IS THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE COMPATABLE WITH SERIOUS RELIGOUS FAITH ?

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I. Introduction

There exists a feeling among thinkers and among the masses that tra itional monotheistic religion with its ritualistic practices and liturgical forms does not fit into modern life. There are orthodox pious people attached to the essential truths of such religion who do not believe in detail any traditional system of theology. "It is plain to keen observers that in these latter days both within and without what might be called the pale of Calvinism there is a certain relaxing of confidence in the previously accepted solutions of some of the gravest theological problems. This appears among many whose attachment to the core of the essential truths formulated in the past does not wane, whose substantial orthodoxy, as well as piety, is not of ten, if it be at all questioned, and who have no sympathy with agnosticism in the technical sense of the word." (Professor Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, p. 551.)

There is also a feeling among special students of philosophy that the real cause of this change of mind has not been found and that no one has yet constructed a sane theology and ritual in accord with modern life. Logicians are agreed that the reason for this change of attitude ought to be discovered and that a modern theology and ritual must be constructed if the church is to be a controlling force in future civilization.

The present investigation was undertaken for the purpose of discovering the reason of the change and testing it by a sound methodology of religious experience.

There is much fear and anxiety; but such changes were bound to come (1) as a result of scientific discoveries and (2) as a result of the industrial revolution, for these have produced a new world and a new world mind to which the consciousness of God is always relative. We are living in an age marked by the greatest intellectual readjustments history

records, and the consciousness of God is so correlative to the consciousness of the world that it has become the task of men to labor patiently for the clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit in a new world-mind, and to work for the transformation of all practical instrumentalities of religious education until they are in harmony with it.

When Socrates lived he compared the people of his day inhabiting the lands about the Aegean to ants and frogs about a marshy pond. They thought the land about the Aegean was the whole world. Today the thought of the world is as comprehensive as the great globe itself, and it bids us think of the life of God in world terms. The historic disappearance of old faiths warn us against attempting to go back and find the whole of truth in earlier creeds: they teach us to respect new expressions of faith because it is in them, or through them, that we are to find the faith of our day and generation. He who maintains that all is known concerning the world and God that the human mind is capable of knowing, and he who maintains that the world is directly perceived or immediately know, are intellectual Pharisees, who do not merit the compliment of labored refutation.

As a result of the industrial revolution, the masses have quit speaking of some long past era as the Golden Age. For men of the streets the Golden Age is yet to come, and this is a highly significant fact. In the past, they feel, the practice of law and order was based on a system antidating the industrial revolution, a system that has been much on the side of those in possession; so that men who are out feel that they can get in only through a disruption of order. When the German peasants in 1525 betrayed and murdered their aristocratic enemies, who scorned to keep faith with the conaille and used violence in return, Luther lost all his former sympathy with the fair demands of the poor and called for

order at any price. He said the peasants had forfeited all rights, and summoned the forces of law and order to kill them. The princes and barons he said, were not only protecting their own interests, but serving God, in slaughtering a hundred thousand, in devastating entire districts, and in retarding the emancipation of a great and worthy class by centuries. Similarly, during a Brooklyn street car strike in 1895, a minister of that city sounded the attitude of Luther toward all disturbers of order when he said: "If clubs will not do, then bayonets; if bayonets will not do, then lead; if bullets will not do, then Gatling guns". The Golden Age for the man of the streets, consequently, is an age in which the interests of the working class will equal capitalists not only in courts of law but also in the hearts of the world. It is an age of greater, more genuine freedom for all, and especially for the class that now experiences the bitter consciousness that they have no freedom that greatly matters, an age of constitutional democracy in the world of industrial relations as well as in the political world, an age of genuine democracy in the great world of spiritual values. Modern science to which the industrial revolution is chiefly due is indirectly the cause of the emancipation of slave and serf, but its expansion and promulgation have resulted in a new kind of social stratification and oppression owing to the fact that science itself has always been the special privilege of a class, namely of the class who can afford it. The man of the streets dreams of an age of more abundant life.

New confidence in the future of mankind finds more or less cataclysmic utterance from time to time in the disturbances of law and order that have become the bane of existence to modern life: it rests historically on the revelations of science as these have found expression in more contageous forms of communication. It is these revelations that justify the term, a new world mind. The chief obstacles to human progress

have been ignorance and the selfish short-sightedness that always accompanies ignorance. Because of ignorance, men are victims of fear, superstition and want: because of their selfishness they are victims of one another in war, oppression and slavery. Growth in knowledge, especially im knowledge of the laws of human commmnity life, is the great hope of the future.

II. Growth in Knowledge

The new knowledge has come to be called science instead of philosophy. Its method differs from the older method of philosophy, if at all, only in the care with which it assembles and analizes the facts of the sitaation under investigation before venturing to make general assertions concerning it. Perhaps, however, the most striking difference between science and the older philosophy lies in the extent of its diffusion throughout society and its wholesale application to the practical problems of community life. Modern industry is describable as one vast system of applied science that has enormously increased the wealth of the world and at the same time the capacities of men to enjoy it. The fact that the wealth of the world at this present moment is largely at a stand-still is traceable to the fact that the development of modern science has been one sided, to the fact that man's enormously increased power over the forces of the material world has not been accompanied by an equal extension of his control over the human spirit. The great task of the future presents itself in this form, to apply to the nature of man and the processes of community life the same searching investigation that has proven so effective in natural philosophy.

