from the author

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

ENGLISH GRAMMAR,

ON AN

ANALYTICAL PLAN,

ADAPTED TO THE USE OF

STUDENTS IN COLLEGES

AND

THE HIGHER CLASSES IN SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES.

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PREFACE.

THE circumstances which led to the composition of the little work here presented to the public, are these. Having been for many years engaged either professedly or incidentally in the business of teaching, and, for a number of years past, having been one of those charged with the examination of the public teachers, and the inspection of the schools of the town where he resides, the author has had frequent occasion to notice the different degrees of progress made by pupils of various ages and capacities, while pursuing their studies, and of ascertaining the real, substantial acquirements they had made, when released from the discipline of their teachers, as a stock to answer their purposes in their onward course through life, either for their own peculiar use, or to be employed in the instruction of others. The result of his observations was, that in grammar, to speak of that only, much that was acquired, was acquired mechanically, as a matter of routine and habit, a recollection of the contents of the Grammar, rather than an understanding of them. This was the case with even the majority of those, whose instructers sent them forth as qualified to teach. They would know well what the Grammar contained, and apply its rules with readiness to the common forms of writing; but, if questioned as to the meaning of what was so fluently repeated, or as to the reason of rules or their adaptation to unusual constructions, they soon betrayed how superficial was their knowledge.

Consideration of the causes of this seemed to point out imperfection in the plan and execution of the Grammars in common use, as one among the principal, and

want of attention in the teachers, as another. For the former of these it seemed as if even an individual might in some degree provide a remedy, by constructing a better elementary work; for the latter he could not expect to do much, yet might possibly do something, by so constructing his work as to compel the teacher to more attention, by guarding against too great facility of repetition on the part of the learner, which might pass for knowledge, and rendering it necessary for the teacher to exert his own mind in comprehending what the learner ought to say, as satisfactory evidence of his acquisition of the subject of his study.

The Grammars in common use are chiefly abridgments of Murray, with small alterations of one kind or another, some valuable, and some of little intrinsic importance. Murray's is a compilation, mainly and essentially from Lowth's, which constitutes, as it were, the frame-work of the system, and gives its shape and character to the whole. Lowth's Grammar is still retained in use in some seminaries, and deservedly; for as a whole, explaining the principles and uses of our tongue, it is a more philosophical and original work than Murray's; though the latter contains some valuable improvements, and may perhaps seem more methodical, and better adapted to general use for acquiring the technicalities of the subject.

The great fault of Murray is a want of perspicuity. The definitions are often vague, and in some instances a definition of one term contains another, that is not explained till some time after, in a more advanced part of the work; nor do the definitions seem always to be correct. There are besides often omissions of circumstances of importance; and the Syntax presents little but a chaos of rules and remarks, without any guiding principles in the use of language and the construction of sentences.

Lowth is in some degree liable to the same objections, as must necessarily be the case, since a great portion of his work is copied literally into that of Murray; yet in its original shape may be seen greater distinctness of general principles and philosophical investigation.

Both works have however done good service to the language, in bringing order into and establishing it in its usage; and to them may be attributed much of the settled form it now wears in general acceptation. Yet they seem to have this great defect, — they are too synthetical; they seem too much to treat of the use of language, as if it were derived from the principles of grammar, and in pursuance of its forms, instead of treating of grammar as derived from the use of language, and merely embodying and arranging the forms and principles established by custom in the common employment of it.

Hence these systems have too artificial a character, one too independent of the realities of the case, and too unconnected with them; so that they are studied without their real relation to language being properly perceived; and, aided as this imperfection of the plan is by the defects above pointed out, it hence results, that much time is often wasted in the study of grammar without leading to a proper understanding of the language. When grammar, without more explanation, is defined to be "the *art* of reading and writing a language with propriety," it is hardly to be wondered at, that it should be considered as something not essentially inherent in the use of the language and derived from it, but as something *artificial* fastened upon it, to guide and direct it.

It seemed to the author that the way to correct these defects was, to arrange the whole system anew; to take up the subject from the very beginning, and pursue it more analytically, tracing out and explaining the various natures, properties, and uses of words, instead of defining them, and drawing out and exhibiting their forms and modifications from the different purposes to which they are applied, and as expressive of their corresponding changes in signification; going on gradually from step to step, and as far as possible making each step

clear in itself, without anticipating any thing not sufficiently obvious to persons having such a general comprehension of the meaning of language, as to fit them for pursuing a subject, that must be taught by language solely.

Such a system, by substituting, instead of definitions, explanations more diffuse and inductive in their character, seemed to promise to the learner a more full understanding of the subject, not only by really affording it, but by checking the facility of committing what was said to memory, and substituting *recollection* for *perception*, and by the same means calling the attention of the teacher more perfectly to the real import of the subject, and both enabling and making him to perceive the actual progress of his pupil.

Such a system the author has endeavoured to construct in the following work, composed in the often interrupted hours of leisure from widely different pursuits. How far he has been successful in his attempt, those skilled in the subject have now an opportunity of judging for themselves.

