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A

COMPREHENSIVE

GRAMMAR,

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OF THE

STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE;

DESIGNED

TO EXPLAIN ALL THE RELATIONS OF WORDS IN ENGLISH SYNTAX,
AND MAKE THE STUDY
OF

GRAMMAR AND COMPOSITION

ONE AND THE SAME PROCESS.

Abridged from a work preparing for publication.

BY W. FELCH.

"It is not amisse, if one seeing by triall an easier and readier waie, would saie what he hath prooved, that other might by experience proove the like, and then by proofe reasonable judge the like, not hereby excluding the better way when it is found."—*King Henry's edition of Lily's Grammar.*

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PREFACE.

Perhaps no science, except the science of mind itself, is more important, or has more need of reform, than that which should explain the structure of language, the medium by which the operations of the mind are communicated. This science, unfortunately as it would seem, owes but little to the constructive talents of modern times. What we call grammar was not framed for any of the present languages; nor was it exactly fitted to the past—its most approved teachers being themselves the judges. It is the defective and misshapen garment of the dead, which, after some slight variations, and no little contortion, is found to fit the living still less.

To the standard of reason its advocates make no appeal, but hang it upon school authority,—an authority well adapted to perpetuate either truth or error—an authority, which, in one age or other, has been brought to sanction the greatest follies and absurdities that ever possessed the human mind.

From the defects and incongruities of our system of grammar, inevitably result the very general complaints against it as "a dry," "a blind," "a tedious," "a perplexing study," and the like.

Some imagine that the difficulties attending it arise from the peculiarly complicated and irregular structure of our language. Dr. Lowth, however, supposes that ours, in simplicity, excels all the languages of scientific nations, ancient and modern.

Others have intimated that a good understanding of the English cannot be obtained without a thorough acquaintance with the classic languages. Murray, and other standard authors, on the contrary, admit that this kind of

learning is a possible snare to the English grammarian, and source of error and perplexity to the student.

Lowth says of Bently, "This comes of forcing the English under the rules of a foreign (the Latin) language, with which it has little concern."

"The genius and grammar of the English, to the reproach of the country," says Dr. Blair, after speaking of the French, "have not been studied with equal care, or ascertained with the same precision."

"Every science," says Dr. Adam, "may be reduced to principles." "The principles of grammar will be most successfully taught by arranging and explaining them according to the order of nature."

Speaking of Johnson, Dr. Webster observes, "Fortunately, this great man, led by usage rather than books, wrote correct English instead of grammar."

Of the prevailing classification it is said, in Rees' Cyclopedia, "However general and convenient in a popular view, it is by no means to be admitted into a philosophical grammar."

A correspondent of the American Journal of Education, remarks, "The followers of Murray in this country have been careful to preserve nearly all his peculiarities, contenting themselves with making a different arrangement, and attempting a clearer illustration of his errors. The subject of English grammar is as much in the dark as ever."

"While the arts and sciences," says a late writer,* "have recently been, and are still, receiving such vast improvements, there can be no reason why language, their medium, should not be investigated, and its structure ascertained."

Among physical bodies, those of little consistency are the more difficult to remove. A system of instruction not based on reason, does not make reasoners of its pupils. A system established in defiance of reason, will not readily submit to its control. A system that dispenses but little light, affords but little assistance in discovering its own deformities, and hence is sometimes viewed as an object

* Cheever Felch, A. M.

of reverence. To rest a science on precedent, is to make it stationary.

When we are told by a person of literary distinction that Murray's classifications have been long established, and therefore must not be changed, he accounts in so many words for the backwardness of this science. Here is something that must not be altered, whether right or wrong!

"As to every particular," says lord Kames, "that can be denominated proper or improper, right or wrong, custom has little authority, and ought to have none."

"Reason alone, and not authorities," says the author of the British Grammar, "ought to weigh and determine the reader's judgment and assent in a matter of such importance."

