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I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by John A. Elbert

entitled Newman's Conception of Faith Prior to 1845

be accepted as fulfilling this part of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. (in Philosophy)

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ii

Newman's Conception of Faith

Prior to 1845

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Newman's Conception of Faith Prior to 1845

A Genetic Presentation and Synthesis.

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School

of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

1932

by

John Aloysius Elbert

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CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	vi
BIBLIOGRAPHY	xi
Chapter	
I. GOD	1
II. MAN	34
a) Human Nature in General	34
b) The Corruption of Human Nature	45
III. MAN: THE MORAL ASPECT	59
IV. CONSCIENCE	94
V. MAN: THE INTELLECTUAL ASPECT	129
a) Character and Function of the Mind	129
b) Probability	142
c) Certitude	159
VI. REASON	172
VII. THE CHARACTER OF FAITH	202
I Introduction	202
a) Pre-suppositions	202
b) Relation of Faith to Other Modes of Knowledge	207
II The Rational Character of Faith	210
a) Faith Preceded by Trust	210
b) Faith not Identical with Feeling	211

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CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
	c) Faith not Preceded by Demonstration..	215
	d) Faith a Rational Principle of Belief.	219
	e) Faith a Rational Principle of Action.	225
VIII.	FAITH AS A DISCURSIVE ACT.....	238
	a) The Oxford University Sermons.....	238
	b) Faith in Relation to Reason.....	243
	c) Newman's Justification of his Theory on the Relation of Faith and Reason..	251
IX.	PROBABILITY THE GROUND OF FAITH.....	266
	a) Newman's Personal Attitude toward Probability, In General.....	266
	b) Probability in the Faith Process	270
	c) Influence of Butler.....	281
X.	FAITH AS AN INTUITIVE ACT.....	293
	a) Introduction.....	293
	b) Sources of Confusion in Newman's Conception of Faith.....	295
	c) Genesis and Development of Faith Considered as an Intuitive Act Prior to 1845.....	305

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INTRODUCTION

In spite of all that Newman has written and still more, in spite of all that has been said and written about him, he remains somewhat of a puzzle. And it is in this spirit that I have approached him. I do not pretend that the puzzle has been resolved entirely to my satisfaction, however, nor to attempt even to offer one's solution after a careful investigation appears to me inane. A purely indifferent point of departure is, of course, essential for any work claiming scientific value, but an indifferent conclusion would be an open admission of defeat.

To dismiss the author of "The Development of Christian Doctrine" with attributing to him the brain of a rabbit, may be characteristic of the manner of Carlyle but it hardly makes a claim of serious acceptance; or, to tax the writer of the Apologia with exercising the deliberate fascination of the serpent after the fashion of J. H. Hutton, is an exhibition of mind that strikes the average reader as grotesque. Nor is there greater inducement in following the Oxford leader with sympathy, "from darkness, to darkness" in the brilliant company of Oscar Wilde.

W. E. Orchard, in his "Foundations of Faith," has a neat distinction which I can readily adopt in the present connection. Speaking of the meaning and claims of Catholicism, he says: "It is impossible for any one to pretend to

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be impartial on this subject; but at least one can endeavor to be objective." (Vol. III, 36) The assertion holds equally of Newman, in his person and in his writings. It is difficult to treat either the man or his work impartially even after the lapse of years. Waiving, then, any such pretension, I take refuge in the distinction given above and set up merely the claim of a strictly objective approach to the subject under discussion. The present thesis is not, therefore, a defense of Newman's conception of faith, still less a defense of faith in general. Nor is there question of constructing a theory; my purpose is rather to sound Newman's mind on the subject of faith during the period of his Anglican life and to justify the synthesis which grows out of the investigation, from Newman's own published utterance on the subject.

The present study is, therefore, an attempt to trace the development of Newman's conception of faith prior to 1845. In order to accomplish this purpose adequately I have found it necessary to treat in some detail both the starting point and the general background of Newman's religious philosophy, in as far as these give direction to his investigations on the subject of Faith, and influence him in his methods of procedure as well as in the

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acceptance of his conclusions.

In the opening chapter I have indicated the necessary point of departure for any study of Newman's life and work. This I consider to be his belief in God. The background for the conception of faith is to be found in his philosophy of human nature in general and of man in particular. This is presented in chapters two, three and four. Newman's attitude toward Reason in the field of religious inquiry forms the subject of a special chapter in view of its being a much discussed matter among critics of the Oxford Leader.

My principal purpose, embodied in the last chapters, is threefold: First, to show that the synthesis of Newman's earlier conception of faith, such as I conceive it, really exists in his writings prior to 1845. In order to put this matter beyond dispute, it was necessary to hold as closely as possible to the thoughts and words of Newman himself even at the risk of appearing to give a mere presentation of his ideas; Secondly, to prove conclusively that Newman sought to justify that conception as genuine faith on rational and pragmatic grounds; Thirdly, to trace the steps by which he gradually dropped his first conception, on the ground of its not being faith in the strict sense but a mere preliminary to real faith.

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INTRODUCTION

My contention is, moreover, that his new conception of faith represents, not a sudden reversion, coinciding with his change of creed in 1845, but a slow and gradual development covering almost his entire public life in the Anglican Church. This rigid adherence to Newman's own presentation is not merely literal but extends to the motives and spirit of the man as well. On this ground I have deliberately omitted any discussion of faith with reference to a particular creed or church, since Newman was expressly investigating the grounds of faith prior to distinction into particular creeds. (Apo. 73) Nor had I in mind to exhibit the full nature of that type of faith with which Newman ends his Anglican career and begins his life in the Catholic Church; I merely indicate its general character in contrast with his earlier conception and trace its evolution throughout his numerous writings belonging to the period in question. That period, extending from 1825 to 1841, represents, to my mind, a struggle of reason; or in the words of Newman, it was a time during which he "could employ Reason in the things of faith." (Dev. 445) Still, such brief descriptions are nearly always misleading; the full sense of that theme can be found only in the thesis as a whole.

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In presenting this dissertation to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati, I gladly use this opportunity to express my appreciation to those who have assisted in its preparation: To Robert Pierce Casey, Ph. D. and Eleanor Bisbee, Ph. D., members of the faculty of the University of Cincinnati, who have acted in the capacity of supervisors of the thesis and whose interest and cooperation have been a great encouragement at all times. To Joseph J. Lattner, S. M., John J. Pfaff, S. M., Thomas J. Dolan, S. M. and John P. Finke, S. M.; members of the faculty of Purcell High School, who have generously assisted in the typographical work and given many helpful suggestions in the final revision of the manuscript.

May 1932. J. A. E.

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List of Abbreviations

All the works of Newman used in this study are published by Longmans, Green and Co.

The date given last in brackets in every case is the date of the edition according to the pages of which that particular volume is quoted. Thus Ari., is quoted according to the edition of 1919 (Longmans).

The marks of multiplication indicate separate dates of parts of Contents. Thus P. S., Vol. I., 1825x1826x 1829x1830x1831x1832x1833:1834 consists of Sermons preached in 1825, 1826, 1829, etc. The point at which the Contents were gathered together into a volume is indicated by a colon. The other dates point to editions previous to that used in this study: Thus Dev., 1845, 1878 (1927) shows editions of 1845 and 1878 previous to the edition of 1927 here used. Not all the editions are mentioned in every case, but always the earliest, and the latest here used. In cases where the date of publication was somewhat in doubt, I have followed the indications given in the Index to the Works of J. H. Neman, by Joseph Rickaby, Longmans, Green and Co. 1914.

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List of Abbreviations

Apo.,	Apologia, published 1865 (1929)
Ari.,	The Arians, 1833, 1871 (1919)
Ath.,	I., II., St. Athanasius, two Volumes, 1841-4, 1881, 1887 (1920)
Call.,	Callista, 1855, 1881, 1888 (1928)
Corres.,	Letters and Correspondence, two Volumes, edited by Anne Mozley. 1890 (1898)
D. A.,	Discussions and Arguments, 1836x1838x1841x1855x 1866: 1872 (1899)
Diff.,	I., II., Difficulties of Anglicans-- Vol. I., 1850 (1918) Vol. II., 1865x1874x1875 (1920)
Dev.,	Development of Christian Doctrine. 1845, 1878 (1927)
Ess.,	I., II., Essays Critical and Historical-- Vol. I., 1828x1835x1836x1837x1838x1839x1840: 1871 (1919) Vol. II., 1840x1841x1842x1846: 1871 (1919)
G. A.,	Grammar of Assent. 1870 (1930)
H. S.,	I., II., III., Historical Sketches-- Vol. I., 1853x1824x1826x1833-6: 1872 (1920) Vol. II., 1833-40x1860x1873x1858x1859: 1872 (1898)

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

List of Abbreviations

Vol. III., 1854, 1856. 1872: 1859x1838x1834-5 (1924)

Idea, Idea of a University, 1852 (1899)

Jfc., Lectures on Justification, 1838, 1874 (1924)

L. G., Loss and Gain, 1848, 1874 (1911)

M. D., Meditations and Devotions; Oratory papers, posthumous (1912)

Mir., Essays on Miracles, 1825-6x1842-3: 1870 (1924)

Mix., Discourses to Mixed Congregations, 1849 (1929)

O. S., Sermons on Various Occasions, preached 1850x1852x1853x1856x1857x1859x1866x1873: See Contents, IX, X, XI: published 1857, 1870, 1874 (1927)

P. S., Parochial and Plain Sermons, I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII.,~~VIII~~.--

Vol. I., preached 1825x1826x1829x1830x1831x1832x1833: published 1834, 1869 (1920)

Vol. II., preached 1830x1831x1832x1833x1834x1835: published 1835, 1869 (1924)

Vol. III., preached 1829x1830x1831x1834x1835: published 1836, 1869 (1923)

Vol. IV., preached 1835x1836x1837x1838: published 1839, 1869 (1919)

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Vol. V., preached 1834x1836x1837x1838x1839x1840: published 1840, 1869 (1924)

Vol. VI., preached 1836x1837x1838x1839x1840x 1841: published 1842, 1869 (1924)

Vol. VII., preached 1825x1828x1829x1830x1832x 1838x1839x1840x1841x1842: published 1842-3, 1869 (1920)

Vol. VIII., preached 1825x1830x1831x1832x1836x 1837x1839x1840x1841x1843: published 1842-3, 1869 (1920)

Prepos., Present Position of Catholics, 1851 (1924)

S. D., Sermons on Subjects of the Day, preached 1831x 1836x1837x1838x1840x1841x1842x1843: published 1843, 1869 (1918)

S. N., Sermons Notes, written 1849-78: published 1913 (1913)

Y. T., Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, 1847x 1870x1872x1835x1858x1870x1859: 1871 (1924)

U. S. Oxford University Sermons, preached 1826x1830x 1831x1832x1839x1840x1841x1843: pub- 1843, 1871 (1918)

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V. M., I., II., Via Media--
Vol. I., 1837, 1877 (1882)
Vol. II., 1830x1834x1835x1836x1837x1838x1841: 1883, (1923)

V. V., Verses on Various Occasions, written 1818-65: published 1867 (1918)

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CHAPTER I

GOD

In Newman's philosophy of life, God is primary and fundamental, being the first religious idea which the human mind has, the starting point from which every other religious idea proceeds, its very ground and necessary support. In consequence, there can be no reason, in the strict sense of the word, for his belief, only the essential prerequisite of his own existence; "if I am asked," he says, "why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience." (Apo. 198) He does not guarantee the philosophical correctness in the expression of whatever proofs he may adduce for this belief, but he does stand immovably for the fact itself and for its having "a strong and true meaning....which will stand examination." (Ibid. 199) It is to him an original truth to which every other truth must ultimately be attached, so luminously evident that in the light of it every other must be judged. (Apo. 241) And what Newman finds in himself he also attributes to others for "every one spontaneously embraces the doctrine of the existence of God, as a first principle, and a necessary assumption. It is not so much proved to him, as borne in upon his mind

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irresistibly, as a truth which does not occur to him, nor is possible for him, to doubt; so various and so abundant is the witness for it contained in the experience and the conscience of everyone." (Mix. 261) The truth itself stands clearly, irrefutably bright as the noonday sun in the heavens; we have but to open our eyes to life to find there, not its proof, but its indubitable confirmation, for it maintains itself always without proof. Not indeed that the knowledge or realization of God necessarily finds its beginnings in the first dawn of human consciousness and continues its sway unimpeded throughout the passing years. Our first look into life is away from ourselves to the things around us and tending rather toward a forgetfulness even of our own reality and, therefore, a turning, for a time, from the source of our light and strength. (P. S. I, 19) But in the day of God's visitation which comes upon the soul, the mind is turned back from external things, with the realization of their unprofitableness, feebleness and change, first to itself, as unchanging and, therefore, higher in the scale of reality, yet to a self, burdened with a keen sense of dependence which seeks support outside of itself, finding none. And so, gradually, in the experience of life we are led first to distrust the external world, then weaned from the love of it "till at length it floats before our eyes merely

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as some idle veil, which, notwithstanding its many tints, cannot hide the view of what is beyond it;--and we begin, by degrees, to perceive that there are but two beings in the whole universe, our own soul and the God Who made it." (P. S. I, 20) Such are the realities of Newman's world, two beings, the one utterly dependent on the other, for its origin and for its continued existence. And not only is the soul dependent on God for its existence but its very nature being God-given looks to Him for the final criterion of its knowledge and conduct. Admitting God into one's life is admitting a fact into knowledge which encompasses, absorbs and closes in upon every other fact, forming the focus of all true principles, (Idea 26), and furnishing the final end of all human striving.

God, though in the midst of all things and "while He thus intermingles His presence and His operations with an ineffable intimacy of union in every place and in every substance, in every act, everywhere,....is at the same time infinitely separated from everything and absolutely incommunicable and unapproachable and self-dependent in His own glorious Essence." (O. S. 79) His power is not a mere "constitutional monarchy" which can issue commands only through legal forms and precedents, a power, therefore, coincident and identical with the sensible laws and phenomena of the universe. Such would be but the sorriest figure of a God, reducing the unsounded depth

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of His Essence to be only "a function a correlative or subjective reflection and mental impression of each phenomenon of the material or moral world as it flits before us."

Such a conception would be mere Pantheism and it matters not whether it be clothed in the sentiment of poetry with "ornament of language" or buds forth from the "pageant of experiment" or abstract reasoning presenting us Nature, written in capitals, "with a divine glow upon it," and providing certain favored individuals with a "gratifying treat" of a private and personal kind, "such a belief in God is no more than an acknowledgment of existing sensible powers and phenomena, which none but an idiot can deny." (Idea 38, 39)

Power, not thought, is the attribute of God which comes most strikingly before us in any revelation of Himself. "It might even be said that strictly speaking, no evidence of a Revelation is conceivable which does not partake of the character of a Miracle; since nothing but a display of power over the existing system of things can attest the immediate presence of Him by Whom it was originally established." Duties, in the strict sense, He has none; "nothing can add to Him; no one can be His creditor, no one claim anything of Him; if we can "claim" anything of Him it is only by virtue of His own gratuitous promise which calls for fulfilment since He is the Truth and most faithful. (Ibid.)

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GOD

With agnosticism, as such, Newman has no patience; he does not see "much difference between avowing that there is no God, and implying that nothing can for certain be known about Him." And he certainly would have subscribed to the pronouncement of Argyll on the subject of such doubt "which is really nothing more than a morbid effect of weakness and fatigue....embraced as a doctrine and systematized into a Philosophy." (Argyll, the Unity of Nature 126) Doubt about God's existence never entered into Newman's life and the stigma of atheism makes Hume, in his estimation, "the most low-minded of all speculators." (Idea 40)

Whereas to Newman himself, God the first object of all religious experience, the one personal Reality with whom the soul of man, correlative in reality, dependent in existence, consorts sola cum solo, remains ever the worthiest and highest object of the human mind and will, within reach of that mind in single aspects yet ever eluding its apprehension by the manifoldness of his dazzling attributes. For "He, though One, is a sort of world of worlds in Himself, giving birth in our minds to an indefinite number of distinct truths, each ineffably more mysterious than anything that is found in this universe of space and time. Any one of His attributes, considered by itself is the object of an inexhaustible science:

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and the attempt to reconcile any two or three of them together,--love, power, justice, sanctity, truth, wisdom,--affords matter for an everlasting controversy." (Idea 462) And as miracles do not at all startle the mind of Newman in view of his conception of God as Absolute Power, so neither do mysteries halt the onward, triumphant march of his superb faith; for is God not infinite? and what is infinity but the internal constitution of the Deity whose outward manifestation is mystery. "The mysteries of nature and grace are nothing else than the mode in which his infinitude encounters and is brought home to our minds. Men confess that He is infinite, yet they start and object, as soon as His infinitude comes in contact with their imagination and acts upon their reason. They cannot bear the fulness, the superabundance, the inexhaustible flowing forth and the 'vehement rushing' and encompassing flood of the Divine attributes." (Mix. 309) To strain at miracles as such, independently of the evidence which guarantees them, to balk at mystery, what more is this than to limit the Divine to human comprehension, to measure God's attributes by a finite standard and model. (G. A. 497)

The belief in God is not only the beginning of our knowledge of Him, it is likewise the guarantee of all finite knowledge. He seals the very instruments of our advance, our

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senses, reason, intuitions, the reality of the external world, the attributing to external nature a rational course of existence which we must assume in an elemental act of faith. This would seem at first sight to be theologizing with a vengeance. Yet the same procedure is not foreign to other systems of thought and belief. Thus Fichte: "Nature in which I am to act, is not a foreign being, created without regard to me, into which I can never penetrate. It is fashioned by the laws of my own thought and must surely coincide with them." (Destiny of Man 32) And the same claim comes to us in somewhat more of a mystic form from Holland: "All our knowledge, for instance, relies on our sonship; it starts with an act of faith. We throw ourselves with the confidence of children, upon an external world....who can assure us of its reality, of its truth?....we measure it by our various faculties....what guarantees their accuracy?....how can we justify the extension of our inner necessities to the world of outward things?....We could not so confidently recognize, understand and handle the world, if it had been wholly foreign to us....we move about freely as children in a father's home." (Holland: "Faith": in Lux Mundi 22, 23)

And what Newman postulates for the constitution of the human mind, the structure of the universe, and the laws which govern it, he assumes, with an <u>a fortiori</u>, of the relations

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of rational beings amongst themselves, the whole course of social affairs carried on by human agency with all the duties and pursuits resulting from such intercourse. "There is," he says, "a great variety of stations and fortunes among mankind; hardly two persons are in the same outward circumstances, and possessed of the same mental resources. Men differ from each other, and are bound together into one body or system by the very points in which they differ; they depend on each other; such is the will of God." (P. S. VII, 28)

Back of the very movements of social and political history, in the accidents of climate and the contingencies of national and racial distribution, he perceives the will of God, as the sole unifying principle. "How composed is the course of the world" he exclaims, "yet it is the working out of a moral system, and is overruled in every point by God's will ! Or, take the structure of the earth; mankind are placed in fertile and good dwelling-places, with hills and valleys, springs, and fruitful fields, with metals and marbles, and coal and other minerals, with seas and forests; yet this beautiful and fully-furnished surface is the result of (humanly speaking) a series of accidents, of gradual influences and sudden convulsions, of a long history of change and chance." (D. A. 149-150)

And what holds for the group is for Newman still more

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manifest in the individual. "The laws of the human mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but of His will. I should be bound by them even if they were not his laws; but since one of their very functions is to tell me of Him, they throw a reflex light upon themselves, and, for resignation to my destiny, I substitute a cheerful concurrence in an overruling Providence." (G. A. 351) Newman would, on the strength of his philosophy, disagree most decidedly with H. G. Wells, that the human mind is 'essentially a food-seeking system, and no more necessarily a truth-finding apparatus than the snout of a pig'.(In J. H. Robinson, the Mind in the Making, p. 9) Schiller commenting on the above ventures the opinion that we may be obliged to agree with the realistic Wells. And if so, then "the truth-value of a belief i. e. the fact that it appears to us true--will be merely an index to its survival value. A belief that is universally regarded as 'true' will be one we cannot live <u>without</u>, a 'false' belief will be one we cannot live with; a disputed belief will be one whose survival-value is variable or uncertain." (Schiller, Problems of Belief, p. 161) Now, strange as it may seem, all these men follow the same procedure: All base themselves on the constitution of the human mind and on the constitution of the universe. The only difference, then, in Newman, Wells, and Schiller is in the conception that lies

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back of the human mind or human nature. To show conclusively that we need certain beliefs, (Wells) that they are in harmony with the constitution of the human mind (Newman) that we cannot live without them (Schiller)--all these are but half-way houses--the thing to know is, what lies in back of these facts--Newman says, God.

And God's will not only guarantees the constitution of the human mind in general, but his will is specifically the measure and bound of our certainty. "Perhaps the more we examine and investigate, the more we have to perplex us. It is the lot of man: the human mind in its present state is unequal to its own power of apprehension; it embraces more than it can master. I think we ought all to set out on our inquiries, I am sure we shall end them, with this conviction. Absolute certainty, then, cannot be attained here; we must resign ourselves to doubt as the trial under which it is God's will we should do our duty and prepare ourselves for His presence." (Corres. II, 278) These words were written at a time when Newman was actually in a state of doubt, (1840) but that they represent an unvarying characteristic in his conception of the function of God's will with respect to the human mind, appears to me clear. In his later development, 'doubt' is toned down to "difficulty," but the essential sentiment remains. "We may gladly welcome," he says thirty years later, "such difficulties

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as are to be found in our mental constitution, and in the interaction of our faculties, if we are able to feel that He gave them to us, and He can overrule them for us. We may securely take them as they are, and use them as we find them. It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by which we acquire it is His way." (G. A. 351)

Now if Newman holds to these principles in the general domain of human knowledge we can expect that he relies more heavily on the divine guarantee in ethical and religious inquiries; and such is the case. The truths of religion are directed, with set purpose, to the moral development of man, not primarily to his intellectual expansion. There is nothing in them to flatter human pride, encourage carnal taste, nothing to make us easy, irreverent or to induce us to think lightly of sin. And in the acquisition of such truths, "fallible men may convey truth infallible; human systems may be instruments of heaven. And he who feels his ignorance may seek for light wherever he can obtain it; he will not prescribe rules to God's Providence; he will not say, 'Instruct me by thy inspired oracles, or not at all.'" (V. M. I, 162) Provided we restrict our method of inquiry according to the nature of the subject matter, God's blessing will supply the necessary measure of certainty to bring us to the appointed goal. For, "if we proceed on the hypothesis that a merciful

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Providence has supplied us with means of gaining such truth as concerns us, in different subject matters, though with different instruments, then the simple question is, what those instruments are which are proper to a particular case. If they are the appointment of a Divine Protector, we may be sure that they will lead to the truth, whatever they are. The less exact methods of reasoning may do His work as well as the more perfect, if He blesses them. He may bless antecedent probabilitie in ethical inquiries, who blesses experience and induction in the art of medicine." (Dev. 111-112) So we see that the conviction of God's encircling Providence in the timid advance of man's mental processes, possessed Newman not only in the high noon of his Anglican career when he was ready to span with a Via Media, the chasm between Protestantism and "Romanism" but likewise when he stood halting on the threshold of the Catholic Church. That same conviction remained with him, undimmed, in the sunset of his intellectual life. "It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by which we acquire it is His way. He varies that way according to the subject matter; but whether He has set before us in our particular pursuit the way of observation or of experiment, of speculation or of research, of demonstration or of probability....If we take the way proper to our subject matter, we have His blessing upon us, and we shall find, besides abundant matter for mere opinion, the

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materials in due measure of proof and assent." Such, he tells us, is the very law of His dealings with us. (G. A. 351-2)

Whatever lies outside the domain of the ordinary natural procedure in the world of mind and matter, whatever comes with a display of physical power or depth of insight, has in an even higher degree, the pre-supposition of this over-ruling providence. Such would be the case for miracles. We have seen that (just because of his conception of God) these do not, inherently, create any difficulty in Newman's mind. It stands to reason that Newman did not consider miracles as proving for him the existence of God. Contrariwise, belief in an intelligent Maker is assumed throughout in establishing the genuineness of a miracle. The utmost function that a miracle may perform is to remind us of the existence of God. In fact, to Newman's mind, the ordinary course of nature, the order and design in the universe, evidence the existence of God more powerfully than any deviation from that course; (Mir. 10-11-12) and as soon as the mere doctrine of a Creator and a Supreme Governor is admitted, without reference to inspired history, then the abstract argument against miracles, has little or no force; if anything, they become antecedently probable. (Mir. 104)

There remains to be considered Newman's attitude toward proof for the existence of God. This has been a much disputed question. Shafer tells us confidently that Newman

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"tacitly recognized that a formal demonstration (of the existence of God) is impossible." (Christianity and Naturalism, p. 82) The word 'tacitly' makes Shafer's charge a very elusive one, difficult to meet head-on, still, I consider that it can be met and shown to be not perhaps, groundless, yet inapplicable. I am not here laying down a distinction without a difference; I plainly consider Shafer's contention both groundless and inapplicable but I cannot <u>show</u> its groundlessness though I can show its inapplicability. Evidently, it is useless to call for any particular citation of Newman which would prove the contention--we are told expressly that it is a tacit recognition on Newman's part. In the course of the succeeding pages I shall endeavor to bring out Newman's mind on this matter and the general picture resulting from the study ought to give us a clear perspective on the question at issue. Shafer's charge is not an isolated one; it has come up time and again especially from the Catholic French school of critics

Newman has written a "History of his Religious Opinions," and a "Grammar of Assent"; he was constantly engaged in religious controversy but his genius was never exercised on a formal treatise of natural theology. Why then a demand for the formal proofs demonstrating the existence of God? Had he even passed from atheism to belief, we might well look into his life for the decisive count which swung his mind into the

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regions of faith. But such is not the case. Here was a man who lived and breathed in the atmosphere of God's presence from the time he first began to think until he closed his eyes in death, whose unclouded faith was never dimmed even for a fleeting moment over an uninterrupted span of three quarters of a century. What wonder that in such a life the formal proofs for the existence of God should not shed any added light into his mind nor kindle any warmth in his heart ! And this is all that Newman says or implies. Even when he sets forth the grounds of his belief for public examination in the pages of the Apologia as a probability, hence, seemingly, a ground short of demonstration, there is an element in that recital which must be taken into consideration. "Let it be recollected," he tells us, "that I am historically relating my state of mind, at the period of my life which I am surveying. I am not speaking theologically nor have I any intention of going into controversy or of defending myself; but speaking historically of what I held in 1843-4, I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed in Christianity on a probability and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability and that the three grounds of probability, distinct from each other of course in subject matter, were still all of them one and the same in nature of proof, as being probabilities--probabilities of a special kind,

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a cumulative transcendent probability but still probability.... (Apo. 199) And, thereupon, follows the important element which may not be left out of consideration: "inasmuch as He who made us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities; He has willed, I say, that we should so act, and, as willing it, He cooperates with us in our acting, and thereby enables us to do that which He wills us to do, and carries us on, if our will does but cooperate with His, to certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusion." (Apo. 199-200) In view of what has been said on Newman's conception of God in the previous pages I will not stop, for the moment, to defend this argument from any charge of circular reasoning, but will proceed immediately to the case in hand. Here we have a "transcendent probability" guaranteed by divine power and Newman claims that it gives <u>certitude</u>, which is all that any formal demonstration can give. It is Newman's "formal demonstration"--it is not mine, it may not be yours. But anyone desirous of giving an analysis of Newman's mind is necessarily obliged to take <u>his</u> mind and no other. You may quarrel with the facts as he sets them forth but that takes from you the mantle of the analyst and clothes

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you in the garments of the critic.

But it may be urged: Newman was a man of high intellectual power and the elemental faith in the existence of God which was his undisputed possession for so long a time would necessarily seek and meet, at some time or other, the confirmation of a formal demonstration. Such a contingency can hardly be gainsaid. And in fact we have Newman's reaction to such an event. "From the things which are seen from the voice of tradition, from the existence of the soul, and from the necessity of the case, the natural reason can infer the existence of God." (Mix. 152) And again: "reason teaches you there must be a God; else how was this universe made?" (Mix. 285) and proceeding then from the contingency of man he follows up the argument to a Creator who eternally is. The Metaphysical arguments as contained basically in Aristotle and elaborated by Aquinas, Newman does not discuss, from an inherent inability to cope with Metaphysics (U. S. 217) and in this respect he was wiser than Kant, who "overthrew" the metaphysical arguments with his imagination.

Leaving now the field of controversy, let us examine Newman's general attitude toward any kind of proof for the existence of God. I am not speaking of the <u>fact</u> of the existence of God as it appears in his own life. On that there can be no dispute; but the subject here is his stand on the

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question of proof, which may confirm that fact to others; this seems to vary somewhat at different periods of his life, and there is always an uneasiness, even a distrust, because none of the external proofs measure up to the height and depth and breadth of the living, inner experience in his own soul. Thus he maintains in his earliest published work, that Revelation is necessary to clear up all doubts on the existence of God, as separate from and independent of nature. (Ari: 184-5) In 1837 he certainly seems to consider that books written to prove the being of an Almighty, Infinite, Everlasting God, basing themselves on what is seen in the natural world, "do not strictly prove it; they do but recommend, evidence, and confirm the doctrine to those who believe it already." (P. S. VI, 338) But he expressly goes on to say that the failure lies not in the ground of the 'proof' but in the method. "I must not be understood to say, that the course of the world does not justly impress upon us the doctrine of One, True, Infinite, and Almighty God;--it does so,--but that the proof is to deep, subtle, complex, indirect, delicate and spiritual to be analyzed and brought out into formal argument, level to the comprehension of the multitude of men." (P. S. VI, 339) Newman's strongest statement against the objective validity of the argument for the existence of God, is to be found in the Oxford University Sermons and has

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been often quoted against him: "It is indeed a great question," he says, "whether Atheism is not as philosophically consistent with the phenomena of the physical world taken by themselves, as the doctrine of a creative and governing power." (U. S. 194) But the note added to the edition of 1871 practically nullifies the statement.* The same holds for the similar opinion expressed in Discussions and Arguments p. 300 when the note brings the contention round to meaning that the objective conclusion from the facts of Nature is in favor of the being and providence of God.

Newman's belief in God though always remaining a primary and absolute truth in his own life, is yet beset with an almost insurmountable difficulty. This arises from his view of the world of men, which seems simply to give the lie to that great truth," of which his whole being is so full. Here, then, he finds no support whatever and he expresses his blank

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* "Physical phenomena, taken by themselves"; that is, apart from phychological phenomena, apart from moral considerations, apart from the moral principles by which they must be interpreted and apart from the idea of God which wakes up in the mind under the stimulus of intellectual training. The question is, whether physical phenomena logically <u>teach</u> us, or on the other hand logically <u>remind</u> us of the Being of a God. In either case, if they do not bring to us this cardinal truth, we are, in St. Paul's words "without excuse." (U. S. p. 194 Note 9)

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amazement and the piercing disappointment which comes over him in consequence of his "everlasting nay" of the world of human beings, in words which for their heart-rending quality, take away our very breath: "If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me, when I look into this living busy world, and see no reflection of its Creator." (Apo. 241) But even this "heart-piercing" "reason-bewildering" fact is not sufficient to dislodge from his mind the original, primary, fundamental truth. He accepts the fact, sorrowfully, then casts about for the necessary reconciliation between the two truths. He argues: "<u>if</u> there be a God, <u>since</u> there is a God, the human race is implicated in some terrible original calamity. It is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God." (Apo. 242-3) And so we find him, in general, giving a greater degree of confirmatory evidence for the existence of God, to arguments drawn from the contemplation of the physical universe, for there is no corruption there, no nature fallen from its God-appointed level. Even human agency can be purged under particularly favorable circumstances and then "the being of a God is reported to us

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by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by conscience." (Idea 25) And always the various formal proofs, on which the being of a God rests, remain, in his estimation, irrefragable against the free-thinker and the sceptic. (Mix. 261-2)

But the witness for the being of God which Newman so distressingly fails to find in the world of men, which reaches him only tardily and in intermittent flashes from the great universe, he finds so amply and superabundantly in his own conscience, as to compensate for every other deficiency. Not indeed that he <u>proves</u> the existence of God from conscience; he never intended to do so, and let it be repeated, the being and existence of God, need no proof in the life of Newman. Conscience is merely the first and only essential confirmatory testimony of that truth. This is clear from the following: "As then we have our initial knowledge of the universe through sense, so do we in the first instance begin to learn about its Lord and God from conscience," (G. A. 63) and we may by means of induction from particular experience of conscience "have as good a warrant for concluding the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master, as we have from parallel experience of sense, for assenting to the fact of a multiform and vast world, material and mental." (Ibid.) And since for Newman, a realist in philosophy, (if we can label him at all) sense perception gives us our first and immediate knowledge of the external

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world, so does conscience give us our first and immediate knowledge of God, not directly by way of proof for the existence of the object of that knowledge, but by way of apprehending what exists independently of us and is borne in upon us irresistibly, provided only that the organ of perception be normal and receive the ordinary assistance which every other function of the human creature requires for its proper development. For it must not be supposed that Newman considers conscience as an isolated faculty, an "entity" of some kind, a creature of his own imagination to which he assigns a place and a function, which fits in with some preconceived pet theory. "I grant, of course that we cannot assign a date, ever so early, before which he (the child) had learned nothing at all, and formed no mental association, from the words and conduct of those who have care of him. But still if a child of five or six years old, when reason is at length fully awake, has already mastered and appropriated thoughts and beliefs, in consequence of their teaching, in such sort as to be able to handle and apply them familiarly, according to the occasion, as principles of intellectual action, those beliefs, at the very least must be singularly congenial to his mind, if not connatural with its initial action," (G. A. 112) Argyll expresses the same thought when he maintains that the conception of a supreme, invisible Being is not difficult for man.

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GOD

"It must have been in the very nature of things, the earliest, the simplest, and the most necessary of all conceptions." In fact, Argyll goes one step further in holding that "if Man, ever since he became Man, had always some such impression or Belief, then he always had a Religion, and the question of its origin, cannot be separated from the origin of the Species." (The Unity of Nature p. 474-5)

Newman relies, therefore, on the facts of common experience to show both the nature and the operations of conscience and requires for its development the cooperation of human agency and an average protection against influences destructive of the religious instincts. (G. A. 64, 112)

He does not attempt to determine in "how far such knowledge comes from without, how far from within, how much is natural, how much implies a special divine aid which is above nature." (G. A. 115) In other words, he is not tracing origins and developments but simply witnessing to the fact as it actually exists. What he does attempt to prove is, that when external and internal conditions are favorable, conscience becomes level to the task of recognizing God and, further, avails to impress the imagination with a picture of a Supreme Governor, (G. A. 110) hence a Person not a mere 'something' the echo of whose voice is conscience itself. "An echo implies a voice; a voice a speaker. That speaker I love and fear."

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GOD

(Call. 314-15)

If, then, we were to summarize Newman's theology briefly we could do so basing ourselves on his own words. Conscience portrays God, Reason concludes about Him, Creation witnesses of Him. (Mix. 294) Still, all of these are but confirmatory of the great fundamental fact: God is, and Newman knows it with a knowledge which begins not in the conclusion of a syllogism but in the illumination of a vision. Philosophically, Newman starts out with a basic assumption grounded in his own experience. Conscience is merely the sufficient justification to his own mind of that assumption; but he is convinced that what he finds indisputably in his own mind is at least general, if not universal, in the race. Still, conscience is not the necessary premise upon which follows the proof of God's existence--conscience simply gives him the right to maintain that the faith by which he believes in God is a reasonable act and can be attached to an indisputable fact found in human nature under normal conditions. His faith in God is, therefore, not grounded in conscience but stands by itself alone, an act not only sole but complete in itself, a luminous truth bearing its own evidence.

The question that now calls for discussion evidently concerns the value of his Conception. And here I would distinguish between the fact of his own experience considered as

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individual testimony to a great truth; its value as generalized or rationalized philosophical knowledge; and the consequences which Newman himself deduces from that fact of his experience.

The last named, being the most particularized aspect, would naturally, from the nature of the case, invite the heaviest opposition as being questioned not only by out-and-out sceptics and rationalists but by everyone differing from Newman in a particular creed. For, as has been noted previously, Newman's belief in God is not an isolated thing, stranded upon a desolate rock and destined to die without hope of issue. It is the first religious idea and points infallibly to a last; between the two there is the "concatination of argument by which the mind ascends from its first to its final religious idea," and this is nothing more nor less than the entire history of Newman's life. Now the final chapter of that religious search is written in the conclusion to which he came that "there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it finds itself here below must embrace either the one or the other.... or, as he goes on to express it more tersely: I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in God." (Apo. 198) His position,

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relatively to others with whom he fought the battle of life either as ally or as opponent, is given just as succinctly and on the same principle: "there are but two alternatives, the way to Rome and the way to Atheism: Anglicanism is the half-way house on the one side, and Liberalism is the half-way house on the other." (Apo. 204) That consequence he never disowned and so we find him after a period of almost forty years from the time that he made the application of that principle in his own life, giving utterance to the self-same thought: "I account it no paradox to say that, let a man but master the one doctrine of the Being of God, let him really and truly, and not in words only, or by inherited profession, or in the conclusion of reason, but by a direct apprehension be a Monotheist, and he is already three-fourths of the way towards Catholicism." (G. A. Note II, p. 500, 1880) Now, whoever does not concur with Newman in the acceptance of Catholicism must necessarily quarrel either with his premises or with the process of reasoning that leads to the conclusion. Sceptics and rationalists may quarrel with both; a believer will limit his strictures to the legitimacy of the process and deny the conclusion, whilst holding to the premise either on Newman's grounds or for reasons of his own.

In the second place, it is pertinent to ask whether Newman's

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conception of God has value as rationalized philosophical knowledge. On this head rationalists of all shades and beliefs are at variance with him and under this caption I include, particularly, the high and dry rationalism of the scholastic philosophers. The question resolves itself to this: Is such a starting-point as Newman's, preposterous, absurd, unworthy of the philosophical temper? It is not extravagant to say that every philosopher from Aristotle down to our own day starts with assumptions no less momentous; some admit them and call them by their proper names: postulate, assumption, hypothesis--others decry them and use them withal. A few examples must suffice. Thus for Locke, the assertion "God exists" is an assertion of real existence, as real as the judgment "I exist" and the latter is the point of departure for the former. (On the Human Understandings II, 307) Fraser in his introduction to Locke (XXXIX) rejects the proof i. e., its demonstrable certainty on the ground of its being circular reasoning, yet Fraser also admits that the atheistic hypothesis is self-contradictory ! (XCII) I am not now concerned with the one or the other. My contention is, that without the fundamental assumption of God as an ALL-Wise and ALL-Powerful Creator, Locke's empiricism runs directly into a chaotic irrationalism; moreover, I contend further that Locke is fully

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aware of the fact and constantly and unblushingly appeals to the theological assumption to save himself from such a fate. So, for instance: "This near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker, who....has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm they will do." (Ibid. I, 161) Again, the whole of Locke's procedure in the empirical field is based on the same assumption as Newman's in the ethical domain, that our human nature is constituted in its actuality by an All-wise Author of our being: "The infinite wise Author of our being; having given us the power over several parts of our body to move or keep them at rest.... having also given a power to our minds, in several instances to choose amongst the ideas which it will think on....has been pleased to join with several thoughts and several sensations a perception of delight."....(Ibid.) The disparity between objects and the sensations they create in us, he likewise grounds on the power of God, "it being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which the idea hath no resemblance." (Ibid. I, 172-3) No principle in Locke is more primary and fundamental

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than his conception of simple ideas, yet these also are made to rest for their ultimate validity on the will of God. There are two sorts of ideas he says, "the first are simple, which since the mind....can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating in the mind, in a natural way, and producing therein perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to." (Ibid. II, 229) Not only is Locke's assumption as momentous as Newman's, it is identical in kind though applied in a different field of inquiry.

Locke belongs to the seventeenth century and, generally speaking, to the empirical school of philosophy. The method of philosophical inquiry which proceeds on far-reaching assumptions has not varied since his time nor is it alien to other systems of thought. Royce belongs to our own day and represents the Hegelian idealism here in the United States. Anyone acquainted with Royce's philosophy must recognize the fundamental character of his Absolute and its all-encompassing function over the realm of finite thought and meaning. Yet this Absolute rests on a mere postulate. I am fully aware that Royce, at times, claims that it follows from "philosophical necessity" but the indubitable fact remains that Royce has closed off irreversibly, every avenue of approach to this Absolute except the finite mind in its finite experience, and

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that the finite mind and its finite experience in turn, depend utterly on the Absolute for the correctness of its judgments and even for its very existence. (The Religious Aspects of Phil. p. 348-9)

My purpose is not to justify either Newman's, or Locke's or Royce's assumptions. It is rather, to secure a basis for objective criticism of such assumptions. And that basis I find in the principle that an hypothesis is to be judged not primarily on the clearness or light of its own evidence but on the light which it throws into vast ranges of phenomena or into the hidden and mysterious events of human existence. That is the principle on which all modern scientific theories receive acceptance; the more phenomena they explain, the wider is their acceptance until they become established dogmas of science. They are not even rejected when a contrary hypothesis takes the field, at least, in particular instances; witness, for example, the opposing corpuscular and wave theories of light-transmission in modern physics. Because an assumption happens to deal with phenomena of the religious and ethical world it should not, therefore, lose all rights to an objective philosophical appreciation. Only on that basis can one proceed according to the true philosophical temper; on such a basis, we may accept or reject Newman's fundamental

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assumption of the existence of God, but that is a further question which does not affect the character of the inquiry. My own contention is merely this: that in its character of an hypothesis Newman's conception of God should be estimated on the amount of light which it imparts to problems that have puzzled the human mind since the beginnings of all speculative thought. In this connection, I gladly bring forward the testimony of an independent witness previously cited in these pages.

