ENGLISH
THEMES AND ESSAYS:

OR,

The Teacher's Assistant in Composition;

BEING

A SYSTEM OF EASY RULES

FOR WRITING EXERCISES,

ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLES, ADAPTED TO THE USE
OF BOTH SEXES, AT SCHOOL:

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

HINTS FOR CORRECTING AND IMPROVING JUVENILE
COMPOSITION.

By JOHN WALKER,

AUTHOR OF THE CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY, &c. &c.

True ease in writing comes from art, not chance,
As those move easiest who have learn'd to dance.—Pope.

THE NINTH EDITION.

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PREFACE.

THE present Work is the offspring of necessity. Being engaged for several years in teaching young people a method of writing their thoughts on common subjects, I was desirous of availing myself of the labours of those who had gone before me; but was disappointed: not a work could I find in our language which afforded me any considerable assistance; nor did the French language, fertile as it is in books, offer any thing on the subject worth notice. After various inquiries, therefore, I found myself under the necessity of composing something of my own; and the present Work is the result of it.

What can be the reason of such a scarcity of books on this subject, it is not easy to determine. Surely the power of putting our

thoughts upon paper in a clear and agreeable manner is of sufficient importance in life to form part of a polite education; nor can it be denied that this, like every other accomplishment, is in a great measure to be attained by rules and practice. It is well known by those who have studied human nature, that whatever is to be gained by habit can scarcely be taught too early; and yet the habit of expressing our thoughts in an easy and regular way is generally either entirely neglected, or the last thing thought of, in a course of education. It is a great mistake to suppose that an advanced age only can enter upon this part of instruction. The moment young people can read fluently, and talk upon common subjects, they may be enabled to write upon them; and nothing but the habit is wanting. It is true, the path must be smoothed for them; we must not expect them to invent matter: what they write must be infused into them, and what we infuse must be of the easiest kind, and so connected, that one

part will naturally suggest another: when a subject is thus prepared, it will be easy, even for a child, to set it down from memory upon paper; and when once a habit of doing this is acquired, the greatest difficulty is over. By degrees, they will naturally supply with their own words those they do not remember, and soon begin to think upon a subject for themselves.

The difficulty which attends an exercise of this kind, without preparing it by the easiest and most gradual advances, is the principal reason why it is so much neglected both by pupils and teachers.—To order a young beginner to write upon a subject without giving an outline, by laying down some leading points, is the most unreasonable thing in the world. We ought to expect nothing from tender youth but memory; judgment and invention will come by degrees, and ought not to be forced upon the delicate intellects of children too soon. The mind should advance in strength by the same

insensible degrees as the body. Too strong exercise in either will prevent the growth of both, just as the want of proper exercise in either will infallibly hinder their arriving at the greatest degree of strength they are capable of. To follow Nature, therefore, in that happy medium in which the excellence of almost every operation lies is the intention of the following Work. How I have succeeded in this intention must be left to the judgment of the Public, and from their sentence there is no appeal.

INTRODUCTION.

DIRECTIONS TO PARENTS AND PRECEPTORS, IN THE USE OF THE FOLLOWING WORK.

In the first place the rules in prose must be written out by the pupil, and explained more fully by the teacher. The rules versified must also be copied and explained, by comparing them with the prose; after which, the pupil must get them by heart.

In the next place, the teacher must read over the Theme distinctly to the pupil, observing the correspondence of each part with the rules. When this is done, the teacher should talk over the Theme to the pupil, by making use of his own words in as familiar

a manner as possible; after which he should read the Theme over a second time to the pupil, and then leave him to put it down from memory as well as he is able.

It will be necessary for the pupil to have a book in quarto, like a copy-book, and to write his exercise on the left-hand page; if he should write more than one page will hold, he should turn over the leaf and continue to write on the left-hand page, and so on till the Theme is finished.

The teacher should then inspect what is written, and correct what is improper, rather by giving the pupil's thought a proper turn than changing it for one more accurate; for it is the pupil's idea which ought to be "*taught how to shoot,*" as an idea thus humoured will thrive much better in the human mind than one that is not a native of the soil. Care should therefore be taken that the teacher do not affect too elegant a style in his corrections, but, as much as possible,

to make them of a piece with the pupil's own production*.

When the Theme is thus corrected, the pupil should be ordered to copy it out fair, with all the improvements, upon the right-hand opposite page, that the original and the fair copy may face each other; and this writing over the Theme a second time will imprint the corrections in the pupil's mind, and insensibly make them his own.

After the Theme is first read over and explained, it would be advisable to set the pupil upon writing it as soon as possible, that it may not slip out of his memory.

Perhaps it would not be without its use

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* Quintilian excellently observes, "that luxuriance in "juvenile composition is an infinitely better sign than "sterility. Teachers should not aim at too great correct-"ness, which may possibly cramp the genius too much, "by rendering the pupil timid and diffident; or, perhaps, "discourage him altogether, by producing absolute des-"pair of ariving at any degree of perfection."

to desire the pupil to write his first sketch upon a bit of loose paper, and to leave it till the next morning, when he may try to make improvements of his own, and recollect something more of the Theme that was given him; he may do the same another morning, and then he should copy what he has done upon the left-hand page of his book of exercise, for the inspection of the teacher. This method, if I am not mistaken, will in some measure take away the difficulty which arises from the thoughts of doing his best at first, and make him enter on his exercise with more ease and alacrity than if he were to begin it in a more formal manner in his book.—"These "little things," as Dr. Goldsmith observes on another occasion, "are great to little men;" and some of the best practical moral philosophers have laid the greatest stress upon the doctrine of associations.

As the capacities of pupils are very different, a very different method should be adopted in teaching them; but scarcely, in

any part of education, can instruction be given in classes with so little convenience as in writing Themes. Particular care, therefore, should be taken to let the classes be small, and to form them of such pupils as have nearly the same capacity. If a whole Theme should be too difficult, either for a single pupil or a class, let them only have the three first parts given them for the first exercise, and the four last for a second: if this should be found too hard, it may be advisable to give them but two parts at a time; nay, for those who have almost an invincible repugnance to this sort of exercise (which is often the case), a single part at a time may be enough to begin with. "Divide and conquer," as Dr. Johnson observes, "is a maxim true in letters as well as in politics;" and we should always keep in view a rule of the greatest importance in teaching, that the advances in a difficult art cannot be too easy and gradual.

The attentive teacher will observe, that every Theme, Subject, and Essay, has an in-

structive and moral tendency; and if he is at first displeased with the want of ease and elegance in the language and style, he will easily recollect that such a style would have been unsuitable to the capacities of young people just beginning to put their thoughts upon paper, and that the first aim of their teacher ought to be, to enable them to express some of the most obvious ideas in the most obvious words. The very elegant style of Mr. Addison would, in this case, be too delicate to meet their apprehension; his most ingenious turns of thought would be lost upon them: and some of the finest passages in his Spectators might be read to them, without their being able to carry away with them a single idea.

The first object, therefore, in the following Work, was, to convey clear and prominent ideas; to arrange these ideas in such a manner as to make one thought suggest another; to give as much imagery to the thought as possible, that a picture might remain in the

mind of the pupil which would enable him to clothe it in words, when the more refined and sentimental part of the subject might escape him. In short, I thought it the business of the teacher in this case, to embody thought and sentiment as much as possible, and, as Shakspeare finely says,

> ——to give to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.

In the course of this work I have derived so little assistance from other writers, that I might, perhaps, pass uncensured for plagiarism, if I were to be silent on this head; but candour obliges me to confess some obligations to Knox's Essays, to Jones's Letters from a Tutor to his Pupil, to Letters from Honoria to Marianne, to Bright's Praxis, and perhaps to a few others scarcely worth mentioning. But most of these I have been obliged to modify in such a manner as to make them more suitable for an exercise; but by far the greatest part, with all their faults, are my own; and it remains with the

public to judge whether, upon the whole, I have added any thing to the stock of instruction, and have met the wants of parents and teachers in this very important part of education.

It is presumed, that by the time the pupil has written the Narratives, the Regular Subjects, and the Themes, he will be enabled to begin those which take a more excursive turn, and to give his mind a little scope, by producing something more like an Essay. This is the order I had recommended, in the first edition, to be occasionally adopted, and have been induced, by a judicious observation in the Monthly Review, to prefer this arrangement in the present edition, as most agreeable to the natural procedure of the mind.

It is hoped that the present Work will be found useful not only to those who are under the care of a teacher, but to those who wish to improve *themselves*. To these it may be observed, that if they read over the Theme or Subject till they are fully possessed of the

sense, and then lay it aside and write down from memory as much as they can recollect, they will, by looking at the Theme, see how far they have deviated from it, and what they ought to correct. This is a practice recommended by Dr. Blair, who advises the pupil to read a passage in Addison, and endeavour to imitate it in the manner above noticed. This, for pupils far advanced, is undoubtedly an excellent practice; but for the younger class of pupils, as we have before observed, Mr. Addison's language seems too elegant and (if I may use the expression) too untangible. A regular chain of thinking, and a coarser and more palpable choice of words, seem best calculated for the improvement of beginners in the art.

It need scarcely be observed, that it is of the utmost importance that pupils should not have this book in their possession. So difficult and irksome at first is the task of writing their thoughts, that young people will risk every thing to ease themselves of the

burden. This book, therefore, should be carefully kept from them; as even one of them in a school, if the teacher's eye be not upon them while they write, will be sufficient to frustrate his expectations. The rules, therefore, may first be written out by the teacher, and then given to the pupil to copy, without permitting him to see the book; and even if the teacher were to copy out the Theme or Subject, and read it in manuscript to the pupil, it might probably have a good effect on his mind; as it might lead him to suppose there was no such book in being, and give him that idea of rarity and worth which manuscript generally carries with it above what is in print.

*** This caution, which was given in the first edition, was evidently calculated for large schools, and the younger class of pupils: but when the classes are small, and the pupils more advanced—if the teacher can withdraw the book, or be present while they are writing their exercises, the possession of the book

may be so far from a detriment, that it may possibly be an advantage: it may familiarize them to the train of thought which a subject requires, and give them a habit of thinking and writing with consistency and precision. In this case, as in most others, general rules will often be found defective; and the judgment of the teacher must distinguish the exceptions.

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OUTLINES IN NARRATIVE.

ADVERTISEMENT.

PERHAPS the easiest method of training young people to write is to begin with Narrative. All who have the use of reason can relate a transaction in the manner they have seen or heard it; and though to do this to the best advantage is not a very easy task, yet to do it tolerably is, perhaps, less difficult than any other species of composition: for this reason I have thought it proper to begin with Narrative, that nothing might be left untried to induce youth to the habit of writing down their thoughts on whatever might be the least difficult to them at first. Nothing so easy to comprehend and retain as a story, and therefore nothing so easy to write down from memory.

But as some pupils have an almost invincible repugnance to putting down their thoughts upon paper, every method, and even every stratagem, should be made use of to induce them to try at it: for which purpose, I have often thought, that if a short, simple story were read to them, and then a paper given them with the leading words of the story written at certain distances, and left for them to fill up, it would be an easy means of bringing them on to undertake that terrible task of writing their own thoughts. This may be called drawing the *outline* of a subject, in the same manner as a drawing-master traces the outlines of a picture, which he leaves for the pupil to fill up; and there seems to be no reason why one method should not be as conducive to improvement in writing as the other is in drawing. Both these modes of writing will be exemplified in the following pages.

OUTLINES IN NARRATIVE.

COURAGE AND CONJUGAL AFFECTION IN A FEMALE.

ARRIA, the wife of Pætus, understanding that her husband was condemned to die, and permitted to choose what death he liked best, she went and exhorted him to quit life courageously; and, bidding him farewell, gave herself a stab in the breast with a dagger she had hid under her garment; then drawing it out of the wound, and presenting it to Pætus, she said, "The wound I have given myself "is not at all painful: I only feel for that which "you must give yourself in following my example."

THE OUTLINE.

ARRIA,
Pætus,
condemned to die,
death he liked best,
to die courageously;
farewell,

breast
dagger
presenting
Pætus,
not at all painful;
feel
you must give yourself
example.

COURAGE AND JUDGMENT UNITED IN NECESSITY.

THE Romans being ready to join battle with the Albans, to avoid bloodshed, it was agreed by both parties, that the victory should be determined by three champions against three on either side. There happened to be in each camp three brothers, born at one birth, of equal years, and equal stature; the three *Horatii* for the Romans, and the three *Curiatii* for the Albans. After a doubtful conflict, two of the Romans were slain, and the third finding himself unable to contend with the three Albans together, feigned fear, ran away, and by this stratagem drew his adversaries asunder, who by reason of their wounds could not run with equal speed; upon which he turned back, slew them one by one in single fight, and obtained the victory for the Romans.

THE OUTLINE.

THE Romans,
Albans,
agreed
three champions
in each camp three brothers,
Horatii
Romans
Curiatii
Albans,
two of the Romans slain,
the third Roman
feigned fear,
drew his adversaries asunder,
victory for the Romans.

FRIENDSHIP CONTINUING AFTER DEATH.

TITUS VOLUMNIUS, a citizen of Rome, was the friend of Marcus Lucullus, who was slain by the command of Marc Antony, because he had followed the party of Brutus and Cassius; and though he

had sufficient time to preserve himself by flight, yet he remained by the body of his dead friend, and lamented him with such abundance of tears, that notice was taken of him by the soldiers of the opposite party, and he was dragged by them to Antony. When he came into his presence, "Command me, "Sir," said he, "to be taken back to the body of "Lucullus, and to be there slain; for I ought not "to survive him, since I was the only person who "persuaded him to take that unfortunate side which "has brought him to ruin." Antony was easily prevailed upon to grant his request, and he was led to the place where Lucullus lay dead. When he came to the body of his friend, he kissed his right hand, took up his head that was cut off, and put it to his bosom, and then presented his own neck to receive the blow of the executioner.

THE OUTLINE.

Titus Volumnius,
Marcus Lucullus,
slain by Antony
Brutus and Cassius;
time
by flight,

abundance of tears,
dragged him to Antony.
into his presence,
" Command me,
body of Lucullus,
not to survive him,
persuaded him to take that side
back to the body.
kissed his hand,
took up his head,
neck to the executioner.

DISINGENUOUSNESS OFTEN FATAL TO YOUTH.

The Roman Emperor, Trajan, after a long war with Decebalus, king of the Dacians, who had often prevaricated and deceived him, at last took him, and subdued his kingdom; and, after his death, was educating his son, with an intention, according to the Roman custom, to restore him to his father's kingdom, making him his tributary and vassal; but seeing him once break into a garden at night, he asked him where he had been all the afternoon. The boy answered, in school: with which disingenuity the emperor was so offended, that all the intercession of

the Dacians, and many of the Romans, could never induce him to make good what he had intended for him; always saying, "That he who began so early "to prevaricate, could never deserve a crown."

THE OUTLINE.

Trajan,
Decebalus, king of the Dacians,
took him and subdued his kingdom;
educating his son,
restore him
break into a garden
afternoon.
in school:
offended,
Dacians and Romans
do what he intended,
so early to prevaricate,
deserve a crown."

FILIAL PIETY RESPECTED BY ENEMIES.

When the city of Troy was taken by the Greeks, after the first fury of plunder was over, the conquerors, pitying the misfortunes of their captives, caused it to be proclaimed, that every free citizen had the liberty of taking away any one thing which he valued most: upon which Æneas, neglecting every thing else, only carried away with him his household gods. The Greeks, delighted with his piety, gave him permission to carry away with him any other thing he had the greatest regard for; and immediately he took upon his shoulders his aged father, who was grown decrepit, and was carrying him out of the town: the Greeks, struck with his filial duty, gave him leave to take away every thing that belonged to him; declaring that Nature itself would not suffer them to be enemies to such as showed so great piety to the gods, and so great reverence to their parents.

THE OUTLINE.

When the city of Troy
plunder was over,
proclaimed, that every free citizen
which he valued most:
Æneas, neglecting
his household gods.
The Greeks, delighted

any other thing
his aged father:
the Greeks, struck
every thing that belonged to him;
Nature itself would not suffer them
piety to the gods
reverence to their parents.

CANDOUR IN A CRIMINAL PLEASANTLY REWARDED.

The Duke of *Ossuna,* as he passed by *Barcelona,* having got leave of the *King* of Spain to release some *slaves,* he went on board the *galley,* and passing through the benches of slaves at the oar, he asked several of them *what their offences* were? Every one excused himself; one saying that he was put there out of *malice,* another by the *bribery* of the judge; but all of them unjustly. Among the rest there was a little *sturdy fellow;* and the Duke asking him what *he was there for,* "Sir," said he, "I cannot deny but I am *justly* sent here; for I *wanted* money, and so I took a purse upon the *highway* to keep me from *starving.*" Upon which *the Duke,* with a little stick he had in his hand, gave him two or three *blows* upon the shoulders,

saying, "*You rogue,* what do you do among so many *honest men?* Get you gone out of their company." So he was *freed,* and the rest remained there still to *tug at the oar.*

A STRIKING INSTANCE OF THE SUBJECTION IN WHICH THE ROMANS HELD OTHER NATIONS.

Nothing can shew the terror of the *Roman name* in a stronger light than the *insolent behaviour* of their ambassador to *Antiochus, king of Syria. That monarch* meditated an invasion of *Egypt,* and was just on the point of declaring war *against Ptolemy,* who was the *ally* of the Romans. *The Senate* immediately despatched *Popilius Lænas* with a peremptory message to Antiochus, *commanding him to desist* from attacking the *ally* of the Roman people. *When Popilius* arrived at the *camp of Antiochus,* he found him surrounded by his *courtiers,* and attended by a *powerful army;* but, without being intimidated, *he boldly* delivered to him the *Senate's message. Antiochus,* embarrassed at so unexpected an address, but unwilling to give up his intended enterprise, gave *an evasive answer:* upon which *Popilius, with a wand* he had in his hand,

drew a *circle* upon the sand *round the king*, and ordered him not to stir out of it till he had given him a *direct answer* to the Senate's demand. The boldness and austerity of this action *so intimidated Antiochus*, that he immediately promised *he would desist* from his intended invasion, and *obey* the mandate of *the Romans*.

The letters in Italics in the two last may be disposed by the teacher in the same manner as in the former examples; and this trial may be made in the Themes, Regular Subjects, or Essays, as the teacher finds the pupil want assistance. Thus we have descended to slowness of parts as low as we can go. No descent can be too low, if it raises the pupil from indolence to exertion, from backwardness to facility. It is the principal task of a teacher to measure the capacity of the pupil, and to adapt his instructions to that measure; and it is hoped that the present Work affords to the teacher a variety of methods, not all of them unworthy of his notice; but if but one of them prove really useful, the Author shall not think the time and pains he has bestowed unprofitably or illaudably employed.

SKETCHES IN NARRATIVE.

ADVERTISEMENT.

In teaching to write Exercises, particularly in Narrative, I have often observed that the most difficult part of the composition is the connectives. If a pupil, therefore, of the lower class, seems remarkably backward in writing, perhaps it might not be improper to direct him to make his sentences as short as possible, and, instead of tacking one member to another in a long chain by relatives and conjunctions, to relate his subject by short, detached members. When he has done this, the teacher may shew him how these connectives may be supplied, and by copying over the exercise thus connected and perfected, he may be led to a use of the connectives by himself. This may be called, giving a *sketch* of a subject.

SKETCHES IN NARRATIVE.

GENEROSITY REWARDED.

Plancus, a Roman citizen, being proscribed by the triumvirs, Antony, Lepidus, and Octavius, was forced to abscond. His slaves, though put to the torture, refused to discover him. New torments being prepared,—to prevent further distress to servants that were so faithful to him, Plancus appeared, and offered his throat to the swords of the executioners. An example so noble, of mutual affection betwixt a master and his slaves, procured a pardon to Plancus; and Rome declared, that Plancus only was worthy of so good servants, and they only were worthy of so good a master.

THE SAME STORY IN DETACHED SENTENCES.

Plancus was proscribed by the triumvirs, and was forced to abscond.

His slaves were put to the torture, but refused to discover him.

New torments were prepared to force them to discover him.

Plancus made his appearance, and offered himself to death.

This generosity of Plancus made the triumvirs pardon him.

They said, Plancus only was worthy of so good servants, and the servants only were worthy of so good a master.

GENEROSITY TO AN ENEMY UNIVERSALLY ADMIRED.

Cneius Domitius, tribune of the Roman people, burning to ruin his enemy, Marcus Scaurus, chief of the senate, accused him publicly, before the people, of several high crimes and misdemeanors. His zeal in the prosecution excited a slave of Scaurus, through hope of a reward, to offer himself privately as a witness. But justice here prevailed over revenge: for Domitius, without listening to a single word, ordered the perfidious wretch to be fettered, and to be carried instantly to his master. This action was so universally admired, that there was no end of heaping honours upon Domitius. He was successively elected consul, censor, and chief priest.

THE SAME STORY IN DETACHED SENTENCES.

Cneius Domitius, tribune of the Roman people, had a great enmity against Marcus Scaurus, chief of the senate.

He accused him publicly of several high crimes and misdemeanors.

A slave of Scaurus, through hope of a reward, offered himself as a witness against his master.

Domitius ordered him to be bound, and sent to his master.

This generous action of Domitius was much admired by the people.

Honours were heaped upon him without end.

He was successively elected consul, censor, and chief priest.

ONE GENEROUS ACTION COMMONLY PRODUCES ANOTHER.

In the siege of Falerii by Camillus, general of the Romans, the schoolmaster of the town, who had the children of the senators under his care, led them abroad under the pretext of recreation, and carried

them to the Roman camp, saying to Camillus, That, by this artifice, he had delivered Falerii into his hands. Camillus, abhorring this treachery, observed, "That there were laws for war as well "as for peace; and that the Romans were taught "to make war with integrity, not less than with "courage." He ordered the schoolmaster to be stripped, his hands to be bound behind his back, and to be delivered to the boys to be lashed back into the town. The Falerians, formerly obstinate in resistance, struck with an act of justice so illustrious, delivered themselves up to the Romans, convinced, that it would be far better to have the Romans for their allies than their enemies.

THE SAME STORY IN DETACHED SENTENCES.

The city of the Falerii was besieged by Camillus, general of the Romans.

A schoolmaster decoyed the children of the principal citizens into the Roman camp.

He told Camillus that the possession of these children would make the citizens soon surrender to him.

Camillus told him, the Romans loved courage, but hated treachery.

He ordered the schoolmaster to have his hands bound, and to be whipped back into the city by the boys.

The citizens were charmed with this generous behaviour of Camillus, and immediately submitted to the Romans.

HEROIC GENEROSITY SELDOM UNREWARDED.

When Calais, after a shameful revolt from the English, was retaken by Edward III., he, as a punishment, appointed six of the most reputable burgesses to be put to death, leaving the inhabitants to choose the victims. While the inhabitants, stupidly aghast, declined to make a choice, Eustace de St. Pierre, a burgess of the first rank, offered himself to be one of the devoted six. A generosity so uncommon raised such admiration, that five more were quickly found who followed his example. These six illustrious persons marching out barefooted, with halters about their necks, presented to the conqueror the keys of the town. The queen, being informed of their heroic virtue, threw herself at the king's feet, entreating him, with tears in her eyes, to regard such illustrious

merit. She not only obtained their pardon, but entertained them in her own tent, and dismissed them with handsome presents.

THE SAME STORY IN DETACHED SENTENCES.

CALAIS revolted from the English, and was retaken by Edward III.

In revenge for their treachery, he ordered them to choose six citizens to be put to death.

While all were struck with horror at this sentence, Eustace de St. Pierre offered himself for one.

Five more soon joined him; and they came with halters about their necks to Edward.

He ordered them to be executed; but his queen pleaded so powerfully for them, that he pardoned them.

The queen not only entertained them sumptuously in her own tent, but sent them back loaded with presents.

NARRATIVE.

ADVERTISEMENT.

If it has been found necessary to begin with the pupil so low as the Outlines and Sketches in Narrative, he may then be led to Narrative without the foregoing assistance, and be induced to write down a story from memory. For this purpose I would advise the teacher to read over an example of this kind to the pupil, and, if possible, to make him tell it over in his own words, by helping him out a little, then to read it over again, and to order him to write it down from memory. This should be corrected and re-written, like the other exercises, and repeated till a facility is obtained, and an ability of proceeding to something more difficult.

In order to induce the pupil to exercise his imagination, I would advise the teacher to give him first a short narrative, and, after he has done that, to give him the same story amplified: for which purpose, I have given some examples of both these kinds, which, if the teacher finds to be useful, may, with very little trouble, be multiplied at pleasure.

NARRATIVE AMPLIFIED.

FIDELITY RESPECTED BY ENEMIES.

At the battle of Philippi, when Brutus, after the rout of his army, was in danger of falling into the hands of his enemies, his bosom friend, Lucilius, gave him an opportunity to escape, calling out, "I am Brutus! lead me to Antony!" Being conducted to Antony, he spoke with great resolution: "I have employed this artifice," said he, "that "Brutus might not fall alive into the hands of his "enemies. The gods will never permit that for-"tune shall triumph so far over virtue. In spite "of fortune, Brutus will always be found, dead or "alive, in a situation worthy of his courage." Antony, admiring the firmness of Lucilius, said to him, "You merit a greater recompense than it is "in my power to bestow. I have been just now "informed of the death of Brutus; and as your "fidelity to him is now at an end, I beg earnestly "to be received in his place: Love me as you did "him, I wish no more." Lucilius embraced the offer, engaged himself to Antony, and maintaining

the same fidelity to him that he had done to Brutus, adhered to him when he was abandoned by all the world.

THE SAME STORY AMPLIFIED.