Until scientific method was ap plied, the schooling of the human race was and is the schooling of experience, a hard teacher whose method consists not in a word and a blow, but a blow without warning or explanation. The tuition paid in that school in suffering and

is enormously expensive. In the course of a half million years such schooling yeilded much information that is more or less incomplete, inexact and unsystematic, but such as it is, it became the common possession of the race: it does not amount to a science of life or a knowledge of the art of living. These must wait for the development of a knowledge of human nature and community life that is only now in its beginning stages. And yet, the growth of s cientific knowledge in the XIX century was so great and so abrupt that we may call it a cataclysm, in the intellectual life of the race. "In their mental habits, in their methods of inquiry and in the data at their command, the men of the present day who have fully kept pace with the scientific movement are separated from the men whose education ended in 1830 by an immeasurably wider gulf than has ever before divided one progressive generation of men from their predecessors". (John Fiske)

The discoveries, inventions and practical applications of science of the XIX century both outweigh and outnumber all that had prededed them in the past. At the beginning of the XIX century there were no individual sciences of physical astronomy, physical geography, botany, geology, chemistry, thermo-dynamics, light, electricity, paleontology, biology, morphology, neurology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, non-Euclidean geometry and bacteriology; and these sciences embody most of the knowledge we have today. When we realize that the greater and the more important part of all of the world's knowledge is not more than 100 years old, we reasonably expect that new religious ideas will appear to meet the situation thus created. "The scientific order remains forever a triumph. Each moment of future experience is an opportunity of applying our interpretations anew and anew realizing their worth". Professor Tufts writes that "We cannot test our truth by the experience of the child or the savage. We have moved on and

found new evidence in the life of the Spirit. If the humanity of a later time is to have a larger vision, a larger and richer revelation, it must test this by its own higher life". Much that the future will unfold will doubtless be as far ahead of us as the latest conceptions of science are beyond Lord Bacon's Novum Organum. Each fresh advance made yields a vantage ground for the next, and the conditions that favor scientific investigation are increasing by leaps and bounds. Instruments and methods are continually perfected, increasing sums of money taken out of the vast and increasing wealth of society are being devoted to scientific investigation, and the disposition to be scientific becomes ever more wide-spread. In the words of James, "The aspiration to be scientific is such an idol of the tribe of the present generation , is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive a creature who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided subjective interest which it is".

Professor Hale of the Lick Observatory on Mount Wilson has become a Columbus of the heavens. His first test plate revealed 16000 new worlds, the second, 60000 more, some of them ten times larger than the sun, and he is preparing a lens that will have three times the power of the strongest lens heretofore made. What shall we expect of the twentieth century in view of the fact that 10000 men of great abilities are carrying on original scientific researches.

We can readily see the miracles of change wrought by applied science in communication, transportation, manufacture, indeed in all the materials of civilization inthe past century, but some do not appreciatethe fact that the discoverers of science have wrought changes of much more importance to civilization in man himself. Science has been emancipating man from the tyranny of external cir-

cumstance: it has enormously increased man's control over the forces of nature. But it has also been at work emancipating man from the tyranny of custom and authority. It is more true today than it was in the sixteenth century that opinions are accepted on the evidence of their truth and workableness. We live in an age of the freedom of the mind to investigate. Speaking of this, Dewey affirms, "The recognition that natural energy can be systematically applied through experimental observation to the satisfaction and multiplication of concrete wants--that is doubtless the greatest single discovery ever imported into the life of man, save perhaps the discovery of language. Science has made the control of natural forces for the aims of life so inevitable that for the first time man is relieved from overhanging fear, with wolf-like scramble to possess and accumulate, and is freed to consider the more gracious question of securing to all an ample and liberal life", (The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays p. 58), Moreover, writes H. G. Wells, "When the intellectual history of this time comes to be written, nothing, I think, will stand out more strikingly than the empty gulf in quality between the superb and richly fruitful scientific investigations that are going on, and the general thought of other educated sections of the community. I do not mean that scientific men are, as a whole, a class of supermen, dealing with and thinking about everything in a way altogether better than the common run of humanity, but in their field they think and work with an intensity an integrity, a breadth, boldness, patience, thoroughness, and faithfulness--excepting only a few artists-- which puts their work out of all comparison with any other human activity.....In these particular directions the human mind has achieved a new and higher quality of attitude and gesture, a veracity, a self-detachment, and self-abnegating vigor of criticism that tend to spread out and must ultimately spread out to every

other human affair." This new and refreshing quality of scientific conversations is part and parcel of the technique of scientific work. In so far as human life is engaged in scientific work, it is marked by simplicity, a straightforwardness and an effectiveness that it has not possessed at any other time on so large a scale. Something like it existed in esoteric communities in the past; today it is rapidly becoming the sale of the earth.

On the other hand, it must be confessed that the increasing knowledg of nature and the noble technique of conversations in the field of natura science are not equal today, or even approximated in the field of man's knowledge of man. The knowledge of the springs of his conduct, of his relations to his fellow men singly or in groups, and the happy regulatior of human intercourse in the interest of harmony and justice, have made nc such advance as the knowledge of nature's forces. Undoubtedly, the most important problem before the scientific intelligence of the world today is the problem of human relationships, of individuals in their communitie of communities in the state, and of states in the world at large. The Church which has mothered the scientific movement in the past, until it has developed an organization and technique of its own, may well take seriously the task of organizing and motivating the study of man by man in the interests of more wholesome and liberal intercourse.