"In his (Newman's) hands, then, the Christian conception of the world proved itself true to the abiding facts of individual experience and gave life an intelligible meaning an intrinsic worth which men could learn for themselves by trial. It gave them a work to do, which was sufficiently its own reward, which tested all their powers and which was the full expression of all that was distinctly human in their nature." (Shafer: Christianity and Naturalism p. 113-114)

We come to the third aspect of Newman's conception of God. It may be considered as a fact of his personal experience to which he gives testimony. The things to know in this connection are these: with what kind of psychological acumen and with what degree of moral integrity does this experience come to us? In other words, how is it guaranteed? Shafer's

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opinion on this point also, represents a fairly general estimate on Newman's ability to interpret psychological experience and on his knowledge of human nature, which for subtlety and depth few men in any age have rivaled." The abiding character of the experience with which Newman deals is stressed by the same writer when he says: "Newman's fundamental concern was with certain factors of individual experience which no change in our knowledge of the physical world and no changes in our conclusions from human history can in any way alter....he knew that he was essentially, centrally, a spiritual being. He knew by direct experience that there is an invisible, timeless world which is the fulfilment of life....he bore witness to what is central and abiding in human nature." (Ibid. 113-14)

What the nature of that witness is, from the moral point of view, must be gathered from the personal history of Newman himself. We have there the witness of a man whose life, scrutinized as scarcely another has been, and pronounced above reproach, a man far above the average in endowments of mind and heart--a witness prolonged over more than three quarters of a century--never obscured by shadow of doubt or misgiving--unwavering, clear and unmistakable, amid the storm and sunshine of a diversified life, bearing unequivocal testimony

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to himself and to the world at large, that the existence of God was as real to him as his own. And according to that unfaltering testimony he lived and died. As human witness goes, we can conceive of none that transcends it. As such it has value.

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CHAPTER II

MAN

a) General Aspect

Newman's belief in God, presented in the previous chapter, serves as the point of departure for his conception of human nature in general and of man in his capacity of an individual. The primary relation of man toward God is one of dependence, that of the creature towards the Creator. And this relation is not a transitory thing which ceases once man has been set upon his course of existence, but extends uninterruptedly throughout life and into another world. Hence, too, it is not a quality or condition that can be put on or laid aside at times and seasons, varying with the fortunes of nations and races or with the moods of the individual. It is something inherent and inseparable and makes man essentially a religious being. Such, Newman claims, is the very teaching of nature independently of any divine revelation. "What does nature teach us about ourselves, even before opening the Bible? That we are creatures of the Great God, the Maker of heaven and earth; and that, as his creatures, we are bound to serve Him and give Him our hearts: in a word, to be religious beings. And next, what is religion but a habit? And what is a habit but a state of mind which is always upon us as a sort of ordinary dress or inseparable garment of the soul?" (P. S. VII, 205)

Judging human nature, then, from its origin and destiny, Newman must necessarily posit it as good; even the "physical

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nature of man is good; nor can there be anything sinful in acting according to that nature. Every natural appetite or function is lawful, speaking abstractedly. No natural feeling or act is in itself sinful." (Idea 510) Whatever discrepancies arise to cast doubt or suspicion on this fundamental principle must, somehow, find a reasonable explanation in secondary principles which may cut in on the first and modify its action; difficulties must be ironed out so that human nature may be made to square with the perfections of God, without, at the same time, doing violence to the facts of man's actual history.

This is the key to Newman's interpretation of human nature He proceeds not on any antecedent theory, not even on any formulated laws of science. These laws, at least in their wider generalizations, are merely convenient classes or categories into which facts can be grouped; they do not picture reality, nor do they tell us how nature acts in a particular case, "A law is not a fact but a notion." (G. A. 280)

Newman's procedure, therefore, is factual, not conceptual; he accepts the elements of the mind as facts, whether these elements apparemtly contradict each other or not; if an empirical science can clear up real or seeming contradictions, so much the better, but the absence of such explanation is no warrant for rejecting or even questioning the structure of the mind. For "as we use the elements (of the physical

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universe) without first criticizing what we have no command over, so is it much more unmeaning in us to criticize or find fault with our own nature, which is nothing else than we ourselves, instead of using it according to the use of which it ordinarily admits. Our being with its faculties, mind and body, is a fact not admitting of question, all things being of necessity referred to it, not it to other things." (G. A. 346) A critique of the instruments of our advance, and that performed by the very instruments under question, after the manner of the Kantian epistemology, would be to Newman's mind (as to any realist) perfectly absurd, much as the case of an individual jumping out of his skin and surveying himself from an external point of vantage. "If I may not assume that I exist and in a particular way, that is, with a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate about and had better let speculation alone." (G. A. 347)

Newman would not consider that we <u>trust</u> our mental powers, such as reasoning or memory. "It seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about trusting in a case like this, is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing I had had a choice if I would be created or no, or speculating what I should be like, if I were born of other parents. Our consciousness of self is prior to all questions of trust or

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MAN

In the second place, Newman's view is psychological and organic, not logical and abstract. It has been commonly said of Newman that he considered man not as a definition but as a concrete individual. This is true but hardly says enough. Such a conception while interesting and rich from a psychological point of view could scarcely claim any general, scientific value. I would amend and enlarge Newman's conception to its proper bounds. His view is not merely concrete, it is organic. Thus: "We call rationality the distinction of man, when compared to other animals. This is true in logic; but in fact a man differs from a brute, not in rationality only, but in all that he is, even in those respects in which he is most like a brute; so that his whole self, his bones, limbs, make, reason, moral feelings, immortality, and all that he is besides, is his real differentia, in contrast to a horse or a dog." (G. A. 281-2) And what is thus true of man as a species in comparison with other species, is equally true of the individual differences between man and man. Individuals differ not only in number, as the traditional logicians hold, but in everything. Whatever opposition, therefore, we may find in Newman, either to logical science or to any other form of science, is not an opposition in the direction of <u>reducing</u> man in the scale of being but towards elevating him, both as a species and as an individual. It is on this basis,

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for example, that Newman hedges in even the real truths of a science such as medicine: for "what is true in medical science might in all cases be carried out, were man a mere animal a brute without a soul: but since he is a rational, responsible being, a thing may be ever so true in medicine, yet may be unlawful in fact, in consequence of the higher law of morals and religion having come to some other conclusion." (Idea 510) In the light of the above, a well known and much decried saying of Newman takes on a different meaning from that which is usually attributed to it. In speaking of argumentative processes of reasoning, Newman says: "After all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal." (G. A. 94) His view of man and of nature is simply not furthered by a logical definition, however true such a definition may be, a contention which Newman readily concedes. And so, when he seeks to establish a differentia which will carry through the entire human species and distinguish it from the brute creation, he falls back again to a fundamental reality, not to logical definition, not even to those "notions" which we call the laws of science.

Newman, therefore, sought for a basis more solid and permanent than the shifting ground of the empirical sciences at any particular period of their development, on which to build a philosophy of man and of life. And he finds this, as Royce

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later did, in elemental laws more fundamental than the "ideal constructions" of the natural sciences, and applicable both to matter and to mind, to the physical as well as to the moral universe. Such, for instance, is the law of growth and decay, of the development of each individual according to its needs and in harmony with its powers. The law of growth appears as a law of progress which in turn is modified and finally dominated by the law of decay or irreversibility. "Every being is in a true sense sufficient for itself, so as to be able to fulfil its particular needs. It is a general law that, whatever is found as a function or an attribute of any class of beings, or is natural to it, is in its substance suitable to it, and subserves its existence and cannot be rightly regarded as a fault or an enormity. No being could endure of which the constituent parts were at war with each other....there is a principle of vitality in every being, which is of a sanative and restorative character, and which brings all its parts and functions together into one whole, and is ever repelling and correcting the mischiefs which befall it, whether from within or without, while showing no tendency to cast off its belongings as if foreign to its nature." (G. A. 348) This law applies to man in his character of a physical, moral and intellectual being. He develops himself, not mechanically, not of eternal necessity, but of his own efforts, "out of the

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living elements with which his mind began to be"; (Ibid.349) he has the gift of being the creator of his own sufficiency and to be emphatically self-made. This is a law of his being, the knowledge of which, we do not gain by any a priori view of man, but by generalizing from the facts provided by himself. Now there seems to be, at first sight, a contradiction in Newman's fundamental assertion respecting the constitution of human nature, to the effect that "no being could endure of which the constituent parts were at war with each other." For he does recognize the warring of elements that make up the human being, both in the group and in the individual. No one has described this confusion better than Newman himself, the tumult, sedition, rebellion of the various powers of man engaged in civil strife against each other to establish the reign of appetite, passion, brute strength or virtue, in the world of the individual and the group to which he belongs. Not merely a warring of parts but a separation, marring and destroying the harmony and coordination of human nature. "This is a very serious state of things; and what makes it worse is, that these various faculties and powers of the human mind have so long been separated from each other....that it comes to be taken for granted that they cannot be united; and it is commonly thought, because some men follow duty, others pleasure, others glory and others intellect, therefore that one of these things excludes the

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other; that goodness cannot be great, that conscientiousness cannot be heroic; and the fact is often so, I grant, that there is a separation, though I deny its necessity." (O. S. 7-8) The actual presence of warring elements in human nature gives him ground for concluding to an abnormal condition or derangement within the kingdom of human nature itself and makes of it a "fallen" or "corrupt" nature. This aspect of Newman's conception will be developed in detail in the second part of the present chapter.

Meanwhile, in accepting the fact of internecine strife within the boundaries of our human nature and the conclusion which follows from it, Newman does not lose sight of the factors which act as a check on the downward trend of man. There is "depth of power and strength" lodged in man, a power which is free to choose, which must in fact choose, for it is a freedom which is encompassed by the same law of his nature and destiny "the fate of being free, the unalienable prerogative of choosing between life and death...(P. S. IV, 53). This power of will, with reason as a guide gives him light and direction toward progress, away from the brute; and more wondrous even, than this, a spiritual principle more marvellous in every way than all the powers and forces of nature. (P. S. V, 343-5) All of these serve not merely as a check against the downward grade of nature but acting as a lever

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are able to raise that nature, even in the elements which it has in common with the brutes, to a level distinctly above them and furnish the elements in which a divine stock can be grafted on to what is merely human.

Freedom of the will, therefore, furnishes man with the possibility and fact of progress. "What is the peculiarity of our nature, in contrast with the inferior beings around us? It is that, though man cannot change what he is born with, he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good. Other beings are complete from their first existence, in that line of excellence which is allotted to them; but man begins with nothing realized (to use the word) and he has to make capital for himself by the exercise of those faculties which are his natural inheritance. Thus he gradually advances to the fulness of his original destiny." (G. A. 348-9) But as events of the physical world do not flow from the instrumentality of the laws formulated by us, as from some mysterious efficient cause, so neither does the mind of man progress from the laws of logic. "His progress is a living growth, not a mechanism; and its instruments are mental acts, not the formulas and contrivances of language." But in Newman's conception of nature and of human nature in particular, there is a law wider than the law of progress encompassing it and

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effectively setting its bounds, absorbing it and every other law of reality. It may be described as the law of irreversibility. In his physical reality man is subject to it--he "rises to fall; he tends to dissolution from the moment he begins to be; he lives on, indeed, in his children, he lives on in his name, he lives not on in his own person. He is, as regards the manifestations of his nature here below, as a bubble that breaks and as water poured out upon the earth. He was young, he is old, he is never young again." (O. S. 165) And what holds for man's physical being is equally true of his moral nature, "the diviner part," natural virtue, romantic love in all its charm and beauty; for "as night follows day, as decrepitude follows upon health, so surely are failure, and overthrow and annihilation, the issue of this natural virtue, if time only be allowed to it to run its course." More hideously, therefore, does this aspect of man illustrate the irreversibility of his nature, its inherent insufficiency and ultimate powerlessness. (O. S. 165-6) In his works, man fares in no wise differently; the same inexorable law is supreme over them; they die and have no power of renovation. (Ibid. 167). The recognition of this law gives to Newman's entire philosophy of life its marked element of pessimism in spite of his unshaken belief in a Power that can renew all things on the face of the earth and in spite of his love of Him

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who said: "He that believeth in Me shall not die forever."

The nearest that Newman came to quarreling with the constitution of human nature, such as it has been presented in the previous pages, is in the relation of that nature to the supernatural. In this latter realm he will not concede that we ought to deal with human beings as they are but rather such as they ought to be, or rather, such as they may become by virtue of the supernatural destiny conferred on them and the supernatural means placed at their disposal. He is willing to bear the charge, in this connection, of being a theorist and a dreamer, as sponsoring a procedure which "refuses to deal with them (men) as he finds them, and tries to raise them, and change them, and to make them what they are not." On the same ground he sustains and grapples with the accusation that religion is "unnatural," in that it "does not bring the elementary and existing nature of man to its highest perfection, but thwarts and impairs it, and provides for a second and new nature." (S. D. 85-86). Religion, being to a great extent a thing of the mind, he will not consent to the application of the principle, which holds of the material creation, that we overcome nature by yielding to it; it must rather be resisted and overcome, sacrificed to something beside itself and thus fall to the level of an instrument for achieving a higher end. (Ibid. 87).

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but in general, Newman's tendency is to build religion on what is in conformity with our nature, what is congenial and in accordance with its deepest principles; and this, even when he considers the actions of Christ, for he recalls that "He who thus acted had taken upon Him human nature in its perfection." (S. D. 28). So, too, true supernatural faith and religion tend to fulfil the aspirations, needs and foreshadowings of natural faith and devotion, not thwart them; (G. A. 430) and by natural, he means what is universal. (G. A. 405)

b) The Corruption of Human Nature

The general law of the irreversibility of all natural processes gives a negative ground for the ultimate dissolution of human nature. Whatever science can establish to indicate a law of progress, will be a progress or evolution within a restricted sphere bounded by the greater cycle which works fatally toward decay in the individual, the race, the planetary, and the stellar universe. The actual presence, in human nature itself, of powers in conflict and opposition to each other, creating in man an enormity or derangement as compared with other departments of the visible creation, gives a more positive foundation to the contention, that human nature has somehow slid from a normal to a diminished level.

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MAN

From an independent objective outlook, making abstraction of all religious considerations, the same mysterious truth is discerned, however widely the interpretations of that truth may vary. Thus Argyll: "It is as if weapons have been placed in the hands of Man which he has not the strength, nor the knowledge nor the rectitude of will to wield aright. It is in this contrast that he stands alone. In the light of this contrast we see that the corruption of human nature is not a mere dogma of Theology but a fact of science....the analogies of nature are averse to the supposition that this condition of things was original. It looks as if something exceptional must have happened. (The Unity of Nature-371-2)

Newman whilst giving full weight to the arguments based on the laws governing human nature, for proof of man's fallen state, does yet, primarily, attach that belief directly and immediately to his most fundamental assumption, the existence of God. The world of man is out of joint with the purpose of its Creator: "this is a fact, a fact as true as the fact of its existence" and thus the theological doctrine of original sin becomes almost as certain to him as that the world exists, and as the existence of God.(Apo. 242-3). There is no lack of confirmatory evidence to strengthen this belief in his mind. Such evidence he finds in the primary teachings of the human race, the belief of all mankind as

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manifested in the various forms of natural religion and, more particularly, in the witness of the individual conscience to a sense of guilt "as keen as our experience of bodily suffering." (G. A. 417) The real foundation for such a sense of guilt may seem to present difficulties and may, at first sight, be questioned, but even common knowledge of the human heart and more especially our own actual and bitter experience, bear witness to the presence of some "mystery of iniquity," lying at the very root of our nature. (P. S. VIII, 118) And such experience issuing from the individual conscience is an evidence perfectly distinct from the evidence emanating from authority; it brings back whatever argument there may be on the subject, to the testimony of consciousness and if men differ on this, then argument has ceased to avail.

The corruption which Newman finds in human nature, is not the result in each individual of the actual sin on the part of that individual; it is not an accidental evil which some men, therefore, may possibly escape; but man's <u>nature</u> is corrupt . (P. S. VIII, 223-25) Personal weakness, indulgence and transgression, are in addition to the general downward tendency, and these, of course, vary with each individual. (P. S. VII, 98)

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MAN

In the sphere of earnest religion, the admission of the belief in the corruption of human nature in general, is of no particular avail; a mere profession, therefore, without application to the individual may have its place in a philosophical outlook on life but for the amendment and advancement of the individual, a <u>real</u> apprehension of the doctrine and of its implications are necessary. (P. S. I, 172-3)

Hence,a religious pre-occupation gives Newman the direction which his thoughts will take in view of this corruption. He fears the freshness and buoyancy of innocence as being incompatible with our sinful state, "scarcely suitable and safe"; white garments and unfading chaplets befit an Angel, or very young children. For all who have advanced to the apprehension of evil, pain and sorrow, sanctified indeed by God's grace, are the almost necessary medicine to bring home effectively the real apprehension of our true condition. (P. S. V, 305-6) And so he would call "resignation a more blessed form of mind than sanguine hope of present success, because it is truer and more consistent with our fallen state of being and the more improving to our hearts; and because it is that for which the most eminent servants of God have been conspicuous." (P. S. VIII, 129). There is no doubt that Newman emphasizes the weak, corrupt side of man's nature, more particularly

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in the works which fall within his Anglican life. It is not, however, a fair estimate of his view of man, to pick out all the gloomy, dreary things he has said in the course of seventy years and group them all into one dark hideous mass.*

Newman's insistence on the corruption of human nature is possibly the result of his almost exclusively religious preoccupations and somewhat also the fruit of controversy. Thus he opposes the "large views on the subject of human nature" common to the deistic philosophy of his own time. (P. S. I, 319); he throws the weight of his personality against the politically revolutionary theories of a De La Mennais which would build on the assumption that "the multitude of men were at bottom actually good Christians." (Ess. I, 158-9). But these controversial issues are but passing and subsidiary in character. On their account, Newman may stress the corruption of human nature more than the case warrants, but such misplaced emphasis does not avail to efface the clear-cut outlines of the principal fact: Human nature is in a fallen state. The question that, thereupon, calls for consideration is this: is there a remedy for such a condition? And where

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* That Newman gives a wide and fair scope to the beauty, genius, charm and grace of the natural man and to his capacity for natural good is evident from the University Discourses. (Cf. esp. Idea 229 ff)

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loes this remedy lie? Stating it differently, it is the question of salvation or "the fulfilment of our highest purposes"; and whatever those highest purposes are conceived to be, whether imposed from without or the unfolding of what is germinally within our nature, it presupposes the overcoming of the corrupting elements and the raising of that nature to a higher level of being and activity.

Salvation, the fulfilment of our highest purposes and the satisfaction of our deepest needs, cannot come from within. Such is Newman's first principle. Left to itself, human nature goes on a downward grade both in the individual and in the group, (Diff. I, 243, 273) or as he says again, the history of human society may start with the poet but it ends with the policeman. The possibility of good seems to be completely excluded. "Our unassisted nature is represented in Scripture as the source of much that is evil, but not of anything that is good. We read much in Scripture of <u>evil</u> coming out of the natural heart, but nothing of good coming out of it. When did not the multitude of men turn away from Him who is their life? When was it that the holy were not the few, and the unholy the many? And what does this show but the law of man's nature tends towards evil, not towards the good?" (P. S. V, 132)

That salvation must necessarily come from without, is

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clear. "What being can change its own nature? That would be almost ceasing to be itself; fire cannot cease to burn; the leopard cannot change its spots, and ceases not to rend and devour." (P. S. VIII, 70)....when....the mind has become sinful in its habit and character, and the Spirit of God having departed, it has no principle within it of sufficient strength to save it from spiritual death." (Ibid.) Nature cannot be overcome by natural means, and Newman cites with approbation the heathen proverb: naturam expellas furcâ usque recurret. (D. A. 273)

Though salvation itself cannot come from within, something must proceed from man himself, at least as a prerequisite to salvation. This prerequisite on the part of the responsible individual is a willingness to be changed. (P. S. 240-1) Now such a willingness implies eagerness and a looking out, a readiness to accept proferred help, "for a religious mind is ever looking towards God and seeking his traces." (P. S. VIII, 220).

And so God is our salvation but that salvation comes to us only through Jesus Christ. Both Nature and Revelation testify to our corrupt condition but "we are not told the secret of our guilty nature till we are told the means to escape from it; we are not told of God's fearful wrath till we are told of His love in Christ." (P. S. III, 295) Through

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his assumption of our nature we have been raised to a higher level, and a germ of a new life has been injected into us which under favorable conditions and proper cultivation gives hope of salvation. The external instrument of that regeneration is Baptism but its power is from the death of the Son of God incarnate. (P. S. VI, 77, VII, 187)

The possibility of a new nature has been thus provided; our old nature has not been changed. "Human nature remains what it was, though it has been baptized." (P. S. IV, 155) The good and the bad are not on the same level but they have the same nature; the good still have in tendency what has remained actual in the bad. (P. S. V, 126) "In this world, even the best of men, though they are dead to sin and have put sin to death, yet have that dead and corrupt thing in them, though they live to God; they have still an enemy of God remaining in their hearts, though they keep it in subjection." (P. S. VII, 186). Hence, though Baptism has the power to turn man to God who is his salvation, yet, it has not of itself the power to keep him irrevocably directed in the course which it opens to him (Diff. I, 243) nor does Baptism confer on man the power to return to God, should he of his own volition again turn from the source of his light and desire. (Diff. I, 243-4) And what is true of the individual holds equally of the group. (Diff. I, 272). These

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'acts make the confession of sinfulness for him essential to
iven the highest sanctity and establishes a clear line of
demarcation between Christianity and any incomplete form of
'eligion. "The disciples of other worships and other philos-
)phies thought and think that the many indeed are bad, but the
'ew good." (O. S. 18) "In them guilt is an attribute of in-
lividuals, or of particular places, or of particular acts of
iations, of bodies politic or their rulers, for whom, in con-
sequence, purification is necessary." (O. S. 17-18) But in
'hristianity, with its raison d'être in the Incarnation and
.ts fulfilment in the Redemption, all are raised from a lower
;o a higher level, all are redeemed and the corruption of
iuman nature finds its resolution, or to speak philosophically,
.ts synthesis, in the nature and world of the God-made-Man.
'his is a thought which lies patent in Newman (e. g. P. S. II,
59) and we might have expected it to soften the harshness of
iis general outlook on human nature and to brighten his sombre
'iew of the world and of men. But only at intervals does he
iccord us gleams of hope like sunbeams piercing the clouds and
.ighting up for a passing moment the face of our fallen nature.
'hus, for instance, he seeks to turn our minds from the con-
;emplation of our corruption, since we do not really know its
ixact limits; hence, it need not be a source of trepidation
iince we do know that God's grace is sufficient against "the

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far-spreading root of evil in us. (P. S. II, 126) And he can even concede our having "good natural feelings" though they are confined mostly to the period of childhood. (P. S. II, 53) On the other hand, no one has a higher conception than Newman, of the Christian dignity for "all Christians are kings in God's sight; they are kings in this unseen kingdom, in His spiritual world, in the Communion of Saints. They seem like other men but they have crowns on their heads, and glorious robes around them, and Angels to wait on them, though our bodily eyes see it not. Such are all Christians, high and low; all Christians who remain in that state in which Holy Baptism has placed them." (P. S. VIII, 53) And in his Catholic life, he is willing to use the world and human nature, as the raw material out of which to fashion a higher world and a higher nature. "We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature, not by doing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own." (Idea 123)

Summing up, then, this phase of the subject, we find that Newman conceives human nature as corrupted, and fallen from its normal level. That fact, induces the sense of sin which forms the basis of all natural religion. The remedy for that corruption and guilt is found in the Mediation of Christ. (G. A. 487-8)

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MAN

There remains to be considered in the present chapter, the character which this fallen nature takes on, as a result of Christ's mediation, and its relation to the new nature which is superadded to man in consequence of his sharing in that mediation. Whatever progress man's nature is capable of must be a development, not a destruction of its original state. In such a progress and in its resultant perfection we must find an organic growth of the entire nature, not merely an abnormal development of a part whether that part represent the intellectual the volitional or the emotional aspect. In this respect, Newman finds natural religion of primitive times more truly representative of the elements in man's nature than the philosophical religions of modern times. These latter "are not true developments of Man's whole nature but mainly of the intellect, recognizing indeed the moral sense but ignoring conscience" i. e. the sense of duty. (G. A. 395-6) Newman's concern for a true development of all of man's natural powers, is, of course, the contention that man is, by his very nature, religious. And as natural religion is essentially bound up with human nature so revealed religion must build on and carry through what human nature in its utmost development provides.

What the original state of man was before the fall, when, raised above his human nature by a supernatural grace,

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the powers of his soul and body blended in perfect harmony, we can but dimly surmise. With the loss of that favored condition, there succeeded to the harmony of man's powers, a warring of his elements; and in the restoration or regeneration this remains, together with such an inextricable union of the natural and supernatural as to defy merely human analysis. Such a commingling and confusion of the two states we find continuously in Newman, particularly, when he describes the state of mind preliminary to the acceptance of the supernatural truths of revelation. "When, then, even an unlearned person thus trained--from his own heart, from the action of his mind upon itself, from struggles with self, from an attempt to follow the impulses of his own nature which he feels to be highest and noblest, from a vivid natural perception (natural, though cherished and strengthened by prayer, though of that new and second nature which God the Holy Ghost gives), from an innate though supernatural perception of the great vision of truth which is external to him....when a person thus trained from his own heart, reads the declarations and promises of the Gospel, are we to be told that he believes in them merely because he has been bid believe in them?" (P. S. VIII, 117-18) There is no possibility of separating the natural from the supernatural elements in such an act of the mind; here we have "the highest impulses of our nature";

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these, "strengthened by prayer" and "unfolded by practice"; the prayer and practice deriving from a "new nature which the Holy Ghost gives." And such a fusion of elements in the mind and heart of the baptized Christian, the combined product of nature and of grace, is for Newman the necessary ground in which the strictly supernatural truths of revelation can find their congenial soil.

And when we would view the action of nature and the supernatural in the history of the group, we are confronted with the same conditions. "Nature pursues its course," he tells us, now coincident with that of grace, now parallel to it, now across, now divergent, now counter, in proportion to its own imperfection and to the attraction and influence which grace exerts over it." (Idea 181) And again: "there are two systems going on in the world, one of nature, and one above nature; and two histories, one of common events and one of miracles, and each system and each history has its own order." (Prepos. 307) At first sight, this would seem to contradict what I have said of the hopeless commingling of the natural and the supernatural; yet it does but confirm and strengthen my contention. For the facts or events of these two orders are but one and the same; they are <u>two</u> only in the principles whence they issue.

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MAN

On one point Newman always holds a clear course: the supernatural does not destroy what is human in us but spiritualizes and perfects it. (O. S. 95), for we are not stripped of nature but clothed with a new nature. It does not exclude the love of human nature, still less the knowledge of human nature. There are saints, indeed, in whom grace seems to supersede nature; but for the most part grace does but sanctify and elevate. (O. S. 113-14)

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CHAPTER III

MAN: THE MORAL ASPECT

M. Julien Benda in his recent work, "La trahison des clercs," sums up the thesis of that startling book, on the very title-page, in a brief citation from Renouvier: "the world is suffering from a lack of faith in a transcendental truth." (Trans. Richard Addington, New York, 1928) We have seen how Newman assumes a transcendental truth, the existence of God, and necessarily so, for his whole philosophy of life. Without it, he would have no solid ground to rest on, nothing on which to build up a moral world or an ethical and religious system.

In and through conscience, Newman apprehends God as ethical because he finds in himself, primarily, a moral character. We can readily anticipate, therefore, what aspect of man, of the world, and of truth, will take precedence in every way, over all others: It is the moral aspect. In so far, Newman's general outlook coincides with that of the medieval voluntarists, with Kant and his modern successors. He seeks, if not a <u>connection</u>, at least a <u>confirmation</u> of knowledge from duty. He would certainly subscribe to Baillie's contention that our powers of discernment are dependent in great measure upon our sense of duty, for he does say repeatedly, that a truth takes on greater or less probability varying with the normal dispositions of the subject. "A good

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and an evil man will think very different things probable." (U. S. 191). And when we meet such a statement as this: "to believe in duty and to believe in God, or not, for the man of faith, two different beliefs, but only one belief," (Baillie, The Roots of Religion in the Soul p. 221) it would be difficult to say, without specifically indicating its source, whether it proceeds from Newman or from a Post-Kantian. And yet in another respect, and that an essential one, Newman stands opposed to Kantianism; he starts with God. For him, knowledge of God's existence is the starting point for all subsequent religious knowledge, as well as the necessary ground for the sense of duty. Kant, and his later disciples even more so, reach out after God, through the sense of duty or a sense of values; or I should rather say, they are ever in the attitude of reaching and straining after what is really unattainable on their own principles. Baillie's treatment of the subject is as good as typical as any of that school of modern thought with which Newman seems, at first sight, to have so much in common. Speaking of man in his moral capacity, as bound by a sense of duty Baillie describes how at first implicitly, then in the course of the experience of life, man comes to feel that "it is nothing less than the hidden nature of things that is laying this obligation upon him....whence can that must derive, if not from the nature

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of things?....For how can he be obliged to do the right, if in the last resort, the Universe does not care whether he do the right or the wrong?" (The Roots of Religion in the Soul p. 223) Now it is precisely on this last point that Newman parts company with the Kantian school. He has as his starting-point the firm conviction of the existence of God and without that unshakable conviction the universe, even when written in capitals, has no moral character whatever. Baillie, without Newman's fundamental assumption, uses the same form of argument: "Mankind....from the beginning," he tells us, regarded its moral standards as being, in some deep sense, rooted in the real order of things; and the same is normally true of the individual also....(Ibid. 220). And again: "when no disturbing influence enters in, our knowledge of good and evil is naturally, and without further ado, taken by us to be a knowledge of the ultimate principles of the constitution of the system to which we belong" (Ibid. 227). I am far from being unsympathetic with this argument but to my mind it has no ground, in Kantian principles, on which to stand. The trouble is, that "a disturbing influence" has come along for everybody. That "disturbing influence" is knowledge of modern science. In so far as it is factual, it does not disturb, nor do we quarrel with it on such a score; but its claims go beyond mere facts and that is

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where it begins to be a "disturbing influence." For without belief in God, whether taken on faith or established in demonstrative knowledge, the whole system of the universe, from a purely scientific point of view, shows not a trace of moral influence; the order of the universe does not come under the classification of good or evil; it does not check evil nor favor the good, unless we desire to keep up a harmless fiction and call sugar "good" and vitriol "evil".

But it will be said: conscience must be excepted from such a drastic generalization; it not only shows traces of a moral character but is essentially moral. What more vivid than our general and immediate recognition of right and wrong? what more keen than our sense of responsibility? Moreover, does not Newman himself hold to the inherently moral character of man? Does he not pit the witness of his conscience, confirming for him the belief in God, against the united flood of the "everlasting nay," pronounced by the whole course of human history, as well as against the enigmatical silence of an utterly indifferent external universe?

In the first place, Newman does hold to the essentially moral character of man; in fact, the present chapter will be devoted to exhibiting in detail, the primacy which this moral character assumes in his religious and philosophical outlook. But Newman first believes in God, believes in Him

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as the self-evident Reality. And wherever that belief becomes the point of departure for the unshakable character of our clear apprehension of the distinction between good and evil and the guarantee of its consequent "must", there the argument has unequivocal meaning and an open field for logical development. Without it, the consciousness of a morally-binding distinction between good and evil, sinks to the level of a brute fact, with no more rational guarantee for its "must" than any other brute fact. Thus, love of country, parents, God, becomes for the materialist only a "bright pressure" located somewhere in the mid-section, as opposed to a "dull pressure" conventionally known as hate. Inspiration of supremest genius sinks to the level of a visceral process and Shakespeare's tragedies are but the by-product of a ham sandwich.

Gore takes up the argument for the moral interpretation of the universe,beautifully, but pathetically and hopelessly, (Belief in God Vol. I, esp. p. 3-67) for he begins at the wrong end. He is seeking a rational proof for God in the moral events of the world. Baillie (The Roots of Religion in the Soul p. 228) admits that Kant failed to make faith a product of our rational nature, but insists that Sorley in his "Moral Values and the Idea of God," has accomplished it. That is, of course, a large order. Gore, to my mind, does

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not accomplish it. In fact, he appears helpless before the onslaughts of such ruthless critics as Bradley and Alexander. They leave him, as he admits, in the blankest amazement. "Fundamentally to disbelieve in God," he exclaims,...."means that we see in the world of which we form a part, no signs of anything corresponding to the mind or spirit or purpose which indisputably exists in man--no sign of a universal spirit or reason with which we can hold communion, nothing but blind and unconscious force." (Belief in God, p. 45) "Quite so," says our matter-of-fact atheist, "and allow me to add, that not even in man is there anything but blind unconscious force." The point I would bring out is, that arguments such as Gore's which are supposed to prove the existence of God on rational grounds, from a consideration of the moral aspects of man and the universe, are not valid as independent arguments. The same holds true of Fechner's, "das Argument vom Geiste" in his truly remarkable treatise, "Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens." The argument does not take on any more cogency when it proceeds from the consciousness of moral values to reality, than it has as an independent proof, nor yet, when it is grounded on acknowledged human needs such as for instance, in our striving after happiness. The most that can be said for them is that they have strong, subjective force and serve as confirmation

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of objective proof when attached to an independently demonstrative argument. Newman, as we have seen, grounds his conception in his personal experience and conviction of the existence of God considered as a self-evident truth. That gives him the strongest possible subjective ground, together with a high degree of probability from the objective side, but as an independent argument for the existence of God, the passage from our conscious moral values to reality, always falls short of demonstration and most often, simply moves about in a vicious circle. Such is the fate of Baillie's presentation, in spite of its human appeal. One can agree with all his facts, but his turning the order of values and the order of reality in opposed relations to each other, renders those facts ineffective to the attainment of his end. All seekers after righteousness, he affirms, have in all ages trusted in an Eternal Righteousness. All inspired workers believe they are working for a more than human Cause. The consciousness of these facts, moreover, is accompanied by a clear recognition of the claims of righteousness on my allegiance. Furthermore, that which obliges me is a larger order of things to which I stand related. Finally, how can the Ultimate Righteousness demand righteousness of me, if itself is not so? (The Roots of Religion in the Soul p. 233 ff.) To all of which the answer is short and cruel:

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if it exists--right ! And on that hypothetical if, every form of ethics and morality that has its root in Kantian principles will forever stick, barren in its objective worth, powerless to bind in spite of its categorical imperative,--for what binding force has a hypothetical Righteousness?

Taking up now Newman's conception of the moral nature of man, I find that it has its deepest root in a distinctively sceptical strain which crops out persistently in his thinking and which has served to characterize him by friend and foe as an anti-intellectual. We have reason to suspect, that at times, he considered truth beyond the attainment of our unaided natural powers; at least, it is that tendency which led him to take refuge in a human mind guaranteed by its Creator, and using moral means in preference to purely intellectual gifts for the surer attainment of such truth. Whatever may be said contrary to this view, when put upon general grounds, I feel that it holds, at least, for Newman's investigation in the field of religious knowledge. Thus he says: "Religion, for instance, may be reverenced by the soldier, the man of literature, the trader, the statesman, and the theologian; yet,how very distinct their modes of reverencing it, and how separate the standard which each one sets up in his mind ! Well, all these various modes of viewing things, cannot one and all be the best mode, even

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were they all good modes; but this even is not the case. Some are contrary to others; some are bad. But even of those that are on the whole good, some are but in part good, some are imperfect, some have much bad mixed with them; and only one is best. Only one is the truth and the perfect truth; and which that is, none know but those who are in possession of it, if even they. (P. S. VIII, 27 italics mine)

It is not as though the wide differences among men in their religious and moral perceptions led Newman to doubt the existence of objective truth. He recognizes two facts: First, all men are not in possession of it; secondly, we are responsible for the associations we attach and the relations which we assign to the objects of the intellect. The object itself of the intellect is not for Newman a "construct", but the association and relations which that object takes on, are the workmanship of the human mind;and the mental attitudes resulting therefrom, import responsibility as being the result of personal acts. Everything in our thought, except the constitutive elements, depends on us.

From the above facts,Newman proceeds to reach out to an intuitive conclusion; they suggest to him "that there is something deeper in our differences (of opinion) than the accident of external circumstances; and that we need the interposition of a Power, greater than human teaching and

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human argument, to make our beliefs true and our minds one." (G. A. 375) And so Newman refuses to remain sticking in even a partial or qualified form of scepticism. After having testified to the almost hopeless entanglements of human knowledge produced by a ceaseless warring of opinions, he assumes that the natural human mind cannot of itself know with any degree of certainty the really momentous things which it needs to know in the order of natural religion. Yet will he not surrender to a universal scepticism in religious knowledge for always there remains One who does know; and though our natural faculties be inadequate because incommensurable with truth, still He can supply and make means to reach that, which, without Him, would fall short of attainment. For God knows what is true amid the chaos of human dispute; "and towards that one and only Truth He is leading us forward. He is leading forward His redeemed, He is training His elect, one and all, to the one perfect knowledge and obedience of Christ; not, however, without their cooperation, but by means of calls which they are to obey, and which if they do not obey, they lose place, and fall behind in their heavenly course. ----We pass from one state of knowledge to another, we are introduced into a higher region from a lower, by listening to Christ's call and obeying it." (P. S. VIII, 27-8) It is, then, through his moral nature that man attains

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to religious knowledge. Here, as everywhere, in Newman, God is its fountain-head; from Him such knowledge flows, from Him it receives its worth; its clarity and its certitude. And the channel of its advent into the human mind is not through the intellectual powers of man; the experiences of life furnish the raw material, and obedience to conscience is the instrument of its progress and development. "Designs," "appointments," "works," "judgments," which enter the daily life of the religious man, directed by an over-ruling Providence, are the providential clues and directions which lead the religious mind aright. (P. S. I, 225)

But even without this negative root of scepticism in the field of religious knowledge, the preponderance of the moral aspect of life in Newman's philosophic thought, is readily accounted for by his fundamental assumptions, on the constitution of the human mind. Religion is not an extraneous tie, but an essential relation between God and man. Conscience is an essential element in that nature, and whatever proceeds from a sense of duty, has upon it the guarantee, not only of our human nature, but the seal and approval of the will of its Maker as well. Hence, it would follow, that whatever proceeds from obedience to a sense of duty, will be for Newman a surer guide to truth than the process of any intellectual power functioning on its own initiative,

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however enlightened that may be. Obedience to conscience thus becomes the way to knowledge and, more particularly, a personal guide to individuals, even when there is but little light of objectively producible evidence for their decisions. This was also Newman's conception of Private Judgment in religion, that is, a judgment "not formed arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or liking, but conscientiously, and under a sense of duty." (Apo. 21)

There is another reason why Newman stresses the moral character of man in preference to any other; this reason has its root in the very nature of religious knowledge. Religion does not stop in knowledge; it is a method of knowing in order to recommend ourselves to God by the practice of obedience to his will. (Dev. 112) Now we perceive from facts, that not all men are gifted intellectually up to the point where they can apprehend the sublime truths of natural and revealed religion by speculative intuition or rigid reasoning; whereas, simple obedience to a sense of duty is accessible to all, and thus opens the path of religious knowledge and ultimate salvation to every man of good will. Practically, then, we have Newman's answer to the great Augustine's charming circle: "Grant, then, O God, that I may know and understand whither of these two things be first, to call upon thee or to praise thee, and whether it be first

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to know thee or to call upon thee." (Confessions, I, 1.) And his answer, difficult from a logical point of view, yet psychologically correct: "I will seek thee, O Lord, calling upon thee." (Ibid.) Newman's solution is the same: little knowledge, a bare probability, with obedience to our sense of duty. Thereupon, the intellectual powers become diminished in his estimation, the moral nature of man, exalted. Summing up, then, his general view of this matter, we have in Newman, the superiority of moral excellence over intellectual or any lesser form. The whole of his contention is based on the distinction between religion and the knowledge of religion. And because he conceives moral excellence as superior to intellectual, he proceeds to a step which may well be questioned: The instruments of moral excellence take on, for him, something of the superiority of the product itself: conscience ranks higher than speculative reason: obedience, with God's will, is better than critical investigation; probability, acting under a sense of duty, is a match for objective certitude.

With these preliminary principles to guide us, we can more easily proceed to an analysis of the constituent elements of the moral nature of man as well as its scope and bearing in the general scheme of man's life and activity.

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MAN: THE MORAL ASPECT

In general, by moral powers or activities, Newman means such powers which function within a particular domain, that is, the domain of freedom and responsibility. This would exclude in the first place, whatever falls below the level of a human action and secondly, even within the sphere of human activity, any act or process which follows upon necessary and therefore inescapable premises. Thus, within the field of a rigid demonstrative conclusion, there is no room for freedom or responsibility; what follows necessarily, therefore, would belong to the realms of intellect, or of physical causality, not to that of the moral nature of man. There is an element of the <u>subjective</u>, <u>personal</u> quality attaching to the individual human being, in every thing moral, whether it be moral proof, moral argument, or moral sense.

