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THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

by

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THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As the Ontological Argument is grounded in the Platonic philosophy, in a systematic consideration of this proof for the existence of God, for orientation, it is necessary to start with Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. Plato, following in the spirit of his great teacher Socrates, endeavored to give to the world a theory of knowledge founded upon the Socratic idea of universals. The Sophists had placed knowledge upon the basis of the particular and the accidental, and Socrates pointed out to them that knowledge is concerned with the general and the typical. Plato argued that if our knowledge is derived from sense-perception and opinion, the Sophists would be right in their contention that there could be no genuine knowledge. But Plato contended that sense-perception gives us mere appearance only and genuine knowledge arises when we go beyond sense-perception to the idea, and discover the universal. This art of thinking in concepts is called Dialectics by Plato, and he says it is the love of truth which compels us to this study.

For example, we cannot call a man just or unjust unless we have a notion of what justice is. The main theme in Plato's Republic, is what is Justice? Plato is endeavoring to find a universal which is the archetype of all qualities under it. He finds in his doctrine of Eidos the solution of the problem of the One and the Many. The universal, permanent idea is the One, all else is the Many subsumed under the One. The idea or notion is a synthesizing principle which comprehends or holds together the essential qualities common to many particulars. To us of today these ideas appear as mere mental processes only, the particular alone exists. Outside the mind there is nothing corresponding to the archetype. Antisthenes is reported to have said

"I see horse but not horseness". But Plato held a different viewpoint, and this is the essential point upon which this Ontological Argument finds any cogency at all, and that is, that the ideas or forms to Plato were not mere ideas in the minds of men or even in the mind of God. For Plato they exist in and for themselves, they are real or substantial forms; the original, eternal, transcendent archetypes of things, existing prior to things and apart from them, independent of them and uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The particular objects which we see are just imperfect copies of eternal forms. The particulars come and go, but the ideas go on forever. For example, men come and go but the man type, the human race goes on forever. The objects or copies are many, but the idea or archetype is one. All things, relations, qualities, actions, in fact, everything has its idea or form, thus the ideas are numberless. But, while the archetypes are numberless, they are not a chaos, but rather consist of a well-ordered system with the highest idea at the apex, the Idea of the Good. Thus the ideas consist of a well-ordered and rational cosmos. The ideas are interrelated and connected by organic unity and arranged in logical order. The Good is the source of all the rest and beyond it there is no other. This idea of the Good is also regarded as the cosmic purpose, so therefore the Universe is also a rational moral whole.

This notion of the idea does not originate in experience. It does not come by inducting from particular cases. For example, the idea of justice already exists implicitly in the soul. These universal principles which lie imbedded in man's soul are the starting point of all his knowledge. When we approach the world, we already have ideals or standards of truth, such as Beauty, Justice, Goodness,- the particular

objects in the world are imperfect copies of these standards. So, with Plato as with Socrates, conceptual knowledge is the only genuine knowledge. But, if it is asked what guarantee have we of its truth, we find, in short, Plato appealing to metaphysics, that is, his world view for the proof of the validity of knowledge. He holds that our senses can grasp only the changing, fleeting phenomenal world, but conceptual thought can grasp the eternal and changeless, the essential forms of things which exist independently of the mind.

It would take too long to give an exhaustive account of Plato's philosophy in respect to his doctrine of ideas, and for our purpose it is only necessary to note that the Platonic philosophy is based upon the reality of the Ideas. Our universal concepts, such as Justice, Beauty, Truth, Goodness, have for Plato not merely existence in re but also ad rem. To a thorough understanding of the Ontological Argument it is essential to recognize this point.

It is further necessary to note that, while in Plato there is a dualism of ideas and matter, yet it is not the dualism of modern philosophy, that is, of consciousness and its object. The ancient Greeks did not have the idea of consciousness such as we hold today. Our view that the contents of knowledge are the mind's own ideas, and as things exist outside of the mind we cannot know them, was foreign to the Greeks. Their problem was the problem of the One and the Many, and Plato tried to solve it by making the Idea the One, and the imperfect copies in the world of sense the Many. To Plato universals cannot exist in the mind without objectivity. To him ideas could not be mere mental states. The controversy in the Middle Ages between Nominalists and Realists ^{was} ~~was~~ over just this ^{very} question. Nominalists, as we know, held that Universals are just names; Realists, following Plato, held that ideas are not only mental

states, but also entities in the external world. The Greeks did not distinguish between in mind and out of mind. Descartes, by putting ideas in the mind, sets the problem for all modern philosophy. The ideas, then, to Plato are the only true and original elements of reality, to which everything that becomes or changes owes what reality it possesses. Socrates had held that only the knowledge of concepts guarantees a true knowledge, but Plato goes further and maintains that only ⁱⁿ reflection ~~in~~ of forms, ideas, or concepts that true and original being can be maintained. Plato, in the Phaedo, also speaks of the ideas as causes, and actually denotes the ideas as the causes by which all that is is. So the ideas are the only true being. Thus Plato's doctrine of ideas is not subjective but is as objective as matter.

Having seen this objective viewpoint of Plato we now have the basis for the ontological argument. It is an attempt to establish the existence of the Infinite, not from facts, such as is done in the Causal, the Design, and the Moral arguments for God, but from ideas. That which is necessary exists. While Plato, arguing for the existence of the gods, especially mentioned as proofs, the argument from Design, from Intuition, and from Universality of Belief, yet it may be said that his philosophy was the first attempt to prove the reality of the Infinite from the essential principles of knowledge.

Following Plato came a number of firm believers in the Platonic pre-suppositions, and they have based their views of divine reality upon this foundation. Augustine, for instance, argues for the existence of God from the very nature of truth. The very laws of our intellectual and moral constitution are ideas which cannot have their source in us but must be eternally inherent in an unchangeable and perfect Being. Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the founder of English Deism, Cudworth, Cleanthes the Stoic philosopher, and Boethius, all held to metaphysical pre-

suppositions similar to Plato. But Anselm of Canterbury was the first to attempt to deduce the reality of God from the very idea of God. So Anselm has become famous as the founder of that type of a *priori* argument which is called Ontological.

He has written two discourses^{which}, especially attempt to argue to the existence of God, namely the Monologium and the Proslogium. In the Proslogium, or, as he calls it, "A Discourse", we have a direct argument for the existence of the Infinite, while in the Monologium the argument is rather indirect. Anselm was not altogether satisfied with the presentation in the Monologium, and as he himself says, he wanted to find a single argument for the proof of God. "After I had published, at the solicitous entreaties of certain brethren, a brief work, The Monologium, as an example of meditation on the grounds of Faith, in the person of one who investigates, in a course of silent reasoning with himself, matters of which he is ignorant; considering that this book was knit together by the linking of many arguments, I began to ask myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists, and that there is a Supreme Good requiring nothing else, which all other things require for their existence and well-being; and whatever we believe regarding the Divine Being."

Anselm's wording of the argument is as follows: "Indeed, we believe that Thou art a Being, O Lord, than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God?. But at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this Being of which I speak - a Being, than which nothing greater can be conceived - understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist. For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When

When a painter first conceives what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it. Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

"Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a Being, than which nothing greater can be conceived and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

"And it assuredly exists so truly that it cannot be conceived not to exist, for it is possible to conceive of a Being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this Being, Thou art, O Lord, our God."

But how has the fool said in his heart what he could not

conceive; or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? Since it is the same to say in the heart and to conceive. But if really, nay, since really, he both conceive, because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, in one sense an object is conceived when the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity which the object is is understood. In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist, but in the latter not at all, for no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no one who understands what God is, can conceive that God does not exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any, or with some foreign signification. For God is that ^{than} which a greater cannot be conceived. And he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this Being so truly exists, that not even in concept can It be non-existent. Therefore, he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that He does not exist." (Prologium, Deane's trans. pp. 7-10.)

This argument of Anselm, condensed and by the use of symbols, may be stated as follows:

Let X = God, a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived.

The fool has an idea of X because he cannot deny what he has an idea of.

But the fool does not understand that X exists.

Differentiation: 1 - Object in the understanding.
2 - Understanding that object exists.

Illustration of this: The painter first has the picture in the understanding only, then after painting it he has a picture in the understanding and in actuality.

Hence, the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least X.

Assuredly, X cannot exist in the understanding alone.

For, suppose X exists in understanding alone, then say, X1, for instance, can be conceived to exist in reality.

X1 is greater than X because it exists not only in the understanding but in reality also.

If X is in the understanding alone, then something which is greater can be conceived, namely, what exists in reality as well as in the understanding.

But this is impossible, because X, by definition, is a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived.

Conclusion, hence X plus X1 exists.

This constitutes the first part of the argument. Stating symbolically the second part, it would read as follows:

Let A = a being which cannot be conceived not to exist.

" B = a being which can be conceived not to exist.

If X = B, then it is not X, for this is a contradiction.

But X = A (Anselm does not say this in his Argument but it is implied) $\neg$ X1 = X plus A.

Therefore, X is that which cannot even be conceived not to exist.

If our mind could conceive^o better than X plus A, the creature would rise above the Creator, Everything else can be conceived not to exist; let us call this Y. To X it belongs to exist more truly than all other things, and hence in a higher degree. We should say that Anselm means to be more real^{mlr} than to exist more truly. For there are kinds and degrees of reality; for example, reality of the idea in the mind, and reality in re, or in actuality, in things. Anselm holds that everything

else, that is, Y, can be conceived not to exist, except God. Then he goes on further and his argument may be stated as follows: ~~Not~~ Not only God (X) but also say Xn, a being greater than can be conceived. But if God is not Xn, then a greater than God can be conceived, but this is impossible. Anselm's argument here seems to tend to the infinite regress, because he says that it can be conceived that there is a being greater than can be conceived.

Anselm's argument, reduced to a syllogism, would seem to read as follows:

Let M = the Idea of the greatest being.

" P = reality or existence.

" S = God.

The idea of the greatest being includes reality; M is P.

God is the idea of the greatest being; S is M.

Hence, God is reality or existence; S is P.

But it may be objected that, of course, granting the major premise, the conclusion necessarily follows. But can we grant the major premise? Anselm would answer that if existence is not included in the idea of the greatest Being, then it is not the idea of the greatest Being; for there would still be a greater being conceivable, which would have the attribute of existence.

On the basis of the Platonic realism that universals exist objectively, Anselm's argument is logical and cogent. This is the crux of the whole problem. To Plato, idea, as we have seen, included existence. If that is true, all follows. But the real point of attack, as far as the syllogistic form is concerned, is in this major premise. In fact, it seems to us that there are really four terms to Anselm's syllogism, namely: 1 - the Idea of the Greatest Being; 2 - the Idea

of the Greatest Being plus existence; 3 - Reality, per se; 4 - God.

1 - This Idea of the Greatest Being = ^{Being} _^ than which nothing ^{greater} _^ can be conceived.

2 - This Idea of the Greatest Being = objective reality.

3 - God = this Idea.

4 - Hence, God = reality.

Thus, Anselm concludes, God is not only an Idea, but is an idea which has objective reality. Unless we have this term number 2. we cannot get beyond the realm of ideas. This second term, of course, is a Platonic presupposition which Anselm included in term 1, but in fact it is for us, it is a separate term. On this basis of four terms Anselm's syllogism is fallacious.

Looking at the argument in another way, we would criticise Anselm's major premise by asking the question, Does M (The idea of the greatest Being) include reality in re? We are bound to say M includes reality only by definition. Starting with this definition of M the conclusion that God exists logically follows, but only on this allowed definition. Therefore, we must conclude that the major premise, M = P is true only by definition.

In this respect the Ontological Argument is like the demonstrations in mathematics and the theorems of geometry, which are based on and involve definition. Mathematical or geometrical theorems are true only if something else is true, but that something else must always be granted before the conclusion logically follows: If we do not grant the major premise, then the conclusion will not follow. This is precisely our criticism of Anselm's syllogistic reasoning. His argument is valid only if the definition in the premiss is valid. If we do not allow the Platonic definition of the Idea, then Anselm's

argument falls to pieces. As Paulin says, in an article on the Ontological Argument in the American Journal of Theology, vol. 10, page 53, "Of Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza, it might be said that all three of these ~~xxx~~ thinkers might well say that they care not who makes the argument, if to them be given the making of definition. Their general form of syllogism is: - "If I have an idea of God of which existence is ~~a mark~~, then that God exists. But I do have such an idea, therefore God exists."

We can conclude no more than this, ^{that} namely, his argument as stated gives us only the Idea of reality, and not objective reality. We remain in the realm of ideas and have not passed to concrete existence. Re-stating the argument once again, we find that what Anselm actually does is this:

M = the Idea of the Greatest Being.

P = the Idea of existence, (not objective existence but only mental existence.)

S = God.

Then the syllogism would read, M = P (^{would be} ~~P~~ not the idea of the Being, than which a greater could not be conceived, unless it included the idea of existence as an attribute, and we might add the idea of perfection, ^{to} etc.).

S = M.

Hence S = P.

What Anselm thought he was logically doing is this: M = the Idea of the Greatest Being, which includes existence (Platonic).

P = Reality,

~~objective-existence.~~

S = God,

Therefore, S = P.

Gaunilo's Objections.

