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THE

STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH PROSE

A MANUAL

OF

COMPOSITION AND RHETORIC

BY

JOHN G. R. McELROY, A. M.


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"Essential Lessons in English Etymology," etc. etc.

"If, therefore, Plato had reason for writing over the door of his Academy, 'let no one who is not a geometrician enter here,' the Rhetorician has equal reason for inscribing upon the rostrum, 'let no one ascend here who is not a scholar and a thinker.'"

FOURTH EDITION, WITH COMPLETE ANALYSIS.

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

THE gratifying success of my book has led me, in preparing this new edition, to add a complete Analysis of the entire work. (See pp. ix. to xxviii.)

This Analysis, it will be observed, is not only by paragraphs, but also by the larger sections of the book. First, the main divisions are set forth; then, under each of these main divisions in turn, the several chapters of that main division, the sub-divisions of these chapters, and even the sections of these sub-divisions. Finally, the subject of each paragraph is given, and thus the last analysis of the work is reached. Complete tabular views of all classifications, and occasionally of the contents of more difficult paragraphs, are included in the Analysis, in the hope that, serving as "*maps*" of important parts of the subject, they may help materially to fix in the student's memory the sometimes perplexing minutiae of the subject.

If properly used, the Analysis can hardly fail to promote topical recitations. No student of seventeen or eighteen ought to need severe, or even close, questioning to enable him to state concisely the contents of a paragraph; but he will very often need such help as is here offered, if only to show him how to analyze a paragraph for himself. The Analysis will, therefore, promote a second useful purpose; it will indicate clearly a method of studying, not only this, but all kindred subjects.

The best results in the use of the Analysis will be obtained, I think, if the student will first read over a paragraph, then, with the help of the Analysis, learn what

that paragraph contains, and last, in re-reading the paragraph, verify and store away in his memory every detail. After each paragraph has been acquired thus, he can memorize the topics treated in his whole lesson, and then go into recitation fully armed and equipped. Even a final examination will lose its terrors to one who has prepared the subject thus.

A few slips in the book, not observed in the previous editions, are now corrected.

J. G. R. McE.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
August, 1889.

PREFACE.

The teacher of Rhetoric has a double office. First, and chiefly, he must make writers; secondly, he must so exhibit the laws of his art as to promote mental discipline. In other words, he must be practical, without being a mere empiricist; he must be rational, without for an instant losing sight of skill in composition.

With these views in mind, I have tried to fill what seemed to me an empty place among books on Rhetoric. None of them, I thought, aimed at practical results, without sacrificing too far the principles of the art; none of them taught these principles in their fullness, without sacrificing in part or in whole the practical side of the work. I have aimed to strike the happy medium,—to make a book that shall teach composition while it forces the student to think, and shall exhibit the principles of the art at the same time that it keeps uppermost the problem *How to Write*. I have adopted Dr. Shedd's words quoted on my title-page, accepting fully the doctrine that Thought is more than Style, and modifying this doctrine by only one other truth—a truth to which Dr. Shedd would doubtless equally assent—that worthy thought deserves, as it promotes, an excellent form. In other words, while, with Herbert Spencer, I extol practice, I also accept, with him, the doctrine that "some practical result may be expected from a familiarity with the principles of style. . . . If in no other way, yet, as facilitating revision, a knowledge of the thing to be achieved—a clear idea of what constitutes a beauty, and what a blemish—can not fail to be of service."

I have also tried to exhibit the laws of Rhetoric in their entirety,—not the laws of Style alone, but also those of Invention. However we may quibble about that word *Invention* in its rhetorical sense, Rhetoric does teach other laws than those of Form; and these laws must be exhibited, if the art is to be taught fully. I admit freely that, in a book whose chief aim is skill in composition, Invention will occupy a considerably less number of pages than Style; and, hence, even after saying what I have said of the superior importance of Invention [§ 32], I have given by far the greater portion of my whole space to Style. The questions discussed under

the head of Invention are largely theoretical; and their full exposition belongs either to a distinctively theoretical treatise on Rhetoric or to the several sciences that furnish the theory of the art. Were Rhetoric now, as it once was, a purely disciplinary study of Senior year, my book would have taken an entirely different form; but, in view of the wholesome change in our college work which assumes, not that the men know their mother-tongue because they speak it, but that, sadly ignorant of this mother-tongue, they need lessons in English, even more than they need the discipline of foreign languages, ancient or modern,—in view of this change, I have tried to make a book that shall start our younger college students and the older students in high schools and academies on the only road, difficult as it is, to a mastery of English composition.