The work is not in any sense a compilation. What were believed to be the essential and well established principles of the language, were taken as exhibited in the grammars in use, or as impressed upon the mind of the author by his reading, critical or miscellaneous, or in the experience of several years' teaching both his own and other languages.

These materials he has arranged and expressed according to his own ideas, and in his own words; with the assistance, in revising the work, of a few remarks on some passages in it from a highly esteemed literary friend.

He has adhered to the commonly received rules of classification and form in all cases where the results of his analysis did not conduct him to something importantly different; and where any change has thus been made, the reasons are given at considerable length either in the body of the work or in the Appendix.

A more strictly analytical and inductive form might possibly have been adopted with advantage; but there seemed to be considerable objections to it, both from the complex nature of the subject, and as making a wider departure from the forms and methods of instruction, in common use; too wide probably for teachers easily to accommodate themselves to it. Even as it is, one or two literary friends, who saw the work in manuscript, seemed to think, that some might find objections on that score, especially in the instruction of the younger class of pupils, for whom, according to their apprehension, the work is of too high and argumentative a cast. It may possibly be so as a whole; that is, there are undoubtedly passages in it on the nature, propriety, adaptation, and peculiar import of certain forms, which such pupils could not be expected to study with either pleasure or profit; yet, unless the author's experience and the assertions of his pupils have greatly deceived him, this cannot well be the case with much of the work, and a judicious teacher could easily mark off with his pencil such passages, as subjects to be reserved for maturer judgment and more advanced progress in knowledge.

In reality the present work is not designed for the elementary instruction of *young* beginners. Such can study with advantage only the simple outlines and technical forms of grammar; though it is important that they should get a clear and accurate knowledge of these, and in such a form as shall advance their progress, when they arrive at an age capable of a deeper consideration of the subject, and not retard them, by the necessity of doing away false impressions, and learning to substitute ideas instead of words.

The author's object was to produce a tolerably thorough elementary system on the plan before described; and to do this, it was necessary to go into considerable discussion and examination of some points involving more or less abstract reasoning. Without stating these points, the system would not be complete, and without

giving the reasonings that led to the stating of them in the manner in which they are stated, a fair view of the subject might not be presented to his readers, and the well founded results of analysis might be considered causeless and wanton innovations.

Such a system as this, it is obvious, considered as a whole, must be adapted only to those persons, who have some maturity of mind, and have made some progress in the acquisition of knowledge; that is, to students in the higher classes in academies, to those in colleges, and to persons preparing to teach or engaged in teaching. As such it is accordingly designated on its title-page; though it is believed that it may be adapted, as before mentioned, to very many others.

Should the work be favorably received by those for whom it is intended, it is in the author's contemplation to prepare an abridged and simplified form for the use of beginners, and to render the larger work more complete by the introduction, in appropriate places, of some more minute remarks on several somewhat anomalous particulars in the use of our language, and a few pages on its correspondences in particular forms with somewhat analogous forms in one or two other languages, or its differences from the same.

The criticism of the learned will doubtless be able to point out defects and imperfections in the present publication, which, should it be otherwise favorably received, so as to come into use, it will be the author's aim to supply and correct in another edition.

S. W.

March, 1832.

ENGLISH GRAMMAR.

Language is the means of intercourse or conversation among men, consisting of sounds, by the utterance of which they express to each other whatever it may be their wish to communicate.

The sounds, thus pronounced and expressing distinct meanings, are called *articulate sounds*, to distinguish them from mere cries, like those of the brute creation, destitute of particular meaning, but showing merely the influence or action of some passion, as fear, love, anger, &c.

The formation of these sounds and the meaning that they convey, differ among different races, tribes, or communities of men; being regulated in each by common consent, custom, or the like, and thus constitute the different languages spoken by men.

The regulations by which any language is governed, as spoken among the people to whom it belongs, constitute what is called the *Grammar* of that language. These regulations consist of certain generally acknowledged forms and variations of form in the employment of the articulate sounds of the language, whereby one man may precisely and definitely present to the perception of another, using the same language, whatever ideas he may wish so to present. The directions for the employment of these different forms and their variations, expressing the established usage, are called the Rules of Grammar.

The Science of Grammar in any language consists in knowing the distinctions and divisions of the articulate sounds in it, with their variations, and the varieties or modifications of meaning belonging to them or denoted by them;

native is placed after the verb, or between the auxiliary and the verb; as, "Were I," instead of "If I were;" "Had I heard," instead of "If I had heard." This form of expression is proper only where there is no danger of its being mistaken for a question, which has a similar position of the Nominative.

Some conjunctions go in pairs, corresponding to each other, so as to make two subsequent members of a sentence answer to each other; as, *Though* or *although*, — *yet*; *Whether*, — *or*; *Neither*, — *nor*; *Either*, — *or*; *As*, — *as*; *So*, — *as*; *As*, — *so*; *So*, — *that*; as, "*Though* he was rich, *yet* for our sakes he became poor;" "*Whether* he come *or* go;" "*Neither* John *nor* James knew;" "*Either* he *or* I will go;" "*As* black *as* pitch;" "He is not *so* beautiful *as* his father;" "*As* the cedar of Lebanon among the shrubs, *so* art thou among the daughters of the land;" "*So* strive *that* ye may win."