Gaunilo, a monk, of Marmoutier, in his Liber Pro Insipiente, becomes the first great critic of Anselm. In eight different points *parts* he takes up the argument of Anselm and attacks it. *First* he sets up the argument as Anselm gives it in the Proslogium. ~~Second~~ *2* Then he remarks that the fool might make this reply, "This Being is said to be in my understanding already, only because I understand what is said. Now, could it not with equal justice be said that I have in my understanding all manner of unreal objects, having absolutely no existence in themselves, because I understand these things, if one speaks of them, whatever they may be."

"Unless, indeed, it is shown that this Being is of such a character that it cannot be held in concept like all unreal objects, or objects whose existence is uncertain, and hence I am not able to conceive of it when I hear of it, or to hold it in concept. But I must understand it and have it in my understanding; because it seems, I cannot conceive of it in any other way than by understanding it, that is, by comprehending in my knowledge its existence in reality."

"But if this is the case, in the first place there will be no distinction between what has precedence in time - namely, the having of an object in the understanding - and what is subsequent in time - namely, the understanding that an object exists; as in the example of the picture which exists first in the mind of the painter, and afterwards in his work."

"Moreover, the following assertion can hardly be accepted; that this Being, when it is spoken of and heard of, cannot be conceived not to exist in the way in which even God can be conceived not to exist."

~~in the way in which even God can be conceived not to exist.~~ For, if this is impossible, what was the object of this argument against one who doubts or denies the existence of such a Being.

"Finally, that this Being so exists that it cannot be perceived by an understanding convinced of its own indubitable existence, unless this Being is afterward conceived of - this should be proved by an indisputable argument, but not by that which you have advanced: namely, that what I understand, when I hear it, already is in my understanding. For thus, in my understanding, as I still think, could be all sorts of things whose existence is uncertain or which do not exist at all, if someone whose words I understand, mentioned them. And so much the more if I should be deceived, as often happens, and believe in them: though I do not yet believe in the Being whose existence you would prove." (Deane's tran. Proslogium, pp. 145-7.

Succinotly put, Guanilo's reply might be stated, A - If to have a thing in understanding implies that I comprehend in my knowledge its ~~existence~~ existence in reality - then there is no distinction in time between a concept having an object in the understanding and knowledge of its existence. For example, the picture which first exists in the mind of the painter, then in actuality in the concrete object.

B - That the assertion about X (using our previous symbol), that it cannot be conceived not to exist, cannot be accepted, for if this is impossible, what is the object of this argument against the denier of X. (Evidently, Guanilo means that if God cannot be conceived not to exist, no one can doubt that He does not exist, and so, there is no use to argue against one who claims He does not exist. He may claim that God does not exist but that does not make it so; in fact, his claim is of no value when the actual fact is that no one can conceive God's non-existence.)

0 - Guanilo holds that what is in the understanding is not necessarily real, that is, objectively so, because in the understanding are all sorts of things whose existence are uncertain or which do not exist at all.

3. He holds that Anselm's example of the picture and the painter is not a good analogy to the idea of X, ^{4. -} ~~for~~ He cannot conceive the nature of X as he cannot conceive the nature of God, and for this very reason, God can be conceived not to exist. He cannot comprehend reality even from some other like reality. For, he says, you yourself assert that reality is such that there can be nothing else like it.

He then gives example of a man who was absolutely unknown to him. He could understand the characteristics of the man named because he knew in general what man is. But even at that, he could be absolutely deceived, for the man named might not exist at all. He can conceive of a man such as mentioned because he knows the characteristics of man in general, but of God he cannot conceive, except as a word, because he knows no ~~the~~ class characteristics to which God can be likened. When a thing is understood it is not understood by a mere word, which is a real thing as far as the sound of letters and syllables is concerned; but a thing is understood by what the word denotes. Here we note Guanilo's nominalistic tendencies. To him the word God is a mere word or concept and we do not know its nature in reality.

5. He then takes up the next point made by Anselm that if X does not exist in reality, then whatever exists in reality would be greater than X. So X, which has been proved to exist in my understanding, could not be greater than Y, (all other beings), Guanilo admits that X is at least in the understanding. But to be in the understanding does not mean that it has real or objective existence. As to the argument that X must exist or it would not be X, (otherwise the Being which is

greater than all would not be greater than all,). Guanilo says "I deny that X is greater than any real object." And further he denies any other existence to X than mental existence.

He then argues that before you can hold that X subsists in itself you must prove that X itself really exists somewhere, (i.e. objectively). When X as objective reality is proved, then from the fact that it is greater than ^{all} _^ may be proved that it is absolute and independent, (i.e., subsists in itself).

6. In this part he gives his famous illustration of a lost island. He says, "For example, it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called the Lost Island. And they say that this Island has an inestimable wealth and all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of the Islands of the Blest; and that, having no owner or inhabitant, it is more excellent than all other countries which are inhabited by mankind, in the abundance with which it is stored.

"But if someone should tell me that there is such an island, I should easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by logical inference: 'You can no longer doubt that this Island, which is more excellent than all lands, exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For, if it does not exist, any land which really exists, will be more excellent than it; and so the Island already understood by you to be more excellent, will not be more excellent.'

"If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this

Island truly exists, and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe that he was jesting or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had established with any certainty, the existence of this Island. For he ought to show first, that the hypothetical excellence of this Island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain in my understanding."

Robert Flint, in his "Theism", objects to this illustration of the Lost Island. His words are interesting. He says, "There is no force, as Anselm showed, in the objection of Guanilo, that the existence of God can no more be inferred from the Idea of a Perfect Being than the existence of a Perfect Island is to be inferred from the idea of such an island. There neither is nor can be the idea of an Island which is greater or better than any other which can ever be conceived. Anselm could safely promise that he would make Guanilo a present of such an Island when he had imagined it. Only one Being, - an infinite, independent, necessary Being - can be perfect in the sense of being greater and better than every other conceivable being."

7. In the seventh place, Guanilo points out that this X must be first proved in some way to have objective existence. Then we may be able to prove from this all the attributes that such a Being necessarily should possess. To us this is a good point. Anselm tries to prove the reality of God from his attributes. Guanilo would prove the attributes only after the existence of God had been proved. Anselm takes the attributes for granted and proceeds to prove God from them, but this cannot be done. And, as Guanilo holds, the attributes must be proved first, or God's objective reality must be proved first in some other way.

Then Guanilo shows that the non-existence of God is not the only thing that is inconceivable. He speaks of himself saying that since he is to positively aware of his own existence, he is not sure that he can conceive of his non-existence. So onesself as well as God, are in the same class as far as the conception of non-existence is concerned. Instead of saying the non-existence of God is inconceivable, he holds it would be better to say it is unintelligible. For, according to the true meaning of the word, unreal objects are unintelligible. Paulin remarks, "Guanilo touched the nerve of the whole issue when distinguishing the conceivable from the intelligible, and declared that unreal objects are unintelligible. Other tests of existence we have none; if God exists even He cannot escape it (that is, this test of ^{existence} ~~experience~~.) Amer. Jour. of Theol. Vol. 10, p. 57.

8. Finally, Guanilo passes a compliment upon Anselm as regarding the other parts of his books, ^{which he} ~~and~~ says, "Are argued with such truth, such brilliancy, such grandeur, and are so replete with usefulness, so fragrant with a certain perfume of devout and holy feeling, that though there are matters in the beginning which, however, rightly sensed, ~~are~~ weakly presented, the rest of the work should not be rejected on this account. Rather ought these earlier matters to be reasoned more cogently, and the whole to be received with great respect and honor."

As to the value of Guanilo's reply, we believe it is a valid rebuttal and disproof of Anselm's argument as long as we also deny the Platonic pre-supposition with which Anselm began. It would be taken by common consent that anything in the understanding does not necessarily have to exist. With Guanilo, we would think a man was joking with us who made such a claim. As Weber says, "the criticism of Guanilo is

just. Indeed, the Ontological Argument would be conclusive only in case the idea and the existence of God in the human mind were identical. If our idea of God, is God himself, it is evident that this Idea is the immediate and incontrovertible proof of the existence of God. But what the theologians aim to prove is not the existence of the God Idea of Plato and Hegel, but the existence of the personal God. However that may be, we hardly know what to admire most, St. Anselm's broad and profound conception, or the sagacity of his opponent who, in the seclusion of his cell, anticipates the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant." (~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Weber's Hist. of Philosophy, pp.)

~~Dorner, in interpretation of Guanilo's reply, says that Guanilo makes a twofold answer in defense of atheism. We doubt whether Guanilo was trying to substantiate atheism. However that may be Dorner's remark is interesting. He says, "The highest essence has no being in the understanding; it only exists therein by the ear not by being. It only exists as a man who has heard a sound endeavors to embrace a thing wholly unknown in an image." And so on, quoting from Guanilo.~~

Let us note, however, that Guanilo did not fully comprehend the depth of Anselm's thought. We cannot think Anselm so naive as not to realize that a mere thought in understanding ^{does not} implies its objective existence. His own words indicate that he clearly recognizes the distinction between in intellectu and in re. Anselm had something deeper in mind than mere thought or idea, in fact he makes his contention on the basis of concepts that have a right to be called universal, ^{as} as Kant later held, if universal, then objective. And further,

his main contention is not on universals in general but on the highest universal, God. He did not, perhaps, always stress this point fully enough, but he does say very distinctly "Now I promise confidentially that if any man shall devise anything existent either in reality or in concept alone, except that than which a greater cannot be conceived, to which he can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing and will give him his Lost Island, not to be lost again." ^{that} (Anselm's Apologetic, Deane's trans. p. 158). The important point ~~here~~ ^{here} ~~that it is~~ ^{that it is} ~~that~~ ^{is} brought out ~~is~~ ^{is} not ~~that~~ every notion that must have objective existence, but only the notion of God. In this respect the universal God is unique. It seems to us that Guanilo missed this point and made his objection upon the basis of any notion in the mind. As Hocking says, "In general, the circumstance that I have an idea of an object is the ~~empt~~ emptiest of reasons for supposing that that object exists. Whatever force such reasoning can have must depend upon some peculiarity in the idea of God, not to be found in ~~the~~ ideas or ideals generally. It is always with some incredulity that we read the assertion that any idea of ours carries with it its own guarantee of reality. Yet this same ontological argument is the only one which is wholly faithful to the history and the anthropology of religion. It is the only proof of God. Although an idea which should carry on its face an assurance of reality must have something unique about it. We are not without analogies which help to interpret this extraordinary type of argument. The Idea of God is not the only one of our ideas which seem to convey an assurance of objectivity. My idea of space I am inclined to regard as real. Of my idea of causality, I can hardly think that it is an idea only, a form of relating events without an objective counterpart. So also with the Beauty of things, or their

Goodness, etc. It is not without precedent, then, that an idea should convey with itself some apparent title to reality; it is not impossible that some idea, as perhaps the idea of God, should be able to make this title good." (Hocking's "Meaning of God", p. 308).

Anselm's Answer to Guanilo.

Anselm attempts a general refutation of Guanilo's argument against him. He replies that either God is not X or he is not in the understanding or in concept. He resorts to an argument ad hominem by appealing to Guanilo's faith and conscience that his statement is false. By faith and conscience, Anselm says, we know God in concept and understanding. Then it follows, that either Guanilo's grounds are not valid, or the inference based logically on these grounds is not justified. And again he asserts, that if X is even conceived in the understanding, it must exist in reality, for X cannot be conceived except as without beginning, and Y (all other things) which we conceive, but which do not exist, are conceived through a beginning. Hence Y is not X, therefore X necessarily exists because it can be conceived to exist. Thus he asserts in the same old way that if a thought is in the understanding, then it is in reality.

He makes a further contention regarding X existing as a whole everywhere and always. We would grant that X is in the understanding and that we can conceive it to exist. But conceiving it to exist does not make it exist, not, at least, from the modern psychological point of view.

Anselm then takes up the illustration of the Lost Island, in which Guanilo tries to show that in the same way as Anselm's argument about X, so the real existence of a lost Island might be inferred from the fact of its being conceived.

*In chapter five of his reply Anselm
Anselm shows that the case of a lost island is not
analogous to X.*

takes Guanilo to task for misquoting him. Guanilo speaks of the term Being as greater than all other beings. Whereas Anselm uses the term 'a being than which nothing greater can exist.' Of course Anselm is right in this respect, for there is a difference between the two terms. He is not concerned with the merely more excellent, but with that than which a more excellent cannot be conceived. The former is one among particulars, while the latter is the universal and embraces all particulars. Thus, Anselm would contend that for this reason Guanilo's idea of a Lost Island does not involve existence. Particulars are known through the existence, while universals are known a priori. While we would grant that Anselm is right in this contention, it does not change the validity of his argument, although it may weaken somewhat Guanilo's criticism.