The limitation of the book to Prose has been adopted, because I believe that every one who will apply himself can acquire appreciable skill in this kind of writing; while Poetry and Romance are products of exceptionally endowed minds. But I have not scrupled to quote examples from either poets or novelists. In many cases, such examples are of superior interest; while, not infrequently, they illustrate the laws of composition even better than examples in prose.

The work is the product of my own teaching. Circumstances led me about eight years ago to write a course of lectures for my class, with which to replace the text-book then in use. Later I printed an abstract of these lectures; and now this abstract has grown into an entire work. I do not wish to boast, much less to anticipate criticism; but the course has never yet failed to yield in large measure the fruit expected of it.

From the many works on Rhetoric, acknowledged and obscure, ancient and modern, I have sought both light and help. I am indebted, therefore, to all these writers: indeed, although I have in the main sought new examples and illustrations for the rules, yet I must adopt Dr. Austin Phelps's words;—"I have not scrupled to use any material which has seemed to me adapted to my purpose. I have appropriated principles of which no one knows the origin; I have employed illustrations, some of which belong to the common stock of rhetorical discussion." With him, too, I can excuse myself for not always noting the sources whence I drew my material, on the ground that even "to name them would be in part commonplace, and in part pedantic." To one writer, however, I must make especial acknowledgments. Early in my professorship, *The Art of Discourse*, by Prof. Henry N. Day, taught me the outline of a systematic Rhetoric, and so gave my studies a direction they have never since lost. Prof. Day will doubtless smile, should he ever honor me by turning my pages, to think that he could have stimulated the production of

a work so unlike his as is mine: yet I hold to my confession. I believe there is nothing extant even purporting to have been written by Timothy; but, if there were, it would doubtless be as little Pauline as are the epistles of James or Peter. Yet Timothy was "son in the faith" to Paul, and evidently his particular disciple.

Many friends—more than I could readily mention here—have helped me in my work. Besides the names that appear in several foot-notes, the name of my colleague, Professor ALBERT S. BOLLES, must be specially recorded. To him I owe what is worth more than help,—continual and hearty encouragement, even when I was most discouraged.

J. G. R. McE.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
February 26, 1885.

SUGGESTION.

The author's own experience with his book leads him to suggest to his fellow teachers that the best results with it may be obtained by omitting until review nearly all paragraphs in the smaller type. Then these paragraphs, which, as a rule, are theoretical rather than practical, will be the more easily understood. Of course, examples and illustrative extracts must be excepted; but these are not commonly numbered as separate paragraphs. The judicious teacher, however, will modify this plan at his discretion.

The Appendix is intended almost exclusively for the teacher.

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ANALYSIS.

MAIN DIVISIONS.

INTRODUCTION. PART SECOND.—INVENTION.
PART FIRST.—STYLE. APPENDIX.

INTRODUCTION.

- I. RHETORIC DEFINED.
- II. RHETORIC PROPER AND COMPOSITION.
- III. THE SCIENCES THAT GIVE LAWS TO RHETORIC.
- IV. FUNDAMENTAL MAXIMS.
- V. THE DEPARTMENTS OF RHETORIC.
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 - (b) Imagination;
 - (3) The Elaborative Faculties,—
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 - (c) Reasoning;
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- 8, 9. Why this statement is true; examples.

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 (b) Alike in sense,
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I. THE CHOICE OF WORDS.

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 216. Effect of the periodic structure; examples.
 217. Why neither structure is always better.