After the second battle of Philippi, between Antony and Octavius, two of the Roman triumvirs, and Brutus, which proved fatal to the latter, and, indeed, to the liberty of Rome, one Lucilius Lucinus, an intimate friend to Brutus, observing a body of Thracian horse taking no notice of any other in their pursuit, but making directly towards Brutus, resolved to stop them, and save the life of his general at the hazard of his own. Accordingly, without acquainting Brutus with his design, he halted till the Thracians came up and surrounded him; then he cried out, "I am Brutus!" and, begging quarter, desired they would carry him to Antony, pretending that he feared Octavius. The Thracians, overjoyed with their prey, and thinking themselves happy, immediately detached some of their own body to acquaint Antony with their good fortune; and, in the mean time, giving over the pursuit, returned to the field of battle with their prisoner. The report being spread in an instant, all over the army, that Brutus was taken, and that the

Thracians were bringing him alive to Antony, both soldiers and officers flocked together from all parts to see him. Some pitied his misfortunes, others accused him of a meanness unbecoming his former glory, for suffering himself, out of too much love of life, to be a prey to barbarians. As for Antony, he was not a little concerned at this adventure, being quite at a loss in what manner he should receive, and how he should treat his illustrious captive: but he was soon delivered from his uneasiness; for, as the Thracians drew near, he knew the prisoner, who had passed himself upon the Thracians for Brutus; and now addressing the Triumvir with a generous confidence, 'Be assured, 'Antony,' said he, 'that no enemy either has or 'ever shall take Marcus Brutus alive: forbid it, 'ye gods, that fortune should ever prevail so much 'above virtue! But, let him be discovered dead 'or alive, he will certainly be found in such a state 'as is worthy of him. As for me, I have delivered 'myself up to save him, and am now ready to 'suffer whatever torments you think proper to 'inflict upon me, without demanding or expecting 'any quarter.'

Antony, wonderfully taken with the fidelity, virtue, and generosity of Lucilius, turned to the Thracians, now sensible of, and enraged at, their

disappointment, and addressed them thus: 'I perceive, my fellow-soldiers, that you are concerned and full of resentment for having been thus imposed upon by Lucilius: but be assured, that you have met with a booty better than that you have sought for; you have been in search of an enemy, and you have brought me a friend. I was truly at a loss how I should have treated Brutus, if you had brought him to me alive; but of this I am sure, that it is better to have such a man as Lucilius our friend than our enemy.' Having thus spoken, he embraced Lucilius, and commended him to the care of one of his friends.

DESPERATE FIDELITY IN FRIENDSHIP UNEXPECTEDLY REWARDED.

Damon and Pythias were intimate friends. Damon, being condemned to death by Dionysius the tyrant, demanded liberty to go home to set his affairs in order; and his friend offered himself to be his surety, and to submit to death if Damon should not return. Every one was in expectation what would be the event, and every one began to condemn Pythias for so rash an action: but he, confident of the integrity of his friend, waited the appointed time with alacrity. Damon, strict to his engagement, returned at the appointed time. Dionysius, admiring their mutual fidelity, pardoned Damon, and prayed to have the friendship of two such worthy men.

THE SAME STORY AMPLIFIED.

Damon being condemned to death by Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, obtained liberty to visit his wife and children, leaving his friend Pythias as a pledge for his return, on condition that, if he failed, Pythias should suffer in his stead. Damon not appearing at the time appointed, the tyrant had the curiosity to visit Pythias in prison. 'What a fool were you,' said he, 'to rely on Damon's promise! How could you imagine that he would sacrifice his life for you, or for any man?' — 'My lord,' said Pythias, with a firm voice and noble aspect, 'I would suffer a thousand deaths rather than my friend should fail in any article of honour: he cannot fail; I am as confident of his virtue as of my own existence. But I beseech the gods to preserve his life: oppose him, ye winds! disappoint his eagerness, and suffer him not to arrive till my death has saved a life of much greater consequence than mine, necessary to his lovely

'wife, to his little innocents, to his friends, to his 'country. Oh! let me not die the cruellest of 'deaths in that of my friend.' Dionysius was confounded and awed with the magnanimity of these sentiments; he wished to speak; he hesitated; he looked down; and retired in silence. The fatal day arrived. Pythias was brought forth; and, with an air of satisfaction, walked to the place of execution. He ascended the scaffold, and addressed the people: 'My prayers are heard; the gods are propitious; the winds have been contrary; Damon 'could not conquer impossibilities; he will be 'here to-morrow, and my blood shall ransom that 'of my friend.' As he pronounced these words a buzz arose, a distant voice was heard, the crowd caught the words, and 'Stop! stop the execution!' was repeated by every person. A man came at full speed. In the same instant he was off his horse, on the scaffold, and in the arms of Pythias. 'You 'are safe,' he cried, 'you are safe, you are safe, 'my friend! The gods be praised, you are 'safe!' Pale, cold, and half speechless, in the arms of his Damon, Pythias replied in broken accents: 'Fatal haste——cruel impatience——what 'envious powers have wrought impossibilities 'against your friend? But I will not be wholly 'disappointed: since I cannot die to save you, I

'will die to accompany you.' Dionysius heard, and beheld with astonishment; his eyes were opened; his heart was touched; and he could no longer resist the power of virtue. He descended from his throne, and ascended the scaffold. 'Live, live, ye 'incomparable pair! Ye have demonstrated the 'existence of virtue; and, consequently, of a God 'who rewards it. Live happy, live renowned! and 'as you have invited me by your example, form 'me by your precepts, to participate worthily of a 'friendship so divine.

THE SAME STORY MORE AMPLIFIED.

When Damon was sentenced by Dionysius of Syracuse to die on a certain day, he begged permission, in the interim, to retire to his own country, to set the affairs of his disconsolate family in order. This the tyrant intended peremptorily to refuse, by granting it, as he conceived, on the impossible conditions of his procuring some one to remain as hostage for his return, under equal forfeiture of life. Pythias heard the conditions, and did not wait for an application upon the part of Damon: he instantly offered himself as security for his friend; which being accepted, Damon was im-

mediately set at liberty. The king and all the courtiers were astonished at this action; and, therefore, when the day of execution drew near, the tyrant had the curiosity to visit Pythias in his confinement. After some conversation on the subject of friendship, the tyrant delivered it as his opinion, that self-interest was the sole mover of human actions; and that virtue, friendship, benevolence, love of one's country, and the like, he looked upon them as terms invented by the wise to keep in awe and impose upon the weak. 'My lord,' said Pythias, with a firm voice and noble aspect, 'I would 'it were possible that I might suffer a thousand 'deaths, rather than my friend should fail in any 'article of his honour! He cannot fail therein, my 'lord! I am as confident of his virtue as I am of 'my own existence. But I pray, I beseech the 'gods to preserve the life and integrity of my 'Damon together. Oppose him, ye winds! prevent 'the eagerness and impatience of his honourable 'endeavours, and suffer him not to arrive till by 'my death I have redeemed a life a thousand 'times of more consequence, of more value, than 'my own; more estimable to his lovely wife, to his 'precious little innocents, to his friends, to his 'country. O leave me not to die the worst of 'deaths in that of my friend!' Dionysius was awed

and confounded by the dignity of these sentiments, and by the manner in which they were uttered: he felt his heart struck by a slight sense of invading truth; but it served rather to perplex than undeceive him. The fatal day arrived: Pythias was brought forth, and walked amidst the guards with a serious, but satisfied air, to the place of execution. Dionysius was already there; he was exalted on a moving throne that was drawn by six white horses, and sat pensive and attentive to the prisoner. Pythias came; he vaulted lightly on the scaffold, and, beholding for a time the apparatus of his death, he turned with a placid countenance, and addressed the spectators: 'My prayers are heard,' he cried, 'the gods are propitious; you know, my friends, 'that the winds have been contrary till yesterday. 'Damon could not come; he could not conquer 'impossibilities; he will be here to-morrow; and 'the blood which is shed to-day shall have ransomed the life of my friend. O! could I erase 'from your bosoms every doubt, every mean suspicion, of the honour of the man for whom I am 'about to suffer, I should go to my death even as 'I would to my wedding. Be it sufficient, in the 'mean time, that my friend will be found noble; 'that his truth is unimpeachable; that he will 'speedily prove it; that he is now on his way, hur-

'rying on, accusing himself, the adverse elements, 'and fortune; but I haste to prevent his speed:— 'Executioner, do your office.' As he pronounced the last words a buzz began to rise among the remotest of the people; a distant voice was heard, the crowd caught the words, and 'Stop! stop the execution!' was repeated by the whole assembly. A man came at full speed; the throng gave way to his approach; he was mounted on a steed that almost flew; in an instant he was off his horse, on the scaffold, and held Pythias straitly embraced. 'You 'are safe!' he cried: 'you are safe, my friend, 'my dearest friend! the gods be praised, you are 'safe! I now have nothing but death to suffer, 'and am delivered from the anguish of those re'proaches which I gave myself for having endan'gered a life so much dearer than my own.' Pale, cold, and half speechless, in the arms of his Damon, Pythias replied in broken accents—'Fatal haste!— 'Cruel impatience!—What envious powers have 'wrought impossibilities in your favour? But I 'will not be wholly disappointed. Since I cannot 'die to save, I will not survive you.' Dionysius heard, beheld, and considered all with astonishment. His heart was touched, he wept, and leaving his throne, he ascended the scaffold. 'Live, 'live, ye incomparable pair,' he cried; 'ye have

'borne unquestionable testimony to the existence 'of virtue; and that virtue equally evinces the 'existence of a God to reward it. Live happy, 'live renowned! and, O, form me by your pre'cepts, as ye have invited me by your example, 'to be worthy of the participation of so sacred a 'friendship.'

FILIAL PIETY REWARDED.

In civil wars, as it often falls out that fathers and sons, and brothers and brothers, take contrary parts; so in the last battle of Actium, between Augustus and Marc Antony, where Augustus was conqueror. When the prisoners, as the custom is, were counted up, Metellus was brought to Augustus, whose face, though much changed by anxiety and imprisonment, was known by Metellus, his son, who had been on the contrary part: with tears he runs into the embraces of his father, and turning to Augustus, 'This, thy enemy,' said he, 'has deserved 'death, but I am worthy of some reward for the 'service I have done thee; I therefore beseech 'thee, that, instead of what is owing to me, thou 'wouldest preserve this man, and cause me to 'suffer death in his stead.' Augustus, moved

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with the piety of the son, though the father had been his mortal enemy, gave him his life.

THE SAME STORY AMPLIFIED.

WHILE Augustus was at Samos, after the famous battle of Actium, which made him master of the world, he held a council to examine the prisoners which had been engaged in Antony's party. Among the rest there was brought before him an old man named Metellus, oppressed with years and infirmities, disfigured with a long beard and a neglected head of hair, but especially by his clothes, which by his ill fortune were become very ragged. The son of this Metellus was one of the judges, and he had great difficulty of knowing his father in the deplorable condition in which he saw him. At last, however, having recollected his features, instead of being ashamed to own him, he ran to embrace him, weeping bitterly. Afterwards turning towards the tribunal, 'Cæsar,' says he, 'my father has been 'your enemy, and I your officer: he deserves to 'be punished, and I to be rewarded. The favour 'I desire of you is either to save him on my ac- 'count, or to order me to be put to death with 'him.' All the judges were touched with com-

passion at this affecting scene; Octavius himself relented, and granted to old Metellus his life and liberty.

THE FALSE HAPPINESS OF TYRANTS.

DIONYSIUS was always betraying his unhappiness. Damocles, one of his flatterers, descanting upon his magnificence, his power, his riches, Dionysius said to him, 'These things seem to delight you; 'make a trial of my place, by way of experi- 'ment.' Damocles was instantly arrayed in a purple robe, was attended by the king's guards; to him all bowed the knee, and in every respect he was treated as king. In the midst of his pomp, Dionysius ordered a naked sword to be hung from the ceiling, by a horse-hair, directly over the royal throne, where Damocles was sitting at a feast. From that moment Damocles lost his appetite, his joy vanished, and he begged to be restored to the security of his former condition. Dionysius thus tacitly acknowledged that his happiness was poisoned by a constant terror he was under, of the punishment he deserved for his cruelty and injustice.

THE SAME STORY AMPLIFIED.

Damocles, one of the courtiers of Dionysius the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse, was perpetually extolling with raptures his treasures, grandeur, the number of his troops, the extent of his dominions, the magnificence of his palaces, and the universal abundance of all good things and enjoyments in his possession; always repeating, that *never man was happier than Dionysius.* 'Because you are of 'that opinion,' said the tyrant, 'will you taste 'and make proof of my felicity in person?' The offer was accepted with joy; Damocles was placed upon a golden bed, covered with carpets of inestimable value. The sideboards were loaded with vessels of gold and silver; the most beautiful slaves, in the most splendid habits, stood round him watching the least signal to serve him. The most exquisite essences and perfumes were not spared: the table was spread with proportionable magnificence. Damocles was all joy, and looked upon himself as the happiest man in the world; when, unfortunately, casting up his eyes, he beheld over his head the point of a sword, which hung from the roof only by a single horse-hair. He was immediately seized with a cold sweat; every thing disappeared in an

instant; he could see nothing but the sword, nor think of any thing but his danger. In the height of his fear he desired permission to retire, and declared he would be happy no longer.

MODESTY GENERALLY A SIGN OF MERIT.

Antiquity tells us that, on a resolution to erect a fine palace, all the architects of Greece were summoned to deliver in their plans, and to propose such methods as they intended to adopt in building it. After several of them had made very florid harangues on the excellence of their art and the superiority of their pretensions, one of them, who had been quite silent, was asked what he had to propose? Upon which he laconically answered, 'What they have said, I will do.' This answer appeared to have so much modesty, as well as confidence, that he was immediately chosen in preference to the rest.

THE SAME STORY AMPLIFIED.

We are told by an ancient writer, that one of the States of Greece had resolved upon building a magnificent palace, and for that purpose had summoned all the most famous architects to give in their plans,

and to propose the methods they intended to pursue in the execution of them. On the day appointed they all met, and each of them was desired to deliver his opinion on the subject. One expatiated on the necessity of laying a good foundation, as the principal part of every building, and that which was to support and secure every other; a second insisted that the body of the superstructure ought to be bold, spacious, and convenient; a third dwelt upon the propriety of a beautiful attic story, and said that the upper part of every edifice was the crown of all the rest. After others, in the same manner, had delivered their opinions in the most florid and ostentatious speeches, and the judges were proceeding to their choice, they observed that there was one of the candidates, who had been quite silent, attentively listening to every thing the others had proposed. Their curiosity was excited to know his opinion before they came to a final determination, and they accordingly asked him what he had to propose? Without any preface, he bluntly answered, 'What they have said, I will do.' This short and pithy answer, which at once implied modesty and confidence, engaged the judges to inquire further into his character, and they found his abilities so superior to the rest, that they unanimously gave him the preference.

REGULAR SUBJECTS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THERE are but few subjects that will admit of being treated in so regular a way as to be viewed in all the points set down in the rules. I have been at no small pains to collect so many as I have done; and, even in a few of these, I have been obliged to drop some of the points: but as there is not any subject which may not be considered in two or three of these points of view, I flatter myself the method here adopted will be found useful to young people, who must generally be furnished with some hints to be able to say any thing upon the subject. I have endeavoured also to place the easiest subject first, but am not sure I have always succeeded: I wish the Teacher to use his own judgment in this respect, to be particularly attentive to the capacity of his pupil, and to give him two, three, or more points, as he finds his capacity equal to it.

I doubt not but a great degree of stiffness will be sometimes perceived, by endeavouring to bring all the points to bear on some of the subjects; but, when it is recollected that the object of the present work is not so much to form the style as to furnish matter for writing, it is hoped the stiffness will be overlooked. Ease is the completion of every operation of art, and therefore ought not to be expected in the beginning.

REGULAR SUBJECTS.

I.—ON EDUCATION.

Defin. THE culture of the mind, as education may not improperly be called, has ever been considered as one of the most important concerns of society.

Cause. Nor is it wonderful that the parent, who knows how much the happiness of the child depends upon its education, should bestow so much care and attention upon this momentous article.

Antiq. The Greeks and Romans, among whom were produced such prodigies of excellence in every kind of writing, and in every department of civil and military life, were remarkably attentive to the education of their children; insomuch that they began their education almost with their birth. In Sparta, children were taken from their mother at a very early period of their age, and educated at the public expense; and the celebrated Roman writer, Quintilian, advises those parents who destine their children to the Bar, to choose

nurses for them who have a good pronunciation.

Novel. Various are the modes of education which have been adopted among the moderns; but all of them seem to be greatly inferior to the strict discipline and methodical instruction of the ancients.

Univ. In short, all nations pay attention to this essential duty of parents; even the savage takes care to instruct his child in hunting, fishing, and those branches of knowledge which are necessary for him.

Local. But in no part of the world has education been brought to such perfection as in civilized countries: here its importance is properly estimated; and in no part of science has the human mind been more exerted than in the improvement of education. Locke and Milton, the two greatest names of our own country, have not thought it unworthy of their attention.

Advan. Nothing can shew the advantages of a good education in a stronger light, than a contrast with the disadvantages of a bad one. A person of good education has the mind and body so cultivated and improved, that any natural defects are removed, and the beauties of both

placed in so fine a light, that they strike with double force: while one who has had the misfortune of a bad education has all his natural imperfections remaining; and to these are added artificial ones, arising from bad habits, or from pursuing wrong studies. The former engages the attention of those he converses with, by the good sense he shows on every subject, and the agreeable manner in which he conveys it: the other disgusts every company he comes into, either by his total silence and stupidity, or by the ignorance and impertinence of his observations. The one raises himself to the notice of his superiors, and advances himself to a higher rank in life: the other is obliged to act an inferior part among his equals in fortune, and is sometimes forced to seek a shelter for his ignorance among the lowest orders of mankind.

II.—ON GOVERNMENT.

Defin. GOVERNMENT is the soul of society: it is that order among rational creatures which produces almost all the benefits they enjoy. A nation may be considered as a large family:

all the inhabitants are a sort of relations; and the supreme power, wherever it is lodged, is the common parent of every individual.

Cause. The origin of government is in the nature of man. The selfishness of man makes it necessary to have some power to restrain it; and this power is government.

Antiq. Government is nearly as ancient as man. Sacred history informs us of kings soon after the flood; and the most ancient of profane histories begin with kings.

Univ. In every part of the earth, where human creatures are found, a kind of government is found among them; and this government is generally that of kings.

Local. Almost all the different kinds of government in the different parts of the world may be reduced to three; namely, the Monarchy, the Aristocracy, and the Democracy. A monarchical government is that where the supreme power resides in an absolute King, as in Russia and Spain; an aristocratical government is that where the power is lodged in the Nobles, as it was, till lately, in Venice and Genoa; and a democratical government is that where the People give their votes in affairs of state, or choose representatives to vote for them, as it

was formerly in Holland and Switzerland, and is now in the United States of America.

Advan. The advantages of a monarchy are the same as that of a family where there is but one master; every thing is executed more speedily, and there is less room for parties. The advantages of an aristocracy are, that, as several men are less liable to be deceived in their judgment than one, the errors of one of the nobles may be corrected by the wisdom of the others, and thus the State will be less liable to be misgoverned. The advantages of a democracy are, that, as every man has a share in the government, every man is more respectable, and is less liable to be oppressed by laws of his own making than those which are made by others.

Disad. But each of these governments has its defects as well as its advantages. The defect of monarchy is this: men who have no check upon their power are apt to abuse it; an absolute monarch may easily mistake his true interests, indulge his favourites and oppress his people. The defects of an aristocracy are of the same kind, but greater: if the majority of nobles are tyrants, and each has his favourite, whose interests are in opposition to those of the people, the mischiefs of monarchy are mul-

tiplied. But the defects of a democracy are still greater; for as every man of abilities may arise to power by the voice of the people, they are in constant danger of anarchy; that is, of being without any government at all; for where all are equal, they are apt to fall into parties, by striving who shall get the superiority; and while this strife continues there can be no regular government.

How happy, therefore, is GREAT BRITAIN, which, by uniting these three kinds of governments in a King, the Lords, and the Commons, avoids the inconveniences, and possesses the advantages, of all!

III.—ON WAR.

Defin. WAR has very justly, as well as emphatically, been styled the scourge of mankind.

Cause. It has its origin in pride, avarice, envy, and revenge; and generally ends in cruelty, injustice, and all sorts of crime.

Antiq. The history of mankind is little more than a history of battles and sieges. In sacred history we read of the violence which filled the

earth before the flood, and which was the great cause of that universal destruction: and in profane history, the first great fact, which can be depended on, is the siege of Troy.

Novel. The history of our own time rings with the dreadful sounds of war; though, perhaps, it may be questioned whether, since the discovery of gunpowder, wars have either been so bloody or so frequent as they were in ancient times.

Disad. While war prevails, it is impossible society can flourish: that party which is the weakest cannot employ a single moment on the liberal arts and embellishments of life; their whole care is engaged, either in repelling the enemy, or in saving themselves from violence, rapine, and death: while the victorious party, flushed with conquest, generally grow more insolent and tyrannical, and either prepare for new wars, or sink into vice and luxury.

Advan. But this miserable state of human nature is not without some uses. War, which gives a loose to the worst passions of human nature, gives frequent opportunities of exercising the best. Great conquerors have sometimes been as remarkable for their generosity and clemency, as for their intrepidity and valour.

War is sometimes undertaken in the defence of virtue, and for the repression of injustice and lawless power: and then it becomes just and necessary to check the pride and ambition of a conqueror, who, without resistance, would enslave and oppress the whole human race; and war may be, therefore, sometimes necessary for the sake of peace. Thus God, who says to the sea, "Thus far shalt thou go, and "no farther!" sets bounds to the violence of man, and makes even his worst actions productive of some good.

IV.—ON PEACE.

Defin. PEACE is the ultimate wish of all men:

Cause. For, however we desire to exercise our faculties in the acquiring of knowledge, riches, or honours, we all look forward to a state of peace and tranquillity, in which alone we think we can enjoy them. In this happy state it is that the merchant expects to enjoy his riches, the soldier to be secure from toils and dangers, and the statesman to lay aside his anxious cares.

Antiq. So agreeable to the mind of man is a state of peace and tranquillity, that all the poets of antiquity have supposed that this state existed originally when man was first created, and that it insensibly changed into a worse as men grew wicked and depraved: hence the poetical fictions of the Golden Age, the Silver Age, the Brazen Age, and the Iron Age; which last always means the present age. Peace on earth was the benediction announced by the angels on the birth of Christ, the Prince of Peace, as the greatest benefit which could be bestowed on man; and at his birth, under the reign of the Roman Emperor Augustus, the whole world was in a state of peace.

Advan. Peace gives the human faculties liberty to expand themselves, and has generally been styled the Nurse of Arts; for, when a nation is at peace, it generally rises to improvements of every kind.

Disad. But however desirable peace may be, if it is not accompanied by virtue, it is often productive of as many evils as war. The riches acquired in peace are apt to give a taste for luxury and prodigality, and these generally lead to profligacy. The quiet and ease men enjoy in peace, have a tendency to make them

careless and irreligious; and these dispositions put them off their guard, and make them liable to become a prey to every other vice. Nay, peace may be said naturally to generate war: for security begets self-sufficiency; self-sufficiency, insolence; and insolence, quarrels. Thus peace, the most desirable thing on earth, by the depravity of man, who is not virtuous enough to bear it, becomes in the end productive of the most dreadful scourge of human nature, a state of war. Upon the whole, therefore, we may conclude, that, without religion and virtue, no state can afford true enjoyment; and that the best things on earth, if not properly enjoyed, will often be productive of the worst.

V.—ON YOUTH.

Defin. YOUTH has ever been looked upon as the happiest part of human life. It is to this early stage of our existence that age looks back with regret, and contemplates the thousand satisfactions that are now no more.

Cause. In youth the world is new; every object

has the recommendation of novelty. The perfidy of the world is then unknown; and all things, but our parents and teachers, seem to wear an agreeable aspect, and to invite us to the indulgence of our desires.

Advan. But youth has not only a thousand imaginary pleasures; it has many real advantages, which are denied to almost every other stage of life. Youth is the season for improving in knowledge, for forming the mind, for gaining such accomplishments as make us agreeable or useful to others, and consequently for forming our fortune. What a golden age is that which affords us such opportunities of laying up happiness for riper years! and how ought we to prize that part of our existence on which so much of our future happiness depends!

Disad. But, with all the advantages and pleasures of youth, it is certainly the most critical period of our lives. A thousand dangers surround it on every side. The inexperience of youth is liable to be deceived to its ruin. Its fondness for pleasure is apt to beget a dislike to study; and its hatred of restraint often leads it to the indulgence of bad habits, which can never be eradicated. An improper

tutor, a bad book, or a vicious companion, may often lay the foundation of the greatest misfortunes in life. If such be the critical situation of youth, how necessary is it for parents to be careful of the education of their children! and how incumbent is it on children to be attentive to the instructions of their parents and teachers! If those things are the dearest to us, which, when once lost, can never be recovered, how superlatively dear to us ought to be the time of our youth, which is so soon gone, and, when gone, is so irretrievable! To which we may add, that those who misspend their youth, by wasting their time, and neglecting to cultivate good habits, give shrewd signs that, as they advance in life, they will be guilty of the same neglect and dissipation in every future stage of it.

VI.—ON OLD AGE.

Defin. OLD AGE is a state to which all aspire, though so few attain it. It is that stage of human life in which the mind acquires strength, though the body grows weaker; a stage in which the former gains respect, while the latter loses it.

Cause. Nothing can be more agreeable to good sense than to respect those who, by their experience, must be wiser than the generality of mankind; nor can any thing be more consonant to politeness and humanity, than to alleviate the infirmities of those who, by their age, are more helpless and less happy than the rest of the world.

Antiq. Age has ever been held in veneration by the greatest and wisest of nations; and those who have despised it, have been looked upon as deficient in good-breeding as in humanity. The Greeks and Romans, the most polished and sensible people on earth, were remarkable for the respect they had for age; and the Jews and Christians, the only people who have been favoured with divine revelation, are a thousand times admonished in the Sacred Scriptures to honour old age.

Advan. Age, therefore, has certain privileges which afford it a certain degree of happiness suitable to a latter stage of human life. Age is naturally the teacher and counsellor of youth, and is attended with the pleasure and satisfaction such a superiority necessarily brings along with it. It is exempted from many of those trials to which youth is ex-

posed, and in which so many unfortunately fall a sacrifice.