Conjunctions are frequently used double; as, "*Though* neither he *nor* I were there;" "*If* either John *or* James can come;" "He was there, *but whether* he heard him is doubtful."

The adverbs that connect sentences are *when*, *while*, *whilst*, *therefore*, *wherefore*, *however*, and the like; as, "He came *whilst* I was there;" "You shall see it *when* it is done;" "He did it not, *therefore* he was punished;" "He did wrong, *however* it happened." These have been called *adverbial conjunctions*, but they often retain distinctly their adverbial meaning and influence on the verbs or adjectives following them; though if nothing can connect but a conjunction, they must in these and the like instances be considered such.

There are a few expressions, such as *methinks*, *methought*, &c. occasionally met with, that defy grammatical construction, being, like some others already mentioned under the head of Interjections, corruptions of phrases belonging to one of the older dialects of the language, and having therein a grammatical form, which is not found in the modern dialect. Thus, 'methinks,' meant *it seems to me*, 'methought,' *it seemed to me*.

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING SOME FARTHER REMARKS ON THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE EXPRESSIONS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND ON THE CHANGES MADE IN THE CONJUGATION OF VERBS IN THE PRECEDING WORK.

In the body of the work the author has stated generally the principles, which led him to make an alteration in the usual disposition of the parts of a verb constituting its conjugation. For the farther explanation of the subject, some remarks are now given, with which it did not seem to him worth while to incumber the work itself, but which may yet be necessary for the full explanation of his views, and for the satisfaction of those who take an interest in the subject, and may be disposed to examine it thoroughly.

The three great and strictly philosophical divisions of time are, the Present, the Past, and the Future. The Indicative Mode, according to the generally received definitions of it, *simply indicates* or *positively declares* an action, being, or state of being.

Simply to indicate, or *positively to declare*, an action &c., seems to be, to point it out, or declare it, merely as such, without any admission of *power*, *will*, *liberty*, *determination*, *necessity*, or *obligation*, extraneous to the signification of the simple verb, since the admission of these constitutes a different *manner* or *modification* of the action, of course belonging to another *Mode* of the verb, which by the possession of them is, according to the definition, known to be the *Potential Mode*, having for its characteristics these very circumstances.

The simple indication or positive declaration must also be without the admission of a motive, a wish, or doubtfulness, since these are the characteristics of the Subjunctive Mode, and certainly constitute a distinct modification of the action or being.

The Indicative mode must therefore be limited to pointing or declaring the existence of an action, or being, simply as a fact, either present or past, or to indicating it as a thing to come, with equal simplicity of manner; that is, as a *future fact*, unmixed with any declaration of power, will, determination, &c., and unclogged with any doubtfulness, or contingency. Even simple intention to do, or be, is inadmissible in the annunciation of it; since intention is a part of volition.

If this definition of the Indicative mode is correct, (and there seems to be no well founded objection to it,) it only remains to examine how far the usual assignment of Tenses, in conformity to the three great divisions of time above specified, is consistent with it.

The present tense, either simple or with the auxiliary *do*, harmonizes perfectly with the definition, since it only declares more or less forcibly the actual occurrence of the action at the time of the declaration, or its existence as a *present fact*. Such also is the case with the imperfect tense, either simple or with the auxiliary *did;* the time only of the occurrence of the action is changed, so that it is stated as a *past fact*, either definitely or indefinitely as to the precise time of its occurrence. It is true that from the nature of the tense, the fact, although mentioned by it as past, is not precluded from being present also, if the action or being were capable of continuance, but this does not make less true the statement of it as past, or being present at a past time, nor does it interfere at all with the expression, so far as the *Mode* is concerned.

The Perfect tense states the fact as past, with an allusion to the time of the declaration of it, made by the use of the present of the compound auxiliary *have*, for the purpose of showing the action or being to be completed; thus expressing fully what the *imperfect* leaves unfinished, except so far as it may be limited by the signification of the verb.

The Pluperfect tense in the same manner states the action as a past fact; but by the use of the past auxiliary *had*, an allusion is made to another time also passed, which the occurrence of the fact itself, or the action, is thus made to precede, and is also shown to be completed at or before that passed time.

In these tenses no change is made but in the time, which is thus divided into three specifications; the manner of the

action remains unmodified by any admission of circumstances in its expression.

In the Future tenses usually assigned to this mode, two new auxiliaries, *will* and *shall*, are introduced. These by the definition of the mode ought to have no effect, except on the time of the action; if they have any other influence, if they in any way affect the *manner* of expressing the action, they must be inconsistent with this definition, and should, with the tenses they form, be placed in some other mode.