In the sixth chapter of his Apologetic. Anselm points out clearly that he means by understanding an object, the comprehending of it as real existence. To have an object in the understanding is to comprehend it real, But he ought to have pointed out that this cannot be true of every object, but only of God as Leibniz suggested. Regarding this reply of Anselm to Guanilo, Windelband points out that Anselm, instead of holding to the belief that God must be thought, simply expatiates further on his argument in the Proslogium that whatever is in the intellect must be in re. Leibniz, too, mentions this as a defect of the Anselmian argument. If Anselm had pointed out more explicitly the unique character of the God idea he might have gone farther in his proof. As regarding the force of his answer to Guanilo, there is not much to be said in addition to our general comments made previously on the Anselmian arguments. The only real addition that he makes in the Apologetic to his previous argument in the Proslogium is an appeal to the eternity and ubiquity of God, which, however, does

not help him much in the establishment of God's existence.

Descartes and the Ontological Argument.

Though Descartes is the father of the modern dualism of thought and its object, yet he is an upholder of the Ontological Argument. In fact, he is regarded as stating this Ontological Proof in a better form than Anselm, the originator of the argument. As is generally known, Descartes starts his philosophy with a provisional doubt. He has been seeking to gain uncontaminated truth. Nothing is to be accepted as true until it has been proved absolutely true. Descartes doubts everything, - the testimony of the senses, the existence of the material world, and the existence of God. After examining all traditional beliefs he comes to the conclusion that the only thing that cannot be successfully doubted is the thinking process itself. As he says, one thing I am certain of, is that I am conscious of myself as thinking, - even in doubting I am thinking. Therefore, an analysis of our ideas reveals at least one absolutely certain principle: "Cogito ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am". He believes that this principle gives him a criterion of truth. Its characteristic is distinctness and clearness, and he regards these characteristic as the proof of the truth of ideas. // Thus for Descartes, reality lies within the self, and now the problem is, how to get out of the self, - Solipsism. He proposes to escape solipsism through the door of logic. He maintains that any idea is as true as the consciousness that accompanies it, just as in geometry a proposition partakes of the axioms from which it is derived. There are at least three kinds of ideas in my mind, adventitious (what comes in); factitious (what the mind creates or makes over); and innate. Descartes hits upon the

innate ideas to help him out of his solipsism. Innate ideas are not derived from experience, and they are clear and distinct. God as a perfect Being is one of these ideas. Now, if the idea of God can be deducted from consciousness it would prove very useful to Descartes, provided, of course, it had reality. Consciousness only knows itself and the question is, how is the outerworld to be known. Descartes thought that if God could be demonstrated, then he could demonstrate the existence of nature. It is not our purpose to discuss Descartes any further than to show how he is led to discuss the problem of theism. He regarded this question as being of such importance that he gave a number of arguments tending to establish the existence of God. We are only interested in the two Ontological arguments which he discusses. One is a simple deduction, which might be stated, "If I have in my consciousness any idea as clear and distinct as my idea of myself, it must have existence as myself. My idea of God has just that clearness and distinctness; therefore God exists." As Descartes himself states it, "But now if I, because I can draw from my thoughts

His second proof is the geometrical argument, so named by
Descartes

the idea of an object, it follows that all I clearly and distinctly apprehend pertaining to this object does in truth belong to it. May I not from this derive an argument for the existence of God? It is certain that I no less find the idea of a God in my consciousness, that is, the idea of a Being supremely perfect, than that of an figure or number whatever; and I know with not less clearness and distinctness that an actual and eternal existence pertains to His nature, than that all which is demonstrable of any figure or number freely belongs to the nature of that figure or number; and therefore, although all the conclusions of the preceding meditations were false, the existence of God would pass with me for a truth at least as certain as I ever judge any truth of mathematics to be, although indeed such a doctrine may at first sight appear to contain more sophistry than truth. For as I have been accustomed in every other matter to distinguish between existence and essence, I easily believe that the existence can be separated from the essence of God and that thus God may be conceived as not actually existing. But nevertheless, when I think of it more attentively, it appears that the existence can no more be separated from the essence of God, than the idea of a mountain from that of a valley, or the equality of its three angles to two right-angles from the essence of a triangle; so that it is not less impossible to conceive a God, that is, a Being supremely perfect, to whom existence is a wanting or who is devoid of a certain perfection, than to conceive a mountain without a valley."

Meditations - Veitch Transl. pg. 28

Descartes seems to anticipate the objection of Kant and others in regard to his statement of this argument. Kant made the objection that it is not necessary to think a triangle or to think a

His view is that just as the peaks of mountains and valleys are inseparable from each other, so the notion of existence and thought are inseparable from each other. And while he admits that thought cannot impose any necessity upon things yet he thinks perhaps we can say the necessity of the existence of God determines him to think that way. We can for what is this necessity? To speak unless it is for thought and by thought?

Supreme Being, because ~~there~~ ^{objects to the position that} thought imposes no necessity upon things. Descartes points out that the case between thinking a mountain and therefore a valley, is not analogous to thinking God and therefore his existence. He says, "But in truth I cannot conceive a God unless as existing, any more than I can a mountain without a valley, yet just as it does not follow that there is any mountain in the world merely because I conceive a mountain with a valley, so likewise, though I conceive God as existing, it does not seem to follow on that account that God exists; for my thought imposes no necessity upon things; and as I may imagine a winged horse, though there be none such, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God though no God existed. But the cases are not analogous, and a fallacy lurks under the semblance of this objection, for because I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain or valley in existence, but simply that the mountain or valley, whether they do or do not exist, are inseparable from each other; whereas on the other hand because I cannot conceive God unless as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and therefore that He really exists; not that this is brought about by my thought, or that it imposes any necessity upon things, but on the contrary, the necessity which lies within itself, that is, the necessity of the existence of God, determines me to think in this way. For it is not in my power to conceive a God without existence, that is, a Being supreme and perfect, and yet devoid of absolute perfection, as I am free to imagine a horse with or without wings."

Descartes then takes up the objection that to posit existence of God after granting Him all perfection, is to argue in a circle.

He holds that upon the basis of this idea not being factitious, that is, depending simply upon my thought, but upon the basis that it is an innate idea, we can hold to its truth. Finite beings could not originate such an idea. It can come only from the existence of such a being. He says, "Nor must it be alleged here as an objection that it is in truth necessary to admit that God exists, after having supposed him to possess all perfection, since existence is one of them, but that my original supposition was not necessary; just as it is not necessary to think that all quadrilateral figures can be inscribed in a circle, since if I supposed this I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus, being a figure of four sides can be therein inscribed, which, however, is manifestly false. This objection is, I say, incompetent; for although it may not be necessary that I shall at any time entertain the notion of Deity, yet each time I happen to think of a first and sovereign being, and to draw so to speak the idea of him from the storehouse of the mind, I am necessitated to attribute to him all kinds of perfections, though I may not enumerate them all or think of each of them in particular. And this necessity is sufficient as soon as I discover that existence is a perfection, to cause me to infer the existence of this first and sovereign being: just as it is not necessary that I should ever imagine any triangle, but whenever I am desirous of considering a rectilinear figure composed of only three angles, it is absolutely necessary to attribute those properties to it from which it is correctly inferred, that its three angles are not greater than two right-angles, although perhaps I may not then advert to this relation in particular."

Having gone at this length in his argument, which is called the geometrical proof for God, Descartes then falls back upon his

dictum that true ideas are those that are clearly and distinctly perceived, and that the God idea is one of this character. He says, "But indeed, whatever mode of probation I in the end adopt, it always returns to this, that it is only the things I clearly and distinctly perceive which have the power of completely persuading me. And, although of the objects I conceive in this manner, some indeed are obvious to everyone, while others are only discovered after close and careful investigation; nevertheless, after they are once discovered, the latter are not esteemed less certain than the former. Thus, for example, to take the case of the right-angled triangle, although it is not so manifest at first that the square of the base is equal to the squares of the other two sides, as that the base is opposite to the greatest angle; nevertheless, after it is once apprehended, we are as firmly persuaded of the truth of the former as of the latter. And with respect to God, if I were not preoccupied by prejudices, and my thought be set on all sides by the continual presence of the images of sensible objects, I should know nothing sooner or more easily than the fact that we see Him. For is there any truth more clear than the existence of a Supreme Being or of God, seeing it is to his essence alone that necessary and eternal existence pertains? And, although the right perception of this truth has cost me much close thinking, nevertheless at present I feel not only as assured of it as of what I deem most certain, but I remark further that the certitude of all other truths is so absolutely dependent on it that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly. "

It is pointed out by Dörner that Descartes makes an advance upon Anselm in that he holds that all other ideas carry in them possibility only and contingency; but the idea of God as the most

real of all beings, carries also in itself its 'necessaria, et eterna existencia'. Dorner, in criticism, says, "By such reasoning some negative or apogogic aid is rendered to the proof that we do not arrive contingently at the thought of the absolute; but nothing more. Granting that the idea of God lies ready made and innate within us, we might, it is true, be compelled to think it, but the apprehension would still be absent of the fact that the thought of the divine existence necessary inhered in the thought of God."

And further it will be granted that modern psycho-analysis would not fully admit Descartes' criterion of truth. We need only to witness the facts of dream life. It is objected on good grounds that the Cartesian theory of cognition of God does not differ from his theory of any objective reality. And since his philosophy has become antiquated and rejected, his whole argument for the existence of God has become impaired. The case is the same as with Anselm; if you accept his epistemology you have to accept his conclusion. After reviewing Anselm we came to the conclusion that while his syllogistic putting of the argument may have been faulty, yet upon the deeper basis of the Platonic pre-suppositions his conclusions were hard to refute. Now, in regard to Descartes, we meet this strange situation. He restates the Anselmic argument and speaks of the *Supremé Being*, not as a greater than which cannot be thought but as the all-perfect Being. Perfection is a universal in the Platonic sense. Yet Descartes' separation of thought and being, or consciousness and its world, divides into two sides the gulf which he apparently had bridged by his insistence on universal perfection, implying the existence of God. His ontological argument attempts to unite thought and being, while his epistemology separates these two again; and ever since

Descartes' day philosophy has been trying to overcome this dualism of subject and its object.

Descartes no doubt did not see the inconsistencies in his several views, and if he had he might have saved the world a deal of trouble in trying to answer the problem, is existence created? For our present purpose we can only hint that the dualism which Descartes created does not exist, and that his version of the ontological argument contains more truth than his dualism. Of course, on the basis of this modern dualism of thought and object, Descartes is to be criticised in his version of the ontological argument, upon the same grounds as Anselm. Kant takes up in particular this geometrical argument, so-called, and apparently demolishes it to the satisfaction of most thinkers. We shall take up this criticism of Kant and treat it when we come to him.

Spinoza and the Ontological Argument.

Spinoza, "the God intoxicated man," naturally was interested in an argument for the proof of God. So entranced was he by the mathematical formula of Descartes that he attempted to construct on a geometrical model a complete system of the knowledge of God, of the Universe, and of Man. He writes, "I will write about human beings as though I were concerned with lines and planes and solids." And so his chief work, the "Ethics", is a treatise which consists of definitions, axioms and demonstrations like the Euclidian geometry. With Spinoza, definitions play a more important part than with either Anselm or Descartes.

His definition of a supreme being is, "By God I mean a Being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality." Having given this definition, he proceeds in Proposition II, as follows: "God, or Substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists."

Of this proposition, he gives the following proofs, "If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then His essence does not involve existence. But this (by Proposition 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Now Proposition 7 reads, "Existence belongs to the Nature of substance. Proof. Substance cannot be produced by anything external, must therefore be its own cause, that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, for existence belongs to its own nature."

The first statement in the proof comes from corollary to Proposition 6, which reads, "One substance cannot be produced by another substance. Proof. It is impossible that there should be in the

universe two substances with an identical attribute. That is, which have anything common to them both, and therefore one cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the other. Q.E.D. Corollary, - Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself, for in the universe nothing is granted save substance, and their modifications. Now (by the last proposition), substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external itself. Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend upon the knowledge of its cause, and itself would not be a substance.

Then, step by step from the original proposition, as in geometry, he arrives at his conclusion. "Therefore God necessarily exists." QED. And after giving proof upon proof and each time apparently with mathematical precision arriving at his conclusion, "God necessarily exists", QED; Spinoza is still a little doubtful of the validity of his own proof. He says, "Many persons will not be able to see the force of this demonstration. If people would consider the nature of substance they would have no doubts about the truth of proposition 7. In fact this proposition would be a universal axiom and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself and is ~~perceived~~ conceived through itself, - that is, something of which the conception requires, not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of a thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications; for although they may have no actual existence apart from

the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only ^{truth} ~~xxx~~ substance can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence because they are conceived through themselves." (Ethics, ^{Elwes's} ~~Elwes's~~ trans. p. 43.)

As logical as Spinoza's propositions and proofs appear to be, we must ask this one important question, can we grant his definitions? And this is what we must ask of all mathematical demonstrations - we must first be sure we can grant the definition before we can accept the conclusion that logically follows. If we do accept Spinoza's definition that absolute infinity and perfection of a thing establishes its existence, then in his own words it is true that, "Of no existence can we be more sure than of the existence of the Being, absolutely infinite or perfect, that is, God."

In fact, we have really made no progress until Spinoza has shown that we must accept his pre-supposed definitions. Leibnitz held mathematical definition must be shown to correspond to reality, and as he urged, "We cannot safely use definitions before knowing that they are real."

