprove them, their having no obstacles before them to check their wills, to cross their humors, to curb their lusts and passions, are so many snares unto them: wherefore they do need plentiful measures of grace, and mighty assistances from God, to preserve them from the worst errors and sins; into which otherwise it is almost a miracle if they are not plunged.

Archbishop Tillotson's style is also exceedingly defective in respect to harmony. The following is an extract:

One might be apt to think at first view, that this parable was overdone, and wanted something of a due decorum; it being hardly credible, that a man, after he had been so mercifully dealt withal, as, upon his humble request, to have so huge a debt so freely forgiven, should, whilst the memory of so much mercy was fresh upon him, even in the very next moment, handle his fellow-servant, who had made the same humble request to him which he had done to his lord, with so much roughness and cruelty, for so inconsiderable a sum.

CHAPTER V.

HARMONY—RHYTHM.

§ 260. RHYTHM in style is founded on accent; and requires that the succession of accented and unaccented syllables be such as will produce an agreeable effect on the ear in the pronunciation of the discourse.

Among the ancients rhythm was regarded as the prominent thing in harmony of style; and much attention was given to it in the study of oratory. The structure of the Greek and Latin languages admitted, to a much greater degree than our own, the application of the principles of rhythm to the formation of style. Yet in the English language rhythm plays an important part; and in no point are the writings of different men more easily distinguishable from one another than in respect to rhythm, nor is there scarcely any other property more missed in oratory, when wanting.

The ancient rhetoricians endeavored earnestly to ascertain and settle the laws of rhythm; that is, determine in what particular successions of accent, or in what feet oratorical rhythm consists. The endeavor seems to have been fruitless; as the results of their investigations were widely variant. Indeed, from the very nature of oratory as distinguished from poetry, and yet proceeding from a mind formed in feeling and taste as well as in intelligence, aside from the nature of harmony as representing the form of expression yet as not independent of the thought expressed, we might have anticipated a failure in such an effort. The rugged oak, with its heavy, abrupt and open arms and its scanty spray and foliage has a harmony, so to speak, of its own; and there is, too, a harmony peculiar to the willow with its

long and slender branches and pendent foliage: The diverse character of the thought gives a diverse character to the rhythm. Strength and vehemence delights in the frequent concurrence of heavy accents; tenderness and familiarity avoid them. Yet the oak is not all heavy, jagged boughs; nor the willow all twig and leaf. There are extremes in both directions; and against these the following rules are given as the only ones which the nature of the case allows.

It should be ever borne in mind that while there is such a thing as rhythm, it is ever determined by the character of the thought; else rhythm would be mere euphony. The rhythm of Demosthenes would not be rhythm in Cicero.

§ 261. Rhythm forbids the excessive recurrence both of accented and also unaccented syllables.

This rule is founded in the very nature of rhythm which is constituted of an intermixture of accented and unaccented syllables. A style that offends against this rule must be pronounced to be so far wanting in rhythm. The writings of Tillotson, generally characterized for want of harmony, furnish abundant exemplifications of this fault in style. It will be remarked in the following extracts from this, in many respects, excellent writer, that the ear demands a heavy accent on the italicised words so much that such an accent is thrown on a word which should not regularly receive it. In this we find a proof that harmony ever respects the thought, and not the sound merely in which it is embodied.

Consider that religion is a great and a long work; and asks so much time, that there is none left for the delaying of it.

But then I say withal, that if these principles were banished out of the world, Government would be far more difficult than *now it is*, because it would want its firmest basis

and foundation; there would be infinitely more disorders in the world, if men were restrained from injustice and violence only by humane laws, and not by principles of conscience, and the dread of another world.

If the word *humane* in this last extract be pronounced as it is here spelt, the ear will instantly detect the want of rhythm in the sentence. The offense is indeed so great that we cannot doubt the word was pronounced in the time of Tillotson as it is now with the accent on the first syllable, and that we have only conformed the orthography to the pronunciation.

In striking contrast with the style of Tillotson in respect to all the oral properties, and particularly that of rhythm, is the style of Milton, of which the following are beautiful exemplifications.

I shall detain you now no longer in the demonstration of what we should not do, but straight conduct you to a hill-side, where I will point you out the right path of a virtuous and noble education, laborious indeed at the first ascent, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects and melodious sounds on every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not more charming.

By a slight change in the rhythm without affecting the sense, this sentence may lose all its beauty. By substituting, for instance, in the last part of it "at first" for "at the first ascent"; "on all sides" for "on every side"; and "sweet" for "charming," the rhythm is greatly marred; as will be seen from a mere perusal of it as thus altered:

I will point you out the right path of a virtuous and noble education, laborious indeed at first, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects and melodious sounds on both sides, that the harp of Orpheus was not more sweet.

When a man hath been laboring the hardest labor in the deep mines of knowledge, hath furnished out his findings in all their equipage, drawn forth his reasons as it were a battle

ranged, scattered and defeated all objections in his way, calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please, only that he may try the matter by dint of argument; for his opponents then to skulk, to lay ambushments, to keep a narrow bridge of licensing where the challenger should pass, though it be valor enough in soldiership, is but weakness and cowardice in the wars of truth. For who knows not that truth is strong, next to the Almighty? She needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings, to make her victorious. Those are the shifts and the defences that error uses against her power.—*Of Unlicensed Printing.*

§ 262. Rhythm also forbids an excessive recurrence of metrical feet which shall suggest the suspicion that the speaker has become poet.

This is a fault in style into which immature writers are liable to fall; especially if accustomed much to the exclusive recitation of poetical compositions. While it implies a musical ear, it is yet a fault of excess; and in pure oratory is inadmissible. The fault more commonly appears in the more elevated parts of discourse, when the speaker, as it were, absorbs the audience into himself, and imagines himself no longer an orator, in address to others, but their mouth-piece in the mere utterance or pouring out of their common thoughts and feelings. As words of foreign origin do not readily fall in with those of native stock in rhythmical harmony,* writers who are liable to this fault of excess in rhythm are generally characterised for their preference of Anglo-Saxon words.

The following passage, from a popular author in the

* In the last extract from Milton, it will be seen at once that "ambushments" mars the rhythm. And in the next quotation, under this section, the phrase "assurances of immortality" is almost the only one that interrupts the poetical structure.

lighter departments of literature might be reduced to the form of regular blank verse.

Then when the dusk of evening had come on, and not a sound disturbed the sacred stillness of the place—when the bright moon poured in her light on tomb and monument, on pillar, wall, and arch, and most of all, it seemed to them, upon her quiet grave—in that calm time, when all outward things and inward thoughts teem with assurances of immortality, and worldly hopes and fears are humbled in the dust before them—then, with tranquil and submissive hearts they turned away and left the child with God. Oh! it is hard to take to heart the lesson that such deaths will teach, but let no man reject it, for it is one that all must learn, and is a mighty, universal truth. When death strikes down the innocent and young, for every fragile form from which he lets the panting spirit free, a hundred virtues rise in shapes of mercy, charity, and love, to walk the world and bless it. Of every tear that sorrowing mortals shed on such green graves, some good is born, some gentler nature comes. In the destroyer's steps there spring up bright creations that defy his power, and his dark path becomes a way of light to heaven.

§ 263. A correct or faulty rhythm appears most conspicuous at the termination of sentences or phrases, as the character of a strain of music is most affected by the cadence.

In the cadence of a sentence, or member of a sentence, is concentrated its entire musical effect. Hence, in the study of rhythm, the chief attention has been given to the construction of the cadence.

The style of Addison owes its easy flow in a great measure to the fact that, while trochaic cadences, or such as end with an unaccented syllable, predominate, the heavy effect of an invariable sameness is avoided by a due interspersion of iambic endings. A spondaic cadence rarely occurs in the compositions of this author.

CHAPTER VI.

HARMONY—MELODY.

§ 264. MELODY is founded on pitch; and requires that the phrases or members of a sentence be so constructed and disposed that, in the pronunciation, the successions of pitch be pleasing to the ear.

The term "melody," as applied both to style in composition and to elocution, has, for the most part, been used in a vague and indeterminate sense. Its use in music is, however, fixed; and there is obviously every reason for preserving to it the same radical import in all its various applications. In song, it denotes pitch in succession, and is clearly distinguished from rhythm, which respects accent in succession. In elocution, we perceive the necessity of maintaining the same distinction, and need, for this purpose, the same precision in the distinct use of the terms. The same necessity, likewise, exists in style.

The exact relations of pitch to style are indicated in the fact that, in the oral delivery of discourse, the mutual dependence and connection of the particular constituents of the complex thought are expressed chiefly, although not exclusively, through the variations of pitch. While it belongs to elocution to define precisely what these variations are, it is the appropriate province of rhetoric to prescribe how the sentence shall be constructed so as to meet these qualities of an easy and agreeable elocution.

More particularly, every constituent part of a complex thought, or the expression of it in a particular phrase, has, in a correct elocution, a pitch of its own by which it is distinguished from the other constituent parts. In passing from one phrase to another, the voice changes its pitch for

the purpose often simply of making the transition, and with no reference to any emphatic distinction. These successive ranges of pitch, given respectively to the several phrases, may obviously be such as to be offensive to a musical ear. So far, therefore, as they are determined by the structure of the sentence, they need to be regarded in style.

But, farther than this, the relations between the constituent thoughts are indicated, in delivery, chiefly, by the pitch of the voice. If, accordingly, the sentence be so constituted that these relations cannot appropriately be expressed with ease and agreeable effect under the limitations of the laws of vocal sounds, it is so far faulty; and the prevention or correction of the fault comes within the proper purview of rhetorical style.

How far, and in what particular respects, the principles of melody in elocution may thus affect the style of discourse, will be exhibited in the sections which follow.

§ 265. Melody in style may be distinguished into two kinds; *the melody of proportion*, and *the melody of arrangement*.

A fault in melody may be either in the time of the variations of pitch,—the variations being too rapid or the contrary; or in the character of the variations themselves, being in their own nature unmusical.

That species of melody which is founded on the time of the variations, or what amounts to the same thing, in the length of the phrases, is denominated the melody of proportion. The melody of arrangement respects the character of the variations themselves, as judged by a musical standard.

§ 266. *The melody of proportion* is founded on the relative length of the phrases or parts of a sentence; and requires that the discourse be neither frag-

mentary and abrupt, on the one hand; nor on the other, be made up of phrases too extended for easy elocution.

The abrupt and fragmentary style is more tolerable in essays; and is more frequent in this department of writing. The following extract from Lord Bacon, however excellent in other respects, is deficient in melody.

Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment and disposition of business; for expert men can execute, and perhaps judge of particulars one by one, but the general counsels, and the plots and marshaling of affairs come best from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies is sloth; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules is the humor of a scholar: they perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need pruning by study; and studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men condemn studies, simple men admire, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation.

The opening sentence in Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, as well as the succeeding extract from Middleton, labor from being broken up by numerous qualifying clauses.

Though for no other cause, yet for this; that posterity may know we have not loosely, through silence, permitted things to pass away as in a dream, there shall be for men's information extant thus much concerning the present state of the Church of God established amongst us, and their careful endeavor which would have upheld the same.

And that it was not peculiar to the gift of language or tongues only, to be given at the moment of its exertion, but common likewise to all the rest, will be shown, probably, on some other occasion, more at large in a particular treatise,

which is already prepared by me, on that subject.—*Middleton*.

The style of Ossian and of Young in his *Night Thoughts* is also deficient in this species of melody.

Leave, blue-eyed Clatho, leave thy hall. Behold that early beam of thine. The host is withered in its course. No further look—it is dark. Light trembling from the harp, strike, virgins, strike the sound. No hunter he descends, from the dewy haunt of the bounding roe. He bends not his bow on the wind; or sends his gray arrow abroad.—*Temora*, B. v.

Sense! take the rein; blind passion! drive us on;
And Ignorance! befriend us on our way;
Ye new, but truest patrons of our peace!
Yes, give the pulse full empire; live the brute,
Since as the brute we die: the sum of man,
Of Godlike man! to revel and to rot.

Night Thoughts.

The opposite fault of this kind may be exemplified in the following extracts from John Howe:

If we can suppose an offence of that kind may be of so heinous a nature and so circumstanced as that it cannot be congruous it should be remitted without some reparation to the prince and compensation for the scandal done to government; it is easy to suppose it much more incongruous it should be so in the present case.—*Living Temple*.

And no doubt so large and capacious intellects may well be supposed to penetrate far into the reason and wisdom of his dispensations; and so not only to exercise submission in an implicit acquiescence in the unseen and only believed fitness of them, but also to take an inexpressible complacency and satisfaction in what they manifestly discern thereof, and to be able to resolve their delectation in the works and ways of God into a higher cause and reason than the mere general belief that he doth all things well; viz: their immediate delightful view of the congruity and fitness of what he does.—*Ibid*.

In this class of faults—those against melody of proportion, may be included, also, the joining together of disproportionately long and short members. The ear demands not only variety, but, also, a harmonized variety or proportion between the members of a sentence. The following sentence from Sterne is in this respect highly melodious:

The accusing spirit which flew up to Heaven's Chancery with the oath, blushed as he gave it in; and the recording angel, as he wrote it down, dropped a tear upon the word and blotted it out forever.

By simply altering the length of one or two of the clauses, the melody may be entirely destroyed through a mere change of proportion between the parts. This may be done by leaving out in the last clause the phrase "upon the word," and also the word "forever"; thus, "and the recording angel, as he wrote it, dropped a tear and blotted it out."

§ 267. THE MELODY OF ARRANGEMENT is founded on the variations of pitch which are requisite for expressing the proper relations between the constituent parts of a complex sentence, or more directly on those relations themselves; and requires that the sentence be so constituted that those relations may be easily expressed by the voice.

It has been remarked, under § 264, that the vocal expression of the relations between the different parts or phrases of a complex sentence, or the grouping of speech, as it is called, is mainly effected by the function of pitch. In a melodious style, accordingly, the sentence must be so constructed that these relations may be easily expressed; in other words, so that there may be no confusion in the indication of the relations on the one hand, and no laborious effort be imposed on the voice in effecting this, on the other.

In the following selections, although the sentences are more or less complex, they are yet so arranged that the relations between the parts are easily indicated by the voice; and the effect on the ear is consequently pleasing in a high degree.

The first are from Dugald Stuart, whose style in this respect is highly finished.

The most trifling accident of scenery, it is evident, at least the most trifling to an unskilled eye, may thus possess in his estimation, a value superior to that which he ascribes to beauties of a far higher order.

By simply transposing the second and third clauses of this sentence, the melodious flow is broken up and its music is lost.

The most trifling accident of scenery, at least the most trifling to an unskilled eye, it is evident, may thus possess, in his estimation, a value superior to that which he ascribes to beauties of a far higher order.

If the one party should observe, for instance, to his companion that the minute parts of the tree, which the latter affirms to be the most remote;—that its smaller ramifications, its foliage and the texture of its bark are seen much more distinctly than the corresponding parts of the other; he could not fail in immediately convincing him of the inaccuracy of his estimate.

In this sentence the leading thought is placed last. The voice, accordingly, in pronouncing it, naturally rises to a higher pitch and swells into a larger volume; and thus leaves upon the ear at the close an agreeable fulness and force of sound. At the same time, the less important explanatory and modifying clauses are so thrown in, as both to break up the monotonousness of a direct assertion, and also to furnish the proper occasion of a pleasing variety in the successions of pitch. Change the order of almost any

two numbers of the sentence and the melody will be destroyed.

The style of Addison is more direct and less diversified with dependent modifying clauses. It exhibits this species of melody,—that of arrangement in the disposition of the leading thought in the sentence; which is generally so placed as, in a reading correctly adapted to the sense, to leave the ear impressed with an agreeable elevation and body of sound.

We are obliged to devotion for the noblest buildings that have adorned the several countries of the world. It is this which has set men at work on temples and public places of worship, not only that they might, by the magnificence of the building, invite the Deity to reside within it, but that such stupendous works might, at the same time, open the mind to vast conceptions, and fit it to converse with the divinity of the place.—*Spectator*.

It seeks not to bereave or destroy the body; it seeks to save the soul by humbling the body, not by imprisonment or pecuniary mulct, much less by stripes or bonds or disinheritance, but by fatherly admonishment and christian rebuke, to cast it into godly sorrow whose end is joy and ingenuous bashfulness to sin. If that cannot be wrought, then as a tender mother takes her child and holds it over the pit with scaring words, that it may learn to fear where danger is; so doth excommunication as dearly and as freely, without money, use her wholesome and saving terrors. She is instant; she beseeches; by all the dear and sweet promises of salvation she entices and woos: by all the threatenings and thunders of the law and rejected gospel, she charges and adjures: this is all her armory, her munition, her artillery: then she awaits with long-sufferance and yet ardent zeal.—*Milton*.

Of Law there can be no less acknowledged, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men and creatures

of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.—*Hooker*.

§ 268. Faults in respect to the melody of arrangement are either in the adoption of the loose, in preference to the periodic structure of a sentence, or of the parenthetical as opposed to the compact structure.

The periodic and the compact structure is as favorable to clearness and to energy, as to melody; and hence it will be again treated of in the chapters on those properties of style. It has a more intimate and vital connection, however, with melody; since a sentence may be perspicuous or energetic which is not periodic in its structure, whereas this structure is indispensable to melody.

§ 269. A PERIODIC STRUCTURE is one in which the leading thought of the sentence is presented in the closing member.

A LOOSE STRUCTURE, as opposed to the periodic, is one in which the sentence terminates with one or more dependent clauses.

This definition is given in preference to that adopted by Dr. Campbell and after him by Dr. Whately, which is as follows: "A period is a complex sentence in which the meaning remains suspended till the whole is finished." It is easy to construct a sentence which shall be exceedingly loose while it yet accords precisely with this definition. For example: "One party had given their whole attention, during several years, to the project not only of enriching themselves and impoverishing the rest of the nation; but, also, by these and other means, establishing their dominion under the government and with the favor of a family who were foreigners that they might easily believe they were

established on the throne by the good-will and strength of this party alone." This sentence must be denominated exceedingly loose, and yet, to apply Dr. Campbell's criterion, there is no "place before the end, at which, if you make a stop, the construction of the preceding part will render it a complete sentence."