III. Application of Knowledge.

This new knowledge has given humanity a new view point. Old things intellectual have passed away and all things become new. Chemistry has revolutionized out conceptions of matter. Greek philosophers sought some type or principle of being from which all forms of existence has derived. Thales believed this principle to be water: Anaximander said, "the indefinite": Anaximines, air. For Heraclitus it was a kind of etherial

water: Aristotle asserted these four and an ether belonging to the stars and the heavenly bodies generally. The international atomic weights for 1910 show eighty three elements, while actinium, coronium, and holmium have been announced and their properties are being determined. With these discoveries in chemistry have come new conceptions of disease in both the plant and the animal kingdoms. Geology has changed our conceptions of the age of the earth, of its fitness for the abode of man, and of the uses man has made of the world. The oldest date for the beginning of the earth in the authorized version of the Bible is 4004 B. C. By taking into consideration the processes of erosion and sedimentation, geology proves that the age of the world exceeds this figure by a period of time inconceivably vast. If the time from the beginning of the Cambrian era includes 48,000,000 years, which most geologists would pronounce too low an estimate, the Paleozoic period would comprise 36,000,000 years, the Mesozoic, 9,000,000 years, and the Cenozoic 3,000,000, since the estimated ratios of the Paleozoic, the Mesozoic and the Cenozoic are 12: 3: 1. Neither the geologic nor the physical modes of calculation can yield certain results in the present state of knowledge: yet it can be considered probable that geological time from the beginning of the Cambrian era is measured by tens of millions, rather than millions, of years.

Conceptions of the development of life and the creation of man have been revolutionized by the science of biology which has given the world the theory of the cell with its great light on the origin, the development, the structures and the functions of organisms. With Darwin, Wallace and their confreres has come a nobler conception of the dignity and worth of the human body based on its incalculable cost. Creation by evolution seems more wonderful than creation by direct manufacture.

The science of physics has discovered electricity and its laws, thus laying the foundation for inventions relieving man of drudgery and solving the problem of human isoclation. People have become world-neighbors through rapid transit and rapid communication. The lever and the inclined plane, known to the ancients at the dawn of history, have come into new and multiplied uses through the application to them of the forces of steam, electricity, and air. The comparative study of languages, customs, religions, laws, and institutions has revealed, or rather is revealing man to himself and opening the way to more rational organization of the associated life of mankind. History, as a consequence is being rewritten from a new viewpoint. History is the study of how man came to be as he is and to believe as he does: the heart and nerve of it being the history of philosophy. History is philosophy, when the former is well told, for history is explanation of a scientific type, explanation that can be made the basis of advance into the future. We are only just now coming to see that an historic consciousness is the first prerequisite of effective participation in the life of the human community.

Observe, again, the revolutionary change in ethics. There was a greater ethical advance during the 19th century than during the entire Christian era preceding. This included not only the development of ethical principles, and the extension of the field of applied ethics, but also a profoundly significant change in emphasis. After the Renaissance, the moral emphasis was increasingly individualistic with the insistence on rights. Now the emphasis is increasingly upon duties. This means that ethics has been revitalized, that there is a new ethics for the new world mind.

Along with the new principle of historic interpretation has developed a new knowledge of the times in which the Hebrew and Christian

Scriptures were penned. This means a new light upon their meaning, and with that new light comes a new meaning, and a new interpretation of Christianity. Our conception of the Creator and His relation has changed on account of the new knowledge of creation. Before the birth of this new knowledge men conceived God as the Great First Cause, operating upon matter from without, as we mortals do. The Carpenter theory of creation, and the legalistic theory of God's relations to His creatures have been and are being altered. We have too long insisted on making God in our own likeness, a magnified ghost of our own ego. God is too vast for our limited imagination, too rich for our abstract thought. His is the creative genius of the ages - the genius of an infinite cosmos. But if we are true to our noblest insight, if we strive creatively for larger unity of humanity, we shall in a measure live Him and thereby even though darkly understand Him. "Live in me, create in me", says the larger life. "I am the vine, ye are the branches. Without me, ye can do nothing". Co-operate in free and loyal creativeness for the whole, and the universe is yours.

Humanity is drifting toward this conception. God is immanent in the universe, yet distinct from the universe. God is the infinite and eternal energy from which all things originate. God now reveals Himself to humanity through the operation of natural laws. These are the expressions of His will. He does not reveal Himself by suspending natural laws or by the infraction of them. Humanity looks upon God's relations as vital rather than legal.

The changes that have taken place in ethics, theology, and all abstract sciences, are changes in man himself. For knowing always alters reality, so far at least as one part of the transaction is concerned. Knowing always alters the knower; and as the knower is a part of reality, reality is really altered.

With such radical changes in the new world mind concerning God and the universe, it is only natural that humanity is coming into possession of a new conception of human life, its meaning, and its possibilities.

This new knowledge has also placed a new emphasis on the future. A rudimentary knowledge of natural science demonstrates that this world is not a finished product; but rather a world in process of becoming. Nothing that we observe bears the stamp of finality. Nature is fundamentally radically progressive.

Since eugenics is the study of the agencies under social control, that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally, the results that have been achieved in breeding plants and animals assure us of improving the human race by observing the same vital laws, for the fundamental processes of heredity are the same in all organisms. In the near future we may expect to have the science of being well born.

Science is not only making us familiar with the laws of heredity but also with the influence of environment. New knowledge of the laws of life, individual and social, and the influence of environment, gives us all the necessary materials for the true art of living. Applied sciences and wealth give us control over environment, and now we shall be able by transforming the conditions of life to transform life. For example, preventive medicine, aseptic, and antiseptic surgery promise much. With these new discoveries, plagues and epidemics, with their attendant evils are being gradually banished from humanity. As we become more civilized and christianized, we do not erect monuments to those who have been the destroyers of life. We erect them to such men as Pasteur, the saviours of life.