But the inseparable and essential characteristic of everything that comes under the term moral, is the notion of responsibility which in its turn supposes freedom. When Newman, therefore, exalts the moral nature of man above every other aspect of his human dignity in the natural order and assigns him a legitimate and even a favored place in the great universe, he, by the fact, takes issue with the intellectuals of any creed or opinion and evidently stands opposed to every mechanistic interpretation of the world. For him, man is primarily and essentially a moral being, responsible

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and free, exercising his powers as a real cause in the universe. And if such a cause, which cannot be accounted for by natural factors nor predicted and measured within a closed system, jars upon the smooth-running mechanistic hypothesis, so much the worse for mechanism. Newman prefers to range himself in this matter on the side of Aristotle who "when he would enumerate the causes of the things that take place in the world, after making mention of those which he considered to be physical and material, adds, 'and the mind and everything which is by means of man." (Idea 53) To pass over the moral agency of man, is to Newman a preposterous procedure, for the moral forces are powers not merely as influential as physical forces but of an even higher order and effectiveness.

Conscience is, of course, the principal element in the moral nature of man. In its strict meaning it is properly an act, a decision in the form of a dictate, bearing immediately upon conduct. (Diff. II, 256) This subject will receive full treatment in the following chapter. But in addition to conscience there are other elements constituting the moral nature of man. There is, first of all, the source out of which conscience takes its rise, an intuitive apprehension of the first moral principles. Then, too, we have in the moral nature of man a sense of fitness which Newman

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so often denounces, not in its own range and legitimate capacity, but as being the substitute for the real conscience in the philosophical religion of present-day civilization. The counterfeit conscience we might call it. All of these three together, by their repeated acts furnish the material of a system for the direction of individual conduct and thus gradually build up a man's "moral nature" and create a "moral state" which has more of permanence than any act or series of acts. The moral state of a man by its influence on the other powers of the human soul raises the entire personality to the level of a moral disposition" or "temper". These are, in general, the principal influences that make of man a moral being and it is in this light that Newman regards him.

The original source of all that is moral in man Newman considers an intuitive apprehension of right and wrong. He calls it by various names such as "common sense", an "instinct", a "sentiment". These names do not express its nature but rather indicate the manner in which it functions, that is to say, directly and immediately without any apparent process of deliberation or of reasoning. "In all.... cases of conduct," he says, "there is no end of arguing about right or wrong, if we once begin; there are numberless ways of acting, each of which may be speciously defended

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by argument, but plain, pure-hearted common sense, generally speaking, at the very first sight decides the question for us without argument; but if we do not listen promptly to this monitor, its light goes out at once, and we are left to the mercy of mere conjecture and grope about with but second-best guides." (P. S. VIII, 68)

This moral sense has been impressed upon our mind by nature; by it we recognize "certain moral truths, when they are presented to us from without, so that we are quite sure that veracity, for instance, benevolence and purity are right and good, and that their contraries involve guilt"; it consists in sentiments." (Diff. I, 270-1) Its scope is limited, its indications delicate and evanescent and though unmistakable, it is not capable of proof since it acts as a first principle; (Call. 97) hence, all obedience to it is of the nature of faith. (U. S. p. 19) It is distinct in its essence from right action. (Diff. I, 271) Newman insists repeatedly on the ease with which this moral sense is lost or enfeebled both in the individual and even in whole races. The Greeks, in particular, suffered in this respect more than other nations "partly from the vivacity of their intellect, partly from their passion for the beautiful."...(Call. 97) "When men are in a state of nature these (first moral principles) are sinned against, and vanish very soon, at so early a date in the history of the individual that perhaps he does not recollect that he ever

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possessed them; and since, like other first principles, they are but very partially capable of proof, a general scepticism prevails both as to their existence and their truth." (Ibid.) Yet, Newman always stoutly maintained that every normal human being possessed, at one time, such a moral sense and not merely every individual but the world of men collectively. "As each individual, (he writes in 1829) has certain instincts of right or wrong antecedently to reasoning, on which he acts--and rightly so--which perverse reasoning may supplant, which then can hardly be regained, but, if regained, will be regained from a different source--from reasoning, not from nature--so, I think, has the world of men collectively." (Corres. I, 180) That they can also be restored from some supernatural source he likewise holds; (Call. 97) but their original strength, clearness and delicacy can never be fully regained, once they have been deliberately sinned against. Hence, the majority of men and of nations are in a moral condition parallel to one who has passed through a physical crisis. "That ready and clear perception of right and wrong, which before directed us, will have disappeared, as beauty of person or keenness of eye-sight in bodily disorders; and when we begin to try to make up our minds which way lies the course of duty on particular trials, we shall bring enfeebled, unsteady

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powers to the examination; and when we move to act, our limbs (as it were) will move the contrary way when we wish to do right." (P. S. VIII, 69)

The moral perception or insight which is the act of this elemental gift is not the same in its nature as mystic insight, which latter Newman regards as an "unreal almost passive illumination," (Ari, 110) but it functions in the same direct and intuitive manner, being an instinctive perception guaranteed by the practice of virtue. It is independent of any explicit logical process both in its discernment as well as in the acceptance of what is discerned and whatever consequences in the way of action follow upon such acceptance. (Dev. 190)

Such, then, is the elementary moral sense in Newman. Juergens (Newman, On the Psychology of Faith p. 168) has rightly pointed out that this moral sense corresponds practically to what the medieval scholastics call synderesis. I would note, however, this difference that Newman's conception approximates more to a power, whilst the Schoolmen consider it a habit. Thus Aquinas: synderesis is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others said that it is reason itself, not as reason but as a nature." (Summa Theol. I^a, Qu. 29 art. 12) St. Thomas himself considered it a

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MAN: THE MORAL ASPECT

The cultivation of the moral sense and continued obedience to the sense of duty gradually form man to a permanent condition of mind which Newman calls a moral state. Through repeated decisions of conscience there, likewise, results a body of truths not strictly proved but passed on and approved in thought and act, a product of the experience of each individual, furnishing to every man a rule of antecedent probability with regard to any matters of conduct and religious opinion that may come up. Such a rule is necessarily incomplete and uncertain and serves as a sure guide only in proportion as it is refined and strengthened in individuals, (U. S. p. 20) but the general disposition resulting therefrom is the moral state which Newman requires as a necessary prerequisite for the reception of the first beginnings of the supernatural religion; (G. A. 415-16) it consists in being imbued with religious opinions and sentiments, which either beget or are supplemented by such feelings as fear, confidence, affection, devotion and wonder. (P. S. II, 29 and IV, 293) Those possessing this moral state have a different criterion than others not so situated; the measure of their prospective belief is the power of God as opposed to the capacity of the human mind. (P. S. IV, 283) The reason, therefore, why one man is ready to accept a truth which another rejects on the same evidence, is

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precisely this difference in their standard of measuring what is or is not probable. Such a difference takes us back to the first principles of a man's moral nature which in its gradual cultivation has come to an habitual realization of the great realities of the invisible world. These minds in their reasonings take into consideration factors which other minds, not so trained, fail to take into account. "Such men," Newman tells us, "are little understood by the world because they are not of the world; and hence it sometimes happens that even the better sort of men are often disconcerted and vexed by them. It cannot be otherwise; they move forward on principles so different from what are commonly assumed as true. They take for granted what the world wishes to have proved in detail. They have become familiar with the sights of the next world, till they talk of them as if all men admitted them. The immortality of truth, its oneness, the impossibility of falsehood coalescing with it, what truth is"....(P. S. IV, 234-5) all these and more are taken for granted, assumed as first principles, not because they are incapable of proof but because habituation has made such truths a part of a man's moral habit or state which he now uses as a second nature. The absence of such a disposition will naturally throw a man for support in his decisions, on the external world,

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whether it be to evidence, to the examples of others, to precedents or to the popular opinion, whereas, the "religious mind" has within itself the sufficient guarantee for its own line of conduct and belief, even, when such guarantee falls short of the producible evidence necessary for convincing a supposedly unbiased and dispassionate mind. (P. S. II, 18-20) Thus, the moral state eventually, in its highest development, makes a man a law unto himself, approximating in this respect the creatures of genius in the intellectual, aesthetic or practical fields of human achievement.

The moral state is, however, for the most part, the work of nature and not of grace. The ordinary experiences of a man in his capacity of a moral being, influence the activities of the mind and form it to a certain pattern. This moral pattern or temper whilst having its origin in the field of nature has for purpose to obviate difficulties which the first presentation of revealed religion brings along; the opposite temper <u>creates</u> difficulties under the same circumstances. (P. S. IV, 27) And since the claims of a revelation come as an appeal to both mind and heart, the moral disposition becomes an essential, if not the determining factor in conviction on such an obviously important moral concern. The moral temper is the only

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promise for the fruitfulness of the revealed truth in the life of the individual; where there is no feeling of need, no desire for God's truth, there can be no hope for betterment even with its reception. Then, too, the moral disposition confers the right point of view with regard to revealed truth: "revelation is a boon, not a debt on the part of the Giver," hence the proper attitude is that of a suppliant, not that of a judge or critic. It is not "the conduct of those who resolve to treat the Almighty with dispassionateness, a judicial temper, clear-headedness and candour. It is the way with some men, (surely not a good way) to say, that without these lawyer-like qualifications conversion is immoral. It is their way, a miserable way, to pronounce that there is no religious love of truth where there is fear of error. On the contrary I would maintain that the fear of error is simply necessary to the genuine love of truth. No inquiry comes to good which is not conducted under a deep sense of responsibility, and of the issues depending upon its determination." (G. A. 426)

An example of the complete absence of a necessary moral disposition, requisite for the adequate and correct interpretation of a great moral event in the history of the human race, Newman finds in the historian Gibbon when he would ingenuously explain the spread of Christianity from

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causes spun out of his own head. "It is very remarkable," Newman says, "that it should not have occurred to a man of Gibbon's sagacity to inquire what account the Christians themselves gave of the matter. Would it not have been worth while for him to have let conjecture alone, and to have looked for facts instead? Why did he not try the hypothesis of faith, hope and charity? Did he never hear of repentance towards God, and faith in Christ? Did he not recollect the many words of Apostles, Bishops, Apologists, Martyrs all forming one testimony? No; such thoughts are close upon him, and close upon the truth; but he cannot sympathize with them, he cannot believe in them, he cannot even enter into them, <u>because</u> he needs the due formation for such an exercise of mind." (G. A. 462-3) In making such a criticism of Gibbon, Newman bases himself, not on any specialized principles of his own creation, but upon the broad general principles of Aristotle, when the Philosopher discusses the necessity of a good moral training for a correct apprehension of the first principles of any science that deals with human conduct. (Eth. Nicom. I and VII,)

Just as Newman distinguishes the original moral sense from mystic insight, so too, does he differentiate the moral from what is more strictly religious. A man may be

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moral, honorable, conscientious, from a mere feeling of obligation without being religious in the proper sense of that term, (P. S. IV, 30) because the moral perception consists, primarily, in sentiments whereas, the perception of religion, at least in its highest form of supernatural faith, carries the mind on to objects. (Diff. I, 271) Each may exist and function without the other though this represents an anomalous condition. In his ordinary advance from natural to revealed truth, the moral disposition is a condition of a saving state, (P. S. II, 153) the very soil in which alone faith can take root; meaning by faith, not the supernatural virtue but the preliminary to true faith, that which Catholic theologians designate as credibility. (P. S. II, 165 and Diff. II, 271) The purpose which such a moral disposition serves in the approach to faith, is to furnish a congenial soil in which the first seeds of revelation can take root; without it the seed falls upon barren ground, or taking root in merely shallow earth withers at the first scorching rays of the sun. Difficulties exist in revelation; these are the stumbling blocks to those whose minds are not prepared, who have not disciplined themselves to the dispositions of the moral temper. (P. S. I, 211-12) For there is normally a connection between beliefs in the same mind and "it is more pertinent to say

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that belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural. Belief is a state of mind; belief generates belief; states of mind correspond to each other; the habits of thought and the reasonings which lead us on to a higher state of belief than our present, are the very same which we already possess in connection with the lower state." (G. A. 413) And as faith is something distinct from the group of sentiments that constitute the moral disposition, so too, evidently is righteousness. Yet, the moral nature of man is its dwelling place and what at first is but the covering of our natural disposition, becomes in time so intimately united and intertwined in all its acts and habits, as to become almost indistinguishable from it. (Jfc. 170, P. S. III, 258)

Newman exalts the moral sense and man's moral nature, not for its own sake but because it is the strongest subjective testimony to the greatest of all objective facts, the existence of the moral law of God. It is inconceivable to him that our consciousness of the destination between right and wrong should represent a mere psychological fact and not be the unquestionable testimony of something beyond itself, namely, that the good is that which is acceptable to God, and evil that which is reprehensible in his sight. (Mix. 262) In other words, there is an objective moral

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order corresponding to our moral nature and furnishing to man a field of activity outside his subjective domain of personal conduct. In this moral order, there are causes and agencies not reducible to the physical, which function in their own right either independently of the material agencies of the universe or mingling with them and modifying their action. Man is such a cause, God is the moral cause par excellence. (Idea 53)

It goes without saying, that for Newman, the moral order takes precedence over the physical, not in time but in dignity and importance. The physical creation speaks to us only partially and indirectly of the moral law and not at all of the moral attributes of God. It cannot, therefore, be the point of departure for investigations in the moral order; conscience alone can be such a beginning, and even it, in its bare natural capacity, falls short of complete attainment; " a large part of the moral law is too sublime to be attained by the light of nature." (Idea 224, 225, 226) The moral sphere, therefore, is not only distinct from the physical, but the instruments, tests and standards of both the physical and purely intellectual realms are inapplicable in the moral order; these are truths which are foreign to the province of the most exercised intellect and which yield themselves only to the moral

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insight in its most highly developed form. In particular, analogies derived from physical investigations fall short and are positively fallacious, when transferred to the moral order. (Ari. 33-34)

The fact that the moral order is but partially understood and so little recognized, particularly, by those possessed of a mania for isolated physical inquiries, does not make that order less intelligible in its laws and provisions, than the material world. (Mix. p. 16) It has as clear-cut and certain a point of departure in the fact of conscience; it has its own methods of procedure, its insight and its genius; it has its ground in the facts of individual and group experience. The moral system does not more "interfere" with the physical than the reverse; and an established miracle is for Newman merely proof positive of the subordination of the physical with reference to the moral order of the universe. And though the physical "laws" may, in their turn, at times "embarrass the operation of the moral system, (or what we conceive the moral system to be) still on the whole they are subservient to it; contributing as is evident, to the welfare and convenience of man, providing for his mental gratification as well as animal enjoyment, sometimes even supplying correctives

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to his moral disorders." (Mix. p. 17)

The objective moral order not only takes precedence of the physical and purely intellectual system of things but it, likewise, stands above the moral nature as represented in any particular individual; not every subjective pronouncement of the subjective moral sense takes on objective value for there are possibilities of moral error and even moral aberrations. (Prepos. 287) What is general, what is universal, what represents the long-accepted wisdom of the race, provable, though not proved, these have claim to acceptance as objectively cogent moral truths. (Corres. I, 180)

There is, then, an objective moral world, existing independently of any individual, which world has relations to us and we with it; in that relation consist moral truth and error. Such truth lies beyond the reach of mere intellectual attainment, even beyond its sure recognition. And yet, this moral truth is our highest good which we seek behind the shifting shadows of sense in a permanent, spiritual reality, whose real presence though unseen of bodily eyes, cannot be doubted, since the distinct echo of its voice reverberates in our mind and heart. (P. S. II, 17-18)

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Now this moral truth though emanating ultimately from Him who is the source and fountain-head of all light, lies scattered in myriad rays, reflected and refracted from the whole moral world. It reaches us differently from purely intellectual truth, being recommended not by books but by oral instruction, and apprehended by habituation rather than by reasoning. (Corres. I, 203) The original moral truths, which are to be found in the infancy of nations and recognized in the infancy of individuals, are either a primitive revelation or a part of our original nature impressed there by its Creator. Such truths transmitted in the race by instruction and tradition, are held not in virtue of individual processes of reasoning but because of feeling, prejudice, bigotry. They are truths, nevertheless, but being great truths, only great minds are capable of grasping them and only the greatest minds are capable of throwing them into the proper form. (Corres. I, 180)

For as there is a distinction between moral and intellectual truths, so is there a difference between the form and the manner of proof adduced in the one field and in the other. In the first place, intellectual proof leaves no room for the exercise of responsibility; nor is it, therefore, sufficient to convince the intellect in moral proof; since there is a surplusage of belief over the adducible evidence,

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this surplusage must somehow be accounted for in an analysis of the whole complex process. (Prepos. Introd. X) It stands to reason, then, that strict demonstration falls short of producing conviction in moral matters; arguments and proof are of a more personal character and require a greater exercise of the practical judgment and good sense both in the acceptance and in the presentation of moral proof. (V. M. I, 55) The personal element is rarely absent from any form of argument but it has its strongest representation in the field of moral truth. (G. A. 320) Moral argument and proof are <u>different</u> in many respects from purely intellectual processes; they are not, therefore, on the whole, <u>inferior</u> in their character nor yet in their purpose or achievements. What moral proof may lose in rigidity and objective cogency, it gains in the richness and depth of the experience on which it is grounded, for moral proof is eminently the method which results from a large and deep acquaintance with the subject matter under consideration. (G. A. 79) Then, too, since moral proof leaves room for the element of responsibility in its acceptance or rejection by the mind, it becomes by the very fact a test for the individual, so that no one can, for long, remain in ignorance through his own fault in what concerns his immediate and elementary moral needs. (Dev. 251) Finally, moral proof has the distinct

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advantage of appealing equally to the simple and the educated; it becomes possible to use it, therefore, in a wider field as is necessary for matters which embrace all human conduct and belief. If it be urged that every man has at his command the reasoning process by which to arrive at truth, Newman has recourse to experience to bear out his contention that argument gets a man nowhere in cases of practical conduct. His very conception of man as a moral being rests on the contention that the intellect is insufficient in the order of moral truth just because man is a person, an individual who is not exhausted nor circumscribed by a definition; man's practical need of coming to a decision in a particular case, prohibits the use of mere argument, which by its nature can be made endless in almost any concrete case. (P. S. VIII, 68)

The question that evidently calls for discussion in this connection, concerns the precise function of moral proof and its relation to strictly intellectual processes and logical forms. Moral proof does not go directly to the objects which excite its sentiments and notions, nor need it formulate its beliefs in precise language. It is more in the nature of an insight, which opens a path from a general premise, to acquiescence in a particular truth. By contrast, the intellectual process contemplates the objects of those

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sentiments or affections, but the accession of knowledge in the stricter sense of the term does not change the character of those first affections which acted truly and legitimately from the beginning. (Ari. 143-145) From this it is clear that, in addition to sufficient evidence, moral truths require for their acceptance, a rightly-disposed recipient. (Prepos. Introd. X)

But not all moral truths are intuitive in character; only the highest and most general principles are so. Hence, there must be a method or a process by which the individual mind passes on to the possession of further truth in the moral order. The path of moral truth lies through the path of duty. Obedience to the sense of duty, is the sure guarantee for the acquisition of moral truth. We are taught religious knowledge from within "by means of a purified heart, by a changed will, by chastened reins, by a mortified appetite, by a bridled tongue, by eyes corrected and subdued." (P. S. VIII, 111) Instruction or external direction from teachers can set us upon the path, but wisdom and understanding come, not from a knowledge of the moral law and of our duty, but from the doing of it. "By obeying the commands of Scripture, we learn that these commands really come from God; by trying we make proof; by doing we come to know." (P. S. VIII, 112-13) And Newman enlarges on the words of

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the Psalmist: "I am wiser than the aged, because I keep thy commandments." (P. S. 119)

Such a procedure is evidently different from an explicit logical process; it stresses "moral fitness" without entirely excluding intellectual apprehension. (Dev. 49) There is an insistence on what is "congruous, desirable, pious, appropriate, generous," rather than what conforms to strict logical inference, because the moral world and moral truth appeal to the whole personal nature of man and give play to all his sentiments, affections and aspirations. (Dev. 47-8) And they must, of necessity, do this since moral truths are not isolated or abstracted things like mathematical creations; they "are not placed in a void but in the crowded world and make way for themselves by interpenetration, and develop by absorption." (Dev. 186) The logical process on the other hand is but the external organization of the truth, its presentation in a form accessible to all. We get a very enlightening view of the character and range of moral proof when Newman enumerates some of the fields in which it principally holds sway: History, antiquities, political science, ethics, metaphysics and theology, are its favorite fields. (Dev. 112) He bids us remember that in moral proof antecedent probability has a weight and cogency which it may not have in experimental science. The lack of evidence

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in the moral sphere is supplemented by the person, his habits of thinking, his intuition, genius, previous experience and acquaintance with the subject. But even with all these factors it is difficult to see how metaphysics, for instance, should come under moral proof, unless moral insight is equivalent to genius of the rarest order; but on that ground the highest forms of mathematics could be drawn into the circle of moral proof as easily as metaphysics; and this, I have no doubt, Newman would allow. (U. S. 216-17)

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CHAPTER IV

CONSCIENCE

We often hear of the primacy of conscience in criticisms and appreciations of Newman. If conscience is taken in a broad sense, to denote all human consciousness, then the assertion bespeaks a truism. To maintain, that conscience considered either as the moral sense or as the sense of duty is primary in Newman, I consider ambiguous, even when such primacy is restricted to the field of natural religion in the individual person. I would prefer to say, that in Newman, conscience has a primary, instrumental function, parallel to the function of reason in the scholastic system of thought. In this sense, as instrumental, it is evident that conscience is primary, it is practically sole, as Newman hardly trusts any other instrument. But I would not grant that conscience, considered as the moral sense, represents Newman's first and most fundamental reality; and it is in this sense that I would restrict the meaning of the expression, "the primacy of conscience in Newman." For we have seen previously, that there are two real primary ideas in Newman's religious philosophy: God and himself. And this self is constituted in its whole human nature, as an essentially religious being by God, through a relation of complete dependence on Him.

What, then, is the place of conscience in Newman's philosophy? It is a part, an element of human nature and as

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such, consistently with his entire thought, it is accepted as a fact, without being submitted to any preliminary criticism, as to its reality and right to receive a hearing on all matters within its proper scope. The determination of that scope is what characterizes and distinguishes Newman's conception of conscience from other similar or contrasted views. With those who differ from him in his estimation of conscience as an integral part of our human nature, he does not argue. For him, its guarantee and claims lie in its being a legitimate act of the human mind. That it holds, for him, a favored place among the other elements of our nature, I readily grant.

In general, Newman's plea for conscience rests on the ground of its being at least on the same level as the senses and reason. All are equally elements of our nature and we trust or, rather, <u>accept</u> and must accept them equally under the penalty of being untrue to that nature. The very reason that unbelievers give for their attitude he tells us, "is, that they trust their own sight and reason, because their own, more than the words of God's Ministers. Now, let me ask, if they trust their senses and their reason, why do they not trust their conscience too? Is not conscience their own? Their conscience is as much a part of themselves as their reason is; and it is placed within them by Almighty God in

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order to balance the influence of sight and reason"....(P. S. I, 220)

While not holding the primary place in the whole of Newman's religious philosophy, conscience is yet a first principle which, therefore, he does not attempt to prove and which serves as the foundation of further inquiries. "I assume", he says, "that conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; as really so, as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or as the sense of the beautiful; that as there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel grief, regret, or desire, so there are things which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or wrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific sense of pleasure or pain, which goes by the name of a good or a bad conscience." (G. A. 105)

Conscience is, therefore, in its first aspect, a principle which "our Creator has made a part of our original nature" (Apo. 151), and, as such, preceding experience, training, formation, though these are necessary, as we shall see shortly, for its growth and development. Newman will not allow, that it can be resolved into "any combination of principles in our nature more elementary than itself." (Diff. II, 248) And when he claims for it at least equal authority and right with our powers of reasoning, our sense of order and the

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beautiful or any other natural endowments, he does not thereby limit it to that minimum of claim. It is indeed "a law of the mind" but that does not prevent it from being, for example, at the same time, a dictate, conveying the notion of responsibility, a threat and a promise, having more of vividness than any other constituent element of our nature. (Ibid.)

In fact, the real distinguishing quality of conscience is not its objective but its unquestionable authority. Conscience being nothing else than the Divine Law as apprehended by the individual mind, no matter what refraction or distortion this Divine Law may undergo in being received through each separate, intellectual medium, it still remains in its nature, the Divine Law and as such bears greater authority upon the individual than any other law of his being, since every other law suffers the same distortion in a particular individual. Its impress is the nearest and clearest picture we have of the Divine Being; its ethical character is the immediate revelation of God as Justice, Truth, Wisdom, Sanctity, Benevolence and Mercy. (Diff. II, 246-7)

This is Newman's most mature conception of conscience and he contrasts such a power, God-given and God-revealing, to every other conception which would reduce it to the workmanship of man or the result of chance development. Conscience

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being an irreducible element in our nature, it cannot be substituted by any other principle, whether external or internal, such as human law, a rule of expedience or the perception of the beautiful. (H. S. III, 79-80) Conscience, "the rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor State convenience, nor fitness, order and the pulchrum." (Diff. II, 248) To make conscience merely coincident with the moral sense, is to restrict it, in one of its fundamental operations; for right and wrong are not merely matters of taste. (Idea 198)

Newman sees clearly that the opposition to conscience in the philosophy of his day, is really devoid of rational basis and rests for its strength and edge, on ridicule, and more particularly on the gratuitous assumption of the mechanistic interpretation of human nature from analogy with a similar interpretation of the external universe, all dating back to Hume and accepted in perfect simplicity and submission since his time by every one who desired the magic passport to "scientific" recognition. "We are told that conscience is but a twist" on primitive and untutored man; that its dictate is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which that dictate enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly be freedom of will, how can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite net-work of cause and effect, in which we helplessly lie? and what retribution

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have we to fear, when we have had no real choice to do good or evil?" (Diff. II, 249) Against such misconstructions of the clearest inward witness to God and his law, Newman sets up his own conception and that conception brings into view the whole nature and temperament of the man himself: "Conscience is the aboriginal vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness" and then, flying directly into the face of Locke and Hume, he adds: "a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would remain and would have a sway." (Diff. II, 248-9)

Conscience has a double function according to Newman. In the first place, it gives a decision on the character of an act; thereupon it commands or prohibits, according as the act has been judged good or evil. On the second, and more important function, there is no room for doubt or question as to Newman's attitude. The same cannot be said of the functions he attributes to conscience in its capacity of the moral sense i. e. in the power it has of rendering a decision. Ordinarily, he considers it as the first guide of life, parallel in its function to personal ability. Yet the demand for a common standard of conduct to men living under social conditions, force him even in this connection, to recognize

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the necessity for external helps as we shall see. (H. S. III, 79) In addition, however, Newman did seem to hold that conscience is also our highest guide not only in practical matters, requiring an immediate decision, but in speculation as well, (Apo. 151) and this on his usual basis of the moral sentiments, being a part of that original nature which is guaranteed by God its Creator. He himself used his conscience so, in that struggle which went on in his own soul between the years 1841-45; and "I felt," he says, "I could not be wrong in attacking what I fancied was a fact-- the unscrupulousness, the deceit, and the intriguing spirit of the agents and representatives of Rome." From his actual turning to the Church of Rome, one would at first sight be inclined to think that Newman should, in consistency, have repudiated the use to which he had put conscience, but this is not the case. He places his error in the apprehension of the wrong fact and continues to hold throughout his life that conscience as the moral sense and, in its final development, as moral genius, is still our highest guide, that "a right moral state of mind germinates, or even generates, good intellectual principles." (Letter to Rev. Coleridge, 1871 cited by Bremond: "The Mystery of Newman" p. 528) And he trusts to his having "some portion of an 'inductive sense' founded on right instincts." (Ibid.)

Just exactly, in how far Newman can be made responsible

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for a system of belief and truth which owes its justification to a basis and procedure independent of strict rational proof with cogent demonstrative force, will be a matter of interpretation. In any case, his religious philosophy, such as I conceive it, does not require such proof, save in its remoter deductions. In its first aspect, conscience belongs to our original nature and what belongs to our original nature essentially, cannot be frustrated in its elementary implications because that nature comes to us guaranteed by God its Creator: for nature, with God as its Author, does not act in vain. Hence, the emotions and sentiments of conscience imply their corresponding objects. Conscience does not prove the existence of God (Newman's mind is not guilty of so naïve a circle) but depicts the character of God as ethical; conscience is proof of the moral character of God, "it implies a relation between the soul and a something exterior, and that, moreover, superior to itself; a relation to an excellence which it does not possess and to a tribunal over which it has no power. And since the more closely this inward monitor is respected and followed, the clearer, the more exalted, and the more varied its dictates become, and the standard of excellence is ever outstripping while it guides, our obedience, a moral conviction is thus at length obtained of the unapproachable nature as well as the supreme authority of that, whatever it

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is, which is the object of the mind's contemplation." (U. S. 18-19) Newman, therefore, makes a twofold claim: first, that the experiences of conscience furnish the elements of a religious system; implicitly he admits that such facts of experience are open to the same amount of error, other things being equal, as any other facts of mental experience; secondly, that the habit of obedience to the dictates of conscience creates the most favorable condition for the generation and germination of right intellectual principles, and serves as a protection against false deductions not only in matters of personal conduct but also in the wider field of speculation.

We know, for instance, that in the process of his second conversion, leading to his submission to the Church of Rome, his reason was convinced long before his conscience spoke the word that led to the irrevocable step. He waited for that word amid anguish of heart, heeding neither the importunities and examples of friends and followers, nor the insidious whisperings of his enemies. Until the sovereign power of his soul had spoken that word, he refused to budge.

Newman leaves no doubt in our mind as to the place of conscience in the domain of natural religion. There are three channels of information which Nature furnishes for the acquisition of the knowledge of God: "our own minds, the voice of mankind, and the course of the world, that is, of human

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life and human affairs." (G. A. 389) Of these, our own mind, whose act is conscience, is the most authoritative because nearest to the source of reality, being part of our own nature which we cannot help using. It is not merely the first, among three equal sources of information specifically on the same level, but its pronouncements "give us the rules by which we test, interpret and correct what is presented to us for our belief, whether by the universal testimony of mankind, or by the history of society and of the world." (Ibid.) Thus, there is assigned to conscience the indubitable supremacy over every other principle in the sphere of natural religion. And were the individual alone in the world and natural religion the highest aim of his existence, this sovereignty would remain forever unquestioned and unqualified. There is for Newman an aspect under which man remains absolutely incommunicable, and under this aspect, conscience in its magisterial capacity, always retains its supremacy over every other principle; for the primary truths of his religious philosophy lie near to the basic source of his entire thought i. e. the luminous intuition of only two realities, God and himself. And the individual face to face with that other Reality, cut off from every external support, finds a judgment, without appeal, in a voice which is the echo of another Voice which itself is Truth and Righteousness.

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CONSCIENCE

Bremond (The Mystery of Newman p. 332) ventures the opinion that Newman "succeeded but imperfectly in reconciling the principle of primacy of conscience with that of dogmatic Catholicism." If by "conscience" Bremond means the moral sense or moral disposition, that habit of first practical principles out of which the dictate of conscience takes its rise, then Bremond hardly says enough. Newman does not succeed in reconciling that with the dogmatic principle, nor does he even attempt to do so. It is precisely on this point that Newman stands on different ground from that of Thomistic scholasticism. The dogmatic principle issues in an act of reason having its root in speculative principles. Newman's principles and the scholastic principles stand opposed, the former being practical, the latter speculative; again Newman's "moral disposition" is the mind's natural intuitive capacity, the scholastic first principles are the truths of reason and revelation. Neither of the two are capable of proof. Conscience, considered as an act, a dictate or judgment stands in Newman, therefore, in the same relation to the individual as reason does (in the scholastic philosopher and theologian) to the group, in so far as that group acknowledges a body of consistent truths claiming objective validity.

Briefly, then, my contention is that Newman uses the word conscience in two senses. First, to denote that body of first

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principles, which is the divine law itself as apprehended in the minds of individual men. Secondly, as the act issuing from those first principles. (Diff. II, 247) Now it is only in the second sense that conscience can come into conflict with the "dogmatic principle." For in that sense conscience is the subjective norm of conduct and the dogmatic principle claims to furnish an objective norm. The question then is: if conscience is supreme, on what basis does Newman reconcile it with the dogmatic principle in case of a discrepancy between the two? A careful study of Newman's teaching on this point, ought to give us a clear answer to the proposed question and at the same time serve as an estimate of Bremond's opinion. As a point of departure, I would establish the correctness of the view, such as I have presented it thus far. Let Newman's own words decide: "What conscience is in the history of an individual mind, such was the dogmatic principle in the history of Christianity. Both in one case and in the other, there is the gradual formation of a directing power out of a principle. The natural voice of conscience is far more imperative in testifying and enforcing a rule of duty, than successful in determining that duty in particular cases. It acts as a messenger from above and says that there is a right and a wrong, and that the right must be followed, but it is variously, and therefore erroneously, trained in the instance of various persons.

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CONSCIENCE

It mistakes error for truth; and yet we believe that on the whole, and even in those cases where it is ill-instructed, if its voice be diligently obeyed, it will gradually be cleared, simplified and perfected, so that minds starting differently will, if honest, in the course of time converge to one and the same truth." (Dev. 361)

From this statement several points stand out clearly. In the first place, conscience is in the individual what the dogmatic principle is in the group, that is to say, the power which not only says there is a right and a wrong but which judges the character of each act in the life of the individual and thus gradually proceeds to the building of a system which rests in a body of conclusions. In the second place, Newman leaves a wide-open ground, to account rationally for conflicts between conscience and the dogmatic principle when he says: "it (conscience) is variously, and therefore erroneously trained in the instance of various persons. It mistakes error for truth"....In the third place, he indicates his own preferred and practical solution of such conflicts: sincerity of purpose with God's blessing and direction, will eventually bring about the reconciliation. "A mind, habitually and honestly conforming itself to its own full sense of duty, will at length enjoin and forbid with an authority second only to an inspired oracle." (U. S. 20)

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CONSCIENCE

Theoretically, Newman must and does admit that conscience may strike wrong; he even concedes that such may have been the case in his own conversion; (Apo. 200) practically, it leads right, provided there has been no trifling with conscience.

Of course, even in the sphere of natural religion Newman considered conscience primarily as a personal guide and only in a secondary manner, as the point of departure for the establishing of a system of religion and morals. It is the means of knowledge which every individual has nearest to him; and being carried about by every individual in his own breast, and requiring nothing besides itself, it is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most momentous to him individually....(G. A. 390) And because conscience is not, primarily, the instrument for building up a system of religious truth but the immediate and intuitive apprehension of personal duty, therefore, in matters of conscience first thoughts are best. "It is often said that second thoughts are best; so they are in matters of judgment, but not in matters of conscience. In matters of duty first thoughts are best--they have more in them of the voice of God." (P. S. IV, 36) To the same purpose is one of Newman's earliest pronouncements: "At first conscience tells us, in a plain straightforward way, what is right and what is wrong; but when we trifle with this warning, our reason becomes

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perverted, and comes in aid of our wishes and deceives us to our ruin." (P. S. VII, 67, 1831) In the domain of natural religion and as the personal guide of the individual, conscience does not and cannot come into conflict with any dogmatic principle. Its authority remains sovereign and sole, restricted though it be to the function of a subjective authority.

Still, it cannot be doubted that Newman does assign to conscience an important, though secondary function. It is, indeed, the essential principle and sanction of religion in the individual mind, but it also furnishes the elements of a fairly complete religious system of truths and becomes the guide and rule of morals. (U. S. 18-20) Since conscience is essentially religious, Newman will hold that its power and authority to establish such a religious system, in the sphere of natural religion, is almost equal to its authority over the individual. It furnishes a large and practical creed, "a belief in a principle exterior to the mind to which it is instinctively drawn, infinitely exalted, perfect, incomprehensible, here is the surmise of a judgment to come; the knowledge of unbounded benevolence, wisdom and power, as traced in the visible creation, and of moral laws unlimited in their operation; further, there is even something of hope respecting the availableness of repentance, so far (that is)

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as suffices for religious support; lastly there is an insight into the rule of duty, increasing with the earnestness with which obedience to that rule is cultivated." (U. S. p. 21) The real test of possible conflict between conscience and any dogmatic principle must therefore lie chiefly in the sphere of morals; there, conscience is a guide only in proportion as it has been refined and strengthened in individuals. (U. S. 20) Hence, the supremacy of the individual conscience becomes modified and restricted; it is no longer the absolute and sovereign authority which judged and decided without appeal in the life of the individual. As we said above, Newman evidently left open such a field of possible discrepancy between conscience and the dogmatic principle, by the very fact of admitting that the individual conscience is variously and erroneously trained in different persons. Such training evidently supposes influences both from within and without, hence the result of experience and authority both of which thus become guides and norms which conscience takes into consideration, and which modify its scope and authority. Newman has described this process repeatedly. Thus for instance: "For let us suppose a child, under God's blessing, profiting by his teacher's guidance, and trying to do his duty and please God. He will perceive that there is much in him which ought not to be in him....As he grows older

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he will understand this more and more. Wishing, then, and striving to act up to the law of conscience, he will find that, with his utmost efforts, and after his most earnest prayers, he still falls short of what he knows to be right and what he aims at. Conscience, however, being respected, will become a more powerful and enlightened guide than before; it will become more refined and hard to please; and he will understand and perceive more clearly the distance that exists between his own conduct and thoughts, and perfection." (P. S. VIII, 116) Hence, although, as a principle, conscience is planted within us previous to experience and training, it requires both factors for its due growth and proper formation, and each individual conscience will reflect in its judgment the influence of such factors in its development. We have, then, not merely the possibility but the certainty of differences among individuals and the resultant conflict between conscience and any dogmatic principle whether it be dogmatic Catholicism or purely natural religion on which the present discussion bears. Moreover, the influence of other factors in the formation of conscience and in the giving of its pronouncements may, and often does, take over the greater part of the sovereign sway of conscience in such wise as to leave to it merely an "influence" on our judgment of matters of conduct. And "even this office it cannot perform

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adequately without external assistance; it needs to be regulated and sustained. Left to itself, though it tells truly at first, it soon becomes wavering, ambiguous, and false; it needs good teachers and good examples to keep it up to the mark and line of duty."....(Mix. 83) Such a condition, of course, Newman recognizes as a degeneracy and deplores: "That light was intended to set up within us a standard of right and of truth; to tell us our duty in every emergency, to instruct us in detail what sin is, to judge between all things that come before us, to discriminate the precious from the vile, to hinder us from being seduced by what is pleasant and agreeable, and to dissipate the sophisms of our reason." (Mix. 84) But whatever his condemnation of such a falling off from the original sovereignty of this great natural gift, he must recognize, in the fact itself, the necessity of supplying by external help what is wanting through the weakness of human nature when left to itself. And hence the judgments of others, and in the final development, a dogmatic principle, though taking away some of that lordly sway of the inward Monitor, must yet be acknowledged as a boon and a blessing for the weak, and these are the many. "Consider," he tells us, "what it is to be left to oneself and one's conscience, without others' judgment on what we do, which at times is the case with all men; consider what it is to have easy

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opportunities of sinning."....(U. S. 145-6)

If such is the case in the knowledge and direction of personal conduct, much more will external help be necessary for conscience in its efforts to build up a consistent body of truths. As the basis of a religious system the dictates of conscience are dim and equivocal in contrast with the facts of the senses which form the luminous evidence of the physical sciences. "They are faint shadows and tracings, certain indeed, but delicate, fragile, and almost evanescent, which the mind recognizes at one time, not at another--discerns when it is calm, loses when it is in agitation. The reflection of the sky and mountains in the lake is the proof that sky and mountains are around it, but the twilight or the mist, or the sudden storms hurries away the beautiful image, which leaves behind it no memorial of what it was. Something like this are the Moral Law and the informations of faith, as they present themselves to individual minds," (Idea 514)

In discussing Newman's attempted reconciliation between the supremacy of conscience and the claims of <u>any</u> dogmatic principle, I have evidently covered the greater part of the question relative to the dogmatic principle of Catholicism. All the previous considerations combined lead to one conclusion, to wit, the insufficiency of conscience to fulfill that high and sublime function to which its nature theoretically

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entitles it, due to the circumstances under which man actually lives and works out his salvation. That insufficiency is the sufficient justification of the dogmatic principle in natural religion and more so in the domain of revealed religion. Newman accepts that conclusion courageously, even when it takes concrete form in external authority which comes to us laden with the human imperfections that necessarily characterize even a divinely-commissioned messenger from on high. I insist, he accepts a Church courageously, with the courage of resignation, mayhap with a touch of regret that, constituted as we are, governed indeed and directed by intimations from above, we yet need "a local government on earth." He does not love the "awful, supernatural, bright, majestic, delicate apparitions" of conscience any the less, but he needs the clear and unmistakable pronouncements of a Church more, because the enemies of conscience are many and various. "The world is a rough antagonist of spiritual truth: sometimes with mailed hand, sometimes with pertinacious logic, sometimes with a storm of irresistible facts, it presses on against you." But whatever the Church takes over from the sovereign claims of conscience, it takes in loving regard for the same great truths "which the natural heart admits in their substance, though it cannot maintain--the being of a God, the certainty of future retribution, the claims of the moral law,

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the reality of sin, the hope of supernatural help--of these the Church is, in matter of fact, the undaunted and the only defender." (Idea 516) It is not as though the dogmatic principle tears down what the individual conscience has correctly built up with painstaking, personal effort and cheerful obedience to the inward voice. That would be "cutting the ground from under its own feet." The dogmatic principle in Newman's conception, must resemble in all things the original God-given criterion of right and wrong. "Revelation consists in the manifestation of the Invisible Divine Power, or in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of conscience." (Dev. 86) Those two voices must chime in tuneful harmony. The very mission of the Pope "is to proclaim the moral law, and to protect and strengthen that 'Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world.' On the law of conscience and its sacredness are founded both his authority in theory and his power in fact." It is only by the recognition in conscience of the first principles of the natural law, deeply lodged in the hearts of men that "he has gained his footing in the world and achieved his success." (Diff. II, 252-3) Conscience is not discounted, it is strengthened and supported, in those quarters where it most needs support. For "the sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so fitful, so easily

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puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biased by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course, that, in the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous."....(Ibid.) Thus the dogmatic principle in whatever form it may appear, is the supply of a real and urgent need.