Why the periodic structure is favorable to melody may be seen in the fact, that the leading thought being presented in whole or in part in the closing member, that member must receive vocal distinction in the enunciation, which is indicated by the pitch; and consequently the sentence closes with a full and strong impression on the ear. In a loose sentence, on the contrary, ending with a dependent clause, the voice is abated upon it, and the effect is analogous to that of ending a strain of music on some other than the key-note.

Examples of a periodic structure are given under §326. The following are instances of a loose structure:

And here it was often found of absolute necessity to influence or cool the passions of the audience, especially at Rome, where Tully spoke; and with whose writings young divines, I mean those among them who read old authors, are more conversant than with those of Demosthenes; who, by many degrees, excelled the other, at least as an author.—*Swift*.

It would be difficult, perhaps, to find in the writings of a reputable author, a sentence more loosely constructed than this. The leading thought terminates with the first member; and there are five modifying clauses appended, at each of which the voice seems ready to rest, but is called up anew by another connective bringing in a new member. While it is not destitute of clearness or strength, it is exceedingly difficult to express the relations between the members by any pleasing management of the voice.

The following stanza from Byron, whose poetry is not remarkable for this kind of properties, is also exceedingly loose, while not wanting in other qualities of an elegant diction:

And Ardennes waves above them her green leaves,
Dewy with nature's tear-drops, as they pass,
Grieving—if aught inanimate e'er grieves—
Over the unreturning brave,—alas!
Ere evening to be trodden like the grass
Which now beneath them, but above shall grow
In its next verdure, when this fiery mass
Of living valor rolling on the foe,
And burning with high hope, shall moulder cold and low.

To this succeeded that licentiousness which entered with the Restoration; and, from infecting our religion and morals, fell to corrupt our language: which last was not like to be much improved by those who at that time made up the court of King Charles the Second; either such who had followed him in his banishment, or who had been altogether conversant in the dialect of those fanatic times; or young men, who had been educated in the same company; so that the court, which used to be the standard of propriety and correctness of speech, was then, and I think hath ever since continued, the worst school in England for that accomplishment; and so will remain till better care be taken in the education of our young nobility, that they may set out into the world with some foundation of literature; in order to qualify them for patterns of politeness.—*Swift*.

The first could not end his learned treatise without a panegyric of modern learning and knowledge in comparison of the ancient; and the other falls so grossly into the censure of the old poetry and preference of the new, that I could not read either of these strains without indignation, which no quality among men is so apt to raise in one as self-sufficiency, the worst composition out of the pride and ignorance of mankind.—*Temple*.

§ 270. An antithetic structure, so far as it is periodic, is peculiarly favorable to this kind of melody.

Where the main member of the antithesis, or that to which the writer wishes to give peculiar prominence, is placed last, the antithesis is periodic, and so far melodious. Where this order is reversed, the melody is marred or destroyed. The following extract has this quality in a high degree, although the members are too uniformly short to give it the highest melodious effect.

If they were unacquainted with the works of philosophers and poets, they were deeply read in the oracles of God. If their names were not found in the registers of heralds, they felt assured they were recorded in the Book of Life. If their steps were not accompanied by a splendid train of menials, legions of ministering angels had charge over them.—*Macaulay.*

§ 271. Parenthetical sentences are opposed to melody, when the parentheses are of excessive length, or when parentheses are included within other parentheses.

The reason of this is that when the parenthetical part is long, a great part of the sentence must be pronounced with an abatement of the voice; and when parentheses are included within parentheses, the voice, in the endeavor to express the relations correctly, sinks too far for melodious effect.

The following sentences are faulty in this respect.

For we here see, that before God took any people to be peculiar to him, from the rest of men, the reason which he gives, why his spirit should not always strive with man, in common (after an intimation of his contemptible meanness, and his own indulgence towards him notwithstanding, and instance given of his abounding wickedness in those days) was, because "all the imaginacions of the thoughts of his heart were only evil continually."—*John Howe; Living Temple.*

Yet because it may be grateful when we are persuaded that things are so, to fortify (as much as we can) that per-

suasion, and because our persuasion concerning those attributes of God will be still liable to assault unless we acknowledge him every where present; (nor can it well be conceivable otherwise, how the influence of his knowledge, power and goodness can be so universal as will be thought necessary to infer a universal obligation to religion;) it will be therefore requisite to add somewhat concerning his omnipresence, or because some, that love to be very strictly critical, will be apt to think that term restrictive of his presence to the universe, (as supposing to be present is relative to somewhat one may be said present unto, whereas they will say without the universe is nothing,) we will rather choose to call it immensity.—*Id.*

A very common variety of faults of this class occurs where, by the interposition of a long parenthetical clause, a just reading must throw an excessive stress on a portion of the sentence.

Thus in the following sentence, the subject "they" being separated from its verb, requires a heavy accent followed by a pause which destroys the melody.

They, going about to work a righteousness of their own, are not wise.

Which, as it standeth with christian duty in some cases, so in common affairs to require it were most unfit.

Who, aiming only at the height of greatness and sensuality, hath in tract of time reduced so great and goodly a part of the world to that lamentable distress and servitude, under which, to the astonishment of the understanding beholders, it now faints and groans.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 272. The SUGGESTIVE PROPERTIES of style include those that are founded on the relationship between the sound and the thought, and those that are founded on the relationship between the object that represents the thought and the thought. The former may be denominated the imitative; the latter, the symbolical properties of style.

It was observed, in treating of the nature of language, § 245, that language is representative or suggestive in its nature in a two-fold respect. In the first place, a sensible object is taken to represent the thought, if abstract, and in the second place, a sound or word is applied as indicative of that object, or of the mental state itself. Hence the ground of distinguishing these two varieties of suggestive properties.

§ 273. The properties of voice on which the suggestive qualities of style are founded, are those of quality and time; pitch and force, except as the latter is connected with accent, not admitting any consideration in this department of style.

§ 274. Words regarded as sounds are imitative of three different classes of thoughts: 1. sensations of sounds; 2. other sensations analogous to those of sound; 3. mental states analogous to these sensations.

§ 275. All languages contain words which, in their very structure as composite sounds, more or less perfectly resemble in quality, as soft or harsh, &c., the sounds which they designate. Such are, in our own language, *hiss*, *buzz*, *murmur*, *gurgle*, *dash*, *rattle*.

The following extracts are familiar exemplifications of the beauty and force imparted to style by the adaptation of the sounds to the objects represented:

The pilgrim oft
At dead of night 'mid his oraison hears
Aghast the voice of time-disparting towers,
Tumbling all precipitate down-dashed
Rattling around, loud thundering to the moon.—*Dyer*.

Loud sounds the air, redoubling strokes on strokes;
On all sides round the forest hurls her oaks
Headlong. Deep echoing groan the thickets brown,
Then rustling, crackling, crashing, thunder down.

Pope's Iliad.

§ 276. Not only single words but the entire structure of the sentence may bear a resemblance to the sound represented.

Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows;
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,
The hoarse rough verse should like the torrent roar.

Pope: Essay on Criticism.

What! like Sir Richard, rumbling, rough, and fierce,
With arms, and George, and Brunswick crowd the verse,
Rend with tremendous sounds your ears asunder,
With gun, drum, trumpet, blunderbuss and thunder?
Then all your muse's softer art display,
Let Carolina smooth the tuneful lay,
Lull with Amelia's liquid name the Nine,
And sweetly flow through all the royal line.—*Id: Sat. I.*

§ 277. In so far as the sensations of sound resemble in their effects on the mind, or in other relations, those of the other senses, words, regarded merely as sounds, may be imitative of them also.

In this case, the imitation is not direct, as in the use of sounds; but only indirect, as it is not founded immediately

on the qualities of the sensation; but on the relations. This analogy between the sound and the object represented greatly assists the impression to be made in the representation.

Of the sensations susceptible of this analogous imitation in style, those of sight are the most common; and of the latter class, those of motion.

Here the imitation is more frequently effected by connected than by single words. The following will serve as exemplifications:

Deep in those woods the black-cap and thrush still hooted and clang unweariedly: she heard also the cawing of crows, and the scream of the loon; the tinkle of bells, the lowing of cows and the bleating of sheep were distinctly audible. Her own Robin, on the Butternut below, began his long, sweet, many-toned carol; the tree-toad chimed in with its loud trilling chirrup; and frogs from the Pond and Mill Brook, crooled, chubbed and croaked.—*Margaret.*

While the cock, with lively din,
Scatters the rear of darkness thin,
And to the stack or the barn-door,
Stoutly struts his dames before.

Milton; L' Allegro.

Oft on a plat of rising ground,
I hear the far-off curfew sound,
Over some wide watered shore,
Swinging slow with sullen roar.

Id.; Il Penseroso.

With easy course

The vessels glide; unless their speed be stopped
By dead calms, that oft lie on these smooth seas,
When every zephyr sleeps.

§ 278. Mental states, in so far as they may be conceived of as analogous to the sensations of sound, may also be imitated in language.

The range of this species of imitation is very wide; al-

though the imitation is less direct and obvious than in the other species. As all those words in language which denote mental states as well as all abstract terms were, originally, expressive only of objects of sense, and could be transferred to this abstract use only on condition of a correspondence between the world of thought and the world of sense, we might rationally expect that language would furnish frequent instances of this species of imitation. In point of fact, we find that in able writers the style is ever colored by the mental state. Anger, kindness, vehemence, gentleness, and the like, have, each, a language, a style of expression peculiar to themselves. And this peculiarity of expression is to be traced in the character of the language regarded as a complication of sound merely. The following will serve as illustrations of this correspondence in the sound to the sense:

In those deep solitudes and awful cells,
Where heavenly pensive contemplation dwells,
And ever-musing Melancholy reigns.

Pope: Eloise to Abelard.

With eyes upraised, as one inspired,
Pale melancholy sat retired,
And from her mild sequestered seat
In notes by distance made more sweet,
Poured through the mellow horn her pensive tone.

Collins: Ode to the Passions.

But O, how altered was its sprightlier tone,
When cheerfulness, a nymph of healthiest hue,
Her bow across her shoulders flung,
Her buskins gemmed with morning dew,
Blew an inspiring air, that dale and thicket rung,
The hunter's call, to Faun and Dryad known.—*Ibid.*

Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Jest and youthful Jollity,
Quips and cranks and wanton wiles,
Nods and becks and wreathed smiles,

Such as hang on Hebe's cheek,
 And love to live in dimple sleek;
 Sport that wrinkled care derides,
 And Laughter holding both his sides,
 Come, and trip it as you go,
 On the light fantastic toe;
 And in thy right hand lead with thee
 The mountain-nymph, sweet Liberty.

Milton: L'Allegro.

Nor shall the wisdom, the moderation, the christian piety, the constancy of our nobility and commons of England be ever forgotten, whose calm and temperate connivance could sit still and smile out the stormy bluster of men more audacious and precipitant than of solid and deep reach, till their own fury had run itself out of breath, assailing by rash and heady approaches the impregnable situation of our liberty and safety, that laughed such weak enginery to scorn, such poor drifts to make a national war of a surplice frabble, a tippet scuffle.—*Milton: Reformation in England.*

To this class of properties may be referred the grammatical figures of paronomasia and alliteration. These figures owe their peculiar beauty to the fact that in using them the speaker indicates a controlling reference to the nature of language as consisting of sounds,—the sound of the word suggesting the use of them.

§ 279. The PARONOMASIA is the use of words which differ in sense but are dissimilar in sound; as,
Amantes sunt amentes.—Terence.

The PUN is sometimes regarded as a species of paronomasia. It differs from it in this respect; that it is the use of a word in a two-fold sense, as,

“A second Thomas, or, at once,
 To name them all, another *Dunce*;”

where allusion is made to two celebrated scholastic metaphysicians, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.

Lastly, he has resolved ‘that neither person nor cause shall improper him.’ I may mistake his meaning, for the word ye hear is ‘improper.’ But whether, if not a person, yet a good parsonage or impropriation, brought out for him, would not ‘improper’ him, because there may be a quirk in the word, I leave it for a canonist to resolve.—*Milton.*

And thus ends this section, or rather dissection of himself, short ye will say, both in breath and extent, as in our own praises it ought to be.—*d.*

§ 280. ALLITERATION is the use of several words in succession beginning with the same letter; as, O Tite, tuta Tati, tibi tanta, tyranne, tuliste.—*Ennius.*

Then while the honor thou hast got
 Is spick-and-span new, piping hot.—*Hudibras.*

Already doubled is the cape, the bay
 Receives the prow, that proudly spurns the spray.
Byron.

Anglo-Saxon poetry was mainly distinguished from prose by a regular alliteration. Hence alliteration continued to be a prominent characteristic in early English poetry. It abounds in Spencer.

But direful deadly black both leaf and bloom,
 Fit to adorn the dead and deck the dreary tomb.

She, of naught afraid,
 Through woods and wasteness wide him daily sought.

“The lion, lord of every beast in field,”
 Quoth he, “his princely puissance doth abate,” &c.

§ 281. Words are SYMBOLICAL when they designate sensible objects or scenes which symbolize or image forth the sense.

Words generally, as before observed, are originally symbolical, when used to denote abstract notions. The sensible object or scene is taken as the mirror of the thought to be

conveyed. How the mind is enabled to discern the thought in this reflection, whether by some analogy of the scene or object to the thought, as, for instance, a similarity in the effect upon the mind, or by association or otherwise, it is not necessary here to explain. It is sufficient to note the fact that sensible scenes and objects do reflect abstract thoughts; and especially when, as in language, the attention is set to discern the thought revealed in the symbol.

The peculiar force and beauty imparted to style by this use of words may be accounted for, in part at least, by several distinct considerations. First, this use of words is in accordance with the proper nature of language. Language, originally and properly, is not a mere collection of arbitrary signs, like those of algebra, which in themselves import nothing. Words are more like the diagrams of geometry, in which, without previous explanation, may be perceived the truth of the proposition which they severally exemplify. Although, in the process of language, it becomes more and more like algebraic signs and less and less symbolical and picture-like, it yet retains to a greater or less extent this original characteristic; and so far as language is used in accordance with its primitive and uncorrupted nature, it pleases and impresses.

Secondly, in this use of language, the imagination is directly addressed and put in play. The hearer fixes his eye on the sensible object or scene, and his imagination forms the picture of the thought. He thus becomes himself a creative artist; and the forms, to which his own imagination gives birth, gratify at once the instinctive dotings of paternity and the love of originating, inherent in our nature. Interpreting a mere language of signs, where words only stand for ideas and do not represent them through sensible objects, is, on the other hand, a dull exercise of memory.

If the language of modern civilization, in which science prevails over poetry, is more precise, more exact and unambiguous, it is yet less pleasing and less impressive than the rich imagery and life of earlier dialects. It is the high prerogative of an accomplished speaker to unite the precision of the modern with the vivid beauty and force of the primitive diction.

§ 282. In the selection of words with a view to this beauty of style, the more specific are to be preferred to the more generic.

In the following extract from Mr. Sheridan's Speech against Hastings, it will be apparent that, instead of the specific or individual objects which are so forcibly presented to the mind in it, and by which the sentiment is so vividly communicated, the whole thought might be as fully and accurately exhibited in more generic language, but the force and richness of the expression would be lost.

It is true he did not direct the guards, the famine, and the bludgeons; he did not weigh the fetters, nor number the lashes to be inflicted on his victims: but yet he is equally guilty as if he had borne an active and personal share in each transaction.

The thought would have been as fully conveyed if he had simply said, "It is true he did not give out the orders for the arrest and the torture of his victims; nor himself carry these orders into execution: but yet," &c.

§ 283. It is unnecessary, further, in securing this property to style, that truth to the actual object or scene used to symbolize the thought, be strictly observed.

This implies exactness in the particular delineations and congruousness in the parts of a complex object.

In the following extract the mind labors to conceive the representation in consequence of being unable to unite the incongruous features of the heterogeneous objects presented.

Though in their corrupt notions of divine worship, they are apt to multiply their gods, yet this earthly devotion is seldom paid to above one idol at a time, whose ear they please with less murmuring and much more skill than when they share the lading or even hold the helm.

The following are examples of an opposite character in this respect, in which the sensible representation is exact and congruous throughout:

For truth, I know not how, hath this unhappiness fatal to her, ere she can come to the trial and inspection of the understanding: being to pass through many little wards and limits of the several affections and desires, she cannot shift it, but must put on such colors and attire as those pathetic handmaids of the soul please to lead her in to their queen; and if she find so much favor with them, they let her pass in her own likeness; if not, they bring her into the presence habited and colored like a notorious falsehood. And contrary, when any falsehood comes that way, if they like the errand she brings, they are so artful to counterfeit the very shape and visage of truth, that the understanding, not being able to discern the fucus which these enchantresses with such cunning have laid upon the features sometimes of truth, sometimes of falsehood interchangeably, sentences for the most part one for the other at the first blush, according to the subtle imposture of those sensual mistresses that keep the ports and passages between her and the object.—*Milton.*

So is the imperfect, unfinished spirit of a man. It lays the foundation of a holy resolution, and strengthens it with vows and arts of persecution; it raises up the walls,—sacraments, and prayers, reading and holy ordinances. And holy actions begin with a slow motion, and the building stays, and the spirit is weary, and the soul is naked and exposed to temptation, and in the days of storm takes in every thing that can do it mischief; and it is faint and sick,

listless and tired, and it stands till its own weight wearies the foundation, and then declines to death and sad disorder.
J. Taylor.

Nor in our prosperity, our affluence of good things, our possession of common, should we be unmindful of him who relieved us in our straits, who supplied our wants, sustained our adversity, who redeemed us from Egypt, and led us through the wilderness. A succession of new and fresh benefits should not, as among some savages the manner is for the young to make away the old, supplant and expunge ancient ones, but make them rather more dear and venerable to us. Time should not weaken or diminish, but rather confirm and radicate in us the remembrance of God's goodness; to render it, as it doth gold and silver, more precious and more strong.—*Barrow's Sermons.*

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE GRAMMATICAL PROPERTIES OF STYLE.

§ 284. The grammatical properties of style may be distributed into three species, according as they respect *the forms of words, their connection, or their meaning.*

The departments of grammar which respectively treat of these several species are Etymology, Syntax, and Lexicography. Etymology presides over the words introduced into the language and the forms which they take; syntax, over the arrangement and relations of words; and lexicography assigns to them their meaning. The several species of the grammatical properties of style are founded, accordingly, on these departments of grammar, and derive from them their regulative principles.