In answering the question "Is life worth living?" William James

said "it depends upon the liver". The new science is making life worth living by increasing the stock of vitality. I am come that they might have life and that they might have it more abundantly. When men live more abundantly, many ills, both real and imaginary disappear. And it is just this little surplus of vitality through the science of right living that calls forth this abundant life. The new knowledge has created a new civilization; given the world a new outlook, and revealed undreamed of possibilities. It is revealing the laws of life more and more both of the individual and the social body. Mankind are coming to the thought that society is guided - if we may still use the word - not by king or class, but by the infinite action and reaction of all its members. A society of the new world mind, whether local, national, or world wide, will be a society that lives in harmony with the laws of its own being. And in the doing of this such a society actualized its highest possibilities. "A sphere of law," says King, "is the only possible sphere for a progressive being, and it is precisely his progressiveness - his capacity of indefinite growth - that mainly distinguishes man intellectually from the lower animals; and with man all ideal interests come in. Every ideal point of view, then, is concerned to insist upon a sphere of law. It is further to be noticed that freedom and law are not set over against each other in the way often supposed; but rather that a sphere of law is necessary to give significance to freedom itself, the condition of character; for choices look to ends, and there can be no accomplishment of end without law." (Reconstruction In Theology, King, pp. 58-59.). The new knowledge of law is what we take for the pragmatic criterion of truth. Its implications point to the purposive character of all scientific thought. Let us turn to the pragmatic theory

IV. The Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge.

The pragmatic-theory of truth "represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it in a more radical and a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely at once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophies. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, toward facts, towards actions and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth". (Pragmatism, William James, p. 51.)

James holds that this theory mediates between two opposing views which he terms the "tender minded" and the "tough minded". He holds the "tender minded" to be"rationalistic, intellectualistic, idealistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, dogmatical," and the "tough minded" he holds to be "empiricist, sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, sceptical". (Pragmatism, William James, p. 12.)

William James tries to satisfy both of the demands of the above views. For an empirical philosophy is not religious enough, and a religious philosophy is not empirical enough. Pragmatism can remain religious like the rationalisms, and at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts. And it is a philosophy that does not merely exercise your powers of intellectual abstraction. It makes positive connections with the actual world of finite lives, which should be desired in all philosophy. We must have

a system of philosophy that will combine scientific loyalty to facts, and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation and accommodation, the old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or of the romantic type. And this is then your dilemma: they are wholly separated. You find empericism inhuman and irreligious; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts, joys and sorrows.

Temperamentalities with their cravings and refusals do determine men in their philosophies and always will. "In the last resort, I repeat, it will be by them that all our philosophies shall untimately be judged. The finally victorious way of locking at things will be the most completely impressive way to the normal run of minds". (Pragmatism, William James, p.38.)

"The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?- fated or free?- material or spiritual?- here are notions which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences". (Pragmatism, William James, p. 45.)

If no practical differences differentiate between notions; then the alternatives mean practically the same thing and all disputes are idle. But when a dispute is serious the pragmatist holds that we ought to be able to show that some practical difference will follow from one side or the other's being right. And in order to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve-- what sensations we may expect from it, and what reactions we must

prepare. And our conceptions of these effects, whether near or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, in so far as the conception has positive significance at all.

The terms God, the Absolute, Matter, Reason, and Energy are solving names in Metaphysics, but in pragmatism you must give each word an important value as it works within your experience.

It becomes less a solution than a program for more work. It grafts itself on previous truth, just as idiom grafts itself on previous idiom, and law on previous law. Given previous laws the judge twists them into fresh laws in courts of equity.

Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest. Pragmatism limbers up our theories and sets each one to work. And being nothing essentially new, pragmatism harmonizes with many ancient theories, or philosophical tendencies.

The pragmatic method is the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, "Categories", supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.

So far we have been considering pragmatism as a method, and fundamentally it remains a method to the end. The pragmatic theory of truth is its central doctrine and for this reason it should be considered at some length. It is expressed in various ways, some of which I shall give from the leader of the pragmatic movement. He holds that ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. And again he says that "truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of beliefs, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons". (Pragmatism, William James, p. 75.)

Therefore, any idea that will carry us prosperously from one part of our experience to another part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. And if our theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are good, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged. The True is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good for definite assignable results, or reasons.

If there is any idea that would help us to lead a better life, if believed in, then it would really be better for us to believe it unless it clashed with other greater total benefits to the human race. And should it clash with greater total benefits, it should not be believed. New contents of immediate experience are not themselves true, they simply some and are. Truth is what we say about them, and when we say that they have come truth is justified. An idea is true if it works: a belief is true if it works, etc: and from this doctrine we arrive at the conclusion that the belief in a God is true, - laying the stress on belief and not on God, - if it works for good, the betterment of humanity. Therefore, since it works; it is true, that the belief in a God is true. This brings us to the metaphysical problems with which pragmatism is bound up. Berkeley says that matter is known as our sensations of color, figure, hardness and the like: they are the cash-value of the term matter. The difference matter makes to us by truly being is that we then get such sensations; by not being, is that we lack them. These sensations then are its sole meaning. But Berkeley does not deny matter, he simply tells us in what it consists. It is a true name for just so much in the way of our sensations. So there

is no ground for dispute here, as no practical differences exist between the notion of Berkeley and the pragmatists.

If pragmatism be true, it is sound that theories under fire must have some practical values. A world with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we still think of him as mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that where He is the tragedy is only provisional and partial, the shipwreck dissolution not the absolutely final thing. There is another order, the eternal moral order, which is the deepest need of our breast.