Will seems evidently to have been originally the present tense of the verb *to will*, and as such implies volition or determination, a greater or less exercise of the will, and thereby introduces a new element of meaning, and one, by the definitions given, belonging to the Potential Mode. That this element is actually present in the tense formed by this auxiliary, however much we are accustomed in many cases to overlook it, may be ascertained by a consideration of examples. Thus take the phrase, "I will read the book." This does not seem to mean merely, that the act of reading the book is to come, but that there is also an intention to perform the action. Let these words be spoken with a calm uniformity of accent, and in the simplest manner possible, the intention is evidently expressed, and the manner of expression amounts to a promise, which is a decided act of volition. Now let the phrase be pronounced with a moderate emphatic stress of the voice upon *will*, the act of volition or the exercise of the will immediately becomes strong and prominent, and the expression is that of a firm determination. Let the phrase be pronounced a third time, with a strong abrupt emphasis upon *will*, and the language becomes that of menace, or of resolute, uncontrollable determination in defiance of menace or opposition.

Thus in the first person the new element modifying the annunciation, or statement of the action, is evident, since in its simplest and least obtrusive form, it shows intention, and is universally considered as amounting to a promise wherever a promise is admissible.

In the second and third persons, this signification is less forcible, and its exact character and force are otherwise changed. When a phrase, such as "He will read the book," is pronounced with an equable accent, it seems to come very near in expression to a simple announcement of the futurity

of the action, so latent has the real force of the auxiliary become by usage. Let however a moderate emphasis be laid upon *will*, and the volition of the agent, or our belief in it, immediately becomes apparent; and by a still stronger emphasis the phrase may be made to express any degree of determination or resolution in the agent, or our belief in such resolution, though it does not in itself convey so clearly as in the first person the expression of defiance or menace, simply because one cannot affirm so strongly for a third person, as he can for himself. This ready developement of the element of volition, in these two last cases, serves to show, that it was merely latent in the first; possibly from the effect of habitual inattention to it as being slight, though it at the same time really existed, signifying merely intention in the person spoken of, or our belief in his having the intention.

Shall, in its primary sense, means *to owe*, and is so found in Chaucer, conveying a sense of duty, of something that *ought* to be done or *must* be done. From this last expression it was readily inflected to denoting determination or resolution, and thence softened down by habitual employment of it to announcing, when used of one's self, merely intention, which is its least formal and forcible expression, though it still retains its other derived significations, according to the greater or less emphasis laid upon it in speaking.

Taking the phrases before made use of, if *shall* be substituted instead of *will*, so that they may read, "I *shall* read the book," and "He *shall* read the book," somewhat similar results will be obtained; though with a variation in the application of them to the persons. Thus, "I shall read the book," simply pronounced, comes the nearest to a mere expression of futurity, conveying in addition to it, only *intention*, and that often but slightly. With a stronger accent, *shall* in this phrase expresses different degrees of resolution or determination, but does not convey the idea of menace or defiance. This is reserved for the second and third persons. Thus, "*He shall* read the book," expresses resolution, and is equivalent to a promise, meaning I *will make* him read it. With the stronger accents upon *shall* it expresses stronger resolution and determination, and becomes the language of menace and defiance.

In the second and third persons, *shall* also very distinctly implies the possession of *power*, or a belief in possessing it,

in the speaker, by which to compel the performance of the action in the person addressed or spoken of; thus adding another element of modification to the annunciation of the action, belonging also to the Potential Mode.

Something of the same kind may also be observed in *will*, though less strongly marked; for to say "I *will* do a thing," implies that I think I *can* do it; and "He *will* do it," seems to suppose that the speaker believes him *able* to do it, as well as willing or intending to do it.

These instances seem sufficient for the illustration of these auxiliaries when applied to persons. To prove how readily the mind, even without analysis, perceives the force of them, let the two be mutually misplaced, as in the story of the poor Frenchman, who fell overboard from a ship and was drowned without an effort's being made to save him, because he kept crying out, "I *will* drown, and nobody *shall* help me."

It is from the application of these auxiliaries to the expression of actions, the agents of which are incapable of exercising will, or volition, that probably arises in a great measure the obtuseness of our perceptions to their proper and literal import, when our attention is not solicited to it directly, by an unusual emphasis. It is an instance of a natural sense of propriety correcting the deficiencies or inappropriateness of means. But even in the cases where the agents are things of which volition cannot be predicated, let the stronger emphasis be applied, and it may be immediately perceived, that the natural force of the auxiliary is by no means lost, though the manner of its action is altered, and its seeming direction and location changed.

Take, for instance, the following phrase; "The river will overflow its banks." We can attribute no volition to the river, except figuratively, and this figurative meaning being put aside, as not entering into the ordinary usage of the expression, the phrase, as generally received, amounts merely to an announcement of a future event. If however it be examined carefully, it will be found to indicate something different from a mere announcement or a future fact; it is not positive and declaratory enough for that, but only denotes an apprehension or opinion in the mind of the speaker, that the event is to take place, being equivalent to saying, that "There *is danger* of the river's overflowing its banks," or, "I think that the overflow is going to happen." If we

use an equivalent figurative expression, the phrase may be appropriately rendered by saying, "The river *threatens* to overflow its banks," a form of expression not unfrequently used in such cases, and fully developing the force of *will*, as expressing volition.