Locke has observed that "truth like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine."

"It is no sufficient reason against a reformation," says archbishop Tillotson, "that it makes a change."

"I find," says Jeremy Taylor, "that men are most confident of articles that they can so little prove that they never made questions of them."

It is hardly more than half a century since Dr. Lowth, the prince of grammarians, affirmed that English grammar made "no part of the ordinary method of instruction" in his day, and "must always stand in need of improvement." And it is at least a subject of doubt whether our latest systems are as judicious in their classification of words, and otherwise as free from absurdities, as his celebrated "Introduction to English Grammar."

While unnecessary imperfection exists in any system of science, there is need of improvement; and improvement always implies change. He who fancies it to be the great object of grammar to teach a certain system of arbitrary distinctions and rules, has done no better than to mistake the means for the end, be that system ever so useful. But if that system should be loaded with obscurity, absurdity, and gross inconsistencies, his mistake is the more pernicious. He treats his pupils as a sick child, who is required to take a nauseous drug without any conception of its fitness.

How far these characteristics attend the prevailing grammars, will appear upon careful examination. The following remarks (and they are necessarily very brief) may begin to assist those who have not well considered the subject. They chiefly refer to Murray's work, because of that the others are little else than transcripts.

That our systems commence with a class made up of two supplemental words, instead of first placing the noun and verb as a foundation, is not one of their worst mistakes; but it indicates, at least, that room is left for improvement.

The article is defined, "a word prefixed to nouns, to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends; as, *a* garden, *the* woman." If this definition has any meaning and application, it will as well apply to a thousand other words; as, *one* garden, *Smith's* garden, *that* woman, *black* women, &c.

The scholar's information, then, that "*a* and *the* are articles," amounts to the proposition that *a* and *the* are *a* and *the!* He must therefore have a third name for each, and spends some days or weeks in learning to tell that "*a* is the indefinite article," (though it is so far definite as to signify *one*,) and "*the* is called the definite article, because it ascertains what particular thing is meant." Suppose, then, I say, *The men are sinners;* if no particular men are otherwise ascertained to be the subject of discourse, you ask, What men? and receive for answer, All men. This is perfectly understood, because the adjunct *all* is very definite; while *the* is so indefinite that it is improper to use it for defining as in the example. But we should not forget that our grammarians tell us that "*the* is the definite article," and *all* an "indefinite adjective pronoun!"

At this stage of the examination, some have protested against discarding a whole system of instruction on account of a few mistakes at the beginning. But such mistakes are not confined to the beginning; and a system which abounds with them is not worthy of being regarded as a standard of science. In fact, a science admits of no proper standard but its subject.

The rule for using *an*, requires some mending. It is as

improper to say *an union*, as *an youth;* or *such an one*, as *such an wonder*.

Our grammarians instruct us that "a noun, without an article to limit it, is taken (some say generally) in its widest sense." This, like many other errors, seems to come from an error in classing; and, if adhered to, would make a long list of articles, as, *one* house, *neither* house, *his* house, *my neighbor's new carriage* house, &c., &c.

Murray says, "The present participle, with the definite article *the* before it, becomes a substantive, and must have the preposition *of* after it." If this direction were followed, instead of saying, *The firing ceased—I saw the setting sun*, &c., we should say, *The firing of ceased—I saw the setting of sun!*

That mistakes like this should be made in a work essentially new, would not be so surprising. But to select them, as Murray did, from old books, and to retain them for near half a century in a standard work on science, affords striking evidence that real improvement is more needed than encouraged, and that authority has usurped the place, and silenced the voice, of reason and facts.

Other popular writers have doubled the error by saying of an article before, and *of* after, that "the one should never be used without the other." But we may say, *I had been thinking of that;* not, *I had been the thinking of that.* We may say, *this telling of tales*, or *no telling of tales*, as well as *the telling*, &c. We may say, *his speaking of her; John's speaking*, &c.