Now, whatever difficulty Newman may have found in reconciling his stand on the supremacy of conscience with such a dogmatic principle, the fact remains, that he has determined with a nicety worthy of the best casuist, the precise rights and limitations obtaining in this delicate relation. It is not easy, nay it is impossible to set down in a single unambiguous proposition, all the ramifications of an involved, concrete situation such as Newman analyzes and presents in his magisterial treatise on Conscience. For the full argument the reader is referred, therefore, to the second volume of his "Difficulties of Anglicans." But I may be permitted to point out the characteristic attitude of the entire discussion and indicate the predominant note that sounds unmistakably through his life and work, and that comes forth in clarion tones as he speaks his final word on the subject, and this leaves no room for doubt at all: Conscience remains supreme in all that counts

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for anything real, always remembering that the real for Newman is God and himself. This holds for the Catholic who, on the average, would concede most to the dogmatic principle. And Newman, in that capacity, has expressed himself clearly: "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink--to the Pope, if you please,--still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards." (Diff. II, 261) Now this is precisely what we mean by primacy, beyond the reach of cavil or quibble, the primacy of conscience; and this is its relation to the dogmatic principle, a relation of supremacy, first and last; in between, there is a region of compromise where reconciliation is necessary, because conscience can and actually does fall from its rightfully high estate.

The case of an individual who is not of the Catholic fold presents no greater difficulty. Here, Newman evidently holds that the claims of conscience are paramount; anything that does violence to conscience is wrong and cannot lead to right conclusions for the individual. Speaking of the Anglicans who find conscience standing between them and their acceptance of the Catholic faith, he says expressly: "I am the last man to say that....violence is in any case lawful, that the claims of conscience are not paramount or that anyone may overlook what he deliberately holds to be God's command, in order to

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ake his path easier for him or his heart lighter." (Diff. II,) His resolution of whatever difficulty is involved in the rder of natural religion we have already seen. In its prac- ical application to conduct in the field of revealed religion he answer is not only clear but categorical. Even a faulty onscience, faithfully obeyed will, in the long run, bring a an right because God's mercy is equal to the task of sup- orting and directing such a conscience ultimately to His ruth. (Diff. II, 6)

I have said that, in Newman, conscience is supreme first nd last; first, before any external help, training or experi- nce has come to strengthen, direct, or mislead that dictate f our original nature; last, when every external help has ailed us; therefore, in the most momentous issues of our life, ts starting point to indicate the way, and give us the direc- ion; in its close, to put the final test and decision before he human soul when only the two realities of its world are resent. And not all men need wait for the end of human life o meet that conscience face to face and alone in a decision f the gravest import, when no human help is in sight or all uman help has become of no avail, so individual is the deci- ion. Such was Newman's own plight in 1841. The Church, his urest and last refuge, was failing him and he turned from rgument and a convinced reason, back to original nature with

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its voice of authority, to be his guide and light amid the gloom, to direct his wandering feet aright. As he expresses it: "the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope or Church or Bishop, is the essence of revealed (religion); and when such external authority is taken away, the mind falls back again of necessity upon that inward guide which it possessed even before Revelation was vouchsafed." (Dev. 86) Describing his own condition of mind, twenty years later, the same fact stands out: "From that time (1841) the Anglican Church was, in my mind, either not a normal portion of that One Church to which the promises were made, or at least in an abnormal state and from that time I said boldly....That the Church in which I found myself had no claim on me except on condition of its being a portion of the One Catholic Communion....All this is not inconsistent with my saying above, at this time, I had no thought of leaving the Church of England; because I felt some of my objections against Rome as strongly as ever. I had no right, I had no leave, to act against my conscience. That was a higher rule than any argument about the Notes of the Church. (Apo. 149-50, italics mine)

Such, then, is Newman's teaching on the supremacy of conscience, exemplified not only in his words but in the actions of his life as well. That he found such teaching and practice difficult no man can doubt; that he failed to express

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himself clearly and unequivocally in the matter, is equally beyond question. If any claim can with justice be preferred against him on the subject of conscience, it is that his teachings on that phase of his religious philosophy, is of such a severity and sternness as to lay him open to the charge of rigorism. The sense of duty, conscience, was ever before him in menacing attitude, pointing an immovable finger of accusation, inspiring fear and trepidation, blighting the freshness and bloom of life. For him "conscience is a stern, gloomy principle; it tells us of guilt and of prospective punishment." (P. S. II, 312) And he champions that view of it because, to his mind, religion is not pleasant and easy and benevolence not the chiefest virtue; and when the terrors of conscience disappear, "then disappear also, in the creed of the day, those fearful images of Divine wrath with which the Scriptures abound." (Ibid.) Its function is a purging process, negatively, by stripping us of support and assistance, positively, by revealing the extent and fearfulness of our transgressions, obliging us to seek helps outside of ourselves and putting us on the lookout for the voice of revelation. That inner voice "has nothing gentle, nothing of mercy in its tone. It is severe, and even stern. It does not speak of forgiveness, but of punishment. It suggests to him a future judgment; it does not tell him how

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he can avoid it. Moreover it does not tell him how he is to get better; he feels himself very sinful at the best; he feels himself in bondage to a tyranny which, alas! he loves too well, even while he hates it." (O. S. 67) And so conscience by its severity, in its very failure to save, creates the dispositions for faith; for the religious-minded man, "because he feels his ignorance, because he feels his bondage, because he feels his guilt and danger,....will be on the lookout for revelation." (Ibid. 67-8)

Moreover, by its threats and forebodings, conscience becomes the most efficacious deterrent from greater evils, especially the loss of that happiness which is the necessary basis of all well-being in this life, our peace and friendship with God. Disregard of its solemn warnings brings misery which pursues the sinner relentlessly. "It is a keen, harassing, disquieting, hateful pain which hinders sinners from being happy. They <u>may</u> have pleasures, but they cannot be <u>happy</u>. They know that God is angry with them; and they know that, at some time or other, He will visit, He will judge, He will punish. They try to get this out of their minds, but the arrow sticks fast there; it keeps its hold." (P. S. VII, 182) Thus, conscience becomes the means, a drastic means, of convincing men to embrace a religious attitude even while disliking it in their hearts and minds,

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convincing them in their reason at least, that "religion alone is happiness." (Ibid.) For reason being subdued by the evidence of such facts, follows in the trail of conscience from the very beginning. "Conscience, and Reason in subjection to Conscience, these are the powerful instruments (under grace) which change a man. But you will observe, that though Conscience and Reason lead us to resolve on and to attempt a new life, they cannot at once make us love it. It is long practice and habit which make us love religion"....(P. S. I, 115) Feelings and emotions may play some initial part in such conversion but merely as taking away some of the grievousness from its beginnings, to give us some slight measure of rejoicing. But this is not a habitual ingredient; our permanent state here below does not lift us beyond a "sober and high comfort" in the practice of obedience to that inner voice and in the love of the ties which bind us to God.

The proper place and function of reason or intellect, in this connection, is to follow upon the indications and directions of conscience; it may not lead the way nor outstrip it. For the domain of reason is the external world, the world of natural theology, and this world cannot teach us our duty; it does not speak to sinners. The works of God do indeed "declare his glory" but they were created

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before the fall of man; in them we see God's brightness and harmony but not his will towards us. (P. S. I, 316-17) Hence, men who proceed on reason, without first obeying conscience, will not arrive at true religion, for reason directs us to the external world, whereas conscience points to the invisible realities. And this gives us the true function of conscience in Newman; it points--it does not prove; it leads on to something beyond itself, it opens out into the clear brightness of a revelation, the religion of the Scriptures, to the God of revelation not to the God of Natural Theology. And in this capacity, it is a truer indication than even the highest natural genius leading the faithful soul, through agony, to triumph over others, even those supremely gifted with nature's special endowments. (Ess. I, 177)

In Newman, then, conscience points to something beyond itself. Such, too, seems to be the function of conscience in practically all systems based on the Kantian ethics; but in Newman, it points out more precisely what is already known, a God really existent and a revelation clearly enunciated. In the Kantian ethics, conscience points to an ideal, a criterion of values actually non-existent, and beyond the possibility of existence. Thus Baillie: "If duty means anything, if conscience be not a lying voice, then at

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the heart of the Universe there is life and Mind and Reason, because Goodness and Truth and Love." Both for Newman and for Baillie, the process of arriving at God by an inference is merely the analytic way of putting it down in argumentative form--the concrete way, (for the latter) is that man "from the beginning finds God in his values"; for Newman, the concrete way is, that man finds the existence of God borne in upon him in such a manner as to make it a self-evident truth. (Baillie: The Roots of Religion in the Soul p. 238-40) My purpose here is merely to show that for Newman (as for many others) the phenomena of conscience are primarily, a point of departure to something beyond themselves. Taking up, therefore, the thread of Newman's thought we find him insisting on two phenomena of conscience: The sense of shame and the sense of fear. The sense of shame or the sense of what is becoming does not, by itself, fulfil the most important function of conscience in this matter; "when the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more, surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead us to God." (Idea 191) Newman protests against this identification of conscience with a mere moral sense, on the grounds

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that such a phenomenon does not take us out of ourselves but remains simply a subjective emotion. Whereas, he holds that conscience "inflicts upon us fear as well as shame" and "fear implies the transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver and judge; but the tendency of intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear in the self-reproach, and self-reproach is directed and limited to our sense of what is fitting and becoming. Fear carries us out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within the round of our own thoughts." (Ibid.) In other words Newman will not concede that conscience stops short in the individual; it is not just self-respect, its failings do not only induce anger against self, a feeling of remorse or degradation; its offenses are sin and it induces contrition of which God is the object.

The manner in which conscience points to God has been described, at length, by Newman in the Grammar of Assent. "As from a multitude of instinctive perceptions, acting in particular instances, of something beyond the senses, we generalize the notion of an external world, and then picture that world in and according to those particular phenomena from which we started, so from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and

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then again we image Him in His attribute in those recurring intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of His existence was originally gained." (G. A. 104) Practically, therefore, Newman bases himself on a legitimate psychological fact, which in more recent times has been championed as the law of pendular influence in the field of synthetic psychology. Such a procedure is not strange in Newman, in fact, it fits in with his whole system of thought and his concrete, dynamic view of mental and physical events. On the other hand, a different development of the same argument would at first sight appear out of place in Newman, as seeming to demand a metaphysical foundation and justification. "As certain objects," he tells us, "excite certain emotions and sentiments, so do sentiments imply objects and duties. Thus conscience, the existence of which we cannot deny, is a proof of the doctrine of a Moral Governor, which alone gives it a meaning and a scope; that is, the doctrine of a Judge and Judgment to come is a development of the phenomenon of conscience. Again, it is plain that passions and affections are in action in our minds before the presence of their proper objects; and their activity would of course be an antecedent argument of extreme cogency in behalf of the real existence of those legitimate objects, supposing them

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unknown." (Dev. 48) Such an argument readily finds a place in scholastic metaphysics but Newman uses it on no such ground. His justification lies again in the fundamental principle of his thought: nature, with God as its Author, does not deceive us in its elementary operations. It is a principle which harks back to Aristotle, in its essential form as for instance in de anima: "Nature, like intelligence, acts for a purpose, and this purpose is for an end" (415^b 15, trans. Hicks)* and this principle of the philosopher, joined with its further development in the following: "if nature does nothing in vain" (432^b 21)(implying evidently in the context that it does not,) gives us Newman's sufficient justification for the proposition: "Sentiments imply objects and duties."

Conscience not only points toward God, it also opens the way to Revelation. As has already been noted in passing, it does this by creating the necessary pre-dispositions for the acceptance of the revealed truths. Now, since conscience is a part of human nature itself it follows that every individual is thus equipped to prepare himself for the reception

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* Hicks' comment on the above lines reminding us that for Aristotle, nature "is not an external directing intelligence, but an indwelling principle," in no wise affects my use of the reference.

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of a revealed religion. All that becomes necessary, then, is that he be given the opportunity of hearing the word. Two conclusions immediately follow upon such a conception: the duty of preaching the gospel and the individual responsibility which every man is under in the acceptance or rejection of such preaching. The last-named deduction is one of the outstanding characteristics of Newman's teaching: every man is responsible for his faith--a characteristic which will receive further treatment anon. The work of conscience is, therefore, a work of preparation for something beyond its own scope, "it raises a desire for what it does not itself fully supply." (O. S. 66) It suggests the idea that what it possesses in fragments must have an existence in perfect completeness and thus, "a religious man, who has not the blessing of the infallible teaching of revelation, is led to look out for it, for the very reason that he is religious. He has something, but not all; and if he did not desire more, it would be a proof that he had not used, that he had not profited by what he had." (O. S. 66) The first struggling efforts of the individual soul are, therefore, in the direction of the light of revealed truth. Grace and Providence coming to the assistance of nature, lead on to the fullness of religious knowledge. "The natural conscience of man, if cultivated from within, if enlightened by these

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external aids which in varying degrees are given him in every place and time, would teach him much of his duty to God and man, and would lead him on, by the guidance of both Providence and grace into the fullness of religious knowledge."....(O. S. 20) Thus, the claims of conscience and the teachings of revelation do, in fact, coincide or rather, conscience finds its claims extended and continued in an unbroken line beyond any point which itself could attain. Now it is precisely on this ground that Newman would choose in preference to any other, to establish an argument for the existence of God, one that would be intellectually satisfying and at the same time would appeal to every grade of human intelligence; "the best argument, better than all the books in the world....an argument intelligible to those who cannot read as well as to those who can,--an argument which is 'within us',--an argument intellectually conclusive, and practically persuasive, whether for proving the Being of God, or for laying the ground for Christianity,--is that which arises out of a careful attention to the teachings of our heart, and a comparison between the claims of conscience and the announcements of the Gospel." (O. S. 74, italics mine)

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CHAPTER V

MAN: THE INTELLECTUAL ASPECT

a) Character and Function of the Mind

The key to Newman's attitude toward the intellectual powers of the human mind, is to be found in a seeming paradox: he is pursued by and in turn, pursues scepticism. In the first place, he puts the attainment of truth on demonstrable ground, beyond the reach of the unaided, natural powers of the human intellect; this attitude lays him open to the constant menace of scepticism from which he flees and is sometimes hard pressed to escape its clutches. On the other hand, he attacks the scepticism of those who would question his belief in the reality of an unseen world, (Mix. 14) even while he himself is pursued and besieged by another form of scepticism, which he apprehends as capable of triumphing, in and through intellect employed in isolation and complete supremacy over the rest of man's powers. Hence, his efforts to restrict the purely intellectual gifts and to subordinate them, not necessarily to any other particular power, but to the entire man acting as a unified being. It would, therefore, be correct to say that Newman accords the primacy to the human being rather than to the thinking being. His problem, then, resolves itself to this: how to make the human being rational in all his powers of soul, in order to build up a reasonable process,

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short of explicit demonstration, and thereby escape a bankruptcy of knowledge both for the present visible order of things as well as for the invisible world of realities which experience and belief have opened to him.

To begin with, therefore, Newman's conception of man is evidently not that of "an intellect manifested in a mortal frame." (Mix. 13-14) When intellect is identified with the soul he protests, not against intellect as such, but against the identification. I cannot agree with Bremond's extreme opinion that Newman "took pleasure in abasing reason." (The Mystery of Newman. p. 13) On this question of intellect, Newman is to my mind, just incurably English, that is, empirical in his thought, practical in his conduct, besides being religious in his personal outlook on life; and since reason is not any one of these, he fails to give it that importance and scope which another may think its due. For there is no dearth of evidence to show that Newman appreciated the intellect as one of our highest faculties and that, not merely in its sovereign capacity as an intuitive,inventive or creative power, but as the reasoning process which deduces or checks up from received premises. (G. A. 147) He finds its use even in the field of religion "natural, excellent and necessary." No one has advocated more earnestly and eloquently than he

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the cultivation of intellect for its own sake and spoken in behalf of the enlargement and illumination, which issue in a condition of mind analogous to virtue in the moral order. (Idea 124-5)

But to Newman, the human mind remained withal a somewhat mysterious thing (Corres. II, 389) which he could not sound to his own complete satisfaction, which puzzled him and which in consequence, he regarded distrustfully. In any case, it is, for him, but a natural gift and not an attribute of regenerate man. (Idea 230) Newman's supposedly hostile attitude toward reason, and the reasoning process in particular, will be considered fully in a separate chapter. For the present, I would draw attention to the more general aspects under which he treats the human mind. That treatment will be found to coincide, in its large outlines, with his entire conception of human nature as sketched in previous chapters.

Newman's conception of the mind is emphatically not that of a mere passive organ which simply receives impressions. "The intellect of man....energizes....and perceives in sights and sounds something beyond them. It seizes and unites what the senses present to it; it grasps and forms what need not have been seen or heard except in its constituent parts....it gives meaning..it invests (objects)

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with an idea..it distinguishes..generalizes"..in a word, it philosophizes. (Idea 74-5) It is not bounded by the present, its power is active in establishing relations and syntheses. (Idea 136, 179) A great intellect "is one which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these on one another....it possesses the knowledge not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement but as philosophy." (Idea 134)

There are no limits to intellect in its own field, but its field is not coterminous with all the realities of life both natural and supernatural. Such is Newman's philosophical outlook. Hence, there will be limitations on the human mind relatively to the whole man, and from the religious standpoint, relatively to the supernatural conception of man as illustrated and exemplified in the person of Christ. This is Newman's ideal and,hence,intellectual excellence, power, and genius are for him, incomplete as falling short of the Ideal, whom it has been given the world to know. (S. D. 60-1) Still, there is here also a distinct pragmatic strain which recurs in Newman and which we shall have occasion to note; because intellect often fails to practice what it knows and professes, setting, therefore, a

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standard unattainable in fact, by the persons who should be best equipped to attain it. Working in the same direction as the pragmatic strain, we have in Newman,likewise,his almost exclusive moral preoccupations. These two tendencies together, cause him to impose limitations on the scope of the human mind which coincides exactly with those set by Locke. The similarity is apparent even in the very form of the language used by the two. For Locke, as for Newman, there are things "to which our understandings are not suited" (On the Human Understanding, Introd. 4 p. 28-29 Fraser's Edit.) where the mind must "stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether....to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities." For him, also, the human mind is guaranteed in certain spheres (the practical and the moral and the religious) by an All-Wise Creator; still, in respect of whatever touches our present and future concerns, sufficient knowledge is attainable. "Our happiness as well as our duty," Newman tells us, "lies in not going beyond our measure--in being content with what we are--with what God made us." (P. S. VIII, 257) The cultivation of the human intellect, as such, can add no light to the sum of religious knowledge, (P. S. VII, 246-7) though from the source of all illumination, sufficient light has been

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vouchsafed to make us responsible beings, (P. S. III, 295) but "the great Universe itself, moral, and material, sensible and supernatural, cannot be gauged and meted out by even the greatest of human intellects"....(Idea 460). And since we must know certain things for our own material and spiritual well-being, things which lie beyond a reasoned process, the assent of the mind to such truths will necessarily be greater than the evidence producible in their behalf by strict reasoning. (P. S. VI, 256) On the principles of both Newman and Locke such a conclusion is inevitable. The former accepts that conclusion, and the Grammar of Assent has been written to bolster up the contention. Locke turns volte-face on his own basic assumptions and maintains the exact contrary.

Newman, then, assumes from the start that the human mind is endowed with a particular constitution, pointed toward action and the sphere of our moral and religious interests. Why we are so constituted he does not attempt to discover; he accepts it as a fact, with resignation, for without that acceptance we would "be forced to take refuge in the intolerable paradox that the mass of men are created for nothing, and are meant to leave life as they entered it." (D. A. 296) This is an example of what Newman means by a fact of human nature on which he builds his theories

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of knowledge, (G. A. 176) and if the function which he assigns to any power of the soul can be pronounced natural, it takes on authority and value, because "my first elementary lesson of duty is that of resignation to the laws of my nature, whatever they are; my first disobedience is to be impatient at what I am, and to indulge an ambitious aspiration after what I cannot be, to cherish a distrust of my powers, and to desire to change laws which are identical with myself." (G. A. 347) What other philosophers, therefore, attempt to accomplish by having recourse to hypotheses of intuitions, intellectual forms, a priori forms of the mind and the like, Newman seeks to accomplish by an appeal to a psychological fact; his purpose is no other than clearing the ground for the epistemological problem of vindicating the certainty of a knowledge transcending the limitations of experience; the fact to which he appeals, is the actual presence of certitude in the minds of men brought about by a normal operation of our nature and exemplified on a large scale in the history of human thought. (G. A. 343-4) Now such a conception does not stand isolated in Newman's system of thought, but attaches itself directly to his fundamental conception of God, which makes of such "laws of the mind" an expression not of a mere constituted order or internal consistency which can be verified, but in addition, the

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expression of God's own will in our behalf. (G. A. 351)

Whatever, therefore, proceeds from such a natural operation of the human mind, whether proceeding from intellectual principles or from experimental investigation, comes with a guarantee of truth and certainty; (Idea, 300) and where scientific experimentation and demonstration are, by the nature of the subject matter, impossible, the same guarantee attaches to even probable reasoning and creates a resultant knowledge which in its cogency is equivalent to certitude. (Apo. 20-1)

From a merely subjective and individual point of view, there is much to be said for such a conception of the constitution of the human mind, but I do not see how it can carry us beyond a subjective conviction to an objective correspondence with a truth, independent both of our mind and of our conviction. On Newman's principles, of course, we are not left stranded in subjectivism for they carry us on to the assumption of an objective truth with which the constitution of the human mind is in correspondence when it acts truly and according to its own laws; and if with him we further "assume that God made us, and that what He made is good" (Idea, 300) then we have a complete and satisfying solution. But from a philosophical point of view the solution advances us no farther than pure

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empiricism or pure idealism. Not all men have that uncloud-ed vision of God which expels every doubt (Mix. 298) and with the avenues of rational demonstration closed, there remains no way by which the goal can be attained. What is of general value in Newman's analysis, is his emphasis on the psychological facts. We must take the human mind such as we find it, (G. A. 216) and what is congenial and conatural in its operations has an antecedent probability in its favor. (G. A. 232) On these points, he evidently identifies himself with the common-sense school of phi-losophers. We cannot honestly repudiate that mind, then begin placidly to speculate at great length with the same instrument, and in conclusion claim credence for our spec-ulations.

So much for the constitution of the human mind in general. It will be necessary for a more precise appreciation of Newman's conception to bring out clearly the manner in which the mind operates. There seems to be a double function, the one almost purely subjective in character, the other objective; the former is moral and issues primarily in duty, the latter is intellectual having its fruition in a truth independent of the individual mind. (O. S. 5-6)

Under its subjective aspect the human mind is a law unto itself, sovereign and final, but also restricted to

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the realm of the individual within the sphere of personal conduct. (G. A. 354) Newman uses the term phronesis to designate this aspect of the mind, and in his characterization of it he brings out the salient features of his own individual and national temperament. Phronesis becomes personal, empirical, pragmatic, guarded only by a sense of duty from becoming a rule of mere expedience, bounded by the limits of immediate responsibility in its scope and issuing in virtue, not primarily in knowledge. Save for the last-named quality, one could use the same formula for describing Newman's personality or the British Constitution. The great difficulty in this first function of the human mind lies naturally in its restricted and subjective character. Newman grants, of course, that there is no science of the individual; moreover, there is no necessary connection between the two functions, rather rivalry and hostility. The difficulty lies, then, in the transition from the subjective to the objective domain. Our first assents represent little more than prejudices; the reasons on which they may be grounded are sufficient for their immediate purpose, but not proportioned to the energy of those assents. "A law of our nature" requires a closer proportion (G. A. 184) and the law of the intellect governing the growth and development of the normal educated mind, is <u>trial by investigation</u>.

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(G. A. 192-3) Now it is precisely here, in the attitude of the mind, in face of a possible objective truth that Newman stands opposed to any form of scepticism. Trial by investigation does not begin for him, in doubt. Both logical truth and duty agree on this, he maintains. The normal human mind acting in accordance with its inmost nature and constitution first trusts; it first acquiesces, then puts to trial opinions agreeing with or differing from its own subjective estimate, proving or disproving them by use; when they fail to illustrate phenomena or harmonize them, then only does it proceed to question, doubt and rejection. (Dev. 101) Again from the very nature of the mind time is an important and necessary element for the comprehension and perfection as well as for the ultimate rejection of ideas. (Dev. 29)

The conditions under which the human mind advances into the sphere of objective truth are many and various. It is a process of numerous stages with its progress impeded by stops and changes of direction; its advance proceeding not in a straight line to its ultimate goal, but circuitously, picking its way like the bold and resourceful mountain-climber. (Idea 474-6) Its paths are not to be choked up because it seems for a time to be veering away from the line of its earlier advance, for great truths

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like great minds spread out, they need "elbow-room" that is, a large sphere and the cooperation of many minds. For different minds are variously affected by the same truth, hence early or later developments in the same field depend much upon the number and the individual peculiarities of the minds which come in contact with the truth. (Dev. 178) These are the "regulating power, the law, the organization....the form of its development." For intellectual processes are carried on silently and spontaneously in the minds of a group; "analogy, the nature of the case, antecedent probability, application of principles, congruity, expedience being some of the methods of proof by which the development is continued from mind to mind and established in the faith of a community." (Dev. 190) Such is Newman's account and if I were to attempt to label the whole process in a single phrase which should cover the entire procedure I would do so in calling it a process of probable reasoning. The element of "reasoning" Newman might protest against but such I hold it to be; the element of probability he could not and would not disown.

However, before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of probability in Newman's system of thought, it will be of advantage to note some of the obstacles to the progress of the mind in its transition from subjective to

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objective truth. These hindrances are more manifest in the advances of second-rate minds. First-rate minds meet truth directly using common sense, moral perception, genius, and logical reasoning or forms of ratiocination. Lesser men, useful in their time and place, prove, reconcile, finish, explain. (V. M. I, 283) These minds approach objective truth through media, that is principally through other minds, and in consequence of this, also through the medium of language. The mind in original investigations is less hampered, the apprehension of truth is less refracted and distorted, than it is in ferreting out the meaning from what others have enunciated; there is the additional danger of reading one's own meaning into their thought, besides the initial possibility of error in reasoning or experimentation. (Ess. I, 226, 227, 228) Language, whilst remaining the most subtle means of communication in the dispersion of truth does yet, oftentimes, furnish ground for misconception and error. (Dev. 56)

The order of the mind's procedure from its own subjective states to the apprehension and possession of reality Newman has described in very brief compass: "first comes knowledge, then a view, then reasoning and then belief." (D. A. 293) By knowledge, then, Newman evidently means the grounds or premises, of knowledge. The point

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I would bring out is the place of belief in the process. It is that which furnishes the spring of action and so meets the test for the "realization" of a truth whether that truth be formulated as an abstract dogma or as incarnate in a person. Whatever meets this test proves that it has attained a reality of some kind and what is real and realized, men will live and die for. To Newman's whole philosophy of life, it is of no great consequence in the final analysis whether belief follows upon a reasoning process which is demonstrative in character or merely probable; it is not the process which matters, for,...."no man will be a martyr for a conclusion." (D. A. 293) What really matters is the belief. From a consideration of facts he comes to the conclusion that the process involved is, most often, merely probable in character; he accepts the facts such as he apprehends them, and seeks to justify belief, that is, its reasonable character, on such grounds. The nature of the function of probability will, therefore, furnish the topic for our further consideration.

b) Probability

Newman uses "probable" in two meanings. First, as the evidence for a truth, based on fitness or congruity in contrast with what is actually demonstrated by a process of

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reasoning which proceeds on rigid logical forms. This sense when restricted to the moral domain becomes equivalent to "moral certitude" in the scholastic conception.

It does not fall short in evidence, but the process, which would be necessary to bring out this evidence, is not worked up into any explicit form; it remains latent. The force of such probability is not inferior to the force of an explicit process of reason, nor does it issue in a less energetic assent of the mind to the truth which is the object of that evidence. It excludes all fear of error, which in itself is ample proof for its character of being a real certitude; it is clearly perceived that its contrary violates our conception of the moral order and is repugnant to our moral nature. This is the ground for calling it a "moral certitude," that is, a certitude which has its basis in the moral constitution of a thing such as we conceive it to be.

That Newman actually attaches such a meaning to probability which effaces every line of demarcation between it and certitude, the following illustration will show. Speaking of the Protestant Revolt, he says in 1841: "I think I shall never believe that so much piety and earnestness would be found among Protestants, if there were not so many grave errors on the side of Rome. To suppose the contrary

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is most unreal and violates all one's notion of moral probabilities. All aberrations are founded on, and have their life in, some truth or other--and Protestantism, so widely spread and so long enduring, must have in it, and must be witness for, a great truth or much truth." (Apo. 188) Newman's conception of the moral order, according to which all aberrations have their life in some truth, is exactly parallel to the Thomistic conception that "good" is the subject in which "evil" inheres, as an accident does in a substance, under which form it expresses a deep metaphysical truth. (Summa Theol. P. I, q 48 a.3) Newman transfers the same idea to the order of truth, without however, bringing out the ground on which his assertion rests; the contrary is to him "unreal" and violates all his notions of moral probabilities. It is disconcerting to find the term "probability" put to such a use, but there can be no doubt as to its meaning. Moreover, I am convinced that he has put the same meaning on the word when he maintains that in 1843-4 he believed in God, in Christianity, and in Catholicism on a ground of probability, calling it at the same time a "transcendent probability" and its evidence, "cumulative" in character. (Apo. 199) The contrary of these he considered repugnant to his conception of the moral nature of things, and the very least

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that can be said of them is, that they represented to his mind a moral certitude.

D'Arcy in his recent work "The Nature of Belief"(p. 148) maintains that only from Newman's letters do we learn that he used the word "probable" in contrast with the demonstrable and not with the certain. I believe my interpretation bears out the same contention as D'Arcy's, but directly from the context of Newman's writings. Moreover, it appears to me more correct to say that "probable" is used in contrast with what has been demonstrated de facto, in such wise as to satisfy one's own mind, not in contrast with what is capable of demonstration. That probability, in this sense, does not exclude certitude in Newman's estimation appears to me indubitable. For such probability is for him the result of the constitution of the human mind, which in turn is dependent on God's will and guaranteed by Him. Moreover, and this appears to be his best argument, this form of evidence is proper to certain subject matters, that is, subjects in which strict demonstration in logical form cannot be employed; and so we are acting in conformity with the constitution of the human mind and likewise, in conformity with the nature of the subject matter when using "probability" to reach a conclusion. This conclusion, Newman places on the same level of

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evidential cogency as a conclusion drawn from a demonstration and that level he perversely designates a "probability," not because there is any weakness in the process but because even formal reasonings do not establish the premises (which are therefore "assumptions") and fall short of the concrete reality in its conclusion. (G. A. 284-5)

There is a second sense, much more conformable to ordinary usage, in which Newman employs the word "probable" and "probability," It is the quality of a reasoning process having any kind of a ground, physical, moral, factual, which falls short either in its evidence or in the process itself. Wherever there is a substitute for direct evidence or for hard reasoning; where the appeal is to the imagination rather than to the intellect, there we have probability. (V. M. I, Pref. III Edit. XX ff) It is the stuff out of which hypotheses are made.

The method of probability is not legitimate for Newman, in a professedly scientific treatise. (D. A. 384) In so far as physical investigation uses it, such investigation remains on the level of mere hypothesis which may <u>suggest</u> but does not prove. On the other hand there are subjects in which the legitimate procedure is that of probable reasoning; such are History, Ethics, Religion. (Dev. 110 ff) There is a surplusage of belief over the

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evidence in conclusions drawn from probable arguments; Newman admits this but he holds, nevertheless, that such a procedure is legitimate in certain subject matters and not in others, from the very nature of the events or phenomena under consideration. Where rigid reasoning cannot be applied from the nature of the case, probable reasoning will achieve the same results, because we are acting in conformity with the nature of things and according to the nature of our mind, and in that conformity we have the guarantee of Him who is the Creator of the mind and of the world, who is the Truth and who leads us to the truth, by ways which He has ordained. (G. A. 351-2, Dev. 113-14)

From the merely natural point of view, the guarantee of probable reasoning is in its consistency, and for practical matters, in its results. Newman admits, of course, that probabilities are surer indications of truth when regarded in retrospect, than they are when seen prior to an event; (Dev. 114) that there is danger in assents which follow upon probable reasoning because of the <u>feeling</u> which enters into it; but he will not admit that such feeling plays an illegitimate part in the assents resulting from probable reasoning, when such assents are embraced by a healthy mind. (P. S. VI, 256-7) Finally, moreover,

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these assents though issuing from evidence short of scientific proof, are the same as certitudes. Newman adduces evidence, and correctly so, to show that Locke, who is supposedly the most irreconcilable opponent of such a theory, admits it in the case of certain truths. (cf. Locke: Concerning Human Understanding . II, p. 364.) With Locke these truths are few in number; for Newman they are found "throughout the range of concrete matter," under the sway of the "judicium prudentis viri," not as superseding logical and impersonal reasoning but as supplementing it. (G. A. 316-17) Even in this broader sense, therefore, "probability" in Newman does not stand opposed to certitude, but as in the first instance, so here also, it is contrasted with strict demonstration and thus confined to the process of attaining truth, not applicable to the truth itself, nor to the assent given it. Of the two meanings which Newman attaches to the term "probable," it is the second which will ordinarily be referred to in the following pages, unless the contrary is expressly stated.

There are two forms of probability which stand opposed to each other in respect of the evidence out of which they arise: antecedent probability and converging or concurring probability. The former is a probability which precedes, not only actual proof, but even the consideration

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of the facts in a case. In its weakest aspect, it is simply the result of a subjective interest very much on the order of a "live hypothesis" in the phraseology of James. It assumes a stronger form when it has a basis in some general truth accepted on ulterior grounds, though even in this case it still precedes the proof for the particular issue in question. We obtain a clear view of the matter from a consideration of what Newman regards as antecedently improbable. To be real, an antecedent improbability must avail to prejudice the evidence, and be of a nature to diminish or destroy its force. (Mir. 102) The contrary holds for antecedent probability. Both are in conformity with our human nature and are not blamable provided they do not hold out against facts and evidence. (Ibid. 101) The importance of our moral and religious concerns gives a sufficient subjective interest to create antecedent probabilities, but it is the existence of God under the aspect of Providence which bears the brunt of Newman's antecedent probability in the field of religious inquiry and disposes the mind in a certain manner, previous to a consideration of evidence. (Mir. 14, 109-10) A belief in Divine Providence, for instance, gives a high antecedent probability for the continued preservation of the truths of

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religion among men and for their proper development. (Dev. 100)

Still, in every case, whether the antecedent probability be weak or strong, it remains distinct from the evidence itself. Two facts may be on the same level of the antecedent probability yet, furnished with different evidence. (Prepos. 412 ff)

Newman considers that neither antecedent probability nor its contrary, is to be lightly set aside, especially, when it has its ground in objective considerations. (Mir. 175, 177) He grants that it is not logical proof, being merely on the same level as a priori argument, but we may be compelled from the nature of the case, as in gauging a future event, to put up with such forms of reasoning because no others are forthcoming and there is need for action. (G. A. 299) It was precisely the arguments along the line of antecedent probability which gave birth to Tract 90 and all its consequences in Newman's own life, (Apo. 81-2, 84) and which directed him in the composition and method of his final treatise as an Anglican. (Dev. 55)

For Newman, antecedent probability has a limited initial function. It indicates the direction and gives the first step; it can and does legitimately throw the burden of proof one way or the other. (D. A. 148 ff.)

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But it does not stop in itself since antecedent probability is but a surmise which should open a way for investigation. (Apo. 81-2) Thereafter, the appeal is to the facts; but antecedently, probability still holds some sway, for more facts and stronger evidence are required to reverse such a probability, whilst fewer facts or mere indications with lesser evidence, will be sufficient to confirm it. In any case, however, it is the facts which decide the issue and the antecedent probability sinks to the level of a prejudice if it holds out against them. (Mir. 101-2)

In the domain of conduct unfavorable antecedent considerations are not sufficient to prohibit the exercise of any act; "they may demand of us an increased circumspection before committing ourselves to it," (G. A. 228-9) and only require that other considerations of equal or greater weight be present which may be urged in favor of the act.

I have already noted that Newman uses antecedent probability freely, both when it tells against his case and when it strengthens his prospective argument. It happens often enough that his antecedent probability and final conclusion go apart; in such cases, he does not try to twist the antecedent probability into line with his conclusion nor to minimize its force. (V. M. I, 276-7)

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In its proper place, it is a legitimate element in the process of acquiring knowledge particularly, in view of our present merely-partial apprehension of the moral and religious purposes of God in our behalf. Antecedent considerations, he maintains, are especially obnoxious to the spirit of the rationalism, characteristic of the deistic movement, but only when they tell against its own fundamental assumptions. (Ess. I, 34) When they further their cause the same form of argument takes on a weight and cogency which no amount of evidence can counterbalance. Hardly any writer has used antecedent improbability so flagrantly and illegitimately as Hume in his argument against miracles. For Hume no force of evidence can bear against it; he merely takes the precaution of stigmatizing antecedent improbability as "impossibility," hoping thereby to close the avenues of all future investigation. (Mir. 14, 33, 39-40, 46, 109-110)

Converging probability, like all probability, is primarily the character of a reasoning process. It differs from antecedent probability in several respects. In the first place, it is supported by evidence which bears directly on the matter in hand; in this respect, it is more specific in character than antecedent probability and constitutes by itself, a body of proof. In the second place,

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convergent probability is created in the mind by a multiplicity of evidences from various sources, all pointing in the same general direction. Thirdly, converging probability has a greater objective evidence; the subjective element, indeed, is never entirely absent in the grounds of Newman's conception of any form of probability, for the state of mind here under consideration always leaves room for the personal equation, hence for responsibility.

The strength of converging probability lies not only in having its ground in a series of isolated evidences but more especially in the combination of such a series or group which gives evidence not merely an added weight but multiplies its force and cogency. (Dev. 108) Hence, also a belief which rests for its proof on concurring and cumulative evidences does not fall in our estimation when any one of these has been shown to be of small avail or insufficient to account for the strength and scope of the belief; nor yet, when each separately has been disposed of as not proving the whole case. Such procedures do not account for the combination of evidences, and the combination carries a cogency of its own over and above the individual elements.

From this it appears, that procedures issuing in convergent probability stand opposed to the merely analytic

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method of an experimental science, which does not reach beyond the mechanical juxtaposition of individual elements taken in isolation and falls short of the union or combination of those elements; a neglect of,what may be called, the organic view of a subject. The merely analytic method applied, particularly, by Hume to religious inquiries is rejected by Newman as not proper to such a subject matter. Because we cannot fully rely on this or that motive of belief, because no single proof is absolutely secure in its own right, is no reason why each evidence is to be discarded singly, instead of being connected and combined. Newman, following Butler, points out that such a procedure is the subterfuge of a prejudiced scepticism. (Dev. 109) He, therefore, not only champions the organic conception of religious truth but enlarges its scope beyond any restricted view of a particular aspect. Thus, for instance, he will not consider the question of miracles as an isolated matter disjoined from every other moral and religious consideration. For, <u>all</u> the evidences of revealed religion gain strength from each other; what appears weak when viewed separately and in abstraction, takes on strength when regarded in conjunction with other facts or events belonging to the same system. (Mir. 8) One fact or analogy furnishes evidence to another; all of them

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together are correlative, confirmatory or illustrative of each other . (Dev. 93) On this contrast between the organic view and the analytic procedure illegitimately foisted upon the domain of religious investigation, Newman cites Hume as typical. "Let us," says this Philosopher, "examine those miracles related in Scripture, and, not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, etc." (Mir. 10) Such a practice, Newman maintains, not uncommon with those ill-affected to the cause of religion, consists, therefore, in applying a method, legitimate in its own sphere, to a narrowed field of religious investigation. It stands at the other extreme of that process which leads to converging probability.