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- 218, 219. Law of explicit reference; reasons for it; how it is
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 225. Effects of short and of long sentences; advantages of each;
 other distinctions; examples.
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230. The common definition; in what respects erroneous; examples.
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238. Overstatements of the law; opposite considerations; Blair's rules.
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240. Blair's second rule; how far true.
241. Blair's third rule; when parentheses destroy Unity; examples.
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243. The relative "tag" and Unity.
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246. Nature of the Paragraph; importance of its laws.
247. Neglect of paragraph-arrangement by even the best writers; silence of rhetoricians on the subject.
248. Rules for the paragraph.

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249. Office of the opening sentence of a paragraph; examples.

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250. The law of Explicit Reference; reasons for it; example.
251. When neglect of explicit reference is especially bad; example.
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253. Special Devices for Explicit Reference:—
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 (c) Pronouns so used;
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254. Kinds of sentences that need no connectives.
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257. Rule for all other English connectives.
258. Objections to initial *and*, *but*, *for*, *however*; Prof. A. S. Hill's view.
259. General reply to these objections.
259a. Possible grounds of some of the objections.
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5th. The testimony of competent authorities—(a) rhetoricians, (b) good authors.

3. PARALLEL CONSTRUCTION.

268. The Law of Parallel Construction; its reason; examples.
269. The effect of joining Balance, etc., to assimilation.
270. The means to Parallel Construction; examples.
271. Opposing laws; examples with comments on them.
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273. The law of Method in the paragraph; reasons for orderly arrangement; examples with comments.

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274. The law of Unity in the paragraph; where the "principal affirmation" is made; examples with explanations.

275. Limitations of the rule; danger of giving undue prominence to unimportant matter.
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278. Definition of Climax, of Bathos; kinds of each and their character; aim of intentional Bathos; examples.

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1. *The Parts of a Composition.*
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279. Laws of the composition as a whole; which of them belong here.

1. THE PARTS OF A COMPOSITION.

280. The four parts of a composition; the essential parts; the non-essential parts; definition of each part.
 281. Analysis of Matthew Arnold's essay *On Translating Homer*.
 282. Law of the introduction and the conclusion; example.
 283. Limitations of the rule; example.
 284. Less methodical structure of many compositions; what is always necessary; example.
 285. Danger of this plan; possible evil results.
 285a. A fair test of the doctrine.
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 286. The *mechanical* in this use of method; why better than confusion; formality not necessarily a result.
 287. The value of a synopsis, or 'skeleton,' in writing; how to use such a synopsis; how to work without one.
 288. Forms of the Proposition; need of variety; danger of including the proposition in the title.
 288a. When the Proposition is, when it is not, a judgment.

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289. Four rules obeyed by the composition as a whole;—
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 291. Classification of the figures of speech; how far possible.
 292.—(1) Figures in the 'use of single words,' or '*tropes*.'
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 294.—(3) 'Figures of diction' and 'figures of thought'; the distinction between them; value of the phrase 'figures of thought.'
 295. Table of the Figures of Speech; the principal figures defined.
 296. Why a longer list is not given.
 297-302. Another arrangement of the figures of speech;—
 (1) Figures that compare objects much alike;—Metaphor, Simile;
 (2) Figures that compare objects remotely alike;—Allegory, Personification;
 (3) Figures that substitute one thing for another;—Metonymy, Synecdoche;
 (4) Figures that present the unexpected;—Antithesis, Epigram, Irony, Hyperbole, Euphemism.
 (5) The Figures of Thought;—(see § 295.)
 303. Further (but not essential) details.
 304. When comparison is figurative; when literal.
 305. Rules for the use of Figures;—
 (1) The Law of Keeping; examples;
 (2) The Law of Moderation; examples;
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(C) THE QUALITIES OF STYLE.

DEFINITION AND SUB-DIVISIONS.

I. THE SUBJECTIVE QUALITIES.

II. THE OBJECTIVE QUALITIES.

Definition and Sub-Divisions.