Disad. These advantages, however, are only the companions of a virtuous old age; for when the latter part of life is still accompanied by the vices of the former, it must be as miserable as it is despicable. When this is the case, age must be much more unhappy than youth: it wants many of those satisfactions which are attendant on the earlier stages of life, and is often accompanied by such infirmities as render life a burden; infirmities which nothing but religion and virtue can support, and which nothing but death can entirely cure.

VII.—ON FRIENDSHIP.

Defin. FRIENDSHIP is an affectionate union of two persons of nearly the same age, the same situation in life, the same sentiments, and (as some writers will have it) of the same sex.

Cause. Friendship is in the nature of man. As man is a social creature, it is no wonder he should love to associate with those of similar dispositions, and to attach himself to that person who is most like himself. This attachment naturally produces reciprocal acts of kindness, which beget that union we call friendship.

Antiq. The ancient writers of morality are full of encomiums on friendship, while the poets and historians abound with the brightest examples of it: the friendship of David and Jonathan in the sacred writings, of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer, and of Nisus and Euryalus in Virgil, shew how strong an attachment may be formed by two persons of the same sex, and to what a degree of enthusiasm this attachment is sometimes carried. Nay, some of the ancients go so far as to say, that we may be unjust to others for the sake of our friend: this sentiment is of the most dangerous tendency, and ought always to be opposed by the much sounder maxim:—Socrates is my friend: Plato is my friend: but Truth is still more my friend.

Novel. The moderns indeed seem to have abated of this enthusiasm of friendship, but have not entirely extinguished it. Shining instances might be produced, from modern history, of the force of friendship; nor are our own times, degenerate as they are supposed to be, entirely without them.

Advan. There are strong reasons in the nature of man why friendship should form so conspicuous a part of his character. Every one finds himself so much in need of a person in whom he can confide; he finds his joys so much increased, and his sorrows so much abated, when shared by a sincere friend, that it is no wonder we find few people of sentiment without a person they can call a friend.

Disad. But, however advantageous it may be to have a sincere friend, it is dangerous to have a false one. Infidelity in friendship has been the foundation of many tragedies; and history is full of the fatal consequences of it. The strongest friendships are generally formed in youth, when we are the least capable of choosing a friend, and a greater misfortune cannot befal a generous youth, than to make a wrong choice; for such a one will find it a hard task to give up his friend, though he must do it, or be involved in his crime. "Try your friend before you choose him," is the wise caution of all ages and nations; and Dr. Young greatly illustrates and enforces this caution in his usual masterly manner, when he says,

> Friendship's the wine of life: but friendship new
> Is neither strong nor sweet.

VIII.—ON DRAMATIC ENTERTAINMENTS.

Defin. DRAMATIC Entertainments are so lively a picture of the actions and passions of mankind, that they have been the favourite amusement in every age and nation in which civilization has been cultivated, and the arts and sciences encouraged and improved.

Cause. Nor is it wonderful that a species of entertainment, so imposing and animated, should so captivate the imagination and affect the passions. If the historical narrative of any singular transaction engages our attention, and interests us in the event, how much more must we be engaged in the representation of a transaction, where the incidents are not only more surprising than any thing we meet with in history, but the passions and sentiments which accompany them are heightened and invigorated by beautiful poetry, animated pronunciation, and forcible action.

Antiq. The Athenians were so enthusiastically fond of dramatic entertainments, that they became one of the principal concerns of the state. Taxes were levied for the support of them,

and the public were admitted to them without distinction. The Romans, too, were greatly devoted to the amusement of the Theatre.

Univ. Nay, we find even the most savage nations have something like dramatic entertainments, accompanied by songs and dances, representing the heroic exploits of their leaders in war.

Disad. But the powerful effects which dramatic representations have on the minds and morals of the people, lead us naturally to a reflection on the delicacy with which they ought to be written. If the beauties of poetry, the surprise of incident, and the force of action are united, to favour the vices of human nature, to make the licentious gaiety of the fashionable world appear agreeable and inviting, and the sober, modest, and regular conduct of the virtuous and religious world formal, sour, and disgusting; if this be the general object of that species of dramatic representation called Comedy, we shall easily see how disadvantageous it must be to the morals of society: and as Theatres are under the management of men whose sole object is money, we may easily conceive they will favour the acting of those pieces which will bring the most profit; and, consequently, if the public taste be

vicious, they will, as much as possible, favour that vicious taste, as the likeliest method of obtaining their object.

IX.—ON FABLES AND ALLEGORIES.

Defin. Fables and Allegories are lively representations of the actions and passions of men, under the borrowed characters of brutes or inanimate beings, and have always ranked among the most useful compositions of mankind.

Cause. The reason why moral writers so early adopted this mode of instruction is obvious. Representing the passions, virtues, and vices of human nature, under the well known characters of brutes, pleases us by our perceiving the likeness between them, and instructs us by inducing us to apply the moral to ourselves. Disagreeable truths always strike us more forcibly when we do not think them aimed at us, as we are not so much on our guard against them, and do not feel that resentment which is so natural to us when we are personally accused of our failings. Thus the parable of the Rich Man and the Ewe Lamb, in the Holy Scrip-

tures, struck David much more powerfully than if Nathan had openly reproached him with adultery and murder; and the fable of the Fox and the Crow, gives us a stronger idea of the power of flattery than the most ingenious discourse in the world could do.

Antiq. The fables of Esop, who lived so early as six hundred years before the coming of Christ, still form an agreeable vehicle of instruction to youth; nor have the inventive faculties of later ages been able to furnish us with a better mode of laying the foundation of moral and useful truth.

Advan. From a consideration of the efficacy of fables and allegories in the inculcating of moral lessons, we are naturally led to admire the wisdom and goodness of God, in giving us so many beautiful and striking examples of them in the parables of the New Testament. What can better show us the necessity of a good disposition for the reception of religious truths, than the parable of the Sower, who went forth to sow, and scattered the seed upon different kinds of ground? What can better display the tender and amiable disposition of our Maker, than the parable of the Lost Sheep? What can better exhibit the parental tenderness of our Almighty

Father, than the story of the Prodigal Son? And what can give us a more awful account of the last judgment, and the necessity of preparing for it, than the parable of the Ten Virgins? These imprint the most striking images on the mind, and give a form and substance to religious and moral truths, which would not be so well remembered, nor have so powerful an effect on the heart, though inculcated in the best-chosen words in the world.

Thus, what at first sight seems to be only a sportive and amusing method of instructing us, appears, upon examination, to be the most efficacious that can be conceived by the mind of man.

X.—ON BOOKS.

Defin. BOOKS are the great vehicles through which the knowledge of one part of the human species is conveyed to the other.

Cause. Books, like many other noble discoveries, have their origin in the necessities of human nature. The wants of men soon induced them to put these wants into writing, that others might be informed of their wants, and induced to supply them.

Antiq. No sooner, therefore, were men formed into society, and inclined to cultivate knowledge, than books were written to communicate it.

Novel. The communication of knowledge, however, was comparatively slow till the discovery of printing in the fifteenth century; since which time books have been so amazingly multiplied, and knowledge so widely dispersed, that printing may be said to have formed a new epoch in society.

Advan. By books, that science which is dispersed throughout the human race becomes the property of every individual; and thus it is that every individual has an opportunity of improving himself by the joint labours of the whole species: they bring the most ancient times to our view as if they were present, and, like a telescope, enable us to see the most distant places and transactions as if they were directly under our eyes.

Disad. But, as books are written by men, they are as various in their merits; and, to the disadvantage of human nature, it may be observed, that as there is a great deal of evil among mankind, so there are a great many bad books in the world. This observation naturally leads us to reflect how careful we ought to be in the

choice of our books. If bad companions will both disgrace and corrupt us, so will bad books: if we are ashamed of being seen with a person of ill fame, ought we not to be as much ashamed to be seen perusing an ill book? Certainly: for those who understand human nature will form an estimate to our advantage or disadvantage, as much by the books we read and are fond of, as by the company we keep. There is no mistake more common among young people, than that of supposing, that if they have a multiplicity of books, they must necessarily have a great deal of knowledge. The contrary to this is often the truth: a great number of ill-chosen books confuse the mind, and form no regular consistent chain of instruction; while a few of the best books afford us clear ideas of what is worth knowing, without loading the mind with what is impertinent or noxious. If I were asked what are those books which are the most indispensable in polite education, I should answer, three histories and three epic poems; namely, the History of Greece, of Rome, and our own country; and the Iliad of Homer, the Æneid of Virgil, and the Paradise Lost of Milton.

XI.—ON TRAVELLING.

Defin. VISITING foreign countries, surveying the various productions of nature, viewing places celebrated in history, observing the different customs and manners of the different inhabitants of the world, are some of the highest gratifications of which the human mind is capable.

Cause. This arises from that principle of curiosity which is ingrafted in the nature of man; that principle, which, Dr. Johnson tells us, is one of the most certain and permanent characteristics of a vigorous intellect. The love of novelty, says Mr. Addison, is implanted in us by our Maker, that he might encourage us in the pursuit after knowledge, and engage us to search into the wonders of his creation; and nothing can more gratify this inquisitive propensity than travelling.

Antiq. Those among the ancients who studied philosophy, and inquired deeply into human nature, were remarkable for visiting foreign countries. Almost all the celebrated philosophers of Greece travelled to Egypt, and many of them to India, in search of knowledge. Anacharsis the Scythian, who so much excelled his coun-

trymen, was famous for his travels into Greece, and for the great improvement he derived from that highly improved and elegant spot.

Novel. But the moderns have gone far beyond the ancients in their visits to the different parts of the world: the ancients had a much smaller world to visit than the moderns; and the imperfect state of navigation made even that smaller world less *visitable* than it is at present: while the moderns, by their surprising improvement in naval architecture, and their superior knowledge of the properties of the loadstone, have made the ocean a high road of communication with all the inhabitants of the globe.

Univ. A communication with distant places by travelling is by no means universal. Those nations only who are in a high state of improvement, have their curiosity awakened sufficiently to induce them to undergo the inconveniencies and dangers of long journeys for the sake of acquiring knowledge. How astonishing is it that the great and populous nations of China and India, should never travel westward to the polished nations of Europe! This is a full refutation of all their boasted wisdom.

Local. The nations of Europe show their superiority to the rest of the world, by their voyages

and travels to the remotest corners of the globe, for the purpose of accumulating curious and useful knowledge.

Advan. The advantages of this disposition are obvious. By examining the several opinions, and observing the different customs and manners of the different nations of the earth, we are not only gratifying our curiosity, but improving our knowledge of mankind; a knowledge which must be gained by actually conversing with them. Travelling takes away our surprise at opinions and manners different from our own, and leads us to make proper allowances for them; and as every nation has something in common with others, and something peculiar to itself, we are enabled, by a survey of them, to compare their advantages and disadvantages, and to glean from them what is worthy of being imitated. In short, as Dr. Johnson observes, "All travel has its advantages: if the passenger visits better countries, he may learn to improve his own: and if fortune carries him to worse, he may learn to enjoy it."

XII.—ON POETRY.

Defin. Poetry is that proportional arrangement of different syllables, which produces a pleasing melody to the ear.

Cause. So delightful is this melody, when happily accomplished, that it was thought to derive its origin from Heaven; and we find poets, both ancient and modern, begin their verse with invoking some muse, or inspiring power, to assist them in their task. This may be called the poetical origin of poetry; but even philosophers, who do not trace it quite so high, suppose that there is a kind of enthusiasm which inspires every good poet.

Antiq. This is certain, that the most ancient pieces of writing that remain to us are poetic; as if men no sooner began to speak, than they perceived the suavity and harmony of speaking in numbers.

Novel. The first attempts, indeed, were rude; and this art, like all others, never attained any degree of perfection till a certain degree of civilisation had polished and refined society.

Univ. So universally does the taste for poetry prevail, that we find the remotest and least

cultivated nations have their compositions in verse; and even barbarians and savages have their war-songs, which record the heroic deeds of their ancestors.

Local. It has been a favourite opinion with some philosophers, that poetry, like the other fine arts, is only found in perfection in warm climates. Ancient history, indeed, seems to favour this opinion; as Homer, Virgil, and Horace, were natives of Greece and Italy: but modern history informs us of Shakspeare, Milton, Dryden, and Pope, in our own country, who may vie with the ancients in every species of poetic composition.

Advan. The advantages we derive from poetry are so many that it is no wonder it is so generally cultivated: it pleases the ear, it assists the memory: it gives beauty and energy to pious, moral, and heroic sentiments; and has therefore always been adopted in the service of the Deity, and in the praise of great men. The Psalms of David are poetic hymns to the Almighty, and the hymns of Orpheus are dedicated to the heathen gods.

Disad. These seem to have been the original uses of this divine art; but as man is prone to turn the best things to the worst uses, poetry,

instead of assisting and enforcing virtue, has been too often enlisted into the service of vice. It may indeed be with truth observed, that the best poetry in all languages is that which has a tendency to virtue, and that vicious poets are never in the first class of writers; but still so much poetic genius has been prostituted to bad purposes, that we cannot be too much on our guard against the seductive power of this art; for it may with truth be affirmed, that the most dangerous dress which falsehood can wear is fine poetry.

XIII.—ON PAINTING.

Defin. PAINTING is the art of representing any objects we wish to imitate, by means of such colours as appear on the objects themselves.

Cause. That painting should be held in such estimation will scarcely be wondered at by those who consider the pleasure and utility which it produces. The vivid idea which it instantaneously conveys, either of a person or transaction, gives it a power of impressing the imagination, and exciting the passions, which must render it of great importance to society.

Antiq. It is highly probable, as Mr. Addison observes, that painting is more ancient than writing; for as the sight is the most perfect and the most delightful of all our senses, it is very natural to suppose men would soon begin to imitate those objects which gave them pleasure, that they might enjoy them in imagination when the objects themselves were absent. Accordingly we find accounts of painting and statues in the remotest ages of antiquity.

Novel. As we have no remains of the art of painting among the ancients, we cannot so well estimate it as their poetry; but if we may judge by their statues and seals, which are still extant, we must conclude that their painting was equally excellent; though it is difficult to imagine that it was in greater perfection in Greece and Rome, than it was in Italy under Raphael, Titian, and Michael Angelo.

Univ. The remotest nations, as well as the remotest ages, have practised painting; but, for want of being accompanied by other studies, their pictures are exceedingly deficient in the principal requisites of the art. This is apparent in the Chinese paintings, which show glaring colours, but neither light and shade, perspective nor expression.

Local. To the honour of our own country, and the taste of our sovereign, this art has risen in England, within these few years, to a degree of perfection almost unrivalled.

Advan. The advantages of painting are so numerous, that we cannot be surprised it has so many votaries and admirers. It strengthens friendship and benevolence, by bringing an absent person, that is dear to us, to our view: it gratifies our curiosity, in showing us the likeness of those persons who have signalized themselves in former ages; and gives us a beautiful, a strong, and a lasting idea of any transaction of which we had before but a confused and indistinct one; in short, it speaks to the mind instantaneously, expresses an object powerfully, and remains in the imagination perpetually.

Disad. What a pity is it that this art, so beautiful and useful, should, like the other fine arts, be found sometimes subservient to vice! but as those who cannot read may be instructed by good pictures, so the most grossly illiterate may be corrupted by bad ones. This must not induce us to condemn the proper use of the art, but the abuse of it; for it is an obser-

vation as old as Aristotle, that the corruption of the best things produces the worst.

XIV.—ON MUSIC.

Defin. Music is an harmonious arrangement of agreeable sounds that delight the ear, and excite pleasing emotions in the mind.

Cause. The origin of music is in the nature of man. We are so framed that we cannot but be pleased with melodious sounds; and this pleasure answers so many good and useful purposes, that we shall not be surprised this art has been so much cultivated and admired in all civilized nations.

Antiq. The remotest ages of antiquity give testimony to the important influence of music. The most ancient compositions are hymns, odes, and songs; and the Greeks, if we believe their poets and historians, were as great proficients in this art as in those of poetry, painting, and statuary.

Novel. The music of the moderns is said by some to excel that of the ancients, and by others to

fall much below it. If what they call counterpoint be an excellence in music, it is certain the moderns excel the ancients, as the ancients were entirely ignorant of it: besides, as we excel them so much in the number and perfection of musical instruments, it would be extremely strange if we should be inferior to them in the art itself.

Univ. All nations, the most barbarous as well as the most civilized, have a relish for music. The dances of savages are regulated by something like measured sounds, and they are pleased beyond measure with such plain simple tunes as are suited to their simple state of society.

Local. Italy, in this as well as in the other fine arts, has generally excelled the rest of Europe; though Germany seems of late to be exerting herself, and not without hope of becoming her rival.

Advan. The advantages of music do not stop at the pleasure it gives the ear: it unites with the sentiment, and gives language a force and beauty which recommends it to the heart: it disposes the mind to devotion, or rouses it to action; and has, therefore, always been used in religious ceremonies and the evolutions of martial exercise: but one of its greatest advantages

is that soothing tranquillity which it gives to a disturbed and agitated mind.

Disad. As music has an effect on the passions, it is supposed that improper music may have a bad influence on the morals. The ancients tell strange stories of the effects of music on the manners of the people; but as no such effects are perceived among the moderns, we may conclude they are exaggerated. It is incumbent, however, on those who perceive themselves disposed to evil, by any kind of music, to avoid indulging in it, as they would if excited to evil by any other occasion.

XV.—ON COMMERCE.

Defin. COMMERCE is the exchange of one thing for another: it is giving a thing we can spare for something that we want, and by that means supplying the wants of each other.

Cause. The origin of commerce, therefore, is in the wants of mankind. Providence has supplied one country with commodities which are wanted in another, and has thus invited them to

commerce for their mutual interest. The furs, the deal, the iron, and the pitch, so plentifully produced in the north of Europe, are wanted in the southern climates; and the wine, oil, silks, and spices of the south, are exchanged for them, to the mutual benefit of each country.

Antiq. Commerce is as old as society. No sooner are men formed into large bodies, and are acquainted with the productions of other countries, than they naturally desire to purchase them with the products of their own. Hence we find commerce among the most celebrated nations of antiquity, and particularly the Phœnicians, whose Tyrian purple was famous throughout the world.

Novel. But the commerce of the ancients was trifling compared to that of the moderns, who, from the extensive cultivation of the arts and the wonderful improvements in navigation, have made commerce the great source of the wealth of nations.

Univ. There is scarcely a corner of the world that has not some kind of commerce; from the Esquimaux Indian in America, with his furs, to the most distant inhabitants of the empires of China and Tartary; but the grand emporium of the whole world is Great Britain.

Advan. To enumerate all the advantages of commerce would fill a volume: but some of the greatest are, that it infuses a spirit of industry; it produces opulent merchants, manufacturers, and traders, who, by their riches, acquire an independence favourable to liberty; it excites to ingenuity in the mechanic arts, and forms an intercourse with other nations, which has a tendency to remove prejudices and promote civilization.

Disad. But with all those advantages, it may be observed, that where trade totally engages the attention of a country, and where every other advantage is sacrificed to it, that country often loses its patriotism, neglects the fine arts, and becomes enslaved to a poorer but a more military people. This has been the case with the Dutch: but Great Britain seems to have preserved the happy medium in this as well as in other points. A dread of sacrificing too much to trade gave occasion to that remarkable exclamation of Mr. Harpinge, in the House of Commons, 'Perish Commerce, so we preserve the Constitution!'

XVI.—ON THE EVILS OF GAMING.

Defin. Playing at Games of Hazard, and especially for sums of importance, is big with evils of the most enormous kind.

Cause. A love of gaming lies deep in the superstition, selfishness, and folly of human nature. What but superstition can lead us to believe that there is such a being as Fortune, or such a power as Luck, which presides over games of chance? What but avarice, and an opinion of our own worthiness, can make us imagine that we are the favourites of this being? What but the rankest folly and stupidity can induce us to risk a sum, the loss of which would make us completely miserable, for the chance of getting one which would not make us completely happy?

Antiq. The superstition, selfishness, and folly, which lie at the bottom of gaming, have been the vices of all ages; and all ages have produced votaries to this fictitious goddess, few of which have escaped becoming, at last, her victims. The ancient moralists are full of their dissuasions from this pernicious practice, and

severe laws were enacted by the Roman Emperors against it. Almost all modern nations have done the same; but, till the vices that produce it are rooted out of the heart, there is but little hope of preventing it by penal laws.

Univ. Gaming seems to have been the vice of all ages and nations, and of all ranks of people. The poor are addicted to it as well as the rich; and though they cannot aspire to the Faro and the Hazard Table, they can indulge their superstition, self-opinion, and folly, by a game at Cards, or a share in the Lottery.

Disad. The disadvantages of a propensity to gaming are innumerable, and have been admirably delineated by moral and religious writers. At present, perhaps, it may be quite sufficient to make a few observations which are not to be so generally met with. One of these is, that it is an enemy to all laudable exertions for the bettering of our fortune by honest industry; for, who will think of labouring to acquire riches, or study trade or commerce, who hopes to get them by the turn of a card or a die? The other is, that it implies a hardness of heart, and want of sympathy for our fellow-creatures; for who that has a grain of humanity can enjoy a fortune got by gaming, which has made him that

lost it miserable in the extreme? The last is, that gaming is an enemy to God, who has forbid us to covet our neighbour's goods; and accordingly we find, that no man who has raised himself by talents and industry, no man remarkable for a feeling heart, no man who has been attentive to religious duties, was ever found to be a gamester.

XVII.—ON CHIVALRY.

Defin. CHIVALRY is a subject which has often engaged the attention of the philosophical historian, and very deservedly, as it forms one of the most singular, as well as one of the most beautiful, features of the human character.

Chivalry was a system of knighthood which engaged its votaries to a strict attention to religion, an ardent desire to relieve the distressed from the oppression of tyrants, and a peculiar passion for vindicating the fair sex from the violence and injustice they were liable to.

Cause. The original motives to chivalry appear to have been a love of justice and humanity. The knights-errant were young men of distinction,

who, from a spirit of adventure and general benevolence, devoted themselves to the service of the distressed.

Antiq. This species of knighthood began soon after the Crusades, and it is generally supposed that the many great achievements and strange adventures which happened at that wonderful period gave rise to it; for they awakened in the youth of those times a thirst of fame, and a desire to distinguish themselves by generous actions till then unknown.

Advan. The advantages of chivalry were very great at the time it began. Europe was then divided into a vast number of petty states, independent of each other, which were almost in a continual state of war. Hence the laws were weak and ill administered, and had not force enough to restrain the violence of individuals, who often, in open defiance of them, committed the greatest acts of injustice and barbarity; and Providence seems to have raised up the adventurers of those times to make up in some measure for the deficiency of the laws.

Disad. But as the most generous designs may be carried to excess, and the best institutions may by abuse become hurtful and absurd, so chivalry, by the vices and follies of its votaries,

degenerated into a senseless and romantic passion, which at last became the ridicule of the whole world.

The spirit of chivalry remained longer in Spain than in any other part of Europe, till the Don Quixote of Cervantes extinguished it even there, and seems to have put a period to its existence. But though the ancient chivalry was entirely extinguished, there arose out of its ruins a spurious kind of chivalry, called *gallantry*. This consists in a certain complaisance and deference to the fair sex, to which they are certainly entitled; but, by being carried too far, it is just as absurd as the notions of knight-errantry. Women were taught to believe that they were goddesses, who ruled the affairs of this world as they pleased; and thus, by exaggerating their power beyond all bounds, it was in reality lessened and made ridiculous. Hence that attention and deference, that tenderness and attachment, which are due to females, have degenerated into a system of flattery, hypocrisy, and seduction.

XVIII.—ON PHILOSOPHY.

Defin. PHILOSOPHY, in its original language, signifies the love of wisdom: but its signification now extends to the study of Nature in all her various departments, whether material, animal, rational, or moral; so that all inquiry into the nature of things is termed Philosophy.

Cause. The reason with which man is endowed, and the curiosity which is implanted in him, must necessarily induce him to the Study of Nature. The world in which he is placed, surrounded with so many shining spheres above his head, adorned with so many beautiful plants, trees, and flowers, inhabited by so many and such various animals, must infallibly rouse his curiosity to inquire into their several qualities, and make him a *natural* philosopher; while the relation he stands in to his fellow-creatures, and the several duties he finds himself engaged in, as a parent or a child, a master or a servant, a king or a subject, obliges him to study these relations, and so to become a *moral* philosopher.

Antiq. So natural are these inquiries to man, that the earliest ages of the world were not without

their philosophers. No sooner had societies risen to a certain degree of civilization and improvement, than philosophy became the favourite study of the wisest among them. Greece, India, and Egypt, swarmed with philosophers, many of whom had their schools, where they publicly taught their opinions.

Novel. Modern times abound with philosophers, and with philosophers no less celebrated than those of antiquity.

Univ. There is scarcely a corner of the world without some persons who distinguish themselves by the study of philosophy. China is famous for these philosophic characters; nor is India, Arabia, or Tartary, without them.

Local. But the seat of philosophy is Europe. Here it is that the great discoveries in astronomy, magnetism, electricity, and all the arts and sciences, have been made: here it is that the truest system of religion and morals is to be found; and here only it is that every improvement in knowledge is rapidly communicated by printing.

Advan. The advantages of philosophy are numerous. From a knowledge of metals, minerals, plants, and animals, we derive a thousand uses, both in medicine, and the liberal and mechanic

arts. By studying the nature of man, we improve in the art of government, and strengthen and enforce those moral sentiments which Providence has implanted in his breast.

Disad. But how is it to be lamented that philosophy, which seems so natural and so beneficial to man, should have produced so much evil, as to make us almost disgusted at the name? The errors of some of the ancient philosophers were so gross as to excite either our pity or contempt; and their systems so crude and inconsistent, that Cicero says, there is no opinion, however absurd, but some philosopher has maintained it. In short, so various, so numerous, and so contradictory, have been the opinions even of modern philosophers upon the present state of man, and his future expectations, that, had it not been for Revelation, we should, in all probability, have been in the state of the ancient Greeks and Romans; who, as St. Paul has justly observed, 'professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.'

THEMES.