If we allowed Spinoza's definitions (which manifestly we cannot until proven,) by his *causa sui* we would apparently have satisfied the first demand of the Anselmian proof, namely, God is only thought if He is thought as existing - existence necessarily inheres in the idea.

But the further question remains that if God is not an idea of a contingent being, we must still ask whether he is not a contingent idea, and not a necessary idea, that is, whether it is necessary to ~~xx~~ think the idea of God. We have seen that in this matter Descartes has given us only a negative and apagogic reply. It remained for Kant

to enter profoundly into this question. But before taking up his contributions, pro and con, to the Ontological Argument, let us consider the reaction of Leibnitz to the general argument.

Leibnitz and the Ontological Argument.

Leibnitz is a critic of Descartes as regards his putting of the Ontological Argument. While he acknowledges his belief in innate ideas, and in particular the innate idea of God, yet he holds there is a gap to be filled in the Cartesian reasoning. He does not believe with the scholastics that the Ontological Argument amounts to a paralogism, but that it is an imperfect demonstration. He holds that Descartes is at fault in assuming that the perfect being is possible and implies no contradiction. He agrees that if this single point of the possibility of God were proved in addition to the Ontological Argument - the whole demonstration would be complete.

Leibnitz admits that we have the right to presume the possibility of every being and especially that of God until a contradiction is found, and he makes this admission in favor of the argument. It at least gives us a morally demonstrative conclusion. Yet while this may be so nevertheless he believes it is not quite sufficient and that a demonstration must be sought which has the strictness of a proof in mathematics. In his own words, "Although I am for innate ideas and in particular for that of God, I do not think that the demonstrations of the Cartesians drawn from the idea of God are perfect. I have shown fully elsewhere that what Descartes has borrowed from Anselm is very beautiful and really very ingenious, but that there is still a gap therein to be filled. This celebrated archbishop who was without doubt one of the most able men of his time, congratulates himself not without reason, for having discovered a means of proving the existence of God, a priori, by means of its own notion, without referring to its effects. And this is very nearly the force of his argument: God is the greatest, or as Descartes says, the most perfect of beings, or rather, a Being of supreme grandeur and perfection, including all

degrees thereof, that is, the notion of God. See now how existence follows from this notion. To exist is something more than not to exist, or rather, existence adds a degree to grandeur and perfection and as Descartes states it, existence is itself a perfection. Therefore this degree of grandeur and perfection or rather this perfection which consists in existence, is in this supreme, all-great, all-perfect Being, or otherwise some degree would be wanting to it, contrary to its definition, consequently this supreme being exists. The scholastics have misunderstood this argument and have taken it as a paralogism, in which respect they were altogether wrong, and Descartes who studied quite a long time the scholastic philosophy at the Jesuit of Le Fleche, had great reasons for re-establishing it. It is not a paralogism, but an imperfect demonstration, which assumes something that must still be proved in order to render it mathematically evident; that is, it is tacitly assumed that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect Being is possible and implies no contradiction, and it is already something that by this remark it is proved that, assuming that God is possible, he exists. This is the privilege of divinity alone. We have the right to presume the possibility of every being, especially that of God, until someone proves the contrary. So that this metaphysical argument already gives a morally demonstrative conclusion, which declares that according to the present state of our knowledge we must judge that God exists and act in conformity thereto. But it is to be desired nevertheless that clever men achieve the demonstration with the strictness of a mathematical proof, and I think I have elsewhere said something that may serve this end." (Taken from New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Langley's translation, pp. 502, ff.)

We see here again how Leibnitz, as others of his day, believes that the only valid proof is that built upon a mathematical model. In another place, he speaks of this same defect of assuming the possibility of God and concluding therefore that He exists. He says that the assumption of the possibility of God, which is secured from having an idea in the mind, is analogous to the idea of perpetual motion which we assume to have, and as perpetual motion is an impossibility, therefore our idea of it is not real but apparent. And so likewise, before we can deduct the existence of God from the idea of God, we must prove his possibility. Leibniz own statement of this contention is as follows: "The other argument of Descartes which undertakes to prove the existence of God because the idea of him is in our souls and must have come from the original is still less conclusive. For, in the first place, this argument has this defect in common with the preceding, that it assumes that there is in us such an idea, that is, that God is possible. For what Descartes alleges, that in speaking of God, we know what we are saying, and that consequently we have an idea, is a deceptive indication, since in speaking of perpetual mechanical movement, for example, we know what we are saying, and yet this movement is an impossible thing, ^{of} which consequently we can have only an apparent idea." *New Essays. Pg - 505 (Trans.)*

~~In the second place Leibnitz holds that the argument is inadequate~~

With Anselm there was no question about the possibility of God, ^{as} in his theory of knowledge, to deny the possibility of the universal was absurd, and as Descartes regarded the idea of God as innate it was never thought necessary to inquire about the possibility of the idea. Leibnitz, too, regarded the idea of God as innate, and the

chief reason for his emphasis upon the possibility of God is seen in the fact that he had a difficulty to meet in reconciling his theology with his theory of physics. So he was compelled to lay stress upon the possibility of God, a need which was not necessary in his physics but essential to his theology. To Leibnitz, if the idea of God is not contradictory it is possible. As he assumes that the idea is not contradictory, therefore to him, it is possible. Then he continues in his reasoning that, if God be defined as a necessary Being, then it is self-evident that the necessity of his existence is involved, therefore God exists. To this it is objected, that Leibnitz has covered the ground all too quickly, and what he really has done is to bury the difficulty a little deeper under the ambiguity of the category of possibility.

In the second place Leibnitz holds that the argument is inadequate which attempts to prove that the idea of God which is in our souls must have come from the original, therefore God exists. He realizes that as a believer in innate ideas he ought not to question the existence of God, but he holds that he permits this doubt of God only in relation to a strict demonstration based upon the idea alone. He reminds us that he does believe in the existence of God and the possibility of demonstrating this existence in other ways, as for instance, in the doctrine of the pre-established harmony. We think that he is right in his view that all the arguments for the existence of God are good but need perfecting. And the Ontological Argument falls under the same criticism, it too is good but needs to be perfected. As regards its worth as a morally demonstrative conclusion, Leibnitz is hinting at its validity ~~as~~ as a value judgment, but does not state so in so many words. In fact, the reality of value judg-

ments comes as a later development after Leibnitz' time, and of this we shall have much to say later on. For our purpose here, however, we simply want to note how he, though subjecting the Ontological Argument to criticism, still sees value in it and cannot give it up entirely. As a rationalist, he was a firmer believer in the ^{a priori} method, and gives a most cogent metaphysical argument ^{of his own} for God, which is hard to refute.

As Anselm was criticised in his view of the Ontological Argument on the basis of definition, so Leibnitz is also attacked. Uberweg remarks, "Leibnitz makes application of these definitions to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God in its following Cartesian form: whatever follows from the definition of anything can be predicated of this thing; existence follows from the definition of God as the most perfect being, than which no greater can be conceived, for existence is a perfection, therefore, existence can be predicated of God. He argues that only follows that God exists provided his existence be possible; for the inference from the definition ~~he~~ presupposes that the definition is a real definition, that is, that it involved no contradictions; the nominal definition, namely, contains only the distinguishing marks, while the real definition establishes the possibility of the thing defined; this possibility is known a priori if all the predicates are compatible with each other, that is, if a complete analysis discloses no contradiction between them. But no such contradiction is possible in the idea of God because this idea includes only reality." Uberweg makes this comment upon this

addition of Leibnitz to the Cartesian argument. "But the categorical inference from definitions takes not merely the possibility, but the reality of the object defined for granted; the definition only shows the necessity of our connecting the predicate with the subject, and ^{that} not/supposing the subject to exist, and it leads, therefore, by itself to a hypothetical conclusion, which only then, when the reality and not merely the possibility of the subject, has been otherwise demonstrated, passes over into a categorical conclusion. Kant justly disputed the correctness of the Cartesian argument, together with that of the Leibnitzian addition to it. ^{" Vebwing - History of Philosophy - pg 105} This leads us to Kant.

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Kant and the Ontological Argument.

Following Leibnitz, the Leibnitz-Wolffian school, realizing, the part played by definition, showed that their predecessors had treated existence as a perfection among the perfections of the most perfect being. Now, they pointed out, that if the notion of their predecessors concerning God be accepted, their analysis of that concept is bound to establish existence. This is cutting at the nerve of the whole argument. The question may be asked, does the analysis of a concept point to existence as a necessary element of the concept? If you answer no, then the question becomes, if not in other cases, why in the case of God? Is it not a fact that the reality of a concept seems to be obtained only by adding something to a concept, rather than by the mere dissection of a concept; that is, by synthesis rather than by analysis. And this is just Kant's point, and it is now appropriate to take up

his analysis of the Ontological Argument. In a very thorough manner and very profoundly, Kant analyses the argument employed by the speculative reason for the proof of the existence of a Supreme Being. He points out how reason, seeking this proof of God, takes the following course. First, most naturally, it moves from the conditioned to the unconditioned or necessary being. Taking for granted that there must be some absolute, necessary existence, reason endeavors next to discover what kind of being that is, which is necessary, and concludes that the only necessary being is that which is the condition of all other reality, but which in itself is unconditioned. This gives us the conception, in short, of an ens realissimum, the most real being.

The third step is to conclude that this being containing all reality in itself, is the Supreme Being for which reason was seeking. Granting that this reasoning is sound so far as it goes, Kant objects that it does not necessarily follow that the only necessary being is that which contains all reality within itself. For it is very possible to have a necessary being which is also finite and not infinite. If that is so, we cannot reason from the existence of a necessary being to the existence of an infinite being. And thus here our argument is put to an estoppel. Even granting that we have reached legitimately the existence of a necessary being, we cannot legitimately go on to an infinite being, as necessity of being does not imply infinity of being, *for an Infinite*. In Kant's own words he states the matter as follows: "For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that namely, the inference from a given existence (my own, for example,) to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being, is valid and unassailable; that, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of other beings, to be absolutely un-

conditioned; and admitting, too, that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing which may be attributed without inconsistency, absolute necessity - it does not follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in which the supreme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not discover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being - an element which is manifestly existent in the sum total of all conditions, I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not exist (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are concerned), the condition does not exist either. On the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary being, and must be in every respect without result." *Critique of Pure Reason* Pg-

Notwithstanding the logical deficiencies which he sees in this argument, Kant makes some interesting remarks upon its deep-seated influence. He says, "This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an authority which in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has never been divested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us, which as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical application to our nature, or in other words, would be responsibilities without motives, except upon the supposition of a supreme being to give effect and influence to the practical laws; in such a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions which, although

objectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of reason, preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter. The equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical addition; indeed reason would be compelled to condemn herself, if she refused to comply with the demands of the judgment, no superior to which we know - however defective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be." (Critique of Pure Reason, Michaeljohn's translation, p. 441.)

In a passage preliminary to his discussion of the arguments of Theism, which he declares to consist of only three, namely the physiological, the cosmological, and the ontological, he practically shows in one point his chief objection to the Ontological Argument. He regards it as based upon grounds contrary to his philosophical viewpoint namely, the impossibility of knowing objects beyond the phenomenal world. He says, "I shall show it as unsuccessful on the one path - the empirical, as on the other - the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative thought."

All though his dissertation on the impossibility of an ontological proof for the existence of a Supreme Being, ^{again} and again he shows that in the final analysis his chief criticism of this proof rests upon its incompatibility with the suppositions of his epistemological conclusion. It is to be noted that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant holds that if the final test of reality is in the data of sensations, there can be no data for the idea of God. He did not mean that God does not exist, but only that if he does exist it must be out of all relation to the human intellect. The only method Kant knows according to the Critique of Pure Reason, whereby one can learn of a being is a posteriori and not a priori^{again} through the data of the

senses and not through mere activities of the thought. Hence, from the idea of absolute being we do not get the right to posit existence. He remarks, "It is evident from what has been said, that the conception of an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations than, by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold; for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely necessary existence, seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of such a being."

By this last remark, of course, Kant means that the understanding operates only in the world of experience, and therefore can give us no help in the ideas which transcend experience. He reminds us that while philosophers have always talked about an absolutely necessary being, they have never taken the trouble to ascertain if a being of this nature is conceivable, much less to show its existence is demonstrable. As Watson, in interpreting Kant, puts it, "No doubt it is easy to define a necessary being as one the non-existence of which is impossible. But this does not tell us whether that, the non-existence of which is impossible, is really conceivable. Now what we wish to know is the condition which compel us to affirm that the non-existence of the absolutely necessary being is impossible. The unconditioned is no doubt thought of as a negation of the conditioned by means of which the understanding is able to regard anything as necessary; but this does not give us a positive conception of the

unconditioned, and therefore it may be that it is merely a product of abstract thought, to which nothing whatever corresponds." *Kant Explained*
Watson pg 293

Kant calls this conception of a necessary being a chance conception which many have attempted to establish by examples taken from geometry. No doubt he is especially referring to Descartes. It is said that every geometrical proposition, such as a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, and ~~thence~~ from this it is inferred that we may reason from the conception to the existence of a necessary being. Kant objects to this reasoning and points out that all the examples given, have been drawn from judgments and not from things, and concludes, "the unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgment. The proposition above mentioned does not enounce that three angles necessarily exist but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three angles must necessarily exist - in it." *Condillac*

Then Kant points out that the difficulty involved is due to the confusion of logical necessity with real necessity. It is contended that because existence is a predicate inseparable from the subject as conceived, therefore it follows that the subject must have existence. Logical necessity is the necessary inseparability of a predicate from a given subject, and real necessity is a necessary existence of the subject itself. It is obvious that the two are different, for example, in an analytic judgment the predicate cannot be denied without denying the subject, because the predicate simply contains what is in the subject and no more. In case of a triangle we cannot deny that it has

three angles and yet affirm the existence of a triangle. But Kant points out that while the logical necessity of the predicate, a triangle has three angles, is apparent, yet it can be said that there is no triangle, and therefore no three angles.