306. Meaning of the phrase, 'subtler properties of language'; distinctions between these properties and the grammatical and the mechanical properties of language; to what part of man's nature the qualities of style appeal.
 307. Classification of the Qualities of Style; meaning of 'subjective' and 'objective.'
 I. The Subjective Qualities of Style.
 308. The names of the subjective qualities of style.
 309. What is implied by Significance; 'spurious oratory'; 'the Nonsensical.'
 310. The Humorous and the Nonsensical.
 311. What is implied by Continuousness; the sources of true Sententiousness; 'talking in a circle.'
 312. Naturalness defined; grounds for the quality; imitation.
 313. Modifications of Naturalness in discourse; examples.

II. The Objective Qualities of Style.

314. Classification:—

1. The Intellectual Qualities;—
 - (1) Simplicity,
 - (2) Clearness,
 - (a) Perspicuity,
 - (b) Precision;
2. The Emotional Qualities;—
 - (1) Force,
 - (2) Pathos,
 - (3) The Ludicrous,—
 - (a') Satire,
 - (a'') Humor,
 - (b) Wit;
3. The Æsthetic Qualities;—
 - (1) Melody,
 - (2) Harmony,
 - (3) Variety,
 - (4) Elegance.

1. THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.

315. Simplicity defined; contrasted with clearness; examples.
 316. Abstruseness only relatively a fault; examples.
 317. Means to Simplicity;—(1) Familiar terms, (2) Particular terms; examples.
 318. Clearness defined; not a relative quality, but "of obligation."
 319. Relations of clear thinking to clear writing.
 320. Clearness as produced by correctness of form in general.
 321. Special rules for Clearness;—
 - (a) Indicate the particular meaning intended;
 - (b) Avoid two meanings of the same word in the same context;
 - (c) Use every word in its exact sense, and always express that sense by that word;
 - (d), (e), (f) Avoid ambiguous pronouns, ambiguous negatives, obscure sentence-structure;
 322. Mutual relations of simplicity, perspicuity, and precision.
 323. Absurdity of Blair's rule about clear thinking and clear writing.

2. THE EMOTIONAL QUALITIES.

324. Error in their classification before Bain.
 325. Force defined; other terms for it.
 326. The chief source of Force in composition; examples.
 327. Restraint of language and true force; Bombast; examples.
 328. Further conditions to Force; examples.
 329. Pathos defined; relations of Pathos and Force; examples.
 330. Feeling and true Pathos; Sentimentality.

331. The Ludicrous defined; its several forms;—
 - (a) Degradation of an object ordinarily dignified;
 - (a') Satire, (a'') Humor;
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 332. Criticism of another use of the terms Humor and Wit.
 333. Humor and Pathos united in the same composition.
 334. Other terms to denote the Ludicrous.

3. THE ÆSTHETIC QUALITIES.

335. Æsthetic qualities defined; how refinement of style is produced.
 336. Melody and Harmony in Music, in Style; euphony; rhythm; further distinctions; examples.
 337. Law of the rhythmic in Prose.
 338. Variety defined; its opposita.
 339. Elegance defined; Taste; examples.
 340. The permanent and the variable element of Taste.

PART SECOND.—INVENTION.

SUB-DIVISIONS.

- (A) THE THEME.
- (B) THE DISCUSSION.

Sub-Divisions.

341. Definition of Invention; the sub-divisions of Part II.
 342. The word "discussion" as used here and in § 289.
 - (A) The Theme.
 343. Source of the Theme; three cases; examples.
 344. The exercise of judgment in each case; examples.
 345. Three things to be determined when the subject is not given;—
 - (a) occasion of speaking, (b) character of audience, (c) purpose in writing; work done in ignorance of (a) and (b).
 346. Relation of the writer to his subject.
 347. The danger of choosing "fertile" subjects.
 348. Development of the theme; (a) preparatory reading; (b) determining the Proposition; (c) mapping the outline; avoidance of formality; example.
 349. Probable results of working without method.

(B) The Discussion.

I. General Rules.

II. The Modes of Discussion.

350. Collection of matter for the composition; how guided; resulting sub-divisions of this section.
 350a. Why Rhetoric cannot teach the discussion of separate themes; earnest writing and earnest reading; plagiarism.