OF A THEME, AND THE PARTS OF WHICH IT IS COMPOSED.

A Theme is the proving of some truth. After the Theme or Truth is laid down, the proof consists of the following parts:—

1st, The Proposition, or Narrative; where we shew the meaning of the Theme, by amplifying, paraphrasing, or explaining it more at large.

2d, The Reason; where we prove the truth of the Theme by some reason or argument.

3d, The Confirmation; where we shew the unreasonableness of the contrary opinion; or, if we cannot do that, we try to bring some other reason in support of the former.

4th, The Simile; where we bring in something in Nature or Art similar to what is affirmed in our Theme, for illustrating the truth of it.

5th, The Example; where we bring instances from History to corroborate the truth of our Theme.

6th, The Testimony, or Quotation; where we bring in proverbial sentences, or passages from good authors, which shew that others think as we do.

7th, The Conclusion; when we sum up the whole, and shew the practical use of the Theme, by concluding with some pertinent observation.

THE RULES VERSIFIED.

THE PROPOSITION, THE REASON, THE CONFIRMATION, THE SIMILE, THE EXAMPLE, THE TESTIMONY, AND THE CONCLUSION.

The Theme at large the Proposition gives,
And the same thought in other words conceives:
The Reason shews the Proposition's true,
By bringing Arguments and Proofs to view:
The Confirmation proves the opinion's right,
By shewing how absurd's the opposite;
If that's not to be done, it tries t' explore
Some proof in aid of what was giv'n before:
The Simile an apt resemblance brings,
Which shews the Theme is true in other things:
Th' Example, instances from history draws,
That by mankind's experience prove our cause:
The Testimony to the Wise appeals,
And by their suffrage our opinion seals:
Some useful observation comes at last,
As a Conclusion drawn from what is past.

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NOTWITHSTANDING that the Theme, from the regularity of its form, seems to be the easiest species of composition, I am much deceived, however, if, upon trial, this is always found to be the case. A Theme is the proving of some truth; and that closeness of thinking, which argument requires, demands a greater maturity of the faculties than a subject which is merely narrative or descriptive, and where we are not so strictly tied down to a unity of design. I would therefore recommend it to the teacher, if the pupil finds the Theme too difficult at first, to take him to the Easy Essay, and either to give him one or two Points only at once, or without restricting him too rigidly to the several parts, to require of him only what he can collect upon the whole. This advice seems to imply, that I have made an arrangement of the points in question; but, it may be observed, that this order is easily altered, and that, where the pupil has a sufficient capacity, it is really the best. It tends to give a precision of thinking, and to keep the mind from wandering too widely from the subject, which many pupils are apt to do, who have a great facility of expression, but want a closeness of thinking. The propriety of this order, therefore, must depend on the capacity of the pupil; and to this point must all the care of the teacher be directed.

THEMES.

I.—WELL BEGUN IS HALF DONE.

Prop. WHEN we have once determined upon doing any thing, and have actually begun it, we may, with great propriety, be said to have half finished it:

Reas. Because the beginning of every thing is always the most difficult: as we proceed, we acquire ease and expedition by habit; and the labour lessens as we draw near to a conclusion.

Conf. Besides, as we have a strong desire to finish what we have once begun, that our pains may not be thrown away, and our work be left imperfect, the latter part of a task is generally performed with more speed and alacrity than the former.

Simi. As physicians tell us, that when the cause of a disease is once known, the cure is half performed; so we may say, that, when any difficult undertaking is once begun, it is half executed.

Exam. It was the constant policy of Alexander the Great to surprise his enemies. When once he had determined upon an expedition, he lost no time, and was generally ready to give his enemies battle before they supposed he had begun his march. To this speedy commencement of his enterprises was owing his rapid and unexampled success.

Test. There is a common observation, that Fortune favours the brave. If this observation be true, one reason of it may be, that the brave generally begin their undertakings with resolution; and this beginning, by preventing opposition, soon brings their designs to a conclusion.

Conc. With the utmost truth, therefore, it may be affirmed, that, when we have once made a good beginning in any task, the principal and most disagreeable part of the labour is over.

II.—TRUST NOT APPEARANCES.

Prop. Nothing can be more imprudent than to approve or disapprove of any thing too suddenly, especially if it be an object of importance.

Reas. For such a mixture of good and bad, of virtue and vice, is there in almost every thing we see; so much is it the interest of falsehood to wear the appearance of truth; that we ought always to suspect what has a fair outside, till time and experience have made us more thoroughly acquainted with it.

Conf. If it were not unsafe to trust appearances, we should not hear the whole world caution us against it; we should not hear so many unhappy characters, both in history and in our own times, deploring the hour when they first became dupes to the fair pretences of falsehood.

Simi. But in vain does the fish struggle when the hook is in her mouth: she ought to have been more cautious before she seized the bait.

Exam. One of the greatest catastrophes in ancient history was occasioned by too great credulity: the Grecians, after ten years' siege, found it impossible to take Troy; and, pretending to

abandon the siege, left a large wooden horse, with armed men enclosed in it; which, being received into the city as an honourable present, proved the destruction of it.

Test. In short, the wisdom of ages, as proverbs may justly be called, tells us, all is not gold that glitters.

Conc. If, therefore, we would avoid the most common of all misfortunes,—being undeceived too late,—we ought, as much as possible, to withhold our approbation till we have experience; and not trust to appearances, till time has proved them worthy of confidence.

III.—DELAYS ARE DANGEROUS.

Prop. Nothing can be more unfavourable to the success of an undertaking than frequent and unnecessary delays.

Reas. So many and unexpected are the disappointments in life, so frequently do things happen contrary to our expectations, that unless we seize the present moment, we run the greatest risk of being disappointed.

Conf. If it were not so, we should not hear so many encomiums on the advantage of alacrity and watchfulness in business, nor so many admonitions to dissuade us from losing a favourable opportunity.

Simi. The sagacity of the Fox affords us a useful lesson on this subject: the moment he hears the hounds he begins his flight, and, by a constant pace, often avoids them, or at least preserves his life much longer; while the Hare, though a much swifter animal, by frequently stopping to listen, and delaying her flight, falls much sooner a sacrifice to her enemies.

Exam. History is full of examples of the danger of delay: Marc Antony, by delaying his return to Rome, and dissipating his time in the island of Samos with Cleopatra, suffered Octavius Cæsar to supplant him in the favour of the Roman people, and, at last, to deprive him of his share in the empire of the world.

Test. Philosophical writers have observed, that in the voyage of life there is a certain tide in human affairs, which, if we are prudent enough to take the advantage of, we shall safely arrive at the desired port; but if we neglect till the tide is turned against us, we shall generally find ourselves encompassed with difficulties,

and disappointed of our hopes. How admirably does our great Poet, Shakspeare, paint this critical situation!

> There is a tide in the affairs of men,
> Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
> Omitted, all the voyage of their life
> Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

Conc. There is nothing, therefore, which we ought to have more constantly in mind, than the danger of committing any important transaction to the hazard occasioned by delays.

IV.—NONE ARE COMPLETELY HAPPY.

Prop. THERE is no solid happiness to be expected in this world.

Reas. For so many and various are the evils incident to human nature, and so frequently are our greatest earthly comforts dashed with alloys of pain and uneasiness, that no state of life, whether of youth or age, of riches or poverty, of grandeur or meanness, is exempt from difficulties and troubles.

Conf. If this were not the case; if we were completely happy in the present life; if we had no

troubles and vexations here below: we should want proper exercise for our moral character; we should not improve in virtue, which consists in overcoming difficulties; and we should not look for a better state hereafter, where alone we can be completely happy.

Simi. As the brightest mornings are often overcast with clouds, and the serenest days succeeded by storms and tempests; so the greatest human happiness is frequently alloyed with intermixtures of anxiety and pain.

Test. Tragedies, both ancient and modern, which are pictures of human life, sufficiently show us how uncertain is a state of happiness, and how often the most flattering scenes in the beginning have a mournful and tragical end.

Conc. Justly therefore says the Poet:

> To hope for perfect happiness is vain:
> And joy has ever its alloys of pain.

Since, then, an entire and unmixed happiness is not to be expected in our present state, let us not be too sanguine in our wishes to find it here, but place our happiness on things above, and on that state which approaches the nearest to it; which is, doing our duty in whatever situation Providence is pleased to place us.

V.—PERSEVERANCE GENERALLY PREVAILS.

Prop. PERSEVERANCE seldom fails of making us successful in any thing we undertake:

Reas. For though the steps are slow by which it advances, yet, as every step advances nearer and nearer to its end, it must in time make a considerable progress, and crown our endeavours with the desired success.

Conf. To confirm this truth, we need only remark how surprisingly any thing increases to which we add only a little every day; and what a bulky volume the exercises we write at school would make if we were to collect them together at the year's end.

Simi. The fable of the hare and the tortoise finely exemplifies the force of perseverance: the former, trusting to the swiftness of her foot, delayed setting off upon the race so long, that the latter, though slow, by continually advancing a little, got the soonest to the goal, and became the winner,

Exam. We scarcely read in history of any fortifications, however strong, that held out against a persevering besieger; and in common life we find the utmost difficulty in refusing the importunity of those who incessantly solicit us, and often unwillingly yield to them what we ought to refuse.

Test. Dr. Johnson tells us, that diligence, which is nearly allied to perseverance, is never wholly lost; for, even though we miss our principal aim, we gain improvement by pursuing it with perseverance.

Conc. It may therefore be concluded, that if we make but little progress in our undertakings, it is generally more owing to our want of perseverance than of ability.

VI.—NIP SIN IN THE BUD.

Prop. NOTHING is more important in the moral conduct of life than to watch the beginnings of evil, and to check them as soon as possible.

Reas. Evil propensities are easily conquered at first, and require but a small share of resolution to resist them; but if we suffer them to grow into a habit, by flattering ourselves that we can resist them when we please, we shall in all probability fall a sacrifice to them:

Conf. For, as it is the nature of evil habits to be still gathering strength, and growing stronger

every day; so the power of resisting them becomes proportionably weaker, till at last we are completely enslaved by them.

Simi. Nothing is more inculcated by judicious physicians than the necessity of attending to diseases in their infancy; so nothing is more pressed upon us by moralists than the necessity of attending to the beginnings of vice, which may be justly styled the diseases of the mind.

Exam. The danger of not correcting the beginnings of evil is finely exemplified in the character of *Macbeth;* who, though a man of great virtue and honour, was, by listening to fortune-tellers, and yielding to the ambitious counsels of his wife, transformed, by little and little, into a murderer of his king and a tyrant to his subjects.

Test. One of the most common observations of the ancient moralists was, that no man became bad all at once; and that the greatest offences against virtue have arisen from the smallest beginnings of vice.

Conc. How justly, therefore, may we conclude, that we cannot be too much on our guard against the first temptations to evil; as every vicious inclination contains an egg, which, by being cherished, will be hatched into a serpent.

VII.—MAKE NO MORE HASTE THAN GOOD SPEED.

Prop. Nothing can be more unfavourable to expedition in business than too much haste, hurry, and precipitation.

Reas. When this is the case, by our eagerness to do any thing quickly, we are apt, not only to overlook a thousand things we ought to have remembered, but to do what we are about in an imperfect and bungling manner.

Conf. It ought never to be forgotten, that the mind of man is only capable of retaining a certain number of things, and of exerting itself in business with a certain degree of swiftness; and, therefore, if we grasp at more things than the mind will hold, and attempt to execute them more rapidly than is natural to us, we shall certainly fail in accomplishing our purpose.

Simi. We see in nature, that those animals and vegetables which are produced the quickest are generally the least perfect; and we find in art, that those structures which are the soonest raised seldom last the longest.

Exam. The Roman general, Flaminius, from too great an eagerness to overcome Hannibal, was

most disgracefully beaten by him: but the other Roman general, Fabius, by delaying and putting off fighting till he saw an advantage, gave that bold Carthaginian a complete overthrow.

Test. The famous Dutch pensionary, De Witt, when hew as asked, how he could possibly execute all the business he did, made answer; "Be-"cause I never do more than one thing at a "time:" so truly just and prudent is that proverbial admonition—"Fair and softly."

Conc. If, therefore, we would not only do any thing well, but do it also in as short a time as possible, we ought to be calm and collected, and to make no more haste than good speed.

VIII.—'TIS ILL PLAYING WITH EDGED TOOLS.

Prop. As nothing is more dangerous than sporting with those instruments which have sharp points and keen edges; so nothing is more perilous than trifling with those follies that border on vices, which wound the character and hurt the morals.

Reas. Scarcely any thing is so common as to fancy ourselves safe, while we are only playing with

evil at a distance, as this distance lessens every moment, and we are insensibly involved in criminal indulgence before we think we have consented to it.

Conf. Laughing at vices, instead of abhorring them, is generally the first step towards committing them. Those things cannot appear very terrible to us which we only shew our disapprobation of by ridicule.

Simi. The fly beholds the candle, at first, with vast pleasure and satisfaction; she wantons round it and round it, charmed with its warmth and brightness, till at last, by sporting too near the flame, her wings are caught in it, and the poor insect dies a miserable death.

Exam. The vice of gaming affords a thousand melancholy instances of the danger of meddling with those things that are not, perhaps, vicious in themselves, but which naturally lead to vice. How many thousands who have sat down to play with an intention of only venturing a few shillings, have, by little and little, been drawn into the loss of such sums as have rendered them miserable for life!

Test. So truly just is the observation of one of the ancients, "Those who tempt danger gene-"rally perish by it."

Conc. We may therefore conclude, that as human life is naturally exposed to many dangers and temptations which we cannot avoid, it is the height of folly to dally with those dangers which we may avoid if we please.

IX.—TOO MUCH FAMILIARITY GENERALLY BREEDS CONTEMPT.

Prop. THERE is no observation more generally true than that our esteem of a person seldom rises in proportion to our intimacy with him.

Reas. Such is the general disguise men wear, that their good qualities commonly appear first, and their bad ones are discovered by degrees; and this gradual discovery of their weaknesses and failings must necessarily lessen our opinion of them. Besides,

Conf. It is the nature of man to have a high opinion of any excellence he is not fully acquainted with: he is prone to imagine it much greater than it really is; and, therefore, when it becomes thoroughly known, the expectation is at an end, and the good qualities which we at first admired, having no longer the recommendation of novelty, become not only less

striking, but often produce indifference and contempt.

Simi. As the frogs in the fable were frighted almost to death at the log Jupiter threw them down into the lake for their king, but, by degrees, became so familiar with their wooden monarch as to despise it; so kings have often found, by mixing too familiarly with their subjects, and masters by being too free with their servants, that they have lost their importance in proportion to their condescension.

Exam. James the First, King of England, was a man of considerable learning, and had as few bad qualities as the generality of his subjects; but, by jesting with his attendants, and descending to childish familiarities with them, scarcely any king of England was held in greater contempt.

Test. "Young people cannot be too much on their "guard," says a celebrated teacher, "against "falling into too great familiarity with their "companions: for they are sure to lose the "good opinion of those with whom they are "too familiar."

Conc. It may, therefore, be laid down, as confirmed by reason and experience, that nothing requires greater caution in our conduct than our behaviour to those with whom we are most intimate.

X.—ORDER IS OF UNIVERSAL IMPORTANCE.

Prop. THOUGH the order in which things are placed seems at first sight to be of but little consequence, yet experience convinces us that if we wish to conceive a thing clearly, or perform any thing with accuracy, we must have recourse to order.

Reas. When things are placed in order, they do not only look more beautiful, but are more easily comprehended. Thus the rules of Grammar, Arithmetic, or any other Art or Science, being placed in order, give the mind a clear conception of what is intended to be conveyed; while the same rules scattered in confusion would not only be less agreeable to the imagination, but less conducive to instruction: for, in all instruction, it is necessary that those things that are most easily conceived and best known should be placed before those that are more difficult and less known.

Conf. It is very remarkable, that when a great number of things are scattered about in disorder, they appear not only more disagreeable, but much more numerous than when they are

classed and arranged according to their several kinds and sorts: thus, when we at first reflect on the great number of animals received into the Ark of Noah, we think it impossible it should contain them; but, upon a distinct inquiry into all such animals as are known, or have been described by natural philosophers, it will appear that there are much fewer than is commonly imagined—not a hundred sorts of beasts, and not two hundred of birds.

Simi. As a small army, well disciplined and arranged in proper order, is superior to the greatest number of troops in irregularity and confusion; so well-directed studies, and an orderly course of reading, will gain more knowledge in a short time than a whole life spent in detached and desultory inquiries.

Exam. "To count," says Dr. Johnson, "is a modern "practice: the ancient method was to guess; "and when numbers are guessed, they are al- "ways magnified."

Test. It is an injunction of St. Paul to the Corinthians, that, in the management of ecclesiastical affairs, every thing should be done in order.

Conc. If, therefore, we wish to have any number of things appear beautiful; if we wish to comprehend them easily, either for our own

information or for the instruction of others, we must arrange them in proper order, and class them according to their respective qualities and properties.

XI.—USE PLEASURES MODERATELY, AND THEY WILL LAST THE LONGER.

Prop. THERE cannot be a greater mistake than that of supposing that pleasures will continue as long as we pursue them:

Reas. For such is the nature of man, that every pleasure palls by repetition, till, at last, it not only becomes tasteless and tiresome, but even disgusting; so that those who pursue pleasures, by repeating them too often, change their very nature, and transmute them into pain.

Conf. Besides, every one's experience will tell him, that the greater the pleasure the greater danger there is of excess, and that excess in every thing is sure to be followed by disappointment and disgust.

Simi. Immoderate pleasures are like intoxicating liquors; they raise the spirits for a short time, but afterwards leave them in a worse state than

before; while moderate pleasures are like wholesome food, which does not raise the spirits like strong liquors, but gives them a pleasing satisfaction, which is substantial and lasting.

Exam. So much were the ancient philosophers afraid of indulging in pleasure, that it is said of Diogenes, that, meeting with a young man who was going to a feast, he took him up in the street, and carried him home to his friends, as one who was running into imminent danger, had he not prevented him.

Test. Dr. Young, with his usual strength of thought, observes, that, whenever we drink too deep of pleasure, we find a sediment at the bottom which pollutes and imbitters what we relish at first.

Conc. Nothing therefore can be more glaring than the folly of those who, by pursuing pleasures too eagerly, defeat the very end they wish to obtain.

XII.—NO ART CAN BE ACQUIRED WITHOUT RULES.

Prop. As art is the power of doing any thing in the best and most expeditious manner, the way to

acquire this power must be to observe those methods which have been adopted by artists, and to follow them:

Reas. For, as the best method of doing any thing can only be acquired by experience, it is highly reasonable to pursue those methods which the experience of artists has shewn to be proper to arrive at the art.

Conf. If rules were unnecessary, if arts could be acquired without teaching, why should we not see people become painters, or musicians, or architects, without study or practice? On the contrary, we see none of these arts can be acquired without attending to the instruction of masters, and following the rules they have laid down.

Simi. No man attempts to steer a ship who does not understand the principles of navigation: no one consults a person for advice in medicine who has not for a considerable time applied his attention to the practice of it: and he who undertakes the learning of an art, without beginning at first principles and attending to rules, is as absurd as he who thinks to build a house without first laying the foundation.

Exam. An ingenious author observes, that the arriving at art by attending to rules seems to be the

peculiar characteristic of human nature. Brutes may be taught to do surprising things by habit; but it is man only who can acquire these habits by attending to rules; and it is by these rules that he teaches brutes.

Test. "Art," says Mr. Burke, "is man's nature." Nature leads man to art, and art enables him to improve and perfect nature.

Conc. Let those therefore who wish to acquire an art, submit patiently to such rules as are laid down by masters in the art, as these rules will in the end be found to be the shortest and easiest way of gaining the art we want.

XIII.—AVOID EXTREMES.

Prop. THERE is nothing in human conduct we ought more carefully to avoid than running into extremes, as a medium in all things is the most advisable course we can take.

Reas. All the moral virtues lie between two extremes. The virtue of temperance lies between gluttony and abstinence; the virtue of courage between rashness and cowardice; the virtue of

liberality between prodigality and parsimony; and so of the rest. Therefore, as true virtue consists in moderation, in the restraining of our passions, and keeping us from running into excess, the middle course is that which we ought always to choose, as that which is the most likely to lead us to virtue and happiness.

Conf. Besides, it is so much easier to fall into extremes than to keep the medium; it is so much easier to indulge too much in eating, or to abstain entirely, than to be temperate; it is so much easier to be rash or timid than to be truly courageous; it is so much easier to be prodigal, or avaricious, than to be frugal or liberal; that we cannot be too much upon our guard against these extremes, as they will certainly end in disappointment and misery.

Simi. Thus as a pilot, whose course lies between rocks and shelves, must carefully observe a middle way, and steer neither too much to the right hand nor to the left; so, in the voyage of life, if we wish to avoid miseries and misfortunes, we ought as much as possible to keep a middle course, and shun extremes in our moral conduct.

Exam. A striking example of the advantage of moderation may be seen by comparing the lives of

the ancient philosophers and the lives of kings; the former of whom exceeded the latter so much in longevity, that, as Mr. Addison remarks, "one would think them a different race "of beings:" and this, we may fairly conclude, could arise from nothing else but the moderation and regularity of the philosophical life, and the temptation to excess in that of kings.

Test. The ancient moralists are constantly admonishing us, that, while we endeavour to shun Scylla, we should take care not to fall into Charybdis; intimating by this, how apt we are to run into extremes, and how necessary it is to preserve a medium.

Conc. Those therefore who wish to obtain health and happiness must shun every kind of excess, or they will infallibly subject themselves to difficulties and disasters.

XIV.—EVIL COMMUNICATION CORRUPTS GOOD MANNERS.

Prop. NOTHING is more certain than that a constant intercourse with those who are vicious and immoral will infallibly infect us with vice and immorality.

Reas. Man is a creature of imitation; and it is as much impossible to avoid imitating those manners which are constantly before our eyes as it is to avoid speaking a language we are constantly hearing.

Conf. Besides, whatever is perpetually present to us loses its singularity. Vice, which at first was odious, by too much familiarity becomes less disagreeable; and, if it happens to be united with certain qualities we admire, we slide, by insensible degrees, into an imitation of those characters which at first shocked us with their turpitude.

Simi. As a young unvitiated palate generally dislikes high-seasoned dishes and poignant sauces, but at last becomes fond of them; so a virtuous mind, which at first is disgusted with vice, by too much familiarity becomes enamoured with it.

Exam. History, both ancient and modern, affords us a thousand instances of the danger of communicating with evil. None are more striking than the example of Solomon: That king, favoured by God so highly; blessed with wisdom, riches, and power, above all his predecessors; and authorized by God to build him a temple, and to compose part of the holy scripture;—that king, by conversing too familiarly with the idolatrous nations with which he was surrounded, was at last seduced by them to wickedness and idolatry; and it is a question among divines, whether he ever repented and returned to God.

Test. The moralists of all ages have earnestly exhorted us to fly from the company of the wicked; and Dr. Johnson observes, with his usual acuteness, there are few who do not learn, by degrees, to practise those crimes which they cease to censure.

Conc. How justly, therefore, may we conclude with the sacred writer, that accustoming ourselves to the converse of those who are evil will infallibly lead us to be evil ourselves.

XV.—NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION.

Prop. WHEN men are in the utmost distress for the want of any thing, this want generally prompts them to the means of supplying it:

Reas. For when men are at ease, and have no wants to provide for, their imaginations lie dormant and their faculties inactive; but when they are stimulated by want, and pressed by neces-

sity, their imaginations are roused and their faculties are exerted to supply these wants. This situation urges them to try every possible expedient, and by this means they make very useful discoveries.

Conf. This is agreeable to the general economy of Providence: the necessity of food, raiment, and a sheltering roof, cannot be supplied without the invention of the head, the toil of the hand, and the sweat of the brow. Providence, therefore, in order to make men active, has laid them under the necessity of providing for their subsistence; and this necessity has given rise to a thousand useful and curious inventions.

Simi. As the bird, before her young ones are fledged, carefully provides them with food, but the moment they can fly turns them out to provide for themselves; so Providence has endued man with inventive faculties; and has placed him in the midst of wants and necessities that urge him to the exercise of those faculties which would otherwise be useless and unemployed.

Exam. This is wonderfully exemplified in the accounts we have of savage nations, where the necessity they are under of providing themselves with warlike weapons and implements for fishing, gives them such a power of invention, as surprises the more civilized nations, whose necessities are provided for.

Test. Dr. Johnson tells us, that it was an excellent observation of Pythagoras, that ability and necessity dwell near each other. To which we may add another observation, that great revolutions and great political exigencies have generally produced great men.

Conc. We may therefore conclude, that, if invention is at a stand, there is seldom any necessity for it; as necessity is almost sure to become the mother of invention.

XVI.—REAL KNOWLEDGE CAN BE ACQUIRED ONLY BY SLOW DEGREES.

Prop. HUMAN knowledge is at best only progressive:

Reas. For as the sources of information open gradually by experience, the knowledge arising thence must be gradual also: in the same manner as, by gradually ascending a hill, every

step we take opens new prospects to us, which enable us to see farther than we did before.

Conf. If we seek to acquire knowledge too rapidly we shall be too apt to neglect those first principles that lead to it; and for the want of those principles, we shall find the knowledge we acquire very imperfect and easily lost.

Simi. As the attractive power of the loadstone was first discovered, then its polarity, or its tendency to the north pole, then its dipping quality, and its several other qualities; so, in all human knowledge, we discover first one point, then another, and so on, till we arrive at the last improvement.

Exam. We need not go out of ourselves for a testimony of the gradual acquisition of knowledge. We can remember how slowly we gained a power of reading at sight, by beginning with letters, syllables, and words; how tardily we advanced to a knowledge of arithmetic, by numeration, addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division; and how tediously we repeat the gamut, and the first principles of music, before we can attain to any proficiency in the art: and yet, however slow and tedious these procedures may be, we find that at last

they produce a great effect, and enable us to acquire the most difficult arts and sciences.

Test. It is an observation of the ancient schoolmen, that Nature and Providence take no leaps: that is, that they proceed by no violent transitions, but bring about their ends gradually and almost insensibly.