In short, it can be made to appear that our grammarians have not pointed out a single peculiarity of the articles; and whatever they teach us concerning them is worse than useless, a real nuisance in grammar.

If I ask a scholar how he knows a pronoun, he has this answer from his book—Because it is "used instead of a noun, to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word." I offer the sentence, *I wish you to read this book*, and ask of what noun *I*, *you*, or *this* avoids the repetition, and receive for answer that he has found grammar difficult to understand!

The first, second, and third *he* in the following sentence, stand for *the same person* as *a child*, but do not avoid the repetition of the word *child:* "Train up a child in the way *he* should go, and when *he* is old *he* will not depart from it." In fact, the pronoun is the noun of most common and preferable use; and the name takes its place principally where it (the pronoun) is not sufficiently definite.

The particular rules, instead of general principles, for knowing when *that*, *which*, and *what*, are to be called *relatives*, and when they are to bear some other name equally insignificant, have cost learners much time and trouble. And the name, at last, is all they are permitted to know; for if they learn to say, "Relative pronouns are such as relate, in general, to some word or phrase going before," they are still unable to determine what manner of relationship "in general" they sustain. Lord Kames says, "In a complete thought or mental proposition, all the members and parts are mutually related, some slightly, some intimately."

And the nominative case is not defined. Suppose we say of a prince, *He rules his people.* What case is *he?* Ans. Nominative. Quest. Why so called? A. (according to Murray,) Because it "simply expresses the name of a thing, or the subject of the verb." Q. Is *he* more a name than *people?* A. Well, it is the subject of the verb *rules.* Q. Is the ruler the subject of ruling? A. I have always found grammar a perplexing study, but will look at the dictionaries: "Subject, one who is under the power of another;" "that on which any operation is performed."* Well, I have heard a lecturer say, "The nominative case denotes the agent or actor." Q. But what will you do with the nominative case absolute and independent, and the nominative of neuter verbs?

Murray says, "The possessive case expresses the relation of property or possession." Suppose then, I purchase *a man's* hat at a woman's shop, who is entitled to the pay?

Our grammarians define the adjective, "a word added to

* "Verbs are related, on the one hand to the agent, and on the other to the subject upon which the action is exerted."—*Kames.*

a noun to express its quality;" not meaning "its quality," however, but the quality or description of the thing signified. The scholar reads of *the carpenter's* trade, *the Christian's* hope, &c. Here the words added to *trade* and *hope* express their quality; but he is not permitted to call them adjectives.

Murray, and others among the most distinguished grammarians, instruct us that "an adjective may be known by its making sense with the addition of the word *thing*, or of any particular substantive." The scholar finds *a* thing, *the* thing, *this* thing, *that* thing, *which* thing, *what* thing, *any* thing, *every* thing, *Smith's* house, *our* house, &c. These adjuncts of course he should take to be adjectives; but is gravely informed by his teacher that they are articles, nouns, and pronouns—three other parts of speech—but no adjectives!

Murray says, by way of definition, "The superlative degree increases or lessens the positive to the highest or lowest degree." He says, on another page, "The comparative degree may be so employed as to express the same pre-eminence as the superlative." This last remark is correct; but it destroys his definition. The fact is, the difference between these degrees consists in the manner of drawing the comparison, and not in the degree of quality expressed; as, She is *wiser* than they; she is *the wisest* of them.

Murray describes neuter verbs as expressing "neither action nor passion, but being or a state of being." Hence, a school-boy must renounce his grammar, or believe that *running*, *jumping*, and *shouting* are not actions!

Murray defines mode to be "a particular form of the verb, showing the manner in which the being, action, or passion is represented." He says the participles are "mere modes of the verb;" and yet parses them as verbs of no mode at all! I may say, He had commanded, and we obeyed; or, He having commanded, we obeyed. Here *had commanded*, and *having commanded*, are but two forms of the same verb, "showing the manner in which" the same expressed action of the same expressed agent "is represented." In the last form, the scholar is taught to parse the

pronoun as "nominative case absolute," and the verb as "compound perfect participle;" without an intimation of any connection between them, and without knowing what useful instruction is involved in the *absoluteness* of the one, or the *compound perfection* of the other!