Inasmuch as these grammatical principles are fixed and imperative, the observance of them in style is indispensable. Hence it is more convenient to consider these properties in their negative aspect; and, to exhibit them not in the forms in which, as observed, they impart beauty to discourse, but in which, as they are disregarded, the discourse becomes thereby faulty.

Before illustrating the several faults against grammatical purity in style, it becomes necessary to ascertain the standard of purity. Numerous and weighty authorities determine this to be *good use*. The language of Horace is:

Usus

Quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi.

Quintilian only says use is the most certain rule: *Certissima regula in consuetudine*.

Dr. Campbell is earnest in maintaining that use is necessarily the sole criterion.

It has been before observed, § 246 that grammatical science is either abstract or historical. The laws of thought, on the one hand, and the laws of articulate sounds, on the other, impose certain necessary conditions on the formation of language. These laws being given, it may be determined beforehand, to a certain extent, what must be the properties of language, or, in other words, the principles of grammar. No use can be characterised as good that violates these universal principles of language.

But, again, there is such a thing as grammatical science, regarded as historical, and founded on inductive grounds. There are in every language certain general laws which control and regulate its development. There are general principles of etymology and syntax; violations of which must be regarded as faults. It is true that sometimes the different principles that preside over the formation of

language come in collision with one another, and thus grammatical rules frequently have exceptions. The principles of euphony, thus, frequently, occasion deviations from the common laws of derivation. So, likewise, more purely rhetorical or logical principles modify the operation of proper grammatical rules. Such exceptions are not, however, properly violations of the laws of language. Now no "use" can be allowed to transgress these general principles. If grammatical monstrosities by any mishap exist, a correct taste will shun them, as it does physical deformities in the arts of design.

Back then of use we have both the abstract principles of universal language, and also the inductive principles of particular languages, as guides and criteria of grammatical purity. By these principles use itself must be tried.

Good use is, therefore, only a proximate and presumptive test of purity. While generally its decisions are authoritative, they admit, in their nature, of being questioned, and must themselves submit to higher authority. The expressions "nowadays" and "had have gone" have all the prescribed characteristics of good use; "reputable, national, and present." No one can rationally deny, however, that in elevated discourse at least one is a barbarism and the other a solecism. We may accordingly lay down the principle which regulates this matter as it is expressed in the following section.

-§ 285. THE STANDARD OF GRAMMATICAL PURITY is to be found proximately in good use; but ultimately, in the fixed principles of grammatical science, that is, in the principles of etymology, syntax, and lexicography.

§ 286. That use alone is to be regarded as good

which possess the following characteristics, viz: that it is *national*, as opposed to provincial and technical; *reputable*, or sanctioned by the best authors; and *present*, as opposed to what is obsolete.

§ 287. Offenses against grammatical purity may be distributed in reference to their occasions into the following species, viz:

1. *Archaism*, or obsolete use;
2. *Provincialism*, or the use of what is not national, or confined to a district or province;
2. *Idiotism*, or the use which is confined to an individual;
4. *Technicality*, or use peculiar to a sect or trade;
5. *Alienism*, or use derived from a foreign language.

It is to be remarked that each of these species includes offenses against all the departments of grammar, whether etymology, syntax, or lexicography. An archaism, thus, may either be a barbarism, solecism, or impropriety.

§ 288. A fault in respect to the settled forms of words, that is, an offense against the etymology of a language, is denominated a BARBARISM.

§ 289. A barbarism may lie in the use of a radical word not sanctioned by the etymology of a language; or in an unauthorized mode of deriving, inflecting, or compounding words.

The English language admits more freely the introduction of new radical words than most other languages. Words of Latin or Greek origin it receives without hesitancy; and subjects them in the process of naturalizing to but trifling modifications. So common has this adulteration of the language been, that a barbarism of this species is

hardly reckoned a fault, and the preservation of a pure Anglo-Saxon style has consequently become a positive excellence.

The following are barbarisms in respect to the use of *words not authorized*: approbate, eventuate, heft, jeopardize, missionate, preventative, reluctate, repetitious, peek for peep, numerosity, effluxion, inchoation, anon, behest, behove, erewhile, whenas, peradventure, obligate, memorize, bating, pending, hearken.

Barbarisms in *inflection*: Stricken* for struck, het for heated, pled for pleaded, lit for lighted, proven † for proved, had'nt ought for ought not, had rather have gone for would rather have gone, have drank for have drunk, have began.

Barbarisms in *derivation*: Betrayal, deputize, happify, firstly for first, illy for ill.

Barbarisms in *compound words*: Sidehill ‡ for hill-side, sundown ‡ for sunset, fellow-countrymen for countrymen, whereas, selfsame.

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES.

The court of Augustus has not wore off the manners of the republic.—*Hume*.

I had no sooner drank, but I found a pimple rising in my forehead.—*Tatler*.

Which some philosophers, not considering so well as I, have mistook to be different in their causes.—*Swift*.

I easily foresee, that, as soon as I lay down my pen, this nimble spectator will have stole it.—*Id.*

The queen, whom it highly imported that the two monarchs should be at peace, acted the part of mediator.

* Poetic use. Many words are admissible in poetry which must be pronounced barbarisms in prose.

† Technical use.

‡ Colloquial use.

The hauteur of Florio was very disgracious, and disgusted both his friends and strangers.

§ 290. A fault in respect to the settled arrangement or construction of words in a sentence, or an offense against the syntax of a language is denominated a SOLEICISM.

It is obvious from the definition that a solecism may be committed in respect to any one of the various principles of syntax. The following will suffice as exemplifications under the more generic heads:

1. *In the use of adjectives:* "the most extreme," "most straitest," "more preferable."

2. *In the use of nouns and pronouns:*

a. In concord; "Each will observe their turn," for his turn"; "If any one transgresses, let them be," &c.; "At Smith's the bookseller."

b. In government; "I supposed it to be he," for "to be him."

3. *In the use of verbs:*

a. In concord; "The amount of all the expenditures and disbursements far exceed," &c.; "He dare not do it," for "dares," "Would to God," for "Would God."*

4. *In the use of conjunctives, including conjunctions proper and relatives.*

"He told the same story as you," for "that you";

"Equally as," for "equally with";

"Neither flatter or contemn the rich," for "nor";

"No more is meant but that," for "than";

* Dr. Campbell attributes the introduction of this solecism to an improper imitation of the French expression "Plut a Dieu." "Would God," as equivalent to "I wish, or pray, that God would," is the preferable form.

"Persons will not believe but *what*" for "but *that*";

"Solomon, the son of David, who built the temple."

5. *In the use of prepositions:**

"She is free of pain," for "from pain";

"In pursuance to the";

"By the observing these precepts," for "of these precepts."

6. *In the use of adverbs:*

Second, third, &c., for secondly, thirdly, &c.

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES.

Removing the term from Westminster, sitting the Parliament, was illegal.—*Macaulay*.

We need not, nor do not, confine the purposes of God.

Bently.

I shall endeavor to live hereafter suitable to a man in my station.—*Addison*.

He behaved himself conformable to that blessed example.

Sprat.

I can never think so very mean of him.—*Bently*.

The chiefest of which was known by the name of Archon among the Grecians.—*Dryden*.

The author is informed, that the bookseller has prevailed on several gentlemen to write some explanatory notes, for the goodness of which he is not to answer, having never seen any of them, nor intends it, till they appear in print.

Swift.

Nor is it then a welcome guest, affording only an uneasy sensation, and brings always with it a mixture of concern and compassion.—*Fielding*.

Base, ungrateful boy! miserable as I am, yet I cannot cease to love thee. My love even now speaks in my resentment. I am still your father, nor can your usage form my heart anew.—*Goldsmith*.

* For other examples, see under improprieties. Regarded in one light these faults are solecisms; in other words, one view of language would place them in the sphere of syntax; another, in the sphere of lexicography.

But the temper, as well as knowledge, of a modern historian, require a more sober and temperate language.—*Gibbon*.

Neither death nor torture were sufficient to subdue the minds of Cargill and his intrepid followers.—*Fox*.

Each of these words imply some pursuit or object relinquished.

'Tis observable that every one of the letters bear date after his banishment.—*Bentley*.

Magnus, with four thousand of his supposed accomplices, were put to death.—*Gibbon*.

These feasts were celebrated to the honor of Osiris, whom the Greeks called Dionysius, and is the same with Bacchus.
Swift.

Whether one person or more was concerned in the business was not ascertained.

Those sort of favors do real injury under the appearance of kindness.

Every person, whatever be their station, is bound by the duties of morality and religion.

He dare not do it at present, and he need not.

Whether he will or no, I care not.

We do those things frequently that we repent of afterwards.

Many persons will not believe but what they are free from prejudices.

One of his clients, who was more merry than wise, stole it from him one day in the midst of his pleading; but he had better have let it alone, for he lost his cause by his jest.
Addison.

I am equally an enemy to a female dunce or a female pedant.—*Goldsmith*.

King Charles, and more than him, the duke and the Popish faction, were at liberty to form new schemes.—*Bolingbroke*.

The drift of all his sermons was, to prepare the Jews for the reception of a prophet, mightier than him, and whose shoes he was not worthy to bear.—*Atterbury*.

He whom ye pretend reigns in heaven, is so far from protecting the miserable sons of men, that he perpetually delights to blast the sweetest flowers in the garden of Hope.
Hawkesworth.

Neither of them are remarkable for precision.—*Blair*.

In proportion as either of these two qualities are wanting, the language is imperfect.—*Addison*.

I had no sooner drank than I found a pimple rising in my forehead.—*Addison*.

In this respect, the seeds of future divisions were sowed abundantly.—*Lyttleton*.

A free constitution, when it has been shook by the iniquity of former administrations.—*Bolingbroke*.

A large part of the meadows and cornfields was overflowed.

He was early charged by Asinius Pollio as neither faithful or exact.—*Ledwick*.

He was persuaded to strenuously prosecute the great enterprises of the company.

§ 291. A fault in regard to the settled meaning of words, that is, an offense against the lexicography of a language, is denominated an IMPROPRIETY.

§ 292. Improperities are either in single words or in phrases.

I. IMPROPRIETIES IN SINGLE WORDS.

1. Adjectives.

"The *alone* principle," for "the sole principle."

"A *likely* boy," for "promising."

"This *wilderness* world."

"He did not injure him *any*," for "at all."

"The work was *incident* to decay," for "liable."

"He is *considerable* better."

"He is *considerable* of a man."

"Such words were *derogatory*," for "degrading."

"*Obnoxious* doctrines," for "hurtful doctrines."

2. Nouns and Pronouns.

"Mean" for "means."

"The *observation* of the rule," for "the observance."

"He was in a *temper*," for "bad temper" or "passion."

"The *balance* of them," for "remainder."

- "At a wide *remove*," for "distance."
 "In *community*," for "*the community*."
 "The works of *Deity*," for "of *the Deity*."

3. *Verbs.*

- "I *admire* to hear," for "I like to hear."
 "I *admire* that he should do it," "I wonder," &c.
 "I *expect* he did it," for "suspect."
 "He *does* not fellowship with him," for "hold fellowship."
 "I *learned* him the lesson," for "I taught."
 "He was *raised* in China," for "brought up."
 "Mr. L. *supplied* at Kingston," for "preached."
 "They *calculate* to go," for "intend."
 "There let him *lay*," for "lie."
 "The council was *setting*," for "sitting."
 "To *fall* trees, for "to fell."
 "I *reckon* he did."
 "He *conducts* well," for "conducts himself."
 "It was *predicated* on other grounds."
 "The work *progresses* rapidly."
 "Such doctrines *revolt* us."
 "The proceedings of the cabinet have not *transpired*,"
 for "been made public."
 "Property *appreciates*," for "rises in value."

4. *Conjunctions and Adverbs.*

- "*Like* he did," for "as he did."
 "*Directly* they came, I went away," for "as soon as."
 "He was *quite* sick," for "very."
 "I feel as *though*," for "if."
 "Equally *as well*," for "equally well."
 "As old or older than *tradition*."

5. *Prepositions.*

- "Averse *from*," instead of "averse to."
 "In comparison *to*," for "with."
 "In accordance *to*," for "with."
 "Militate *with*," for "against."
 "Confide *on*," for "in."
 "Independent *on*," for "of."
 "*Worthy*," for "worthy of."
 "Differ *with*," for "from."

II. IMPROPRIETIES IN PHRASES.

Celebrates the church of England as the most perfect of all *others*.

I had like to have gotten *one or two* broken heads.

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES.

The only actions to which we have always seen, and still see all of them intent, are such as tend to the destruction of one another.—*Burke*.

To which, as Bishop Burnet tells us, the Prince of Orange was willing to comply.—*Bolingbroke*.

The discovery he made and communicated with his friends.—*Swift*.

The people being only convoked upon such occasions, as, by this institution of Romulus, fell into their cognizance.—*Id.*

The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness or derogation to their sufficiency to rely upon counsel.—*Bacon's Essays*.

The esteem which Philip had conceived of the ambassador.—*Hume*.

The christians were driven out of all their Asatic professions, in acquiring of which incredible numbers of men had perished.—*Robertson*.

I do likewise dissent with the Examiner.—*Addison*.

Dr. Johnson, with whom I am sorry to differ in opinion, has treated it as a work of merit.—*Scott*.

The memory of Lord Peter's injuries produced a degree of hatred and spite, which had a much greater share of inciting him, than regards after his father's commands.—*Swift*.

You stand to him in the relation of a son; of consequence you should obey him.

It is no more but his due.

The ship lays in the harbor.

He will become enamored for virtue and patriotism, and acquire a detestation of vice, cruelty, and corruption.—*Goldsmith*.

Having been for a fortnight together, they are then mighty good company to be sure.—*Id.*

Now the difference between one audience and another is very great, not only in intellectual, but in moral attainments. It may be clearly intelligible to a House of Commons, which would appear as if spoken in an unknown tongue to a conventicle of enthusiasts. It may kindle fury in the latter, what would create no emotion in the former, but laughter and contempt.—*Campbell.*

This effect, we may safely say, no one beforehand could have promised upon.—*Hume.*

PART II.—SUBJECTIVE PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW.

§ 293. The subjective properties of style are those which are determined to discourse by the mental condition of the speaker. § 244.

Speech is the expression of thought, not as abstract and, so to speak, separate from the thinking mind, not of mere truth or of ideas, but rather of the thinking states of the living speaker. Just so far as it becomes the mere representative of abstract propositions, it sinks from its proper character and elevation. On the other hand, just so far as it is an expression of the thinking mind itself, partaking of its individual life and glow, it fulfils more perfectly its proper object, and consequently is more pleasing and more impressive.

§ 294. The mental condition of the speaker is determined by the natural and acquired characteristics of his own mind, whether common to all mind or peculiar to individuals;

By his physical structure and habits;

By the relations which he sustains to those whom he addresses; and,

By the particular subject and occasion of his discourse.

Mind has properties as mind; and discourse as the expression of mind must exhibit, more or less, these properties. There are only two, however, which demand particular consideration here. They are these;—that mind is a thinking substance; and that it thinks continuously.

The analogies of external nature, ever multifarious and diverse, lead us at once to the conjecture that there are also native idiosyncracies of mind; that each thinking, like each material existence, has peculiarities of its own. At all events, in the development of mind under diverse influences, there arises a great diversity of mental habits.

The physical structure has its influence, not only in determining the mental habits and modes of thought generally, but, also, particularly in the framing of thought for expression. A narrow chest and weak lungs reject long periods and vehement harangue.

Farther, *the professional standing* and *official character* of the speaker should be regarded in style. There is a proper dignity belonging to the pulpit; and the elevated and commanding tones of the general would be ludicrous in the familiar discourse of colloquial equality.

The subject, likewise, and *the occasion* generally of the discourse naturally impress themselves on the mind of the speaker and leave on it their own peculiar characters. The style, consequently, ever shaping itself by the state of the speaker's mind, at the time, is modified by these outward circumstances.

§ 295. The subjective properties of style include those of SIGNIFICANCE, CONTINUOUSNESS, and NATURALNESS.

The two first of these properties are founded on the nature of mind itself. So far as discourse is an expression of mind, it must be significant or expressive of thought.

Thought, moreover, is continuous. The mind, and more especially when cultivated and disciplined, does not act by sudden impulses in irregular, disconnected thoughts: the unity of its aim imposes on its movements the character of progressiveness and consecutiveness.

The property of naturalness is founded on the individuality of thought as the product of one distinct mind peculiar in its native structure and its acquired habits, and influenced in its action by peculiar circumstances of place and time.

CHAPTER II.

SIGNIFICANCE IN STYLE.

§ 296. Significance in style implies two things:

First, That the speaker have some thought to communicate; and

Secondly, That the words employed actually express some meaning.

Sometimes a speaker has no desire to communicate any thought; but speaks for some other object, as to occupy time, or amuse or astonish his audience. This kind of discourse has been denominated "*spurious oratory*."

It sometimes happens, moreover, that through mere vagueness or vacuity of thought a speaker or writer will use the forms of speech with no thought or sentiment expressed in them. This kind of style is termed "*the nonsensical*."

§ 297. SPURIOUS ORATORY, or discourse in which the

speaker does not design to communicate any thought, is, either,

For the purpose of appearing to say something :

For occupying time ; or

For entertaining his audience with words of lofty pretensions, but of no significance.

The first species named is a kind of verbal or rhetorical sophistry, in which want of argument is disguised under the mere dress of words.

The second is very common in deliberative bodies where, to prevent immediate action and delay a decision, a speaker occupies the attention of the assembly with the show of discussion.

The third is a species of rhetorical jugglery, and sometimes appears even in parts of grave and serious discourse, when vanity and love of applause, or perhaps a worse principle, lead to a sacrifice of the high end of speaking to the gratification of a low personal feeling.

§ 298. THE NONSENSICAL in style proceeds from vacuity of thought. The various species of it are *the puerile, the learned, the profound, and the marvellous*.