And in the adjustments of our concrete attitudes of hope and expectation, and all the delicate consequences which their differences entail, lie the real meanings of materialism and spiritualism - not in hairsplitting abstractions about matter's inner essence, or about the metaphysical attributes of God. Materialism means the denial that the moral order is eternal, it means the cutting off of ultimate hope; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and optimism.

Spiritualistic faith in all of its forms deals with a world of promise, while materialism's sun sets in a sea of dissappointment. The Absolute grants us moral holidays. Any religious view does this, and it not only incites our more strenuous moments, it takes our joyous, careless, trustful moments, and justifies them. We study our God by studying his Creation. But we can enjoy our God, if we have one, in advance of all that labor. I believe that the evidence of God lies primarily in inner personal experiences. The truth of God or the Absolute, has to run the gauntlet of all our other truths. Other truths try it out, and in turn it tries out other truths. Our final opinion about the Absolute can only be settled after all of the

truths have straightened themselves out together.

Our fundamental ways of thinking about things are old. They are the discoveries of our exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experiences of all subsequent time. Our ways of thinking are changing some, and they must change more in the future. Theologions have stretched their minds so as to embrace the Darwinian facts, and yet to interpret them as still showing divine purpose. The aim of God is not just merely to make men and save men, but rather to get this done through the sole agency of nature's vast machinery. For without nature's stupendous laws and counter-forces, man's creation and perfection, we might suppose, would be too insipid achievements for God to have proposed.

The designer of the universe should be no longer the oldman-like deity. Designs have become so vast that they are incomprehensible to us human beings. They so overwhelm us that to establish a designer for them becomes of very little consequence in comparison. We can better comprehend the character of a cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange mixture of goods and evils that we find in this actual world's particulars. The mere word design, by itself, means nothing and explains nothing. The real questions are: what is the world?; what is the truth? This calls for a study of all nature's particulars.

The question of free-will should also be considered from a new view point. For most persons who believe in what is called their free-wills, do so after the rationalistic fashion. They consider it a principle, a virtue, a positive faculty added to man, by which his dignity is enigmatically augmented. He is obligated to believe it, he ought to believe it. The determinists refute this view and

hold that men originate nothing individually. A diminished man results, who serves only to transmit to the future the whole push of the past cosmos of which he is a small expression. Man in an unadmirable being, from this view point, who is stripped of his creative principle. But when we look at free-will from the pragmatic standpoint, it means novelties in the world, the right to expect that in its deepest elements as well as in visible phenomena, the future may not identically imitate and repeat the past. These ancient ideas should not be taken as something august and exalted above fact. The real question after all is, what is the world going to be? What is life eventually to make out of itself? Such questions must be treated by minds of a less abstractionist type than before. We need minds more scientific and individualistic in their tone but not more irreligious. We need an alteration in the seat of authority.

The pragmatic theory of truth makes this new alteration. It gives us true ideas. And "true ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not." The practical difference it means to us to have the true ideas, is the meaning of truth, for this is all that truth is known as. Truth happens to an idea, it becomes true. Its validity is the process of validation. Verification and validation mean certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea. Ideas agree with reality. They lead us through acts and other ideas toward or to other parts of experience, with which we feel all the while that the original ideas remain in agreement. The transitions and connections come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, and satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification. The possession of the true means the possession of invaluable instruments of action, and our duty to gain truth can account for itself by

man's practical reason. The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely useful or harmful. Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as the true ideas in this primary sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions.

The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. Their objects are not useful at all times. The true is the name for whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the name for its complete fruition in experience. The true is only the expedient in the way of acting and truth is made as health, wealth, and strength are made, in the course of experience.

The outcome of the whole matter is this: when we say that truth depends on application, what is meant is that a truth which can not be applied can have no meaning; when it is said that all truths are useful what is meant is that to apply them is to use them; and that, consequently, whatever is possessed of meaning must be capable of use; when it is said that truth is practical, what is meant is that the process of application must always be application to some concrete situation; and hence any so-called theory that avowedly makes no conceivable difference in practice stands confessed as having no meaning. To hold that truth is an assertion depending upon its consequences, is, again, just another way of saying that the penalty of claiming a one-sided independence of theory from practice is the impossibility of assigning any meaning to the so-called theory. And the contention that meaning depends on purpose sharplychallenges the inveterate convention that

logic, in its examination of thought, is bound to abstract from the personality of the thinker. This new pragmatic knowledge is a method of testing laws. It does not claim to be a metaphysic. Yet, it is conscious that a method which works may be far more valuable than a metaphysic which is pursued as an intellectual game. The sole methodological principle which will serve our purpose and minister to a desire for progressive law is one which conceives no reality as so rigid and no truth as so valid as to be constitutionally incapable of being improved, when and where our needs demand it. G. A. Tawney says that "The sentimental yearning for absolutely complete and perfect experience is like the trophism of the moth for the candle flame, a yearning for a nirvana of unconsciousness in which the struggle of practical life shall have ceased. Struggle, change and readjustment belong to the essence of practical experience, and a world of pure beauty, of perfect utility and economy, or of absolute individuality and perfection would be a world of nothingness". (Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James, p. 414.)

The pragmatic criterion of knowledge may err and later correct its mistake; but it is better for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own time than to maintain an immense monastic impeccability, without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present. The pragmatic theory of knowledge is practical; however, the noblest service philosophy can render us is to pass a self-denying ordinance and draw our attention away from idle and inactive speculation about reality in the absolute, to the real ways in which ideals are realized and the world of reality is made a fit place to live in.