Murray describes the infinitive as "expressing a *thing* in a general and unlimited manner." That he was serious in assigning to this mode an unlimited expression, notwithstanding he also terms it "general," appears from his distinguishing the others as "finite." But lest a scholar of finite capacity should fail to comprehend its infinitude, he informs him, in a special rule of syntax, that "one verb governs another that follows it and depends upon it in the infinitive mode; as, *Cease to do evil.*" But suppose we say, *Cease doing evil;* here the verb *doing* follows *cease*, and is as general and dependent as the other. And if I say, *Cease thou*, or *I wish thee to cease*, the action of ceasing is restricted to the second person and future time as much in one case as the other.

Our grammarians define the preposition as serving "to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them." So far as I can understand what is meant by showing the relation between words, it is supposed that the following, and many other connectives, are included under this definition:—He *is* sick; he *keeps* lent; John *having* gone; he *who* spoke; Smith *and* Co.

And the conjunction—have they defined that? If they say it "connects words," they say nothing: all parts of speech do this. If they say it "connects sentences," this is not its uniform or exclusive character: other words connect sentences; as, Was he alive; *oh!* I can hardly believe it. Is he coming? *speak!* I am impatient to know. Did you see him? *No;* he had passed by.

But it will be said that other words do not connect as conjunctions do. The remark is true, and brings us back to the very thing in question. In what peculiar manner do conjunctions perform their syntactic office, so as to entitle them to a classification, and enable us to decide whether a word is a conjunction or not, and what is meant by its being so?

Murray defines interjections to be "words thrown in between the parts of a sentence to express the passions or emotions of the speaker; as, *O!* I have alienated my friend; *alas!* I fear for life; *O!* virtue," &c. In these examples the interjection precedes the sentence, as usual—contrary, however, to his definition.

Murray's rule 1 of syntax, "A verb must agree," &c., is too general for his system, which leaves nearly half our verbs without person, number, or nominative.

Rule 2—"Two or more nouns, &c. (probably he means nouns and pronouns) in the singular number, joined together by a copulative conjunction, expressed or understood, must have verbs, nouns, and pronouns agreeing with them in the plural number." This concerns only the conjunction *and*. The rule is blind, because *&c.* is indefinite. It is false in expression, because it requires the agreement of "verbs, nouns, *and* pronouns," without exception. It is false, because, in requiring the plural verb, it does not embrace the exceptions, most of which are, indeed, provided for in the notes, but are rarely remembered with the rule. All exceptions should be expressed or allowed in the rules. And their expression is even compatible with a great reduction of rules, when based on proper classifications.

And if it is the conjunction that makes the plural verb necessary, then Rule 3, "The conjunction disjunctive (!) has an effect contrary," &c., is useless; for singular verbs would of course attend singular nouns under Rule 1.

The description of nouns of multitude, in Rule 4, as "signifying many," does not distinguish them from plurals.

And these four, with all their notes and comments, may be superseded by one short, unexceptionable rule, which he in substance applies to collective nouns, in Rule 4, and which expresses the true principle of agreement, viz. *A verb agrees in person and number with the idea conveyed by its agent.*

Rule 5, "Pronouns must always agree," &c., is perhaps superfluous; for pronouns take their gender and number upon the same principle as names. And the word *generally* would be preferable to *always*, for the rule has exceptions; as, *It* is John; John, *you* are to blame.

The latter part of Rule 6, "When a nominative comes between the relative and the verb, the relative is governed," &c., is not true in sentences like the following: He is the one *that* I suppose *wrote* it.