Dr. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, has ably treated of this part of style; and has indicated at length the causes of it. The species enumerated are those described in his work. The following extracts will exemplify them:

1. *The Puerile*. If 'tis asked whence arises this harmony or beauty of language? The answer is obvious. Whatever renders a period sweet and pleasant makes it also graceful: a good ear is the gift of nature; it may be much improved but not acquired by art. Whoever is possessed of it will scarcely need dry critical precepts to enable him to judge of a true rhythmus, and melody of composition. Just numbers, accurate proportions, a musical symphony,

magnificent figures, and that *decorum* which is the result of all these, are *unison* to the human mind; we are so framed by nature, that their charm is irresistible. Hence all ages and nations have been smit with the love of the muses.—*Geddes on the Composition of the Ancients*.

The cadence comprehends that poetical style which animates every line, that propriety which gives strength and expression, that numerosity which renders the verse smooth, flowing and harmonious, that significance which marks the passions, and in many cases makes the sound an echo to the sense.—*Goldsmith*.

2. *The Learned*. Although we read of several properties attributed to God in Scripture, as wisdom, goodness, justice, &c., we must not apprehend them to be several powers, habits, or qualities, as they are in us; for as they are in God, they are neither distinguished from one another, nor from his nature or essence in whom they are said to be. In whom they are said to be; for, to speak properly, they are not in him, but are his very essence or nature itself; which acting severally upon several objects, seems to us to act from several properties or perfections in him; whereas, all the difference is only in our different apprehensions of the same thing. God in himself is a most simple and pure act, and therefore cannot have any thing in him, but what is that most simple and pure act itself.—*Beveridge's Sermons*.

3. *The Profound*. 'Tis agreed that in all governments there is an absolute and unlimited power, which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole body wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal spirits in general, the body moves and acts by a consent of all its parts.—*Swift*.

4. *The Marvelous*. Nature in herself is unseemly, and he who copies her servilely and without artifice, will always produce something poor and of a mean taste. What is called loads in colors and lights can only proceed from a profound knowledge in the values of colors, and from an

admirable industry which makes the painted objects appear more true, if I may say so, than the real ones. In this sense it may be asserted, that in Reubens' pieces, art is above nature, and nature only a copy of that great master's works.—*Dr. Piles.*

The nonsensical appears not unfrequently in translations in which the words and grammatical construction of the original are followed only in respect to the form; and the particular thought of the author escapes attention.

The following will serve for illustration:

Let Rhetoric therefore be a power or faculty to consider in every subject what is therein contained proper to persuade.

This sentence extracted from a translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric by the translators of the Art of Thinking, conveys no meaning. Rhetoric is not a power or faculty to *consider* in any sense that can be attached to the expression; and we can form no notion of what it is to "consider *in a subject* what is contained in it."

The following is another extract from the same work which is liable to the same censure:

Wherefore also Rhetoric seems to personate politics; and they who challenge the knowledge of it, claim that knowledge partly through ignorance, partly through arrogance, and partly upon other human reasons; for it is a kind of particle and similitude of logic, as we have said in the beginning.

CHAPTER III.

OF CONTINUOUSNESS IN STYLE.

§ 299. CONTINUOUSNESS is that property of style which represents the thought as connected and flowing.

All thought in a cultivated and disciplined mind is con-

tinuous, § 269; and consequently should be so represented in discourse so far as language will allow. There are limits, indeed, to the degree in which this property can be secured to style. When the mind is roused to a high pitch of passion, and the thoughts come strong and quick, language becomes too inflexible and awkward to serve as its ready expression. Then the thought bursts out, as it best can, in dissevered fragments of speech. It leaps, like the electric fluid from cloud to cloud, manifesting itself here and there at wide intervals of space. And yet even then it properly maintains something of the appearance of continuousness, and does not offend the hearer by its violent leaps; but by the very velocity of its movement prevents the notice of its successive radiations, and, like the lightning, gives to its separate flashes the effect of a continuous sheet of light.

Although, thus, strong impassioned thought leads to a sententious style, and, therefore, such a style becomes highly beautiful, as natural and proper to it, the affectation of such a style when the thought is of the opposite character is extremely disgusting.

The speeches of Lord Chatham and Patrick Henry furnish copious examples of a sententious expression which, as warranted by the character of the thought, are fine illustrations of its nature and its proper function.

The following are examples of a style faulty in this respect. The first is an extract from the Euphuës of John Lyly; from which romance the name of Euphuism has been derived to this species of style. This kind of writing is not uncommonly combined with labored antithesis and affected quaintness of expression.

A burnt child dreadeth the fire. He that stumbleth twice at one stone is worthy to break his shins. Thou mayest happily forswear thyself, but thou shalt never delude me.

I know thee now as readily by thy visard as by thy visage. It is a blind goose that knoweth not a fox from a fern-bush; and a foolish fellow that cannot discern craft from conscience, being once cozened.

§ 300. For expressing this continuity in the thought language provides,

In the first place, a great variety of words designed for this very purpose;

Secondly, it allows the use of many forms for this object that are also employed for other purposes of speech; and

Thirdly, It admits of a peculiar structure of the sentence which is adapted to this sole end.

* How great an excellence this is in speech is shown at once in the fact that the human reason in the framing of speech has contrived and furnished so many expedients for binding discourse together, which without them is justly compared to "sand without lime." * It is one of the peculiar excellencies of the Greek tongue that it abounds in such connectives which, while they show the relations of the thought, at the same time give to the expression of it cohesion and compactness.

Of proper connectives we have in language—

1. Conjunctions of all species, both copulative, adversative, conditional, illative, &c.;
2. Relatives of all kinds, whether pronouns or such adverbs as *accordingly, thus, therefore, &c.*, and adjectives of order and others;
3. Forms of expression appropriated to this object, as "*to continue,*" "*to add,*" &c.

In the general structure of the sentence, also, the property

* *Arena sine calce.—Seneca.*

of continuousness or its opposite may be represented to a great degree. The length, the implication and interdependence of the parts, the arrangement of the several members, the imagery, whether derived more from individual objects or extended scenes, from particular features or connected parts—all these various aspects of the sentence may exhibit, more or less, the continuous or the fragmentary character of the thought.

It should be observed, in this connection, that much will depend on the particular habits of the individual speaker whether his style will more naturally be continuous or sententious and abrupt. Simplicity, earnestness, and directness incline more to short, disconnected expressions. Expanded views, fulness of thought, cautiousness and wariness lead to a more extended, connected and continuous style. Continuousness is an excellence only when it is natural. A broken, abrupt, saltatory style, unless obviously determined by the character of the thought, never pleases long. Even the pithy sententiousness of Lord Bacon's style wearies. Strong thought may save such a style: it is not commended by it.

CHAPTER IV.

OF NATURALNESS IN STYLE.

§ 301. NATURALNESS is a property which appears in style so far as it represents the particular state of the speaker's mind at the time of speaking.

The other two subjective properties of style are general, being founded on the nature of thought. Naturalness is

founded on the peculiar mental condition of the individual speaker.

Every one has his own modes of thinking. He has his own modes of viewing truth. His feelings have their own peculiar characteristics. The same ideas, even, passing through two different minds, or through the same mind at different times and in different circumstances, become to a considerable degree modified in their character.

Every one has, also, his own manner of expression. His range of words is peculiar. The structure of his sentences is peculiar. His forms of illustration, his images are peculiar.

Every writer and every speaker, thus, has his own manner. One is more diffuse, another more concise; one more lean and jejune, another more copious and luxuriant; one is more florid, another more plain; one more dry, another more rich and succulent; one more nervous or vehement, another more feeble or tame; one more neat and elegant, another more careless and loose; one more elevated and stately, another more familiar and free. The speaker's own manner best becomes him. While he is careful to avoid positive faults, and particularly those of excess, to vary and enrich with all the various excellencies that can be admitted into his style, he should still preserve his own manner, as scarcely any thing is more offensive than a strained, affected, unnatural style of expression. For the purpose of *forming* a style, it may be safe to select a model and strive to imitate. This may, indeed, be recommended within certain limits and in strict subjection to certain principles. Even here, however, the better course is to study the different elements of expression or properties of style, and exercise on those especially in which there is consciousness of deficiency, using other writers or speakers remarkable for those proper-

ties rather as exemplifications than as models for imitation. But when actually engaging in the work of conveying thought and feeling to others, the speaker or writer should banish from his mind all thought of this or that style or manner, and allow a free spontaneous expression to his thoughts. Reason must, indeed, preside over all discourse. But its influence in securing rational discourse should be exerted rather in determining and shaping the mental habits, and thus impressing its high character on every exertion of the mind while the life and beauty of spontaneous action is still preserved. This is, indeed, the end and object of all true intellectual discipline. Excessive care, at the time of constructing discourse, to preserve from every thing faulty, may be injurious. In writing, at least, it is better to write freely and correct afterwards.

§ 302. Naturalness in style respects the person, the official character and standing of the speaker, and the subject and occasion of his discourse.

§ 303. *The personal characteristics* of style are determined either more directly by the habits of thought, however formed, peculiar to the individual speaker, or more indirectly by his physical habits.

There is a singular beauty in that style which is the free and unforced expression of the speaker's own thoughts with all their peculiar characteristics. It must yet be ever borne in mind that low thoughts and low imagery, even although expressed naturally, must necessarily be offensive. It cannot therefore be too earnestly enjoined on the mind that is forming its habits and character to shun with the utmost care every thing that can vitiate its taste, debase its sentiments, or corrupt the verbal and sensible material in which its thoughts are to embody themselves; and to cultivate

assiduously, on the other hand, familiarity with all that is pure and ennobling in thought and sentiment, and all that is lovely and beautiful in language and in the various kinds of sensible imagery employed in expression. Both of these objects should be kept distinctly in view, viz: the purity and elevation of the thought itself, and the material which is used for embodying thought. Every man has, in an important sense, a language of his own. Both the range of words, and the sensible objects and scenes, as well as all the various means of communicating and illustrating thought, are peculiar, within certain limits, to the individual. Hence arises the imperious necessity of care and labor in providing for a pure and elegant as well as a natural expression of thought by avoiding all low associations both of words and images.

The physical condition and habits of the speaker have much to do with his style. Speech is, materially, a physical effort; and must, consequently, be vitally affected by the condition of the body. Especially do the more proper vocal organs, or those parts of the body which are more directly concerned in speaking, exert an influence on style. The culture of the voice in elocution is, therefore, important to the highest skill in constructing discourse for delivery. In preparing such discourse the writer will ever, even if unconsciously to himself, consult his powers of utterance. Observation abundantly shows how a naturally imaginative and highly impassioned style may be gradually changed into one that is dry and tame by the continued influence of the conviction of an inability appropriately to deliver strongly impassioned discourse. A conscious power and skill to express with effect the most highly wrought discourse will, on the other hand, ever be stimulating to the production of

it. Indeed, the imagined effect of his writings as pronounced by himself will ever control the writer in preparing thought for communication to others. He will not write sentences that he cannot pronounce, on the one hand; and, on the other, he will be secretly prompted to write in such a manner as best to display his skill in delivery.

While naturalness requires that discourse be a free representation of the speaker's own mind and character, it forbids all direct reference to himself. This fault, denominated egotism, is always exceedingly offensive.

§ 304. *The official character and standing* of the speaker should ever so control style as that while it is not suffered to predominate in his attention at all over his subject or the design of his discourse, it yet shall prevent every thing incompatible with such official standing.

The regard which the speaker must pay to his official standing and relations must be a controlling one; and yet only in subordination to that which he is to pay to other things. Official propriety is only one, and a subordinate one, of those species of propriety which must appear in discourse.

§ 305. *The subject and the occasion* of the discourse, as they must affect strongly the mind of the speaker, will also leave their impressions on his style, in rendering it more earnest and elevated, more stately and dignified; or more light and familiar.

The distinction of the high, the low, and the middle styles of oratory recognized by the ancients was founded mainly on the subject and the occasion of the discourse. Other things, it is true, were regarded in the distinction,

as personal peculiarities. Homer thus distributes the different styles among three of his leading characters.* Still, when the attempt was made by rhetoricians to determine the province of these separate styles they generally fell back on the subject. Thus Cicero, *Is erit igitur eloquens, qui poterit parva summis, modica temperate, magna graviter dicere.—Orat. 29.*

The following will serve to illustrate what different character the occasion or the subject will impress on style even when the same thought is to be conveyed. Homer thus describes the morning:

The saffron morn, with early blushes spread,
Now rose refulgent from Tithonus' bed,
With new-born day to gladden mortal sight,
And gild the course of heaven with sacred light.

Butler, in his *Hudibras*, thus describes the same scene:

The sun had long since in the lap
Of Thetis taken out his nap;
And, like a lobster boiled, the morn
From black to red began to turn.

Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America, was led to speak in the following terms of the rapid increase of population in the colonies:

I can by no calculation justify myself in placing the number below two millions of inhabitants of our own European blood and color; besides at least five hundred thousand others, who form no inconsiderable part of the whole. This, sir, is, I believe, about the true number. There is no occasion to exaggerate, when plain truth is of

* *Ea ipsa genera dicendi jam antiquitus tradita ab Homero sunt tria in tribus; magnificentum in Ulyxe et ubertum, subtile in Menelao et cohibitum, mixtum moderatumque in Nestore.—Gell. VII. 14* See also Quint. Inst. Orat. II, 17, 8; XII, 10, 63, 64. Cic. Orat. 23—29.

so much weight and importance. But whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is a matter of little moment. Such is the strength with which population shoots in that part of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood, than they spread from families to communities and from villages to nations.

Dr. Johnson, in his pamphlet entitled "Taxation no Tyranny," aiming at an entirely opposite object, to disparage the colonies, uses the following language in respect to the same point:

But we are soon told that the continent of North America contains three millions, not of men merely, but of whigs; of whigs fierce for liberty, and disdainful of dominion; *that they multiply with the fecundity of their own rattlesnakes*; so that every quarter of a century doubles their numbers.

PART III.—OBJECTIVE PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW.

§ 306. THE OBJECTIVE PROPERTIES of style are those which are determined to discourse by a regard to the effect on the mind addressed. § 244.

The objective properties presuppose the other two classes of properties, and are founded, in part at least, upon them. They differ, sometimes, only in degree; as clearness, which is an objective property, may often be only significance in a higher degree, which is a suggestive property. Energy, also, another objective property, presupposes harmony, an absolute property, as well as others of that class. But it may be necessary, however, for the sake of effect, often to regard those other classes of properties more than would otherwise be required by any consideration of the nature of style.

But this objective use of language, for effect on other minds, requires some characteristics of style that are distinguished from the absolute and subjective properties, not in degree merely, but also in kind. Many of the figures of speech, so called, for instance, are of this character.

The circumstance that the subjective properties presuppose those of the other classes and are founded, in part upon

them will account for the fact that, in some cases, the consideration of the same property may belong in common to different parts of rhetoric.* There is, notwithstanding, an obvious and radical distinction between the three different classes.

§ 307. The objective properties are, all, in their nature relative, and must vary with the various character of the mind addressed.

It is hardly necessary to advance any formal illustrations of the truth of this proposition. What is clear to one mind may be obscure to another. What is impressive and beautiful to one, may be dull and dry to another.

It is still to be observed that all minds have common properties; and there are laws applicable to all alike, which control the exercises of the intellect, the feelings, and the taste. There are, consequently, principles of style which are founded on the general and invariable character of the human mind. Those characteristics which render a discourse clear to one mind will, to a certain extent, be requisite to make it so to every other mind.

§ 308. The objective properties of style are **CLEARNESS, ENERGY, and ELEGANCE.**

It is obvious that in order to affect another mind to the highest degree by discourse, it must not only contain thought,—be significant, but, also, be susceptible of ready interpretation. It must be *clear*.

In order, farther, to a vivid effect upon the intellect and feelings, discourse must bear on its face the character of life

It may be proper to remark here, that in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, some observations are made under one class of properties which might properly fall under another.

and vigor. The thought must be addressed in lively, glowing language. Discourse must be *energetic*.

Once more, the same end of discourse cannot well be effected without regard to the aesthetic properties of the mind; in other words, without regarding the taste of those addressed.

These three properties are all which a consideration of the effect of discourse requires in style, exclusive of those which the nature of language and the mental condition of the speaker impose.

§ 309. Of the three objective properties of style, clearness is, in order of importance, the first and most indispensable; energy is next in importance; and elegance last and lowest.

Clearness is most indispensable, since if discourse is not understood, it can not be felt. Just so far as it is unintelligible, it fails of its very end. Wherever, therefore, clearness comes into collision with energy, it should have the precedence. But yet, as clearness is a property that admits of degrees, and what is slightly obscure may be still intelligible—although only with effort, a high degree of energy may sometimes be properly preferred to a slightly increased degree of clearness.

Farther, energy must be obviously regarded, in all proper oratory, as of superior importance to elegance; while, at the same time, it may be expedient to sacrifice a little energy to gain a high degree of beauty.

The character of discourse will, however, affect the relative properties. In explanatory discourse, where the object is to inform, clearness is decidedly the ruling property; and its claims far outweigh all others. In conviction, energy rises relatively in importance, and may properly require

some sacrifice of clearness. Still more is this the case in excitation and persuasion. Passion, here, sometimes triumphs over reason; and sympathy outruns argument. Wherever, again, vehement feeling enters into discourse, energy should strongly prevail over mere elegance. On the other hand, in gentle excitement of feeling, elegance is elevated, relatively, to a higher rank.

CHAPTER II.

OF CLEARNESS.

§ 310. CLEARNESS in style requires that the thought be so presented that the mind addressed shall apprehend it readily and without labor.

It is not enough that the speaker himself readily apprehend the thought, or that the discourse be clear to himself; or that it may be readily intelligible to a certain class of minds. Clearness, as a relative property of style, § 307, requires that the particular mind addressed be regarded, and that care be taken to adapt the discourse to its capacity of apprehension.

Nor, farther, is it enough that even the mind addressed may, on sufficient study and reflection, be able to make out the sense. The discourse, says Quintilian, should enter the mind, as the sun the eye, even although not intently fixed upon it; so that pains are necessary not merely that the hearer may be able to understand it, but that he can in no way fail to understand it.*

* Ut in animum ejus oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat. Quare non, ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere, curandum.—*Orat. Inst.* III. 2, 23, 24.

§ 311. Clearness depends on a right consideration of three different things in discourse, viz :

1. The kind of words employed ;
2. The representative imagery ; and
3. The structure of the sentence.

§ 312. The kinds of words to be preferred for the sake of securing clearness, are

1. Such as are grammatical in opposition to barbarisms ;
2. Anglo Saxon words ;
3. Such as are not equivocal or ambiguous ; and
4. Simple and specific in distinction from the more generic.