Conc. We may therefore conclude, that all hopes of acquiring knowledge suddenly are groundless and visionary; and that the best way to gain improvement, either in mind or body, is to proceed by slow and almost imperceptible degrees.

XVII.—PRIDE IS THE BANE OF HAPPINESS.

Prop. Nothing can be a greater enemy to true felicity than the haughtiness of behaviour which throws others at a distance, and gives them an unpleasant sense of their inferiority.

Reas. Every man is pleased to see the humble raised and the proud lowered; and therefore every man is fond of seizing every opportunity of mortifying the proud man, by trumpeting forth his faults; and as the proud are more hurt than any other people by the discovery of

their failings, so they must necessarily be miserable to have these failings published to the world.

Conf. Besides, when we consider how few are the real wants of nature, and how many are the artificial ones created by pride, we shall find that almost all the mortifications and difficulties we meet with in life are produced by a desire of appearing greater and more important than we really are; or, in other words, by suffering ourselves to be the slaves of pride.

Simi. The envy which is sure to follow in the train of pride has been happily illustrated by the fable of the Peacock; who no sooner begins to spread his gorgeous plumage than the other birds begin to cry out against his screaming voice and his ugly legs.

Exam. Alexander the Great was so puffed up with pride by his many victories, that he foolishly believed himself to be a god. He had so often escaped in battle, that he thought himself immortal. This pride led him to shew a superiority in every thing; and, by attempting to drink a larger quantity of wine than others, he threw himself into a fever, which was his death.

Test. The odiousness of pride, and the evils attend-

ing it, have been the common topics both of ancient and modern moralists: but no observation seems more pointed than that which says, of all human vices, pride seldomest obtains its end; for, by showing our own pride, we pique the pride of other men; and thus, by aiming at honour and reputation, we reap derision and contempt.

Conc. We may therefore conclude, that if we have any thing to be proud of, the only way to be happy with it is to conceal it from others; for, as a proud man is considered as a common enemy, every man is happy to mortify him.

XVIII.—CUSTOM IS SECOND NATURE.

Prop. So easily do we slide into any actions we are accustomed to, so readily do we fall into any thing we have long practised, that use or custom may be very properly styled a second nature.

Reas. This propensity in human nature is established by Providence for the best and most useful purposes: by this we acquire the arts and sciences; by this we become habituated to the most laborious tasks; and by this,

those duties which were the most irksome to us at first, become not only easy, but agreeable.

Conf. If custom had not this power of making every thing natural to us, if doing things often did not give us a facility of doing them, we should never be able to make any progress in the arts and sciences: every task we undertook would be as laborious the last time as the first, and all our moral duties, which require self-denial, would never become easy or pleasant to us.

Simi. The wise philosopher, Socrates, in order to show the force of custom, bred up two dogs, of very different kinds, in a manner quite opposite to their natures. He had a hunting-dog kept in the kitchen without ever seeing any game, and a house-dog bred to hunting till he became habituated to the chase. On a certain day, at the same instant, he placed meat before the two dogs, and started a hare; when the house-dog quitted the meat, and pursued the game; and the hunting-dog, after his usual manner, attended only to the meat, and took no notice of the hare, which was his natural prey.

Exam. Mr. Addison tells us, that he heard one of

the greatest geniuses this age has produced, who had been trained up in all the polite studies of antiquity, declare to him, that, upon his being obliged to search into several old rolls and records, notwithstanding such an employ was at first very dry and irksome to him, he at last took an incredible pleasure in it, and preferred it even to the reading of Virgil or Cicero.

Test. So just is that golden saying of Pythagoras, "Pitch upon that course of life which is most "excellent, and custom will render it the most "delightful;" for, as Mr. Addison admirably observes, inclination will at length come over to reason, though we can never force reason to comply with inclination.

Conc. We may therefore conclude, that, as custom is sufficiently powerful to change nature, we cannot be too cautious how we accustom ourselves to any thing that is wrong.

XIX.—HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY.

Prop. To be punctual in our engagements and just in our dealings, though it may sometimes seem to be contrary to our present advantage,

is always sure in the end to promote our real interests and true happiness.

Reas. A fair and honest conduct will always be rewarded by the approbation of our fellow-creatures; and this approbation will naturally be followed by good offices and grateful returns; and these will certainly tend to promote our interest, and give success to our undertakings.

Conf. On the contrary, that selfishness which tempts us to encroach on the rights of others when we can do it with impunity, is very soon discovered by those who are injured; and then our dishonesty will certainly meet with its reward, which is, disapprobation and contempt.

Simi. As a plain road which is easily found, though it may not be the shortest way to the place we are going to, is preferable to a shorter way which is intricate and difficult to find, so a plain, open, and honest conduct, though seemingly less profitable than a conduct of art, is the easiest course to follow, and is in no danger of detection.

Exam. Sir Theodore Jansen, a respectable merchant of London, by unavoidable losses became a bankrupt, and was able to pay his

creditors but a small portion of the debts he owed them. Some years after, he became successful in trade, and invited all his creditors to a splendid dinner; as soon as they had sat down, he desired his guests to take up their plates, when, to their agreeable surprise, each man found the money that had been due to him, with the interest upon it to that very day. This instance of honesty so endeared him to the citizens of London that they elected him to the lucrative and honourable office of Chamberlain, which he held to the end of his life.

Test. A Spanish Ambassador was asked how he counteracted the intrigues of the ministers of foreign courts? Upon which he answered, "by "always speaking truth; for the ministry never "believe me, and are therefore generally de-"ceived." It is a maxim worthy of being written in letters of gold, that there is no method so certain of defeating the plots of wicked men against us as by acting uprightly.

Conc. Upon the whole, therefore, we may conclude, that there is no mistake so common, or so fatal, as supposing that artful, indirect conduct will promote our interest; for, both by reason and experience, it plainly appears, that, however we may be deceived by appearances

of advantage, honesty is the most really advantageous, and will be found in the end to be the best policy.

XX.—A MAN IS KNOWN BY HIS COMPANY.

Prop. NOTHING shows more evidently the temper, disposition, and opinion of any individual, than the temper, disposition, and opinion of those he associates with.

Reas. This must necessarily be the case, because man is so formed that he cannot long take pleasure in the company of those who are of opposite sentiments to himself, and therefore he will not make them his companions.

Conf. It is similitude of temper and sentiment that classes the whole creation; we do not find deer associate with tigers, nor lambs with wolves; nor among rational creatures, do we often meet together, in the same company, the wise and the foolish, the learned and the ignorant, the virtuous and the vicious, the religious and the profane.

Simi. Philosophers tell us, that the four elements, though blended together, have a strong tendency to separate from each other, and to unite themselves with their respective kindred elements; that heavy things have a tendency to the earth, light things to the air, hot things to fire, and liquids to water. However founded this may be in the nature of bodies, it is certainly true in souls; the good and bad have a natural dislike to each other, and therefore are seldom found in each other's company.

Exam. This rule is so seldom broken, that, when it is, it never fails to excite our surprise. The Scythians were a people remarkably savage and barbarous; and yet, in one period of their history, there lived among them a man famous for his wisdom, justice, and virtue: this was the philosopher Anacharsis. The Greeks, who were a people of a quite opposite character to the Scythians, could not help viewing the Scythian philosopher as a prodigy; and used to say, when they met with a good man among bad ones, that he was Anacharsis among the Scythians.

Test. The truth of these observations is confirmed by the concurrent testimony of experience; which experience has given rise to so many proverbial phrases; such as, "Birds of a feather "flock together"—"Shew me your company, "and I will tell you your manners."

Conc. If, therefore, we are known by our company, how cautious ought we to be of our company. How careful ought we to be not to associate ourselves with improper companions, as the world will judge of us by them, and will, in all probability, judge rightly; for such is the corrupt nature of man, that if vice and virtue are associated, there is little hope of the vicious person's becoming virtuous, but almost a certainty that the virtuous person will become vicious.

XXI.—VIRTUE IS ITS OWN REWARD.

Prop. VIRTUE may be defined to be, doing our duty to God and our neighbour, in opposition to all temptations to the contrary. This conduct is so consonant to the light of reason, so agreeable to our moral sentiments, and produces so much satisfaction and content of mind, that it may be said to carry its reward along with it, even if unattended by that recompense which it generally meets with in this world.

Reas. The reason of this seems to lie in the very nature of things. The all-wise and benevo-

lent Author of Nature has so framed the soul of man, that he cannot but approve of virtue; and has annexed to the practice of it an inward satisfaction and happiness, that mankind may be encouraged to become virtuous.

Conf. If it were not so—if virtue were accompanied with no self-satisfaction, no heartfelt joy, we should not only be discouraged from the practice of virtue, but should be tempted to think there was something very wrong in the laws of Nature, and that rewards and punishments were not properly administered by Providence.

Simi. But as, in the works of nature and art, whatever is really beautiful, is generally useful; so, in the moral world, whatever is virtuous or praiseworthy is at the same time so beneficial to society, that it generally meets with a suitable recompense.

Exam. How has the approbation of all future ages rewarded the continence of Scipio? That young warrior had taken a beautiful captive, with whose charms he was greatly enamoured; but finding she was betrothed to a young nobleman of her own country, he, without hesitation, generously delivered her up to him. This one action of this noble Roman youth

has rendered him more famous than all his conquests.

Test. The loveliness of virtue has been the constant topic of all moralists, both ancient and modern. Plato has a famous saying in praise of virtue: he supposes that, if virtue were to assume a human form, the whole world would be in love with it.

Conc. If, therefore, virtue is of itself so lovely; if it is always accompanied with the greatest earthly happiness,—a consciousness of acting rightly,—it may truly be said to be its own reward: for, though it is not denied that virtue is frequently attended with crosses and misfortunes in this life, and that there is something of self-denial in the very idea of it; yet, as Pope expresses it,

> The broadest mirth unfeeling Folly wears,
> Is ————
> Less pleasing far than Virtue's very tears.

EASY ESSAYS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The following Essays cannot be reduced to the same rules as the foregoing Regular Subjects and Themes; and the pupil, therefore, may feel a want of the assistance which these rules afforded him. For which reason I imagined, that dividing each Essay into its principal component parts, and giving to each part an abridgment of its contents, would, in some measure, assist the memory, and remedy the want of rules.

I would therefore advise the teacher, after he has read the Essay to the pupil the first time, then talked it over, and read it again to him a second time, to repeat distinctly the several heads of the Essay, as set down at the bottom of the page. Thus, after having read and explained the first Essay, *On the Importance of a Well-spent Youth*, I would have him remark distinctly the number of heads, and say, "The first head is—'All desire to arrive at old age, but few think of gaining those virtues which alone can make it happy.'—The next is—'That Life is a building, and youth the foundation.'—The next—'All the latter stages of life depend upon the good use of the former.'—The last—'Age, therefore, requires a well-spent youth to make it happy.'"

Perhaps, if these abridged contents were to be repeated by the teacher before each head in the second reading, as well as after the whole is read, it might tend to imprint the subject more strongly: I would, however, by no means advise him to suffer the pupil to take them down in writing; but if his memory should be bad, and his apprehension slow, it may be proper to give him one or two points at first, till, by habit, he has acquired a greater facility.

EASY ESSAYS.

I.—ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A WELL-SPENT YOUTH.

(1) A desire to live long is the fervent wish of all the human species. The eastern monarchs, who wanted to make all human happiness centre in themselves, were saluted with the flattering exclamation, "Oh king, live for ever!"—Thus all propose to themselves a long life, and hope their age will be attended with tranquillity and comfort; but few consider that a happy old age depends entirely upon the use we have made of our time, and the habits we have formed, when young: if we have been profligate, dissipated, and insignificant, in our earlier years, it is almost impossible we should have any importance with others, or satisfaction to ourselves, in age.

(2) The life of man is a building. Youth is to lay the foundation of knowledge, habits, and dispositions; upon which middle life and age must finish the structure: and in moral, as in material

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(1) All desire to arrive at old age, but few think of acquiring those virtues which alone can make it happy.
(2) The life of man is a building; youth the foundation.

architecture, no good edifice can be raised upon a faulty foundation.

(3) This will admit of further illustration in every scene of life through which we pass. The children who have not got such a knowledge of the first rudiments of learning in their infancy as they ought to have done, are held in contempt by boys or girls who have played less and learned more. The youth who mispends his time, and neglects his improvement at school, is despised at college by those who have been more industrious at school. The man of business, and the gentleman, who have lost the golden opportunity of advancing themselves in knowledge while young, often find themselves degraded for the want of those acquirements which are the greatest ornament of human life: and when age has lost every occasion of advancing in knowledge and virtue, what happiness can be expected in it?

(4) The infirmities of age want the reflections of a well-spent youth to comfort and solace them: these reflections, and nothing but these, are, by the

(3) All the latter stages of life depend upon the good use we make of the former.

(4) Age, therefore, requires a well-spent youth to render it happy.

order of Providence, capable of supporting us in the last stage of our pilgrimage.

Thus a mispent youth is sure to make either a miserable or a contemptible old age. This Pope has happily expressed, where, speaking of those who in youth give themselves up to the vanities of life, he says,

> See how the world its veterans rewards,
> A youth of folly, an old age of cards.

II.—ON THE NECESSITY OF SUBMISSION TO TEACHERS.

(1) It is a very dangerous mistake to imagine that the mind can be cultivated, and the manners formed on any principle, but that of submission to teachers and superiors: any other method is radically absurd and unnatural; it is contrary to that rational order which does and must prevail in all other cases of the same kind. The raw recruit learns his exercise on the authority of his officer, because he knows nothing yet of the art of war, and he waits

(1) Submission to teachers and superiors necessary in all states of life, exemplified in the recruit, the patient, and the Ephori, and even in children themselves.

for the reasons of it till he comes into action. The patient commits himself to the physician, consenting to a regimen which is against his appetite, and taking medicines of which he knows neither the names nor the qualities, and while nature is ready to rebel at the taste of them. The Lacedæmonians carried this doctrine to such excess, that they obliged their Ephori to submit to the ridiculous ceremony of being shaved when they entered upon their office, for no other end but that it might be signified, by this act, that they knew how to practise submission to the laws of their country. Nay, the very children themselves, who are the most intractable and disobedient to their teachers, think it highly injurious to their own authority if their inferiors in age pretend to have a judgment of their own.

(2) It is an universal and established law, that he who will gain any thing must give up something: he that will improve his understanding, his manners, or his health, must contradict his will, and submit to the will of others. This may appear hard; but it is much harder to risk knowledge, happiness,

(2) It is a law of Nature, that, if we gain any thing, we must give up something. So that, if we wish to gain health or knowledge, it must be by giving up our own opinion, and submitting to physicians and teachers.

and perhaps even life itself, by adhering obstinately to an opinion of our own sufficiency. So that, after all the high flights and fancies of philosophical fanaticism, we may rest satisfied there is no rule of education that has common sense in it, but the old-fashioned, and almost exploded doctrine, of authority on one side, and submission on the other.

(3) Animals, devoid of reason, and guided only by instinct, frequently afford the most useful lessons to mankind. A swarm of bees is an excellent pattern to all human societies: there is perfect allegiance, perfect subordination; no time is lost in disputing or questioning, but business goes on with cheerfulness, and the great object is the common interest. All are armed for defence, and ready for work; so that in every member of the community the two characters of the soldier and the labourer are united. If we look to the fruit of this wise economy, we find a store of honey laid up for them to feed upon when the summer is past and the days of labour are finished; and intellectual honey will be the reward of those who follow so instructive an example.

(3) The bee, an excellent example of the utility of obedience to superiors.

III.—ON DIVERSIONS.

(1) It is generally taken for granted, by most young people of fortune, that diversion is the principal object of life; and this opinion is often carried to such excess, that pleasure seems to be the great ruling principle which directs all their thoughts, words, and actions, and which makes all the serious duties of life heavy and disgusting. This opinion, however, is no less absurd than unhappy, as may be shewn by taking the other side of the question, and proving that there is no pleasure or enjoyment of life without labour.

(2) The words commonly used to signify diversion are these three, relaxation, amusement, and recreation; and the precise meaning of these words may lead us to very useful instruction. The idea of relaxation is taken from a bow, which must be unbent when it is not wanted, that it may keep up its spring. Amusement means an occasional for-

(1) It is a great mistake to suppose that diversions should form the business of life, the contrary to this being true.

(2) The original sense of relaxation, amusement, and recreation, may convince us of this.

saking of the Muses, or the laying aside our books when we are weary with study; and recreation is the refreshing of our spirits when they are exhausted with labour, that they may be ready, in due time, to resume it again.

From these considerations it follows, that the idle man who has no work can have no play; for, how can he be relaxed who is never bent? How can he leave the Muses who is never with them? How can play refresh him who is never exhausted with business?

(3) When diversion becomes the business of life, its nature is changed; all rest presupposes labour. He that has no variety can have no enjoyment; he is surfeited with pleasure, and in the bitter hours of reflection would find a refuge in labour itself. And indeed it may be observed, that there is not a more miserable, as well as a more worthless being, than a young person of fortune, who has nothing to do but find out some new way of doing nothing.

(4) A sentence is passed upon all poor men, that if they do not work they shall not eat; and a similar sentence seems passed upon the rich, who, if they

(3) When diversion becomes the business of life, it is no longer diversion.

(4) Poor and rich must be employed, or be unhappy.

are not in some respect useful to the public, are almost sure to become burdensome to themselves. This blessing goes along with every useful employment; it keeps a man upon good terms with himself, and consequently in good spirits, and in a capacity of pleasing and being pleased with every innocent gratification.

(5) As labour is necessary to procure an appetite to the body, there must also be some previous exercise of the mind to prepare it for enjoyment; indulgence on any other terms is false in itself, and ruinous in its consequences. Mirth degenerates into senseless riot, and gratification soon terminates in satiety and disgust.

IV.—ON TIME.

(1) NOTHING is so valuable and nothing so much wasted as time. It is by a good or a bad use of time that we are happy or miserable, both in this world and the next. A stated time is allotted us

(5) Labour of mind and body equally necessary for the health of both.

(1) Our happiness in this world and the next depends upon a proper use of time.

by Providence for the improvement of those faculties which are given to us; and if this time is not properly managed, our faculties are not only left uncultivated, but generally depraved and spoiled.

(2) It is a very mistaken notion, common to youth, to imagine that they have a great deal of time beforehand, and therefore they can afford to squander away the present in idle amusements; but they ought to consider, that though there is a probability they have a proportion of time in reversion, there is not any thing like a certainty of it. We need not recur to the weekly bills of mortality, to prove that youth is liable to death: every one's circle of acquaintance will furnish him with melancholy instances of the brittleness of the age of youth; and every churchyard will exhibit the tears of parents upon the tombstones of their children.

(3) But should Providence afford us time by prolonging our life to its latest period, it cannot be said that we have a moment to spare. Every day brings its duty; to-morrow is not in our power: and if we borrow of the present time to pay in the future,

(2) Youth is apt to be deceived in counting upon much time to come.

(3) The longest life cannot afford to run in debt with time, or burden to-morrow with the business of to-day.

we run in debt to an inexorable creditor, who never forgives us either principal or interest; for we must exert ourselves with double industry to recover our time, or lose it for ever.

A sense of this truth made the Emperor Titus, when he had passed the day without doing some good action, cry out that a day was lost; upon which Dr. Young, in his strong, picturesque style, says,

> How wretched he
> That's haunted by the ghost of murder'd time!
> And he how happy
> Whose yesterdays look backwards with a smile,
> Nor like the Parthian wound him as they fly!

V.—ON MODESTY.

(1) Modesty is an humble opinion of our own merit, when compared with that of others. So refined a compliment to the superiority of those with whom we converse cannot fail of prepossessing them in our favour, and conciliating them to our interests.

(1) Modesty a refined compliment to those we address.

(2) The wise author and governor of nature has implanted a love of modesty in the breast of every one, that its opposite vices, presumption and affectation, should be checked by universal disapprobation. The modest man is sure to have the world in his favour, and the presumptuous man is as certain to have every man his opponent.

(3) So naturally does modesty arise from a just knowledge of ourselves and others, or in other words, so necessarily does it imply good sense in its possessor, that Cicero tells us, he never had a good opinion of a young orator, who did not shew great modesty, and even timidity in his first appearance in public: that same sensibility which leads us to a proper estimate of our merits, and induces us to attempt such actions as will excite the public esteem, gives us at the same time a just esteem for the merit of others, and makes us feel how much they expect from us. Conceit and presumption are an insult to those we converse with: they tarnish the most brilliant qualities, while modesty gives those qualities a double lustre; and, in some measure, makes up for the want of them.

(2) All are friends to the modest, and enemies to the presumptuous man.
(3) Modesty a proof of good sense.

(4) But however amiable modesty may be in men, it is the peculiar ornament of the fair sex, and is essential to the beauty of every other accomplishment. While modesty remains, the most homely form has a beauty; and when this beauty is lost, the finest form only reminds us that it is impossible for a woman to be amiable without it. It has been observed, that all the virtues are represented by painters and statuaries under female shapes: but if any of the virtues has a more peculiar title to appear in the form of that sex, it is modesty.

VI.—ON FLATTERY.

(1) FLATTERY is false praise; either when it is bestowed on an undeserving object, or when it is given in a greater degree than the object of our praise is entitled to. It has its origin in the too high opinion we generally have of our own excellence, and the selfishness of those who wish to impose upon us. The flatterer has always an interested

(4) Modesty the peculiar ornament of the fair sex.
(1) Flattery arises from the pride of the person flattered, and something designing in the flatterer.

motive, and often a base one. The person flattered is always disposed to listen to the flatterer, from that self-love and partiality to ourselves which is the origin of so many mischiefs among mankind.

(2) A mind open to flattery is always in a dangerous situation; it credits whatever is spoken in its praise, and must therefore think those who do not offer the incense of adulation are either blind to its merits or envies them; this produces the arrogance, ill-nature, and self-sufficiency, which are almost inseparable from such persons, and frequently urges them to the most ridiculous expedients to tempt others to flatter them. So far as this over-fondness for praise operates, it must retard our improvement: for who will strive to gain any new accomplishment, who believe they are already accomplished? Who will endure the labour of acquiring advantages who are told either that they do not want them, or that they have them already.

(3) No disposition, therefore, can be more detrimental to youth than a love of flattery; both as it may prevent their improvement and make them

(2) Flattery particularly dangerous to youth, as it prevents their improvement.
(3) A flatterer always to be suspected of some insidious intention.

too fond of the person who pretends to admire them: who is always to be suspected of some vile and disingenuous purpose; for those who basely violate truths by gross flattery can scarcely be supposed to possess any virtue

VII.—ON DRESS.

(1) THERE are several things of very great consequence in life which, at first sight, seem very insignificant. The dress we appear in is supposed to be of little importance to our moral character; and, therefore, an impropriety in dress is frequently indulged by those who would be much ashamed that it should be thought any imputation on their virtue or understanding: and yet nothing is more certain than that our dress, as well as our behaviour, is a true picture of what passes in our minds; and that here cannot be an oddity or impropriety in the one but there must be the same oddity or impropriety in the other. If we dress remarkably finer (and, as we think, better) than those we associate with, what is it but the very same pride which induces us to

(1) Dress, a picture of what passes in our minds.

take the lead in conversation, and to consider ourselves as more worthy of attention than others?

(2) The same sense of decency and propriety, therefore, which teaches us to regulate our behaviour in company, ought to teach us a decency and propriety of dress; for those who understand human nature will judge of the rectitude of our minds by the dress we appear in, as much as by our language and deportment in conversation.

(3) But an impropriety in dress does not only affect the moral character, it affects also what people of dress value infinitely more, the taste. Nothing can be stronger proof of the good or ill taste of a person than the dress he appears in. Every one who dresses for public approbation becomes a kind of painter or statuary; and we shew what we think would be elegant in a picture or a statue by what we make use of to adorn our own persons. Let us be careful, therefore, of our dress, as we value the opinion of the world with regard to our taste in the polite arts. Besides, as any thing glaring and particular catches the eye, and will not suffer us to pass over the person so adorned without due notice

(2) Dress, sometimes a test of good sense.
(3) Dress, a criterion of our taste in painting and statuary.

and observation, so we may be certain, that if our singularity in dress does not gain praise, it will infallibly draw us into ridicule and contempt.

(4) To these considerations we may add, that as first impressions are often of the greatest importance in life, and as dress forms a great part of the impression we make at first sight, how impolitic is it not to be attentive to a circumstance on which so much of our future fortune depends! The secret of dressing gracefully, and so as to excite the approbation as well as the notice of those we converse with, is known but to a few; but every one may be sure of escaping censure, by attending to neatness and avoiding finery; and as fashion forms so great a part of propriety in dress, we cannot do better than to follow the advice of our most elegant poet, Pope:

> In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold,
> Alike fantastic if too new or old:
> Be not the first by whom the new are tried,
> Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
>
> *Essay on Criticism.*

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(4) Dress of great importance to the first impression we make upon others.

VIII.—ON HISTORY.

(1) HISTORY is the foundation of all useful and elegant knowledge: it acquaints us with the transactions and characters of mankind, from the remotest antiquity to the present times, and gives us a knowledge of the most distant nations, as well as our own. It gives us a view of the powers of man, by showing how he has improved, from the most barbarous and savage state of society, to that state in which we now see the most polished nations of Europe.

(2) What a different picture do the same creatures exhibit employed in hunting, fishing, and making war on each other with the most unrelenting cruelty; and, as we now see them, improving life with useful arts, and embellishing it with ornaments and elegancies suited to a state of refinement!—Without history man would have continued nearly in the state in which he happened to be placed, for want of those improvements which he can only receive by the history of his own species.

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(1) The most useful of human knowledge derived from history.

(2) History exhibits the different states of society, and the causes of them.

(3) But history does not only improve the arts and add to the elegancies of life; it is of the utmost consequence to the morals of mankind. It shows, in the history of every nation, how essential morality and virtue are to the happiness of a state, and how constantly vice and irreligion end in national ruin.