And precisely it is the same with the idea of a necessary supreme being. We cannot deny the attributes of God if we posit his existence. His omnipotence ^{For example} cannot be denied because the conception God tacitly involves conception almighty. But we can deny his existence and there is no contradiction involved in holding that a necessary being does not exist. We ask the question ^{of Kant} would it be a necessary being if its existence could be denied? It seems to us it might be a being but not a necessary being. If we deny existence to the necessary being, how can we rationally proceed?

It occurs to us that we are making several suppositions such as the conceivability of the non-existence of a triangle, or the denial that a triangle exists. There can be no value to this supposition when we consider the fact that a triangle actually does exist; therefore, how can we deny it? However, it might be different with the conception of a Supreme Being. We cannot say with such certainty, empirically, that it exists, which is the very point we want to prove. So the analogy of the triangle and the Supreme Being is not a very good one. As Dorner says, "Kant's objection to Descartes is of course too sweeping. When he says in opposition to him 'the three angles of a triangle are equal to two triangles is of course necessary, but only hypothetically, - upon the existence of the triangle,' the objection is not just. Supposing a triangle were nowhere to be found, the conclusion would still hold that when thought it must be so thought,

But it is to be conceded that Descartes has not proved that existence is just as inherent in the thought of God as the relation of the angles is in the thought of a triangle. *Dorner Syst. of Christian Doct. pg*

~~Descartes contended that there is one conception which is unique, namely, this very conception of an absolutely necessary Being; it is a conception with an object which cannot be denied without contradiction. And further he holds that this conception of an absolutely necessary being is that of a being who possesses within himself all reality, and that which contains all reality must necessarily exist. We cannot deny the existence of the object without contradiction as the very possibility of the thing implies the predicate of existence.~~ *Dorner*

Kant then points out that the whole matter rests upon the question whether the judgment that a necessary being exists is an analytic or a synthetic judgment. As an analytic judgment we do not get ^{to} the actual existence, for to say that the conception contains existence as one of its predicates is not to say that an object lying beyond the conception actually exists. To call the predicate existence does not matter, for in an analytic judgment we can have no more in the predicate than is contained in the subject. On the other hand, if we admit that the judgment is synthetic, as he says it obviously is, we cannot ~~xx~~ argue that there is a contradiction involved in denying the predicate existence. Only in analytic judgments is the denial of the predicate self-contradictory. As Kant himself says, "I ask is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible), exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition? In the former, there is no addition made

to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence; but then the conception in your mind is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility - which is a miserable tautology. The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of a predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty, for supposing you were to term all positing of a thing as reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject, and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without contradiction - a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions alone. " Critique -

Kant then showed that from the point of view of logic, being is not a real predicate, but simply the copula of a judgment. For example, in the judgment, God is omnipotent, the word, is, does not mean that God exists, it merely expresses the relation of the predicate to the subject of a judgment. But if I mean by the phrase God is, that he exists in reality, we have a totally different kind of judgment from the other which we have been discussing. This means that an object corresponding to the conception exists beyond the conception. The other simply implied logically that having the conception God, we have also the predicate tacitly contained in it. As far as the content of a conception and the content of the object corresponding to it is concerned, they are the same. Otherwise, the conception God would not be an expression of the whole object God. This is what Kant means when

he says, "The real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contains no more than a hundred possible dollars."

While the content is the same in the conception one hundred dollars and in the actual one hundred dollars, yet this does not give us the right to conclude that, having the concept one hundred dollars, we have the actual one hundred dollars in our purse. That is, we cannot argue from the mere existence of a conception to the actual existence of an object corresponding to it. While it is true, however, that the content of the conceptual one hundred dollars is the same as the ^{content of the} actual one hundred dollars, yet there is a fundamental distinction between the two that is very obvious, namely, - the existence of the one hundred dollars implies something more than the mere conception of them - something in the way of actual cold cash which I handle in experience. As Kant puts it, "But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars, - that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object, the dollars, is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective reality - this existence - apart from my conception, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars." (He means an actual content.)

Hegel says in reply to Kant that God is something very different from a hundred dollars. This is very similar to Anselm's reply to Gaunilo, when he states that the example of a lost island is not a good analogy to the Supreme Being.

Granting all of this, ^{Kant continues his argument, that} the point is that notwithstanding the completeness of my conception in the determination of a thing, it is not augmented by saying a thing exists. For the point at issue is,

not whether certain determinants exist in our thought but whether they actually exist beyond our thoughts in objective reality. And therefore, no matter how complete may be our conception of the Perfect Being, to affirm its objective existence is to go beyond our conception. As Kant says in his own words, "By whatever and by whatever number of predicates - even to the complete determination of it - I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist. And I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of a thing by the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the thing exists - if it exists at all - with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise, not that which was cogitated but something different exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains whether this being exists or not? For although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori." *We must grant the cogency of this logical reasoning*

✓ *new* right at this point we recognize the ^{real} source of the ^{untenability} of the ^{whole} ~~ontological argument~~ ^{in Kant's} ~~difficulty~~. Kant holds that in the case of objects of sensible experience, it is very obvious that from the conception of the thing we cannot pass to its actual existence. As he puts it, "If the question regarded an object of sense merely, it ~~would~~ would be impos-

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sible for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate experience by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility." *And he continues;*

"Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is obtained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception or by inferences connecting some object with a perception), belongs entirely to the sphere of experience, which is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining."

Again we reiterate, we see why Kant cannot entertain the Ontological Argument, *for* we cannot go beyond the sphere of sensuous experience. *For* true ~~the~~ knowledge the categories apply only to sensuous experience, *so* of course we cannot know the Noumenal world, where he has placed the

idea of God. "The conception," as Professor Watson interprets Kant here, "merely states the condition under which an object of experience is possible, and we can only convert this possibility into actuality by means of a perception which enables us to obtain a knowledge of the object as contained within the content of our experience. Thus it is through perception that we are able to pass from the conception of an object to the knowledge of it. (To us this sounds like Berkeley's ~~xxxxxx~~ *esse est percipi*). But, as Professor Watson continues, "In the case of the idea of an *ens realissimum*, there is no possibility of enlarging our conception by means of perception, and hence it is not surprising that we cannot find in our idea anything to distinguish its content from mere possibility. Valuable, therefore, as the conception of a Supreme Being is, as a mere idea it cannot in any way enlarge our knowledge; nay we cannot even say with Leibnitz that an actual being corresponding to our idea possibly exists. The famous Ontological or Cartesian proof of the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore invalid." (Watson, "Kant Explained", p. 297).

Kant finally concludes his account of this proof by saying "The celebrated Ontological or Cartesian Argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of naughts to his cash account." (Critique of Pure Reason. p. 450.)

While Kant thus refutes the Ontological Argument he still regards the idea of a Supreme Being as very useful and concludes his objections to this a priori proof for God as follows: "The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with

regard to the existence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis, of the possibility of which an a priori judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong."

As we review Kant's objection to the Ontological Argument it seems to us that it is based, as we heretofore have mentioned, upon a philosophical viewpoint that we can know nothing beyond the field of experience. Boiled down and condensed it really amounts to just this. Kant admits this in these words, "Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside of it in order to attribute to it existence. With objects of the senses this takes place through their connection with any one of my perceptions according to empirical laws; with objects of pure thought, however, there is no means of knowing their existence because it would have to be known entirely a priori, while our consciousness of every kind of existence, whether immediately by perception or by conclusions which connect something with perception, belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and any existence outside of that field, though it cannot be declared to be absolutely impossible, is a free supposition that cannot be

justified by anything. " (Critique of Pure Reason. Müller's trans. p. 483).

From the standpoint of the modern epistemological dualism as raised by Descartes, Kant's criticism of the Anselmian argument appears to be conclusive; but from the standpoint of the untenability of this dualism Kant's objections are inadequate. This is a problem that we cannot enter into as it constitutes a separate thesis. We may say briefly that if this epistemological dualism is real, it is quite important to ask how is knowledge possible? But if this modern dualism is a false view of consciousness, and there exists a real unity of subject and object in thought, then Kant's argument falls flat. We cannot go into this except as to note this fact. Kant did not take into consideration that the Ontological Argument was formulated by Anselm who was utterly oblivious to this modern dualism. He failed to recognize Anselm's epistemological viewpoint. As Lindsay says, "Kant missed seeing that being is given, not predicated, in the affirmation of this argument. He sets out under the misapprehension that Anselm asserted that what exists in intellectu exists also in re. Whereas Anselm maintained that existence is of necessity in the concept of God. There was truth behind the existential judgment of this judgment which Kant never saw. It was a rasher thing than he supposed, to say that is always is the copula merely of a judgment. Hegel did much better when he founded the highest proof for the truth of a concept in its being a necessity to thought and concluded therefrom to its necessity of being." *And he continues:*

"Kant was wrong in supposing that what we necessarily think and think as necessarily existing, has no title to validity. It is no question of mere conceiving, as is frequently supposed, it is one of necessary thinking. To say that, 'existence cannot be clawed out

of thought' is very obvious and beyond challenge in the case of mere imagining, but that is not thinking at all in the sense of this argument. It is thought dealing with the real - the existence and the necessarily existent.. The truth is - Kant's position is both illogical and irrational. To deny the passage to existence from necessary thought of necessary existence - would be a far more astounding feat than Kant dreamed. To what meaningless confusion would thought, in its ultimate principles and workings, be reduced if it could be held, - as Anselm deemed impossible, (*Nequit enim non esse cogitare*), that God can be conceived as non-existent and this argument treated in the fictitious Kantian mode. The idea of this argument should never have been ~~with~~ classed with those born of individual fancies, and its uniqueness and solitariness lost sight of." (Biblical Sacra, vol. 66, 38.) *Perhaps Lindsey is a little strong in his condemnation of Kant. We think so and would ask him to demonstrate more fully his position.*

Finally, this conclusion is to be noted. While Spinoza and Descartes showed that the idea of God is not the idea of a contingent being, the question which still remained was, whether the idea of God is not a contingent idea, that is, whether it is necessary to think the idea of God, which if thought is necessarily thought as self-existent essence. So the question following Descartes and Spinoza became this; is the formation of the concept of God contingent or necessary? We know Anselm held to the idea of God as given and Descartes as innate, while Kant goes so far to show that the idea of God is the demand of reason. It is not contingent but follows from the very nature of reason.

While Kant grants the necessity of the idea of God, he does not

allow, as we have seen, that the existence of God necessarily follows. Dorner cannot see Kant's position here at all. He says, "Although therefore the idea of God is not an idea of a contingent but of a necessarily self-existent essence - indeed, although the thought of this essence is not volitional or contingent, but rationally necessary, - it does not, notwithstanding, follow in his (Kant's) esteem, that this idea has a real existence; it only follows that we must think it. But its existence does not follow from the fact that we think it and must think it as existent. But what more can be desired of a proof than that we, in order to think rationally,^{we} must think a thing necessarily (in this case, an ultimate essence), which when thought is thought as existent, namely as self-existent? If this thought of the highest existent essence is a thought rationally necessary, a rational thought is not possible in addition, and at the same time it states the opposite, and either asserts that the thought of the highest essence generally is no necessary thought, or that, though necessary, it is not necessarily a thought of something existent. A skepticism which concedes that the thought of God is the thought of an existent thing and a necessary thought, but nevertheless thinks that it does not therefore follow that there is an existent highest essence, must at the same time give utterance to the contradiction that the thought which is necessary for the rational thinker is not necessary. For only by non-thought could it assert non-necessity. We say, on the contrary, that the proof is for rational and not for hesitant thought. The rational necessity of a proof being demonstrated, there is no room for an intermittent or denial of the truth of this thought. If that is not to be regarded as true and certain which we must think, no knowledge at all is possible, not even mathematical

knowledge; we must skeptically despair of the cognizability of truth generally." (System of Christian Doctrine, vol. I, p. 224.)

Pfleiderer joins with Dorner in this view of Kant. He says, "If Kant thinks that even rationally necessary ideas need not on this account be regarded as objectively true, this opinion is the basis of a pure skepticism in the theoretic sphere. But Kant himself denies this altogether immediately he treats of practical proof; then, what is necessary to thought according to reason, is objective truth without more ado, and indeed, possesses transcendental and absolute validity." (Philosophy of Religion, p. 21).