All the varieties of barbarisms enumerated in § 289, are to the popular mind generally obscure or unintelligible, just so far as not in use. It should be remarked, however, that whether barbarisms are clear or otherwise to a particular mind, depends on the circumstance of its having been familiar with them or not. To the scholar, archaisms are not always obscure; nor to the man versed in a particular art or science, are the technicalities of that art obscure. They may be to him, indeed, the clearest of all classes of words. But so far as discourse is intended for the popular mind generally, all barbarisms should, for the sake of clearness, be avoided.

When, on the other hand, the discourse is addressed to a particular class of minds, the words more familiar to that class are preferable as conducive to clearness. An address to sailors may, thus, consistently with clearness, abound with nautical terms.

The following sentences are faulty in respect to the use of this species of words.

Tack to the larboard and stand off to sea,
Veer starboard sea and land.—*Dryden's Æneid.*

He that works by Thessalic ceremonies, by charms and nonsense words, by figures and insignificant characterisms, by images and by rags, by circles and imperfect noises, hath more advantage and real title to the opportunities of mischief, by the cursing tongue.—*J. Taylor's Sermons.*

God begins his cure by caustics, by incisions and instruments of vexation, to try if the disease that will not yield to the alleatives of cordials and perfumes, frictions and baths, may be forced out by deleterics, scarifications, and more salutary, but less pleasing physic.—*Id.*

Anglo-Saxon words, as belonging to the original stock of our language and constituting the truly vernacular part of it, so to speak, are more significant and intelligible to the English mind than those of Latin or French origin, and are on this account to be preferred. Even radical words of Latin origin with Anglo-Saxon terminations are, often, more expressive and clear than those regularly formed with Latin terminations. Hence, perhaps, it is we find so many hybrid terms in our language; such as lucidness, passiveness, tardiness, instead of lucidity, &c.

It is to be observed, however, that in order to greater precision and exactness in the use of language, words of different stocks have become appropriated, respectively, to different shades or applications of the general idea denoted by the original word. Words of Latin derivation have, thus, in many cases, been introduced for the purpose of denoting only one specific shade of the general meaning which is expressed by the proper word, both in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin language. Hence, inasmuch as precision is an element of clearness, a Latin word denoting such a particular aspect of the general idea may be more clear than the corresponding term of Anglo-Saxon origin. Thus the words

human, humane, and manly have originally the same signification; so also, *journal, diary, and daily; igneous and fiery.*

In such cases, the Latin word will often be found to be most perspicuous.

Equivocal words are of four different classes: 1. *Primitives*, to which use has somehow appropriated different significations, of which kind of words the number is very great in all languages; as *coin*, which signifies a corner or wedge, and also a die or money stamped by a die; *helm*, which denotes both a defense for the head and the instrument by which a ship is steered.

The relative pronouns *who, which, and that* are used both to explain and also to limit and restrain the word or words to which they refer. They are, in other words, as Dr. Campbell designates them, *explicative or determinative.*

They are *explicative* in the following sentences:

Man, who is born of woman, is of few days and full of trouble.

Godliness, which with contentment is great gain, has the promise of the present life and of the future.

They are *determinative* in the following:

The man that endureth to the end shall be saved.

The remorse, which issues in reformation, is true repentance.

They are more or less equivocal in the following:

I know that all words which are signs of complex ideas furnish matter of mistake and cavil.

2. *Derivatives and compounds*; as *mortal*, which has both an active and a passive sense, as in the sentence, "As for such animals as are mortal or noxious, we have a right to destroy them"; *consumption*, as, "Your majesty has lost all hopes of any future excises by their consumption"; and in compounds, *overlook*, as, "The next refuge was to say,

it was overlooked by one man, and many passages wholly written by another"; *discharge*, as,

'Tis not a crime to attempt what I decree,
Or if it were, discharge the crime on me.

Dryden's Æneid.

3. *Inflected* words, or those which are equivocal in consequence of a similarity of inflection in different words; as, "She united the great body of the people in *her* and their common interest"; "I have long since learned to like nothing but what you *do*."

Equivocal words are either properly ambiguous, or homonymous. A *properly ambiguous* word is one which has come to be used in different significations, as, *nervous*, which means either *of strong nerves* or *of weak nerves.* *Homonyms* are words which, of a different origin, have accidentally assumed the same form, as *mass*, a heap, and *mass*, a catholic religious service.

Individual and more specific words are to be preferred to those which are more generic, because individual and specific objects are more easily apprehended than abstract and generic.

4. Words which become equivocal *by position*, as in the following instances:

The argument is very plausible, certainly, *if not* entirely conclusive.

The lecture was well attended and *generally* interesting.

§ 313. The representative imagery employed for the communication of thought should for the purpose of clearness, be derived from such objects and truths as are familiar to the mind addressed; and, also, be in itself susceptible of a ready interpretation.

This element of clearness is founded upon the symbolical

properties of language, § 281. From the very nature of language, regarded as symbolical or picture-like, it will be obvious that the symbol or picture itself must be known by the hearer or he cannot interpret it. Here the same observations apply to some extent that have been already made in reference to words of popular use. While all minds may be supposed to be conversant with the great phenomena of nature that daily exhibit themselves to the senses, yet even these specifically differ in different parts of the earth. Hence the inhabitant of sunny Greece may readily understand language that pictures the thought and sentiment through images drawn from his own daily observation, which would be unintelligible to one who dwells under a colder and a cloudier sky. The representative imagery of the Bible is doubtless clear to the orientalist for whom more immediately it was written, while it is often extremely obscure and unintelligible to others. A style that abounds in classical imagery is clear to the scholar; but unmeaning to the uneducated. The sermons of Jeremy Taylor, which employ this kind of representative imagery to a great extent, would entirely fail of effect, from their unintelligibility, on a common audience. - Those discourses, also, which, to an audience familiar with the scriptures, are perfectly clear, we know from actual occurrences are unmeaning even to an intelligent mind that has not been conversant with the Bible.

Farther, even when the mind addressed may be supposed to be familiar with the sources of the imagery, care is necessary to present it in such a manner as that it shall be easily intelligible.

The following are exemplifications of offenses against these principles of clearness:

They thought there was no life after this; or if there were, it was without pleasure, and every soul thrust into a

hole, and a dorter of a span's length allowed for his rest, and for his walk; and in the shades below, no numbering of healths by the numeral letters of Philenium's name, no fat mullets, no oysters of Lucrinus, no Lesbian or Chian wines. Therefore now enjoy the delicacies of nature, and feel the descending wines distilled through the limbeck of thy tongue and larynx, and suck the delicious juices of fishes, the marrow of the laborious ox, and the tender lard of Apulian swine, and the condited bellies of the scarus; but lose no time, for the sun drives hard, and the shadow is long, and "the days of mourning are at hand," but the number of the days of darkness and the grave cannot be told.—*J. Taylor.*

So neither will the pulse and the leeks, Lavinian sausages, and the Cisalpine suckets and gobbets of condited bull's-flesh, minister such delicate spirits to the thinking man; but his notion will be flat as the noise of the Arcadian porter, and thick as the first juice of his country lard, unless he makes his body a fit servant to the soul, and both fitted for the employment.—*Id.*

§ 314. Clearness, as depending on the structure of the sentence is affected either by the brevity of the expression, or by the relation between the parts of the sentence.

§ 315. Brevity is opposed to clearness whenever,

1. Through want of copious and ample illustration, the thought is not held up sufficiently long before the mind for thorough apprehension; or
2. For want of completeness, the whole thought is not presented.

Different minds differ much in regard to quickness of apprehension. The speaker should, therefore, inquire carefully of himself, whether through natural dullness of apprehension, or through want of familiarity with the subject, the mind addressed requires more or less time for contem-

plating the thought in order to apprehend it; and amplify the expression accordingly. He should, likewise, consult the state of the speaker's mind at the time. When the mind is excited and attentive, the apprehension is quicker than when it is dull and uninterested. In the more animated parts of the discourse, accordingly, greater brevity is admissible. It is then less necessary to amplify the thought—to carry out the expression to perfect completeness. Brief hints and suggestions may be sufficient to put the hearers in possession of the entire thought.

Repetition is generally to be preferred to obscurity or ambiguity. Dr. Campbell exemplifies this principle by the following passage, in which the words, *his father*, are repeated three times without disagreeable effect. "We said to my lord, The lad cannot leave his father; for if he should leave his father, his father would die."

The following sentences are faulty in this respect:

If he delights in these studies, he can have enough of them. He may bury himself in them as deeply as he pleases. He may revel in them incessantly, and eat, drink, and clothe himself with them.

How immense the difference between the pious and profane.

§ 316. Clearness, as depending on the relation of the parts of the sentence, is affected

1. By the use of the relative words in it;
2. By the arrangement of the different members; and
3. By the interposition of parenthetical clauses.

§ 317. Relative words may either be too remotely separated from their antecedents, or may be of ambiguous reference.

The following are examples of this class of faults:

a. *Too remotely separated;*

God heapeth favors on his servants ever liberal and faithful.

b. *Of ambiguous reference;**

Lysias promised to his father never to abandon his friends.

Dr. Prideaux used to relate that when he brought the copy of his "Connection of the Old and New Testaments" to the bookseller, he told him it was a dry subject, and the printing could not be safely ventured upon unless he could enliven the work with a little humor.

Thus I have fairly given you, Sir, my own opinion as well as that of a great majority of both houses here, relating to this weighty affair; upon which I am confident, you may securely reckon.

They were summoned occasionally by their kings, when compelled by their wants and by their foes to have recourse to their aid.

He conjured the senate, that the purity of his reign might not be stained by the blood even of a guilty senator.

He atoned for the murder of an innocent son, by the execution perhaps of a guilty wife.

Their intimacy had commenced in the happier period, perhaps, of their youth and obscurity.

We do those things frequently that we repent of afterwards.

Sixtus the Fourth, was, if I mistake not, a great collector of books at least.—*Bolingbroke*.

* Reinhard in his *Memoirs and Confessions* says, "I have always had considerable difficulty in making a proper use of pronouns. Indeed, I have taken great pains so to use them, that all ambiguity by the reference to a wrong antecedent should be impossible, and yet have often failed in the attempt. * * * That it is difficult to avoid all obscurity of this kind I am ready to acknowledge. It can often be done only by completely changing the train of thought and casting it into another form.—*Letter III*, Boston Ed. pp. 102—3.

It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of our Heavenly Father.—*Sherlock*.

Men look with an evil eye upon the good that is in others, and think that their reputation obscures them, and that their commendable qualities do stand in their light; and therefore they do what they can to cast a cloud over them, that the bright shining of their virtues may not obscure them.—*Tillotson*.

This work in its full extent, being now afflicted with an asthma, and finding the powers of life gradually declining, he had no longer courage to undertake.—*Johnson*.

§ 318. In respect to the *arrangement of the members* of a sentence, clearness requires

1. That the parts of the complex thought be presented in their relative prominence and dependence;

2. That the related clauses be kept in close proximity; and

3. That the order be such as to indicate the dependence and connection.

1. *Relation of leading and subordinate thoughts.*

This relation is not regarded in the following sentences:

After we came to anchor, they put me on shore, where I was welcomed by all my friends, who received me with the greatest kindness.

In this sentence, it is difficult to tell which is the leading thought; or on which circumstance the writer intended to fix the attention of his readers. The unity of the sentence, by the failure to express the due subordination of the parts, is destroyed. The same fault is seen in the following sentences:

The usual acceptation takes profit and pleasure for two different things, and not only calls the followers or votaries

of them by several names of busy and idle men, but distinguishes the faculties of the mind that are conversant about them, calling the operations of the first wisdom, and of the other wit, which is a Saxon word, that is used to express what the Spaniards and Italians call *ingenio*, and the French *esprit*, both from the Latin; but I think wit more peculiarly signifies that of poetry, as may occur upon remarks on the Runic language.—*Temple*.

He is supposed to have fallen, by his father's death, into the hands of his uncle, a vintner, near Charing Cross, who sent him for some time to Dr. Busby, at Westminster; but, not intending to give him any education beyond that of the school, took him, when he was well advanced in literature, to his own house, where the Earl of Dorset, celebrated for patronage of genius, found him by chance, as Burnet relates, reading Horace, and was so well pleased with his proficiency, that he undertook the care and cost of his academical education.—*Johnson's Life of Prior*.

2. *Proximity of related clauses.* The following sentences offend against this principle of clearness.

The moon was casting a pale light on the numerous graves that were scattered before me, as it peered above the horizon, when I opened the small gate of the church-yard.

There will, therefore, be two trials in this town at that time, which are punishable with death, if a full court should attend.

Mr. Dryden makes a very handsome observation on Ovid's writing a letter from Dido to Æneas, in the following words.

3. *Order of dependence.* In the following sentences it is difficult to determine which is the subject and which the object of the verb:

And thus the son the fervent sire addressed.

The rising tomb a lofty column bore.

In the following, the dependence of the Italicised clause is obscurely represented:

As it is necessary to have the head clear as well as the

complexion, *to be perfect in this part of learning*, I rarely mingle with the men, but frequent the tea-tables of the ladies.

In the following sentence obscurity is occasioned by the position of the relative word before its antecedent:

When a man declares in autumn, when he is eating *them*, or in spring when there are *none*, that he loves *grapes*.

§ 319. Clearness is often violated by the introduction of long *parenthetical clauses*, and especially of parentheses containing other parentheses within themselves.

The writings of the Apostle Paul, which are characterised more by energy than by clearness, are remarkable for this introduction of long and involved parentheses. A remarkable instance occurs in his epistle to the Ephesians. The subject of the verb is in the first verse of the fourth chapter. The following extracts furnish further exemplifications of the same fault:

It was an ancient tradition, that when the capitol was founded by one of the Roman Kings, the god Terminus, who presided over boundaries, and was represented according to the fashion of that age, by a large stone, alone, among all the inferior deities, refused to yield his place to Jupiter himself.—*Gibbon's Rome*.

The description Ovid gives of his situation, in that first period of his existence, seems, some poetical embellishments excepted, such as, were we to reason *a priori*, we should conclude he was placed in.—*Lancaster on Delicacy*.

CHAPTER III.

OF ENERGY.

§ 320. ENERGY is that property in style by means of which the thought is impressed with a peculiar vividness or force on the mind addressed.

This property of style has been variously denominated, as vivacity, strength, and energy; all which terms, from their etymology, point at once to the nature of the property designated by them.

For the sake of clearness it will be convenient to consider this property in respect to its two species; as secured to style in accordance with the other properties, or only by a certain deviation from these properties. — See § 306.

§ 321. Energy is either *proper* or *figurative*.

PROPER energy is secured to style in accordance with the other properties;

FIGURATIVE energy, by a greater or less deviation from them.

Without going out of the range of the other properties enumerated, it is obvious style may be more or less modified in accordance with their principles with a view to energetic effect. Such modifications, made with a view to such a vivid impression, come properly under consideration under the head of energy.

But discourse admits of modifications with a view to energy, which are not properly dictated by any principles that belong to these other properties. It is often *turned* from the direction in which it would flow if those properties alone controlled it. The verbal expression of thought as

thus turned from its natural course is termed *figurative* expression.

§ 322. Proper energy depends on the kind of words employed, the number and the arrangement of them in the sentence.

§ 323. Energy requires, in respect to *the kinds of words* employed, that

Those of Anglo-Saxon origin, be preferred to others;

Those of national and popular use to barbarisms, whether foreign or technical; and

The more specific to the more generic and abstract.

It is unnecessary to add to the remarks already made under the head of clearness, § 312, in order to illustrate the truth and importance of this principle of style. It is sufficient to observe here that style admits of great modifications in respect to the kind of words habitually employed by the speaker, and that even great energy of thought may be lost in the selection of words that are wanting in this element of expression. It cannot, therefore, be too earnestly enjoined on the forming speaker to study those authors assiduously who are distinguished for their use of Anglo-Saxon, the strictly vernacular and the specific words of our language. It will generally be found that the same taste and the same training which have led to the habitual preference of one of these classes of words, have made, also, the others most familiar and pleasing. Care should be taken to make the classes of words form the body of sound,—the material in which the thoughts most easily and spontaneously invest themselves. That this is practicable is proved by the fact that men learn universally to think in the language which is spoken around them. As we have authors which are characterised by this excellence and others which abound in

Latin and French words and idioms, it is obvious the former should be habitually studied and committed to memory, while the others should be left for maturer reading. Conversation generally prefers Anglo-Saxon words. Even Dr. Johnson himself, in the familiarity and earnestness of his ordinary conversation, employed Anglo-Saxon words, which in his written discourse he unhappily translated into a latinized dialect.* Hence the study of language as employed in common life is highly useful to the orator in this respect.

§ 324. In respect to *the number of words*, the principle of energy is, that the utmost brevity consistent with clearness and with the other principles of energy, be preserved.

In the application of this principle, not only redundant words and phrases are to be avoided, but, also, the more direct and simple forms of expression are to be preferred to the more circuitous and prolix. Hence, often, the sentence should be wholly re-cast.

The following sentences are faulty in respect to this principle:

I went home full of *a great many* serious reflections.

I shall suppose, then, in order to try to account for the vision without a miracle, that as Saul and his company

* Macaulay, in an article in the Edinburgh Review for 1831, gives the following exemplifications. In one of Johnson's familiar letters he says, "When we were taken up stairs, a dirty fellow bounced out of the bed on which one of us was to lie." He records this incident in his *Journey to the Hebrides* thus; "Out of one of the beds on which we were to repose, started up at our entrance, a man black as a Cyclops from the forge." Sometimes he translated aloud, "The Rehearsal," he said, "has not wit enough to keep it sweet;" then, after a pause, "it has not vitality enough to preserve it from putrefaction."

were journeying *along in their way* to Damascus, an extraordinary meteor really did happen.

Neither is any condition of life more honorable in the sight of God than another, otherwise he would be a respecter of persons, *which he assures us he is not.*

It will often be greatly conducive to the energetic effect of the whole expression, after having presented the thought for the sake of clearness in a more extended form, to repeat it in a more condensed sentence.