(4) This is not only a useful lesson to communities, but to individuals; for every man, as the poets have expressed it, is a little kingdom; if the inferior powers and faculties of his body are in due subjection to the superior powers and faculties of his soul, he is like a well-governed state; every part of the creature is in peace and tranquillity, and consequently happy: if, on the contrary, his inferior powers rebel against the superior, there is the same internal commotion in the individual as there is in a nation when it is in a state of civil war. The same history, therefore, which shows us that the happiness of a nation depends on its virtue, informs us that the happiness of individuals entirely depends on the same principle; and that ruin will as certainly be the consequence of vice in a single person as it is in the community at large.

(3) History gives us a lesson of morality.
(4) The history of a state and the history of an individual are perfectly parallel.

IX.—ON TASTE.

(1) As young people become conversant with the world, they will observe scarcely any thing so much talked of, and so little understood, as taste. They hear of a taste in dress, of a taste in music, of a taste in furniture; and, as they see these vary so often with the fashion, they are apt to suppose that fashion and taste are the same thing, and that neither of them is any thing more than whim and fancy: this, however, is confounding two things very different in their natures.

(2) Fashion is indeed only a creature of the imagination: it varies like the winds, and, if the expression will be allowed me, is constant in nothing but inconstancy. But taste has fixed and permanent principles: it sees that a long flowing dress must always be more graceful than a short one; that a building with two wings must always be more beautiful than a building with one; and that a landscape diversified with woods, hills, and rivers, must always be more agreeable than the picture

(1) Taste and fashion distinct and different things.
(2) The principles of fashion are nothing but whim and fancy, but those of taste are beauty and proportion.

of a barren heath. Every one has taste enough to acknowledge these distinctions; and every one sees that the beauty of these objects does not depend upon the fashion, but is in the nature of things.

(3) It is a very common, as well as a very discouraging opinion to young people, that taste is a faculty so peculiarly the gift of Nature, that Art can no more improve than produce it. Whereas the truth is, that taste is no more the gift of Nature than every other faculty of the mind. It is certain that some people are born with quicker conceptions, better memories, and finer imaginations, than others; but it is as certain that this difference is in general but very small, and that it is application and industry that form the grand difference among the generality of mankind.

(4) Every one is born with a sufficient degree of taste to distinguish himself from the vulgar, if he is not wanting in the cultivation of this faculty; for as, in the natural world, a weak constitution, if strengthened by exercise and temperance, will be fitter for labour than a strong constitution enervated by ill habits and dissipation; so it may with certainty be affirmed, that those who are born with but a small share of taste will, by cultivating and improving it, become much more remarkable for this desirable quality than those who are endowed by Nature with a greater share of it, and neglect such studies as tend to promote and refine it.

(3) Taste is only born with us, as memory and the other faculties of the mind are.

(4) The different degrees of taste we find in different persons are owing more to cultivation than to nature.

X.—ON PARENTAL AFFECTION.

(1) The love and tenderness which the parent bears to the child is the strongest and dearest tie in Nature. Providence has kindly implanted this passion in the parent's breast, out of love to the offspring; for, if this passion either did not exist, or existed in a less degree, the earth would soon be unpeopled, as nothing but the unremitting care of the parent can possibly preserve the life of the helpless infant.

(2) The parent, therefore, we see, is but an instrument in the hand of Providence; and it is to the

(1) Parental affection implanted by Providence for the preservation of the species.

(2) To God, therefore, the universal parent, we are indebted for parental affection.

Almighty Father of all things, the universal parent, we owe the love and tenderness we experience in our greatest need.

(3) Instances of the force of parental affection are innumerable: witness that of the Grecian father, who died for joy when he heard his son was conqueror in the Olympic Games; and that of Zaleucus, Prince of the Locrians, who, when his son had committed a crime for which the law condemned him to lose both his eyes, his father consented to lose one of his own, that one of his son's might be spared.

(4) Parental affection naturally leads our thoughts to that duty and gratitude which children owe their parents for the care and tenderness with which they have brought them up. This duty of children to parents was dignified by the Romans to an act of piety; and filial piety is always celebrated by the ancients as one of the noblest of the human virtues.

(5) Ingratitude in a child to a parent is so universally odious, that a thankless child has been

(3) Instances of the force of parental affection are innumerable.

(4) Parental affection shows the duty of filial affection.

(5) Ingratitude in a child to a parent the most odious of crimes.

detested in all ages and nations; for, if ingratitude to a common benefactor is justly deemed one of the blackest crimes, how black must be that ingratitude when that benefactor is a parent! As a grateful disposition, especially towards a parent, is a strong indication of a virtuous mind, so we cannot easily suppose that those who are ungrateful to parents can be grateful to others, or that their hearts can have that tenderness which is the basis of almost every other virtue.

XI.—ON GOOD MANNERS.

(1) A WRITER, who had great knowledge of mankind, has defined good manners to be the art of making those people easy with whom we converse; nor can this definition be much mended.

(2) The three sources of good manners are, good nature, humility, and good sense: so that any person who is endowed with these qualities will learn

(1) Good manners the art of making people easy.

(2) Good manners arise from humility, good nature, and good sense; and ill manners from the opposite qualities.

good manners with little or no teaching. On the contrary, ill manners arise from pride, ill nature, and a want of sense; and one who has these defects in his character, will generally be rude and ill-mannered.

(3) The ill qualities above-mentioned naturally tend to make people uneasy: pride assumes all the conversation to itself, and makes the company insignificant. Ill nature makes offensive reflections, which give pain to the hearers; and folly speaks whatever comes uppermost, without making any distinction of place, person, or occasion. But the qualities opposite to these as naturally tend to make people easy; humility seeks to lower itself, and give others the preference; good nature takes all occasions of lessening the faults of others, and avoiding whatever will give pain to any one present; and good sense will shew us the proper time and occasion for making any remarks which may be either instructive or entertaining.

(4) The importance of good manners is much

(3) The former qualities tend to make people easy, and the latter to make them uneasy.

(4) Good sense and integrity, if we are sure we possess them, will not make good manners unnecessary; the former being but seldom called out to action, but the latter continually.

greater than most young persons are apt to conceive. They imagine that if they have the more substantial qualities of good sense, learning, and integrity, good manners are of no great consequence, and may be easily dispensed with. But they should be told, that they ought to be very sure they have these good qualities before they despise good manners; and that, even if they have them, they will lose much of their value when connected with rudeness and ill-breeding: besides, their good sense, learning, and integrity, can only be known, and useful to a few persons, while their manners affect every one they converse with, and render them either agreeable or disagreeable to the whole world. So true is that excellent observation of Pope,

> Without good breeding truth is disapprov'd;
> That only makes superior sense belov'd.

XII.—ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD CHARACTER.

(1) To those who are to make their own way, either to wealth or honours, a good character is

(1) Every man is deeply interested in the character of those he associates with.

usually no less necessary than address and abilities. Though human nature is degenerate, yet it usually retains to the last an esteem for excellence. For even if we are arrived at such an extreme degree of depravity as to have lost our native reverence for virtue, yet a regard to our own interest and safety, which we seldom lose, will lead us to apply for aid, in all important transactions, to men whose integrity is unimpeached.

(2) When we have occasion for an attorney or a counsellor, a physician or an apothecary, whatever we may be ourselves, we always choose to trust our health and property to men of the best character. When we fix on the tradesmen who are to supply us with necessaries, we are not determined by their names elegantly engraved on a card, nor by a shop fitted up in the newest taste, but by the fairest reputation. Look into a daily newspaper, and you will see, from the highest to the lowest rank, how important are the characters of those who are employed to those who employ them. After the advertisement has enumerated the qualities required of the person wanted, there constantly follows, that

(2) When we wish to employ a physician, a lawyer, a tradesman, or a servant, the first thing we regard is his character.

none need apply who cannot bring an undeniable character.

(3) Young people, therefore, whose characters are unfixed, and who, consequently, may render them just such as they wish, ought to pay the greatest attention to the first step which they take on entrance into life. They are usually too careless and inattentive to this object. They think they see their own interest better than others, and flatter themselves that their youth will be an excuse for a thousand improprieties. By some thoughtless action or expression, they suffer a mark to be impressed upon them, which scarcely any subsequent merit can entirely erase. Every one will find some persons who, though they are not professed enemies, yet view him with an envious or a jealous eye, and will gladly revive any tale to which truth has given the slightest foundation.

The malevolence of mankind affords but too much reason for the beautiful but melancholy observation of Dryden:

> On eagles' wings immortal scandals fly,
> While virtuous actions are but born and die.

(3) Young people ought to be doubly careful of their character, as a false step in youth may sully their whole life.

XIII.—ON THE FOLLY OF INDULGING THE PASSION OF ANGER.

(1) As the command of our passions is the noblest exercise of our reason, it were to be wished that those who pretend to be reasonable creatures did not suffer the passion of anger so often to make them act like brutes. There never was a more absurd apology than that which is commonly made for passionate people, that they are the best-natured creatures in the world. It is true, when their anger is over, they are often heartily sorry for what they have done; but this is only defending them, by proving they are not quite demons, and that, though they are very absurd and injurious for a time, they are not always so: but this will be found to be but a poor excuse, when we consider that a moment's anger will often produce more mischief than whole years of good nature may be able to atone for.

(2) When once people have habituated themselves to the indulgence of this passion, it is not

(1) The absurd excuse for angry people, a proof of the folly and crime of anger.

(2) Anger, when indulged, often makes people do the most ridiculous things.

only their fellow-creatures that they injure by their violence: these furious folks will sometimes vent their rage on things inanimate; they will throw chairs or tables about the room, spoil pictures or break china, when it does not happen that a dog, a cat, or any other domestic animal, is at hand. In short, this sort of people are no more than overgrown testy children; and excite our pity as well as our sorrow, to see them act so much like ill-bred humoursome infants.

(3) The only apology these angry people make for themselves is, that they cannot help this sudden warmth, because it proceeds from constitution: but nothing can be more false than that anger is not to be suppressed; for it is observable, that they can and do restrain their passion when awed by respect, checked by interest, or intimidated by fear. Does a person ever give himself these violent airs in the presence of any one from whom he has great expectations of advantage? or do we ever see a person shew his anger before one of a very superior rank in life? No; it is generally a poor servant, or a meek-spirited dependent, that is the object of these fiery wretches' displeasure.

(3) Passionate people can restrain their anger before their superiors, therefore they can always do it.

(4) In short, of so much importance is it to youth in particular to suppress this passion, that those who know mankind will judge of every young person's good nature, not by his behaviour to his superiors or equals, but to his inferiors, his dependents, and servants.

XIV.—ON RESIGNATION UNDER AFFLICTION.

(1) Affliction is the common lot of human nature: no state of life, from first to last, is entirely exempt from it. The young, the old, and the middle-aged; the rich, the poor, and those who are neither in want nor abundance; the king, the peasant, and the trader, are alike subject to affliction. To alleviate affliction, therefore, seems an employment as rational as it is useful; for, as Mr. Addison observes, "Inquiries after happiness, and rules for "attaining it, are not so necessary and useful to "mankind as the arts of consolation and supporting "ourselves under affliction."

(4) The test of every man's good temper is his behaviour to his equals and inferiors.

(1) Affliction common to every age, state, and degree of mankind.

(2) In order to this, we ought to learn to accommodate ourselves to that portion of happiness which Heaven has set before us. If we would fully enjoy the relish of our being, we must rather consider the miseries we escape than too nicely examine the intrinsic worth of the happiness we possess. We should bring together every circumstance and every advantage we enjoy, and compare them with the miseries below us.

(3) But the principal reason why we ought not to give way to affliction arises from the consideration, that, as nothing happens without the permission of the Almighty, our fretting and grieving at the inevitable evils of life is no better than secretly arraigning the dispensations of Providence.

Alas! we little know what calamities we can bear till we try them: let us look back on what we have already endured, and be satisfied that the same Almighty power, which before was our aid, will likewise be our present support. Let us look on calamity as a providential shock, which awakens us to guard ourselves from some impending evil.

(2) To alleviate affliction, we ought to reflect how much more miserable we might be.

(3) The chief source of consolation ought to be, that all our afflictions are known and appointed by God.

(4) If our conscience tells us it is a punishment for some offence to God or our neighbour, let us bear it with resignation, and reform our conduct; if our conscience does not accuse us, we may be assured affliction is sent to us as a blessing, if we do but make a right use of it. For, as Shakspeare finely observes,

> Sweet are the uses of adversity;
> Which, like a toad, ugly and venomous,
> Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

XV.—ON THE EVILS OF PRIDE.

(1) TRANQUILLITY and cheerfulness, we are told by every moral writer (where guilt is out of the question), is in the power of every one. A heathen could tell us, that this most desirable treasure lies even at our feet; but that we either spurn it from us, or giddily stumble over it, while we eagerly try to grasp at bubbles beyond our reach.

(4) Afflictions are either punishments or trials. If the first, we ought to repent; if the last, to bear them with resignation.

(1) Tranquillity and cheerfulness, where there is no guilt, is in the power of every one.

(2) In order to obtain this inestimable blessing, which the excellent Mr. Addison calls the health of the soul, the first thing to be discovered is, what is that which excludes it; for as it is impossible that two contraries should inhabit the breast at once, we ought resolutely to drive out the aggressor. A small degree of reflection will soon discover that the chief enemy to tranquillity is pride. If we except poverty, bodily pain, and remorse, it will be easily seen, that every obstacle to serenity which can possibly be imagined springs from this unchristian vice. A curious observer will soon perceive that from this root proceeds envy, hatred, malice, tyranny, anger, revenge, ingratitude, profusion, and avarice: we may likewise trace the smaller vices of young minds, such as impertinence, loquacity, affectation, and obstinacy, to the same cause.

(3) But if this vice were less odious to God and to our fellow-creatures than it really is, the miseries it is sure to bring upon us might be a sufficient reason for guarding ourselves against it. Who can describe the secret pangs of heart which this vice produces?

(2) If we are unhappy, and inquire what it is that makes us so, we shall generally find it is pride.

(3) Men, for their own sakes, ought to avoid this vice, which naturally produces so many miseries.

Who can enumerate the disorders, plagues, and calamities, which, in every nation upon the earth, spring from this root? It were well if every thinking person would strictly examine his catalogue of vices, and ask his heart what resemblance they bear to the great and universal cause here assigned them. He would then easily discover, that, if he did but strenuously endeavour to banish pride, he would soon be free from most of those vices which are the torment of our own breasts and the plague of those about us.

XVI.—ON POLITENESS AND GOOD BREEDING.

(1) Though abundance of rules are laid down for acquiring that style of behaviour, and those modes of address, which are usually called polite and well bred; yet there is one plain rule worth all the rest, which is, that a person who pretends to the character and behaviour of a gentleman should do every thing with gentleness, in an easy, quiet,

(1) The first requisite in the behaviour of a gentleman is, to act with gentleness; as a forward, boisterous behaviour is diametrically opposite to that character.

friendly manner, which doubles the value of every word and action. A forward, noisy, importunate, overbearing way of talking, is the surest sign of ill-breeding; and hasty contradiction, unseasonable interruption of persons in their discourse, especially of elders or superiors; loud laughter, winkings, grimaces, and affected contortions of the body, are not only of low extraction in themselves, but are the natural symptoms of self-sufficiency and impertinence.

(2) The word *polite*, which signifies smooth or polished, is another proof of what we generally understand by good manners: a roughness and unevenness of behaviour is diametrically opposite to politeness, as a smooth, easy, and even address is agreeable to the original meaning of the word, when we say such a one is a polite or polished man.

(3) Good breeding, too, which is another word for good manners, is an admirable lesson to us on the necessity of cultivating politeness in our earliest youth; for when we call impropriety of behaviour ill-breeding, we seem to attribute it to the want of early instruction, which plainly intimates the neces-

(2) Politeness, which signifies a state of being smooth or polished, plainly indicates those manners we call polite.

(3) Good breeding intimates the necessity of early instruction.

sity of being trained early to good manners, if ever we hope to be esteemed well-bred.

(4) Thus we see that, by studying the original meaning of the names by which things are called, we shall generally arrive at a true knowledge of the things they signify; which may serve to shew us the importance of a rational knowledge of language, as by this knowledge we gain clear and precise ideas of those things which it is of the greatest consequence to us to be acquainted with.

XVII.—ON THE ADVANTAGES OF CULTIVATING A DISPOSITION TO BE PLEASED.

(1) By constantly looking on the bright side of every thing, we shall insensibly gain a habit of good nature and complacency, and not only improve our own happiness, but the happiness of all about us; while, on the contrary, by constantly brooding over

(4) The utility of a knowledge of the original signification of words, in order to comprehend their true meaning.

(1) As viewing things on the bright side begets cheerfulness, and on the dark side melancholy, our happiness depends much on the view we take of things.

the dark and dismal scenes of life, we insensibly contract a narrowness and melancholy; and as temporal happiness depends in a great measure on the most trivial circumstances, there is nothing more worthy our attention than the art of making these circumstances contribute to our comfort and gratification.

(2) A celebrated writer has observed, that there are few accidents in life so happy that the imprudent will not, by their misconduct, render of less advantage to them, and that there are seldom any events so unfortunate from which the prudent will not derive some benefit. Like the bee, therefore, we should endeavour to extract honey from the meanest weed, and not, like the spider, suck poison from the sweetest and most wholesome flower.

(3) A person who, either from nature or habit, has a disposition to be pleased, diffuses a kind of sunshine of happiness on all around him. Numberless pleasing topics occur to him, which are commonly overlooked by the rest of the world; such as the return of spring, the verdure of that

(2) The same accidents in life are very different to the prudent and the imprudent.

(3) A disposition to be pleased is delighted with those common beauties of nature which are overlooked by others.

sweet season, with the blossom of opening flowers, a bright sky, a moonlight night, with a hundred other nameless delights, which are daily present to a mind not corrupted with what Mr. Addison calls fantastical pleasures.

(4) In short, as a mind, undisciplined by religion, and ungrateful to Providence, can scarcely view any object with pleasure; so a mind naturally disposed to be happy, and inclined to make others so, not only increases the enjoyment of every agreeable incident in life, but, in some measure, makes even those that are disagreeable administer to its satisfaction and advantage.

XVIII.—A COMPARISON BETWEEN HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

(1) Among the many arguments advanced to recommend the study of history, it has been said

(4) As a discontented mind can scarcely view any object with pleasure, so a cheerful mind not only draws happiness from agreeable objects, but turns even those that are disagreeable to some kind of advantage.

(1) Both history and biography teach philosophy by example; but the example exhibited by biography is the most interesting.

that it teaches wisdom without the danger of experience; and, by pointing out the paths of those who have gone before us, facilitates the journey of life. Thus history has been called philosophy teaching by examples; and the same character may be drawn of biography, though upon a smaller scale; but, after all, it must be allowed that history is better calculated for regulating political than moral conduct. The descriptions of battles, the accounts of debates, the characters of kings and heroes, contain very little that can direct the actions of the private and the more numerous ranks in the community. But an exact and authentic account of individuals who have greatly excelled in any of the departments of active or contemplative life seems to be a mode of instruction best suited to an animal like man, prone to imitation, and fond of selecting particular characters and making them his models.

(2) When a single character is distinctly delineated, we can pursue the outline with an ease equal to that which the painter copies from the original picture placed before his eyes. We have the express authority of the pattern we have

(2) The single character of biography engages more of our attention than it would do if mixed with others equally conspicuous.

chosen to direct us in every emergency, and can tread with implicit confidence in the footsteps of the most distinguished men without the suspense of deliberate selection. It is a remark of Aristotle, that the story of an individual, as it is a single object, is comprehended more fully, and therefore attended to with greater pleasure, than a history in which many personages are introduced.

(3) To these observations in favour of biography it may be added, that our sympathy, when attached to a single person, becomes stronger than when scattered among a thousand individuals, which in history necessarily succeed each other, and claim a share of our attention. The interest, therefore, which we take in the fortunes of one character is much greater than when it is divided among several; and our virtuous affections are more exercised and strengthened by contemplating the life of one personage than of many mingled together.

(4) In the same manner it is by exercising our

(3) We form a friendship for a single character in biography, and our benevolent affections are the stronger for being fixed upon one.

(4) Universal benevolence sounds prettily; but it is particular benevolence only that proves our moral character.

benevolence on the individuals which we see and know, that the benevolent affections are strengthened and increased, and not by commiserating the miseries of multitudes which we have not the least knowledge of. Universal benevolence is a pretty philosophical notion, but it is particular benevolence only that will prove our moral character: as experience but too often shews us, that those who breathe the kindest spirit of philanthropy to nations at large, are not always the most benevolent and kind to their own families, friends, and acquaintance.

XIX.—ON NOVELS.

(1) Novels are, in general, the most insignificant and trifling of all literary performances: they are seldom any thing more than the cold productions of people who write for bread, with as much indifference as milliners make up caps,

(1) Most novels are either the flimsy productions of those who write for bread, or the offspring of vanity in the idle and illiterate, or poor imitations of some few that are really good.

without any materials worth communicating. Others are the offspring of idle young people, who are infected with the itch of writing from the contagion of reading them; and who put together a string of incidents not one degree above the tea-table, and of no more real concern than if they were to entertain us, as some tiresome people do, with an account of their dreams: and perhaps the greater part of them are but mean imitations, which affect the style and manner of more successful compositions that have gone before them.

(2) It were well if the reading of novels were nothing more than the loss of time; but young people will not escape so: it has generally a bad effect upon the mind, and, in some instances, a fatal one upon the morals and fortune. In novels, plays, and romances (for they have all the same general object, which is the amusement of idleness and folly), we are presented with false views of life, and deceitful pictures of the virtues and vices of mankind. The end is to please: and how is this end to be obtained? Nothing will please youthful vanity so much as the escaping from dangers incurred by our own imprudence, and

(2) Novels give us false views of life; they palliate the vices and follies of mankind, and discredit the sober virtues.

arriving at unexpected good fortune without our deserving it. Nothing will gratify the idle and romantic mind but such extraordinary adventures as never happen in real life; nor will any thing be so pleasing to the vicious part of mankind as a palliation of the fashionable vices, and sneering at the sober and respectable virtues. Novelists, therefore, and comic writers, who study popularity either for praise or profit, generally mix up vice with amiable qualities to cover and recommend it, while virtue is compounded with such ingredients as have a natural tendency to make it unpleasant and disgusting.

(3) But novels do not only corrupt the manners, but vitiate the taste of their readers; they fly above nature and reality; their characters are all overcharged, and their incidents overflow with improbabilities and absurdities. The imagination, thus fed with wind and flatulence, loses its relish for truth, and can bear nothing that is plain, simple, common, and natural: so that the reading of novels is to the mind what the drinking of strong liquors is to the body; the palate is vitiated, the stomach is weakened, the digestion is

(3) Novels vitiate the taste, as strong liquors vitiate the stomach and hurt the constitution.

spoiled, and life can be kept up only by that which is supernatural and violent. Nothing, therefore, can be more dangerous to the understanding, to the morals, and the taste, than an attachment to the reading of the generality of these fictitious productions. They glide into the heart through the imagination, and, under the taste of honey, often infuse the strongest poison.

XX.—ON CONTEMPLATION.

(1) CONTEMPLATION is one of the noblest employments of a rational creature. Directing and fixing the intellectual eye upon suitable objects, attended with proper reflections, is productive of the greatest advantages, as well as the most refined delights.

(2) By accustoming our minds to this employment, there is not an object in nature but must

(1) Rational contemplation both profitable and delightful.

(2) Contemplating the heavenly bodies raises our minds to adore the power and glory of the Deity; viewing the earth, with its various animals, excites us to admire his wisdom and benevolence; and the profusion of beautiful and salutary vegetables shews his superabundant goodness and condescension.

forcibly excite our admiration and gratitude to our heavenly Maker. Who can survey the starry heaven, as Milton expresses it, glowing with living sapphires, the sun flaming in the forehead of the morning sky, or the moon rising in clouded majesty, and not cry out with the holy Psalmist, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork!" When we look round us, and survey the earth on which we live, the various animals with which it is peopled, and the profusion of vegetables with which it is clothed and adorned, we are lost in astonishment, and are ready to exclaim in rapture, Great God! how sublime, how beautiful, how varied are thy works! Not the smallest blade of grass that trembles in the wind but loudly proclaims its great Creator; the radiated daisy, the lovely violet, the blooming rose, the stately elm, and the majestic oak, all, all declare with an united voice,—The hand that made us is divine.

(3) But if the beauties of Nature are thus capable of affording us such instruction and entertainment, what shall we think of those fashionable

(3) It is absurd to lose the beauties of Nature by always living in populous cities.

people who fly from these delightful scenes to the noisome air of a populous city, and stifle all reflection in the hurry and bustle of a court; who exchange the rural beauties of the fields and meadows, for the artificial glare of balls and assemblies? If these rivals to the beauties of Nature have the least pretence to engage our affections, it can only be when the face of Nature is deformed by the rigours of winter, and her beauties hid by chilling frosts and stormy skies; but even at these times the contemplative mind finds charms which attract its admiration. So true is Shakspeare's observation of such persons, who

> Find tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and good in every thing.

XXI.—ON GENEROSITY.

(1) GENEROSITY is such an attachment to the interest of others as leads us to sacrifice our own. The moment a person foregoes his right in favour of another, and grants him more than he can demand, that moment he becomes generous.

(1) Generosity is doing something more than we are obliged to do.

(2) The laws of nature and society have prescribed certain duties to every one who lives in the world: these laws require us to act justly and honestly to our fellow-creatures. It is in obedience to these laws that justice and honesty consist: but, however we may deserve praise when we fulfil these laws of society, this praise is only bestowed on us when we are compared with those who are dishonest or unjust, which is a mere negative praise; if we would gain the applause of the world for generosity, we must do more than is expected from us; we must, when we weigh our own interest, and that of others, give the turn of the scale against ourselves.

(3) Hence we may observe how truly generous is that perfect system of morals taught by our blessed Saviour, and how exactly conformable to the justest sentiments of human wisdom: "If ye "love them only who love you," says our Lord, "what reward have ye? But I say unto you, "love your enemies, bless them that curse you, "do good to them that hate you, and pray for

(2) We must do justice to escape the censure of the laws; but, to be generous, we must do something more than the laws require.