When Kant leaves the Critique of Pure Reason and turns to the Critique of Practical Reason we find him swinging back again to the conceptions which were really in the background of Anselm's thinking, as we know they were certainly the basis for Plato's views, namely, the idea of value judgments. Kant is the modern discoverer of these value concepts, as Plato was the ancient discoverer of them. While we cannot prove or disprove God's existence from the standpoint of mind, yet, says Kant, from the standpoint of will we can with good conscience hold to the postulate of God and thus satisfy the demands of reason and of life. And we must say to the undying credit of Kant, that this was his real objective in life, - to establish his moral and religious viewpoints on unassailable ground. As he himself says, he did away with knowledge in order to make room for faith. He saw that the ground upon which the arguments for God were built up, were always open to attack and so he made the most thorough study ever attempted in this field of theism, yet not under that title. As Kuno Fisher has said of Kant, "However Kant may have varied in his thinking about the knowableness of demon-

strability
~~stratism~~ of God, there was not a moment in the course of the development of his philosophical convictions when he denied or even doubted the reality of God."

And so, while Kant appeared as the great agnostic who absolutely demolished the greatest argument for the existence of God, we find him in reality as the great discoverer of the universal values which are so necessary that we cannot be rational without acknowledging them. Kant says in regard to his postulates of the pure practical reason that they are not theoretical doctrines but rather pre-suppositions demanded by the character of man as a moral agent. He affirms that they in no way extend our speculative knowledge, but merely enable us to affirm the objective reality of the ideas of speculative reason. Thus they justify us in the use of conceptions which otherwise would be employed illegitimately. As regarding the postulate of the existence of God, he says, that it depends upon the necessity of pre-supposing a supreme being who also is intelligent and moral, as the only condition under which the highest good is capable of being realized.

While the speculative reason led to the conception of a Supreme Being, it was unable to prove that it was more than an ideal. Practical reason, on the other hand, showed that a Supreme Being actually exists as the supreme principle, without which the highest good is impossible, and that this Being is endowed with the sovereign power of prescribing moral laws in an intelligible world. After these considerations, he practically reduced the whole matter of the existence of God to a matter of faith. He asks the question: "do these postulates then enlarge our knowledge? Are immortality, freedom, and God, which for speculative reason are transcendent, immanent, and constitutive for practical reason?" He answers that

they are immanent and constitutive but only in the sense of being pre-supposed in the moral consciousness. He avers that practical reason does not bring the Supreme Being or the free subject or the intelligible world within the sphere of knowledge: all that it can do is to show that they are bound up with the practical conception of the highest good. It is purely on the basis of the moral law that their reality is established. While, we cannot know the the existence of God because of the character of our experience, yet Kant proclaimed his belief that no sophistry can destroy our rational faith in his reality.

In speaking further upon the extension of practical reason, we note ~~need~~ that Kant was far from being the great destroyer of faith that many thus rate him. He holds that the free ~~id~~ ideas of reason, namely, immortality, freedom, and God, are not knowledge but thoughts of objects which even the theoretical reason showed to be possible. They have objective reality in the sense that they are essential to the realization of moral law. He even affirms that we cannot doubt the existence of objects corresponding to these ~~from~~ three ideas of reason, though we cannot know how they are related to those objects, and we therefore cannot make any theoretical synthetic judgment in regard to them. And he admits that while there is no extension of our knowledge through these ideas, the sphere of reason is itself enlarged, in the sense, that we are now certain that there are actual objects corresponding to them. And finally, he writes upon faith as a fundamental need of human nature. He avers that though the principle of morality is for us subjective, it is also objectively the basis of faith in God, Freedom and Immortality, since without postulating these, the highest good could not possibly be realized.

He says, "If it be admitted that pure moral law is inexorably binding on everyone as a command, the righteous man may say, 'I will that there should be a God'; I will that, though in this natural world, I should not be of it, but should also belong to a purely intelligible world; finally I will that my duration shall be endless. I insist upon this and will not ^{let} ~~lose~~ this conviction be taken from me. This is the sole case in which my interest, because I have no right to surrender or limit it, inevitably determines my judgment."

Wizenman attacked Kant's argument here and illustrated his point by the example of a lover who deluded himself with an idea of the duty ^{to} of his mistress, which, however, exists nowhere but in his own imagination. Kant's reply was, "I entirely concur with Wizenman in all cases where the feeling of want ~~is~~ is due to mere inclination or natural desire. Such a want cannot postulate the existence of the object wanted, even for him who feels it; much less can it be the ground of a demand or postulate which is universal. In this case, however, we have a want of reason springing not from the subjective ground of our wishes but from an objective motive of the will, which binds every rational being, and hence authorizes him a priori, to presuppose the existence in the nature of the conditions necessary for its satisfaction."

As to the primacy of the theoretical over the practical we find that Kant's followers ~~were~~ divided. Weber regards Kant as giving primacy to the practical reason. He says, "Theoretical reason and practical reason, though not directly contradictory to each other, are slightly at variance as the most important questions of

ethics and religion, the former tending to conceive liberty, God, and the Absolute as ideal, having nondemonstrable objective existence, the latter affirming the reality of the autonomous soul, responsibility, immortality, and a supreme being. The consequences of this dualism would be disastrous if theoretical reason and practical reason were of equal rank; and they would be still more disastrous, were the latter subordinated to the former. But the authority of practical reason is superior to that of theoretical reason, and in real life the former predominates. Hence, we should, in ~~ex~~ any case, act as if it were proved that we are free, that the soul is immortal, and that there is a Supreme Judge and Rewarder. In certain respects, the dualism of understanding and will is a happy circumstance, if the realities of religion, God, freedom, and immortality of the soul were self-evident truths, or capable of theoretical proof, we should do the good for the sake of future reward; our will would cease to be autonomous, our acts would no longer be strictly moral; for every other motive except the categorical imperative of conscience and the respect which it inspires, be it friendship or even the love of God, renders the will heteronomous, and deprives its acts of their ethical character." (Weber, History of Philosophy, p.).

Thus Kant, who above all attacks the Ontological Argument and its pre-suppositions and apparently overthrows it to the satisfaction of many, turns back to it upon the basis of the practical reason and gives it place and authority. By this we mean, that the Ontological Argument as referring to the reality of values, especially moral values, is reinstated by Kant, though not in so many words. Our highest ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality are given

objectivity such as the Ontological Argument has unceasingly contended for. And it is Kant who gives us grounds for this view in his ~~optical writings~~. *Practical Reason*.

Hegel and the Ontological Argument.

In Dorner's conclusion as to the skepticism of Kant regarding the Ontological Argument, he pays tribute to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel as making the step beyond Kant. They recognized that ~~when~~ what we must necessarily think as existence does exist, Not only did Hegel hold this view but goes even farther and makes some actual ^{identity} identity of necessary thought and objective existence, thus overrating the Ontological Argument to its detriment. To Hegel nature and reason are one, but he subordinates Nature to Reason. For him all being and reason are identical, the same process that is at work in reason is present everywhere - hence whatever is real is rational, whatever is rational is real. We find therefore a logic in nature as well as in history, and he believes that the universe is at bottom a logical system, in fact the Absolute is reason itself.

By reason Hegel did not mean intuition but the concept or general notion; the divine idea is exhibited in history, matter, and thought. All being is thought realized, and all becoming is the development of thought. To Hegel reason is not an outside criterion of nature, that is, it is not in our mind only; but reason is objective in things, not subjective in ourselves. We are not to set up standards of our own by which to judge things, we have only to watch experience unfold and to note the laws which are involved in the unfolding, that is, Nature is full of reason as well as mind. Experience is a system of reason with its own laws, and Hegel's whole philosophy is an endeavor to explain this. We see here what

he means by the assertion that thought and reality are identical. Hegel does not mean, as sometimes interpreted, that our individual thoughts are the sole reality. Nor does he mean that reality is a set of abstract thought concepts; for him, concrete experience is the starting point and the end, and this experience is rational throughout. Every element of experience is connected by relations with a rational whole in which it has a definite place and which enables it to be thought understandingly. Each step exists only as it is intelligibly set in this larger framework; and its existence and its intelligibility are one. With such a system of identity we see how readily Hegel found interest in reviving the Ontological Argument, which also endeavors to unite the opposites, Thought and Being. Hegel reminds us that among the ancients, God is absolute thought as objective. But he attributes to Anselm the first appearance of the opposition between thought itself and being. He says, "Later, on the other hand, the opposition between thought itself and being began to appear with Anselm. It is noteworthy, that only now, for the first time through the Middle Ages and in Christianity, the universal notion and being, as it is to ordinary conceptions, became established in this pure abstraction as these infinite extremes. And thus the highest law has come to consciousness. But we reach our profoundest steps in bringing the highest opposition into consciousness, Only no advance was made beyond the division as such, although Anselm also tried to find the connection between these sides. But while hitherto God appeared as the absolute existence, and the universal was attributed to him as predicate, an opposite order begins with Anselm, - being becomes predicate, and the Absolute Idea is first of all established as the

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subject but the subject of thought. Thus, if the existence of God is once abandoned as a first hypothesis, and established as a result of thought, self-consciousness is on the way to turn back within itself. Then we have the question coming in, does God exist? While on the other side, the question of most importance was what is God?"

After presenting Anselm's statement of the proof of the existence of God, Hegel concludes that the content of the Anselmian reasoning is quite right, but the form is faulty. He says that according to Anselm "the highest conception cannot be in the understanding alone; it is essential that it should exist. Thus it is made clear that being is in a superficial way subsumed under the universal of reality, that to this ~~existent~~ extent being does not enter into opposition with the notion. That is quite right, he says, only the transition is not demonstrated - that the subjective understanding abrogates itself. This, however, is just the question which gives the whole interest to the matter. When reality or completion is expressed in such a way that it is not yet posited as existence, it is something thought and rather opposed to being than that this is subsumed under it."

Hegel then takes up the Kantian objection and criticises his argument against Anselm. He points out that Anselm as well as Kant knew that what was only a conception does not exist. But Anselm was not speaking of untrue conceptions but of pure thought. And then he shows that the only thing lacking in the Ontological Proof is a perception of the unity of thought and existence in the infinite. In his own words, he says, "Kant, on the other hand, attacked and rejected Anselm's proof - which rejection the whole world afterwards followed up - on the ground of its being an assumption that the unity of being and thought is the highest perfection. What Kant thus demonstrates in the present day - that being is different from thought and that being is not by any means posited with thought - was a criticism offered even in that time by a monk named Gaunilo. He combatted this proof of Anselm in a 'Liber pro Incipiente', to which Anselm directed a reply in his 'Liber Apologeticus Adversus Incipientem'. Thus Kant says, 'If we think a hundred dollars, this conception does not involve existence.' That is certainly true, what is only a conception does not exist, but it is likewise not a true content, for what does not exist is merely an untrue conception. Of such we do not, however, here speak but of pure thought; it is nothing new to say they are different - Anselm knew this just as well as we do. God is the infinite, just as body and soul, being and thought are eternally united; this is the speculative, true definition of God. To the proof which Kant criticises in a manner which it is the fashion to follow nowadays, there is thus lacking only the perception of the unity of thought and of existence in the infinite. And this alone must form the commencement."

Hegel - History of Philosophy VR 3.-pg -

Hegel urged rightly that in dealing with God we are treating of an object wholly different in kind from any hundred dollars, and that in fact no particular notion or representation whatever is comparable to the case of the concept of God. And again Hegel remarks that it would be strange if the concrete totality which we call God should not be rich enough to include so poor a category of being as that here involved. As he points out, thought itself seems to demand a unity of things which shall be ultimate; and this argument is but an effort to give logical form to our belief in such an ultimate, which is God.

¶ Hegel seems to approximate the result desired in the Ontological argument. Anselm thought that the idea of the universal God in the mind implied his existence in re. The God of Hegel is the absolute idea, but it is not a God of personality, such as Anselm speaks of in words of adoration and love. Hegel's Absolute Idea is a hard, cold, concept, devoid of personality and without the quality of love. He does not quite identify the idea of the absolute in intellectu with existence in re, but he does hold that the concepts of the thinker in his mind are of the same nature as the universal concepts. The process that is at work in reason is present everywhere in nature. So all motions and actions, in fact, all life, are a sort of unconscious thinking, and like individual minds they too follow the laws of thought. The more law we discover in Nature, the more rational its activity. True, there are superficial transitory and accidental forms in nature and in the entire world of experience, which do not appear to proceed by rational processes; but the problem of philosophy is to discover not these but the eternal essence, the harmony and the law of the world. And for Hegel this can be discovered, for things do have meaning. The planetary system is a rational order, the organism is rational,

6 66 purposive and full of meaning. Since the universe at bottom is a rational process, full of meaning and purpose, it can be known only by thought. But he does not regard the world as static but it is a dynamic process and so is thought or reason a moving process. Both are processes of evolution. All things are passing over into their opposites, but the process does not stop there, for the movement goes on, and opposites are overcome and become part of a unified whole.

Now this dialectical process, so called, this movement from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis, is alike both in the mind and in the world, for both alike are rational. The concepts in the philosopher's mind coincide with the objective evolution of the world; or stated in another way, the categories of subjective thought are likewise categories of the universe. Thus, in this sense thought and being are identical.