The following extract from Burke will furnish an exemplification:

When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of *fealty*, which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and subjects from the precaution of tyranny, shall be extinct in the minds of men, plots and assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation, and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims, which form the political code of all power, not standing on its own honor, and the honor of those who are to obey it. *Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle.*

§ 325. Energy, in the arrangement of the parts of a sentence, depends,

First, On the preservation of unity in the general form of the sentence;

Secondly, On the right disposition of the capital words and members; and

Thirdly, On the disposition of coördinate or correlative words or members.

§ 326. UNITY in a sentence is preserved by the presentation of but one leading subject, § 318, and by the binding together of all the parts in one compact whole.

The first element of unity here mentioned has been sufficiently considered under the head of clearness.

The second appears in style in the periodic structure, § 269, in which the leading member of the sentence, being placed last, binds the whole together into one compact whole.

The following are examples of the periodic structure:

While all the Pagan nations consider Religion as one part of Virtue, the Jews, on the contrary, regard Virtue as a part of Religion.

For as guilt never rose from a true use of our rational faculties, so it is very frequently subversive of them. God forbid that prudence, the first of all the virtues, as well as the supreme director of them all, should ever be employed in the service of any of the vices.—*Burke.*

There is something in the present business, with all that is horrible to create aversion, so vilely loathsome, as to excite disgust. It is, my lords, surely superfluous to dwell on the sacredness of the ties, which those aliens to feeling, those apostates to humanity thus divided. In such an assembly, as the one before which I speak, there is not an eye but must look reproof to their conduct;—not a heart but must anticipate its condemnation.—*Sheridan.*

§ 327. The most conspicuous parts of the sentence being the commencement and the close, these parts should, when energy of expression is aimed at, be given to the capital or leading words and members.

This principle forbids commencing or closing a sentence with circumstantial words or clauses, unless it is desired to give them an emphatic distinction. In merely didactic discourse, such clauses are admissible because they often conduce to clearness and readiness of apprehension. In earnest oratory they can never be justified except, as has been just observed, when they are made emphatic. In this case,

placing them at the beginning or the close at once gives them a high degree of force and impressiveness.

We find in the Latin language a happy exemplification of this principle of energy. When Mucius Scaevola in Livy wishes to turn the attention of Porsenna on the fact that he was a Roman, he says, *Romanus sum civis*. On the other hand, when Gavius in Cicero's oration against Verres was urging his rights as a citizen, not merely as a Roman, he says, *Civis Romanus sum*. Although the words are the same, the leading thought being different in the two cases, Livy places one word at the beginning of the sentence, and Cicero another; and both clearly from mere reference to energetic effect.

The following sentences are faulty in this respect:

The other species of motion are incidentally blended *also*.

Every nature you perceive is either too excellent to want it, or too base to be capable of it.

Seeing the delay of repentance doth mainly rely upon the hopes and encouragement of a future repentance, let us consider a little how unreasonable these hopes are, and how absurd the encouragement is which men take from them.

But it is absurd to think of judging either Ariosto or Spenser by precepts which they did not attend to.—*Watson*.

There need no more than to make such a registry only voluntary, to avoid all the difficulties that can be raised, and which are not too captious or too trivial to take notice of.—*Temple*.

In like manner, if a person in broad day-light were falling asleep, to introduce a sudden darkness would prevent his sleep for that time, though silence and darkness in themselves, and not suddenly introduced, are very favorable to it. This I know only by conjecture on the analogy of the senses when I first digested these observations; but I have since experienced it.—*Burke*.

The following extracts, on the other hand, furnish instances of this kind of energy:

In their prosperity my friends shall never hear of me; in their adversity, *always*.

True liberty, in my opinion, can only exist when justice is equally administered to all, to the king, and to the beggar.

Never, so clearly as in the present instance, have I observed that safeguard of justice which Providence has placed in the nature of man.

No: I am no emissary—my ambition was to hold a place among the deliverers of my country—not in power, not in profit, but in the glory of the achievement! Sell my country's independence to France! and for what? A change of masters? No: but for ambition!

Under this species of energy may be ranked what has been denominated *the Climax*; or that structure of the sentence in which the different members succeed each other in order of strength or importance, the most impressive being placed last.

The following are examples:

In the middle of the day, at the moment of divine worship, when the miserable husband was on his knees, directing the prayers and the thanksgivings of his congregation to their God—that moment did the remorseless, &c.

Impose upon me whatever hardships you please; give me nothing but the bread of sorrow to eat; take from me the friend in whom I had placed my confidence; lay me in the cold hut of poverty and on the thorny bed of disease; set before me death in all its terrors; do all this, only let me trust in my Savior, and I will fear no evil—I will rise superior to affliction—I will rejoice in my tribulation.

§ 328. In the arrangement of the sentence, further, coördinate and correlative words and members should be placed in corresponding parts, so as to answer to each other and reflect on each other, so to speak, their own force.

The Latin and Greek languages, through the variety of their inflections, admitted this species of energy to a much greater degree than most modern tongues. Cicero says that the following expression drew forth wonderful applause from the audience:

*Patris dictum sapiens, temeritas filii comprobavit.**

The following are from his orations; the first from that for Ligarius, the second from the oration for Roscius Amerinus:

Nihil habet nec fortuna tua majus quam ut possis, nec natura tua melius quam ut velis, conservare plurimos.

Accusant ii, quibus occidi patrem Sexti Roscii bono fuit; causam dicit is, cui non modo luctum mors patris attulit, verum etiam egestatem. Accusant ii, qui hunc ipsum jugulare summe cupierunt; causam dicit is, qui etiam ad hoc ibidem ante oculos vestros trucidetur.

In our own language, the following sentences may be given as illustrations:

Never before were so many opposing interests, passions, and principles committed to such a decision. On one side an attachment to the ancient order of things, on the other a passionate desire of change; a wish in some to perpetuate,

* Orator, 63. Hoc dichoreo tantus clamor concionis excitatus est, ut admirabile est. If the double trochee at the close had its effect, it is yet questionable whether the energy of the expression is not owing still more to the admirable arrangement of the words, which are made most perfectly to answer to each other. 'Patris' and 'filii' are at the extremes; 'sapiens' and 'temeritas' in the middle in juxta-position, and the one at the close, the other at the commencement of the respective members to which they belong; and the un-related word 'dictum' thrown as far as possible out of view. The whole sentence is bound together by the verb, which as the most important word, occupies the last place in the sentence. We have, besides, the inversion of the object before the subject. To all this is to be added the harmony of the whole. There is here a combination of many excellencies of style.

in others to destroy every thing; every abuse sacred in the eyes of the former, every foundation attempted to be demolished by the latter; a jealousy of power shrinking from the slightest innovation, pretensions to freedom pushed to madness and anarchy; superstition in all its dotage, impiety in all its fury.

Sullen and severe without religion, profligate without gaiety, you live like Charles the Second, without being an amiable companion; and, for aught I know, may die, as his father did, without the reputation of a martyr.

§ 329. As, frequently, it may be desired to weaken and soften rather than to strengthen the expression, this object may be effected, for the most part, by means just the reverse of those which have been prescribed for imparting energy.

The English language, from the very heterogeneousness of its origin, allows more than most other languages this variation in the degrees of energy. The same object may be represented by a skillful orator in the strongest vividness and force or in the most indifferent tameness, simply by means of a different selection from those words which are grammatically proper to the object. Here belong those expressions usually denominated *Euphemisms*, which are employed to soften or weaken the impression made by the more appropriate representation. The following are exemplifications:

1. *In the kind of words:* The toast concludes with a patriotic wish for all his persuasion, by the consummation of which there can be no doubt the hempen manufactures of this country would experience a very considerable consumption.

For when the restless Greeks sat down
So many years, before Troy town,
And were renowned, as Homer writes,
For well-soaled boots, no less than fights.

2. *In the number of words:*

They did that which every master would have wished his servants to do in such an exigency: instead of, they killed Clodius.

3. *In the arrangement of words:*

Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

§ 330. Figurative energy is founded either,

1. On the kind and number of words employed;
2. On the representative imagery; or,
3. On the structure of the sentence.

The most strictly philosophical treatment of figurative energy, as well as also of clearness, would represent it in the light of the absolute and subjective properties of style, and follow the method furnished by the analysis of those properties. But both to prevent repetition and for convenience and simplicity, it may, perhaps, better be exhibited under the three heads named above.

§ 331. These forms of figurative energy which depend on the kind of words employed, are denominated *Tropes*, which may be defined as follows:

A **TROPE** is a word employed for the sake of energy in a different import from that which is proper to it.

It is obvious to remark that tropes are founded on the etymological properties of language. They are figurative uses of the proper import of words. A tropical *impropriety* is denominated a *catechresis*.

§ 322. Tropes impart energy to style by representing the object in a more individual or sensible form than the proper denomination of it; as *sceptre* instead of *dominion*; *Homer* instead of *the Homeric poems*; *Britain* instead of *the government of Great Britain*.

§ 333. Tropes may be distributed into two classes according as they are founded on a direct resemblance of properties, or an indirect resemblance or similarity of relations.

The former class may be denominated *simple tropes*; the latter are called *metaphors*.

All tropes are founded on resemblance, or, more philosophically speaking, on a more or less perfect identity. This partial identity or resemblance can always be traced even in the most remote cases. When we say, thus, "The crescent wanes," instead of, "The Mohammedan power declines," we first conceive of the flag of that power from its characteristic symbol; and then of the power itself from the flag which represents it; and in both cases the conception is founded on a species of local identity. The place of the crescent is in the flag; and of the flag with the presence of the power or authority. Without this identity, the mind has no power to conceive of the object represented. If the identity respect only one or two obscure particulars, or, in other words, if the resemblance be but faint and dim, the trope is *catachrestic*—harsh and far-fetched. The explanation of tropical energy is hence obvious. By the trope, the mind addressed is placed in a certain place or time or analogous relation, from which it views the object represented; as in the trope 'a boisterous multitude,' the mind is referred to a furious wind swelling and roaring, and in that sensible image perceives the characteristic given in the epithet to the 'multitude.'

Hence, when a word originally tropical ceases, from familiar use, to call up the sensible or singular object or scene to which it properly refers, it loses its tropical charac-

ter. Such is the tendency in the progress of language with all tropes.

Here we find the explanation of the fact that the same discourse pleases an imaginative mind skilled in the use of language and accustomed to refer the words to the sensible object which they originally represented, that, to another mind, seems wholly destitute of beauty. Here, too, is found the explanation of the peculiar energy and beauty of that species of style which puts the imagination of the reader constantly in the way of making this reference.

These general observations apply with equal force to the second class of figures or those founded on the representative imagery.

§ 334. Simple Tropes are of two species;

Those in which the objects compared differ in degree, and those in which the objects differ in kind.

A trope of the former species is termed a *synecdoche*, as "Cicero" instead of "orator;" "a sail" for "a vessel."

A trope of the latter species is called a *metonymy*; as "the father of Jupiter" for "Saturn;" "the grave" for "death."

§ 335. SYNECDOCHE is a trope in which either the part is put for the whole, or a species or individual for the class.

Examples of the former variety are;

"*England* is still flourishing for the instruction of the world," for "Great Britain."—*Mirabeau*.

"By *thousands*," for "great numbers."

The following are instances of the latter variety:

Romanus proelio victor, for *Romani*.

Some village *Hampden* that, with dauntless breast,
The little tyrant of his fields withstood;
Some mute inglorious *Milton* here may rest,
Some *Cromwell*, guiltless of his country's blood.

So thought the countries of Demosthenes and the Spartan:
yet *Leonidas* is trampled by the timid slave, &c.

§ 336. When the whole is put for a part, or the class for the species or individual, the trope is still called a *synecdoche*. In this case, for the most part, the energy of the expression is weakened.

'To appropriate to one's self,' is more general language and less forcible than 'to steal.' 'He went to his rest,' is a softer expression than 'he died.' The use of the plural "we" is thus less egotistical than the singular "I."

On the other hand, when the general essence is put for the individual concrete the trope is often highly energetic; as, "gold" for "the money" made from it, as, 'Paid my price in paltry gold.' 'Freedom shrieked,' for 'the friends of freedom.'

§ 337. A METONYMY is a trope in which the object is represented by a word properly applied to something else that differs in kind from the represented object.

The additional energy imparted to the expression by this trope is owing to the circumstance that the object is represented by means of one more familiar, or more readily conceived, in consequence of its being single or cognizable by the senses.

The different varieties of this trope may be thus classified:

1. Cause represented by the effect or *vice versa*; as "gray hairs" for "old age"; "Milton" for Milton's writings."

This variety is ultimately founded on identity of time, as the following is on that of place.

2. Substance by quality, property, or accident, and *vice versa*; as, "the sun" for "the heat of the sun"; "Brutus" for "inflexible firmness"; "wealth counts its cattle" for "the man of wealth."

Here belongs the metonymy of the sign for the thing signified, and the reverse; as 'scepter' for 'dominion.'

3. The time, for what existed or transpired in it, and *vice versa*; as, 'antiquity' for 'the men of antiquity,' 'posterity' for 'the future.'

Under this variety is included the metonymy founded on proximity of time.

4. The place, for what is in it or associated with it, and *vice versa*; as 'Greece' for 'the Greeks'; 'the forum' for 'a judicial tribunal,' or 'judicial business.'

§ 338. A METAPHOR is a trope in which the representation of the object is effected by the use of a word properly denoting something analogous; and is founded on a resemblance or identity of relations.

A metaphor being founded on an identity of relation is by this distinguished from simple tropes, § 333. The nature of the metaphor may be seen from the following illustrations:

"Time had *ploughed* his venerable front."—The word "ploughed" is here used metaphorically. The use of it is justified on the ground of the analogy of the effect of literal ploughing to that of time. In other words, what the driving of the plough is to the soil, time was to the forehead. The resemblance on which the metaphor is founded is obviously one of relation and not of properties.

O! when the growling winds contend, and all
The sounding forest fluctuates in the storm,
To sink in warm repose and hear the din
Howl o'er the steady battlements—

There is in these lines an accumulation of metaphors, all clearly distinguishable by the characteristic named from the simple trope. The winds are said to growl from the analogy of the effect on the mind to the growls of a wolf. What growling is to the wolf, the noise of the storm is to the wind. So the motion of the forest is to the trees what the *fluctuation* of the water is to the waving sea. The same remark is applicable to 'the howling of the din over the battlement.' It is to be observed that in the first and last of these metaphors there is, besides the metaphor, also, the figure of personification.

The metaphor often contains in itself a simple trope, as in the following examples:

Metaphors of Synecdoche; "A sea of troubles," for "a multitude of troubles."

Apollo bade me check my fond desire,
Nor on the vast Tyrrhenian spread my little sail.

In this last instance, the 'Tyrrhenian' is a synecdoche for any large sea; and it is likewise used metaphorically,—the vast sea being to a little bark what epic themes were to the lyric spirit of Horace.

Metaphors of metonymy. 1. Cause and effect.

Bears his *blushing* honors thick upon him,
Streaming Grief his faded cheek bedewed.

Grief is here put for the effect and is characterised metaphorically as *streaming*.

2. Substance and property.

Or have ye chosen this place
After the toils of battle, to repose
Your *wearied virtue*?

"Virtue" is here used for the persons to whom it belongs, and "wearied virtue" is a metaphor.

3. Time; as, *Merciful clime*; 'Summer life' for 'agreeable life.'

4. Place. 'Bleeding bosom' for 'grieving heart.'

§ 339. Figurative energy as depending on *the number of words* consists in a repetition or an omission of certain words which the ordinary forms of expression do not admit or require.

§ 340. This class of figures includes *Figurative Repetition* and *Ellipsis*.

FIGURATIVE REPETITION includes *epizeuxis* where the word is immediately repeated without any intervening word or clause, as, "The introducers of the now-established principles of political economy may fairly be considered to have made a great *discovery*; a *discovery* the more creditable," &c.; and *epanalepsis*, where a word or clause intervenes, as, "The persecutions undergone by the Apostles furnished both a trial to their faith, and a confirmation to ours: a *trial* to them," &c.

The repetition of connectives belongs to this class, and is called *Polysyndeton*; as, "Such a man might fall a victim to power; but truth and reason and liberty would fall with him."

And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief-captains, and the mighty men, and every bond-man, and every freeman, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains.

ELLIPSIS is the omission of a word or words which would be supplied in the ordinary form of expression; as,

Hereditary bondmen! know ye not,
Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow?

The Ellipsis of connectives is termed *asyndeton*; as,
Veni, vidi, vici.

§ 341. Those forms of figurative energy which depend on *the representative imagery* include three species;

1. Those figures which consist in a change of the nature or relations of the represented object;

2. Those which consist in comparison or contrast; and

3. Those which consist in a deviation from the ordinary mode of expressing the mental condition of the speaker.

§ 342. The first class of representative figures includes those of *vision*, *personification*, and *hyperbole*.

VISION is a figure in which the object although really remote is represented as present in time or place.

This figure, which is founded on a represented change in the relations of the object to time or place, is exceedingly common; and is found in style of all degrees of energy and vehemence. The following are illustrations:

He was chosen: his forces were collected with the utmost diligence: he marched as if towards Cyrrha. But now, farewell at once to all regard either to the Cyrrheans or the Locrians! He *seizes* Elatea.—*Demosthenes on the Crown*.

The unhappy man, arrested as he was going to embark for his native country, is brought before the wicked praetor. With eyes darting fury, and a countenance distorted with cruelty, he orders the helpless victim of his rage to be stripped, and rods to be brought; accusing him, but without the least shadow of evidence, or even of suspicion, of having come to Sicily as a spy.—*Cicero against Verres*.

Advance, then, ye future generations. We would hail you, as you rise in your long succession, to fill the places which we now fill, and to taste the blessings of existence, where we are passing, and soon shall have passed our own

human duration. We bid you welcome to this pleasant land of the Fathers.—*Webster*.

The figure in this last example is specifically denominated an *apostrophe*. It is in truth, however, a combination of vision and apostrophe. § 344.

PERSONIFICATION is a figure in which inanimate objects and qualities are represented as living beings.

This likewise, is, a very common figure. Indeed, as many words in every language which were originally applied to inanimate objects or mere qualities only figuratively, have, by use, dropped their personifying character and are regarded as proper terms; so, likewise, phrases and extended forms of representative imagery have become the ordinary and proper modes of representation.