If instead of *will*, *shall* is substituted, the force of the expression becomes still more striking. Thus, "The river *shall* overflow its banks," is the language of prophecy, and implies supernatural knowledge, and the possession of controlling power over the event, according to the force of *shall* as before explained. This meaning, with a stronger emphasis on *shall*, passes from implication to assertion, and from that to menace, much as is the case when a personal agent is used.

The chief distinction between *will* and *shall* in the second and third persons seems to be, that the speaker using *will*, presumes or vouches for the volition of the agent, and in using *shall* declares his own. Hence the signification of *shall* is always distinctly and manifestly a mental attribute belonging to the speaker, while the signification of *will* belongs properly to the speaker only in the first person, and in the other persons belongs to the agent. When therefore the agent in the third person is destitute of mind, and of course incapable of volition, *will* loses in the understanding of the hearer its peculiar signification, unless in the figurative application of it, as above explained, and thus becomes a mere annunciation of the futurity of the action to which it is applied, or what by usage passes for such annunciation.

To sum up briefly, it appears then as the result of this examination, that *shall* is in no case a simple indication, or simple positive declaration of futurity, but one comprehending in itself volition, from the simple expression of intention to the strongest assertion of resolution, accompanied with a greater or less implication of power, according as more or less stress is laid upon its pronunciation. *Will* expresses the same element in equal strength in the first person, and vouches for it in the second and third when applied strictly to persons. When applied to inanimate objects, it does the same figuratively, and it is only by throwing aside this figurative sense, and reducing the expression within the limits of reality, depriving it in fact of its proper force, that it becomes an annunciation of futurity only. Even this annunciation it makes only in a peculiar and limited form, as will be shown in another place.

Even the very circumstance of having two forms to express one modification of futurity, seems, without discussion, to show that they must express, one at least, something more than simple futurity, and the exchange of force in the different persons points out this something as belonging to each.

From this result it seems to follow, that their proper place is in the Potential Mode, as being the mode expressing *will* and *power*, and accordingly they have been so placed in the present work, with however an accompanying title to the tense to point out the relations in which by usage they are considered to stand to the tenses of other languages.

This conclusion is confirmed by the consideration mentioned in the text, that their imperfect tenses *should* and *would* are considered as established in this mode, and that regard for analogy and grammatical propriety alone should be a sufficient argument against assigning forms to different modes, when these forms differ from each other only in *time*, that is, in *tense*.

If the restricted and conventional use of *shall* and *will* to denote little more than simple futurity, when no particular force of accent is laid upon them, is deemed of sufficient weight to overcome the considerations arising from their proper and equally frequent force of signification, and to render it expedient to place them in a mode to which otherwise they do not belong, it seems difficult to say why the same reason does not apply with equal force to *should* and *would*. These imperfect tenses have the same range of meaning generally, that belongs to their present tenses, referring only to a time that is passed, instead of to that now passing. Thus in the phrases, "I said that I *should* come," "He told me that he *would* read it," "It was expected that the river *would* overflow its banks;" *should* and *would* announce a simple futurity to a past time, as definitely as *shall* and *will* in any case announce the same to the present, and include the same force of signification, to be developed in the same manner by additional emphasis.

Should and *would* have indeed, from usage, in some forms of expression, a signification, which does not belong to *shall* and *will*, and is indeed independent of their proper nature of verbs of past time; as, for instance, "I would advise you in this case to say," "On that account I should not deem

it proper." This signification is not however peculiar to them as belonging to the Potential Mode, being often but a softened and guarded way of expressing the Indicative, referring, as it were, to a condition, though often no condition is expressed, and the force of the phrase is in reality equivalent to that of the Indicative Present, so that the unguarded meaning of the above phrases is, "I advise you," and "I do not deem it proper." This use of the words is a sort of insinuation, or a diplomatic style, intended to produce the effect of the simple expression without its abruptness, or without making the speaker responsible for the consequences.

Similar trains of reasoning may be applied to the compound auxiliaries *shall have* and *will have*, *should have* and *would have*, so that if *shall have* and *will have* belong to the Indicative, *should have* and *would have* ought also to belong to it.

In regulating the parts of the conjugation by the analysis of them, the least extensive and objectionable innovation seemed to be, to put the two *futures*, as they were called, into the Potential Mode, where they naturally belong by their proper force of signification, and where they harmonize so well with their own past tenses, and with the various tenses and imports of the other simple auxiliaries, not only in their several peculiar meanings, but in the general character of futurity, which belongs to them all, and remarkably characterizes the Mode.

This arrangement has moreover, as was before remarked, the advantage of giving great regularity to the structure of the different modes, as regards the number of their tenses.