Rule 7, "When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, the relative and verb may agree in person with either," &c., should read, *two nominatives in apposition.*

Rule 9, "The article *a* or *an* agrees with nouns in the singular number only, individually or collectively," is hardly consistent with such expressions as the following: *A dozen were* found. Besides, this rule is no more needed than rules with regard to the number of *few, several, one, two,* &c.

Rule 14—"Participles have the same government as the verbs have from which they are derived." If they are verbs, as he teaches, this extra rule is unnecessary.

If the nominative case had been defined, then Rule 6, "The relative is the nominative," &c., would be unnecessary.

If adjectives had been defined, Rule 8, "Every adjective and adjective pronoun belongs to a substantive," &c., would be unnecessary.

If transitive verbs, prepositions, and the objective case had been defined, then Rule 11, "Active verbs govern the objective case," and Rule 17, "Prepositions govern the objective case," would be unnecessary.

Rule 19, "Some conjunctions require the indicative, some the subjunctive," &c., seems to be a second unsuccessful attempt to define the subjunctive mode; and a third is perhaps exhibited in the notes to this rule.

With regard to Rule 10, "One substantive governs another," &c., and Rule 12, "One verb governs another," &c., it may be observed, that the possessive adjunct and the infinitive are qualifiers; as, *John's* time; time *to come;* like *that* time; *future* time, &c. If there is any thing among these words that should be termed *government,* the adjunct is rather the governing word, because it restricts the expression. But it is a question whether the term has any proper application to syntax.

In the foregoing examination, all of Murray's rules are

noticed except those numbered 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, and 22. Of these it will suffice to say, that they are such as to be now generally disused.

The additional rules of later grammarians are believed to be, with few exceptions, no better.

The rule, "Neuter and passive verbs may have the same case after as before them, when both nouns" (or pronouns, or noun and pronoun) "refer to the same thing," is rendered unnecessary by another attending it in these words—"Two nouns signifying the same thing are put by apposition in the same case."

The two rules, "The nominative governs the verb," and "The verb agrees with its nominative," &c., so far as they have a signification, are but a repetition of the same rule; and we have no concern with the person and number of the verb till we come to it.

The rule, "The infinitive mode, or part of a sentence, is sometimes the nominative to a verb," might have included the participle with the infinitive, and the objective case with the nominative.

The rule, "Adverbs qualify verbs, participles, adjectives, and adverbs," unnecessarily enumerates participles, and, as it is of no use except as a definition of adverbs, should have put prepositions and conjunctions on the list.

The rules with regard to cases absolute and independent, are mere and unmeaning definitions.

The like may be said of the following, and others: "The article refers to a noun to limit its signification." "Adjectives belong to nouns which they describe"—They help to describe things, not words. If such rules amount to any thing, they indicate that what is called etymology is only a department of syntax.

It appears to be one of the mistakes of grammar to call the classing of words *etymology,* and it is suspected that other mistakes have arisen from this. Whatever reason may be found for this use of the term in the Latin grammar, or the Greek, there is certainly none in the English, where words are at least generally classed in reference to syntactic use, without regard to etymology.

The preceding scraps of grammar (so called) are too nearly specimens of the whole. They rationally account for its bad reputation, and may serve to illustrate the effect of suffering a system of instruction to rest on mere precedent, instead of truth, reason, and utility.

The many objections to Murray's Grammar, and those which may be termed its roots and its branches, have not been met by his adherents in the open field of scientific investigation, and their incessant attempts to improve his system, and the readiness with which such attempts are encouraged, at least in the American schools, afford a striking proof of its imperfections. "The one hundred and one" versions of "Murray's Grammar simplified," (to use the expression of a popular grammarian,)* have been seen successively to rise, float, and break, like bubbles, on the tide of popular opinion, and grammar still remains unsatisfactory to the reasoning mind, "as much in the dark as ever."