The elements that constitute a process of reasoning leading to cumulative probability are many and various. They arise out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case, each too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into a process of explicit reasoning in syllogistic form. (G. A. 288) Besides the particular circumstances, a whole fact or situation may demand as a sufficient reason for its very existence, an assumption grounded in "the logic of good sense." (G. A. 277) The practical character of a truth to which the

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probability witnesses would be a further inducement to accept it short of absolute proof. (P. S. IV, 289) Parallel cases from profane history, confirmatory examples from Scripture, analogies based on the course of the physical and moral world, all add an appreciable weight of evidence to bring home some truth. (Dev. 74) If to these, there accrues the distinct and independent testimonies of many good and learned men over a long period of time, then we have the material for a process of reasoning which creates a converging probability and leads the mind of the inquirer to assent. (Prepos. 87) Finally, the subjective element must not be overlooked for "a cumulation of probabilities, over and above their implicit character, will vary both in their number and in their separate estimated value, according to the particular intellect which is employed upon it. It follows that what to one intellect is a proof is not so to another." ....(G. A. 293)

Converging probability does not stop short in itself. It leads through hypothesis to proof and certitude. The first beginnings may be grounded in imperfect evidence; thereupon, as the evidence grows and various indications begin to point in a common direction, an inference or judgment groups them into a working hypothesis which still

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requires further testing. Any other confirmations which are superadded and which harmonize with previous ones, must henceforth be regarded not as single, isolated proofs but as parts of a working system. (Dev. 122-23) From this, it appears that the process involved is exactly similar to the method employed by the physical science in building up a system, not however, in their method of bare analysis. Moreover, the acceptance of such hypotheses by various independent minds of a high intellectual and moral order, represents a distinct and sound reason in their behalf; this condition does not obtain in a similar degree for physical hypotheses which, as Bacon rightly observed "lie level to almost every capacity and understanding." (Dev. 113) For physical hypotheses are presumably at a higher level today than ever before, whereas the hypotheses grounded in moral proof find their supreme confirmation from the individual genius of men living in any age. It is nothing to the prejudice of Galileo's discoveries that these were rejected with scorn by Bacon for he had not the means at his disposal for arriving at a sound conclusion; but it tells much in favor of a religious hypothesis to have received the submission of many and great minds, on the supposition, of course, that such an hypothesis and its grounds have not varied. (Idea 437-8, Newman citing

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Macaulay) Finally, "from the nature of the case and from the constitution of the human mind, certitude is the result of arguments which, taken in the letter and not in their full implicit sense, are but probabilities."....(G. A. 293) When using convergent probabilities as a process in the field of religious inquiry, both for the truths of natural theology and for the fact of a revelation, they issue in absolute certitude and this again "according to the constitution of the human mind" and in addition, according "to the will of its Maker." But the "absolute certitude" is merely subjective in character, growing out of a sense of personal duty and personal responsibility. (Apo. 20-1) Wherever and whenever probabilities are not supported by a sense of duty they do not issue in a certitude which has any justification outside the will of the individual. For, though Newman grants that there are initial certitude both in secular and religious fields of knowledge, (G. A. 237) he does not grant that any process of reasoning, however formal and strict its character, can reach from such initial certitudes right to the heart of a conclusion in concrete matter. Hence, probabilities become the guide of life, a kind of prudence parallel to equity in the law. (D. A. 16)

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Newman seems to have considered probability as the distinct Anglican view in opposition to the Roman (D. A. 127) in what concerns the preliminaries to divine faith. In both his Anglican and Catholic life, he placed faith itself beyond the evidence.

c) Certitude

We have seen that Newman uses the term "probable" in contrast with what is or can be demonstrated. Probability is, therefore, essentially the quality of a mental process and can lead to assent or certitude, whether the assent be the acceptance or the rejection of a proposition. There is no state of mind, which can correctly go by the designation "probable." The mind does not concur more or less; there are no degrees in assent. (G. A. 159) I have maintained, moreover, that when Newman claims to hold a truth on the ground of a transcendent moral probability, (Apo. 199) he really means that such a truth is a certitude. In the case of the vast majority of men, this certitude is merely spontaneous or what he calls "assent," but its probable grounds, both from the nature of the subject matter and from the constitution of the human mind, are such, that it can readily be changed into a reflex certitude on demand. (G. A. 212) And such a certitude,

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possessing an element of persistence which is absent in simple assent, Newman requires for religious faith. Without it there can be no habit of prayer, no directness of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-sacrifice. (G. A. 220) Certitude is, indeed, the highest quality of religious faith. (G. A. 211) From an analysis of his own mind and from observation and experience, he finds certitude in religious faith. That certitude Newman seeks to justify in his Grammar of Assent.[1] Certitude is properly the highest form of assent. For a correct understanding of the former, it is, therefore, necessary to consider it in its origin and growth, from a simple assent to a rigid certitude in the strict sense of the word.

Newman starts with the kinds of proposition: interrogative, conditional, categorical. These three are distinct from each other; so, too, are the mental acts

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1 Ten years before its publication he expressed that purpose in a letter to Dr. Meynell, Professor of Philosophy at Oscott. "If I wrote a new work, it would be on 'the popular, practical, and personal evidence of Christianity'--i. e. as contrasted to the scientific, and its object would be to show that a given individual, high or low, has as much right(has as real rational grounds) to be certain, as a learned theologian who knows the scientific evidence." (Ward's, Life II p. 243)

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corresponding to them. Hence, we have three distinct acts of the mind: doubt,[2] inference and assent. "It is very evident" he says, "that, so far forth as we infer, we do not doubt, and that, when we assent, we are not inferring, and, when we doubt, we cannot assent." (G. A. 5-6) The mental acts first enumerated, likewise, serve to characterize three general attitudes of mind toward revealed religion. The dominance of doubt stamps a man as a sceptic; the process of inference characterizes the philosopher, whilst the act of assent distinguishes the believer. Dissent or disbelief belongs, equally with its contrary, to the last-named category.

All three acts are natural to the human mind i. e. in doubting, inferring, and assenting, we are acting according to the legitimate constitution of the mind; none of them are extravagances or weaknesses and we are but fulfilling our nature in exercising these acts. (G. A. 6-7) It is important to bear this in mind, in view of what has already been said on Newman's conception, according to which, the entire man is rational in all his acts, so that the act of assent and consequently the act of faith, even though not

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[2] "Doubt" has here, therefore, a wider scope than it has in traditional scholasticism for instance. In Newman's terminology it is made to include, besides doubt, properly so-called, also ignorance.

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explicitly rationalized, has as much claim to being rational, as has the process of inference or doubt.

Newman is concerned, primarily, with assent; he treats only those inferences which proceed on grounds of probability and these principally in their relation to assent and as exercised upon concrete matter, in which, he claims demonstration is impossible.

The most far-reaching distinction in Newman's philosophical conception is that which he draws between assent and inference. The former is unconditional and requires an apprehension of the proposition which is the object of the assent; the latter is conditional and can be had without such apprehension. (G. A. 8) By apprehension, he means the "imposition of a sense on the terms" of the proposition. Such apprehension is of two kinds, notional and real; of these, real apprehension is stronger, more vivid and forcible and indirectly impels to action more readily than notional apprehension, and this, again, because the whole man thinks. Such an assent is faith, that is, an assent with a real apprehension of the terms which make up the proposition on which faith is exercised. Without apprehension assent sinks to the level of mere assertion. When at least the predicate of a proposition is apprehended we can give a direct, rational assent to the proposition.

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Should both subject and predicate lie beyond our apprehension we can still assent to the truth of the proposition on the word of another who does apprehend; moreover, there can be an assent to the ground of the proposition on which the truth rests for us. In each case, the assent is an absolute adhesion: in the first case, to the apprehensible proposition; in the second, to the truth of the inapprehensible; in the third case, to the veracity of our informant. (G. A. 15-16) All these assents agree in being unreserved; they differ in strength according to the reality of the motive which induces the assent; and by reality, Newman means, not primarily the true, but the living force with which a truth comes home to the individual. Thus the assent of a child to the veracity of its mother, which is the ground of that child's assent to an inapprehensible proposition, may be stronger than any other assent, simply because of the reality of the ground of his assent. The application of Newman's exposition on assent to the nature of faith thus becomes apparent. The simplest and rudest form of faith can be exercised in a rational manner as an unconditional assent either to the reality enunciated in a proposition or to its truth or to the ground of its truth; and the assent of that faith which adheres absolutely to the ground of its belief may be stronger and lead to action, even to heroic action, just as readily as a faith which is enlightened and ration-

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MAN: THE INTELLECTUAL ASPECT

I have noted that the distinction between inference and assent underlies Newman's entire procedure in the field of philosophical and religious investigation. His further distinction between notional and real apprehension widens the cleavage between inference and assent still more. Real apprehension is exercised on singulars, notional apprehension, on common terms. The former is more powerful and, because of its variation in the same and different persons, leads to the supposition (contrary to fact) that there are degrees in assent. Now, inferences are cognate to notional apprehension, while assent is more readily attached to real apprehension. Again, the separation between notional and real apprehension has its strongest support and foundation in Newman's conception of the human being in contrast with the thinking being. That propositions enunciating "real" truths affect us more powerfully than those whose object is of a notional character, cannot be doubted. Newman recognizes, of course, that the keenness of real apprehension cannot legitimately be the ground of a true assent, but he does grant to such apprehension the function of confirming an assent, especially in cases where no reflection has been exercised either on the object or the ground of a belief. (G. A. 212) The chief mark of real assent is its personal character; notional assents are acts of our common nature.

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The personal character of real assents is precisely what distinguishes beliefs, convictions, and certitudes from mere inferences and makes of the former, something essentially different from the latter. This difference lies, primarily, in the power of real assents to induce action, not indeed by any direct connection between real apprehension and conduct, but by the motor power of images operating on the passions and the affections. The force and intensity of real apprehension thus becomes a more powerful element in human achievement than the clearness and truth which shine forth in the most rigid, impersonal demonstrations and thus makes of belief a more apt instrument in any department of human life which finds its ultimate issue in practice rather than in speculation. Such, for instance, is the field of practical religion as opposed to that of theology. The same truths may be apprehended either as "notions" or as "things" but it is only when they become "real" that propositions or dogmas serve as the foundation of religious conduct and practice. (G. A. 98)

For Newman, then, there are no degrees in assent. This means that assent is not dependent upon the variations which necessarily appear in evidence when such evidence falls short of demonstration or immediate intuition. From what has already been said on the subject of probability,

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it follows that Newman accepts assent and certitude even from a process of argument that does not rise above the probable. Such a procedure has been condemned by Locke, but Newman takes issue with him, not merely in an argument ad hominem, as noted, but also because Locke's theory runs contrary to the facts: What men actually do--what men are, as it were, constrained to do by the exigencies of human life and thought, these procedures cannot be ruled out except by an arbitrary, a priori ideal of how the mind ought to act, with an utter disregard, for the real constitution of the human mind and a neglect of the facts of psychology. (G. A. 159-65) Simple assent involving, therefore, spontaneous certitude, and that "on reasonings not demonstrative, is too widely recognized an act to be irrational, unless man's nature is irrational.... If our nature has any constitution, any laws, one of them is this absolute reception of propositions as true which lie outside the narrow range of conclusions to which logic, formal or virtual, is tethered"....(G. A. 179)

In approaching more closely to the subject of certitude, it must first be laid down clearly that Newman never called in question the existence and the legitimacy of the state of mind which goes by the name of certitude. Whether he has an adequate philosophical justification of it, is

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a wider question which admits of discussion.

Every simple assent of the mind, unconditional and spontaneous, is already the ground and germ of a possible certitude; it is the material out of which a true, reflex certitude may be fashioned. Every assent is, therefore, the promise of a true certitude and the question has only to be inaugurated by external circumstances in order to draw out from such an assent, a conviction which can and does fulfill the requirements of certitude such as Newman lays them down. (G. A. 211-12) Still, should the occasion never present itself, for changing a simple spontaneous assent into a reflex assent or certitude properly so-called, that fact would not invalidate the character of such an assent as a state of mind thoroughly and genuinely in its own right, sufficient for the needs of the uncultivated or the unquestioning mind; a state of this kind Newman characterizes as one possessed of "invincible knowledge"; and its justification is to be found in the facts of human nature existing throughout the concrete issues of life; first of all, in the fields of intuitive consciousness whether of the practical, intellectual or moral order; then, too, in the domain of ordinary social and material intercourse, founded upon the combined basis of personal or vicarious experience as well as the

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testimony of men. (G. A. 176-79) All of these, furnish material for true certitude, whether the evidence be derived from immediate intuition or rest on grounds which do not go beyond probability; the mental state remains unconditional and complete and is not to be confused with the scientific rule or logical formulas which express the grounds on which the state of mind is judged from an objective point of view. The distinction that Newman makes in this connection runs through his entire mental life and is to the effect that "certitude (is) a habit of mind and certainty a quality of propositions; that probabilities which do not reach to logical certainty, might suffice for a mental certitude; that the certitude thus brought about might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was created by the strictest scientific demonstration; and that to possess such certitude might in given cases and to given individuals be a plain duty, though not to others in other circumstances." (Apo. 20-1) And this conclusion already foreshadows for us the nature of Newman's formal certitude. It has its soil in the psychological constitution of the human mind, it rests indifferently upon intuition, demonstration or probability, dependent upon the subject matter; and, for practical issues, it finds a support and adequate justification in

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the sense of duty or the moral powers. In the final analysis, it remaims, if not purely a subjective criterion, at least, so limited in its scope as to preclude its being a universal test for every person and for every case.

Beyond the spontaneous certitude given in simple assent, Newman places reflex or formal certitude; this issues from conscious, deliberate assent. It begins in a simple assent as its starting-point, proceeds through investigation of the grounds of the simple assent, to a second or complex assent, which includes in a single undivided and unconditional act an adhesion of the mind both to the truth under survey and to the claims of that truth on our submission. In contrast with simple assent, it is characterized by explicitness and deliberation, by a complete mental awareness of the entire process involved in its production. It fulfills a law of our nature i. e. the need of a mind expanding under the influences of experience and education and filling up the full measure or capacity of the mind which seeks truth. It is an assent, or what is commonly called a conviction. (G. A. 189-195) Briefly, such certitude "is the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing, as expressed in the phrase, 'I know that I know', or 'I know that I know that I know',--or simply 'I know;' for one

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reflex assertion of the mind about self sums up the series of self-consciousnesses without the need of any actual evolution of them." (G. A. 197)

Beyond conviction or subjective certitude there is but one further step i. e. a conviction which is at the same time objectively true, and this is formal certitude in the strictest sense of the term. But this last stage in the progress of the mind toward truth, opens up the entire epistemological question which I do not believe Newman ever intended to handle ex professo. That responsibility has been thrown upon him repeatedly, most recently by Wheelright (A Defense Of Orthodoxy, in the Symposium Vol. III No. 1 p. 3-25) but Newman's stand on concrete ground appears to me to render such a purpose manifestly impossible. To challenge any man to produce a universal criterion or token whereby one may instantly recognize for himself, and constrain others to recognize, a truth in such a practical issue, for instance, as is furnished in religious questions, is an order rather beyond human achievement. And yet, that is precisely what would be required in attempting to lay down the positive mark or marks that distinguish a subjective certitude (conviction) from an objective certitude (formal certitude). In

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selecting the quality of "indefectibility" as the most characteristic distinction of certitude, Newman expressly calls it a negative test of certitude, or a sine qua non condition, so that its absence proves conclusively that a supposed certitude was really fictitious. (G. A. 256) Moreover, he even more expressly admits that "certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude. Such a test is rendered impossible from the circumstance, that when we make the mental act expressed by 'I know' we sum up the whole series of reflex judgments which might, each in turn, successively exercise a critical function towards those of the series which precede it." (G. A. 255)

Just, precisely, what Newman proposed to accomplish in treating the question of certitude will be discussed in the following pages, at least, in so far as it bears on the question of faith.

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CHAPTER VI

REASON

For a complete understanding of Newman's conception of faith, it is necessary to consider his attitude toward reason, both in itself and in its relation to faith. On no other point has he been more often and more bitterly attacked, not only by avowed enemies of revealed religion, but by professed believers of his own and other creeds. These charges, at their worst, range from the denial of the supremacy of the intellect, to scepticism, even to rankest blasphemy against the highest gift of man.

Oscar Wilde is a typical example of the first accusation. "The mode of thought" he says,"that Cardinal Newman represented--if that can be called a mode of thought which seeks to solve intellectual problems by a denial of the supremacy of the intellect--may not, cannot, I think, survive. But the world will never weary of watching that troubled soul in its progress from darkness to darkness." (The Critic as Artist, p. 80) Making abstraction from the conclusion of the charge, which does not enter into the present discussion, there remains the fundamental complaint, repeatedly voiced from various quarters, that Newman subordinates the intellect to other powers of the human personality.

Huxley is responsible for what appears to be an equally

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serious stricture on Newman's attitude toward reason. R. H. Hutton (Cardinal Newman London, 1905, p. 3) cites Huxley to this effect: "If I were called upon to compile a Primer of Infidelity, I think I should save myself trouble by making a selection from these works," i.e. Tract 85, Essay on Miracles, Essay on Development. A withering accusation, doubtless, but one which Hutton, by the way, utterly rejects. Still, the gist of the charge, usually imputed under some form, either of open or concealed scepticism in philosophy, or of Modernism in religion, has reverted time and again, to cast its shadow over the work of the great Tractarian.

But the extreme mark of disapproval comes from Dean Inge (Faith and its Psychology, New York, 1913 p. 63) when he classes Newman with the blasphemers against the divine gift of reason.

These charges, characteristic indeed of their authors, but indicative also of a more general tendency, need not necessarily be met in detail, but they must, at least, be accounted for and their grounds exhibited, if we would understand Newman's conception of faith and of reason in relation to it.

In the preceding chapters I have endeavored to set clearly in relief the exact place and role which Newman

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assigns to intellect in its relation to other powers of the soul. The present question sets us only this limited task: in what sense and to what extent does Newman depreciate reason?

As a preliminary it is essential to remember, that Newman was never active in the field of speculative philosophy, scarcely ever in the domain of the philosophy of religion or of systematic theology. His attention over a long life was directed primarily to the subject of a definitely revealed religion. This fact must be taken into account when he is taxed with depreciating reason or with subordinating it to other powers. For he is seldom, if ever, engaged upon problems that have only an intellectual aspect. Huxley's criticism is superficial; its strength lies in the striking rhetoric of its form, which impresses the imagination and causes it to stick in the memory. It will be met fully in the chapter dealing with the nature of faith. Naturally there is at least a half-truth concealed beneath the accusation, but it would be equally true to say that a primer of simplest faith could be formed from selected texts of Newman's works. But neither of the two primers would denote the man completely. His language is, at times thoroughly rationalistic; still, this strain does not, to my mind, represent any general tendency. Only by an utter

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disregard for the organic view of the man and a complete neglect of the steady evolution of his fertile mind, can one freeze him into the static pose of a sceptic, a rationalist, a modernist, or a fideist and so label him conveniently for the ready reference of future generations.

Strange as it may seem, Inge's vituperative accusation deserves our more immediate consideration because it gives a point of departure for an exact appraisal of Newman's stand on the question of reason and serves to lead us into the more general subject which Wilde's charge opens to view. It is of the irony of fate that so violent a partisan as Inge, should say something similar to what a most intimate friend had said in Newman's own life-time, though in reference to an altogether different subject-matter.*

It will be better first to exhibit Newman at his worst on the matter of this depreciation of reason and thereupon to make whatever allowances the circumstances, the nature of the subject under consideration and the developments of his mind require. I take it that Newman's strongest language against reason is to be found in Parochial Sermons,

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* R. H. Froude speaking of Newman's hard language against the Church of Rome: "I must enter another protest against your cursing and swearing at the end of the first 'Via Media' as you do. What good can it do?....(Corres. II, 126)

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Vol. I, "The Self-Wise Inquirer," and in the volume of Oxford University Sermons, principally in chapter four under the title of "The Usurpations of Reason." The former belongs to the year 1830, the latter to 1831. The University Sermons being a treatment ex professo lend themselves to a more systematic and to a fairer treatment of the matter in hand. Other sources will be drawn on as we proceed, in order to show either the agreement or disagreement in language and meaning with the point of view taken in the Oxford University Sermons. In these we find Newman, at least as regards the outward form of expression, at his extreme of hostility to the use of reason in religious inquiry. To his mind it is "mere reason," "captious reason," "human reason," "forward reason," "usurping," "rebellious," "versatile," in short, "the reason of secular minds venturing upon religious questions." (U. S. IV, Passim) But even here, amid a torrent of unmitigated abuse, he takes the precaution of distinguishing between reason when "it stands for all in which man differs from the brutes" and the narrower signification which it usually bears, as representing or synonymous with the intellectual powers, and opposed as such to the moral qualities and to Faith." (U. S. 58) It is plainly against the latter form that his opposition is directed, i.e. against the logical process,

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particularly in its outward form under the guise of argument.

The broad, general thesis of the entire discourse, then, is this: reason has only an instrumental use in religious inquiry, analogous to the employment of power or compulsion, it being "as absurd to argue men, as to torture them into believing." (U. S. 63) Newman would readily subscribe to Bacon's saying: Power is never good unless he be good that exerciseth it. It can and does frame evidences of religion, he concedes, but this is for the most part merely "undoing its own mistakes," without adding jot or tittle to the great body of religious truth. (U. S. 63-64, also P. S. II, 331) The same thought comes to light in his very first published work on "The Arians of the Fourth Century," in which he points out that creeds became a necessary result of an ill-directed use of reason in the first place. (Ari. 36) Its function must ever be "subordinate," "ministrative," "external," and, for the individual, merely "accidental." (U. S. 67ff)

Moreover, reason can never be the sole arbiter in religious matters. In the first place, it does not and cannot, furnish the principles of morality and religion; (U. S. 58-59) these are directly apprehended by the moral sense. In the second place, even when reason accepts the principles dictated by the moral sense, it requires

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personal familiarity with the subject matter under consideration, before it can hope to reach correct conclusions. Such a personal familiarity is the result not merely of acquaintance from the outside, but of the conformity of one's conduct to the principles of morality and religion. (U. S. 61) There is required, in addition, an approach to the study of the sacred truths of Scripture, in the spirit of a learner and not in that of a critic. (P. S. III, 160--1830)and (P. S. I, 272, 1832). It follows from the above that intellectually gifted men are not the arbiters in religious matters. (U. S. 71....P. S. VIII, 187-188...1830) This function is reserved to "the children of wisdom," and it suffices for the sake of argument, to show that Christianity has had disciples among men of the highest ability, without seeking in their ability the confirmation of its truth. And, finally, just as reason cannot replace the internal testimony of the moral sense, so may it not supersede the external ecclesiastical authority to whose keeping religious truth has been confided. (U. S. 71....V. M. I, 22)

Summing up, then, this phase of the situation, we have, in Newman's estimation, faith, (considered as the moral sense) everywhere as the leader, reason as the follower. And the whole Scripture record is there, he points

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out, to show us the triumph of the moral powers of man over the intellectual, of holiness over ability. (U. S. 59) The power of an unlearned faith, not the rivalry of intellect, was opposed to the refinements of Pagan intellect; "and unlearned Faith, establishing itself by its own inherent strength, ruled the Reason as far as its own interests were concerned, and from that time has employed it in the Church, first as a captive, then as a servant; not as an equal, and in nowise (far from it) as a patron." (U. S. 58)

Such is, in brief, the place accorded to reason by Newman, in the series of University Sermons. In the first volume of Parochial Sermons, referred to above, the treatment though more popular in form, varies little from the outline just given. This is to be expected considering that both belong to about the same period of Newman's life. But even in the more popular treatise, he adverts expressly to the fact that he is limiting his animadversions to reason as exercised in the field of religious inquiry; in other domains it is "clearsighted" and "trustworthy". (P. S. I, 218-219) The very title of the sermon, "The Self-Wise Inquirer", gives us the proper clue and direction and furnishes the background against which he views his subject. Hence, it is not surprising when he

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maintains, for instance, that professed inquirers after truth do not find it, (P. S. I, 216) or again, that ability, talent, cultivation of mind and high natural endowments are no guarantee for the possession or the attainment of Christian truth, (P. S. VIII, 187, 1830) for he is referring to reason alone, separated from the fundamentals of revealed truth (P. S. I, 218) and set up in opposition to conscience, (Ibid. 230) directed and led astray by passion. (Ibid. 220, 222) In short, he is inveighing against the individual reason, open to the pride and presumption of "the self-wise inquirer".

We have now presented the extremest form which Newman's hostility to reason takes. Hereupon the question arises: is this a permament characteristic of the man, or does it represent merely a passing phase in the development of his mind? Were we to limit ourselves only to the outward form of words in isolated expressions, it would seem, at times, as if Newman regarded reason as something inherently evil. Thus: "But when that gift of reason is something especial,--clear, brilliant, or powerful--then our danger is increased." ! (P. S. I, 223) Still, from a careful examination of all he has written, I would venture the opinion that such consistently hard language, can be confined almost entirely to the years 1830 and 1831, and

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represents his violent reaction against liberalism which occurred at that time. That there is in him a much more favorable attitude, before, even during that period, and more particularly in his later development, will not be difficult to show.

Thus he concedes to the "mere natural reason" the power to induce in man the dispositions of prayer, praise and reverence toward the Creator, (P. S. VII, 206 "Mental Prayer," 1829) while matters of moral duty are revealed to us through our conscience and a "divinely-guided reason." (P. S. II, 73 "Ceremonies of the Church," 1831) Reason and Revelation are, in fact, "the two voices of God," "two separate approximations towards the Awful Unknown Truth, such as will not mislead us in their respective provinces." (P. S. II, 209, "Mysteries in Religion," 1835) Together with conscience, reason has the necessary function of providing an adequate balance against the excitements of feeling in religion. (P. S. III, 341, 1835) One of his most consistent complaints against "Rome" was precisely his contention that she stopped "the safety-salve of the excitements of Reason," in consequence of which "Romanists" under stress turned infidels. (Corres. II, 167, 1836) Reason, to his mind, was not an inferior power but, equally with conscience, one of the "sovereigns" set over the

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soul "to rule over the inferior parts of our nature." (S. D. 132, 1843)

If, now, we would strike a balance on Newman's attitude toward reason during his Anglican life, we can find it expressed with all its limitations and qualifications in Parochial Sermons V, 112-115, belonging to the year 1838. That attitude is not one of opposition but of retrenchment. Because of its unhampered free-play in the Anglican communion, he found it necessary to check its divagations in the individual but he plainly resents the idea that he uses "light words of what is a great gift of God and one distinguishing mark of man over the brutes." (P. S. V, 114) That in Christ, and consequently in the entire supernatural order, reason is superseded by higher powers, is to him, axiomatic; and if his confidence in reason is at times weak and faltering, this is because of his conviction that reason, by its nature, is not the tough, drastic, ruthless instrument which can bear up against "the league of evil" in the world. Such a necessary weapon is to be found only in Authority. (Corres. II, 268)

The development of Newman's ideas on reason shows no break in his Catholic life, only a logical evolution. The best proof that he did not distrust reason, even in the most serious crisis, is his repeated contention that in

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proceeding toward a change of creed, he went strictly by reason, to the exclusion, in particular, of sympathy. (Apo. 165) and of feeling (Ibid. 189) Moreover, the appeal to reason is his highest criterion in this momentous issue. (Apo. Preface XVI)

The same favorable attitude marks all his published utterances. Reason, considered even in the narrower sense as the ratiocinative power is a divine gift in its origin; (Diff. II, 313) and Newman stands up against the sway of the popular imagination as being detrimental to reason. (O. S. 146-147) There are no limits to its investigations, he tells us; it can and does discover all difficulties, even in the nature and attributes of God, though it cannot always explain its discoveries entirely. (Mix. 269) To be legitimate, however, reason must be used to the full, not merely by halves. (Idea 475-6)

Reason can and should be used in religious inquiries, he maintains; it "teaches you that there must be a God." (Mix. 285) It is a necessary source of the greatest influence, particularly in the field of religious education: "no system of mere religious guardianship which neglects the reason, will in matter of fact succeed against the School. Youths need a masculine religion, if it is to carry captive their restless imaginations, and their wild

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intellects, as well as touch their susceptible hearts." (O. S. 14) In the domain of systematic religion he is convinced that "Knowledge and Reason are sure ministers of Faith" (Idea, Preface XI) and he resists the notion of the current philosophy which held that "Religion was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty, on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many, many, things, but not at all on reason"....(Idea 29) Hence, too, reason is consistent with revelation in <u>fact</u>; any inconsistencies are such only in appearance. (Idea 401)

But Newman advances still further. Reason is that part of our nature to which the very grace of God appeals before it can accomplish its saving works, so that "when souls wander away from him, He reclaims them by means of themselves" in such wise "that the very reason and affections of the old Adam, which have been made 'the instruments of iniquity and sin' should, under the power of his grace, become 'the instruments of justice unto God.'" (Mix. 69) And so reason being the open door to God, He uses the sinner not as "a mere irrational creature who is impelled by instincts...He vitiates in nothing that original constitution of mind which He gave to man" (Ibid. 71-72) and the highest service of God becomes a "rational service." (Ibid. 96) Faith and Reason are indeed two

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different things but reason "is the way to faith," (Ibid. 187) and the logical order is for reason to come first. (G. A. 492) It can even apprehend what faith alone sees ....it is the handmaid of faith; (Mix. 176) equally with conscience it can discover and in a measure pursue objects which are, properly speaking, supernatural and divine; (Mix. 152) it can even simulate grace ! (Ibid. 156)

Here, then, are two conceptions of reason, seemingly poles apart, yet both incontestably substantiated from the writings of Newman. How are they to be estimated?

Before proceeding to a thorough criticism and appreciation of his true attitude toward reason, it will be well to separate what is merely transient and sporadic in his opposition to it, from what is permanent and characteristic. It has already been noted that the violence of his early language on this subject is probably due to a reaction against the spirit of liberalism which was at that time invading the field of religious inquiry. The systematic exposition of this spirit is to be found in one of Newman's tracts published in 1836: "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion." (Ess. I, 30 ff) Moreover, it must be remembered that Newman himself considerably softened the objectionable expressions contained in the University Sermons, by the notes which he

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added to the third edition in 1871. These notes are not mere arbitrary corrections but truly represent the logical evolution of his mind over a period of more than thirty years.

But even when all allowances have been made on this score, there remains a continuous, never-varying opposition to reason, under some form, which does not disappear with the passing years. To determine the nature and extent of that hostility is the purpose of the present inquiry. Briefly, Newman's antipathy to reason takes the form of hostility or depreciation, when reason is considered, 1) as a discursive process in contrast to its intuitive character; 2) as the reason of the individual mind, hence in its historical character; 3) as employed in the field of religious inquiry; 4) as the weapon of liberalism or rationalism in its opposition to revealed truth.

In the first place, therefore, Newman clearly distinguishes between reason considered as the spontaneous rational activity of the mind, which he calls "genuine reasoning," and the reasoning <u>process</u>, which is discursive in character. This distinction is implicit in all his writings. Thus: "Be sure the highest reason is not to reason on system, or by rules of argument, but in a natural way; not with formal intent to draw out proofs, but trusting

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to God's blessing that you may gain a right impression from what you read. If your reasoning powers are weak, using argumentative forms will not make them stronger. They will enable you to dispute acutely and to hit objections, but not to discover the truth. There is nothing creative, nothing progressive in exhibitions of argument. The utmost they do is to enable us to state well what we have already discovered by the tranquil exercise of our reason." (P. S. VI, 341 "Faith without Demonstration" 1837) And more succinctly in the Grammar of Assent: "In spite of Aristotle, I will not allow that genuine reasoning is an instrumental art; and in spite of Dr. Johnson, I will assert that genius, as far as it is manifested in ratiocination, is not equal to all undertakings, but has its own peculiar subject-matter and is circumscribed in its range." (G. A. 338-339)

With this distinction in view it requires no mental twist to grant him that "reason" cannot furnish the first principles in religious inquiry; that it must proceed on principles derived from a higher source, for that is but enunciating a truism. The reasoning process cannot furnish the first principles to any kind of inquiry and has but a secondary importance as compared with intuition, both in the intellectual as well as in the order of sense. In

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other words, the starting-point of any inquiry must necessarily be an intuition or an assumption of some kind. Further, when Newman argues (U. S. 56 ff.) from the character of the Scripture record and the personal teaching of Jesus Christ, against any emphasis of the reasoning process, he proves nothing, since for Newman, the Scripture record is evidently supernatural and the character of Christ obviously divine. Hence it is no great matter that the reasoning process, which is characteristically human, should be superseded in the one and the other by a higher power.

As we have noted, Newman sets up a distinction, and I would venture to say, a clean-cut separation, between the intellectual powers in the narrow sense of the term and the more general sense of reason as standing "for all in which man differs from the brutes." (U. S. 58) Now it is precisely the validity of this separation which I would question. If we abstract from reason, even in the narrow sense of the term, there are no other powers in which man differs from the brute. Reason is basic and indispensable to insure the rational character of any other human function. It is of no avail to point out that reason is not primary in the individual, that "we are born almost into the fulness of Christian blessings, long before we have reason."

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(P. S. VI, 98, 1839) The fact remains that none of these blessings are apprehended by the individual as such, nor do they bring with them the exercise of conscience or of any other "moral powers," until the advent of reason. And if the distinction of reason from the other intellectual powers of the soul is merely an arbitrary and illegitimate separation, Newman's conclusions, drawn from that distinction fall, and reason, as a process of attaining truth, remains characteristic of human nature, yielding only to the workings of a higher mind, (as for instance in the case of Christ), or to the utterances of minds divinely inspired. We may proceed with Newman to the point of placing the products of <u>human</u> inspiration above and beyond the reasoning powers, but even human genius attends on and looks to the reasoned process, not indeed for the establishing of its claims but at least for their confirmation and general acceptance; for the human mind seems to be so constituted that it rests with security only in truths which are actually beyond doubt. Whatever of "irreverence" attaches to our attributing intellectual excellences to our Lord, or to our "measuring the powers of his mind by any standard of intellectual endowments," (U. S. 56) finds a ready explanation in his possessing a nature higher than human, which could, in his particular case, supersede what is highest in

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human nature, in favor of what is higher still.

It is only fair, however, to advert to the fact that Newman's depreciation of reason does not often take the form of opposition to reason in the abstract. (Apo. 243) As a rule his quarrel is with reason in the individual. In other words, Newman's attacks are for the most part directed against the infirmities, the sophisms and the mere semblances of reason; (Mix. 84) more precisely, against assured "reasoners." (P. S. I, 140) And thus placing himself in the order of facts, he finds that "Reason and sin have gone together from the first"; (Mix. 9) wherefore he inveighs against the exercise of that "private judgment" and "private fancy" which "makes its own reason the measure of all things" in the great conflict which goes on in the soul of every man between nature and grace. (Mix. 53-54) For, "Knowledge, viewed as Knowledge, exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own centre and our minds the measure of all things." (Idea 217)

Now Reason, he avers, does not make man autonomous; on the contrary, "it forces on him a dependency on definite principles and laws in order to satisfy its own demands. H must, by the necessity of his nature, look up to something; and he creates if he cannot discover ,an object for venerati

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REASON

(Mix. 88) "But Reason considered as a real agent in the world, and as an operative principle in man's nature, with an historical course and definite results is far from taking a straight and satisfactory direction. It considers itself from first to last independent and supreme; it requires no external authority; it makes a religion for itself." (Idea 181) And if, in addition to its proneness to evil from the beginning, we also "indulge our reason....our passions ....our ambitions....and all the while we think that after having acquired this miserable knowledge of good and evil, we can return to our duty and continue where we left off".... we find in reality that our true heavenly strength is departed from us." (P. S. VIII, 64-65) Thus the individual reason, corrupted and weakened in the fall, and falliable from the first, becomes weaker still in the moral order from indulgence and misuse. Only in the few, the saints of God on earth, does an all-powerful grace subdue "the rebellion of the reason, the waywardness of the feelings, the disorder of the thoughts, the fever of passion, the treachery of the senses; (Mix. 66) in others, if we view it historically, "its tendency is towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion." (Apo. 243)

If such is Newman's opposition to real reason, because exercised by sinful man, we can expect that his

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hostility to it has heightened when there is but a semblance of reason intended to cover over feeling, passion or prejudice. (P. S. IV, 272 also P. S. V, 143)

It cannot be said that Newman denies to intellectual excellence its own place, nor yet a limited scope in the field proper to religion; he merely insists that there is "a radical difference between mental refinement and genuine religion" and in consequence, that in the domain of religion, intellect as such is not a sole, nor an ultimate arbiter. (Idea 190-191) It does not follow that intellect is to be excluded from religion; it can and does reveal to us the "harmony and beauty of the Divine Nature" even though its investigations on such a subject fall short of the completeness accorded to us in Revelation. (O. S. 185) Therefore he does not hold out for a separation between reason and religion; he rather places himself squarely in line with the policy of the Church to "re-unite things (science and religion) which were in the beginning joined together by God, and have been put asunder by man. Some persons will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting and stunting the growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such thought....I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom and religion to enjoy an equal freedom ....it will not satisfy me....to have two independent —

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systems, intellectual and religious, going at once side by side, by a sort of division of labor, and only accidentally brought together." (O. S. 12-13) But when the intellect, stopping short of real conversion of the heart, clothes a system of meagre observances with a mantle of superficial refinements, then does he protest against such formalism as a counterfeit for true internal religion. (O. S.22) Nor does he grant to intellect the power of applying remedies for difficulties which have their root in moral deficiencies. (S. D. 308 note)

If such is Newman's conception of the role of reason in the field of religious inquiry, it may be pertinent to ask on what grounds he sets limits to it at all? His ground is twofold: the nature of reason and the subject matter of religion. By its very constitution reason is not fitted to grapple with certain problems. "Some things are determined by reason, others by sense and others by testimony. We go to dictionaries for information of one kind and to gazetteers for information of another kind. No one discovers the price of stocks, ministerial measures or the fashions of the new year by reason. Whatever is spontaneous, accidental, variable, self-dependent, whatever is objective, we must go out of ourselves to determine." (Prepos. 347-348) Now if reason cannot confessedly compass

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sight and experience, why should it circumscribe faith? (P. S. IV, 289) "Let a man consider how hardly he is able and how circuitously he is forced to describe the commonest objects of nature when he substitutes reason for sight" then "will he not wonder at the impossibility of duly delineating in earthly words the first Cause of all thought" ....(P. S. IV, 291) But not only does reason, in certain ways, fall short of faith and sight and experience; it is itself various in power and range according as it is exercised in one field or another, even by the same person. "No one would for a moment expect that because Newton and Napoleon both had a genius for ratiocination, that, in consequence, Napoleon could have generalized the principle of gravitation, or Newton have seen how to concentrate a hundred thousand men at Austerlitz. The ratiocinative faculty, then, as found in individuals, is not a general instrument of knowledge, but has its province, or is what may be called departmental." (G. A. 339) It is on the strength of this contention that Newman finds "men of learning and ability so often wrong in religious matters," that able men, men of powerful minds, keen perceptions, extended views and various knowledge, are ranged on contrary sides in religious questions. (P. S. VIII, 186) What is required of religion in this connection, is to be able to show that it

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is not inconsistent with the highest gifts and acquirements of the mind; that men of the strongest and highest intellect have been Christians." (P. S. VIII, 190) Not only in religion, therefore, but in other departments of human life as well, reason may find itself outstripped by various powers, better adapted from the nature of the case, to grapple with the problems in hand. Specifically, though, it is superseded in the field of revealed religion by faith, which fulfills a function analogous to sight in the order of sense. (Mix. 169-170) Reason here cannot get beyond inferences, but "to infer a thing is not to see it in respect to the physical world, nor is it in the spiritual." (Mix. 171) And since faith is as sight, "reason can as little be made a substitute for it as faith can be made a substitute for reason." (Mix. 188)

But Newman has a further ground for limiting the activity of reason in religious investigations. Revealed religion deals with mysteries; these contradict the notions of cultivated and speculative minds and humble the reason. It will be found that Newman's sharpest repulsion to reason occurs precisely on the score of its questioning things beyond its range and going out of its own domain into the realm of divinely-revealed knowledge. (P. S. II, 207 ff.) On the question of mysteries, reason is "unregenerate" in

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the same sense in which nature is unregenerate before baptism. To take a concrete example: "The resurrection and consequent spiritualizing of the human body, was not dreamed of by the philosophy of the world till Christ came, and when revealed, was 'mocked' as then first becoming a mystery. Reason is just where it was; and, as it could not discover it beforehand, so now it cannot account for it, or reconcile it to experience, or explain the manner of it: the utmost it does is by some faint analogies to show that it is not inconceivable." (Ess. I, 43) Reason, then, starting from its own first principles, which are foreign to the subject-matter in hand, is bound to come to wrong conclusions; and the more rigidly correct the reasoning process, the more surely will it issue in error. (U. S. 55 note) It is under these circumstances that Newman limits reason in its range and denies it independent authority; (U. S. 57 note) for even in the domain of natural religion, he tells us, reason is perplexed in its investigations of God's attributes. (Mix. 266) On the very nature of supernatural truth, reason is not only limited, but absolutely powerless, either to sound them or to measure them with each other. (P. S. III, 156 ff)

Besides its essential inability to cope with the mysteries of revealed religion, reason may likewise avail

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but little in this field because of failure to approach so high and sacred a subject in the spirit of reverence and with the dispositions of a learner. (P. S. II, 160) Faith, intellect, love and reverence must join together in an effort to apprehend the deep things of God; (P. S. II, 38) with caution, lest the reflex consciousness of the explicit reasoning process detract from the more precious gift of religious devotion. (V. M. I, 137) Not only personal familiarity, but theacquaintance with the subject matter of revealed religion resulting from theological training, must supplement the other qualities of the earnest inquirer into this field, without which reason is but "blind" and "erring." (Corres. II, 116) But in itself the exercise of reason on sacred things is good and desirable in its place, (P. S. I, 204) for it has ever been awake and in exercise upon God and divine things in the Church, from the very beginning. (Dev. 338)

Finally, Newman stands up against reason because he conceives it under a certain aspect, namely, as the weapon of the world, meaning by the world, that body of principles opposed to the teaching of Christ and of his Church. The temptations of the flesh are not grounded in reason but the world appeals to reason in its combat against the Kingdom of God on earth. "Its peculiar offence is that of daring

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to reason contrary to God's word and will"--its reason is "false." (S. D. 81) This false reason embodied in a system of principles Newman envisages more particularly under the name of liberalism or rationalism. Its strongest argument is the pragmatic one, the "actual success of its experiment in cultivating the natural faculties of body and mind; for success seems a fresh mark of God's will, over and above the tendencies of nature." (S. D. 88)

Rationality, Newman maintains, is not a necessary mark of a true religion; "nor is it any credit to a man to have resolved only to take up with what he considers rational." (P. S. II, 24) The true religion is in part altogether above reason, as in its Mysteries; its truth, therefore, is not dependent upon the evidence producible in its favor. Its being, in fact, level to the reason is a "privilege", which can be and is often abused. (Ibid.) That abuse he calls rationalism. More positively, rationalism is a use of reason for purposes for which it never was intended and for which it is unfitted. "To rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the standard and measure of the doctrine revealed; to stipulate that those doctrines should be such as to carry with them their own justification; to reject them, if they come in collision with our existing opinions or habits of thought, or are with

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difficulty harmonized with our existing stock of knowledge." (Ess. I, 31, 1836) And again: "rationalism is the attempt to know how things are about which you can know nothing ....When we ask for reasons when we should not we rationalize. When we detach and isolate things which we should connect, we are superstitious." (Corres. II, 122-123) In this sense, rationalism attempts to supersede faith. It is "the exercise of reason instead of faith in matters of faith," (Dev. 191) not the exercise of reason in matters of reason; nor yet the exercise of reason which, beginning with the principles of faith, systematizes, arranges, throws into form, through logical analysis and development, the conclusions inherent in those principles, "to trace their mutual relations, and to pursue them to their legitimate issues." (Ess. I, 32) These last-named processes have often been confounded with rationalism and invidiously called such; but they represent the commendable use of reason in religion and do not deserve the imputation of rationalism. (Dev. 191)

Newman's opposition to rationalism has various grounds. First of all, it reasons in a circle; (Ess. I, 48) it holds doctrines true only inasfar as they are explicable; (Ess. I, 60) then, as has already been remarked, it attempts an office belonging properly to faith; specifically, it is

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opposed to creeds (Ess. I, 34-35) and leaves no room for genuine faith; (Ess. I, 66) lastly, it confounds facts of the visible with those of the unseen world. (Ess. I, 68-69) Up to the year 1827 Newman himself was in the very current of the rationalistic spirit, but once drawn out of it, he threw the full force of his personality against a movement which, as he repeatedly complains, was flooding the land with scepticism. (Corres. II, 115) It is to his mind a greater danger than superstition, for he accounts it an error to think that "the superstitious have advanced a step toward the truth when they have plunged into infidelity." (P. S. II, 24)

This hostility to reason under the form of rationalism, remained a permanent characteristic of Newman throughout his Anglican and Catholic life. In his later years he more often refers to it as liberalism but it is essentially the same thing. (Compare Ess. I, 91 with Apo. 288) He admits that his being an anti-liberal, even in his Anglican days, made him an inconsistent Protestant; (Apo. 290 ff.) but he holds tenaciously to the fact itself that for "thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion." (Brighton Address, 1879) Rationalism, liberalism, he considered native to Protestantism in the strict sense, with which he never

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identified himself at any time. Even when his Romeward tendencies caused him and his friends uneasiness, he always felt more certain that the Protestant spirit, which he opposed, led to infidelity, than that his Via Media would lead to Rome. (Apo. 136) His penetrating intellect recognized in that spirit of liberalism the true enemy of all revealed religion and so his antipathy to it never wavered over more than half a century. With such reason he knew no compromise for he saw in it the one consistent enemy, out of the Church, which would eventually come to grips with a consistent Church. (Apo. 102) No need of citing proofs for his opposition to liberalism; it lies patent to every one acquainted with his works.