If it be objected, that by adopting this arrangement a strange departure will be made from the usage of other languages, which have generally one or more future tenses in the Indicative Mode, it may be replied that these languages have a properly *indicative* expression for the futurity of an action, and do not employ conventionally, to designate it, a form properly signifying a modification of the action, and not an announcement of its time, and which in a vast many instances is employed distinctly and purposely to express that modification. In the Greek and Latin, and in the French, Italian, and other connate languages of the South of Europe, the future is denoted by a change in the termination of the verb; and no new element of signification,

except that of time, is thus introduced. Here then the analogy fails, since the form resorted to for expressing futurity is so entirely dissimilar. This will also be the case with regard to any other language, in which the future tense is formed by a mere inflexion of the verb. In the German the analogy holds better, since the future is there expressed by means of an auxiliary; but the difference in the nature of the auxiliary destroys the argument, that might otherwise thence be drawn. The auxiliary in German is werden, *to become*, implying no volition of any kind, but merely *future being*, and therefore not in the least interfering with the proper import of the Indicative Mode.

Where the structure of languages is composed upon different radical principles, and of different materials, it seems unwise to attempt to force them into the same forms from any casual analogy. The proper business of a grammarian seems to be, to give to each language that form, which its own nature and usage render most suitable, and to connect different languages with each other, not by a forced disposition of their parts, but by pointing out the correspondences in usage and signification in the parts of each, as they are arranged in their own order.

On this principle, and for the reasons already given both here and in the body of the work, the author has proceeded, deeming that the explanation given of the nature of the Potential Mode, and of the particular future import of each of its tenses, would sufficiently point out its correspondences with the futures &c. of other languages.

Among the various expressions of futurity, with which the English language abounds, there is but one form that answers strictly in its import to the future of the Indicative Mode, though it has, as is believed, never yet been so exhibited by grammarians, notwithstanding it is of frequent use as a phrase, and corresponds very closely, almost literally indeed, to the expression of the futures of the Indicative in the kindred language of Germany. This form of expression is made by placing the simple Indicative tenses of the verb *to be* before the Infinitive tenses of the verb expressing the action. Thus, for the first future, "I am to love," "He is to be there," "They are to come to-morrow," "You are to be whipped." In the second future the *perfect* of the Indicative is used instead of the present, as, "I am to have done it," (or to have it done,) "He is to

have drawn out the writings to-morrow morning." Substituting the verb *to be* instead of *to become*, which is strictly an independent verb in our language, inadmissible before an Infinitive, *I am to love*, is an accurate translation of Ich werde lieben, literally, *I become to love;* and *I am to have loved* is the same of Ich werde geliebt haben, literally, *I become to have loved*, though these are usually translated in grammars respectively, *I shall or will love*, and *I shall or will have loved.* When however the infinitive werden is used, as in its own future, it may be translated literally *to become*, instead of *to be*, so nearly do the words agree in import; thus, Ich werde gut werden, which translated as above would signify *I am to be good*, may also be appropriately translated, *I am to become good.*

In a similar manner, by the use of the imperfect *was*, may be translated the two conditional futures of the German; thus, Ich würde lieben, *I was to love*, and Ich würde geliebt haben, *I was to have loved.* These phrases are usually translated, *I should love*, and *I should have loved*, though the translations above given are not only more exact, but often more appropriate in our own language.

The futures made by *was* with the infinitive of another verb, are of extremely frequent use in English, and are strictly concordant with the definition of the Indicative Mode; and the four forms taken together constitute a complete set of futures to the tenses of that Mode; thus,

Future to the { *Present*, I am to love,
Imperfect, I was to love,
Perfect, I am to have loved,
Pluperfect, I was to have loved;

giving to each expression of time its appropriate future, which in reality belongs to it.

If grammarians should feel troubled at the apparent loss of the future time in the Indicative by the restoration of *shall* and *will* to their proper places in the Potential, they are here presented with abundant means of replacing the loss two-fold; with not only greater harmony with definitions already long established, but with the gratification of preserving analogy with a kindred tongue, the only analogy deserving serious consideration. Moreover by using these futures, they will complete the three great philosophical distinctions of time, and have the pleasure of replacing the verb *to be* amongst the auxiliaries, a situation to which, for

the reasons given in the text, it seems at present to have no legitimate claim.

Even classical analogy of time may be also gratified by the introduction of these forms of the Future, since by merely inserting the adverb *about*, we are at once presented with a set of futures corresponding to the Paulo-post-future of the Greek, but with the advantage over that of being four in number instead of one, and of expressing, by this means, the Paulo-post-future to each of the various divisions of past time, as well to the present. These Paulo-post-futures would be, Pres. *I am about to love*, Imp. *I was about to love*, Perf. *I am about to have loved*, Pluperf. *I was about to have loved.*

The analogy might be pushed so far, without doing violence to the idioms of our own language, as to provide even its participles and infinitives with futures, not only simple but Paulo-post. Thus we might have *being to love*, and *being about to love, having been to love*, and *having been about to love*, for the future participles, and these are forms of expression not unfrequently employed with many verbs; as for instance, "Being to join a party which had set out by a different route," "Being about to commence a new enterprise," "Having been to witness the execution, (?)" "Having been about to suffer much bodily pain, and having experienced much terror at the thought of it." The present infinitive would have no simple future, but only a Paulo-post, answering to the corresponding tense in Greek, and to what is called the simple future in Latin, though in reality a Paulo-post, as, *to be about to love.* The futures to the Perfect of the Infinitive are not of common occurrence, but may be used where great brevity and sententiousness of expression are wanted. They require a strong and well marked emphasis to give their signification correctly. The following sentences may serve as exemplifications of the use of them. "To *have been to be* thus honored, though the fruition was wanting, was in itself some consolation;" "He was not contented to *have been about to be* a king, to have had the crown and sceptre within his grasp, and yet to have failed to clutch them."