According to Dorner, "The aim and result of the Ontological Argument in Hegel's view is to show that the Absolute is true, or the essence of our being and thought, the basis from which our consciousness ascends. In the Ontological Argument the spirit comprehends itself in its Absolute being as absolute thought, it is at the same time existence. Thus Hegel applies this argument in the interests of a pantheistic or panlogistic mode of thought."

Dorner admits that while Hegel's view of the argument does not procure the complete concept of God (that is, the concept which includes personality as well as absoluteness), yet the statement of Hegel does go so far as to show the necessity that an unconditioned absolute essence is to be thought as existent.

As to what this absolute essence is, whether our being or the world or a transcendent being - remains undecided and requires further proof

As regards the Ontological Argument and Hegel's idealistic position in general, we would note that while his attempt to show the rationality of all reality was a very worthy endeavor and quite fruitful - yet he overdid it. It is generally conceded, as Rogers says, that "he exaggerated the extent to which this rationality is a transparent one for human thought, and its logically necessary character. If we were to judge by many of the utterances of Hegel and his disciples, all mystery is at last dispelled in the clear light of reason, and the whole course of creation may be ^{watched,} ~~watched,~~ as it moves with logical necessity from one step to the next. In opposition to this extreme and presumptuous gnosticism, Kant and his limitation of the human faculty to mere phenomena, proved a welcome relief. ***** For the spiritual side of life Hegel had done much; but what of that independent world of things, on which the experience of man depends and which seems at times so indifferent, so antagonistic even, to human interests? Hegel's treatment of this had been weak and fanciful, and he had even set himself against what have proved to be truthful scientific ideas, and finally, there was a new social spirit coming to birth, which Hegel also failed to satisfy. For him the task of philosophy was simply to interpret the movement of a universal spirit as it had already embodied itself in social institutions; it was not in any sense to prophesy or construct ideals. The whole effort of Hegel had been to show that truth is to be found in the actual, that between thought and reality, the ideal and the real, there is no separation. To the new temper which was beginning to demand social justice and a reconstruction of society that should give something to the mass of men to hope for, and relieve the sufferings of those with whom the Idea had not seen fit

to concern itself, Hegel seemed to have nothing to say." (Rogers, History of Philosophy, p. 44.)

As Hume carried out the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley to its logical conclusion, and thus too far, having failed to note the claims of rationalism, so it seems to us that Hegel has carried idealism to its logical conclusion, and thus too far, failing to note the claims of empirical and scientific fact. Thus, very naturally with his emphasis on logical idealism, he would practically find the ontological argument consistent in its claims. But as we have mentioned hitherto, he has exaggerated and overdone it. Hegel was not merely certain of the consonance between necessary thought and objective existence, but he goes to that extreme of transforming the consonance into an identity of thought and being. Anselm has ^{been} out-Anselmed. He desired to find a logical proof for the existence of God, but he never had any idea of worshipping logic in consequence. To Hegel thinking amounts to religion in its highest manifestations. For him the intellectual life practically becomes the supreme form of worship, as well as the basis for the metaphysical view of the world. And with Santayana we would regard Hegel's philosophy as egoistic, for Hegel regards the highest philosophy to be Hegelian. Romanticism becomes directed into a metaphysics, and wherever you have the assertion of the ego, as in Romanticism, you have no assertion of a transcendental ego, but rather a deification of our ego. While there is no question of the strength of many parts of the Hegelian philosophy, we simply desire to bring out in our conclusion regarding him that, as he claimed too much for thought, he has therefore claimed too much for the Ontological argument on its purely cognitive and logical side.

Summary.

The progress of the argument has been somewhat as follows: We noted that Plato hold to the objective reality of the ideas. To him they were not subjective but objective as matter. He offered no particular proof for them, but simply made an assertion of their reality. The ideal forms are there as entities in the external world and we do not know them by generalization or abstraction, but by contemplation, by reverential converse, The soul's own conversation with itself. Of course, this is a mystical and intuitional theory of knowledge and no demonstration of the divine idea as objectively real is attempted.

Anselm, starting with these Platonic pre-suppositions, endeavored to deduce the reality of God from the idea of God. Granting the Platonic premise that the universal idea, God, exists, not merely in the mind but also in re, Anselm's being than which nothing greater can be conceived, must have the attribute of existence, for if it does not have this attribute a greater still can be conceived, which exists not only in intellectu but also in re. For him, the highest degree of greatness must include existence. We noted that Anselm's argument is cogent provided we grant the major premise, namely, that the idea of the greatest being includes existence.

But Guamilo could not grant this major premise. He made the ~~pin~~ point that ~~what~~ what is in the understanding is not necessarily objectively real, and this point seems to be well taken. We granted that Anselm in his reply showed that Guamilo's famous illustration of the Lost Island was not analogous to the concept of God, and even granting this we found that Anselm did not ~~get~~ get out of the realm of ideas by his refutation of the analogy of the Lost Island.

Descartes found it necessary to prove the existence of God to get out of his solipsism. As a starting-point he had found reality in the self, and his next problem was to get out of the self. To do so he chose the route of the divine idea. He bases his argument on the perfection of God. He thought that it was as impossible to think God, lacking the attribute of existence, as it is to conceive a mountain without a valley. The one advance which Descartes made upon Anselm was the emphasis on the necessity of the idea of God; that, while all other ideas carry in them possibility and contingency only, the idea of God carries in itself necessity and external existence. This point helped the argument at least this much: that the thought of the absolute is not arrived at contingently but necessarily. However, even granting this point we saw that we have not conclusively proved that His existence necessarily follows.

Spinoza, too, by his mathematical process, seemed to satisfy the first demand of the Anselmian proof, that God is only thought if he is thought of as existing, - existence necessarily inheres in the idea. But the drawback we found in Spinoza was in his definitions. They played a more important part than in either Anselm or Descartes. But before we could accept Spinoza's conclusions we had to put his definitions under an acid test. The same question asked Spinoza is the same question asked today of all mathematical proof - even of the long established theories of Newton and Euclidian geometry, namely, are these pre-supposed definitions themselves valid? Until Spinoza proved the validity of his definitions we must hold that his proof of God falls short of truth.

Leibnitz criticised Spinoza on this point as we have seen, holding that we cannot safely use definitions before knowing that

they are real, While Leibnitz offered a special a priori proof of his own for the existence of God, yet he criticizes Descartes in that he failed to prove that the idea of God is possible and implied no contradiction. Leibnitz admits that if this point be proved, then the existence of God has been established, but he does not believe that Descartes has achieved this result. He grants, however, that the argument gives a morally demonstrative conclusion. Nevertheless, he holds that the demonstration should have the strictness of a mathematical proof to be valid. Leibnitz, on his own account, thinks he has overcome the objection which he saw in Descartes, namely the absence of proving the possibility of God. He assumes that the idea of God is not contradictory, therefore it is possible. Then, by definition, God is a necessary being. If he is a necessary being, he is self-existence. Then he concludes that the necessity of his existence is involved, and therefore he exists. We saw that Leibnitz goes too far in what he takes for granted, the necessity which Leibnitz saw, Kant declared is not in the existence of God but only in the connection of the predicate with the subject, as in an analytic judgment.

Kant held that the unconditional necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. He believed that the difficulty in this matter of necessity, is due to the ^{confusion} ~~misunderstanding~~ of logical necessity with real necessity. He held that only in an analytic judgment is the denial of the predicate self-contradictory, and not in a synthetic judgment. And he declared that the judgment that God as a necessary being, therefore existent, to be a synthetic judgment, as is every existential judgment. But, he pointed out that the predicate of the synthetic judgment can be denied, and in

the argument concerning God he does deny it. We noted that while Kant's rejection of the Ontological Argument was due to his epistemological presuppositions in the Critique of Pure Reason, yet in the Practical Reason he swings back again to find a place for God, Freedom, and Immortality, which he postulates as necessary to satisfy the demands of reason.

We saw that Kant granted that the idea of God is not the idea of a contingent but of a necessary, self-existent essence. Yet, though rationally necessary, he does not allow on this account that the idea has real existence, but only that we must think it. We noted that the objection made to Kant at this point was his demanding too much of a proof, for it was said, what more can be desired of a proof than just this: if, in order to think rationally, we must think a thing necessarily, and when thought is thought as existent, namely as self-existent, *namely no doubt Kant's answer is sufficient that logical necessity is different from real necessity and the existential judgment is synthetic and not analytic and therefore the predicate in the judgment, God exists, may be*

It was held, we saw, that such a view is skeptical and leads to the overthrow of all rational thought. It was then noted that Kant, immediately upon leaving the theoretical proof and entering upon the practical proof, postulated God, which hitherto he had denied.

Our argument then showed that ^{what} Kant had done was to admit a value judgment, which satisfies the demands of reason and life from the side of will but not of intellect.

We found that Hegel, with his philosophical pre-suppositions, found favor in the Ontological Proof and criticized Kant and some of his objections. We concluded, however, that Hegel with his logical idealism, naturally overrated the Ontological Proof. Even

logically denied without contradiction.

going so far as to use it to establish his pan-logism. This led us to the conclusion that the existence of God cannot absolutely be proved through the Ontological Argument. The most we can admit is that there is truth in the argument when taken as a value judgment, and with Lotze we would hold that the totality of value cannot be utterly divorced from existence.

The Futility of Absolute Proof.

After having made this lengthy examination of the attempted proof for the reality of the Supreme Being, we have to conclude that not much progress has been made by the thinkers from Plato to Hegel in establishing an absolute proof of God. We wonder if there is not a reason for this state of affairs. And why is it that the God idea persists despite its absence of valid demonstration? Anselm firmly believed in God, yet lacked a sufficient and adequate proof. Kant apparently delivered the death-blow upon the theistic argument and yet he never doubted the reality of the Supreme Being. May the truth not be that the validity of the objective existence of God rests upon a fundamental principle in the mind and in life which can have no proof and requires none?

And what^{is} this principle ~~is~~ that permits of belief and yet cannot be demonstrated. Is it the principle of value which has its basis in the intuitions of the mind? There is abundant illustration of intuitional values in all phases of thought and life. We can mention the following group: 1. Color and sound ~~are~~ intuitions of sense; Helen Keller cannot know them because she lacks eyes and ears. These intuitions of sense are variable, however, changing from time to time, according to the light, sound, etc. For the beauty of a painting or a piece of music we cannot give proof as to why we hold them beautiful. All we can say is, their beauty is intuitive. To say that means we consider it a value that cannot be demonstrated. 2. Various kinds of drinks are another illustration. The only reason we can give that they are good is that we know it by intuition. 3. And so the principle of lex talionis. Why is this law of equivalents universally recognized - this idea of value for value? Again all we can say is

that it is an intuition. We generally hold that the government is good. On what basis? How do we know it? Is not the idea of the value of the government an intuition? Aristotle remarked, "Man is a political animal by nature". And this would mean that government is intrinsically valuable.

Plato, in the Republic, gives a lengthy discussion of Justice. *Quoted*
he means by this term an established, peaceful, and orderly character in a community. It is similar to our term righteousness. Where do we get this belief in righteousness as a value to be sought? Again all we can say is that it is an intuition. 4. Mathematics, too, affords an illustration. What is the proof for the axioms of mathematics and geometry? How do we know that two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other., except by intuition? 5. And the laws of thought are still further illustrations. What line of reason have we for holding, for example, that A is A - whatever is, is; except that it is an intuition and life demands it as a rational principle, otherwise we cannot proceed rationally, And so with the other laws of thought, that of non-contradiction and excluded middle and the law of sufficient reason. We know them true only by intuition. These laws are fundamental assumptions of all reasoning and are universally accepted except by skeptics. In fact, in the last analysis they belong to the class of value concepts. 6. Further, the law of causality is a pre-supposition of all reasoning. We have no way of proving the universality of causal relations. We believe in the idea of causal relations, not because we can prove them necessary, but because of their persistence and intuitional character. 7. And so with aesthetic values. Why do we call some things beautiful and others not? What is our criterion of beauty in the Sistine Madonna?

Or in the beautiful passages in Scripture such as the twenty-third psalm? Or the beauty^{as} we see it in great literature. To ask for proof we must answer we have none. The values appear so immediate and intuitive that it seems almost nonsensical to ask for their proof.

8. And finally, we would refer to moral and religious values. Is not the Good a moral intuition? And is not the belief in God a reality-feeling in the final analysis? Would Anselm ever have formulated the Ontological Argument or sought to find a rational proof for God unless first he had a reality-feeling of Him? The origin of the idea of a Supreme Being is disputed, but the existence of the idea is universally admitted. Whence did it come, and why do we still hold it, despite the seeming impossibility of demonstrating its objectivity - except that it is an intuitional reality-feeling and value?

And so we are led back to Plato from whence we came. To him the Good is an inherent value, his doctrine of the Eidos is a doctrine of value-concepts. We believe this to be the better interpretation of Plato. He considered the good as eternal and immutable only because positive value was always eternal. And how does Plato get his ideas or value concepts? They came not from generalization, inference, or abstraction, but rather by intuition, or as he himself stated it, through reverential converse of the soul with the divine. The deepest thing in Plato is just this, reality is value. Whatever is real is value.