(3) Christian morality is true generosity.

"them who despitefully use you and persecute "you." This is real christian generosity; and it may be added, it is this only which the world looks upon to be truly generous.

(4) It is true, that generosity is sometimes ill requited; but the truly generous man looks to no return for his generosity, and therefore he is not disappointed if he bestows his favours upon an unworthy object. But, however degenerate mankind may be, perhaps it may be asserted with confidence, that generosity is seldom without a grateful return. Men do not often care to be outdone in generosity; and one generous action often produces another. We meet with frequent instances in history, of the good effects of a generous conduct towards an enemy; among these may be reckoned the treatment of the schoolmaster by Camillus, and the discovery of the treason of Pyrrhus's physician by Fabricius.

Upon the whole, therefore, we may conclude, that though generosity is sometimes ill requited, it is always respected and admired; and is sure to be accompanied with a self satisfaction, which, in some measure, makes amends for the want of a suitable return.

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(4) Generosity produces generosity.

XXII.—ON THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN POLITENESS AND RELIGION.

(1) It is a general opinion, that politeness and good manners have nothing to do with morals; that civility is a lighter sort of qualification, lying without the system of morality and christian duty, which a man may possess or not possess, and yet be a very good man.

(2) But if we attend to the best definition of good manners that ever has been given, we shall find civility of behaviour very nearly allied to religion: the definition I mean is, that which tells us that good manners is artificial benevolence. Now nothing can be more certain than that benevolence is one of the most essential duties of a Christian. If then good manners be a compliance with those external forms of behaviour which naturally express benevolence, it is, at the same time, an external compliance with one of the most essential duties of a Christian.

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(1) It is commonly supposed that politeness and religion have no relation to each other.

(2) If we attend to the definition of each we shall find them nearly allied.

(3) The apostle Paul has plainly comprehended what we call good manners in his well known description of charity, which signifies the benevolence or friendship of Christians; and is so similar to it, that no man can practise charity, in the christian sense of it, and be guilty of ill manners. Shew me the man, who, in his conversation, discovers no signs of being puffed up with pride, who neither envies nor censures, who is kind and patient towards his friends, and forgiving to his enemies; who does not seek his own, but considers others rather than himself, and gives them the preference: shew me such a man, I say, and he will not only be a good Christian, but, in the best sense of the word, he will be a real gentleman; he will be, in reality, what all artificial courtesy affects to be, a philanthropist, a friend to mankind.

(4) Christianity, therefore, is the best foundation of what we call good manners; and if, as is too often the case, we see persons practise great good manners without any real benevolence, we

(3) The rules of politeness express that benevolence artificially which the rules of religion require of us in reality.

(4) Polite persons, devoid of sincerity, are hypocrites in benevolence.

must rank them among hypocrites, who affect to be what they are not.

(5) But as it would be very improper to disregard religious ceremonies, because they are sometimes made use of by hypocrites to bad purposes; so it would be as improper to undervalue the external expressions of civility and benevolence, because some are void of that benevolence they are calculated to express. In short, the foundation of all politeness, as well as of all piety, is humility: an humble opinion of ourselves must appear in all our actions, if we wish to be pleasing, either to God or our fellow-creatures.

XXIII.—ON THE ART OF PLEASING IN CONVERSATION.

(1) As rational and elegant conversation is one of the highest and noblest entertainments of the human species, the desire of pleasing in conversation is, therefore, a very laudable passion.

(5) As hypocrites in religion ought not to lessen our regard for its ceremonies, so hypocrites in benevolence ought not to lessen our esteem for politeness.

(1) A desire to please in conversation is laudable.

(2) A too great desire to excel in so flattering an accomplishment has often a tendency to make us less agreeable than if we were quite careless about it. The desire of pleasing makes a man agreeable or unwelcome to those with whom he converses, according to the motive from which that inclination appears to flow. If your concern for pleasing others arises from innate benevolence, it never fails of success; if from a vanity to excel, its disappointment is no less certain. In this therefore, as well as in every other desirable accomplishment, we must be guided by the rules of good sense and prudence. These qualities will direct us, when we are in the company of those above us, to be humble without meanness; and, when we are with inferiors, to condescend without the appearance of pride. They will teach us, that the art of pleasing others rather consists in making them pleased with themselves than endeavouring to make them pleased with us.

(3) Good sense will shew us that we ought to seek out the favourite subject of our companions,

(2) If we desire to please others for their sakes, we shall generally succeed: if for our own sake, we shall generally fail.

(3) Good sense must shew us how we are to adapt our conversation to our company.

both as they are most likely to shine in that, and as they are usually best pleased with what they excel in; and prudence will dictate to us never to endeavour to show ourselves so superior to others as to make them ashamed of their inferiority.

(4) But, above all, we should be studious to obtain a justness of thinking and a propriety of expression: for, though this is not the whole of the art of pleasing, it is the basis of it. Good humour and condescension will, in time, be insipid without good sense; and though these qualities are powerful auxiliaries to good sense, and will often supply the want of it, yet if we wish to give solid and lasting pleasure in conversation, we must, as in all other composition, mix the useful with the agreeable, and shew that our conversation does not arise so much from a desire to please ourselves as a desire to be agreeable to others. This disposition is absolutely necessary to make our superiority agreeable, without being humiliating to our companions: for, as Pope very justly observes,

> Without good breeding, truth is disapprov'd,
> That only makes superior sense belov'd.

(4) Justness of thinking, and propriety of expression, the basis of the art of pleasing in conversation.

XXIV.—ON SYMPATHY AND BENEVOLENCE.

(1) AMONG all the moral virtues which at once adorn and delight the heart, those must surely be esteemed the first which awaken with our very existence, pass with us through life, and are designed to form a very material part of our fecility in a future state.

(2) What is it that guards our infancy, which is more helpless than that of the lowest order of created beings, satisfies its wants, gratifies its wishes, instructs its ignorance, and fosters its dawning reason? What is it that in childhood delights and amuses the fleeting hours, calls forth the little exertions of kind offices one towards another, and awakens the first symptoms of the soul of sympathy?

(3) What is it that in riper years forms all the blessings of friendship, that aids our endeavours, consoles our distresses, bears with our infirmities,

(1) Sympathy and benevolence constitute those finer feelings of the soul which at once support and adorn human nature.

(2) What is it that guards our helpless infancy, and instructs our childbood, but sympathy?

(3) What is it that performs all the kind offices of friendship in riper years but sympathy?

nor ceases till its last melancholy office has deposited us in the dust?—Ceases, did I say? I would not do it such wrong.

(4) No; with religious solicitude it then blesses our memory, and shields our good name from the attacks of envy and slander; and, by continuing its kindness to our offspring or connexions, becomes a perpetual blessing to us. What can afford these advantages, or rather necessaries, in a life of society, but that sympathy and benevolence which, being implanted in us by Providence, and forming a part of our nature, are among those faculties we are bound to cultivate and improve?

(5) How must that principle then debase and impoverish the mind which contracts its feelings within the narrow circle of its own concerns, and tends to stifle those generous sentiments which are so congenial to the soul? Can one with patience behold a man living only for himself, pleased only at his own prosperity, vulnerable only by his own calamity, industrious only to procure his own comfort, or to avoid his own misfortune? Can one behold

(4) What is it that consoles us in our last moments, and defends our character when dead, but sympathy?

(5) A person without sympathy, and living only for himself, is the basest and most odious of all characters.

such a character sickening at another's good, and not be filled with indignation? Devoted, as the world too much is to self-love, and estranged as it too much is from benevolence, no character of this kind ever passed through life with respect, or sunk into the grave with pity.

XXV.—ON THE ADVANTAGES OF A GOOD EDUCATION.

(1) EDUCATION, in its most limited sense, generally means that instruction we receive in youth by the study of grammar, rhetoric, and whatever relates to languages or composition; but in its more enlarged sense, it means that knowledge and those habits which we acquire by an early acquaintance with good authors, and a familiar intercourse with the polite and educated world. Education, therefore, taken in its whole extent, as it informs the mind and polishes the manners, may be considered as the most important object to every individual who would wish to be distinguished from the lowest orders of society.

(1) Education does not only consist in literary knowledge, but means the acquiring of such habits as form the character.

(2) If we look round the world, we shall find we are classed together more by our education than our birth or property. It is impossible that persons of good education and no education should be very agreeable companions: so that if fortune falls unexpectedly to an uneducated person, it is impossible he can enjoy it properly, because he cannot associate with those who have been well educated; while a person of moderate circumstances, and a good education, is an acceptable companion to those who are infinitely beyond him in fortune.

(3) Fortune may be left to us by our friends or relations; but education must be acquired by ourselves, or we must want it for ever. Fortune may be acquired at an advanced time of life; but if education is neglected in youth, the loss is almost always irretrievable. Thus when Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, wanted Archimedes to instruct him in geometry by an easier method than common, the Professor answered him, "May it please your "majesty, I know of no royal method of teaching "geometry."

(2) Men classed more by education than by birth and fortune.

(3) Fortune may come to us by others; education must be acquired by ourselves.

(4) The ancients are full of encomiums on a good education, and nothing appeared to be a greater object of their attention. Philip, king of Macedon, the greatest and wisest prince of his time, chose Aristotle, who for his great knowledge has been styled the prince of philosophers, to be tutor to his son; and the fame of his pupil, Alexander the Great, is no small proof of the influence this philosopher had on his fortune. It was, indeed, a question among the ancients, whether Alexander owed more to his father or to his tutor; and this question was generally decided in favour of the latter.

(5) In short, education may be styled the parent of the mind, since it is to that men owe the superiority they have over their fellow-creatures more than to any advantages of nature.

(6) These observations may teach us a very useful lesson. How forcibly does this superiority, which we derive from education, inculcate gratitude to

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(4) The ancients supposed Alexander more indebted to his tutor Aristotle than to his father Philip.

(5) The superiority of one man to another owing more to education than to nature.

(6) Education ought to inspire us with gratitude to our parents, and humility to those who have not had the advantage of it.

our parents, and humility to those who have not enjoyed our advantages! How does it teach us, that perhaps thousands who are employed in the lowest and most degrading offices of life would have been our superiors, if they had received our education! How beautifully has Gray illustrated this thought, where he says, speaking of the poor,—

But knowledge to their eyes her ample page,
Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll:
Chill penury repressed their noble rage,
And froze the genial current of the soul.

Full many a gem of purest ray serene,
The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear:
Full many a flow'r is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.

Elegy in a Country Churchyard.

XXVI.—OF THE EFFECTS OF LEARNING ON THE COUNTENANCE.

(1) The most attractive beauty of the person results from the graces of the mind. Innocence,

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(1) A fine mind appearing in the countenance superior to a fine set of features.

delicacy, sweetness, sense, and sensibility, appearing in the eyes, will more than compensate for an irregularity of features, and will sooner excite affection in a feeling heart, than the best-formed face and the finest complexion, without such expression as indicates a beautiful mind and an amiable disposition.

(2) Nature must indeed have laid the foundation of these amiable qualities in the heart; but they are by no means so effectually called forth and improved as by the cultivation of a literary taste; for, however degenerate the world may be, the best books in every department of learning are still virtuous.—Human nature appears in them in its most pleasing colours: they inspire noble, generous, and benevolent sentiments. He who is conversant with them will find his countenance improving as his mind is informed, and his look ennobled and refined as his heart is elevated. This must be a powerful motive with those who wish to appear lovely, as they may rest assured that the mind receives no real embellishment without communicating a certain portion of it to the face.

(2) A taste for polite literature calculated to give a sweetness to the countenance.

(3) But the most essential rule for adding to the beauty of the countenance is to be careful to improve and cultivate the heart. It has been often remarked that the predominant passion of every individual may be discovered in the face. However this may be, certain it is, that whatever passion takes possession of the mind for any considerable time, with that passion the countenance will be tinctured even after the occasion of it has subsided. Thus, the death of a dear friend will give a gloom to the aspect, which only wears off by slow degrees; and any joyful event will be seen in the face for some time after it has happened. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that a disposition which is always in the heart will shew itself in the face, and that those who wish to have a lovely countenance ought above all things to be careful to have an amiable mind.

(3) The mind is in some degree always visible in the face, and therefore those who wish to have a fine countenance ought to cultivate those virtues which are the real ornament of human characters.

XXVII.—ON THE PASSIONS.

Passions are strong emotions of the mind, occasioned by the view of approaching good or evil.

(1) These emotions are planted in man by Providence, in order to give him activity, and fit him for society. Without any thing to hope or fear, life would not only be insipid, but a burden. With the amiable and virtuous passions we are sometimes more than human creatures, and with violent and ungovernable passions we are monsters and brutes. Passions, therefore, are the very stamina of our natures, the foundation-stones on which our moral character is built.

(2) A man indifferent to good or evil, pleasure or pain, is a character which existed no where but in the school of Zeno. The virtuous man of the Stoics is exactly in the situation of a ship in a calm; while the libertine of Epicurus is like a vessel in a violent tempest, every moment in danger of being

(1) The passions are implanted in us for the most useful purposes, those of activity and benevolence.

(2) No necessity of guarding against an absence of the passions, but against a predominance of them.

sunk by the vehemence of his passions. The apathy of the Stoics is an extreme against which we have no great occasion to guard. The directing of our passions to improper objects, or suffering them to hurry us away with them, is the great danger in human life. "What is history," says an ingenious critic, "but a catalogue of the miseries brought "upon mankind by an improper indulgence of their "passions?"

(3) But if this be so, how ought it to be the constant business of rational creatures to regulate and chastise these internal tyrants! how carefully ought they to guard against yielding to their first impulses! and how ought all our education to be directed to a proper government of our passions!

(4) Nothing will so effectually contribute to this as a proper sense of religion. "Christianity," as Hannah More admirably observes, "changes our "anger against the persons we dislike into a hatred "of their sins. 'The fear of man which worketh "a snare,' she transmutes into 'that fear of God "which worketh salvation.' Thus, by some of "the most rebellious passions of our nature being

(3) Governing the passions the most important part of education.

(4) Religion the best guard and guide of the passions.

"converted, by the blessing of God on a religious "education, to the side of virtue, a double purpose "is effected; if they are no longer rebels, they be- "come auxiliaries; and a foe subdued is an ally "obtained: for it is the effect of religion on the "passions, that, when she seizes the enemy's gar- "rison, she does not destroy the works; she does "not burn the arsenal, and spike the cannon; but "the artillery she seizes she turns to her own use, "and plants its whole force against the enemy "from whom she has taken it.

"Thus," says this admirable writer, "what our "late improvements in natural science have done "in the medical world, by converting the most "deadly ingredients into medicines of life and "health, Christianity, with a sort of divine alchy- "my, has effected in the moral world, by that "transmutation which makes those passions which "have been working for sin become active in the "cause of religion."

XXVIII.—ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FASHION AND BEAUTY.

(1) Fashion may be called the deity of the polite world. Its influence is irresistible, and its power seems capable of altering the nature of things. By the magic power of this goddess, the most absurd and ridiculous things become decent and suitable, and the most graceful and proper are changed to the most uncouth and disgusting. How vulgar and unseemly does a small hat appear when it is the fashion to wear large ones! and how soon are we reconciled to the greatest oddities of dress when they are once in vogue!

(2) But is the nature of things really altered by fashion? Is there no difference between the most extravagant absurdity and the most elegant propriety of dress but what is owing to the mode in use? Are all fashions equally becoming; and is

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(1) Fashion reconciles us to the greatest oddities and extravagances.

(2) If there be not a beauty in dress independent of fashion, it is absurd to call one fashion prettier than another.

there no such thing as a pretty fashion or an ugly fashion? If not, it is absurd to make use of the phrase: but the very use of it shews to a demonstration, that some things are pretty or ugly independent of the fashion: how then shall we reconcile these seeming contradictions?

(3) By considering the nature of custom: it is the property of custom to reconcile us to the most disagreeable things; the habits and manners of the most distant nations become familiar by living among them, and we no longer perceive the oddity which at first excited our laughter. No wonder, therefore, that in our own country we should soon be reconciled to the oddities of fashion; and, when once this is the case, we approve of it for another reason. The young, the handsome, the witty, and the rich, are generally in the fashion: while the old, the homely, the morose, and the poor, are out of it; and thus the fashion, by the laws of association, contracts a beauty and propriety which does not really belong to it, but to the persons who adopt it; and we admire the fashion, not for its own sake, but for the sake of those who follow it; for when

(3) The power of custom is that which makes us always think the present fashion pretty, and this power of custom is strengthened by the power of association.

once these people alter their dress, the beauty we saw in the last fashion immediately disappears, and instead of adorning the person, seems to disgrace it.

(4) For this reason painters frequently dress their pictures in a habit not subject to the changes of fashion, as the finest figure makes an odd appearance in an antiquated dress; but when the present fashion is out of the question, and we compare the several old fashions, or the fashions of several countries, then we can pronounce upon the beauty or ugliness of the fashions; which shews we think there is a beauty and ugliness, a propriety and impropriety, entirely independent of fashion.

XXIX.—SOLITUDE.

(1) Solitude and retirement are what most people affect to admire, and what few can support.

(4) That the beauty of dress is dependent on fashion appears from the practice of painters and the dresses of foreign nations.

(1) Solitude much admired by those who have never experienced it, and seldom approved by those who have, as many have been obliged to quit it and return to the world.

When we are immersed in business, fatigued with company, or vexed with the cross accidents of life, we sigh for solitude, and are apt to cry out "How "happy are those who are free from the fetters of "society and the cares of the world! who, in some "rural retreat, enjoy their own reflections, undis- "turbed by the impertinent visits and restless impor- "tunity of the votaries of business, pleasure, or dissi- "pation!" These wishes, however, arise from the mere pressure of the moment: experience furnishes us with a thousand examples of men sick of business or surfeited with pleasure, who, after eagerly running to solitude as the summit of happiness, have in a little time found it the abyss of misery, and have been forced to return back to the world they so much decried, for a shelter from the horrors and fatigues of retirement.

(2) The reason of this disappointment is obvious: man is a creature of habit; habits and customs form a part of his nature, and, without doing violence to his nature, he cannot fly from one extreme to another; he cannot instantaneously quit all his social companions and usual occupations, and fly

(2) The reason why solitude is generally intolerable to those who have been in busy life, is, that habits are not easily changed.

to solitude and retirement, without feeling such a void in his mind as must be almost insupportable; for, as a man must either be employed or be miserable, a total want of employment is a state of unhappiness.

(3) Employment may be considered of two kinds, active and passive: active employment is that where the mind or body is engaged in accomplishing some performance which demands so much of attention as to prevent the least languor or satiety. Passive employment is that where the mind is employed only in receiving the various impressions made on it by transient objects, without any exertion of its own: as in the sight of a dramatic performance, or the view of various objects continually passing before the eye.

(4) The employment of the greatest part of the polite world is of this kind: they are employed without being active; and when they are in situations which deprive them of the objects of amusement, to which they have been so long accustomed,

(3) The mind must be employed either actively or passively, or be miserable.

(4) The generality of the gay world are used only to passive employment, which solitude deprives them of.

they languish and pine for the want of them, because their minds are incapable of any active exertions.

(5) In the same manner, those whose minds have been actively employed in the pursuit of any particular object, when that object is gained, they find the same want of employment as the idle and inactive, and become equally a burden to themselves.

(6) If, therefore, we resolve upon solitude and retirement, we must also resolve upon some pursuit, either bodily or mental, which will employ our time, or our seclusion from society will be intolerable: so true is the observation of a celebrated writer of the present day,*—"That it is the active mind "alone which can bear retirement and solitude."

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(5) The busy world, when deprived of their active employment, generally find a vacancy they are unable to fill up.

(6) If we wish to enjoy solitude, we must find employment in it either for the body or the mind.

* Knox.

XXX.—ON GENIUS.

(1) GENIUS may be defined the power of invention: it is that faculty of the soul which penetrates into the deepest recesses of nature, and produces either new ideas or new combinations of ideas, which at once please and astonish mankind.

(2) It is a general opinion, that those who have a genius given them by nature have at the same time a natural propensity to employ their genius on some particular subject. However difficult it may be to conceive such a natural propensity without recurring to the exploded doctrine of innate ideas, yet a great number of very striking examples tend to make this opinion probable. Clavius, mentioned in the Spectator, who was incapable of every study but the mathematics; and the celebrated actor, Garrick,* who, though passionately fond of music and drawing, tried in vain to learn them; are remarkable instances of this innate propensity.

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(1) Genius is the power of invention.

(2) The common opinion, that people are born to excel in some art, very probable.

* This I had from Mr. Garrick's own mouth.

(3) But, whether we are adapted by nature to peculiar studies or not, certain it is that a passion for any study is not always an infallible proof of a power to excel in it. There is scarcely any propensity so general in youth as drawing: this art seems the first for which the young mind feels a passion, and this passion is often mistaken by parents for genius. An inseparable companion of genius it certainly is, as none ever excelled in any art without some degree of passion for it; but it is by no means the test of genius, otherwise every one who desires to become a good painter would infallibly be one.

(4) The truth is, man is an imitative animal; imitation is natural to him: and, as visible objects are those which strike youth most powerfully, they naturally become the first objects of imitation; but merely to imitate beauties, however uncommon the talent may be to excel in this imitation, has never been looked upon as genius. A genius must, indeed, ever be capable of imitating the beauties he views, but his imagination will always incite him to conceive something more excellent than any thing he has yet seen, and this persuasion will urge him

(3) A passion for an art not always a sign of genius for it.

(4) Imitation, however excellent, does not arise to genius.

to produce something new; while the mere imitator conceives nothing beyond his original, and, therefore, though he produces a perfect similitude, is entitled only to a small share of praise.

(5) Hence a common painter may draw an exact likeness; but only a good one can draw an agreeable one: he sees shades of character and glances of aspect half issuing to the view, which the mere imitator is totally unconscious of; and his imagination gives these shades and aspects their happiest hue, which, like transparency to colours, adds to their brilliancy without altering their nature.

(6) Upon the whole therefore, we may conclude, that a passion for painting is a strong indication of a taste for the art, but no certain proof of a genius for it; as the former faculty is employed only on what has been before produced, the latter in producing something new and original.

(5) A painter of genius does not draw a servile, but a happy likeness.

(6) A passion for an art an indication of a taste, but not of a genius for it.

XXXI.—ON A LOVE OF ORDER.

(1) A LOVE of order is a love of beauty, harmony, and propriety: it is that taste which admires the beauty and regularity of the motion of the heavenly bodies, of the various productions of the animal and vegetable worlds, and of those laws of the moral world which make it every man's interest to do unto others as he would they should do unto him, and, by this means, to promote the order and happiness of society.

(2) A love of order is not confined to philosophical speculation, but shews itself in all the various transactions of life. It appears in the regulation of our expenses, in the distribution of our time, in the choice of our companions, and in our very amusements themselves. A lover of order will not suffer his expenses to be greater than his income, as that would necessarily produce disorder in his fortune,

(1) A love of order is a love of beauty, propriety, and harmony, in the celestial and terrestrial, and the moral, worlds.

(2) A love of order appears in the regulation of our expenses, in the spending of our time, in the choice of our company, and in our very amusements.

and bring him into poverty and contempt. He will not be generous before he is just, as he will plainly perceive the disorder of such conduct, and that such generosity is contrary to the nature of things, which tells us that we have no right to give away what is not our own.

A lover of order will perceive that, by a proper distribution of his time, and a regular employment of it, he will perform every thing with more ease, and avoid confusion and perplexity in his affairs. He will not put off till to-morrow what ought to be done to-day, as that will be presuming too much on the future, and be loading the morrow with a burden which he does not know it will be able to bear; and if it will not, disorder and disappointment must be the consequence.

A lover of order will be particularly careful to keep company with such as are lovers of order like himself; he will see the impropriety of associating with such as are either much below or much above him, and will be convinced how impossible it is for persons of very different characters, sentiments, and situations in life, to live long in harmony together.

He will, in the last place, observe order in his amusements: he will perceive that there is a season for every thing; and that diversion and relaxation ought not to exclude attention to things of higher

moment, as this would be sure to produce disorder of the worst kind.

(3) Nay, he will delight in order in the most trifling concerns: he will love to see his books, his papers, his clothes, and every thing that belongs to him, in order; and this love of order, or taste for what is right, will make him disgusted with whatever is disorderly, or out of its proper place: and we may therefore conclude, that a love of order will induce us to pursue whatever is just and decorous in life, and to avoid whatever is unjust, irregular, and disorderly.

XXXII.—ON AFFECTATION.

(1) Affectation is apparent hypocrisy. It is the assuming of a character, qualification, or accomplishment, which every one perceives is not our own. It is acting a part so injudiciously, that we impose on nobody but ourselves.

(3) A love of order will appear in the most trifling concerns, as the state of our books, our papers, our clothes, and every thing that belongs to us.

(1) Affectation is apparent hypocrisy.

(2) This disagreeable style of manners has its origin in the love of fame, the universal passion, as Dr. Young calls it; and this passion is at the bottom nothing but the vanity of appearing something better than we really are.

(3) If this be a true account of affectation, it is no wonder it is held in such universal contempt. As we naturally love truth, whatever endeavours to impose upon us must be offensive: our pride is too apt to be hurt at the praises we hear bestowed on the truly deserving; and this naturally makes us jealous of others, lest they should gain approbation by false pretences; so that every one is the natural enemy of him who is affected and artificial.

(4) But nothing can show the odious nature of this quality in a stronger light than a contrast with the beauties of its opposite qualities, simplicity. As affectation disgusts us by wearing a disguise, which every one sees through; simplicity pleases us, by

(2) It has its origin in vanity.

(3) Affectation hurts the pride of others, either by endeavouring to impose upon them, or excel them, and therefore makes them its enemy.

(4) Nothing more exposes affectation than contrasting it with its opposite. As affectation wears a disguise, is a double character, and creates suspicion; simplicity is what it appears to be, has a unity of character, and creates confidence.

shewing us at once that it is what it appears to be. In the former there is a duplicity of character, that which is natural, and that which is assumed; in the latter there is unity of character, and that perfectly natural and undisguised; the one creates suspicion, by endeavouring to impose on us; the other excites confidence, by its appearing totally devoid of art.