The object of the next chapter will be to define serious religious faith, or rather to define the way in which faith functions in life.

V. Serious Religious Faith.

In defining the nature of serious religious faith, we must avoid introducing speculative conceptions of its nature. Our present concern is with the nature of a historic phenomenon. In any final interpretation of the meaning of religion metaphysics can not be excluded: but it is important that the notion we form of religion should in the first instance be formed on the basis of its psychology and history, so that the truth, as far as possible, may show in its own light. The psychological view of religion is not final, but it should not be merged in a speculative theory of the spiritual life. Neither should we take it for granted that the latest forms of religion alone gice us the key to its meaning. This assumption is not true without qualification, and it implies a conception of religious development which it is better not to assume.

Keeping in mind the psychological factors of the religious consciousness and the ways in which they function, many definitions of religion strike us by their inadequacy and one-sideness. We find that they denote certain phases of religion, but not to others, In many instances they leave out what is the most important. In his Science of Religion, Max Müller says that religion is "a mental faculty or disposition which enables man to apprehend the infinite". This definition does not apply to primitive religions, and there is much in the higher developed religions that is not accounted for, in such a definition. In Primitive Culture, by Prof. E. B. Tylor, we have what he terms a minimum definition as "a belief in spiritual beings." This is widely applicable but it omits too much that is really found in religion. A more adequate definition is given by Prof. Menzies, in his History of Religion, "the worship of spiritual beings from a sense of need." And Hoffding describes religion as

"faith in the conservation of value". He offers a philosophical conception of the ultimate meaning of religion in place of telling what it is in its actual working. We can construct a good definition only after a careful and unprejudiced study of the facts in their fullness and variety.

An examination of the phenomena makes it plain that we must take cognizance of a double aspect, if we are to define religion in its full meaning. First of all, it is a process and this process has two sides, an inner and an outer. From one point of view, it is a state of belief and feeling, an inward spiritual disposition; from another point of view, it is an expression of this disposition in appropriate acts: that is, it is concerned with action. Both of these aspects are essential to the nature of religion, and they act reciprocally in the process of spiritual experience. Therefore, any definition which leaves out of account either of these aspects, must be considered inadequate. Cicero's explanation of religion as those "quae omnia quae ad cultum doerum pertinent diligenter retrectant" falls under this head. For in such a performance, the religious disposition may be lacking. M. Salomon Reinach's definition is still more one-sided when he says, in Orpheus: "Histoire generale des Religions, p. 4" that religion is "a body of scruples which act as an obstacle to the free exercise of our faculties." We can also safely say that when we identify religion with a system of taboos, we ignore what is most valuable in it, and to do such, is to select a subordinate feature and call it the whole. You cannot do justice to the nature of religion by trying to reduce it to magic and superstition which hover about its beginnings. In Religions Philosophe, 3rd ed. p. 329, we find Mr. Pfleiderer's definition to be more adequate when he says that religion is "the direction of the will which corresponds

to the idea of Duty". But to our way of thinking, he wrongly denies that feeling belongs to the essence of religion, and though somewhat inconsistently intimates that it is a note of the actual presence of religion. A correct definition must include some reference to the psychical factors which operate together in religious experience.

Writers agree that the manifold and widely different historic forms of religion constitute a serious difficulty in defining it. They find themselves confronted with the alternation of choosing between a definition so wide that it has little meaning, or one so narrow that it does not cover all the facts. Primitive-nature religions and Buddhism lie so far apart that it is hard to embrace them in a single definition. When we proceed by eliminating specific differences in order to reach a common ground, we seem to come back to a colorless residue in the place of a constitutive principle. A definition applying as fully to Fetishism and Totemism as to Buddhism and Christianity would not convey a clear idea of what the real nature of religion is. I do not think we can form a perfect verbal definition along these lines. It seems a waste of time to try to do so.

Two considerations should be kept in mind when dealing with this problem. First, there are features in every religion which do not belong to the substance or essence of religion, and since there are such unessential features, we may disregard them. There is much in the details of religious doctrine, and in modes of worship which, may cast light on a particular phase of religion, but do not help to determine the nature of religion as a whole. Religion as a whole is more profound and enduring, and finds expression in divers forms. Secondly, we are not justified in supposing that the whole nature of religion is revealed in its simplest and most primitive

forms. It is true that the motives and impulses out of which religion issues will be found even in its early beginnings; but not all that man seeks and realizes in religion is apparent from the first. It may only become explicit in the later stages of development. The significance of worship will not be adequately gathered from the study of tribal spiritism or fetishism. A definition which endeavors to bring out what is characteristic of religion in the light of its whole history will undoubtedly state more than is found in the crude religions of nature.

The true nature of religion should bring out the genetic principles or motives which underlie the development of the religious consciousness. In defining the true nature of religion, it is necessary to indicate the psychical factors and the motives which operate through them in making religion. These factors, we have observed, are three in number, viz., emotive, volitional, and cognitive. From this it follows that a definition of the nature of religion must include a belief, a feeling, and a practical activity of the will. When we keep these points in mind and define religion it becomes one's faith in a power beyond himself by acknowledgement of which he satisfies certain emotional needs and gains stability of life, and the consciousness of which he expresses in acts of worship and service. This definition is offered for what it is worth, but at the same time I wish to add that no definition, however careful, will reveal the heart of the subject in its full meaning and richness to the individual life. Many definitions, such as have been so thoroughly classified by Leuba in his Psychological Study of Religion, suggest that those who framed them looked on the phenomena from an external standpoint, and were influenced by extraneous considerations. They seem to have asked what meaning they could assign to religion in terms of their own theory

of life, rather than to have asked what it meant for those who were religious. For example, the sociologist has tried to define religion as a protective function of the social organism developed in the struggle for existence.