In order to account for this world of sense Plato brought in a second principle beside his ideas which Aristotle calls the Platonic matter, ~~hypokeimenon~~ "Dm". It forms the basis of the phenomenal world and is everything that idea is not. This matter has no form of its own, it is merely the raw material on which the forms are impressed. It is

a lower order of existence, and insofar as it takes on form it partakes in a measure of reality. What we wish to note here is that in Plato's designation of this matter as non-being, meaning a lower order of existence, he expresses a judgment of value. In fact, Plato regarded his ideas as classes and relations; not classes of things, but rather classes of classes of things, and relations of relations of things. The Good of Plato is a class term which includes all other classes of Good. As the number, ^{two}(2), is the class of all pairs, therefore a class of classes, so are Plato's universals, such as the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, classes of classes. And the fixity of the True, Good, and Beautiful is probably the same fixity as the numbers 2, 3, 4, etc. We see here that Plato's universals are classes of classes of positive value.

Aristotle criticises Plato because of ~~the~~ lack of distinction and the ideas he ascribes to Plato are abstract universals. While Plato sometimes makes you think that his ideas are mere abstractions or matters of opinion, as he would express it, yet the truer view of Plato is that he meant by his ideas value concepts. And in this respect Aristotle did Plato a philosophic injustice, because he did not understand this to be his meaning. As we have hereinbefore noted, the ideas did not come by generalization from experience, but they came by a priori intuition. They are something instinctive, not anything which you can learn. They are the gift of God but yet do not come without some effort on our part.

Today the tendency is to set down all values as relative. They are regarded as more or less contributing to an end, so more or less valuable to an end, which has another end. Plato did not so regard them. He was sure that some values are inherent, ultimate, and immutable.

between concrete
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abstract universals

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Thus we see there are two ways of interpreting Plato. In the first place as a metaphysician, the Good is a metaphysical principle. In the second place, as a practical ethicist, The Good is a value.

It is this latter interpretation which we wish to hold, and in this the Good would be the highest class of classes of value. We are thus led to a consideration of the theory of values, but this constitutes a separate thesis which we cannot go into. Suffice it to say that we regard the proofs of the existence of God to be intimately related to the idea of value and we may say this briefly.

The doctrine of the existence of values of any sort argues the existence of God. The problem of theism is not a mere academic problem. It is of profound practical significance and social importance. The question whether God exists is the question whether the universe has any goal, or are there any inherent values at all. In a universe with purely physical and chemical changes there would be no value at all, from the standpoint of materialism, there are no values. Yet materialists hold values as by-products. But in the theory of values, they are the reality and the physics and chemistry are the by-products. In other words, they are goals, ends, outcomes, that are of supreme value. This is the theistic conception of the world. As Plato has been attacked, so have all of his followers. The rigoristic method of logic holds that only that is true which can be demonstrated with mathematical exactness. But there is ^{no} such thing as absolute deductive proof of the direct sort. Among the sciences the proofs that are deductive are not questioned, but the deductive proof offered for the divine being are keenly challenged. For example, we cannot absolutely prove the law of gravity, yet its validity is questioned only in rare places. But it is not so with the arguments offered for the divine existence. Science says, if this proposition is proved, certain consequences are to be observed. These consequences are observed.

Therefore this proposition is true. The bi-nomial theory of Newton is seldom questioned. The only proof we have of it is the examples given. And of course we cannot exhaust all possible examples. But when you offer the same kind of proof for God it is immediately rejected. The Bi-nomial theorem is called axiomatic by laymen, but it isn't an axiom, nor is it deductable. It is rather reasoning by recurrence. We do not know the truth of mathematical deduction absolutely. Inductive proof, too, is just illustrative, just one example after another.

Now, trying to prove reality in general amounts to the same thing as trying to prove the Ontological Argument. You cannot demonstrate syllogistically any value or reality-feeling. And so on that account Anselm's syllogistic form of the Ontological Proof is irrelevant and misleading.

Lotze and ~~Bowen~~ Bowne saw intrinsic and absolute value in this ^{arg} argument and ^{this is what we see in it.} ~~thus saw more than others.~~ We recognize the futility of ^{logically demonstrating} ~~logically demonstrating~~ God. Some fine attempts have been made, as we have seen, but in the end, they all fall short.

You cannot put in syllogistic form the experience of value, as you cannot mathematically demonstrate the value of a piece of music. But you can feel it. Isn't it absurd to insist on the mathematical demonstration of value such as ~~xxx~~ music, poetry, God? The essence of reality is to believe in the reality of eternal things, which is to believe in the reality of God. This is in Leibnitz, best possible of all possible worlds. It is in Browning - "the best is yet to be". This is the meaning of the Ontological Argument. When it is said that it is the only possible proof of God it is to say this immediate experience of value is an experience of supreme or absolute perfection.

Existence and Value.

If we regard the idea of God as a value concept quite naturally the question is raised, as in the Ontological Argument, have we a right to infer his existence from the recognition of his value? By objectors we are cautioned that we must remember, in discussing the inference from value to existence, that values, to begin with are just claims, which may like other claims fail of validity. Of course, if we hold to the supposition, to begin with, that whatever is value is valid, then perforce we have settled our case without even arguing it. We must admit that our claims regarding the truth of reality of God are ~~not~~ logically but a postulate. And if we are compelled to get our postulated value confirmed by experience, in case of the divine idea, we run up against a snag put in our way by Kant, namely the impossibility of knowing anything beyond the phenomena of experience.

If, then, we attempt, as Ritschel, to ~~present~~ put the matters of faith judgments in a separate sphere from theoretical judgments and thus argue their reality, we are back again to the scholastic two-fold proof, and have made an unwarranted separation of the unity of our consciousness.

If, then, we resort to absolute values which we regard as self-proved or axiomatic, again we are told that we are merely making formal claims, as comes out clearly in Kant's account of the absolute value of personality and of the categorical imperative. As Schiller says, "Thus it is quite possible, and indeed necessary, to inquire whether the values claimed are really possessed, and to question the validity of the values actually recognized. This, indeed, is one of the chief occupations of a critical philosophy. It means that the problem of values appears also in the sphere of value - the antithesis of ought

and is, which ~~myself~~ was supposed to differentiate value and fact, arises again over the value of value, when they are taken as ~~fact~~ facts for the purpose of assessing their value. The explanation, perhaps, is that error and failure are possible in all human operations and hence also in the estimation of value." (F.C.S. Schiller, "Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.")

We would simply conclude that all truth is value. It may be objected that if this is so then there can be no absolute separation of the practical (the sphere of value) from the theoretical (the sphere of facts). We would answer by asking can descriptive knowledge be free from appreciative knowledge? Have any thinkers been able, in the search for truth, to be absolutely free from evaluation? If not, the apparent antithesis between fact and value does not hold absolutely, for fact without value cannot be found. Is it possible, psychologically, to reach any fact except by a process permeated throughout by values, that is, a purposive endeavor to attain an end of knowledge or what not, without the process of selection, particular preference, special interest, bias, etc. As James says, "Philosophy is a matter of temperament. There are the tough-minded and the tender-minded," And concerning the views of the world held as truths in the different ages, we quote with interest Falckenberg's remark; "In speaking above of the worth of the philosophical doctrines of the past as defined Time and as comparable to the standard character of finished works of art, the special reference was to those elements of speculation which proceed less from abstract thinking than from the fancy, the heart, and the character of the individual, and even more directly from the disposition of the people; and which to a certain

degree may be divorced from logical reasoning and the scientific treatment of particular questions. These may be summed up under the phrase, 'Views of the World.' The necessity for constant reconsideration of them is from this standpoint at once evident. The Greek view of the world is as classic as the classic art of Phidias, and the epic of Homer, the Christian, as eternally valid as the architecture of the Middle Ages; the modern, as irrefutable as Goethe's poetry and the music of Beethoven. The views of the world which proceed from the spirits of different ages, as products of the general development of culture, are not so much thoughts as rhythms in thinking, not theories but modes of intuition saturated with the feelings of worth. We may dispute about them it is true; we may argue against them or in their defence; but they can neither be established nor overthrown by cogent proofs. It is not only optimism and pessimism, determinism and indeterminism, that have their ultimate roots in the affective side of our nature, but pantheism and individualism, also idealism and materialism, even rationalism and sensationalism. Even though they operate with the instruments of thought, they remain in the last analysis matters of faith, feeling, and of resolution. The aesthetic view of the world held by the Greeks, the transcendental religious view of Christianity, the intellectual views of Leibnitz and Hegel, the pantheistic views of Fichte and Schopenhauer are vital forces, not doctrines, postulates, not results of thought. One view of the world is forced to yield its pre-eminence to another, which it has itself helped produce by its own one-sidedness; only to reconquer its opponents later, when it has learned from her, when it has been purified, corrected, and deepened by the struggle. But the elder contestant is no more confuted by the younger than the drama of Sophocles by the drama of Shakespeare, than youth by

age or spring by autumn." (Falckenberg, History of Philosophy, p. 3.)

We beg to note also that for the unsophisticated religious consciousness there is often a confusion between appreciative and existential meanings. No doubt the defenders of the Ontological Argument were somewhat mixed without due appreciation of their differentiation. The pre-supposition of reality in Anselm's idea of God, being mixed with his judgments of worth, led him into making an existential judgment of the Ontological Argument. Urban admirably brings this point out in his discussion of the value judgments of religion. He says, "Religious values furnish us an admirable illustration of the truth of this analysis of the relation of judgments of value to judgments of truth and fact, of their relative independence at certain points. They are, as ^{Höfding} ~~Harting~~ has well said, value judgments of the second degree, in that they express the feelings which arise from the consideration of the faith of primary personal and social values in reality; they express the demand for a conservation of values already acquired. As a consequence of this character, the judgment of value is bound up originally with existential judgments, the real meaning of which is not always at first apprehended.

"The object of religious belief and devotion is psychologically an appreciative construction externalized and given 'outer existence' in the manner already described. The pre-supposition of reality is acknowledged in existential judgments of the most elementary type. As a consequence, for the unsophisticated religious consciousness, appreciative and existential meaning are often inextricably mixed. Literal Paradises and Hells rise out of this state of primitive undifferentiation; the heights and depths of our experiences of value are so confused with temporal and spatial magnitude that belief in the reality of values is made to rest upon the belief in the physical

existence of the symbols. But when this first fusion - and confusion - is broken up, as it ultimately is when the interpretation of the presuppositions of reality in this way is no longer possible, i.e., when the object is neither perceptually verified nor continuous with other truth judgments, a readjustment of reality meanings takes place. A restoration of a value in the form of a conception of symbolic or inner truth appears, and if the value involved is vital, the pre-supposition of reality outlasts the cruder factual and truth judgments. The history of religions, of Christianity no less than others, shows this progressive clarification of reality meaning, historical culmination in the case of Christianity being the attempt to identify the pre-supposition of reality implicit in the idea of perfection with logical or truth objectivity in its most abstract form. The failure of this attempt, as in the Ontological Proof, marks the full realization of the primacy of values. Experience has shown the remarkable power of religious beliefs to recuperate and readjust themselves and from this vitality we may probably infer that, until the values of men themselves change, the value judgments of religion need fear nothing from the appearance of new judgments of fact and truth." (Urban, "Valuation - Its Nature and Laws", p. 394).

This leads us finally to say that the meaning of the Ontological Argument, when considered as a value judgment, is that the value of a Supreme Being guarantees his reality, Value is reality. No doubt Anselm or Descartes never thought of it in that way, but back in their minds they recognized the idea of a Supreme or Perfect Being as of greatest worth, and therefore real. Concerning this supposition of the thought behind the Ontological Proof let us again quote from Urban who remarks: "To the final question therefor - how are judgments of

existence and truth related to ultimate appreciation with their intrinsic values - our answer is simple and evident. They establish relations between experience and experience, between idea and idea, which lead to new appreciations or conserve those already acquired. The specific predicated of existence, of truth, already considered, have meaning only when they add to the intrinsic value or reality of an impression or idea. There are cases where the acknowledgment of the pre-supposition of reality in these predicates does add value and reality to the idea, e.g., where the pre-supposition of reality already includes a retrospective explicit definition of existence or truth.

"But such addition is not a necessary consequence of such acknowledgment, nor is such acknowledgment a necessary condition of appreciation. As the critics of the Ontological Proof have clearly seen, the proof of the truth or existence of the idea of the Perfect Being adds nothing to its reality. In the intrinsic appreciation of the meaning of the demand or postulate of such a Being, whatever reality it has is already included. Its central place in the spiritual life, its guarantee must guarantee its reality. And the attempt to translate such ultimate reality into the subordinate concepts of outer existence and truth can certainly add nothing to that reality, and may even, by falsely interpreting the pre-supposition of reality, lead to error and unreality."

We observe that we are being led unwillingly into a discussion of the theory of value, which the compass of this thesis will not permit. We simply want to note that the strength of the Ontological Argument really lies in our evaluations, - in our appreciative knowledge rather than our theoretical knowledge. To many this admission, constitutes a confession of weakness or failure, for they regard ~~thought~~ that

which cannot be cognitively upheld as not being true. Yet we must reply that the other sides of our nature, the volitional, and the affective, have rights as well as the cognitive. And with Professor Bowne, we must recognize the demands of the whole of our nature and not merely a part.

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