It is even possible to accommodate the Potential and Subjunctive Modes with a set of futures from the same source, corresponding to those provided for the Indicative. Thus a showman may say, permissively, conditionally, or

doubtfully of his exhibition, "It may be to be seen this evening;" or with a simple promise, "It will be to be seen this evening;" or with determination, "It shall be to be seen this evening;" thus giving the Present of the Potential a future. "If I could be there to see," may serve as an example of the Imperfect future, though marred by the introduction of the adverb *there*. "If *I be to see* him," "If *I were to see* him," are plainly instances of hypothetical futures, belonging to the Subjunctive. So also, "If the town *had been to be taken* by storm, he was the man to have done it," exemplifies a Pluperfect future to the same mode.

In fact almost every tense of the verb *to be* may be used before the infinitive of another verb, or before its own infinitive, simple or followed by a passive participle, and in almost all cases will express a futurity corresponding to the time and mode employed. By the application of *about*, most of these become Paulo-post-futures. From the usage of the language, however, all of the inflections of *to be* are not alike admissible before all verbs; and there are but few that have sufficient generality of use to entitle them to a place in a regular conjugation, so that it seems better not to make the attempt, but to leave the conjugation of the verb as it now stands, and to content ourselves with pointing out the force and usage of this position of the affirmative verb before the Infinitive.

Except for the sake of preserving entire this form of expression, as a thing by itself, and to avoid breaking the harmony of the conjugation, it might be worth while to introduce the Indicative tenses of *to be* before the Infinitive, as futures to the Indicative, since these are very much used, and since they often express most exactly the futures in other languages, more often than at first would be readily conceived, accustomed as we are to look upon *shall* and *will* as the legitimate futures. They seem at first, when thus employed, to one unaccustomed to considering the exact force and proper use of the various expressions, to have a startling air of reality and positiveness, to state the future too much as a matter of fact, to be in short *too indicative*.

This will be better explained by an illustration. Thus take the phrase before employed, "The river will overflow its banks," and substitute the infinitive of *overflow* with *is*, making it read, "The river *is to overflow* its banks." The force of the expression is to represent the event as future

indeed, but as settled and determined, a real *future fact*, without any doubt, volition, or subsidiary meaning, to modify its force. This comparison of the two expressions likewise brings into relief the proper force of *will*, showing its import of *volition*, and as equivalent to *threatens* in figurative language, and, in plain language, as denoting merely the belief, opinion, or apprehension in the mind of the speaker, that the event may take place; it does not declare positively that it is to take place, and is not therefore in harmony with the Indicative Mode.

It is indeed the proper form of expression for a circumstance of this kind; for however strong may be our belief, that the overflowing of the river may take place, yet, unless in cases where the event may be directed by human agency of which we know the determination, we are not warranted in *declaring positively* that it *is* to overflow, we can only express our opinion, belief, or apprehension of the danger, or presume upon the will that directs the event. Consequently we should make use of an expression, not positively declaring, that is, not essentially *indicative*, but merely *potential*, or indirect.

There is considerable general resemblance between the least forcible use of *will* and *shall*, and the corresponding use of *may* and *can*. Thus, for instance, "You *will* find in the Bible;" it might with little difference of meaning be said, you *may* find, or you *can* find; "you *shall* find" is very different. Again, "I think I *shall* find it here," or I *may*, or *can*; "I *think I will* find it here," seems quite incorrect.

This seems farther to show the potential character of the futures made by *will* and *shall*. In rendering the futures of other languages, it will sometimes be most proper to use one of these potential futures, and sometimes that pointed out as more indicative, according to the circumstances of the case. This can be no matter of surprise to persons conversant with other languages, since to them it must be a matter of familiar remark, that very few of their tenses are at all times rendered by corresponding modes and tenses in our own language; and where those languages have a less variety of future expressions, or with a different adaptation, it may well happen that what is designated by an indicative future with them, may sometimes be most appropriately translated by a potential future in the English.