Summing up the whole matter, let us try to set forth, in connection with the definition we have suggested, the characteristics of religious experience. First, there is a reference to that which lies beyond what is given. Primitive spiritism is a look beyond the bare facts of the environment and a belief in more than appears on the surface. Man's failures brought disappointment with his immediate world and a longing for more powerful helpers. By an impulse born of his needs, he seeks to win to his side the mysterious powers which are behind phenomena. The evolution of religion is a process which gradually makes clearer what is involved in this reference to the Beyond. The spirit lurks behind the thing of sense in tribal religion. God is a transcendent and spiritual Reality in Universal Religion. And if man at any stage of his history had been able to find his complete good within his immediate environment, he would have ceased to be a religious being. This reference to something beyond, so essential in religion, calls for an exercise of faith on man's part. The lowest form of religion begins in an act of trust, a trust that under certain conditions unseen spirits will help the worshipper; while in the highest forms of religion faith plays the great part. The religious mind never reaches its object by rational inference from what is given, nor does it measure its assurance by a careful review of what the premises will justify. In its advanced stages especially, religion welcomes the aid of reason, and an enlightened piety cannot be anti-rational.

However, it establishes relations with the supersensible object in the first place by an act of faith, of which the real motive is

needs and desires of the soul. Religious faith springs from the pressure of human needs and these needs in their turn depend on the human nature which reveals itself in them. Man's desire for good is reflected in the character of his gods, and desire unsatisfied works changed even in the image of things in heaven.

But feelings and emotions are linked with this conative or active side of the religious spirit. At whatever level you take religious piety, it is only recognizable as such when it is marked by emotional reactions and suffused by feeling-tone. The quickening life-blood of religion is feeling. Without feeling religion would loose its distinctive quality.

The divine object satisfied a personal and spiritual need. Thus it represents a value. A pure fact by itself has no religious interest. Its interest comes only when it takes the form of good for the human soul, and in so doing it evokes religious feeling. Herbert Spencer's Absolute with an "indefinite consciousness" is spiritually worthless. The object of faith is conceived to be a supreme and ultimate value, a value that finally satisfies human needs.

Christianity from the first insisted that the world was insufficient to supply all needs. From an initial dissatisfaction with its environment the religious spirit advanced to the final view of the inadequacy of all earthly values. The soul has found its self-expression in faith in a Good that is achieved through obedience to law in the pursuit of the highest possible social good in this life. The forms of its worship and the flow of its emotions are all colored with the sense that its goal and destiny lie beyond this world of time and space. This is revealed to humanity through the operation of natural laws. These are the expressions of God's will. God is

vital in his relation to humanity and the traditional legalistic view no longer grips the masses. This conception of God causes a recognization on the part of the community and the world of a highest possible social ideal - each member of society living in glad obedience to the laws of his own life, physical, mental, spiritual and thus actualizing the greatest Good for the social group, nation and world. This is a practical point of view but it is also a serious view. "The practical world is profoundly serious. Its atmosphere is the atmosphere of the streets, the workshop, and the laboratory, when these are tinged with reverence." (G. A. Tawney, Essays Phil. & Psy. in Honor of William James, p. 414.)

VI. Is Religion Anything But Morality?

Kant and others insist that religion and morality are identical; that the only true worship is a good life; and that all religious teaching should be interpreted ethically. The literature of the ethical culture movement is founded upon this Kantian conception. Ames, James, and Coe agree in finding every aspect of human nature all kinds of value, represented in religion. Religion is a whole experience and it involves thinking, feeling and conduct. Mackenzie and others hold that religion and morality are not the same. Religion is bound up with all kinds of value but religious values are unique. "Religious value is neither identical with other values, nor is it merely more of the same kind as either or all of these. It is neither constitutive nor demanded of the world. Religious value is purposive without being deliberately so, and in this sense it is true that religion means the conservation of all values, as Hoffding says. Esthetic and economic values are also purposive, but while esthetics represents the purposive aspect of the constituted and objective world, and economics that of the world of production and exchange, where values are

demanded and imperative, religion has to do primarily with the purposive aspect of the entire life of purpose and conation. Attempts to identify religion with ethics or metaphysics or economics or social service leave the essentially religious demands of human nature unsatisfied and unexpressed. Ethical, esthetic and metaphysical elements are present in nearly all the conventional forms of religious worship, but they are not essential to it. One may be dissatisfied with all these, as for example in adolescent doubts, and yet be profoundly religious. He who doubts goes out like Abraham not knowing whither he goes, but he seeks a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God. He seeks that absolute uniqueness, perfection and individuality which are perhaps our most comprehensive experiences of value." (G. A. Tawney The Psychological Bulletin, October 15th, 1909, Vol. VI. No. 10, pp. 344-345.) Our experiences of value give us a group of values as distinct as those of utilitarian or esthetic values. They are of many kinds just as esthetic andutilitarian values are of many kinds. That which distinguishes religious experience from morality, art, science, and politics lies in the sense of absolute completeness and perfection in the object of our fear, worship, and loyalty. The experience of these religious values brirgs intensity of faith and optimism.