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CHAPTER VII

THE CHARACTER OF FAITH

I Introduction

a) Pre-suppositions

In considering Newman's conception of faith it is important to keep clearly in view the various assumptions which serve as the necessary groundwork on which he builds his theories. These have been treated in detail in previous chapters. Chief among them is his belief in the existence of God. This he considers practically self-evident and as having unquestionable confirmation from a fact of human nature, that is, the testimony of conscience.

Immediately flowing from this basic truth is the pre-disposition of the human mind towards relations with God. Newman calls it "a presentiment of mind," (U. S. 213) which puts man on the alert and pre-disposes him for the reception of testimony in favor of a revelation from God. In other words, man is essentially a religious being.

Another view which strongly influences Newman's ideas in faith, is his ethical outlook. God is moral; his government of the world is moral; and man is primarily a moral being. Faith is indeed a principle of belief and therefore must attain truth; but the "pursuit of truth is not only a syllogistic process," (U. S. 211) and the producible grounds of an argument or merely intellectual

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evidence do not properly express the full legitimate power of conviction over the mind of the moral human being. Besides the strictly-reasoned syllogistic process, in which only objective evidence weighs, one must, in view of man's moral nature, take cognizance of other processes which rightly sway the human mind in its pursuit of truth. Some of these are probability, analogy, parallel cases, testimony, circumstantial evidence. (U. S. 227)

Finally, it is impossible to have a correct grasp of Newman's ideas on faith, unless the distinction be maintained, in his various uses of the term "reason." His general attitude toward reason in its relation to faith has already been discussed; the more specific relation between them will form the subject of a subsequent chapter. His uses of the word can be grouped under two general meanings. In its simplest and most general form, reason is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, (U. S. 256) the passing from truth to truth without the intervention of sense, (U. S. 256) the faculty that certifies to us the existence of something on the hypothesis of something else being known to exist, (U. S. 206) that is, on an assumption of some kind or other. Reason, thus considered, is nothing more nor less than the original act of thinking; it is "a process complete in itself and independent"; (U. S. 259)

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a living spontaneous energy within us, not an art and proceeds not by rule but by an inward faculty. (U.S. 257) It is the fundamental rational act of the soul, the common source of every intellectual process, from rigid demonstration to the intuitive flights of genius. It furnishes the cognitive elements of faith (U. S. 207) and includes in its boundaries the faculty known as the practical reason. (U. S. 58 In short, it stands for all, in which man differs from the brutes and its presence and exercise give the acts of man their "rational" character.

In a more restricted sense, reason is synonymous with the purely intellectual powers and as such is opposed to the moral qualities and to faith. It is a particular aspect of man's rational activity, that, namely, by which the mind reflects on its own reasonings and analyzes its own thoughts. (U. S. 259-60) It begins from generally received principles and proceeds along lines of rigid demonstration; the instrument of its progress is the syllogism and the ground of its judgments is the objectively-producible evidence in favor of a proposition. (U. S. 191-2) Reason in this sense is a critical, not a creative faculty; (U. S. 276) it is an altogether natural function of the mind though not initial and is, moreover, not absolutely essential either for the integrity of the thinking

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process or for the certitude with which the human mind adheres to truth. "Its act is usually considered a process.... an investigation or an analysis; it is said to compare, discriminate, judge and decide; all of which words imply, not simply assent to the reality of external facts, but a search into grounds and an assent upon grounds." (U. S. 207) It is , therefore, conscious, explicit reasoning and in its external expression is often called argument or in its scientific form, logic.

Under this aspect Newman contrasts reason with faith and, for the most part, he excludes it from the act of faith. Faith is an act of the whole rational man; and reason, considered as a process, is inadequate to a true representation of the mind's entire rational activity; it is but an instrument which cannot represent "the outline, the hues and shades, in which any intellectual view really exists in the mind." Still, it must not be supposed that Newman rejects the syllogistic method of procedure; in his own words "it is the boldest, simplest and most comprehensive theory which has been invented for the analysis of the reasoning process." But no analysis, in his opinion, is delicate enough to represent adequately the workings of the rational mind in a given concrete case, and this applies particularly to the state of mind under which a

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person believes. (U. S. 267)

The purely intellectual powers are, therefore, merely a part of man and not even the solely characteristic part; (U. S. 55) he does not deny them their own excellence but insists that there are higher principles which function antecedently to any explicit reasoning process and do not depend upon such a process for their validity. (U. S. 183) His highest appeal is, then, not to the thinking being but to the human being and in the human being, to the moral powers and the practical reason, in the first place. Whatever belongs by nature to the human being comes with a claim in its own right and need not first approve itself to the canons of logic. For man is a being subject by the law of his nature to sense impression, to reason, to authority; he is social, religious and moral in character; he is not only man in general but fallen man; (U. S. 85, 99, 101) and all these facts and conditions influence man in his thoughts and acts, influence him rightly and give the only correct standard and measure of the individual. Moreover, when such an individual thinks, reasons or believes, all these elements come into play and the result of such thinking, reasoning or belief defies, or most often escapes analysis, however subtle the analysis may be. The sum-total of elements that make up every individual,

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is what Newman calls the "constitution of the human soul" (U. S. 29) and is that which gives the final and supreme rule for judging the reasonableness of human thought, belief or action.

b) Relation of Faith to Other Modes of Knowledge

Faith is for Newman a principle of knowledge. He clearly distinguishes between faith as a principle, and the object or truth which faith attains. (P. S. I, 191) The latter lies beyond the present world of visible realities; the former is a mode of attaining truth which man exercises in any department of human activity. It becomes a distinctively religious principle only because of the things believed, not because of the character of the act.

Faith, as a principle of belief, is therefore something entirely natural i. e. perfectly in accord with human nature. It is not something extravagant or irrational "as if it were a mere fancy or feeling, which some persons had and others had not,"....(P. S. I, 190) and it must and does find a legitimate place among the other modes of man's pursuit of truth.

The modes of knowing can be reduced to two, the one direct, the other indirect. We have direct knowledge through the senses and in the consciousness of our own

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mental states. What lies beyond the range of our senses or does not come within the scope of our own consciousness, can be attained only indirectly. The channels of such indirect knowledge are reason and testimony; both must in the last analysis be reduced to direct knowledge. (U. S. 205-6) Both reason and faith are modes of attaining truth indirectly. "Reason according to the simplest view of it, is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another." (U. S. 256) It supplies for the limited scope of the senses, bringing near to us beings, facts, and events which lie beyond the range of the senses, recalling the past and devining the future; it does not really perceive anything but certifies to the existence of something, on the hypothesis of something else being known to exist or assumed as true. (U. S. 206) It extends the realms of the senses in time and space and sometimes acts as a substitute for them.

Faith or the acceptance of testimony is cognate to reason in the indirect mode of its procedure. The truth which it conveys must lie beyond the range of the senses. In its first form, therefore, faith is an exercise of reason; "it is an acceptance of things as real, which the senses do not convey, upon certain previous grounds; it is an instrument of indirect knowledge concerning things

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external to us,--the process being such as the following: 'I assent to this doctrine as true, because I have been taught it'; or, 'because superiors tell me so'; or, 'because good men think so', or, 'because very different men think so'; or, 'because all men'; or, 'most men'; or, 'because it is established'; or, 'because persons whom I trust say it was once guaranteed by miracles.... some such exercise of Reason is the act of Faith, considered in its nature." (U. S. 207-8) It agrees with the act of reason in being an assent on grounds of some kind; it differs from the act of reason in the nature of those grounds. Reason assents to what it apprehends and stretches only beyond sense knowledge. Faith assents to what is beyond sense knowledge and, in addition, to what is beyond reason. In faith the field of possible attainment of truth is greatest, but so is the margin of possible error. Considered simply as a process of reason, faith shows to disadvantage; its advantage consists in being more than a process of reason. These considerations on the nature of faith will receive further treatment as we advance. The point I would bring out presently is this: both the direct and the indirect means for gaining knowledge have the warrant of human nature, that is, each mode of acquiring knowledge is in harmony with our present state and when employed in its

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proper sphere, has upon it the blessing and the guarantee of the Author of that nature. In Him all truths find their common origin; and the modes which He has imposed upon us in the pursuit of truth must, each in its own way, be equally fitted to lead our minds to the truth.

II The Rational Character of Faith

a) Faith Preceded By Trust

In the most general sense faith, as a principle, is preceded by some form of trust. We spontaneously trust or rather, we use our natural equipment, our senses, reason, sight. We trust those general inductions or implicit reasonings based on our experience or on the experience of the race. We instinctively trust others unless experience or habit intervenes to modify the first natural tendency. And all this without explicit or reasoned proof. A faith principle which begins in trust is absolutely necessary in human life; the world could not go on without it. (P. S. I, 194-6)

Now this element of the faith principle, when applied to religious issues, has been and will continue to be called in question. Newman holds (P. S. I, 198) that it is not believing on false grounds which excites ridicule and attack, but the very fact of believing at all; and belief

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is unwelcome because it entails trust. "To trust another, much more to trust him implicitly, is to acknowledge oneself to be his inferior," hence, to trust God is an act of dependence. Men do, indeed, trust each other but only within the measure of their need or on a basis of reciprocal trust. The helplessness of childhood makes trust easy; so, too, does the equality of friendship. But the trust involved in religious faith brings man back to his original state of dependence on God and as a reminder of that state, God has made us dependent creatures even in our relations to our fellowmen, utterly dependent from birth to death. (P. S. I, 199)

b) Faith Not Identical With Feeling

For Newman faith is, in the first place, a principle of belief. As we shall see, it is likewise a principle of action and conduct. But in spite of having its soil in trust and even when faith is most personal and subjective in character and unsupported by explicitly rationalized proof or demonstration, it never becomes identified with feeling. A personal faith, for instance, which has its ground only in the experience of life is really based on implicit reason and is not on the level of a mere feeling or affection. Experience, which is nothing more than

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making trial of a thing, is in reality a rational ground just as much as any form of inductive experimentation, even though the individual may lack the skill to bring out into words the result of such a trial or fail to show in clear, logical form that they have a good reason for believing. (S. D. 344)

Nor does a faith, which is somewhat disparagingly called hereditary or traditional, lose its right to be rational; and neither does such a faith sink to the level of a feeling. Persons possessed of an hereditary faith may possibly have no reasons to produce; they may conceivably not know their own reasons, nor have ever analyzed what passes through their own minds or what caused their impressions or convictions. But no faith except that of the very young can be correctly designated as merely hereditary; every other type of faith has been put to trial in the struggle of life and comes under the head of a principle which has been verified at least up to a certain point. (S. D. 343-4) As to the argumentative process necessary for such verification, it is valid and sufficient, if it be carried out seriously and proportionately to each ones mental capacity. (G. A. 213) But even should no argumentative form issue from such a faith, it would not

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thereby become a mere feeling.

For Newman, feeling smacked of "fancy" and "instability of mind," and he refused to identify faith with any such disposition. (P. S. I, 190) He always (even as an Anglican) rejected the Lutheran conception which identified faith and trust. Such a conception he considered "untenable" because "inefficacious." (Jfc. 256-7) Its influence was, to his mind, "pernicious" and for the same reason: it left men in bondage to their feelings. (Jfc. 340) We have seen that Newman requires trust as an element in faith; and he says expressly that faith is "the mind's perception or apprehension of heavenly things arising out of an instinctive trust." (Jfc. 253) But even here, faith is essentially a "perception" and an "apprehension"--it has its ground in an "instinctive trust"; but an instinct in Newman's terminology is not necessarily irrational and may even be supernatural in its character. So, for instance: (faith) "is an original means of knowledge, not resolvable into sense or the faculty of reason, confirmed indeed by experience....but founded on a supernaturally implanted instinct"....(Jfc. 267) There are times when he appears to use trust as synonymous with faith and not merely as the ground or soil out of which faith arises; but the examples he uses in connection with such

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passages dissipate any doubt as to his real meaning. It is a trust such as Abraham had when he believed God's word against his own knowledge (P. S. I, 191) or again, it is a trust which is stayed in God's word and produces stability of mind (P. S. I, 255-6) pre-supposing therefore its cognitive origin and nature. That Newman utterly rejects all theories which identify faith with feeling is evident throughout his writings. Thus he says expressly: "What is faith and how can a man tell that he has faith? Some persons answer at once without hesitation, that 'to have faith is to feel oneself to be nothing, and God everything; it is to be convinced of sin, to be conscious one cannot save oneself, and to wish to be saved by Christ our Lord; and that it is, moreover, to have the love of Him warm in one's heart, and to rejoice in Him, to desire his glory and to resolve to live to Him and not to the world.' But I will answer, with all due seriousness, as speaking on a serious subject, that this is not faith." (P. S. I, 170-1) Hence, faith is not a feeling, nor any form of sensible consciousness. Further, feeling is not even the test for the presence of faith. For in answering the second part of his question as to how one may tell that he has faith, he draws attention to the "immeasurable distance between feeling right and doing right," (P. S. I, 171) and thus

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makes practice the test for saving faith. Firm determination not violent impulse, obedience not feeling, are its guarantees; feelings are, in fact, rather dangerous and may supplant true faith and lead to self-deception. (P. S. I, 177, 185; IV, 127-8)

Newman's energetic resistance to any identification of faith with feeling, manifest even in his earliest published writings, (1831) seems to be grounded on his conception of faith as a certitude. Such a certitude would require as its primary characteristic, stability of mind which could not find a place in mere feeling either as "stability" or as a quality of "mind." "Consider",he says in 1829, "that stability of mind is the chief of virtues, for it is Faith." (P. S. I, 255)

c) Faith Not Preceded By Demonstration

From what precedes, two points should stand out clearly in Newman's approach to the faith principle. It has, as its preliminary, an element of trust or venture. Secondly, it is not to be identified with this trust nor with any other kind of mere feeling. What, therefore, is its character? It is a form of knowledge, a rational principle; and by rational Newman means reasonable, that is, what is in accord with the psychological constitution of

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the human mind.

Now by "reasonable" he does not mean "reasoned", that is, proved by a process of strict explicit demonstration. In fact, demonstration previous to the assent of the mind is expressly excluded from Newman's conception of faith; and this on moral grounds: For, to demand demonstration, previous to belief, is a dangerous procedure and even fatal to certain essential elements of the faith principle. He does not base this contention on the intellectual function of demonstration as one would be inclined to think; for, to any one accustomed to a purely rational procedure it would appear that demonstration by the objective force of evidence could not leave room for faith. But this is <u>not</u> Newman's argument; for him, no demonstration bears objective cogency and every certitude can be free. He excludes demonstration previous to assent, from the faith principle <u>on moral grounds</u>. Such demonstration destroys the element of trust and venture which is necessary for faith. (P. S. VI, 329-30) Nor is demonstration necessary, since its <u>absence</u> does not invalidate the reasonable character of the faith principle. On this contention Newman evidently takes issue with the fundamental principle of the entire deistic movement. He seems to set up a thesis which at first sight

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appears paradoxical, namely: Demonstration previous to the acceptance of a truth is emphatically not necessary to make faith rational. To refuse to believe anything until we are told everything is not the mark of a calm, deliberate rationality; it simply indicates a narrow conception of the faith principle, a conception which would limit it solely to a function of belief to the exclusion of its practical and devotional aspect. For faith is not only a ground of belief; it is also the medium of our intercourse with the world of invisible realities and primarily with God Himself. At the bottom the conception of faith which requires demonstration as a pre-requisite, Newman maintains, argues a faulty state of mind whether there be question of human faith or of divine faith. (P. S. II, 14-15) It indicates a want of confidence which is fatal to the intercourse, even of man with his fellowmen, in social, political, and most of all in domestic life; for distrust breaks the very bonds of human society. And shall we account it less fatal to man's intercourse and friendship with God, that it be marred by a supposedly dispassionate and impartial disposition of mind, which takes its stand on clear-cut demonstration, previous to submitting the mind to truths which emanate from a divine source? (P. S. I, 196)

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Nor does the faith principle become blind and superstitious because it assents to propositions previous to rigid demonstration. (P. S. VI, 329) Personal faith need not be built on argument or proof; there are other procedures which can guarantee the character of personal faith and keep it to a rational level. Such is "the belief of our teachers, friends and superiors, and of all Christians in all times and places"....and "this general reception of it (a dogma) by others is as good a reason for accepting it without hesitation, considering the fearful consequences which may follow from not accepting it, as the general belief how the law stands and the opinion of skilful lawyers about the law is a reason for following their view of the law, though we cannot verify that view from the law books." (P. S. VI, 332-3)

Still, Newman does not consider that demonstration serves no purpose at all in the domain of faith. Whilst its absence does not invalidate the reasonableness of the faith of the individual, its presence is necessary for any one who would claim to direct the faith of others, to be a guide and a light in the domain of religious investigation, to check the progress of error and to secure our own faith against the weakness of heart which may come upon any man in the day of his trial. For such purposes it is necessary

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"to analyze and to state formally our own reasons for be - lieving what we do believe, and thus have fixed our creed in our memories and our judgments." (V. M. II, 95) Hence, there is a difference in the rational and rationalized elements of faith, according as faith is considered a merely personal principle of conduct and belief or as a general rule for the guidance of others. In the former case less explicit knowledge suffices, even a knowledge which may not be of a nature to impress the world at large; for God gives to each of us enough to make us inquire and hope, not necessarily enough to make us insist and argue. Moreover, whatever demonstrative reasoning is involved in personal faith must follow upon trust, not precede it. (P. S. I, 196) But, when faith would become a rule unto others, there is a duty, incumbent on those who expound or confute, to give the reasons of the faith for which they claim credence from others. (P. S. VI, 249-51)

d) Faith a Rational Principle Of Belief

In spite of the fact that the faith principle is preceded by trust which ventures a step in the dark--and in spite of the exclusion of formal demonstration from the process involved in the faith principle, Newman holds to

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its essentially rational character. The basis of that contention is to be found in his whole conception of man as outlined in previous chapters, particularly in what concerns the constitution of the human mind and the processes by which the mind attains knowledge.

In the first place, Newman considers the faith principle as a proper subject of inquiry for the human reason. Its character is such, he maintains, that it can stand investigation on rational grounds; and it will not suffer by comparison with any other processes of human life which are considered by all men as reasonable modes of procedure. Such an investigation, moreover, is not an "undue exaltation" of our reason, an "unseasonable exercise" of it, (Jfc. 11) nor is it a derogation to faith. For if there is an element of trust in faith and consequently, a seeming blindness and obscurity in comparison with a process of reason, it still remains true that the primary quality of all faith is light. The character and inner nature of religious faith is knowledge; its function, is <u>saving</u> knowledge; the Gospel is a <u>manifestation</u>, addressed to the eyes of the mind; (P. S. II, 151) and faith which apprehends the Gosoel-message is a thing of the mind and a sound mind, (P. S. I, 179) "a calm deliberate, rational principle," the principle of a developed religious manhood as opposed to mere "feel-

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of religious life. (P. S. I, 123) It is not different in its rational character from any other principles which are in common and legitimate use in our daily lives. In acts proceeding from the faith principle there is nothing extravagant or alien to our human nature; it is as reasonable a procedure in the field of religious truth as any act of reason in its own sphere; there is nothing in the faith process which is against reason unless reason can be against itself. (P. S. I, 191-2)

This "reasonableness" which Newman claims for faith as early as 1829 is the same in character as that which he enlarged on and developed in 1870. It has as its basis a certitude founded on implicit reason and supported by the general and unquestional testimony of all men or many men. He has in his mind already in 1829 the very examples, at least in a rude form, which he used forty years later.*

Such "reasonableness" has a further support from

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* 1, "Are there not towns (we will say) within fifty or sixty miles of us which we have never seen, and which, nevertheless, we fully believe to be as we have heard them described?"(P. S. I, 194, cf. G. A. 177)

2, "we know that land stretches in every direction of us, a certain number of miles, and then there is sea on all sides; that we are on an island." (P. S. I, 195, cf. G. A. 195)

3, "how certain we all are that we must sooner or later die. No one seriously thinks he can escape death"... (P. S. I, 195, cf. G. A. 198)

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the experience of life in that type of "moral probability" which, from the nature of the case, is equivalent to a moral certitude. "Religious men have, in their own religiousness, an evidence of the truth of their religion that religion is true which has power; nothing but what is divine can renew the heart. And this is the secret why religious men believe, whether they are adequately conscious of it or no, whether they can put it into words or no; viz. their past experience that the doctrine which they hold is a reality in their minds." (S. D. 346--italics mine) Faith then becomes its own evidence; external arguments are appealed to when the internal conviction is questioned or grown cold or when the mind is perplexed with objections or troubled by doubt and anxiety.

Still, these types of certitude which furnish a sufficiently rational character to the faith process must be such that they do not infringe upon the free character of that principle; the evidence on which the certitude rests may not be of a kind to exclude the element of responsibility in faith. Man is responsible for his faith and he that would be saved must think so and so. Now, there can be no freedom nor any responsibility in thinking in accord with evidence which does not admit of the possibility of

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doubt. For "truth and falsehood are set before us for the trial of our hearts"; and religious error is in itself of an immoral nature. (Dev. 357)

In designating faith as a principle of the mind, Newman, therefore, does not intend to limit its nature or its function to the sphere of intellect. It belongs equally in the moral domain, the domain of duty. (Dev. 358) If then it falls short, either in the clearness of the evidence itself or in the immediacy of its proofs, these "defects," relatively to knowledge, are not to be considered misfortunes. But any deviations from what is apparently demanded by a rational principle must be explicable in the light of its complete and complex nature. Following Butler, Newman holds that a revelation need not be so plain as to put it beyond possible dispute or cavil; nor does faith require clear knowledge. (V. M. I, 275-6) In fact, the evidence in faith must not be too strong; and it is not the presence of the strongest kind of evidence (such as the miraculous) which accounts, either for the existence of faith or for the obedience which should normally follow upon faith. (P. S. VIII, 80-2) For "Christ bids us seek and strive and so find; to knock, to watch and to pray; Scripture has not undertaken to <u>tell</u> us everything but merely to give us the means of <u>finding</u> every-

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individual effort and in the presence of overwhelming evidence, such as is given in miracles, this can hardly be. (P. S. VII, 220-1)

Hence, whilst insisting on the essentially rational character of the faith principle, Newman does not lose sight of the fact that there are other elements in it which modify its cognitive character. In the case of principles which have only an intellectual bearing and application, it is entirely reasonable to proceed solely on objective evidence and on a process of demonstration, previous to any acceptance by the mind of the conclusion involved. To withhold ones assent until complete evidence has been furnished would in such cases be the mark of a prudent and scientific impartiality. But the faith principle is not merely intellectual, nor is it purely objective, nor finally, does it rest in speculation. In addition to being a principle of belief, it is likewise a moral principle; it is personal or subjective; it issues in action. Demonstration, therefore, has a different relation to the faith principle than it has to a process which is purely intellectual, and this even when the faith principle is viewed as a principle of belief. The necessity of demonstration is still further lessened when we consider the faith principle as a principle of action and conduct.

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e) Faith a Rational Principle Of Action

For the average individual, rigid proof or demonstration is not necessary to make the faith principle rational, because of a further consideration. A principle of human action does not and cannot proceed solely on strict demonstration; and the faith principle, beginning in trust, issues in action; it is a principle of action as well as a principle of belief.

As we have seen, the sense of duty occupies an undisputed place in the moral constitution of man, according to Newman's philosophical and religious outlook. And it is the sense of duty which determines for him, at least in his earlier conception, the character of faith as a principle of action. Our duty lies in acts, acts of the mind as well as acts of the tongue or hand. Over these acts we have power and consequently also responsibility; we exercise control over habits and feelings only indirectly. Our immediate field of activity lies in our power over our deeds, and hence, faith must be primarily not a feeling nor even a habit, but a principle of belief and therefore, an act of the mind, as well as a principle of action and therefore, an act of the will. A trustful acceptance and assent of the mind to God's word, with a cheerful concurrence in obedience to God's law, constitutes its nature and the

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test of its genuineness. Unlike a feeling or an imagination, it must pass out of the subject to find its object and completeness beyond itself, not remain imprisoned within its own thought or mood. (P. S. II, 160-1) An essential requirement of the faith principle, then, is a looking out of oneself. As a principle of belief, it embraces a truth which has objective existence; and as a principle of action, it carries the will to a union with an objective law in the act of obedience. Duty, conscience, faith, therefore, all point outward, transcending the limits of the individual consciousness and as such stand in contrast with feeling and imagination. A believer does not imprison himself in his own imaginings; the object of his belief is a reality; and the act of the will which seals that belief finds its completeness in a union with that objective reality whether it be the personal Christ or the Gospel message. (P. S. II, 161-2)

We have seen in what sense faith is a principle of belief and how Newman seeks to justify its rational character, in spite of the absence of demonstrative proof, in the process which precedes the assent of the mind to the truth which is the object of such faith. He finds a further justification for the reasonable character of faith without demonstration, in the fact of its being a

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principle of action. Demonstration is incompatible with any principle of action; we do not reason and prove before we act in the affairs of life, yet we do not deny the reasonable character of such actions; all our life cannot be spent in first proving things in such a manner as to exclude every doubt. (P. S. VI, 330, 336)

Newman's conception of faith as a principle of action is, therefore, based on his view of man. Man is born for action, (D. A. 304) and actions flow not from inferences but from general impressions, that is, from probabilities or certitudes based on implicit reasonings; and faith, not explicit reasoning, is, therefore, the spring of action. And so demonstration must once again be forestalled by faith.

This is not a congenial procedure for many men. There are those who insist on being shown, by demonstrative proof, the unimpeachable character of evidence for religious truth. But such a process would keep all practical questions open; for as long as some small measure of uncertainty remains possible, men would feel themselves justified in not acting up to the requirements of religion. And this attitude is often adopted in the domain of religion not because it is reasonable so to do, but because religion imposes duties; and men prefer to argue a matter without end, provided they thereby have a sufficient excuse, in their own

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estimation, for refusing to act up to the requirements of religion. (V. M. I, 4) Nor can it be truthfully maintained that the acting upon an undemonstrated truth is unreasonable, for it is a universal procedure in every other sphere of human life; and what is universal has a claim to being regarded as natural, hence reasonable. "It surely cannot be meant that we should be undecided all our days. We were made for action and right action--for thought and for true thought." Life cannot successfully proceed on demonstrative reasonings. And why demand in the domain of our religious interests, what we do not require in any other field of human activity? "We do all things in this world by faith in others. By faith only we know our position in the world, our circumstances our rights and privileges, our fortunes, our parents, our brothers and sisters, our age, our mortality. Why should religion be an exception? Why should we be unwilling to use for heavenly objects what we daily use for earthly?" (D. A. 214)

Faith, then, does not suffer so much from absence of knowledge, as from a lack of good will. Most men do not doubt sincerely that it is their duty to obey the behests of conscience; yet, they cannot prevail upon themselves to carry out those prescriptions. (P. S. VIII, 81) More knowledge in the form of objective evidence, and

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particularly demonstrative proof, would not be the remedy for such a faulty moral state.

When faith is, therefore, viewed in its complete character both in relation to belief and to conduct, it becomes one complex principle, "a practical perception of the unseen world." (P. S. III, 79) Not that faith and obedience do not stand for separate ideas in our minds but that <u>in fact</u> they are not divided; they are but one thing viewed differently. As looking upon the realities of the unseen world it is called faith--as running to do God's will it is called obedience. (P. S. III, 81) In Newman's earlier conception he holds that we need faith not only to direct the acts of our mind to a right object but also that we may perform our actions rightly; it guides us in choosing the means as well as the end and, thus, becomes not only a guide but likewise a help in the attainment of what faith points out. (P. S. II, 387)

Of course, a faith which has its ground only in implicit reason is a sure guide solely for the individual, but Newman considers this to be the condition of the vast majority of believers. Nor will he concede that it is a mark of weakness or dullness to accept important and necessary truths without previous demonstration, when these import action. For demonstration would practically be an

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endless regress on what touches some of the most important issues of life; indeed, "the greatest things must be taken for granted, unless we make up our minds to fritter away life, doing nothing." (P. S. VI, 336) It is rather a mark of wisdom to use what has been provided for us instead of vainly wishing for what we have not. Faith's highest wish is not for more evidence but for uniform action in accordance with its lights whatever these may be. (P. S. III, 204-5) Faith, then, exists in trust but passes over into acts, issuing finally in the power of the will over the whole soul, "constraining the reason to accept mysteries, the heart to accept suffering, the hand to work, the feet to run, the voice to bear witness"....all these "acts" are the fruit of faith, which is essentially a seeing the invisible world and love choosing it. (Jfc. 302-3)

As long as Newman conceived faith to be essentially a principle of action he felt justified in limiting the evidence or the grounds of faith to the barest minimum; a mere presumption, or antecedent probability being sufficient (in the case of the individual) when joined with some form of implicit reason. And such a faith he still considered "rational." If "rational" be identified with the "demonstrated," then neither faith nor religion itself

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is rational. (P. S. II, 24) Thus, for instance, in so far as religion has extended itself into any countries without sufficient proof of its divinity, so far it cannot be called "rational." But Newman is willing to turn his back on such rationality, boldly laying down the claim that faith is above the rational. Why? First, it has made its way; and secondly, a doctrine or proposition is not less true for being furnished with less evidence; slight indications suffice for an alert mind in any field of knowledge; slight evidence suffices for the mind which is alert for God and its own eternal interests.

Now, if faith is normally a principle of action, action in turn becomes a test of faith, that is, the test of the genuineness of a man's faith is in his acting upon it; (P. S. II, 21) and not merely the test of its genuineness but the test of its truth as well. "To know God is life eternal, and to believe in the Gospel manifestation of Him is to know Him; but how are we to 'know that we know Him?' How are we to be sure that we are not mistaking some dream of our own for the true and clear Vision?" And Newman answers his question in the words of the Scriptures: "'hereby do we know that we know Him, if we keep his commandments'." (P. S. II, 153) Obedience, as action, is both the test and the safeguard of faith; this

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obedience he also merges in "love"; (U. S. 247-50) and under either aspect it becomes the check against deviations of the faith principle. Both together, that is, orthodox faith and obedience, sum up man's entire duty. (P. S. II, 156)

Action, finally, is the remedy for the difficulties that assail faith. Whilst acting in accord with the prescriptions of faith the mind in its unconscious workings removes difficulties; time is a necessary factor or ally in this lowly and apparently circuitous way of meeting doubts against faith but in the end it proves the shorter and easier; whilst we obey the Savior's precept and imitate his conduct our difficulties are removed. (P. S. I, 237) Doubts are, therefore, overcome by <u>acting</u> against them whether these doubts concern the object of faith or the evidence in which it is grounded. "No matter whether we believe doubtingly or not, or know clearly or not, so that <u>we act</u> on our belief. The rest will follow in time; part in this world, part in the next." (P. S. I, 214) It is a mark of wisdom to use what we have; "we find ourselves <u>Christians</u>; and our duty is, not to consider what we should do if we were not Christians,--not to go about disputing, sifting the evidence....but to act upon the

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rules given us, till we have reason to think them wrong, and to bring home to ourselves the truth of them, as we go on, by acting upon them,--by their fruits on ourselves." (P. S. IV, 59) The genuineness and the truth of propositions which faith brings home to us are to be essayed primarily by deeds, not by arguments nor yet by feelings. A man may have seemingly good thoughts and emotions but if he does not hazard them to the experiment of practice, he cannot promise himself that he has any sound and permanent principle at all. If he has not yet acted upon them, he has not even evidence to himself that his arguments are more than words and his feelings more than passing fancies; till he acts upon them he has not even evidence to himself that he has a true living faith. (P. S. I, 171)

In concluding this section on the rational character of faith considered as a principle of action, it may be well to envisage clearly Newman's motive for insisting on the practical aspect, since it is precisely on this view of faith that his mind underwent change, as will be shown.

As has been indicated previously, Newman considered that man is essentially religious; in addition, man's mind is pointed toward God the primary religious Reality. But on the basis of his conception of the superiority of the moral over the merely intellectual powers, he held that

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there were no means at the disposal of the individual for arriving at a knowledge of divine things except through belief; and by belief he means a firm assent of the mind without previous demonstration for the grounds of that assent. Religious truth is not placed before us with that clear, full, uncompromising array of evidence which we may demand in a question of mere academic interest. He does require at least a balance of argument preponderating on the side of religious truth or revelation, hence a greater probability for than against it; but the evidence need not be overpowering. (D. A. 248-9)

Again, Newman holds, that one who is religious will believe more and reason less; that, moreover, the religious-minded man in so doing is perfectly justified from a purely rational point of view, because a wise man will not wait for the fullest possible evidence before he acts; he will act on a probability and not wait on demonstration, if the issue involves his interests. Now, to the religious-minded, Christianity is such a matter of personal interest and a most practical concern; hence, absolutely decisive evidence is not necessary. Newman goes so far as to say: "if religion be not a practical matter it is right and philosophical in us to be sceptics." (P. S. II, 21) Moreover, reasoning, whether on demonstration or on probable

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grounds, is a well-nigh endless process and, therefore, ineffective for meeting a practical, concrete situation especially for minds which are naturally cautious. It is in fact an impossible process when applied to the field of religious truth even if such an inquiry, by the average individual, were limited to the most fundamental and primary propositions such as the existence of God, and the existence and extent of a revelation. Therefore, we are constrained from the very nature of things to believe what we do not see and know, to forestall knowledge by faith, to maintain before we have demonstrated. (D. A. 214) We are constrained so to act from the nature of things, that is, judging from the plan of God's providence as far as we can ascertain it, and judging likewise from the constitution of the human mind which does, in fact, so proceed universally throughout all, even the most momentous, issues of life. But even these two guiding strings do not avail entirely to check the possible divagations of a faith principle which outstrips demonstrative knowledge; and Newman recognizes such a danger. Hence, the real reason why he emphasizes faith as a principle of action: He needs something, short of demonstration, as the sufficient ground on which to establish the rational character of such a principle and he finds that ground in probability; for it is considered

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reasonable by all men, (judging particularly from their practice) to proceed on probable and merely implicit reason when the issue imports action and involves their interests. In such cases it is perfectly legitimate "to form our judgments by such lights as we possess," (P. S. III, 35) and not to wait on formal proof; "in all practical matters we are obliged to dwell upon not what may possibly be, but what is likely to be. In matters of daily life, we have no time for fastidious and perverse fancies about the minute chances of our being deceived. We are obliged to act at once, or we should cease to live." (P. S. I, 192) And if this is true, as it undoubtedly is, for all our present concerns and temporal well-being, why should religious inquiry be considered irrational for pursuing the same of procedure? "Why will we not discern....that trust, in the first instance, in what Providence sets before us in religious matters, is His will and our duty; that thus He leads us into all truth, not by doubting, but by believing." (D. A. 214) Newman, of course, felt that the faith principle such as he conceived it, as well as the process by which faith reached out after and attained truth, would be open to attack on purely rationalistic grounds, for the simple reason that both the principle and the process fall short of the high character of the object which faith attains.

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And it is on the ground of this disproportion that he invokes what I have termed his fundamental assumption concerning God and the guarantee which He, as Creator of our nature, does for the human mind which seeks Him in simplicity and sincerity of heart. He can speak to us by the instrumentality of what seems but accidental; He can sanctify what He sets before us, shallow or weak as it may be in itself, for his high purposes; and "though the received system of religion in which we are born were as unsafe as the sea when St. Peter began to walk on it, yet 'be not afraid'. He who could make St. Peter walk the waves, could make even a corrupt or defective creed a mode and a way of leading us into truth."....(D. A. 215)

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CHAPTER VIII

FAITH AS A DISCURSIVE ACT

a) Introduction: The Oxford University Sermons

In order to bring out more clearly the nature of the faith principle Newman compares it with a process of reason. He does this principally in a series of sermons delivered before the University of Oxford between the years 1831-1841.

Our first object, then, is to secure the correct historical and psychological attitude with regard to the Oxford University Sermons. In this connection the following points will merit attention: 1) Character of the Sermons. 2) Special difficulties which beset them. 3) The purpose which the author had in view when writing them.

In the first place, it must be remembered that the Oxford University Sermons represent an experiment; and, moreover, an experiment which goes through a period of ten years.* Newman himself considered them in this light, a fact which is evident from his preface to the third edition published in 1871. Here he not only states expressly their tentative character but proceeds to show, from the very nature of the discourses on Faith and Reason,

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* In thus limiting the time we take cognizance only of the discourses dealing with Faith and Reason which begin in 1831 and finish in 1841. Needless to say, during this time, the mind of Newman passed through a series of important developments.

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that they cannot be anything else. They are "an exploring expedition into an all but unknown country and do not even venture on a definition of either Faith or Reason on starting. As they proceed, however, they become more precise, as well as more accurate in their doctrine."...* Here it would be pertinent to ask: does the experiment issue in a clear and definite result? Is there a precise conception of faith and reason in the mind of Newman, once he has concluded his exploration into these devious paths? Or, can we but draw confusion from the pages of this book, as an eminent authority on Newman avers?**

That Newman's notions on faith were still incomplete in 1841, is altogether evident; it required the "Grammar of Assent" to give them their final form. But that his ideas on this subject in 1841, represent a distinct development, clear and correct in its fundamental conception, is equally beyond dispute. For, in order to judge an experiment we must neglect the earlier and ruder attempts, which do not perfectly harmonize with the outcome, and abide in the final issue or, at least, in the important stages that mark

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* Oxford University Sermons: Preface, p. X.
** Erich Przywara, S. J., "Kardinal Newman's, 'Grammar of Assent' und seine Grundbegriffe," appearing in "Akademische Bonifatius Korrespondenz Nr. 1, Jahrgang 37, 1921-1922.