It is often conjoined with vision, and especially, with apostrophe.

But look, the morn, in russet mantle clad,
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill.
Shakspeare.

With such delay

Well pleased, they slack their course, and many a league,
Cheered with the grateful smell, *old Ocean smiles.*
Milton.

Ye woods and wilds, whose melancholy gloom
Accords with my soul's sadness, and draws forth
The tear of sorrow from my bursting heart,
Farewell awhile.—*Home.*

The peculiar nature of the English language, which applies no distinctions of gender to objects destitute of sex, makes the use of this figure at once easy and forcible. The simple application of a personal pronoun implying sex to an inanimate object at once invests it with personality.

In like manner, liberty herself, the last and best gift of

God to his creatures, must be taken just as she is. You may pare her down into bashful regularity, and shape her into a perfect model of severe scrupulous law but she will be liberty no longer.—*Erskine.*

When Natural Religion has thus viewed both, ask her, Which is the prophet of God? But her answer we have already had, when she saw part of this scene, through the eyes of the centurion, who attended at the cross. By him she spoke, and said: "Truly this man was the Son of God." —*Comparison of the religion of Christ and of Mahomet in Sherlock's Sermons.*

The opposite of this figure, where a person is represented as a thing, has a similar energy in exposing a character to scorn and contempt.

How in the name of soldiership and sense,
Should England prosper, when such things, as smooth
And tender as a girl, all essenced o'er
With odors, and as profligate as sweet;
Who sell their laurel for a myrtle wreath,
And love when they should fight: when such as these
Presume to lay their hand upon the ark
Of her magnificent and awful cause?

HYPERBOLE is a figure in which the object is represented as magnified or diminished beyond reality.

As vision is founded on a change *in the relations* of the represented object, and personification on a change in its *nature or kind*, hyperbole is founded on a change in the *degree* of some of its properties or qualities.

I saw their chief, tall as a rock of ice; his spear, the fir; his shield the rising morn: he sat on the shore, like a cloud of mist on the hill.—*Ossian.*

A lover may bestride the Gossamer,
That idles in the wanton summer air,
And yet not fall—so light is vanity.—*Shakspeare.*

He was the owner of a bit of ground not larger than a Lacedemonian letter.

The minds of the aged are like the tombs to which they are approaching; where, though the brass and the marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery has mouldered away.

§ 343. The second class of representative figures being founded on a comparison of one object with another include those of *comparison proper* and *simile*; *contrast*, *allegory*, and *allusion*.

This class of figures differs from the first class in this that while the latter confine the view to the object itself and only represent it as changed in its relations, nature or degree, those of the second class go out from the object itself and represent it only through the light of some other to which it bears some resemblance.

The COMPARISON PROPER is a figure in which the properties or relations of the object are represented by means of similar properties or relations in another object of the same class.

The comparison differs from the metaphor chiefly in being more extended. It is not essential to the comparison that the words of comparison, 'like,' 'as,' 'so,' &c., be actually expressed; although the term "metaphor," or "metaphorical comparison," is more commonly applied when those words are omitted. The figure is in this case bolder and makes a stronger demand on the imagination of the reader; as all the properties of the representative object are in form attributed to the other, and the reader is left to distinguish and select from among them such as may be appropriate. The use of the comparative particles and words, on the other hand, indicate only a partial resemblance. If the poet had said, "Be not dumb, driven cattle," the expression, if allowed by the meter, would be felt at once to be stronger

and bolder than the comparative form which he adopts; "Be not like dumb driven cattle."

The SIMILE differs only in form from the comparison. The term 'simile' turns the mind on the object to which the theme is likened as the prominent thing. In the simile, accordingly, the representative object is presented as the leading theme; and the represented as the subordinate one. In the comparison, on the other hand, the represented object is made the leading theme. Thus, a comparison would be in this form; "As when the thunder rolls in peals; the lightning glances on the rocks; spirits ride on beams of fire; and the strength of the mountain-streams comes running down the hills: so was the voice of battle." In the simile, the representative object would be presented as the leading theme; as, "Thou hast seen the sun retire red and slow behind his cloud; night gathering round on the mountain; while the unfrequent blast roared in narrow vales. At length the rain beats hard; and thunder rolls in peals. Lightning glances on the rocks, spirits ride on beams of fire, and the strength of the mountain-streams comes roaring down the hills. Such was the noise of battle." Differing thus slightly, the simile and comparison are very commonly confounded.

CONTRAST is a figure in which the object is represented by another similar object, but the attention is turned on the opposition or points of difference between them.

Contrast thus involves comparison, since there can be no contrast between things entirely dissimilar; it differs from comparison in this, that while it assumes the resemblance it goes farther and dwells on the points of opposition or dissimilarity.

The destruction of a dangerous error which had widely extended its dominion is a glorious victory won by the friends of truth, armed only with the weapons of faith.

Such a conqueror no streams of blood accompany: in his train are no desolated fields.

The ALLEGORY is but an extended simile, in which the comparative words are omitted.

The allegory, the parable, and the fable belong to the same class of figurative forms of representation; and their distinctions are not merely observed in the common use of language. It is sufficient to remark of them that the fable is distinguished from the proper allegory by being shorter and also by being narrative or historical. It is founded on an imaginary event; whereas an allegory may be descriptive. The term parable is more strictly confined to allegories either narrative or descriptive, of a moral or religious character; which are, moreover, founded on real scenes or events, as those of Christ.

One of the finest examples of the allegory is in the eightieth Psalm, from the eighth verse to the sixteenth inclusive.

The Pilgrim's Progress by Bunyan is another fine exemplification of the extended allegory.

The ALLUSION is a species of comparison in which, while the comparative words are omitted, the represented object is still made the leading theme; and the comparison is with a real object or event.

By this last characteristic it is distinguished from the allegory, in which, as in the simile, the representative object is the leading theme. It differs from one class of metaphors only in being more extended. Indeed, this class of metaphors, referring to a real scene or event, are denominated *metaphorical allusions* or *allusive metaphors*; as "The self-seeking will betray his friend or brother with a Judas-kiss."

When it is said that the allusion always respects a real event or object, it is not meant to exclude such imaginary

objects or events as have been actually described or narrated in works of fiction.

§ 344. The third class of representative figures, or those in which the mental condition of the speaker is represented as different from the reality, may be distributed into three species, according as they respect the personality of the speaker; that of the hearer; or the nature of the thought or feeling represented itself.

The first species is PROSOPOPOEIA, in which the speaker personates another; as where Milo is introduced by Cicero as speaking through his lips; "Attend, I pray, hearken, O citizens, I have killed Publius Clodius by this sword and by this right hand, I have kept off his rage from your necks, which no laws, no courts of judicature, could restrain," &c.

It is sometimes joined with personification, in which case inanimate or irrational things are represented as speaking; as in Cicero's first oration against Cataline, the republic is made the speaker and addresses Cicero himself. "What are you doing? Are you suffering him whom you have found to be an enemy, who you see is to be at the head of the war, whom you perceive our enemies wait for in their camp as their general, who has been the contriver of this wickedness, the chief of the conspiracy, the exciter of slaves and profligate citizens, to leave the city which is rather to bring him in than let him out? Will you not order him to be imprisoned, condemned, and executed?" &c.

Sometimes this figure takes the form of a colloquy or a dialogue. This was the ancient *sermocinatio*.

How does God reveal himself in nature? She answers thee with loud voices, with a thousand tongues: God is love.

The second species is APOSTROPHE, in which the speaker, instead of addressing directly his proper hearer, turns him-

self to some other person or thing, either really or only in imagination present.

This figure abounds in the orations of Cicero. Thus in his first against Cataline: "I desire, senators, to be merciful, but not to appear negligent in so great dangers of the State; though at present I cannot but condemn myself of remissness. There is a camp formed in Italy at the entrance of Etruria, against the State; our enemies increase daily; but we see the commander of the camp and general of the enemies within our walls, in the very senate, contriving some intestine ruin to the State. If, now, Cataline, I should order you to be seized and put to death," &c.

Again, in his defense of Milo, he turns to his brother Quintus and addresses him as if present: "And how shall I answer it to you, my brother Quintus, the partner of my misfortunes, who art now absent?"

The third species of figures of this class which respect a change in the represented conception of the object by the speaker from the reality, includes *irony*, *doubt*, and *interrogation*.

IRONY is a figure in which the speaker represents his thought in a form that properly expresses the directly opposite of his opinion. It is employed mostly for purposes of playfulness or scorn and contempt.

Silence at length the gay Antinous broke.
Constrained a smile, and thus ambiguous spoke:
What god to you, untutored youth, affords
This headlong torrent of amazing words!
May Jove delay thy reign, and cumber late
So bright a genius with the cares of state!

Odyssey, I. 490.

'But, Mr. Speaker, we have a right to tax America.' Oh, inestimable right! Oh, wonderful, transcendent right! the assertion of which has cost this country thirteen provinces,

six islands, one hundred thousand lives, and seventy millions of money. Oh, invaluable right! for the sake of which we have sacrificed our rank among nations, our importance abroad, and our happiness at home!

DOUBT, also called *aporia* and *dubitatio*, is a figure in which the speaker represents himself as in doubt for the purpose of winning a stronger confidence from the hearers. Thus, Cicero in his oration for Cluentius:

I know not which way to turn myself. Shall I deny the scandal thrown upon him of bribing the judges? Can I say, the people were not told of it? &c.

INTERROGATION is a figure in which a strong and confident assertion is represented under the form of an inquiry or demand.

Have any alarms been occasioned by the emancipation of our Catholic brethren? Has the bigoted malignity of any individuals been crushed? or has the stability of the government or that of the country been weakened? or is one million of subjects stronger than four millions?

§ 345. Those forms of figurative energy which depend on *the structure of the sentence* respect either the order and connection of the parts; or the completeness and length of the entire sentence.

They include *inversion* and *anacoluthon*; *apostrophe* and *sententiousness*.

§ 346. **INVERSION** is a figure in which the arrangement of the parts of a sentence is changed from the usual syntactical order.

The general principle of energy in regard to the arrangement or the parts of a sentence is, that the more important words or phrases be placed first or last, and the less important be thrown into the middle. This principle, indeed, applies also to the arrangement of words in the members.

Words of transition, of every class, as 'however,' 'besides,' 'therefore,' and the like, should in accordance with this principle be thrown, whenever practicable, into the middle of the sentence;—should be, in other words, *postpositive* and not *prepositive*. So, likewise, merely explanatory members or phrases should be neither the first nor the last on the mind, unless they are to be made emphatic.

But the unbending syntax of our language allows but little liberty to the orator in this respect. It is here incomparably inferior to the ancient languages which, by the multiplicity of their inflections, admitted readily any desired arrangement of the words and phrases. It is, however, even here superior to some other modern languages; and without offending against its essential principles, the orator may impart much energy to discourse by authorized deviations from the ordinary structure of the sentence.

As the subject is naturally the first thing to be presented to the mind, our language requires that ordinarily it be placed first in the sentence. But sometimes it is the predicate in whole or in part, or the mode of the copula, upon which the orator wishes the attention more particularly to be fixed. To accomplish this inversion, in the first place, we have certain words and forms of expression which are used for this purpose alone and are in themselves utterly destitute of meaning; such as, "there," "there is," "it is."

There is a feeling of the sublime in contemplating the shock of armies, just as *there* is in contemplating the devouring energy of a tempest; and this so elevates and engrosses the whole man, that his eye is blind to the tears of bereaved parents, and his ear is deaf to the piteous moan of the dying, and the shriek of their desolated families. *There* is a gracefulness in the picture of a youthful warrior burning for distinction on the field, &c.

It gives me pleasure to advance a farther testimony in

behalf of that government with which it has pleased God, who appointed to all men the bounds of their habitation, to bless that portion of the globe that we occupy.

It is the gospel of Jesus Christ, which has poured the light of day into all the intricacies of this contemplation.

Again, when the predicate is separated in part or in whole from the copula the predicate or a part of it may be placed first.

Great is Diana of the Ephesians.

His faithful dogs howl on his hills, and his boars which he used to pursue, rejoice. *Fallen* is the arm of battle; the mighty among the valiants is low!

Farther, the qualifying parts of a sentence, when they are to be made emphatic, may be placed first without violating the principles of the language.

So deeply were they impressed with the sense of their wrongs, that they would not even accept of life from their oppressors.

Once more, in the objective relation of the sentence, our language ordinarily requires that the object follow its verb. For the sake of energy, however, inversion is often allowable here.

All that I have and all that I am and all that I hope in this life, I am now ready here to stake upon it.

§ 347. ANACOLUTHON is a figure in which, for the sake of energy, the orator drops the grammatical form with which he had commenced and adopts another not syntactically reconcilable with it.

This figure, common in the classical writings, is rarely allowable in our language. Only strong passion can warrant it, as it seems to imply such a degree of emotion in the speaker as to destroy the recollection of grammatical forms.

§ 348. APOSIOPESIS is a figure in which the feelings of the speaker induce him to interrupt the expression and leave the sentence incomplete.

This figure, by its direct address to the imagination of the hearer, is often one of great power.

Demosthenes employs it frequently with much effect; as in his address to Aeschines: O thou—by what name can I properly call thee?

Must I remember? why she would hang on him
As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on; yet, within a month—
Let me not think—Frailty thy name is woman.

§ 349. SENTENTIOUSNESS is a deviation from that continuousness in style which thought naturally requires, § 295. It characterises that discourse which is broken up into short and abrupt sentences.

The women, in their turn, learned to be more vain, more gay, and more alluring. They grew studious to please and to conquer. They lost somewhat of the intrepidity and firmness which before were characteristic of them. They were to affect a delicacy and a weakness. Their education was to be an object of greater attention and care. A finer sense of duty was to arise.

After all, what is high birth? Does it bestow a nature different from that of the rest of mankind? Has not the man of ancient line, human blood in his veins? Does he not experience hunger and thirst?

Besides, Sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat but in submission and slavery. Our chains are forged. Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston. The war is inevitable, and let it come, I repeat it, Sir, let it come.

§ 350. There are certain general principles which

apply to the use of figures and which should be carefully observed.

The first respects the occasion of using them; it requires that they never be introduced unless there be fit and suitable ground for them in the feelings of the speaker.

So far as figures appear to be sought after, they indicate labor and affectation which are in themselves most hostile to energy. The proper rule to be observed in reference to propriety in the use of figures, is that, while familiarity be obtained by previous study with the various kinds of figures, such only be actually employed in discourse as spring up naturally at the time.

§ 351. The second principle respects the number of figures; it forbids a too frequent repetition of them, and, especially, the frequent repetition of the same figure.

§ 352. The third principle respects the relation to be observed to the ordinary essential properties of style; it requires that figurative expressions should be in conformity with the necessary principles that govern those properties.

Figures are deviations from the ordinary forms of speech, but can never be proper violations of its essential properties. In the use of figures, accordingly, the principles of etymology, syntax and lexicography, for example, should never be violated. No real energy is gained to discourse by the introduction of a figure which is unintelligible or obscure.

§ 353. The fourth principle respects the quality of the figure itself; it requires that it be ever congruous and complete in itself; and at the same time be ex-

tended no farther than is necessary for distinct apprehension.

The liability to an offense against this principle is greatest in the case of the representative figures. Whenever these are presented confusedly and with incongruous features they offend rather than impress. So, also, while offensive abruptness and incompleteness are to be avoided, the figure should never be extended farther than the imagination of the hearer needs in order to grasp it intelligibly and fully. In the simile or comparison, for instance, to carry out the figure into every possible resemblance weakens as well as disgusts, and is fatal to energy.

The following extracts exemplify violations of this principle:

I am convinced that the method of teaching which approaches most nearly to the method of investigation, is incomparably the best, since not content with serving up a few barren and lifeless truths, it leads to the stalk on which they grow.—*Burke*.

There is not a single view of human nature which is not sufficient to extinguish the seeds of pride.—*Addison*.

Men must acquire a very peculiar and strong habit of turning their eye inwards, in order to explore the interior regions and recesses of the mind, the hollow caverns of deep thought, the private seats of fancy, and the wastes and wildernesses, as well as the more fruitful and cultivated tracts, of this obscure climate.—*Shaftsbury*.

These are the first-fruits of my unfledged eloquence, of which thou hast oft complained that it was buried in the shade.

Upon thy mirror, earth's majestic view,
To paint thy presence, and to feel it too.

CHAPTER IV.

OF ELEGANCE.

§ 354. ELEGANCE is that property of style by virtue of which the discourse is commended to the taste of the hearer.

§ 355. The elements of elegance in style are *propriety*; *expression of right sentiment*; and *grace*.

This analysis of elegance is founded on that of the constituents of aesthetic beauty. (Introduction, chap. III. § 21.) The first element of taste, if it be not rather an indispensable condition, is propriety or fitness. We require, for instance, as essential to all beauty that there be fitness in respect to the end or design in reference to which the work of art is constructed. The perception of this fitness gives us pleasure of itself with no further element of beauty. Thus the adaptation of the various parts of a steam engine to its designed end—the production of motion; of the different members of the animal body to their respective uses, and of all of them together to the final end of the animal economy; of a chain of reasoning or a series of complicated arguments to the proof of a proposition, gives us a higher or lower degree of aesthetic pleasure.

We are likewise pleased with the expression of a correct sentiment. We admire the exhibition of devoted friendship and attachment in the episode of Nisus and Euryalus in the *Æneid*; of generous and lofty patriotism in the well-known adjuration and other parts of the oration of Demosthenes on the crown.

We are touched, also, by the exhibition of grace in the

constructions of art, evincing a masterly skill and power in the artist.

Into these elements may be resolved all the constituents of beauty in style.

§ 356. PROPRIETY in style requires

1. A just expression of all the various properties of style that have been before enumerated, and a symmetry and congruity as respects the parts of a discourse;

2. An adaptation of the verbal expression to the character of the theme as sacred, important, serious, or otherwise; and

3. The observance of a due decorum as determined by the character of the speaker, of the hearers, and of the occasion and circumstances of speaking.

An element of style so extended although so indispensable and so difficult of attainment, its very nature forbids the attempt to describe or exemplify more fully. It is one which, as Cicero remarks, it is impossible to communicate by art.* One or two general observations are all that it is deemed useful to add on this subject.