Wells says that intensity of faith and its attendant optimism are justifiable from a biological viewpoint. "In the higher developments of the religious consciousness the hygienic value of religious belief, which now becomes instrumental to optimism and hence to health and survival, is perhaps a more important value than the moral value, though the latter is still significant.....Despair means death, literally. A race that despaired would perish from the earth; but a hopeful faith means life, and gives life abundantly. Faith is biologically necessary for the human race, and it is a psychological

fact that 'hope springs eternal in the human breast'. (The Biological Foundations of Belief, Wesley Raymond Wells, p. 15.)

Moral law should be motivated in a way to promote its realization through reason and will. Intelligence needs to be prompted by a motive force. And should this discussion lead us to some conclusion which obviously weakens the motives for a good life. We would feel that such a conclusion must be revised. But if our conclusion takes a form which gives us new motives, to morality or strengthens those we have, it gives us proof that our discussion has been in the right direction. The search for moral truth becomes coincident with a search for moral power. We find truth to whatever extent we find power. We are also in error if the conclusions we reach leave the Right less urgent or the Good less attractive. Our interest lies in the hope that by Connecting Religion with Morality, or by disconnecting it, a new motive may be liberated, or an old motive strengthened, which may cause some one, to enter with renewed energy on the moral life. The experience of religious values creates motives strong enough to overcome difficulties involved in living the good life, and in its simpler forms it is adequate to maintain that continuous improvement of the moral ideal which is the alternative to its deterioration.

A moral theory launched upon the world can not thrive unless in application it is reinforced by powerful motives. Aristotle pointed out that the good life is a very difficult affair, even when it goes no further than conformity to existing customs. And when the good life demands that existing standards be transcended there must be liberated immense motive power. Information why men should do right has never affected their tendencies to do wrong. But the motive to do right has transcended all difficulties in the way of the good life.

Morality must be capable of extension to a larger sphere, a sphere in which the will is brought into contact with an overmastering force. Without this force moral systems are inadequate to the task of making a bad man good, or a good man better. Theologians of the XVII century found sanctions for morality in a system of eternal rewards and punishments. But the fear of Hell and the hope of Heaven are not motives to which liberal minded leaders feel justified in appealing. For those whose interest in the matter is pragmatic, the problem of morality remains unsolved until some motive power equal to or greater than that of theevil life is found for the good life. No statement of the moral end will satisfy unless it liberates, or creates, motive forces adequate to the attainment of the end. If we can say nothing more for morality than that it promotes secular happiness, when the question remains open whether secular happiness is worth the effort its promotion involves, then the moral problem, as we conceive it, remains unsolved. Speaking philosophically, morality must have a cosmic motive; for we are a part of the universe, and the questions involved concern the whole. As long as the cosmos to which we belong sets us the example of indifference or hostility to the interests of humanity, our interest in humanity cannot be the sole or supreme motive of all our endeavor. The moral agent needs to know that the universe is on his side, that it regards him with sympathy and approval, responds to his loyalty as he falls into harmony with its laws, and will no more betray him than he will betray it. The universe must be moral towards us in the same sense in which we are moral towards it; and without this spiritual reciprocity the underlying motive of moral effort is lacking. To the extent that religion gives assurance of such a reciprocity it has a vital connection with morality.

The connection of religion and morality is much clearer if the object of religion is a divine Universe in which the divine person is immanent than it is if the Divine Person is apart from the universe. There are those who do not believe that the world is worth the effort it seems to demand unless its demands are the expression of the personal and creative love of a single Being. To others, ultimate reality is an immortal society, to which we belong or may belong, as a "heavenly city", as the Communion of Saints of Christian Theology. Prof. Royce and others conceive reality as a Beloved Community, which not only asks our loyalty to its laws, but is also loyal to every one of its members. But the motive for the better life is necessary in each of these conceptions of reality.

It yet remains for us to tell whence comes this motive for the good life and just what its distinguishing characteristics are. William James surpasses the wealth of insight and analytical skill among modern psychologists. Yet he makes the touching confession that he had never shared the vital realities he describes. My personal position is simple. I have no living sense of commerce with a God. I envy those who have, for I know that the addition of such a sense would help me greatly. The Divine, for my active life, is limited to personal and abstract concepts, which, as ideas, interest and determine me, but do so faintly in comparison with what a feeling of God might effect, if I had one. This, to be sure, is largely a matter of intensity, but a shade of intensity may make one's whole centre of moral energy shift. Though he felt the lack of the strong sense of God directly assured, he recognized a voice deeper than his own. Something told him, 'Thither lies Truth.' And at times of mortal crisis he had the sense of an unknown Something backing him up. "It is most indefinite, to be sure, and rather faint, and yet

I know that, if it should cease, there would be a great hush, a great void in my life."

This frank confession of a serious scholar, of high personal character, sympathetic with religion and its vital experiences, convinces us that such a view is typical, and would be immediately appropriated by a large number of honest-minded men within and without the Churches. We believe that we have here an indication of the line that must be pursued if we are to succeed in tracing to its source the subtle lassitude and ineffectiveness characteristic of the average religious life in our midst at the present time. We lack the 'intensity' of the sense of God. What we know of the God of whom we think and read, and to whom we pray is most indefinite and rather faint. Such as it is, we count it of value, and we would not on any account be without it. For if it should cease there would be a great hush, a great void in our lives. That which makes the sense of God strong and sure and the witness of His Presence an overcoming power or force in life and service is the experiences of the value of values. How true is James's accurate diagnosis of his own situation and of ours also: "But a shade of intensity may make one's whole centre of moral energy shift." The secret of religious confidence and of spiritual power seems to lie here. It is largely a matter of the intensity of our experiences of the value of values in the progressive realization of law.