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its progress. If there be any confusion, it results from Newman's earlier antagonism to reason, which practically drops as the experiment goes on; his continuous opposition to logical forms; and a general lack of scientific procedure which necessarily marks the Sermons. Newman himself attempted to eliminate some of these possible sources of confusion by the notes which he added to the edition of 1871. A careful examination of these notes, particularly those subjoined to the discourse on "The Usurpations of Reason" would hardly warrant the opinion that they, by themselves, serve to clear up the original text, unless the critic reads his own preconceived ideas into the mind of Newman and starts out to find the justification for his theories in isolated texts of the Oxford University Sermons. The notes, as they stand, can be interpreted in a variety of ways and thus tend merely to create a further contrariety of opinions and consequently, a further confusion. They do not, therefore, furnish a key for the solution of the difficulties inherent in the Sermons. They are only abrupt indications which give us, in flashes, the limits in the development of Newman's mind on the question of reason and faith, after an interval of almost forty years. Such developments can hardly, with any hope of clearness, be compressed into a few dozen notes. There seems to be one logical way out of

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the maze, and that is, to trace the developments as they take place. It is necessary to neglect verbal difficulties and go directly to the mind of Newman as we find it expressed throughout the works which treat the same or correlated subjects and then, if necessary, use the notes to check up the results. This is the method which has dictated the writer's presentation in the preceding chapter, as well as the exposition which is to follow.

Such difficulties, however, are really external to the essential conception of faith. The true and principal source of confusion is in the difficulty inherent in the nature of the subject under consideration, and is to be sought primarily, in the mind of the reader. It consists chiefly in the failure to grasp Newman's viewpoint which is always strictly particular, that is to say, he never departs from the order of individual experience. Now, in the order of facts, we meet faith as a supernatural phenomenon inextricably bound up with natural elements. Newman takes the fact as it is and speaks, now of the supernatural aspect, now of the natural elements on which it is grafted; and always it is <u>faith.</u> Hence, the danger of confusion. However, a more detailed treatment of this subject is reserved for a succeeding chapter.

A further step toward securing the right point of

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view with regard to the Oxford University Sermons, is to bear in mind the Author's purpose in writing them. For enlightenment on this subject we go to Newman himself. He says: "In my University Sermons there is a series of discussions upon the subject of Faith and Reason; these again were the tentative commencement of a grave and necessary work, viz., an inquiry into the ultimate basis of religious faith, prior to the distinction into Creeds." (Apo. 73) Newman likewise tells us (Ibid. 19-21) the exact method of his procedure for this inquiry. He was dissatisfied with Keble's solution, according to which, the firmness of the assent in faith rested on a probability....but a probability which has been transformed by supernatural faith and love. Newman does not reject this solution; it is, to his mind, beautiful and religious but does not even profess to be logical. In the University Sermons, therefore, he proposed to complete this conception. He does this principally by comparing faith to reason itself, showing us, in what respect it coincides with an act of reason, in how far it deviates from the reasoning process and how these deviations are to be accounted for without infringing on the reasonable character of faith.

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b) Faith in Relation to Reason

This relation can briefly be summarized in two propositions: 1) Faith is identified with a process of implicit reason which proceeds on grounds which Newman calls "moral probability," and issues in spontaneous certitude. 2) Faith stands opposed to a process of explicit reason, that is, neither in its nature nor in its grounds, does it take on the character or form of a logical process of demonstrative reasoning. The proof for these two propositions follows. According to Newman, faith is the implicit reasoning of a religious mind (U. S. 203) which acts on presumptions rather than on evidence. (U. S. 187)

In the first place, therefore, he certainly considers an act of faith as an exercise of reason, understanding by reason, the spontaneous, rational activity of the soul. Thus for instance: "The Word of life is offered to a man and on its being offered, he has faith in it. Why? On these two grounds,--the word of its human messenger and the likelihood of the message." (U. S. 202-3)

Just as for any other act of reason, therefore, faith passes from truth to truth, basing itself on particular grounds. Whether or not these grounds are always sufficient to warrant a thoroughly rational assent is a farther question which in no way affects the nature of the act in

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general. (U. S. 243, 249)

In the second place, faith is a particular kind of an act of reason; one, namely, which is the product of a religious mind, or as Newman elsewhere says, "it is an act of reason done in a moral disposition." (U. S. 239) Now it is precisely the "moral disposition" which gives to faith its specific character and distinguishes it from a process of explicit reasoning. It is also this disposition which furnishes to faith one of the two above-mentioned grounds, that is, it gives "likelihood" to the message. In fact, it is the crux of the question on the nature of faith. What, then, does Newman mean by an act "done in a moral disposition"?

Faith certainly is an act of reason but it is not merely and not purely an act of reason; it is also a moral principle, that is to say, "it is created in the mind not so much by facts as by probabilities." Now, probabilities depend on the moral temperament--a good and a bad man, for instance, will think very different things probable. (U. S. 191) However, as being also an intellectual act, faith in the abstract, requires evidence; but this evidence need not be absolute demonstration nor is it essential for the individual. (U. S. 253-4) The "religious mind" is swayed by "antecedent considerations" (U. S. 187) and "adventitious

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illustrations" which a merciful Providence places there for that very purpose. (U. S. 191)

Faith, then, is an exercise of presumptive reasoning or of reasoning proceeding on antecedent grounds; (U. S. 231) it is a presumption not as being a mere conjecture, but because the mind cannot master its own reasons and anticipates in its conclusions, a logical exposition of them. (U. S. 234, note) All of which implies that, in the case of the individual, evidence is not the simple foundation on which faith is built; (U. S. 231-2) rather, faith makes its own evidence, (U. S. 190) or as St. Paul expresses it, "faith (itself) is the evidence of things which appear not." The rational grounds are virtually in the mind of the individual and a strict process of demonstrative reasoning can bring some of them out in formal propositions; (U. S. 264) but the "religious mind" anticipates this process by the acuteness of a right moral disposition. The propositions, formulated by an explicit process of reasoning, are commonly called the evidence of revelation. But even here it is antecedent probability which gives full force and meaning to the evidences. Mere probability, by itself, proves nothing; nor do the facts or evidences alone persuade; both are necessary when conducting an explicit investigation into

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the grounds of faith. Probability is to fact, as the soul is to the body; mere presumptions have no force but mere facts, on the other hand, have no warmth. A mutilated and defective evidence suffices for persuasion where the heart is alive; but dead evidence, however perfect, can but create a dead faith. (U. S. 199-200)

Still, when considered in the individual, the act of faith is sole and elementary and complete in itself and depends upon no process of mind previous to itself. (U. S. 202) It is not an act merely of a moral nature, dependent and following upon, a process of explicit reasoning, but has in itself its own foundation. (U. S. 184) It is not, indeed, independent of objects and grounds, but can and does exist in its perfection without perceptible, recognized, producible, objects and grounds. (U. S. 254) Like conscience, it is a simple element in our nature, and a distinct process of explicit reasoning is not even a sine qua non condition for its existence. "When the Gospel is said to require a rational faith, this need not mean more than that faith is in accordance with right reason in the abstract, not that it results from it in the particular case." (U. S. 183-4)

Summing up, therefore, this phase of the subject, we can say, that faith, on its positive, cognitive side, is a

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rational act done in a moral disposition. Negatively: it is not a purely moral act, following and dependent upon a cautious act of explicit reasoning; (U. S. 204) reason, warranting on the ground of evidence, both ample and carefully examined, that the Gospel comes from God; and then faith embracing it. Yet, faith is not contrary to reason, in either of the two senses defined above. It is merely "independent and distinct from what are called philosophical inquiries, intellectual systems, courses of argument and the like; (U. S. 212) i. e. it is distinct from explicit reason, which produces an assent of the mind, based principally upon objectively-producible evidence."

So much for faith, considered as a cognitive act. There is a second phase of it which Newman constantly keeps in the foreground. Faith is, namely, a principle, an instrument of action; (U. S. 178-9) and an action, moreover, which is exercised by the individual under a sense of personal responsibility. (U. S. 299) These two elements serve to bring out more clearly the precise nature of faith and to distinguish it still further from an act of explicit reasoning.

Faith is the weapon of Christianity, an instrument unknown before, a principle sui generis, independent of what is commonly understood by reason. And though faith,

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as previously described, is "a presumption under defective knowledge," it is yet a practical principle; (U. S. 298) it judges and decides even under defective knowledge, because it is necessary that the individual act. Still, faith is only an instrument for personal action, not the judge of an abstract theory or opinion, and it is swayed in its direction of personal conduct, by being exercised under a sense of duty and responsibility. (U. S. 305) It has, therefore, the limitations of a practical principle, and any deviation from its appointed path will precipitate it into superstition or bigotry. (U. S. 299, 304)

The character of faith as a principle of action brings it more sharply into contrast with reasoning on evidential grounds. "Action does not allow time for finished and minute investigations"; these may have great scientific value but they do not answer the needs of daily life; "diligent collection of evidence, sifting of arguments and balancing of rival testimonies--are not suited to the multitude. Faith, then, as being a principle for the multitude and for conduct....is influenced less by evidence, more by previously-entertained principles, views and wishes." (U. S. 188) Most men must, and do decide by the principles of conduct habitual to them; and a man's antecedent judgment not only sways his actions but even

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colors the evidence for or against religion, if he happen to have recourse to a process of evidential reasoning in order to establish an opinion. (U. S. 227)

Like every other principle of action, which imports responsibility, faith is a test of moral character. This necessarily results from its being influenced by antecedent considerations. If the laws of evidence were the sole arbiters of faith then, indeed, it would import neither responsibility nor, in the event, either praise or blame; whereas, there is merit in accepting, and blame in rejecting a revelation; "a man is responsible for his faith, because he is responsible for his likings and dislikings, his hopes and his opinions, on all of which his faith depends." (U. S. 191-2)

Finally, faith, (as a principle of action which proceeds mainly on presumptions and implies merit or blame) is necessarily a venture. It does not sit back and await the "fearful clearness," of God's visible coming, but presses forward amid the twilight of the present world to seek Him. (U. S. 220-1) The believing mind begins with its own previous knowledge and opinions, and reaches forward on grounds which do not precisely touch the desired conclusion, though, they tend towards it. Hence, it is said, and rightly, to be a venture, to involve a risk.

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(U. S. 224) Its presumptions are "holy, devout and enlightened"; (U. S. 239) "it ventures and hazards deliberately, seriously, soberly, piously, and humbly, counting the cost and delighting in the sacrifice." It is "a reaching forward," yet not of excitement or passion--a moving forward in the twilight, yet not without clue or direction--a movement from something known to something unknown. (U. S. 249) "It acts boldly and promptly....on slender evidence and as if guessing and reaching forward to the truth amid darkness or confusion." (U. S. 292-3) Again, its grounds need be nothing more than the testimony of a human messenger and some such antecedent consideration as the following: "that a revelation is very needful for man; that it is earnestly to be hoped for from a merciful God: that it is to be expected." (U. S. 239)

Such, then is Newman's conception of faith as it exists in the individual; and from a consideration of its nature, one can readily understand why he establishes a continual contrast between it and explicit reason. Faith and reasoning on evidential grounds differ, even when both are considered under their cognitive aspect; the contrast is heightened when faith is described as a principle of action; so that Newman finally comes to the conclusion that the two stand on different grounds, having only an accidental

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does not grow out of reasoned knowledge and an increase or loss of such knowledge cannot affect its essential nature. "The revolution of kingdoms, the rise or fall of parties, the growth of society, the discoveries of science, leave it as they found it." (U. S. 202-3) It has its life in a moral temper or disposition (U. S. 179-80) and thrives or languishes in proportion to the strength of that disposition; whereas, evidental reasoning proceeds on proofs which a man does not make for himself; "it exists independently of him and is apprehended from its own clear and objective character....There is no room for choice, there is no merit, no praise or blame, in believing or disbelieving: no test of character in one or the other."

c) Newman's Justification of His Theory on The Relations of Faith and Reason

In the previous section I have given the general exposition of Newman's ideas on faith in its relation to reason, as contained in the Oxford University Sermons. That his views therein expressed, are in substantial agreement with his whole religious outlook as found throughout his other works bearing on the same subject, can be ascertained by a comparison with the exposition given in the preceding chapter.

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FAITH AS A DISCURSIVE ACT

The questions which next call for discussion are: First, how does he arrive at such a conception of faith? and secondly, how does he justify it?

Newman claims that his theories on faith are built upon facts. He apprehends faith as an exercise of presumptive reasoning because such seems to be the actual state of things, and we must take facts as they are whatever may be the consequences that flow from them. "If children, if the poor, if the busy, can have true faith, yet cannot weigh evidence, (then) evidence is not the simple foundation on which faith is built. (U. S. 231-2) Not that evidence does not bear one way more than another, or have a determinate meaning, but that as things are, few men are in a condition to weigh matters in an accurate balance and to decide after calm and complete investigation of the evidence. (U. S. 227) Moreover, "if the bulk of men believe, not because they have weighed evidence but because they are disposed in a certain way," then again the conclusion is apparent that evidence is not an essential condition for true faith. From daily observation we see that the acceptance of testimony is the ordinary beginning of faith and this, in turn, is influenced and supported by the desires of the heart.

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FAITH AS A DISCURSIVE ACT

Such are the producible grounds for faith as it exists in individual, and such an exercise of reason is the act of faith when considered in its nature. (U. S. 208) Joined to the producible grounds is the weight of antecedent probability created by our hopes and desires, and these likewise are "inducements to believe which prevail with all of us by a law of our nature and whether they are in a particular case reasonable or not." (U. S. 189)

However startling such a view may be at first sight, it will be found, Newman claims, in no way inconsistent with the state in which we actually are with reference to the acquisition of knowledge generally; "a state in which we must assume something to prove anything and can gain nothing without a venture." (U. S. 214-15)

That faith operates independently of and previously to any distinct act of explicit reasoning, is likewise apparent from facts: "Will any one say that a child or uneducated person may not savingly act on Faith, without being able to produce reasons why he acts?....If he has none, Faith, viewed as an internal habit or act, does not depend upon inquiry or examination but has its own special basis. (U. S. 184)....Furthermore, can we doubt for a moment that those who have deliberately given themselves to religion, did not act from the spontaneous movement of the

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heart?" (U. S. 225) Though it cannot be denied that "reason has a power of analysis and criticism in all opinion and conduct and that nothing is true or right but what may be justified, and in a certain sense, proved by it...it does not therefore follow that Faith is actually grounded on Reason in the believing mind itself." (U. S. 182-3)

In the second place, Newman's idea of faith holds closely to the model presented to us in the pages of Scripture. The sacred text clearly points out the difference in the subject matter of faith and reason: "'faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.' It simply accepts testimony. As then testimony is distinct from experience, so is Faith from Reason." (U. S. 180)

That faith, as exhibited to us in the New testament, is a simple acceptance of testimony, can be readily seen from numerous instances. Newman quotes particularly, the example of the lame man at the Beautiful Gate, who was healed by St. Peter; a similar fact is recorded of St. Paul at Lystra; and tending to confirm the same view, is the frequent experience of the Apostle, when he wrought no miracles but merely preached Christ and the Resurrection. (U. S. 180-1) The faith of those who believed "was independent, not of objects or grounds, (for that is impossible) but of perceptible, recognized, producible, objects and

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grounds: they believed, they could not say what or why." (U. S. 254-5) The evidence he gave was "his own word that God had raised Christ from the dead, much like the evidence given to the mass of men now or rather, not so much." It could not be called "strong evidence," but when supported by the "antecedent probabilities" it was enough, for some did believe, those, namely, whose hearts were predisposed for the reception of the message. "To those who had no fears, wishes, longings or expectations of another world he was but a 'babbler'". (U. S. 203-4)

The distinction of faith from a process of evidential reasoning is also indicated in numerous passages: it is something which we have, not of ourselves i. e. as belonging to our nature; now "investigation and proof belong to man as man, prior to the Gospel. Therefore, faith is something higher than reason." (U. S. 180) In the same tenor is St. Paul's well-known definition of faith, which Newman characterizes as a definition "bearing upon the nature of faith" and "singularly justifying the view" which he himself takes of it. "'Faith, he says, 'is the substance' or realizing, 'of things hoped for'. It is the reckoning that to be, which it hopes or wishes to be; not the realizing of things proved by evidence. Its desire is its main evidence; or as the Apostle expressly goes on to say, it

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makes its own evidence, being 'the evidence of things not seen'". (U. S. 190) And if after all that the Scriptures say about faith as a new principle, as a "discovery of the Gospel," a "special divine method of salvation," it were in final analysis, to be but "a believing upon evidence," a resolve formed upon a calculation," how could such a principle be called novel and strange? (U. S. 179)

Newman's conception of faith presents difficulties. This he readily admits. (U. S. 231) In the first place it lies open to the charge of being "a faulty exercise of Reason, as being conducted on insufficient grounds," (U. S. 208) or at least, of being illogical. (U. S. 204) Secondly, the process whence such a faith issues is obscure, dark and mysterious and does not fall within the range of experience. (U. S. 297-8) And finally, such a view of faith can be made an excuse for all manner of prejudice and bigotry and leads directly to credulity and superstition. (U. S. 232)

Such are the objections which present themselves at first sight. In grappling with these difficulties, Newman holds fast to what has been termed, the strictly psychological aspect of the question. He considers faith not as it is in itself, but as it is realized in the individual; and from this point of view he proceeds to show that it is

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altogether in conformity with the natural modes of thinking that characterize the individual, rational mind.

In the first place, then, faith appears to be an irrational process. "Not that it has no grounds in Reason, that is, in evidence, but because it is satisfied with so much less than would be necessary, were it not for the bias of the mind, that to the world its evidence seems like nothing." (U. S. 191) Resting, as it does, more on presumptions than on evidence, it appears to be an act of reason which is weak, bad, insufficient. (U. S. 204)

What has Newman to say to this serious objection which he himself formulates in the most trenchant manner? The proofs for the truth of a revelation commonly known as the "evidences," do not, to his mind, express the real grounds on which men believe. The "evidences" are often considered the whole proof, whereas according to Newman, these particular facts are chosen because they can readily be exhibited, thrown into logical form and studied with greater ease than "antecedent considerations, presumptions and analogies, which ....are more truly the grounds on which religious men receive the Gospel." (U. S. 264, 293-4) The ordinary "evidences" are, therefore, an incomplete exposition of the grounds of belief, due to the very nature of scientific exposition. For when the grounds of belief take

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the shape of a book of evidence, only such principles and arguments can be made use of, as are granted by all and are on a level with all minds, good, bad, rude and refined. (U. S. 271) But such a method of procedure though it be scientific, does not give the truest, the most sacred, the most intimately persuasive, reasons for an individual's faith. Scientific proof can represent but a minimum of the possible evidence of such a momentous fact as is faith.

The same conclusion results from the character of the process pursued in religious investigations. This character is twofold, viz. a posteriori and moral. Now it is in the very nature of a posteriori argument that conviction follows not upon one great and decisive proof.... but upon a number of minute circumstances taken together which the mind is unable to count up or throw into argumentative form. (U. S. 274) Then, too, the strongest grounds for belief in a revelation are moral in character rather than the severe and rigid analysis required in a court of law. "It is hardly too much to say, that almost all reasons formally adduced in moral inquiries are rather specimens and symbols of the real grounds, than those grounds themselves." (U. S. 275)

Faith, therefore, appears to be an irrational process because of the insufficiency of explicit reasoning

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when applied as the measure of the individual mind, and to the subject under discussion; so that if one were to judge only from the "evidences" without considering the antecedent probability of a revelation, it would have to be admitted that faith is a process of mind which runs counter to explicit reason. But if, on the other hand, one takes into account both elements, namely the evidences and the antecedent probability there may be sufficient grounds for conviction even in the judgment of explicit reason. (U. S. 195) And even if all the grounds of faith are not brought out in explicit form, the faith of a particular individual may be illogical, without therefore, becoming unreasonable. That a sharp distinction is to be made between these two states, is too evident to be called into question; for, "accuracy in stating doctrines or principles is not essential to feeling and acting upon them and the exercise of analysis is not necessary to the integrity of the process analyzed." (U. S. 259) Such a quality in faith should not surprise us, for even strict reasoning proceeds on presumptions which do not come within the scope of demonstration: "men advance on grounds which they do not or cannot produce, or if they could, yet could not prove to be true, on latent or antecedent grounds, which they take

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for granted." (U. S. 212-13)

Moreover, faith, in proceeding largely on presumptions does nothing more than unbelief which considers itself especially rational or critical of evidence. But unbelief is critical only in regard to the evidence of religion. "It considers a religious system so improbable that it will not listen to the evidence of it; or if it listens, it employs itself in doing what a believer could do, if he chose, quite as well....in showing that the evidence might be more complete and unexceptional than it is." (U. S. 230)

Again, faith is a principle of action destined for daily use and as such it in no wise differs in its externals from the ordinary processes which are a sufficient guide for man in his ordinary, everyday affairs; for all of man's habitual judgments are guided by presumptions and antecedent considerations. (U. S. 209)

In the second place, it is often objected that faith is an obscure, dark, mysterious process whose conclusions go beyond its premises. Under such an aspect it may sometimes be confused with bigotry; for what is faith but a reaching forward after truth amid darkness, upon the warrant of certain antecedent notions or spontaneous feelings? Its grounds are conditioned; it issues in the absolute

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acceptance of a message or doctrine as divine; it starts in probabilities, it ends in peremptory statements; it believes an informant amid doubt, yet accepts his information without doubt. (U. S. 298)

Newman meets these objections by a series of arguments based on analogy; he does not seem to propose to establish by demonstrative proof, anything as a basis for, or even as a check on a faith which is dark and beyond the reach of experience. There seems to be a law, he says, in our attainment of knowledge, that the greater its excellence, range or desirableness, the greater is the subtlety and complexity of the evidence on which it rests. Thus, sense-knowledge with its sure premises is woefully circumscribed in its range; reason with its wide conclusions is circuitous and indirect in the means of attaining them. But as reason with its great conclusions is confessedly a higher instrument than sense with its secure premises, so faith rises above reason in the <u>excellence</u> and <u>range</u> of its subject matter, more than it falls below it, in the obscurity of its process. Faith is, therefore, <u>higher</u> knowledge and like all forms of higher knowledge, is often beyond the ordinary technical forms of argument. The most subtle and demonstrative sciences, metaphysics and mathematics, seem

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often to be a mere jumble of words and meaningless formulas to the grosser minds that do not penetrate to the ideas corresponding to these formulas.

The same holds true in other fields....consider the almost superhuman sagacity, the lightning intuitions by which a great general divines the plans of his enemies. What a miserable showing would such brilliant conjectures make when reduced to logical forms. (U. S. 216-18) And so, that act of mind, by which an unlearned person savingly believes, on the word of his teacher, may be an analagous process, supernatural grace doing for the uncultivated reason, what genius does for the natural mind.

At the bottom of all this hypothetical, analogical reasoning there is Newman's general principle, concerning the superiority of the moral order over the purely intellectual, and in particular, his conception of faith as a practical venture--the man who would gain the great gift of faith, must be willing to hazard something for the sake of that gift; and this venture lies in the lack of evidence, with which faith is necessarily bound up.

However, faith can never be confounded with bigotry; for though both hold dogmatically to a conclusion which cannot be reasoned out of the premises, they differ essentially

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in their attitude toward that conclusion. Faith does not pretend to understand it; bigotry on the contrary professes to comprehend entirely what it believes; it takes up philosophical, not a religious position. Faith sets out with putting reasoning aside; from the very first, it makes men willing to become fools for Christ's sake; it knows that God has spoken--it does not attempt to prove the truth of his message by reasoning. (U. S. 300-1)

Thirdly, there remains the most serious charge against Newman's conception of faith. A principle which starts from antecedent probabilities and which is beyond the laws of logic and reason, is left without any check upon its conclusions; it is a capricious affair that may be made to serve the cause of truth or error indiscriminately. Not so! Newman avers, for there still remains a sufficient check upon such a faith without the necessity of any appeal to processes of a logical character. That safeguard is <u>love</u>.

Love creates faith or, at least, it creates the <u>dispositions</u> that make faith possible. For when a man savingly believes the Gospel, he does so on two grounds: the word of the human messenger and the likelihood of the message. And why does he feel the message to be probable? <u>Because he has a love for it</u>, his love being strong though the testimony is weak.

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FAITH AS A DISCURSIVE ACT

Love directs the faith which it has created--for faith, of itself, moves forward in darkness and reaches out after what it does not see and does not know; it is love which gives it "clue and direction" and keeps it in the narrow path of truth. Faith, animated and guarded by love, remains what it was in its origin, a presumption, but it takes on the qualities of love; it becomes "the presumption of a serious, sober, thoughtful, affectionate and devout mind." It acts because it is Faith, but the direction of its acts it gains from love. (U. S. 249-50)

Finally, love protects faith against extravagance and error, specifically against superstition and fanaticism. That faith needs to be safeguarded against excess, is beyond dispute; it is merely a question of what that safeguard really is. It is not exercises of reason, says Newman,--it is a right state of heart. "It is holiness or dutifulness or the new creation, or the spiritual mind, however we may word it, which is the quickening and illuminating principle of true faith, giving it eyes, hands and feet. It is love which forms it out of the rude chaos into an image of Christ." (U. S. 234) We believe because we love; it is the new life which Christ brought to earth that leads the soul to Him, not the natural reason. "Does a child trust his parents

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because he has proved to himself that they are such....or from the instinct of affection?" (U. S. 235-6)

The same conclusion, says Newman, is evident from the Scripture-utterances on this subject: the faithful are Christ's sheep; they see in Him the very object whom they desire to love and worship; the very Object of their affections; and they trust Him or believe in Him from loving Him.

A study of facts proves the same thing; for, "as far as and wherever love is wanting, so far and there, Faith runs into excess or is perverted." (U. S. 239) In conclusion, it may be of interest to inquire into the function which Newman attributes to reason, in its relation to faith or the object of faith.

Abstract exercises of reason must be kept within their legitimate bounds and this situation is realized, when they are employed in the vast field of revealed knowledge; <u>not in conjecturing unknown truths</u> but in arranging, comparing and adjusting what is already known. Reason must not outstrip knowledge; where knowledge is scanty and reason active, it does but tend to produce theorists, dogmatists, philosophists and sectarians. (U. S. 294-5)

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CHAPTER IX

PROBABILITY THE GROUND OF FAITH

a) Newman's Personal Attitude toward Probability, in General

Two things should stand out clearly in Newman's conception of faith as presented thus far: 1) It is a discursive act just as is any other act of reason. 2) The rational character of that act need not rest on demonstration or explicit reason.

The question that next calls for discussion is this: what, then, is the real character of the ground or evidence on which faith, as a discursive act, proceeds? Newman, in the justification just given, speaks of evidence (though slight), of presentiment of mind, of presumptions, of antecedent considerations, of testimony, all working together in one complex process of the individual mind. Now such methods of procedure can conveniently come under a single caption; they agree in one respect, namely, as being probabilities. From an intellectual point of view, therefore, the rational character of the faith principle, as presented in the preceding chapters, depends upon the degree of probability in the evidence or grounds on which it rests.

However, before entering upon a discussion of the question of the probability involved in Newman's conception of the faith principle, it may be well to inquire somewhat into his general attitude toward that mode of procedure.

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PROBABILITY THE GROUND OF FAITH

Strange as it may appear, Newman does not seem to have taken probability as the guide of his personal life. When he had to make up his mind on the most important issues, he determined explicitly to be guided by reason; he allowed any new conception or religious truth to influence him only so far as it had a logical claim on him; he sought for and acted only when such claims made reiterated demands on him with cogency and consistency of proof. (Apo. 119-20) And should Newman's own witness be considered insufficient, we have a similar testimony from one who perhaps knew him best, at least in his Anglican days. Keble bluntly warned his friend against what he considered Newman's characteristic fault, a too great and rigid logical consistency. "You know, he says in a letter of June 12, 1844, I have always fancied that perhaps you were over-sanguine in making things square, and did not quite allow enough for Bishop Butler's notion of doubt and intellectual difficulty being some men's intended element and appropriate trial." (Corres. II, 388)

Hence, in analyzing the faith principle Newman is giving us not specifically his own personal attitude and procedure but rather what he considered to be general, a process which is level to the multitude of men. He envisages man as a complex whole, allowing for intellect, feeling and action; and when engaged particularly in a religious field

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of inquiry, his argumentation takes in the corresponding triple requirement of truth, devotion and external order. He, therefore, regards the faith of the average individual in all its complexity, as an instrument for attaining truth, as the beginning or source of devotion and worship, and as a guide in the conduct of life. If faith were only a means of attaining speculative truth then logic and scientific analysis would be its sole and sufficient method of procedure, and its final test; but as such it gives us only theology. (Dev. 236-7) So if the abstract truth is the guiding principle of theology, devotion and edification must be considered in worship; and expedience has its claims in government. (V. M. I, Pref. XLI) Now the faith principle embodies all three of these aspects and this complexity is the source of innumerable difficulties. Hence, in considering the merely intellectual grounds of the faith principle, in Newman's conception, it must be remembered that these, especially when they appear weak, do not stand by themselves, but derive strength and support from other sources of man's nature which have an equal claim with the intellectual powers.

Newman's view of those forms of probable reasoning which appear in the faith principles are, therefore, largely influenced by the fundamental principles which underlie

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his whole religious philosophy. He holds, for instance, as axiomatic, that belief in Christianity is better than unbelief; that faith, though an intellectual act, is ethical in its origin; that we must begin with belief and not with doubt; that the reasons for believing are for the most part implicit and need be but slightly recognized by the mind; that these reasons, moreover, consist mainly of presumptions and ventures after truth rather than of accurate and complete proofs; that, finally, "probable arguments, under the scrutiny and sanction of a prudent judgment, are sufficient for conclusions which we even embrace as most certain, and turn to the most important uses." (Dev. 327) From this it is apparent that Newman will reject Locke's fundamental principle to the effect that doctrines are only so far to be considered true as they are logically demonstrated. The reason for this rejection is his wider conception of the faith principle by which the truth of doctrines or propositions is received. For, such a philosophy as Locke's would "cut off from the possibility and privilege of faith all but the educated few, all but the learned, the clearheaded, the men of practical intellects and balanced minds, men who had leisure, who had opportunity of consulting others, and kind and wise friends to whom they deferred." (Dev. 328) The excess or enthusiasm

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against which Locke warns is a real danger, Newman admits, but he likewise reminds us that logical "calculation never made a hero," and such is the highest aim of faith. With Newman's guiding principles thus briefly re-affirmed we can proceed to a closer examination of his teaching on probability, in its relation to the faith principle, and of the chief influence which bears upon that teaching.

b) Probability in the Faith Process

The general principles which govern reasoning on probable grounds have already been treated in the chapter dealing with the character and methods of procedure of the human mind. Hence only the more specific applications of that process, particularly in its relation to faith, need receive attention in the present connection.

First, then, by way of introduction, there is a generally received sense in which probability is the guide of life. Not only Newman, as Butler before him (Analogy Introd. #4), but Locke also held to a distinct form of that doctrine. "How vain it is," exclaims this Philosopher, "to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and to refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because

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they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretense of doubting. He that in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world but of perishing quickly." (On the Human Understanding II, 335) No one, therefore, can reasonably question the necessity and universality of that method of reasoning which proceeds on probability. Divergence of opinion will arise both on the subject matter to which it may legitimately be applied, as well as the character of the state of mind in which such a process issues. Newman, of course, always held that religion in general and faith in particular are matters of immediate, practical concern, hence belong eminently to the affairs of conduct of life. Regarding the question as to the state of mind in which probability issues, his teaching is somewhat more complex. Both in his Anglican and Catholic days, probabilities as such could issue only in opinion i. e. in the acceptance of a proposition by the mind without excluding the fear of its contrary being true. And because the province of certitude was, in his estimation, so contracted, and that of opinion so large, he was willing to call probability the guide of life, though not without important modifications as will be shown. (V. M. I, 122-

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PROBABILITY THE GROUND OF FAITH

On the question of faith Newman does not fail to seize on an advantage which serves to make his argument easier and clearer. I have already pointed out the precise nature and function which he attributes to antecedent probability. Now, he finds this element functioning favorably in the procedure which leads the mind to an acceptance of a revelation. In other words, the faith principle does not rest on a mere probability or even a cumulation of probabilities; it is already supported previously to any proof, that is, it is antecedently probable. Here we find him again taking refuge in the psychological laws that govern human reasoning and showing that faith acts in accordance with those laws. Faith is a method of acquiring truth, which gives sufficient grounds for rational assent when judged in connection with the antecedent probability in its favor; apart from such antecedent probability it would have to be considered as an irrational, or at least, illogical process, that is, it does not, on its merely probable evidence, measure up to the rigid requirements of explicit reasoning on demonstrative grounds; its conclusions go beyond its premises. (U. S. 195, 208-9) The question immediately before us, therefore, is this: in what manner and with what cogency does antecedent probability militate in favor of the propositions which faith attains?

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PROBABILITY THE GROUND OF FAITH

We have seen that Newman accepts without proof the reasonableness of the dictates of conscience; for conscience is an undeniable fact and its dictates are an essential part of the constitution of the human mind. (U. S. 105-6) But conscience does not stop short in itself; it is the sanction and the essential principle of natural religion, which supposes a supreme Lawgiver; God, considered as a Moral Being, therefore, becomes a necessary deduction from conscience (U. S. 18) and given those elements, we have at once an antecedent probability for the existence of a revelation. For with the existence of God not merely as an allwise Creator but also as a moral Governor, it becomes antecedently probable that He will reveal Himself to man; and the actual presence of any revelation with claims of divine origin, demands a hearing previous to any proof, and acceptance on even slight evidence; (U. S. 187-8) the antecedent probability supplies for any deficiency in the evidence and makes faith reasonable, since so to act is in accord with the ordinary workings of the human mind in every other field of its thought and activity. (U. S. 212-13) To reject a revelation under such conditions would clearly be going against the very laws that govern human thought, for in no other sphere of activity does the average individual require unimpeachable, rigid demonstration of claims where his interests are at stake. (U. S. 203)

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PROBABILITY THE GROUND OF FAITH

Thus Newman passes from the subjective authority of conscience to the objective authority of a revelation, the latter substituting the former and constituting the essence of revealed religion as opposed to natural religion. (Dev. 86)

When applied directly to faith, the argument drawn from antecedent probability really supplements the argument from authority. According to Newman, faith is the assent of the mind to a truth, which assent is based on two grounds: The word of its human messenger and the likelihood of the message. Now this "likelihood" is precisely its antecedent probability, which arises from the predisposition of the individual for the reception of religious truth. The message fills every aspiration of the right-minded man and coincides exactly with the expectations of the heart that desires to know and to do the will of its Maker. In other words, faith is an assent of the mind which fits in exactly with the present scheme of things in so far as we can ascertain it. Newman judges this scheme primarily from analysis of the desires of the human heart; these desires are fostered by the right training and exercise of conscience. Moreover, faith in a revelation becomes urgently probable, when man is considered as the creature of God, to whom must be attributed those desires and expectations of union with Him; otherwise man

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is a Creator, and a hidden one, powerfully bears you on and sets you down at the very threshold of revelation, and leaves you there looking up earnestly for divine tokens that a revelation has been made." (Mix. 277-8)

Under such circumstances it becomes easy to believe upon even slight evidence and, it is entirely reasonable to do so; for we are engaged, not in the domain of physical science, where strict investigation is applied only to facts actually present, but in the domain of moral proof where it is entirely legitimate to fall back upon presumption, authority, analogy, parallel cases and the tradition of ages when more precise evidence is lacking. (Dev. 110-11) Moreover the absence of clearer and weightier evidence in the case of faith must not be regarded as a misfortune, since it is precisely in its proceeding upon antecedent grounds and trusting to presumption, that the merit of faith lies. (U. S. 222)

The question now arises: What is the rational value of a method of reasoning which proceeds mainly on presumptions and antecedent probabilities? Evidently it cannot, under any circumstances, carry demonstrative force. Newman himself admits this when he applies the same method to the credibility of the Scripture Miracles. Antecedent probability can but recommend to our notice the evidence in

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favor of any act and must, in the event, give way to the evidence itself. (Mir. 246) Predispositions and presumptions, even when they are in accord with a religiously-trained conscience, can give nothing more than subjective probability more or less great.

Its objective value lies in lessening the burden of proof; fewer facts and weaker evidence will avail to convince the mind in view of an antecedent probability; and such a condition exists, Newman affirms, for the claims of a revelation. Hence faith can and does accept such claims reasonably, on lesser grounds than it would receive claims to which no antecedent probability attaches. Still, in the final analysis, the appeal for the truth of a proposition is grounded on the amount and kind of evidence. (Mir. 393)

In faith as a discursive act, this kind of evidence is of the nature of probability. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to understand what Newman means by probabilities. He nowhere gives us an exact definition of the term. I have already adverted to the two distinct meanings which occur almost indiscriminately in Newman's writings. (cf. supra: The Human Mind: Probability) In discussing the nature of faith as a discursive act it appears to me indubitable that he is using "probabilities" for the most part, as evidence which the mind accepts with a certain fear of its opposite

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being true; and only in a lesser degree is he using "probability" in the sense of evidence which legitimately induces moral certitude, whose opposite, consequently, is repugnant to our conceptions of the moral order. In fact, the latter meaning enters as a confusing element, carrying with it the distinct implication of a new interpretation attaching to faith, which makes of it something different from a discursive act. The kind of probability, therefore, that Newman generally brings forward as the rational ground of faith, is similar in character to that which he adduces in favor of miracles and for the homogeneous evolution of doctrine. A miracle, just as an act of faith, has in its favor an antecedent probability. The act of faith of even the most unlearned person is, therefore, not a thing to be suspected at the outset unless there be indications of fraud in the particular instance. (Mir. 190-1) We may reasonably treat it with the same criteria of logical truth and duty which we apply to other alleged facts of everyday occurrence. We do not, in the first instance, apply a rigid reasoning process, nor do we begin by doubting; rather, we take on trust, put to trial, prove by using. Moreover, we take probable evidence as a whole, that is, as forming part of a system of things, as forming combined proof; interpreting what is obscure by other parts which are clear. (Dev. 100-1) Thus

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one merely probable evidence gains strength from its relation to other probable evidence and from its being an element in an organized whole, not merely an isolated indication. The forms which this kind of evidence assumes vary according to the individual mind, but every kind is legitimate, provided it find a place among the ordinary means by which men become convinced in fields of inquiry where demonstration or rigid investigation is impossible. Presumptions and prescription, authority and tradition, verisimilitude and analogy, all work together and give cogency to whatever is already antecedently probable. Nor will Newman allow that Bacon's strictures on the "idols of the den" destroy the credit of his method of probability. For Bacon was evidently aiming at the application of such modes of reasoning to strict investigation and that in the province of physics, and not seeking to banish it from such fields as ethics, history and religion. (Dev. 110) We must do the best we can with what is given us, varying our proof with the nature of the subject matter, not looking for demonstration from the orator nor, contrariwise, accepting probabilities from a mathematician, as Aristotle already said. (Dev. 113) The faith principle is an instrument of human life, and "in all matters of human life, presumption verified by instances is our ordinary instrument of proof, and, if the antecedent

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probability is great, it almost supersedes instances. Of course, as is plain, we may err greviously in the antecedent view with which we start, and in that case our conclusions may be wide of truth; but that only shows that we had no right to assume a premise which was untrustworthy, not that our reasoning was faulty." (Dev. 113-14) All men, therefore, use the method of merely probable reasoning and not in slight matters only, or in unimportant affairs. "Our dearest interests, our personal welfare, our property, our health, our reputation we freely hazard, not on proof, but on a simple probability, which is sufficient for our conviction, because prudence dictates to us so to take it." (Dev. 115) Why, then, do some men extend this natural procedure to the acceptance of truths, which lie beyond sight or demonstration, and others do not? Newman answers this question directly: the moral disposition differs in different men; the faith principle as such is common to all. (P. S. I, 190-1) Those who are well disposed, those who are alert for God and his revelation, who are alive to their own spiritual interests, embrace a wider field of truth; they apply the faith principle not only to the things of the present world but to the invisible world of spiritual realities. (P. S. II 18-19)

As Newman already noted, the argument from Probability, in matter of religion, as handled both by Keble and himself,

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became an argument from Personality, which in turn is a form of the argument from Authority. (Apo. 19) Hence we should rightly expect that Probability finds its commonest support in every form of authority, whether this be internal or external. To conscience as the internal authority Newman specifically assigns the function of creating the pre-dispositions for faith; its universal character assures to every individual at least the means of approaching toward revealed religion, given merely the opportunity of hearing the "word" through a human messenger. (O. S. 64-67) The external evidence in faith, therefore, becomes of merely the slightest importance, for in the last analysis, faith is a response to conscience just as obedience to God's law is much more a response to internal than to external authority. (P. S. I, 199-200) Hence, too, a Christian or a believer may almost be defined as one who has a ruling sense of God's presence in his conscience. (P. S. V 225-6)

The part played by external authority whether considered as the Church in general or the individual preacher, Newman considers simply as instrumental. (P. S. VI, 155, 157, 158) Faith is <u>occasioned</u> by the voice of the preacher and this because the soil had been prepared; the proper pre-dispositions were present and it required but a "hint," a "mere whisper in the air" to elicit "a deep response from many

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lips, a deep full and ready harmony of many voices one and all proclaiming Christ." (S. D. 311) With such support from the internal authority of conscience, there is joined the external encouragement from a visible Church, but more by way of confirmation than of evidence. (P. S. III, 236-7) When faith has for its object mysteries, then the authority of the Church supersedes the evidence entirely, but this kind of faith takes on a character different in its nature from a discursive act; it becomes a simple acceptance of testimony with the external authority of the Church as the only ordinary channel of its advent. (P. S. VI, 356)

c) Influence of Butler.