The learned and ingenious have tried, and are trying, to extricate this important branch of study from its embarrassments by changing the methods of instruction without a change of substance. The "Intuitive," "Inductive," and "Productive," have been resorted to by turns. Dialogue has given place to dissertation, dissertation to questions, questions to lectures, and lectures to dialogue, with what success time has shown, and will show;

"And 'tis a poor relief we gain,
To change the place, but keep the pain."

The classification of words should not be based on their meaning—that would make as many classes as words; nor on their etymology, because, as a popular teacher † observes, "use, and not derivation, is the law of language."

A system of grammar is designed to teach and explain the structure of language, particularly the relations of meaning. Words should therefore be classed, like the bones of animals, the timbers of houses, or the parts of a machine, according to their architectural or syntactic relations.

* Smith's Preface. † Emerson's Preface to Watts on the Mind.

Every grammarian conforms mostly to this principle. Without such conformity the science would have no students. They however make some exceptions, in imitation of ancient grammars, or in reference to precedent or etymology; and these exceptions seem to be needless, and greatly derange not only the classification, but the business of defining, of prescribing rules, and of conveying instruction generally. It is believed by the friends of this constructive system that the aberrations referred to are the principal source of the evils complained of, and, while continued, must necessarily paralyze every attempt to render the science extensively useful.

Hence it is that grammar and composition are made separate studies. Grammar is a collection of incongruities, and composition is either neglected, or pursued without a proper system.

The imitative method of classing is exemplified in the following sentence:—

A / *Some* / *No* } man was there.

The words prefixed to *man* are used as much alike as words can be, and really constitute the same part of the speech or sentence. If we tell the student in composition that they are three parts of speech, that *no* is an adjective, "added to a noun to express its quality," and *some* is a pronoun, "used instead of a noun to avoid repetition," we are backing an error in classing by an equal error in defining; we put an obstacle in the student's way, instead of advancing his progress, and teach him falsehood upon falsehood, when the truth would do infinitely better.

If I say, *a boy's coat hangs yonder*, no one understands me that a boy hangs there. I speak of a coat, descriptively called *a boy's coat*, or *a small coat*.

Boys' coats are *coats of boys*. Small coats are *coats of small size*.

The preceding considerations chiefly account for the changes of classification proposed in this work. They result from necessity, and not from a disposition to innovate.

It will be perceived that the author regards the prevailing classification as resting, in general, after making the exceptions alluded to, on the permanent basis of truth and utility. He cannot, therefore, approve the more extensive changes of Cardell, and some other grammarians.

A more critical and extensive work has been for some time preparing for the press. In the meantime, this abridgment is offered for examination, to ascertain what proportion of the public is disposed to encourage such an improvement.*

The system of grammar of which this is an abstract has been termed the Architective, Constructive, or Structural System, because it is supposed to explain all the relations of words in the forms of speech, and because the classification is altogether based on these relations; from which circumstances, although the explanations should be rendered more extensive and critical, yet the science is greatly simplified, grammar and composition are made one and the same study, every step of the learner's progress in the one is equally a step in the other, and he obtains a clearer view of the syntactic characteristics of style, and the peculiar manner of framing practised by himself or other builder of language.

How far these improvements will ultimately tend to advance the cause of education and science, is yet to be known.

* The author acknowledges with pleasure his obligation to Mr. Joseph Harrington, Jr., Principal of the Hawes School, Boston, for some valuable suggestions, for much personal kindness, and for his early and efficient support of this attempt at improvement.

PART II.

SUBDIVISION OF THE CLASSES.

Lesson I. *Division of Nouns.*

Nouns in construction are divided into Orders, Genders, Persons, Numbers, and Cases.

And besides these entire distinctions, the grammarian has occasion to notice several species, each distinguished by some peculiarity.

Questions.—Nouns are divided how? &c.

Lesson II. *Orders of Nouns.*

Nouns are of four Orders, the Particular, Descriptive, Pronominal, and Conjunctive.

A noun of particular (or proper) order is a particular name—the proper name of a particular thing; as, *John*, *London*, *Jupiter*.