I. GENERAL RULES.

Three modes of treating a theme;—

- (1) Exhaustive treatment,
- (2) Treatment within limited portions of a subject;
- (3) Treatment for specific purposes.

351. Exhaustive treatment of a subject; examples.
 352. Writing within limited portions of a subject; examples.
 353. When partial knowledge is enough; example.
 354. Rule for all cases; examples.

II. THE MODES OF DISCUSSION.

355. The matter of a composition as determined by the Purpose of the writer; this always to communicate thought; hence, four Modes of Discussion;—

- (a) Discourse addressed to the Understanding,—
 - (I.) Explanation, which presents a Term,
 - (II.) Argument, which presents a Judgment
- (b) Discourse addressed to the Feelings,—
 - (III.) Excitation;
- (c) Discourse addressed to the Will,—
 - (IV.) Persuasion.

356. Mutual relations of the modes of discussion.
 357. Inclusion of the corresponding negative processes.
 358. Why Explanation, etc., involve each other.

(I.) EXPLANATION.

359. Explanation defined; a synonym for it.
 360. What the theme in Explanation is; when it is presented intelligibly.
 361. Clear and distinct presentation—their difference illustrated.
 362. Means to the intelligible presentation of an object.
 363. The most exact definition.
 364. Substitutes for logical definition.
 365. The general principles that control Definition.
 366. The six processes involved in Explanation Proper.
 367. The distinction between Division and Partition.
 368. The six processes viewed as three pairs of processes.
 369. Mutual relations of Narration and Description;—
 - (a) What each presents; fitness of language to the function of each;
 - (b) Details involved in each; capacity of language to express these details;
 - (c) Which is especially the work of the writer, which of the painter or sculptor.
370. Division and Partition distinguished.
 371. In what Exemplification and Comparison and Contrast agree; the last really a single process; why.
 372. Kinds of Narration; their names; their interdependence; the order of their occurrence in time; examples.

- 373–378. Laws of Method in Narration;—
 - (a) Adherence to the order chosen, except
 - (α) A familiar state of things,
 - (β) Concurring streams;
 - (b) Value of summaries;
 - (c) Use of cross-sections.
379. Forms of Description; their mutual relations.
 380. Laws of Method in Description;—
 - (a) When addressed to the understanding;
 - (b) When addressed to the imagination;
 - (c) How illusion is produced;
 - (d) How illusion may be dispelled;
 - (e) Reason of the failure of many descriptions.
386. Example of self-restraint in this matter.
 387. When descriptions of the "inventory" kind are available.
 388. Description from "the traveller's point of view."
 389. Description involved in other modes of composition.
 390. The laws that control Division.
 391. The laws of Partition.
 392. The rules that control Exemplification.
 393. When examples may precede principles.
 394. Methods of Comparison and Contrast; examples.

II. ARGUMENT.

395. What the theme in Argument always is.
 396. This judgment and the subject of composition; examples.
 397. Means to determining the theme in Argument; examples.
 398. 'Hypothesis' and 'Theory'; examples.
 399. On what Argument proceeds; proofs defined; relations of the process to Logic, to Rhetoric.
 400. Reasoning of two kinds;—(α) Immediate, (β) Mediate; examples.
 401. Proof of two kinds;—(α) Direct, (β) Indirect (=Refutation); examples.
 402. Proofs are—
 - (a) Analytic, given in the terms of the judgment;
 - (b) Synthetic, derived from outside the judgment;
 - (b') Intuitive, furnished by the mind itself;
 - (b'') Empirical, furnished by experience;—
 - (α) *A priori*, from whole to part (Antecedent Probability);
 - (β) *A posteriori*, from part to whole (Signs);
 - (γ) Examples, resting on—
 - (γ') a common property, Induction;
 - (γ'') a common relation, Analogy.
403. 'Cause' and 'Effect' defined.
 404. Value of the several classes of arguments.
 405. Other conditions to success in Argument.