The different variety and force of our future expressions

have not apparently been considered so well as they ought to have been, by those who undertook the labor of forming grammars of foreign tongues for English use; they seem to have tried as much as possible not to go out of the limits of our own conjugation, as this was established, and hence probably arose the making *shall* and *will* answer in all cases to the Indicative futures of those languages, though they are far from being always the proper expressions for them. A thorough revision of these grammars, with a more complete adaptation to them of the English forms to which they most accurately correspond in various instances, would probably be of much advantage for facilitating an accurate knowledge of the signification of the languages, the forms of which they were designed to teach.*

These remarks have extended to a much greater length than was originally contemplated, but they will serve not only for giving the explanation, for which they were at first designed, but likewise to illustrate the copiousness of our own language, and the greatness of its resources of varied yet distinct expression.

Even now the subject is far from having been exhausted, though most of the forms of the future have been pointed out; much farther elucidation of them might be given, particularly of those belonging to the Potential Mode, in the employment of which, simply or in connexion with other verbs, much confusion is often to be observed among writers. A more minute attention to their real import and conventional usage, and to their relation and adaptation to different subjects and forms of expression, than is believed to be usually given, would correct this, and establish the great principles of the language more clearly and firmly.

With regard to the new tense incorporated into the Imperative Mode, little more need be said than was mentioned in the text. The substantial form of the expression seems obviously to exist in the language, though obscured by the circumstance of the object of the verb being introduced between the auxiliary and the imperfect participle, which

* While writing these remarks I accidentally took up Goodrich's Greek Grammar, in which I found that he renders the first future in some cases by *is* before the infinitive, and sometimes by *must*, as well as by *shall* and *will*. I do not remember ever before to have seen this form pointed out in a foreign grammar, though its fitness seems to me unquestionable.

together constitute the tense. In consequence of this the object of the whole has been considered the object of the auxiliary merely, which therefore has been thought to exist in these phrases in its independent capacity of a possessive verb, while the participle has been supposed to be employed as an attribute of the object. The consideration of two points seems to be sufficient to show the true nature of the phrase to be as arranged in the text. The first of these is the circumstance, that the object is often placed in the same position in the compound tenses of other modes, without being thought to infringe upon their structure, or their right to existence as distinct tenses; and as it may in these be placed after the whole compound verb without impairing the meaning, so it may often in the Imperative. The second point is, that if a careful examination be made of the real and exact import of these phrases, it will be found, that *have* does not retain in them its possessive meaning, but serves only to denote, as in other tenses, the peculiar variety of time to be given to the action, which the whole phrase commands. To this there is however the following exception, applicable likewise to all the tenses in which *have* is employed, viz., when the action is not to be done by the subject of the verb directly, but through the agency of another, in which case *have* is employed with a meaning equivalent to *make*, *get*, or *cause*; as, "I will do it, or *have* it done," that is, *get* it done, or *cause* or *make* it *to be* done. So, "Do this, or have it done," that is, do it yourself or *get it* done, or *make* or *cause* it *to be* done. If we say, "Have finished your supper, or have your supper finished, before I come back," the command is entirely personal, and does not mean to employ the agency of a third person in eating, for it would then be *his* supper. "Do it yourself, and have it done, or have done it, by 4 o'clock," precludes expressly the agency of a third person. Take the phrase, "Have your cake eaten quickly;" the old proverb about *eating* one's cake and *having* it, is decidedly opposed to considering *have* in this case the possessive verb.

For calling the simple past participle such merely, or the *imperfect* participle thus, instead of *perfect*, no reason need be given save the definition of the perfect tense, which describes it as containing an allusion to the present time, which allusion is always made in our language by the present of the auxiliary *have* in the corresponding mode. The

heretofore *perfect* participle is therefore properly only the *imperfect*, and being one of the simple tenses of the verb, is called the *simple past participle*, in opposition to the *compound past participle*, heretofore called the *compound perfect*, but in reality by composition and definition the *perfect* participle.

The analysis and reasonings in pursuance of which the changes in form were made, are in their principal parts now laid before the public. To the author they seem a sufficient warrant for his innovations; to those more learned and disciplined in the language than himself, this may not appear to be the case. The author does not feel particularly tenacious of the form he has adopted, if after a candid consideration of his reasons, those qualified to judge should decide it to be incorrect. It really can matter but little whether *will* and *shall* be put in the Indicative or Potential, or whether the simple past participle be called the Imperfect or Perfect; that is, it can matter but little as to any practical utility in the employment of language. If, however, principles incline one way, and custom has hitherto inclined the other, as to the arrangement, the very circumstance of its not exerting any considerable effect on the practical employment of language is an argument for establishing the most correct principles, since the change can be attended with little inconvenience.

Those wishing to have a full view of the subject would do well to analyze the force of *shall* and *will* in asking questions, and in some indirect forms of command; comparing them with the analysis here given; and likewise to try the employment of *is* and *was*, before the infinitive, for the same purposes.

It may be well to remark, on account of the length of the foregoing discussion, and the nature of the argument used in it, that the author does not by any means intend to interfere with the application of *shall* and *will* to the expression of simple futurity, but merely to show, that such is not their proper force, nor that in which they are actually used in very many instances. They must have some place assigned them, and his only object was to show, if possible, that, to choose between the two, there was greater fitness on the whole in placing them as he has done, than in their former position.

THE END.