(5) The folly of affectation is still greater when we reflect on the little we can gain by it, and the loss we are sure to sustain. By endeavouring to shine in borrowed robes for a moment, we incur the disgrace of poverty and contempt for our whole lives. The abilities we really possess, however mean, if honestly exercised, will be sure to gain us a proper degree of respect; while those which we only counterfeit will not bear examination, and, when examined, will certainly expose us to derision.

(6) In short, as Dr. Johnson excellently illustrates this subject, the possessor of humble virtues, when compared with him who affects greater excellences than he is entitled to, is like a small

(5) Affectation is a folly by which we gain nothing but contempt.

(6) An affected character aptly compared to a palace built of ice.

cottage of stone to the palace raised with ice by the Empress of Russia; it was for a while splendid and luminous, but the first sunshine melted it to nothing.

(7) Young people, therefore, who are the most liable to be seduced into affectation, should be the most careful to guard against it. Simplicity and artlessness, as they are the most natural to youth, are its greatest ornaments; but, if once affectation takes possession of the character, it will be sure to tarnish it, and render even youth, beauty, and every commendable quality, disgusting and contemptible.

XXXIII.—ON THE EVILS OF OBSTINACY.

Obstinacy is a pertinacious and stubborn perseverance in any opinion or course of action we have once adopted, however absurd and destructive in its consequences.

(1) This unhappy error often arises from a strong desire of appearing consistent, and a shame of acknowledging ourselves to be in the wrong.

(7) Affectation tarnishes the most shining qualities.

(1) Obstinacy assumes the semblance of a virtue.

It is one of those vices which cheat us with a semblance of virtue. Its opposite disposition, versatility, is so contemptible, and constancy, which it resembles, is so laudable, that it is no wonder that even well-disposed minds have not courage enough to change for the better, and, for fear of appearing inconstant, become obstinate.

(2) Thus the most common foundation of obstinacy is pride. When we are conscious of having no real good qualities to value ourselves upon, we are willing to catch at the shadow of one. This is a fault which may be traced through the several stages of life; from the boy at school to the miser on his death-bed. How often do we find a boy, of good dispositions in other respects, continue obstinate under the lash, because he is ashamed of being thought cowardly and inconsistent! How frequently do we meet with young people inflexible under reproof, and obstinately reject the advice of their friends, because altering their course would imply their inferiority! What more common than to see men, who have adopted a false opinion, defend the cause they have once taken up with the

(2) Obstinacy, under the disguise of steadiness, the vice of every stage of life.

weakest and most frivolous arguments rather than yield to conviction, because this would destroy their self-sufficiency; and when obstinacy has accompanied a man through the former stages of life it cannot be expected it should quit him in age, when the mind is apt to grow as rigid and inflexible as the body: and, accordingly, we too frequently find a dying father continue obstinate against the remonstrances of his friends, and disinherit his nearest and dearest relations, because he will not be thought weak and feeble-minded.

(3) Thus pride and self-sufficiency cheat us through life, and we become dupes to our own blindness, in supposing that others do not see our weakness, because we ourselves refuse to acknowledge it. In short, truth, and nothing but truth, is what we ought obstinately to adhere to; for if we are obstinately attached to error, as sure as truth and falsehood are different things, our misfortunes in life will be in exact proportion to our obstinacy.

(3) Truth alone can make obstinacy laudable.

XXXIV.—ON INDEPENDENCE.

(1) INDEPENDENCE, in the largest and most unlimited sense, is, to created beings, a state impossible. No being is perfectly independent but the one Supreme Being: all other beings, by their very nature, are dependent, in the first place, on their Creator, and in the second on their fellow-creatures; from whose good-will and assistance they derive their chief happinesss.

(2) This dependence, however, consists in a mutual interchange of good offices; in such a suitable return of favours received as makes each party obliged to the other, and at the same time leaves each other independent. This kind of dependence we find in different countries that trade in commodities which are necessary to both; by which means they become useful, but not indebted, to each other.

(3) But the most general sense of independence

(1) No being perfectly independent but God.

(2) The dependence created by trade a kind of independence.

(3) Pecuniary dependence the most humiliating of any.

is that of property. The circulating medium called money, and which is the representative of almost everything we wish, has in it something so sacred, that we can never receive it gratuitously without losing our dignity, and becoming dependent. We may ask for favours of another kind, and though they are granted to us, we are not degraded; but if once we ask a pecuniary favour, we lose our independence, and become enslaved. No more can we converse with our creditor on the same equal terms we did before: no more can we contradict his opinion, and assert our own: a conscious inferiority has deprived us of freedom, and we are the slave of him who was formerly our equal.

(4) But the most deplorable part of this picture is that dependence not only enslaves the mind, but tends to deprave the heart. We feel ourselves degraded by receiving pecuniary favours, and, conscious of what our creditor must think of us, when we cannot return them, we are apt to view him with an eye of jealousy and distaste; and thus insensibly become guilty of one of the worst of crimes, ingratitude.

(4) Pecuniary dependence naturally degrades the mind and depraves the heart.

(5) Young people, who know but little either of themselves or the world, are apt to think such pictures of human nature misanthropical. They are, however, such as have been drawn by the experience of all ages and nations, and concur with several other traits to show us the natural depravity of man. If, therefore, we wish to preserve ourselves independent; if we wish to maintain a proper dignity of character and freedom of opinion; if we desire, above all things, to preserve ourselves from that depravity of heart which we are so apt to slide into when we cannot pay our debts; let us beware of borrowing money: for, as our immortal Shakspeare says,

> A loan oft loseth both itself and friend,
> And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.

XXXV.—ON DELICACY OF PASSION.

(1) Some people are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, which makes them extremely sensible to

(5) Young people ought to be particularly careful to avoid pecuniary dependence.

(1) People of great delicacy of passion are apt to be extremely overjoyed or mortified at the agreeable or disagreeable accidents of life.

all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief when they meet with any strokes of adversity. Favours and good offices easily engage their friendship, while the smallest injury provokes their resentment. Any honour or mark of distinction elevates them above measure; but they are as sensibly touched with contempt.

(2) People of this character have no doubt much more lively enjoyments, as well as more pungent sorrows, than men of cool and sedate tempers; but when every thing is balanced, perhaps there is not one, were he entirely master of his own disposition, who would not rather choose to be of the latter than the former character.

(3) Good or ill fortune is very little at our own disposal; and, when a person that has this sensibility of temper meets with any misfortune, his sorrow or resentment takes entire possession of him, and deprives him of all relish for the common occurrences of life; the right enjoyment of which forms

(2) People of this class less happy than those that have less delicacy.

(3) Occasions of pleasure much less frequent than those of pain, and, therefore, people of a delicacy of feeling more subject to be unhappy.

the greatest part of our happiness. Great pleasures are much less frequent than great pains; so that a sensible temper must meet with fewer trials in the former way than in the latter; not to mention that men of such lively passions are apt to be transported beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable.

(4) In short, the happiness of life consists neither in extreme delicacy of passion nor in a total want of feeling, but in such a moderate degree of sensibility as will entitle us to the sympathy of the rest of the world: for it is very remarkable that, when either our joy or grief is in extreme, we have not so much congratulation or pity as when we bear our good or ill fortune with temper and moderation.

XXXVI.—DELICACY OF TASTE NOT SO DANGEROUS AS DELICACY OF PASSION.

(1) There is a delicacy of taste observable in some men which very nearly resembles a delicacy

(4) Happiness consists in the medium; in that state of mind in which the rest of the world can sympathize with us.
(1) Delicacy of taste very similar to delicacy of passion.

of passion, and produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries.

(2) When you present a poem or a picture to a man of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be touched very sensibly with every part of it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more exquisite relish and satisfaction than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and uneasiness. A polite and judicious conversation affords him the highest entertainment; rudeness or impertinence is as great a punishment to him. In short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion: it enlarges the sphere both of happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well as pleasures which escape the rest of mankind.

(3) But, notwithstanding this resemblance, perhaps there is no one who will not acknowledge a delicacy of passion is to be lamented and to be

(2) Delicacy of taste is charmed with the beauties of poetry, painting, and music, and as much disgusted with their imperfections.
(3) As delicacy of passion is attended with more pain than pleasure, because we cannot command the accidents of life; so delicacy of taste is attended with more pleasure than pain, because we can choose to peruse what pleases us.

remedied, while a delicacy of taste ought to be cultivated and improved; for, as the good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal, a delicacy of passion will expose us to a thousand mortifications: but as we are pretty much masters of what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what company we shall keep, we can find a thousand opportunites of gratifying our taste.

(4) Philosophers have endeavoured to render happiness entirely independent on every thing external. Such a happiness is impossible to be attained in this life: but every wise man will endeavour to place his happiness on such objects as depend most upon himself, and *that* is not obtained so much by any other means as by this delicacy of sentiment. When a man is possessed of this talent, he is more happy by what pleases his taste than by what gratifies his appetites; and receives more enjoyment from a poem, or a piece of reasoning, than from the most expensive gratifications of luxury.

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(4) Delicacy of taste places much of our happiness in our own power.

HINTS

FOR CORRECTING AND IMPROVING JUVENILE COMPOSITION.

THE method of correcting and improving composition, which is here offered to the Teacher, is that which is required for the examination and amendment of the Exercises in English which are given to the pupil in the foregoing treatise. Exercises of this kind are so little attended to in the generality of schools, and, where they are attended to, are so immethodically conducted, that teachers themselves, though very able in other respects, yet, in this part of learning, often stand in need of assistance as well as pupils. The assistance, therefore, which, with great deference, I would propose, is that which is the result of my own practice; and, in offering this, I would rather be supposed to relate my own method than be considered as dictating it

to others. For my part I am indebted both to the learned and the unlearned. I have received valuable hints from those whom I have had the vanity to think much below me in point of intellect; and this has induced me to conclude that others, who are in some respects much my superiors, may receive useful hints from me. I shall, therefore, without further apology, proceed to give such observations on the correcting and improving of exercises as I have made use of, and I hope not without some success.

When the pupil brings his exercise to be examined he should be ordered to read it from the beginning to the end without interruption. The teacher should then read over the first sentence himself, and show the pupil where he has erred, either in the thought, the structure of the sentence, the grammar of it, or the choice of words. Every alteration, as was observed in the introduction, should differ as little as possible from what the pupil has written, because giving an entire new cast to the thought and expression, will lead him into an unknown path not easy to follow, and divert his mind from that original line of thinking which was natural to him. Thus in the Theme, *Make no more Haste than good Speed,* the proposition is little more than an amplification of the title, namely,—

"Nothing can be more unfavourable to expe-"dition than too much haste, hurry, and precipi-"tation." Instead of which the pupil's proposition is,—*It may be well said, that in making too much haste we lose our time; for nothing can be more absurd than to hurry over a thing, and do it in an improper and bungling manner.*

Here is an inference drawn as a reason for not hurrying, which contains no reason at all; but only says, it is absurd to make too much haste; and therefore the thought is not quite correct; but as correcting the thought might too much alter it, and diversify it too much from the pupil's own conception, it would be more advisable, in my opinion, to improve the proposition, than entirely to change it, in this manner:—*It may be said, that, in endeavouring to gain time by making too much haste, we lose time; for nothing can be more unfavourable to business than to hurry it over, and to do it in an improper and bungling manner.*

In the next Theme,

'Tis ill playing with edged Tools,

the proposition is—"As nothing is more dangerous "than sporting with those instruments which have "sharp points and keen edges, so nothing is more "perilous than trifling with those follies that border

" upon vices which wound the character and hurt
" the morals."

The pupil's proposition is,—*It is very dangerous playing with sharp-pointed instruments. We play with them, thinking they can do us no harm; and so it is with vice: for at first we behold it at a distance; it draws nearer and nearer, till at last we become so used to it that we do not look at it with that horror that we ought to do.*

Here, without altering the pupil's thought too much, it will be easy to reduce the proposition to its original form by corresponding conjunctions:—

As it is very dangerous to play with sharp-pointed instruments, thinking they can do us no harm; so it is equally dangerous to trifle with vice: for though at first we view it at a distance, and seem to be out of its reach, it draws nearer and nearer, till at last we become so used to it that we do not look at it with that horror that we ought to do.

This is a short specimen of the manner in which I have corrected themes; and which I submit to the judgment of the teacher. I shall next endeavour to lay down some rules and examples for correcting and improving this species of composition, and leave to the teacher's discernment the use he is to make of them.

ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF A SUBJECT.

In beginning to write on a subject, and especially when we wish to prove a truth by a series of arguments, we may commence with some short maxim or self-evident truth, and follow it by observations gradually longer, so as to form a sort of climax in the members of the sentence, by making the latter longer than those that preceded —somewhat in the manner following:—

ON GOVERNMENT.

Government is the soul of society: it is that order and arrangement among rational creatures from which they derive almost all the benefits they enjoy: it is that active and vivifying principle which, while it directs the powers of men to useful and beneficial purposes, restrains them from such exertions as are noxious or hurtful, &c. &c. &c.

ON TAUTOLOGY.

It is an excellent general rule, that the same word should, as seldom as possible, be repeated; but the affectation of varying the word when the same idea recurs should be almost as carefully avoided. As there are no perfect synonyms, and

but one bare word to be made use of on one particular occasion, so if we vary the word when the same idea presents itself, we shall want in precision what we gain in sound. But as every one can perceive a tautology of words, and but a few a tautology of ideas; or, in other words, as every one is a judge of the sameness of sound in the repeating of words, and but few are judges of the precise sense of them, a tautology of ideas in different words will always be the more pardonable of the two.

We have a remarkable instance of this superstitious avoidance of tautology in the following passage, from the Preface to Richardson's Specimen of Persian Poetry:—

"That the languages of a country where a man "resides, and with whose natives he has much "intercourse, are highly important to him, is a "position unnecessary to be enforced, because "universally admitted. Nor is the conclusion less "obvious, that if such knowledge is to the highest "degree useful to individuals, how much more "consequential must it be to the representatives of "a great commercial body?"

Here, to avoid the repetition of the word *important* in the first sentence, we find the writer has adopted the word *consequential* in the second;

a word never used by good authors in the sense of *important;* and if it had been so used, yet, without any disagreeable repetition to the ear, it would, by preserving the original phrase, have preserved the unity of idea better than another word.

But there are occasions in which avoiding repetition, and diversifying the expression, though the thought may be the same, is not only allowable, but elegant.

Thus when Mr. Addison says,—"The wise man "is happy when he gains his own approbation; "the fool, when he recommends himself to the "applause of those about him:"—we find the repetition of the word *approbation* avoided in the last member of the sentence, though the very same idea occurs as in the first.

The same observation is applicable to the following sentence: "A friend exaggerates a man's "virtues; an enemy inflames his crimes." These sentences, says a judicious commentator, would exhibit the opposition in the thought stronger if they were written,—"The wise man is happy when "he gains his own approbation; the fool when he "gains that of others." "A friend exaggerates a "man's virtues; an enemy, his crimes."

On this criticism on Mr. Addison it may be observed, that when precision is the object, when we

wish to convey an obscure thought clearly, or a strong one forcibly, the latter turn of these sentences is preferable to the former; but when the thought is sufficiently clear, and as strong as is necessary, the structure and variety of the sentence seem to be of some importance; and, if we consult the ear, I believe it will be found that the former is preferable to the latter.

ON REDUNDANCY.

As these observations are made chiefly for the use of young people, I would advise the teacher to avoid inculcating that terse neatness and exact precision of style which may be adopted in riper years. As the Essay is the species of composition of which the preceding treatise principally consists, it seems to allow of an exuberance of expression which is very agreeable to young minds, and is not unsuitable to that easy and apparent negligence so remarkable and so happy in most of Mr. Addison's Spectators. In these we frequently meet with words nearly synonymous, which seem to be adopted for giving a certain plenitude to the sentence, without adding either to its clearness or strength. Thus in the following sentence:—

"If the open professors of impiety deserve the "utmost *application* and endeavours of moral

"writers to recover them from vice and *folly*, how "much more may they lay a claim to *care* and "compassion who are walking in the paths of "death, while they fancy themselves engaged in a "course of virtue."

In this sentence, perhaps, the words *application*, *folly*, and *care*, rather weaken than add force to the general idea; but a good ear would be loth to part with these words, for fear of diminishing the general sound of the sentence. The same observations may be applied to the following passage:—

"In order, likewise, to come to a true knowledge "of ourselves, we should consider, on the other "hand, how far we may deserve the praises and "*approbations* which the world bestows upon us: "whether the actions they celebrate proceed from "laudable and *worthy* motives; and how far we "are really possessed of the virtues which gain us "applause among those with whom we converse." —*Spectator*, No. 399.

Here, perhaps, the words *approbations* and *worthy* might be very well spared without any injury to the thought, and particularly the former, as it pluralizes a general idea, which is hardly ever used as a plural, and which is as pleonastic to the ear as it is to the understanding: for it may be laid down as an invariable rule, that when the singular

expresses the sense as clearly and as fully as the plural, it is always more elegant. Another instance we have of this in a Spectator of Mr. Addison's, No. 169.

"This part of good nature, however, which con- "sists in the pardoning and overlooking of faults, "is to be exercised only in doing ourselves justice; "and that, too, in the ordinary commerce and "occurrences of life; for in the public *administra-* "*tions* of justice, mercy to one may be cruelty to "others."

Here *administrations*, in the plural number, is not only useless, but inelegant.

ON THE STRUCTURE OF SENTENCES.

In constructing sentences, the strongest part of the thought, or that which forms the result, should come the last: for which reason, all circumstances and all conditional members ought to be placed in the middle, or at the beginning of the sentence. Thus, if instead of saying—"The English delight "in silence more than any other European nation, "if the remarks which are made on us by foreigners "are true*,"—we say, "If the remarks which are "made on us by foreigners are true, the English

* Spectator, No. 135.

"delight in silence more than any other European "nation,"—we shall add to the force of the observation, while we improve the sound.

A similar sentence of Mr. Addison's might, perhaps, be improved by a similar transposition:—

"Among all the poets of this kind, our English "are much the best, by what I have seen; whether "it be that we abound with more stories of this "nature, or that the genius of our country is fitter "for this sort of poetry:"—better thus:—

"Whether it be, that we abound with more stories "of this nature, or that the genius of our country is "fitter for this sort of poetry—by what I have seen, "among all the poets of this kind, our English are "much the best."

Where a sentence, or a member of a sentence, is antithetic, and divides itself into two constructive parts, the latter member ought, in general, to be full as long as the former; and even if it be longer, it will be more graceful, and form a better cadence. Mr. Addison seems remarkably attentive to this proportion in the structure of his sentences, and appears sometimes to extend the latter member merely to fill the sentence and please the ear.

"As there are many eminent critics who never "wrote a good line, there are many admirable buf- "foons that animadvert upon every single defect in

"another, without ever discovering the least beauty "of their own."—*Spectator*, No. 249.

In this example we find the length of the latter member add to the beauty as well as the strength of the sentence.

"As there are to be found in the service of envy "men of every diversity of temper and degree of "understanding, calumny is diffused by all methods "and arts of propagation."—*Johnson.*

The latter member of this sentence seems to be too short for the former; and, perhaps, the cadence might be much improved by a small addition:—

"As there are to be found in the service of envy "men of every diversity of temper and degree of "understanding, calumny is diffused by all those "methods of propagation which either ill-nature or "ingenuity can suggest."

ON THE CONNEXION OF SENTENCES BY THE CONJUNCTION "*AND.*"

The copulative conjunction *and* should not only couple like cases, but like forms of speech. Thus in the pupil's exercise, *On the Effects of Learning on the Countenance,* I find the following passage:—

It is a true remark, that whatever passion has the greatest ascendancy over the heart, it is sure to shew itself on the countenance, though for a long

time after the cause has subsided; for instance, the death of a dear friend will leave a settled gloom, and any joyful event may be traced on the countenance for some time after.

This sentence I have corrected in the following manner:—

"It is a true remark, that whatever passion has a "great ascendancy over the heart, that passion is "sure to shew itself in the countenance. We have "frequent occasion to observe, that the death of a "dear friend will leave a settled gloom, and any "joyful event a cheerful gaiety, on the countenance, "for some time after the events have happened."

Among the corrections of this passage it may be observed, that the two last members connected by *and* are much improved by giving them the same form; that is, by saying, *the death of a dear friend will leave a settled gloom, and a joyful event a cheerful gaiety, on the countenance,* instead of *the death of a dear friend will leave a settled gloom, and any joyful event may be traced on the countenance.*

This rule may be further exemplified by an exercise on the subject of *Diversions.*

The pupil's first sentence on this subject was,—

Recreation is regaling our spirits after having been employed, and makes our studies more delightful, as it gives the mind, as well as the body, vigour.

This sentence may be corrected in the following manner:—

"Recreation is recruiting our spirits after having "been much employed, which makes our studies "more delightful, as it gives the mind, as well as "the body, fresh vigour."

But I think it may be still further improved by making the conjunction copulative *and* couple like forms of speech in the manner following:—

"Recreation is recruiting our spirits after being "much employed, and making our studies more "delightful by giving fresh vigour both to the body "and the mind."

A few more instances will shew the propriety of the rule in a still clearer light.

"It should be an indispensable rule in life to "contract our desires to our present condition; and "whatever may be our expectations, we should "live within the compass of what we actually "possess."

This sentence will be greatly amended by adopting the infinitive mood in the last member as well as the first.

"It should be an indispensable rule in life *to* "*contract* our desires to our present condition, and, "whatever may be our expectations, *to live* within "the compass of what we actually possess."

The following sentence of Dr. Johnson's seems to be faulty for the same reason:—

"He that embarks in the voyage of life will "always wish to advance rather by the impulse of "the wind than the stroke of the oar; and many "founder in their passage while they lie waiting for "the gale."

Here the last member connected by *and* has a quite different form from the first; and it is presumed that the sentence might be greatly improved by the following alteration:—

"He that embarks in the voyage of life will "always wish to advance rather by the impulse of "the wind than the stroke of the oar, and to gain "advantage by the exertions of others rather than "by those of his own."

This rule may receive some further illustration by some examples where the conjunction *and* seems to be used improperly.

"Truth seems to fly from curiosity; and, as "many inquiries produce many narratives, whatever engages the public attention is immediately "disguised by the embellishments of fiction."—*Johnson.*

In this sentence it should seem that, if the second member had begun with *for* instead of *and*, a reason would have been given for the truth of the

first member, and both of them would have been more intimately connected.

The same may be observed of the following sentence :—

" All, perhaps, are more willing to honour past " than present excellence ; and the mind contem- " plates genius through the shades of age as the " eye surveys the sun through artificial opacity."— *Johnson.*

In this sentence *for* or *because* should seem preferable to *and.*

ON THE CHOICE OF WORDS.

When a word occurs which is not suitable to the idea we want to express, and that a better does not readily suggest itself, perhaps it will be found useful to look for the word in Johnson's Dictionary, which will, in all probability, furnish us with the word we want.

In one of Steele's Letters, in the Spectator, No. 431, we have an instance of a strange impropriety in the use of the word *due* :—

" The calamities of children are *due* to the negli- " gence and misconduct of parents; those of age to " the past life which led to it."

We need not look into a dictionary to substitute

the word *owing* for *due ;* but it sometimes happens that there are certain shades of thought which it requires some assistance to supply. Thus, in the Theme, *'Tis ill playing with edged Tools*, the pupil's exercise, speaking of the fly, says, *When first it sees the candle it frisks about it with delight till its wings are caught in the flames, and the poor insect dies a victim to its folly.* Here the word *frisks* is rather a low expression, and under the word in Johnson we shall find *frolicks,* which is infinitely preferable. In the same manner in the Theme, *A Man is known by his Company,* the pupil's position is, *Nothing is a greater proof of our dispositions, manners, and characters, than the dispositions, manners, and characters; of those we keep company with.* Here the word *proof* seems not to be exactly the word we should use ; and if we examine Johnson's Dictionary under the word we shall find it explained by *evidence, testimony,* and *convincing token ;* the last of which I apprehend to be preferable to *proof,* and *indication* preferable to that.

ON RAISING AND INVIGORATING THE LANGUAGE.

It may be observed, that language is raised and invigorated by attributing sense to inanimate ob-

jects, reason and moral attributes to animals, and theological epithets to mere moral or political subjects. This elevation of language is beautiful in verse, and may often with great advantage be adopted in prose, especially if the prose be at all sentimental or impassioned: thus—

> The *stubborn* earth does not her treasures yield,
> Till pierced and goaded by the vigorous plough.
>
> Grove *nods* at grove; each alley has its brother;
> And half the platform just reflects the other.—*Pope.*
>
> He ask'd the waves, and ask'd the *felon* winds,
> What hard mishap hath doom'd this gentle swain.–*Milton.*
>
> The *generous* steed you pompously bestride,
> Shares with his lord the pleasure and the pride.—*Pope.*
>
> The *honest* ox and *faithful* dog surpass,
> In moral goodness, many a titled ass.
>
> The filial duty we our parents owe,
> On this the name of *piety* bestow.
>
> And thus when ministers misguide the state,
> We call them *impious* and *profligate.*

Here, by giving the earth the *stubbornness* of an animal, we more strongly express its sterility: by calling the waving of one grove to another *nodding* we give them animation: by styling the winds *felons* we strongly express their ravages: by giving

the steed *generosity,* the ox *honesty,* and the dog *fidelity,* we raise them to the rank of moral agents; and by calling filial duty *piety,* and the bad policy of a minister *profligacy,* we heighten the one to an act of religion, and degrade the other to an act of impiety.

CONCLUSION.

These observations are not offered to Teachers as entirely new, but as such as more particularly regard the instruction of youth in their juvenile compositions; and which seem to have been less attended to than those parts of Rhetoric which are calculated for the more perfect composition of riper years. Those who wish to see almost every thing that can be said on the subject may consult Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and the Belles Lettres, and the third edition of my own Rhetorical Grammar. I shall think myself happy if I have here given a few rules that may be useful to those who have neither leisure nor capacity for larger and deeper works, and who will be contented with such of the most obvious directions as they can easily comprehend and put in practice.

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