The first is, that a strict regard to propriety is absolutely indispensable to success in oratory, so far as success depends on the hearer's taste. And his gratification here may have a determining power over his attention, his perception and judgment. Indeed, Cicero does not hesitate to say that propriety is the essential element of oratorical power. "Is erit eloquens, qui ad id quodcumque decebit, poterit accommodare orationem."

* Caput esse artis, decere; quod tamen unum id esse, quod tradi arte non possit.—*De Orat.* I. 29.

The nature of oratorical propriety, further, may perhaps best be understood from the observation that it is merely the giving to discourse what belongs to it. The demands of propriety are fully met when what belongs to the nature of style as the expression of thought, to the nature of the subject, the character of the speaker and the hearer, the occasion and circumstances of speaking, is correctly observed in the discourse.

§ 357. The EXPRESSION OF RIGHT SENTIMENT as an element of beauty in style, involves the use of such representative imagery in the exhibition of thought as is founded on high and pure associations.

This is a positive element of beauty, and is of a higher order than the first named—propriety. It is by this element that oratory more closely links itself to the peculiar beauty of ideal art which lies in the representation of sentiment. It is, indeed, only indirectly and incidentally that sentiment can be expressed in oratorical style; while in art it may constitute the final end of the work. Still sentiment appears in style. It gives to style a peculiar color and hue. When discourse proceeds from a mind imbued with elevated sentiments and familiarized with pure and noble associations, style, as the body of the thought, puts on a peculiar freshness and beauty which commends it to every refined taste. The character thus reveals itself in style. It was on good grounds that the ancients urged so earnestly the importance of character to success in oratory; for, as Quintilian reasons, "discourse reveals character and discloses the secret disposition and temper; and not without reason did the Greeks teach that as a man lived so he would speak."—"Profert enim mores plerumque oratio, et animi secreta detegit. Nec

sine causa Graeci prodiderunt, ut vivat, quemque etiam dicere."

§ 358. GRACE is that element of beauty which springs from ease of execution implying not only a thorough knowledge of the principles of style but also power and skill in the actual expression.

Grace ultimately is founded on motion or power in sensible operation, § 21. By an easy analogy it is applied to moral and abstract expressions of power, as well as, also, to forms which are motionless but yet suggest previous exertion of power in determining them. We speak thus of the grace of a statue which represents the easy attitude of perfect vigor and suppleness of limb.

Grace appears in style in the easy flow of diction which attends power of expression. Abruptness and sententiousness in style imply, indeed, power. So far as abrupt and broken, however, discourse implies a broken or impeded energy. The roar and foam of a mountain torrent dashing against rocks and trees display force; it is force, however, checked, impeded and out-mastered. The easy gentle flow of the majestic river, that quietly takes into its current and bears along without a ripple every obstacle that comes in its way, is a more perfect emblem of unimpeded power, and in its motion we see grace exemplified. Mere impulsive, jetting oratory is so far deficient in grace, as it implies impeded and resisted power.

§ 359. In the acquisition of this property of style, elegance or beauty, three means are essential;

First, mental culture;

Secondly, study of art, including both its principles and its exemplifications in models; and

Thirdly, exercise with judicious criticisms.

§ 360. *Mental culture* is essential both for the purpose of acquiring those moral habits and associations which are necessary for the expression of right sentiment; as well as also for the attainment of that power which is the foundation and source of grace.

§ 361. *The study of art* is directly beneficial in creating that sense of propriety which is the condition of all beauty; as well as also in forming the sentiments and developing power of expression.

Every species of art may be turned to useful account in the formation of oratorical taste. While in no one are all the forms of beauty perfectly revealed, there is none, perhaps, which is not distinguished above every other in its adaptedness to develop some one or another particular element of beauty.

The term 'art' is here employed in its most comprehensive import; and is intended to include every exertion of power under the control of taste. Nature itself in this view is but the workmanship of a most perfect artist, and is hence a most appropriate model for the study of oratory in all its various forms of skill and beauty. Manners and morals, also, lie within the domain of art; and for many reasons demand the close and constant study of the orator, not for the mere information of the understanding only, but as furnishing the means of developing and forming the taste.

§ 362. *Exercise* in oratory of itself develops and strengthens power of execution; and, combined with judicious criticism, aids in the cultivation of all the elements of oratorical taste.

In applying criticism to oratorical compositions, the caution given in § 18 in regard to the time of criticism

needs carefully to be observed; as nothing more fatally chills and enervates inventive and expressive power than the indulgence of an undue critical spirit at the time of composing or speaking.

By the use of these general means the mind is to be trained and developed to the power of expressing all its thoughts in taste or elegance. Such an indirect culture is to be preferred to any immediate endeavor, at the time of composing, to communicate to style this property. In the words of Dr. Whately, "the safest rule is, never, during the act of composition, to study elegance, or think about it at all. Let an author study the best models,—mark their beauties of style and dwell upon them, that he may insensibly catch the habit of expressing himself with elegance; and when he has completed any composition, he may revise it, and cautiously alter any passage that is awkward and harsh, as well as those that are feeble and obscure; but let him never, *while writing*, think of any beauties of style; but content himself with such as may come spontaneously."

APPENDIX.

THEMES FOR EXERCISES IN INVENTION.

THEMES IN NARRATIVE DISCOURSE.

1. *Simple Narration.*

- The crusades.
- The discovery of America.
- The conquest of England by the Normans.
- Magna Charta.*
- The early population of the earth by successive migration.
- The dismemberment of Poland.
- The expulsion of Kings from Rome.
- The exodus of the Israelites from Egypt.
- The origin of the Grecian game.
- The Persian invasions of Greece.
- The rise of tragedy.
- The plebeian triumph in Rome.
- The origin and spread of British conquests in India.
- The American Revolution.
- The battle of Waterloo.
- The conquests of Alexander the Great.
- The history of Republics in South America.

The Peloponnesian War.
 The history of modern commerce.
 The destruction of Carthage.
 Gothic conquests in Italy.
 The subjection of Greece by the Romans.
 The history of Jerusalem.
 The French revolution in 1830.
 The first Triumvirate in Rome.
 The revival of legal studies.
 The Quadruple Alliance of 1814.
 The battle of Lexington.
 The Swiss Confederacy.
 The rise of Monachism.
 The division of the Roman empire.
 The rise of the Turks.
 The Saxon descendents in England.
 The expulsion of the Moors from Spain.
 The introduction of Christianity into England; the German tribes; China; the South Sea Islands.
 The Danish invasions of England.
 The rise of the Feudal System.
 The Sicilian Vespers.
 The Hanseatic League.
 The Lutheran Reformation.
 The war of the Roses in England.
 The Spanish Inquisition.
 The Slave Trade.
 The imprisonment and execution of Mary Stuart.
 The settlement of New England.
 The English Commonwealth.
 The rise of Mohammedanism.
 The ministry of the elder Pitt.

The independence of Modern Greece.
 The American Constitution.
 The battle of the Nile.
 The Union of Great Britain and Ireland.
 The Reformation in England.
 The rise of Chivalry.
 The lives of Pericles, Solon, Demosthenes, Alexander the Great, Xenophon, Themistocles, Cato, Cæsar, Hannibal, Scipio, Cicero, Mahomet, Charlemagne, Alfred the Great, Belisarius, Tycho Brahe, the Earl of Chatham, Hampden, Michael Angelo, Columbus, Washington, La Fayette, Louis XIV., Cowper, Edmund Burke, Howard, Joan of Arc, Benjamin Franklin, John Milton, Martin Luther, Sir Humphrey Davy, Lord Byron, Galileo, Charles V., Frederick the Great, Burns, Addison, Fox, Alexander Hamilton, Ignatius Loyola, Francis Xavier, John Jay.

2. *Abstract Narration.*

The progress of civilization in the world.
 The rise of popery.
 The diffusion of knowledge.
 The spread of Christianity.
 The rise of free cities.
 The development of taste.
 The growth of genius.
 The progress of free principles.
 The decline of the poetical spirit.
 The lapse of virtuous principle when deprived of its usual support.
 The transition of superstition to infidelity.

3. *Narration with exhibition of causal relation.*

The influence of the Reformation on the intellect of Europe.

The probable influence of the United States on the destinies of the world.

The influence of the spirit of the present age on the destiny of the world.

The influence of the press.

The influence of the American Revolution.

The influence of the national spirit on security.

The public games of Greece.

The influence of the Reformation on civil liberty.

The causes of the melancholy of genius.

The influence of periods of great excitement on literature.

The influence of the Feudal system.

The influence of the Crusades.

The influence of chivalry.

The influence of commerce.

The influence of climate on national character.

The study of History as a means of intellectual growth.

The influence of seclusion in cultivating the mind and heart.

The influence of christian missions on the literature of the age.

The indulgence of a spirit of censure.

Singleness of purpose in its bearing on success.

Imitation as leading to servility.

THEMES IN DESCRIPTION.

1. *Description proper.*

The Geographical Features of Switzerland, Italy, Tartary, Great Britain, Greece, The United States, Denmark, Egypt, Iceland.

Ancient and modern Athens, Rome, Thebes, Babylon, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Edinburgh, Washington.

The vale of Chamouni, Mont Blanc, The vale of Tempe, Lago Maggiore in Italy, The Scottish Highlands; The Falls of Niagara, of Terni; Mount Vesuvius, Hccla.

The Parthenon of Athens, St. Peter's church at Rome, St. Paul's of London, King's Chapel Cambridge, Strasburgh Cathedral.

The cedar of Lebanon.

Autumn.

The planetary system.

2. *Abstract Description.*

The German Confederation.

The Hanseatic League.

The English Constitution.

The Constitution of the United States of America.

The Swiss Confederacy.

The British Parliament.

Republican Rome.

Roman Patriotism.

The character of Napoleon Bonaparte, Washington, Oliver Cromwell, La Fayette, Lord Byron, Cowper, John Jay, Socrates, Cicero, Pompey, Lord Bacon, Sir Isaac Newton.

Character of the American Indians.

The man of independent thought.

The true statesman.

The enthusiasm of genius.

Moral courage.

Character of the Modern Greeks.

The man of impulse.

The character of a Philosophical Historian.

The literary character of the Scriptures.

The writings of Sir Walter Scott.

The Lake poets.
 Cheerfulness.
 The beauty of a forgiving spirit.
 True Greatness.
 Genius.
 Genuine politeness.
 Independence of character.
 The pleasure derived from the contemplation of the past.

THEMES IN ANALYSIS.

The benefits of a refined taste.
 The excellence of ingenuousness.
 The evils of Party Spirit.
 The benefits of Party Spirit.
 Impediments to high literary excellence in the United States.
 The benefits of foreign travel.
 The uses of the study of History.
 The benefits of national adversity.
 The uses of knowledge.
 The motives at the present day to aim at high mental superiority.
 The obligations of a country to her literary men.
 Decision of character.
 The means of perpetuating the blessings of a free government.
 The political prospects of Europe.
 The eccentricities of genius.
 Liabilities of the student at the present day.
 The benefits resulting from a high culture of the social affections.
 The social tendencies in the United States.

Abuses of the imagination.
 Duties resulting from the right of suffrago.
 Uses of biography.
 Uses of history.
 The duties of the American Scholar.
 Constituents of real greatness.
 Benefits of the fine arts.
 The duties of literary men to their country.
 Instruction to be derived from the history of our revolution.
 Moral defects of English Poetry.
 Advantages arising from a love of literature in early life.
 Abuses of the spirit of honor in this country.

THEMES IN EXEMPLIFICATION.

The power of habit.
 The corrupting effects of slavery.
 The order of nature.
 The power of conscience.
 The love of system.
 Nothing beneath the care of Providence.
 The power of resolution.
 The power of association.
 The ingratitude of Republics.
 Practical character of the age.
 Undue influence of foreign opinion in this country.

THEMES IN COMPARISON AND CONTRAST.

The influence of the study of nature and of art on character.
 The comparative effects of climate and descent on national character.

The influence of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures on national character.

Principles, not men.

A Government of law.

Reward and punishment as incentives to exertion.

Acting from principle, rather than from impulse.

Comparative dignity of the warrior and statesman.

Literature as affected by different forms of government.

Reading and observation in the study of human nature.

The comparative virtue of the enlightened and ignorant classes.

The influence of architecture, painting, poetry, and music in providing and perpetuating religious impressions.

The influence of the ancient and modern languages in the culture of the taste.

The letters of Lady Montague, Horace Walpole, and Cowper.

The Mythologies of Greece and Rome.

The military character of Napoleon and Wellington.

Personal memoirs and formal histories as illustrative of national history and character.

The power of conscience and human law.

The comparative effects of literature and science on civilization.

The influence of moral and physical causes on character.

Skepticism and love of truth as indications of mental vigor.

Hume and Lingard as Historians.

The poet of an early and of a civilized age.

Imitation and mimicry.

Domestic Life among the ancient Greeks and Romans, and in this country.

Ages of action and reflection.
The different styles of eloquence prevailing in different ages and countries.
Modern and ancient Greece.
Policy and principle.

THEMES IN CONFIRMATION.

Commerce favorable to national character.
Civilization progressive.
International copy right.
The necessity of maintaining national credit.
Dramatic Entertainments hurtful to sound morals.
Universal Suffrage.
Civilization dependent on christianity.
Novel Reading.
Every man the architect of his own fortune.
The dependence of commerce on credit.
The desirableness of cherishing a military spirit in this country.
The unlimited right of society to control individual pursuits.
The right of government to enforce the sacrifice of private interest to public good.
The equal distribution of happiness.
The rewards of virtue sure.
General diffusion of knowledge advantageous to the higher classes of literature.
The necessity of relaxation.
No man without influence.
Men responsible for their opinions.
The progress of right opinions slow.
Utility of national celebrations.

Precariousness of popular favor.
 The original unity of the human race.
 The desirableness of short terms of political office.
 The expediency of making authorship a profession.
 The natural proof of the soul's immortality.
 Original diversity of talents in man.

THEMES IN EXCITATION.

The death of Socrates.
 The reign of terror in France.
 Gen. Washington resigning his sword to Congress.
 The plague in London.
 The extinction of the Indians.
 The Slave trade.
 The field of battle.

THEMES IN PERSUASION.

The love of truth as a practical principle.
 Aiming at perfection in every thing.
 Culture of the taste.
 Education of the senses.
 Firmness in duty.
 Contentment with the allotments of Providence.
 Fortitude under reverses.
 Habits of industry.
 The love of nature.
 Thoroughness in intellectual attainments.

MISCELLANEOUS THEMES.

Love of retirement.
 Study of the Mathematics.
 Tendency of an excessive veneration of antiquity.

National monuments.
 Influence of a free press on Government.
 Conversation as a means of intellectual improvement.
 The influence of the discovery of America on the intellect of Europe.
 Influence of constitution on literary pursuits.
 Tendency to extremes at the present day.
 Early impressions.
 Knowledge is power.
 The choice of friends.
 Persecutions for opinion.
 Influence of mental culture on moral feeling.
 Providential evils, real blessings.
 The limits to intellectual acquisitions.
 Influence of literature on national refinement.
 The value of an unspotted reputation.
 A superficial attention to a great variety of pursuits.
 The true character revealed in the conduct.
 Influences of circumstances on character.
 Self government.
 The union of discipline with native genius.
 Indulgence of a spirit of censure.
 The power of custom.
 The influence of associates on character.
 The abuse of free discussion.
 The effects of irregularity in rank and condition in a republic.
 The influence of great emergencies on the formation of character.
 Delicacy of feeling.
 Conflict of opinion.
 Sanguine temperament.

Influence of promiscuous reading.
 Public education.
 Prevailing deference to public opinion.
 Anonymous literature.
 National recollections.
 Eagerness for politics in this country.
 Activity as the great source of happiness.
 The authority of great names.
 The dread of singularity.
 Models in literature.
 Inordinate love of wealth as a peculiar weakness in American character.
 The mental discipline required in this country.
 Virtue the true guide to lasting favor.
 Visionary anticipations of the future.
 Influence of free institutions on the habits of social life.
 Love of excitement.
 The character of the early settlers of a country.
 Influence of literature on the stability of government.
 The evils of sudden revolutions in government.
 Self educated men.
 Neglect of literature by professional men.
 The desire of esteem.
 High aims and expectations.
 Self-confidence.
 Early trials in life.
 Free intercourse with the world in early life.
 The influence of great national wealth on morals.
 Use of ridicule.
 Intellectual Independence.
 Genius has its weaknesses.
 Sacrifice for principle.

Power of truth and the certainty of its final triumph.
 Influence of the study of poetry on the intellectual and moral character.
 Knowledge of human nature.
 Influence of periodical literature.
 Errors of Genius without moral principle.
 The power of local association.
 Integrity in politics.
 National benefactors.
 Carrying early warmth of feeling into life.
 Tendency of great scenes and objects to elevate the character.
 Judicious culture of the imagination as a means of enjoyment and usefulness.
 Habits of reverie.
 Security of free institutions.
 Erroneous estimates of greatness.
 Influence of strained and excessive feeling on literature.
 Literary courage.
 Progress of our country in national improvement.
 Power of opinion in a free government.
 Accomplishments.
 Destiny of the English Language.
 Independence of Genius.
 Memorials of great actions.
 Influence of a spirit of distrust.
 Influence of Christianity on the spirit of poetry.
 Generosity of sentiment.
 Ambition as a motive to literary exertion.
 Military greatness as an object of admiration.
 Abuses of free discussion at the present day.
 Cherishing high sense of national character.

- Literary enterprise.
- The abuse of power in republics.
- Spirit of revolutions in Europe.
- Study of the human heart.
- Influence of mental culture, or dignity of character.
- Superficial reading.
- Encouragement to philanthropic effort derived from the present state of the world.
- National amusements.
- Desire of change.
- Culture of eloquence in the United States.
- Influence of great scenes and objects on the formation of character.
- The trials of genius.
- Advantages of a national literature.
- Influence of moral feeling on a refined taste.
- The comparative value of contemporary and subsequent narrations of historical events.
- The moral influence of the Christian Sabbath.
- Active profession in its influence on the effects of a literary man.
- The influence of foreign languages on the originality of a nation's literature.
- The standard of taste.
- The idea of the beautiful as developed in Grecian literature and art.
- The effects of increased facilities of intercourse between the Eastern and Western continents on the United States.

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