406. State of the mind addressed; degrees of belief; method of argumentation in each case.
407. Difference between written and spoken argument; examples.
408. Place of the proposition in Argument; exceptions; examples.
409. Order of the several proofs; determined by
- (a) State of the mind addressed,
 - (a') Without belief, or in weak faith,
 - (a'') In positive disbelief;
 - (β) Relative value of the proofs,—
 - (β') Analytic proofs,
 - (β'') *A priori* proofs, signs, examples.
410. 'Burden of Proof' explained; the 'Presumption'; 'Apology.'
411. Importance of determining which side has the Burden of Proof.
412. On which side the Presumption always is; examples.
413. Opposed and shifting presumptions; examples.
414. Explanation in Argument; where explanations "come in."
415. Other considerations in Argument; example.
416. Conclusion of an argumentative composition; what it may contain.

III. EXCITATION.

417. What the theme in Excitation is; how expressed.
418. Means to the arousing of passion; their mutual relation.
419. Possible state of mind of the persons addressed; rule for each case; examples.
420. Place of the Proposition in Excitation; Whately's view; Day's criticism of Whately.
421. When gradual approach is necessary; examples.
- 422-425. Rules for Pathetic Explanation;—
- (a) Narrow Selection; examples;
 - (b) Particular Views; examples;
 - (c) Appeal to the imagination; examples.
426. Modes of Expressing Emotion; examples.

IV. PERSUASION.

427. The theme in Persuasion; what it is; examples.
428. Means to Persuasion; examples.
429. Motives defined; their classification; general truths concerning them;
- (a) Their different power;
 - (β) Pure motives preferable to lower ones; examples;
 - (γ) Must be adapted to the mind addressed; examples;
 - (δ) Higher motives most successful in large audiences.
430. Necessity of observing state of the mind addressed.
431. Rules for the proposition in Persuasion.
432. Arrangement in persuasive discourse; rules for it; caution.

APPENDIX.

THE
STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH PROSE.

INTRODUCTION.

I.

RHETORIC. DEFINED.

1. RHETORIC IS THE ART OF DISCOURSE¹,—*the Art of Communicating Thought in Language.*

2. In no proper sense, is Rhetoric a *science*; nor should it be defined as the art of *effective* discourse. It discovers nothing; it is like all other arts in aiming at efficient work; and its full definition, therefore, is that just given. The discussion of these questions, however, belongs elsewhere.²

3. A more familiar word for Discourse is COMPOSITION,—a synonym that will be used freely in these pages. The more technical term seems necessary in the definition, however, if only for clearness' sake; since *Composition* also denotes *Practical Rhetoric* as opposed to the *Theory* of the art.³

4. THOUGHT⁴ is here intended in its widest signification. In a certain sense, the mind *thinks* whenever it *acts*; and in this sense, Thought is the product of any mental action. Hence, Dr. Campbell speaks of Rhetoric

¹ H. N. Day, *The Art of Discourse*, § 1.

² Appendix, pp. 329 ff.

³ § 10, below.

⁴ § 1, above.

as "*the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes*,"—in a word, the art of communicating any product of the mental faculties. Exactly how much is intended by the term will appear from the following analysis.

5. The human mind acts in three ways;—it *knows*, it *feels*, it *wills*. Hence, three modes of mental activity, or (as they are otherwise called) *mental faculties*,—1. INTELLECT, or COGNITION; 2. SENSIBILITY, or FEELING; 3. WILL. The Intellectual, or Cognitive Faculties may (for present purposes) be distinguished as (1) *Presentative*, (2) *Re-presentative*, (3) *Elaborative*. The Presentative Faculties include (a) *Intuition*, or *Self-consciousness*, the power of knowing *what is going on in one's own mind*; (b) *Perception*, the power of knowing *through the senses*. The Re-presentative Faculties are (a) *Memory*, which re-presents objects as *real*; (b) *Imagination*, which re-presents them as *ideal*. The Elaborative Faculties are (a) *Conception*, or *Generalization*, the power of forming *class-ideas*; (b) *Judgment*, the power of *comparing conceptions* (or *one conception with an intuition or a perception*) and *affirming their agreement or disagreement*; (c) *Reasoning*, the power of *comparing judgments*.