Before concluding the discussion on the nature and function of probable evidence in the faith process, it will be well to consider the chief influence discernible in Newman's procedure in this matter. This influence, as he himself admits repeatedly, goes back to Butler, and among the great Anglican Bishop's works, the "Analogy" evidently furnishes the basis of both the form and content of such influence.

There are diametrically opposite opinions on the character of the general influence exerted by Butler's Analogy over his own and succeeding generations. Benn holds that it must "be largely considered responsible for the more

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complete unbelief which took the place of Deism among the highest intellects after its publication."....(The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century Vol. I, 37) This amazing assertion is balanced by the opinion of Gladstone (Subsidiary Studies, 132-4) who first of all, holds that the period following the publication of the Analogy represented a distinct religious reaction among the upper and more educated classes, hence, apart from that inaugurated by Wesley and Whitfield; and secondly, that Butler's writings were in great measure responsible for that religious reaction. Spooner, whilst also admitting the fact of such a religious renovation considers the evidence for attributing it to Butler rather doubtful. (Bishop Butler, p. 243) But of the Bishop's positive, religious influence in the nineteenth century there can be no question. As Spooner rightly maintains, "two at least of the greatest leaders of the Oxford movement --Cardinal Newman and Mr. Keble--have expressed in no grudging terms their obligations to him; and have acknowledged how profoundly their whole cast of thought and method were determined by his writings." (Ibid. 244)

Newman always held Butler in the highest esteem. He classes the Anglican divine with such intellects as Newton, Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas. (U. S. 294-5) His

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influence is toward that enlargement of mind which can best be described as philosophical and profound. (Idea 226; U. S. 286) The connection which Butler establishes between the moral and religious systems, by means of probable reasoning on a basis of analogy, Newman considered a stroke of genius. (G. A. 361) The Analogy, he holds, gives visible form and life to spiritual truths by carrying over the Gospel doctrines into nature and society. (U. S. 286) In its argument it is, in Newman's terminology, "a presumption used negatively." (G. A. 382) He insists particularly that Butler in his Analogy did not intend to limit the course of Revelation to the analogy of nature; in other words Butler does not hold that nothing can appear in revelation excepting what already has its counterpart in nature; in fact he plainly asserts the contrary, but limits his argument to a negative conclusion. (Ess. I, 69)

For the most part, Newman's procedure in the field of antecedent probability works hand in hand with the argument from analogy; this is especially the case in his treatment of miracles. (Mir. 151, 153, 157) Still, on a very important point he considers, that analogy, by itself, tells against antecedent probability in the case of the imparting of a revelation; and the force of this

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argument would cut heavily into the cogency of one of Newman's central contentions. Analogy, he finds, "is in some sort violated by the fact of a revelation," being, in a sense, an innovation upon the moral order, for which no antecedent probability can be invoked by any parallel from the physical order. (Dev. 84) Newman meets this difficulty by hazarding a distinction between the facts of revelation and its principles. "The argument from Analogy" he says, "is more concerned with its principles than with its facts. The revealed facts are special and singular, not analogous, from the nature of the case; but it is otherwise with the revealed principles; these are common to all the works of God: and if the Author of Nature be the Author of Grace, it may be expected that, while the two systems of facts are distinct and independent, the principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a connecting link between them. In this identity of principle lies the Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion, in Butler's sense of the word." (Dev. 84-5)

Newman was influenced by Butler early in life. The reading of the Analogy which he places in 1825 (Autobiographical Memoir, Corres. I, 107) had the effect of "placing his doctrinal views on a broad philosophical basis, with which an emotional religion could have little

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sympathy." In the Apologia, whilst assigning the date of the reading to 1823, he enlarges on the specific views which he derived from this study. It marked an "era" in his religious opinions and furnished him, in particular, with two of the underlying principles of his teaching. "First, the very idea of an analogy between the separate works of God leads to the conclusion that the system which is of less importance is economically or sacramentally connected with the more momentous system, and of this conclusion the theory, to which I was inclined as a boy, viz. the unreality of material phenomena....Secondly, Butler's doctrine that Probability is the guide of life, led me, at least under the teaching to which a few years later I was introduced, to the question of the logical cogency of Faith, on which I have written so much. Thus to Butler I trace those two principles of my teaching which have led to a charge against me both of fancifulness and of scepticism." (Apo. 10-11)

Besides these general principles which Newman expressly traces to Butler's influence, there are similarities in their fundamental religious outlook as well as in their methods of procedure. Spooner in his critical study of Bishop Butler assigns as "the bedrock on which his whole system reposes," the "vindication of the

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originality, independence, and authority of conscience." And this belief shaped not only Butler's own life and teaching but, through him has become the "perpetual heritage of the English race." (Bishop Butler, 227-8) Second in importance and serving as the universal background of all that Butler has written, is his "deep sense of personal religion and of direct obligation to a moral and personal God." (Ibid. 228-9) Gladstone (Subsidiary Studies, 6-9) attaches the greatest importance to Butler's method of probable reasoning as an effective procedure both in the province of religion and in the domain of personal, social and political affairs. In common with Locke, (cf. On the Human Understanding II, 350) Butler sets specific limits to human knowledge particularly in moral matters. This doctrine first sketched in the sermon on the ignorance of Man is developed in the Analogy (Part II, Chap. III, "Of our Incapacity of Judging" etc.) with the set purpose of undermining the large pretensions of the Deists and of inculcating in the seekers of religious truths a temper of teachableness, humility, openmindedness, a willingness to proceed on faith and a resigned acceptance of merely partial knowledge as a form of probation in our present life. (Analogy II, IV #2, #7, and I, IV and V)

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From a consideration of these views, which represent only the outstanding characteristics of Butler, it becomes apparent to what extent Newman resembles him both in the content and in the method of his teaching. Some of the fundamental doctrines, common to each, have a relatively different importance in the one and the other but the general similarity is striking. Thus for Newman I have maintained (cf. supra Ch. I) that God, not conscience, is his primary reality and the starting point of his religious investigations. What has often been considered Newman's most original contribution to religious philosophy, the doctrine of development or homogeneous evolution of dogma, is an addition to Butler, though built directly upon the foundation provided by the Analogy. As Newman points out, Butler does not deny a progressive development; (Dev. 63-4) and Spooner considers that evolution in the sphere of revelation moves along the lines which Butler indicated. (Bishop Butler, p. 239-40) Newman himself draws attention to a point of doctrine in which he goes beyond Butler on the conception of the justice of God as a principle of divine governance. Justice, to Newman's mind, is amiable, as well as benevolence: "that we do not commonly love and revere Justice arises from our being sinners and fearing it." (Corres. I, 226; U. S. 99 ff.;

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Analogy I, III.)

As to the fundamental similarity in method between the two men, and particularly on the question of reasoning on probable grounds, we have seen that Newman interprets Butler's arguments from analogy as referring more to principles than to facts.

Both men pursue a practical, concrete method of exposition and reasoning, eschewing as much as possible all abstract and metaphysical speculation. (Mir. 71; G. A. 344) Newman rightly considers that the argument of the Analogy is mostly negative; he approves that form of argument and uses it himself. "Objection being brought against certain characteristics of Christianity he (Butler) meets it by the presumption in their favor derived from their parallels as discoverable in the order of nature, arguing that they do not tell against the Divine origin of Christianity, unless they tell against the Divine origin of the natural system also." (G. A. 383) Both Newman and Butler expand the argument from probabilities (whether positive or negative) into a wider and stronger process of reasoning by what the former has designated "a cumulation" of probabilities or "convergent" and "concurring probability"; these when used from an organic point of view give us the culmination of Newman's method of reasoning on probable

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grounds. The various forms of probable reasoning are found throughout the Analogy, and Butler, more than any other English writer has insisted on viewing the moral and religious world as a system in which the various parts, elements or facts, whilst having a value of their own when viewed in isolation, must be appraised in relation to each other and in their relation to the whole constituted order. (G. A. 319-20, 406; Analogy II, VII #30 and I, V, passim) As Juergens has pointed out, Butler uses the congeries of probabilities only negatively, whereas Newman employs that form of argument both negatively and positively. (Newman on the Psychology of Faith, p. 247) The same writer considers the relation between Natural and Revealed Religion, so strongly implied throughout the Analogy, as the very heart of Newman's chief motive of credibility. This relation is brought out by Newman in two of the Oxford University Sermons belonging to the years 1826 and 1830, that is, shortly after his first acquaintance with Butler's Analogy. From all this it appears that "Newman's whole system of Conscience, Ethics and Natural Religion was undoubtedly shaped under the guiding influence of Butler's Rolls Sermons and the Analogy" (Ibid. 248) with a confirmation from Newman's own

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experience of life.

As for the immediate application of the method of probable reasoning to faith, considered as a discursive act, I believe that Butler's influence acted as a retarding factor in Newman's conception. At first he seems to have accepted mere probabilities as the ground of such faith exactly in the sense of Butler. He appears to have had recourse to probability because of the nature of the subject matter, that is, he conceived faith chiefly as a principle of action and as such dealing with matters which are contingent and variable. (V. M. I, 124) Nor do such probabilities in the evidence create certitude in the conclusion, thus leaving his conception of faith open to the charge of being a mere opinion. The further step of justifying the certitude of faith seems to me to be a later development in Newman. In his earlier conception faith differs not at all from an opinion in its cognitive aspect; whatever certitude it possesses is merely subjective in character and springs not from evidence but from love. Thus he says expressly: "If we are asked, how Faith differs from Opinion, we reply, in its considering His (God's) being, governance, and will as a matter of personal interest and importance to us, not

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in the degree of light or darkness under which it perceives the truth concerning them. When we are not personally concerned, even the highest evidence does not move us; when we are concerned, the very slightest is enough." (V. M. I, 86) The least that can be said on this matter is that Newman made faith independent of the strength or weakness of the evidence, and looked for certitude not in the faith principle itself but rather in the Object to which faith is directed. When that Object is God then his own faith at least, became a transcendant probability which, as I have explained previously, is equivalent to a certitude.

In his Catholic days Newman was certainly dissatisfied with probability as the guide of life and required more than "a mere balance of arguments." (G. A. 237-8) For real and earnest practical religion he demanded certitude, at least in the premises. (G. A. 239-40) That he finally rejected a conception of faith based on probability is beyond question; "it is the very characteristic of the profession of faith," he says in 1866, "made by numbers of educated Protestants, and it is the utmost extent to which they are able to go in believing, to hold, not that Christian doctrine is certainly true, but that it

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has such a semblance of truth, it has such considerable marks of probability upon it, that it is their duty to accept and act upon it, as if it were true beyond all question or doubt: and they justify themselves, and with much reason, by the authority of Bishop Butler." Such a faith, he maintains, "does not rise to the level of the sine qua non, which is the condition prescribed for becoming a Catholic." (D. A. 391-2)

From this it appears that Newman's conception of faith must have undergone considerable change in the course of his life and this development will form the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER X

FAITH AS AN INTUITIVE ACT

a) Introduction

On the basis of the exposition given in the previous chapters I would set down the following principles and claims: First, Newman really has the conception which has been ascribed to him. Secondly, that this conception of faith is clearly a discursive act, being in its nature, an implicit reasoning process, which, from a strictly rational viewpoint, does not rise above the level of a mere opinion. That furthermore, thirdly, Newman confounds two very distinct things: faith and credibility. What has been described thus far is, from the Catholic viewpoint, not faith at all but a preliminary to faith, a process which logically precedes the act of faith and which may take any form of rational procedure open to the average mind. Fourthly that Newman, for a long time, attempted to justify that conception as real faith and not only as the preliminary of faith or credibility. Finally, that, running parallel with this conception of faith is another, which exists already right through Newman's Anglican life, which enters at times as a confusing element, then again serves as a refuge whenever his discursive "faith" is hard-pressed for

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rational justification. (cf. e. g. U. S. 215-18) My purpose, then will be to prove that this second conception of faith, always at least latent in Newman, undergoes a gradual evolution, following somewhat the development of his own mind, and by degrees begins to absorb the first, becomes dominant, finally sole, with the result that the original conception loses, in his estimation, its character of genuine faith and becomes a simple act of credibility. I have designated this second conception of faith as an intuitive act in contrast with the discursive act thus far presented. I conceive that Newman always recognized such a faith in himself at least on the essentials of Anglican Christianity. Moreover, that as a marvelously keen observer, he apprehended the same fact in others and analyzed that fact correctly but gave the wrong justification for it. In view of the high character of the objects which such a faith attains, he appears to me to glorify the weak process of probable reasoning which is but the channel of its advent in particular cases.

My immediate purpose is to clear up some of the confusing aspects in Newman's conception of faith prior to 1845; thereupon to exhibit the progressive development of his conception of faith as an intuitive act together with the ground of such faith.

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b) Sources of Confusion in Newman's Conception of Faith prior to 1845

While not giving us precisely a picture of faith from Newman's own life, the conception as presented in the preceding chapters, must yet have been influenced considerably by his introspective observations and by his personal experiences. The real ground of his own beliefs prior to 1845 was to him "more a matter of experience and feeling than of faith" in the strict sense of the word. (Idea 4) Hence his faith varied according to the experience and feeling which bore upon this or that particular object; it was not, I might say, of a uniform texture. As far as his belief in God is concerned I am convinced that the experience in which it is grounded goes back to his first conversion in 1816; there is here question of a psychological experience; the object of that experience is God whose existence becomes as real to Newman as his own. (Corres. I, 17, 18, 19) That experience was not violent nor was it, on the other hand, a reasoned apprehension. (Corres. I, 109) To my mind it comes as close to an apprehension by supernatural faith as can be found in any authenticated account whatsoever. My reason for this opinion is Newman's own statement, made in 1817, on what

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he considered conversion to be: "The reality of conversion, as cutting at the root of doubt, providing a chain between God and the Soul, that is with every link complete; I know I am right. How do you know it? I know I know." (Corres. I, 21) What is this but faith as an ultimate, a faith that has no ground outside itself?

Now there is no such experience for his belief in a particular Church prior to 1845, and hence we can expect to find a difference in the character of the faith with which he believed in God and that faith by which he believed in the Church. I do not pretend that Newman was consciously aware of this difference until 1845 but the very fact of there being an essential difference would tend to confuse his analysis of the faith principle. Anyone now reading the last sermons of his Anglican career will be convinced, that whatever his faith in the Anglican Church may have been previous to their composition, it had sunk to the level of an opinion at that time. (1841-1843) He is casting about desperately for some ground on which to rest that opinion, exhibiting in turn, the practical result as guaranteeing its truth, (S. D. 347) the experience of life with its power to take root in the heart, (S. D. 343) even feeling, which previously he had banished both as an element in faith and as a test of its genuineness, in a

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last attempt to salvage that faith. (S. D. 352-3, 355) Newman's own last words as an Anglican give us perhaps the best guiding thread in the interpretation of his conception of faith when he speaks of himself in the epilogue of the Development of Christian Doctrine, as <u>using Reason in the things of Faith</u>. My whole claim in this connection is simply this: Newman's personal history reflects his conception of faith; more particularly, the inter-play of reason and faith, mirrors the struggle and confusion which was going on in his own life. Still, the personal influence does not account for everything; other elements must be considered and among these Newman's method enters as an important factor.

In the question of faith, Newman's method is experimental in character, that is, altogether inductive, proceeding from particulars to particulars. Moreover, this experiment is not only a fruit of deliberate, consistent effort but also in large measure, the outcome of accidental writings, strung out loosely over a long period of years. In the handling of his subject matter the Author had "no aid from Anglican and no knowledge of Catholic theologians." (U. S. Pref. IX-X) He starts not with a tentative definition of faith but with faith as a fact, existing in himself and in others. He apprehends that

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fact in all its complexity and sets it forth in its myriad aspects without, at times, explicitly distinguishing between faith itself and its motives, between the grounds of faith in the individual mind and the grounds of faith in the abstract. Such a procedure while lending itself to richness of description loses in scientific precision.

Moreover, to my mind, his presentation and more particularly, his justification of faith do not cover the entire fact impartially. He brings out the historical aspect with its ground in authority, both internal and external; he stresses beyond measure the practical aspect but neglects almost entirely the explicitly reasoned side. The explanation for this neglect is not difficult to find; it has its source in that general attitude, which has been treated in detail, of holding to the superiority of the moral over the intellectual gifts. (U. S. 53) Thus the "moral sense" becomes the final appeal in religious questions. This moral sense is not a feeling. (U. S. 59-60) It stands chiefly for conscience, (P. S. I, 216) sometimes, for a special gift which he calls the "light of innocence." (P. S. I, 221) Conscience we may trust without blame, he tells us, for it comes from God. Here one may well ask: on what ground does conscience come from

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God and reason not? Why is reason put on the level of the passions (P. S. V, 114) and not on the high plane of conscience? And again if reason is one of the two voices of God (P. S. II, 209) why may we not trust it equally, without blame?

These are some of the general criticisms which will necessarily modify our appreciation of Newman's conception of faith as presented thus far and prepare us for the development which is to follow. Before entering on this stage, however, it will be necessary to exhibit the specific proofs for the claims made in the opening section of the present chapter. These can be reduced to three heads: 1) Newman confounds the preliminary to faith known as "credibility", with faith properly so-called. 2) He frequently identifies faith and obedience, thus making faith primarily a practical principle. 3) He confuses faith with saving faith or righteousness, that which in the language of Catholic theology is called fides formata, faith "informed" by charity. Thereupon we will follow him in some of the distinctions by which he threads his way out of these confusions into a clear apprehension of faith as an intuitive act.

As early as 1830 we find in Newman's analysis of the

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faith process, that process namely, by which religious truth is attained, the elements which he considered essential to its integrity. Whilst minimizing the intellectual factors such as reason or talent in general, he insists on exertion, action, obedience, grace. (P. S. VIII, 192-3, 195, 198, 199, etc.) Faith is not, to his mind, only the simple acceptance of testimony, the assent of the mind to a truth with certainty, but a succession of acts proceeding from the mind, the heart, the will and even from grace. Men are left to gather the truths of faith such, for instance, as the divinity of Christ, as best they can for themselves, with whatever degree of certainty, from miracles, from prophecies, from preaching, by making trial of it in their own lives. (V. M. I, 87-88) Now such a conception evidently represents a confusion between faith and a simple preliminary for faith, the preliminary in this case being the evidence which makes a pronouncement more or less credible. Credibility varies in different persons and even in the same person according to the evidence; faith does not. And what Newman, at this time, calls "faith" could not be rated higher than mere opinion especially since he grounds it on probabilities. Newman is fully aware of such a charge hence he has

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recourse to love in order to give such faith stability (V. M. I, 86) and even draws in the help of supernatural elements to bolster up that process which he calls faith (U. S. 208) but which in reality is but a weak form of credibility; weak, that is, on its cognitive side. From these considerations it is also evident why Newman did not consider doubt as incompatible with "faith"; a state of doubt appeared to him no more inconsistent with "faith" than fear, despondency, dulness of mind or heaviness of spirit. (V. M. I, 87, 1837) In contrast with this we find in his later conception that faith consumes doubt utterly. (Mix. 183, 1849) In the interval between 1831 and 1849 Newman has not changed his viewpoint on doubt but he has made a clean-cut and final distinction between faith and credibility.

There is another preliminary to faith which is frequently identified by Newman with faith itself. This is a pre-disposition of mind (pietas fidei in Catholic theology) which trusts and ventures and risks, which stretches out after religious truth amid darkness and obscurity. It is this identification of faith with one of the predispositions for faith, that makes Newman so sympathetic with the faith of childhood, (P. S. I, 213) a temper of mind under which we believe and obey readily.

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(P. S. II, 66) It also accounts for much of his antagonism to reason as an element in the credibility process; for a venture, a risk, cannot proceed on an absolutely calculated process of reason; it is sometimes <u>against</u> reason; it <u>outstrips</u> reason, it attains what reason falls short of, it is a principle of action which lies beyond argument and so appears illogical. (U. S. 224) Thus he speaks in 1839. In 1872 this "pia affectio" or "bona voluntas," is clearly disjoined from faith itself and "does not stand in antagonism or in contrast to Reason, but it is a sovereign condition without which Reason cannot be brought to bear upon the great work in hand," that is, the preparation of the ground for the work of faith properly so-called. (D. A. 251, note of 1872)

In the second place I have put forward the claim that Newman confuses faith with obedience or with right conduct, under whatever name it may go. As such he makes of faith essentially a principle of practice. Now a principle which is directed toward action gives him the right to proceed on a minimum of evidence since practice does not allow time for finished reasoning and argument. For as we have seen he founds the reasonable character of "faith" on its being a principle of action, since in action it is rational to proceed on probabilities. (P. S. I, 192, 1829; II, 21, 22,

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1834) There is, for him, no distinction in fact between faith and obedience; they are "but one thing viewed differently." (P. S. III, 91, 1830) Faith and works are simultaneous in the soul; only conceptually can we speak of faith preceding works, for by itself faith is a practical principle. (P. S. II, 168, 1835) Thereafter, Newman appears to waver on this point. Works, or actions remain the test or criterion of faith but are not altogether adequate even as a criterion, for our works are paltry; there remains a domain in faith in which trust alone can venture. (P. S. IV, 127-8, 1836) Apparently under the stress of controversial pre-occupation he has recourse to action as the test of true faith, (V. M. I, 87, 1837) and as late as 1841, the pragmatic motive is stressed as hard as ever: faith, not knowledge or argument is our principle of action; life is for action; to act you must assume and that assumption is faith. (D. A. 295, 296) Still, the question here is rather one of human faith which can and does find its sufficient stay in the pragmatic principle. As for religious faith, Newman, already two years previously, has made it independent of its practical issues when he states flatly: faith is not a practical principle. (Jfc. 253, 1839)

There is a third error in Newman's earlier analysis

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of faith which serves to explain some of the confusing statements which bear on this subject. Almost throughout his entire Anglican life he identifies faith with conscientiousness, righteousness or holiness; he considers faith the same as saving faith, that which the Catholic theologian would call fides formata, the crown and perfection of faith. Faith is, then, for Newman, one and the same in substance with conscientiousness; "where there is faith, there is conscientiousness--where there is conscientiousness, there is faith; they may be distinguished from each other in words, but they are not divided in fact. They belong to one, and but one, habit of mind--dutifulness".... (P. S. VIII, 107, 1830) Faith thus becomes the tenure upon which the divine life is continued in the soul; (P. S. V, 195, 1838) falling into sin is a "reversing" of one's faith, in fact, we have no faith at all if we commit what Newman calls "greater sins." (P. S. V, 192, 1838) Yet, strange to say, in both of the passages just cited Newman inadvertently slips into the strictly Catholic doctrine when he says that a "faith which has not power over our hearts to keep us from transgressing, has not power with God to keep Him from punishing." And again, if a man sins, his faith "profits him nothing." But Newman's whole trend, evident especially throughout his Lectures on

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Justification, is toward a conception of faith, which is richer in its content than the abstract Catholic conception, but which because of its richness, adds elements which do not strictly belong to faith, (Jfc. 258-261) but represent the crown and completion of holiness. (P. S. V, 109, 1838) It is only among the last utterances of his Anglican life that Newman concedes the possibility of faith in sinners, hence, a faith separated from love. He meets an example of it recorded in the Scripture, how that "by faith, the harlot Rahab perished not with them that believed not." We almost feel the surprise with which that instance of a genuine faith disjoined from righteousness, seems to strike him and the apparent reluctance with which he accepts the fact. (S. D. 153, 1841) How completely he later embraced that view can be gathered from this unequivocal proposition: "faith does not imply love, obedience or works; that the firmest faith, so as to move mountains, may exist without love--that is, real faith, as really faith in the strict sense of the word as the faith of a martyr or a doctor." (Diff. I, 296)

c) Genesis and Progressive Development of Faith Considered as an Intuitive Act, Prior to 1845.

Newman's conception of faith as an intuitive act does

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not appear full-fledged in 1845, miraculously out of thin air, like a creation ex nihilo.

I have indicated in the preceding section the principal sources of confusion in Newman's analysis of faith as a discurisve act. By itself this conception need not necessarily result in a confused presentation; when considered as a simple preliminary to the real faith process, it represents a distinct stage in that process and can stand on its own ground. But when it is identified with faith in the strict sense, when it is modified at every step by elements belonging properly to the faith process itself, then we experience in Newman's presentation a sense of incompleteness and the feeling that he is introducing factors which are not warranted in a discursive act. And these factors exist in even his earliest published writings on the subject of faith; they become stronger and more numerous the further he penetrates into his subject. That the necessary distinctions which will clear up the sources of confusion are implicitly and explicitly contained in his writings, I will now proceed to show.

In his earlier treatment, Newman evidently paid more attention to the grounds of faith than to faith itself even though he had the distinction between the two clearly in mind. The influence to which this emphasis, as well as

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the distinction, can be traced, is most probably due to Dr. Charles Lloyd, Canon of Christ Church and Regius Professor of Divinity. In 1823-24, Newman assisted at Dr. Lloyd's lectures, and notes particularly that he (Dr. Lloyd) "employed his mind upon the grounds of Christian faith rather than on the faith itself; and in his estimate of the grounds he made light of the internal evidence for revealed religion in comparison with its external proofs." (Autobiographical Memoir, Corres. I, 98) On one point, Newman clearly veers away from Lloyd in his earlier treatment of faith; he emphasizes the internal evidence--faith as a response to conscience, love, duty. The object of faith receives relatively little treatment until he takes up the matter in the Grammar of Assent in 1870. (G. A. 99-100) But that he does not lose sight of the distinction is beyond question. Thus in 1834 he treats of faith as "a definite deposit" ...."conceived in set words," which "admits of being received, preserved and transmitted," not a matter of opinion, deduction or private judgment. (P. S. II, 255)

What is even more significant, Newman, whilst emphasizing the grounds of faith, implicitly distinguishes between the evidence as a reasoning process on probable evidence and faith in the strict sense of a simple acceptance of God's word. Thus he says: "Faith, then, does not

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speaking in the way of reason, that we ought to have faith according to the evidence; that the more evidence there is, the more firm it should be; and the less evidence, the weaker will it be required of us. But this is not the case as regards religious faith,--which accepts the Word of God as firmly on the evidence which it is vouchsafed, as if that evidence were doubled." (P. S. VI, 259, 1840) The same distinction comes out clearly already in 1829 when Newman claims that it is not the evidence in the faith process which is adversely criticized by those hostile to religion, but the "believing" itself which implies a profession of dependence that some men scorn; (P. S. I, 198) and by the "believing" he expressly means the acceptance of testimony in the absence of experience, sight or reason. (P. S. I, 190-194, 1829) Evidence and faith likewise have different functions and are therefore distinct processes. (P. S. II, 183, 187-88, 1834) It is to be expected that, in his last work as an Anglican, Newman would bring out the same distinction more in detail. He even distinguishes in the credibility itself, between the ground of such credibility for the individual, which may be a merely human faith or a process of probable reasoning, and the ground of credibility considered in the abstract, which is reason. Faith properly so-called is independent not only of such processes but

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even independent of the assistance of the Scriptures. (Dev. 327, 329) The distinction between credibility and faith is, therefore, Newman's first step in lifting faith above the preliminary evidence.

The second step toward investing faith with a character independent of preliminary evidence, at least in the individual, consists in the distinction between faith and obedience. This represents a much later development in Newman's opinions. We have seen how, for a long time, he completely identified the two. (P. S. III, 81, 1830) In 1835 he still expressly rejected the view that faith carried its own evidence, remarking at the same time that "some Christians" have recourse to it, (P. S. II, 153) but that it is a "notion" which is seldom openly maintained." (P. S. II, 157) And he rejects that opinion on the ground that true faith has its necessary test and guarantee in obedience. In the following year, 1836, his mind appears to waver, and thereafter, for a time, to hang in suspense though with trustful resignation. Clearly, <u>feeling</u> is no adequate test for the truth of what faith proposes to us. How then is it to be ascertained? By works, perhaps? Then comes the reason for the faltering--"who will maintain that his works can be such as to bring home to him an undoubting assurance, that he has a faith able to do this great thing (P. S. IV, 157, 1836) Still he is not

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yet ready to accept the "notion" that religious faith is its own evidence; he knows there are "some Christians" who hold to that view, but as for himself, he can still stave it off by girding himself with trust in God and rest in "a waiting and persevering temper," which must rise to the heroic height of the Psalmist when he proclaims: "though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." (P. S. IV, 128)

In the interval between 1836 and 1839 Newman must have made a clear separation in his own mind between faith and practice. For in his lectures on Justification we find him taking an unequivocal stand on that subject, and pronouncing without qualification that "faith, as such, is not a practical principle--it does not directly cause action, in fact action may in particular instances depend on circumstances on which faith also depends." (Jfc. 253) By 1841 the pragmatic test for religious faith has become for Newman a principle applicable to persons or groups of persons, not to doctrines, which are to be received on faith. (S. D. 1841) From this it is evident that the pragmatic principle has been expelled from religious faith in the strict sense; it remains still as one of the three great roots of credibility, hence, also as the sufficient justification for human faith and for the ordinary processes of human life in general. This appears from the

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citation I have given from Discussions and Arguments of 1841 and which is approved and re-adopted by Newman himself when he incorporates that passage together with others of the same tenor in his Grammar of Assent. (p. 92 ff.) In his Catholic life, faith, for Newman, is essentially illuminative, not operative; it can and does most often remain even when sanctifying grace departs. (Diff. I, 273, 286) And thus he has taken the second step in establishing faith as a process of mind, sole and elementary in itself, independent not only of its grounds but also of its practical issues.

The third step in this development is attained through the distinction between faith and other graces, particularly love, in the sense of the theological virtue. That Newman recognized the distinction between the various graces is evident but he does not attempt, at first, to trace either their connection or to determine in how far one can be separated from another in fact. He does not sufficiently isolate elements in order to analyze their individual natures. They all depend on one root, <u>faith</u>; (P. S. III, 360, 1835) and because of their common source and intimate connection, justification may be attributed, to faith only, to self-abasement, to works. But when Newman began to write <u>ex professo</u> on the subject of

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justification, he found himself under the necessity of isolating elements in fact, and making distinction, in his mind, in order to understand the nature and the meaning of those ideas which, up till then, he had envisaged as existing intermingled and interwoven in his own soul and in the souls of others. In his earlier constructive theological treatise of 1837, The Via Media, religious, supernatural faith apparently was still, in his mind, identical with "saving faith," that is, faith animated by love. Even here, however, faith is independent of the measure of evidence which precedes it; in fact there is no abstract measure of what is sufficient in the way of preliminary evidence; "faith cannot believe more than it is told. It is saving, if it believes as much as that, be it little or great." (V. M. I, 287, 1837) We have, then, the clear indication of that quality which comes up more and more frequently as distinctive of faith, an unconditional acceptance of testimony; but such a faith, Newman still holds, is the same as saving faith. In his Lectures on Justification he recognizes the distinction between faith and love which is the same as the distinction between faith and righteousness. (Jfc. 143-44) He analyzes, more in detail and with greater scientific accuracy, the various meanings

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which must be considered in faith; trust, obedience, conscience, unconditional assent. (Jfc. 120) The last-named again appears as essentially constitutive of faith, the others having been rejected previously. But such faith must somehow remain justifying, for at this time Newman is evidently championing the tenet of the Anglican formularies and divines, that faith is the sole means of justification. (Jfc. 224-27, and 236-7) Hence, while recognizing in the abstract the distinction between faith and justification (Jfc. 139) he maintains correctly, that only a justifying faith can avail unto salvation; his separation from the Roman doctrine is therefore simply nominal. The Roman divines taught that faith with love justified; Newman held that faith alone justified but it had to be a saving faith. The point that I would stress in this connection is Newman's acceptance, at least in the abstract, of the distinction between faith (which is genuine in all respects) and saving faith or righteousness; this was in 1939. Moreover, if there is a somewhat mystical element in his conception of righteousness, there is no such factor in his conception of faith; this has become primarily a simple assent of the mind to a truth, on testimony. All the distinctions noted thus far converge toward that one point and leave that element perfectly intact. In its

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nature, faith thus becomes intuitive, not discursive, illuminative, not operative, and bears its own testimony because divinely enlightened, hence supernatural.

Having thus traced the gradual separation of faith from its preliminaries, from obedience and from love, there remains for us to seek in Newman the origin and development of that element, or combination of elements, in faith on which he grounds its character as an intuitive act. The development traced thus far has been for the most part a negative process, a clearing of the ground for a new conception of faith. That positive elements also existed during Newman's Anglican career, elements which gradually come to the fore, amid resistance and struggle, will appear from the following pages.

Both grace and nature are represented in the conception of faith such as it develops in Newman's writings. Under its supernatural aspect it appears as "greatness of mind" which makes us act above the world, and which results from "a clear apprehension of things unseen." (P. S. III, 1, 1829) It is, therefore, direct, intellectual, and intuitive. And though its character is <u>beyond</u> the natural, it does not represent a break or a twist in man's mind but rather a continuation and extension of the

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natural order, an illumination of what before was but dimly descried by the light of conscience, giving us the completion and perfection of those truths which natural religion only suggested and promised. (P. S. VIII, 201-2,1830) Newman, therefore, clearly recognizes the supernatural character of faith though he appears at a loss to point out precisely the exact nature of the element which makes it supernatural. The Holy Spirit himself is the "Guide of faith," and conveys the truths of faith into the heart of the individual Christian; the soil in which it takes root, is the "trusting, adoring, resigned temper, which children ought to feel." (P. S. II, 218, 228, 225, 1834) Still, the manner in which a man believes is "altogether a mystery" but Newman expressly rejects any professedly natural explanation as the ultimate cause of faith. (P. S. II, 323-4, 1835) As a supernatural principle it is evidently "a discovery of the Gospel"; (U. S. 179, 1839) and the mind which possesses it, is "divinely enlightened" (U. S. 208, 1839) and requires no natural endowment in the sphere of religion, "supernatural grace doing for the uncultivated reason," what genius does for the naturally endowed mind.

Under its merely natural aspect, such faith appears as the simple acceptance of testimony and that before

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proof; evidence "comes after faith as its reward better than before it as its groundwork." (P. S. VI, 340, 341, 1837) Newman always implies that simple assent of the mind to a truth revealed in Scripture, far from being superstitious, is highly acceptable to God; (P. S. VI, 329, 1837) it is of the utmost importance to have faith, even if in so doing we run the chance of its being accompanied by superstition. (V. M. I, Pref. LXVIII-LXVX) Because faith is a simple assent of the mind, its act is "sole and elementary, and complete in itself, and depends on no process of mind previous to it";...(U. S. 202, 1839) like conscience, it is a simple element in our nature, a principle, original and independent. (U. S. 183, 1839) As being an assent, it exists wholly and undivided, not by halves or degrees; faith accepts the Word of God entirely; unbelief rejects it, or rather, quibbles with the evidence. (P. S. VI, 259, 260, 1840) On the basis of such a conception of faith it is clear why Newman resents having it nicknamed a mere opinion; (D. A. 278, 1841) but in doing that, he makes it more than an assent on probable grounds; and since its light is not in the evidence, he implicitly commits himself to the theory that it bears its own light within itself and is its own evidence.

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FAITH AS AN INTUITIVE ACT

Newman easily accepts the supernatural character of faith; he does not readily, with full consciousness of its implications concede that it is a principle sui generis which is a light unto itself. In a sermon of 1835 in which he stresses the intellectual character of faith, as "a manifestation addressed to the eyes of our mind," a principle by which we recognize objects directly as does the eye of the body, "a spiritual sight," (P. S. II, 151-2, 1835) he yet explicity rejects the conclusion that faith carries with it its own evidence ! (Ibid. 153, 157, 159) The conviction accompanying such a faith is a "notion," an "enthusiasm"; (U. S. 181, 1839) and even if it exists, is no guarantee of the genuineness of a faith; in 1835 the test and the guarantee for faith is still, for Newman, in obedience. (P. S. II, 153) When opposition from this quarter ceases, a new counter influence arises. Faith, considered as "an assent of the mind to God's word," is the view of the "Romanists"; (Jfc. 258, 1838) and Newman's tendency to nominalism in philosophy, almost as much as his Anglicanism in religion, stands in the way of such an abstract view; (Jfc. 255, 258) hence he resists it with all his might even whilst admitting that faith "realizes the unseen and future on God's word." (Jfc. 255) At this

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period, therefore, Newman not only comes close to a distinctively Catholic conception of faith; he takes the Catholic conception and adds to it; or we may say he refuses to stop at the Catholic conception in the abstract. His bent of mind, inclining him toward the psychological, individual and concrete order, causes him to penetrate beyond the abstract conception of faith, to faith as a supernatural virtue existing in an individual; and since this view harmonizes with the teaching of the Anglican formularies and divines, he rests content--for a time. (Jfc. 258, 261) During the years 1837-1839 there are evidences of vacillation and obscurity in Newman's utterances on faith. "As a principle of knowledge faith cannot be exactly analyzed or made intelligible to men," he says. (Jfc. 269) We are, therefore, ignorant of its real nature and can know it only in its results; it lives only in deeds, not in passive impressions. (Jfc. 293-96) It remains a supernatural principle, but in its own nature it is <u>colorless</u>, much like a transparent medium through which the soul sees the objects of the invisible world; but this medium cannot contemplate itself save by and in some other virtue. Thus, faith is like air or water, a medium between sight and the object of sight; it is not as yet

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the light itself. (Jfc. 336, 337) On the other hand, from what Newman says at the same period in his sermons, we commonly conclude that faith is intuitive and illuminative. It alone can apprehend any manifestation of Christ's words or deeds and in its light (even though that light be but a reflected radiance) we see the objects of the invisible world of spiritual realities. (P. S. VI, 107, 117, 1837; 121-22, 1838) Again he speaks of faith as a realizing of things unseen, a spiritual sight which stands opposed to physical sight but which acts directly and immediately as does vision, making present, things unseen. (P. S. V, 77, 1838) On the manner of this direct intuition Newman becomes somewhat obscure. It appears to be knowledge which functions in the absence of sight; this is illustrated by the relation existing between Christ and his Apostles during the forty days after his Resurrection. Through faith He was known to be present, not seen. (P. S. VI, 131, 132, 1838) By 1840, the act of faith has become for Newman the most elementary of all religious acts; it is "the simple lifting of the mind to the Unseen God without conscious reasoning or formal argument." (U. S. 253, 1840) The mind can reflect back upon its faith, investigating its grounds or its object, but in itself

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the act of faith, is direct, immediate, without formal antecedents;it is the light which gives color and outline to a new world of realities.

Toward the end of 1841 we find Newman, for a brief space, seeking to justify faith on grounds distinct from the faith itself; in fact there is a temporary reversion to everything which he had previously rejected. He falls back on experience, (S. D. 343) on its practical character, (S. D. 345-6) even on feeling and its inward effects. (S. D. 347-8, 347) The reason for these last desperate resorts is not hard to find. He is losing the external support of his faith, that support which should, at the same time, be the object of his faith. "What want we then," he says, "but faith in our Church? With faith we can do everything; without faith we can do nothing. If we have a secret misgiving about her, all is lost; we lose our nerve, our powers, our position, our hope." (S. D. 380) In other words, Newman is in a state of doubt at this time. He knows what real faith is; he has such a faith, with God as its object; but that faith does not square with the faith with which he believes in the Church; the two are of different textures and will not mingle. He must either relinquish his conception of faith

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or relinquish his Church. History tells us of the issue of that struggle. And so in 1845 faith, independently of what its object or grounds may be, has become for him "the absolute acceptance of the divine Word with an internal assent, in opposition to the informations, if such, of sight and reason," (Dev. 325) To my mind, that issue was already foreshadowed in 1838 when, in discussing the difficulties involve in Latitudinarianism, he says: "If then we will not content ourselves with merely probable, or (what we may be disposed to call) insufficient proofs in matters of faith and worship, we must become either utter Latitudinarians or Roman Catholics. If we will not submit to the notion of the doctrines of the Gospel being hidden under the text of Scripture from the view of the chance reader, we must submit to believe either that there are no doctrines at all in Christianity, or that the doctrines are not in Scripture, but elsewhere, as in Tradition. I know no other alternative." (D. A. 127, 1838) The question as to whether Newman changed his creed because he changed his conception of faith, or contrariwise, that he changed his conception of faith to harmonize with his new creed, is not essential to the present study; nor does it affect the substance of my conclusions on Newman's

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conception of faith. These conclusions rest not on what others have said or may say in their interpretations of the man and his work, but on what he himself has said and written. To my mind the development in his conception of faith represents an independent process; and such a character he also appears to claim for it. Thus he says: "In my University Sermons there is a series of discussions upon the subject of Faith and Reason; these again were the tentative commencement of a grave and necessary work, viz. an inquiry into the ultimate basis of religious faith, prior to the distinction into Creeds." (Apo. 73, italics mine)

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