A noun of descriptive (or common) order is a descriptive name—the common name of a description of things; as, a *man*, the *city*, that bright *star*.

A Pronoun, or noun of pronominal order, is the substitute for a name—the substitute for a particular name alone, or for a descriptive name with its supplements. It is a nounal word that has an office more or less general, but is particular in its application; as, *he* spoke; *it* was incorporated; *I* saw *none*.

A noun of conjunctive (or relative) order is used conjunctively. It is a species of conjunction, serving also as a pronoun, agent, or object in the supplemental clause. As

5. A Verb signifies to do, be, or have; as, they *rejoice;* they *are* joyful; they *have* joy. But *to be* signifies to exist, or keep in being; *to have* signifies to possess, or hold in possession; *to be acted upon* is to receive action, or stand as its object; and they can be commanded as something to be done, materially or mentally; as, *be* merciful, or *have* mercy; *be instructed*, &c. And even existence itself, perhaps, implies action. Hence the following concise and convenient definition.

6. A Verb signifies to do some action; as, I *am*, I *exist*, I *live*, I *stand*, I *move*, I *run*, I *have*, I *possess*, I *hold*, I *keep*, I *claim*, I *demand*.

And it should be understood that grammar has no concern with the difference of things spoken of, farther than that occasions a difference in the forms of speech. Classification has no more concern with the quantity or reality of action signified by a verb, than with the magnitude or materiality of the thing signified by a noun.*

Questions.—First definition? Examples. How is a verb related to mental philosophy? Examples. Does it signify to do a material action? Examples. How related to an agent? Examples. When do two or more words constitute one verb? Examples. Fifth definition? Exemplify it. Last definition? Exemplify it. What concern has grammar with the difference of things? &c.

Lesson X. *Exercises with the Noun and Verb.*

[☞ Let the class be required to distinguish the nouns and verbs in the following exercises, and also to compose sentences consisting of these parts of speech. Grammar and composition should be taught together.]

1st Division.

Jane sings.
Louisa studies.
Nancy reads.
Caroline walked.
Harriet died.

Beauty fades.
Virtue triumphs.
Friendship soothes.
Hope brightens.
Spring returns.

I hesitate.
They mistake.
He declined.
It suffers.
Ours returned.

* "The distinction between verbs absolutely neuter, and active intransitive, is of little use in grammar. The construction of them both is the same; and grammar is not so much concerned with their real, as their grammatical, properties."—*Lowth.*

Laura retired.
Eliza excels.
Edwin attended.
Charles spoke.
Adam sinned.
Peter wept.
Paul preached.

Mankind toil.
Roses bloom.
Winds blow.
Trees grow.
Time passes.
Life continues.
Death approaches.

Who fell?
Which succeeded?
George's failed.
His answered.
These agree.
He replied.
She rejoined.

2d Division.

Julia wrote.
Imitate Martha.
Encourage Lydia.
Rachel mourned.
Pity Susan.
Educate Mary.
Teach Joseph.
Cyrus conquered.
Wallis fought.
Forgive Amos.
Engage Abigail.
Observe Lucy.

Run boy.
Fire burns.
Leaves fall.
Receive instruction.
Fools contend.
Misfortunes follow.
Speak truth.
Do justice.
Love mercy.
Follow peace.
Forsake sin.
Obey God.

Read this.
Patronize whom?
Promise what?
We think.
Awake thou.
Place it.
Serve neither.
That gravitates.
This soars.
Silence all.
Save us.
We perish.

3d Division.

We should consider.	Should we consider?
He might improve.	Might he improve?
You can be called.	Can you be called?
We shall move.	Shall we move?
This cannot be.	Cannot this be?
Frown it must.	Must it frown?
Health is studied.	Is health studied?
This might have been expected.	Might this have been expected?
You prosper. / You do prosper.	Do you prosper?
They ran. / They did run.	Did they run?