6. Words that either present or re-present intuitions, perceptions, or conceptions, are called *Terms*. Hence, Judgment is the power of comparing terms.

7. LANGUAGE¹ primarily and chiefly means articulate speech or alphabetic writing; but many principles of Rhetoric apply equally well to the communication of thought by other means. Signs, symbols, pictures, statues,—all express thought, and in so far are amenable to the laws of Rhetoric. Indeed, both picture-writing and symbolism are older than the alphabet,—are the sources from which the alphabet took its rise.

8. The truth of this statement will hardly be challenged by any one who reflects that the *medium* of communication is of secondary importance,—that the essential characteristic of

¹ *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Introduction.

² § 1, above.

discourse is its communicating thought. The mode of communication may vary; but, so long as thought is communicated, so long must the process be governed in certain particulars by the same rules. For example, the artist, who has this end at least partly in view, is directed in his work by certain laws that are equally binding upon the writer. The laws of unity, of definiteness and continuousness, of proper resolution of the subject into its several parts, as well as many other rules, direct both workers alike,—and for the same reason, that both seek to communicate thought. Lessing¹ has actually asserted that Painting can express some kinds of thought better than Poetry.

9. Further, (if further discussion is necessary,) the case of the deaf-mute is strongly in point. Until he acquires his sign-language, his mind lies dormant, failing of its office because it lacks a means of communication. But, this once furnished, even if he does not learn to articulate, his mind develops and admits of the highest education. The idiot, on the other hand, can never be relieved because he cannot receive thought, however it is addressed to him. Midway stands the feeble-minded child, who is capable of training exactly in proportion to his degree of mental endowment. An extreme case of a mind aroused to the exercise of all its faculties, simply by receiving a medium of communication, and this not language in the ordinary sense, is that of Miss Laura Bridgman, who, though born deaf and dumb and blind, was taught through the sense of touch. Moreover, gestures and facial signs not only add to the effectiveness of spoken discourse, but, it is said, were the only means by which the famous conspiracy of the Sicilian Vespers was inaugurated and carried to a successful issue.² So, the Greek sculptor *carved* motion by setting one foot of his statue in front of the other.

¹ *Laocöon*, xx., xxi.—Of course, he concedes, too, the limitations of Painting and its cognate arts. (See § 369 ff., below.)

² Geo. P. Marsh, *Lectures on the English Language*, p. 34.

II.

RHETORIC PROPER AND COMPOSITION.

10. As thus broadly defined, Rhetoric includes studies of two widely different kinds;—(1) *Theoretical Discussions of Rhetorical Rules and Principles*,—RHETORIC PROPER, or simply RHETORIC; (2) *Practice in the actual work of Constructing Discourse*,—COMPOSITION.

11. "Rhetoric and Oratory," says John Quincy Adams,¹ "are to be distinguished as properly applying, the former to the *theory*, and the latter to the *practice* of the art." By *oratory*, Mr. Adams meant composition²; so that his statement fully supports that made in § 10. Prof. Day, too, calls his theoretical treatise *The Art of Discourse* (that is, *Rhetoric*), but his more practical (as well as more elementary) work *The Art of English Composition*.

12. The distinction results from the fact that, in every art, there may be distinguished three elements;—(1) *Rules*, which guide and control the practice of the art; (2) *Scientific Principles*, which underlie the rules, and explain or justify them; (3) *Practice*, the application of both rules and principles to actual work. Thus, in Drawing, the pupil is not simply given a copy or a model, and told to reproduce it on his paper: he is taught, also, rules for his guidance while at work, and principles—of form, of light and shade, of perspective—for the elucidation of his rules. So, in Engineering, in Analytical Chemistry, in every art, rules and principles at every step direct the practical work, and throw light upon it. Indeed, if, in any art, one of these three elements is wanting, the art is yet in embryo, or the missing element undeveloped.³ In the Art of Discourse, (1) and (2) constitute Rhetoric Proper; (3) is Composition.

13. Further, rules and principles, as true in all cases to which they apply, are in this respect essentially opposed to the practical application of rules or principles to special examples.

¹ *Lectures*, I. p. 34.

² Appendix, p. 336.

³ Appendix, p. 333.

The methods of study in each case must, therefore, be different, and a distinction between the two departments be inevitable. Not to concede this is only to create confusion and to place obstacles in the way of the student. Of course, rhetorical rules may be studied simply as rules, and not in the light of their underlying principles, just as the principles may be studied as such, and not with a view to formulating rules that are to be based upon them; but, in either case,—and neither is usual or likely to occur,—the study is still Theoretical Rhetoric, and is opposed in the sense stated to the practice of Composition, or Practical Rhetoric. This is true, too, whether the practical work proceeds only by "rules of thumb," (that is, by unexplained rules, rules without their underlying scientific truths—their *rationale*;) or whether this *rationale* is in every case carefully given with the rule.

14. But the distinction must not be carried too far. Rhetoric and Composition are not wholly separable. Each implies the other; each contributes to the other's improvement. Of course, either can be conceived of separately; either can at any time command the chief attention; but the two studies are in fact only one,—a single object approached from different sides.

15. To speak more technically, Theory and Practice are *cor-relatives*, implying each other, and having their common ground of relation in the nature of Art as art. Practice unfailingly tends to develop theory; theoretical discussion as inevitably makes practice more perfect. Certain art-practice, it is true, seems to be wholly unguided by either rule or principle; but, in fact, it is not so. Every one who practices an art, though in ever so unintelligent a way, acquires by his experience both rules and principles; and these, though he never formulates them, really control and direct his work.¹

¹ Appendix, p. 335.

- (3) "Then fill a fair and honest cup, and bear it straight to me;
The goblet hallows all it holds, what'er the liquid be;
And may the cherubs on its face protect me from the sin,
That dooms one to those dreadful words,—'My dear, where have you
been?'"¹

"May the blossom of your heart—
Eleanore—
Be a rose whose petals part
But to pour
Sweets of love;—and if there be
Tears as well as smiles for thee,
May they be the dew that He
Doth restore.

"So, a kiss before you go,
Eleanore,
(Reaching up to me tiptoe
From the floor;—
With the gold around your head,
And your dimpled cheeks so red,
There—be off with you to bed,
Eleanore!"²

"But changing hands, it³ reached at length a Puritan divine,
Who used to follow Timothy, and take a little wine,
But hated punch and prelacy; and so it was, perhaps,
He went to Leyden, where he found conventicles and schnaps.

[From Leyden the bowl comes over in the Mayflower, and Miles Standish
and his soldiers drink "a long and solemn draught" from it on the eve of a
battle with the Indians.]

"That night, affrighted from his rest, the screaming eagle flew,
He heard the Pequot's ringing whoop, the soldier's wild halloo;
And there the sachem learned the rule he taught to kith and kin;
'Run from the white man when you find he smells of Hollands gin.'"⁴

"When George the Fourth was still reigning over the privacies
of Windsor, when the Duke of Wellington was Prime Minister,
and Mr. Vincy was mayor of the old corporation in Middle-
march, Mrs. Casaubon, born Dorothea Brooke, had taken her
wedding journey to Rome."⁵

¹ O. W. Holmes, *On Lending a Punch-Bowl*, st. 13.

² C. H. L. (in the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*), st. 5, 6.

³ Dr. Holmes's punch bowl.

⁴ Holmes, *ut cit.*, st. 4, 8. ⁵ George Eliot. (Cited by Prof. Hill, p. 135.)

IV.

THE WHOLE COMPOSITION.¹

279. The laws that control the composition as a whole are derived in great part from the nature of the thought expressed, and belong, therefore, to Invention;² but there are certain other rules that apply to all compositions, and are in part, at least, laws of form. These belong here.

I. THE PARTS OF A COMPOSITION.

280. Considered as a whole, the Composition has four parts, two *essential* and two *non-essential*;—two that should be found in every composition; two that may be present, but need not be. The essential parts are;—

(1) The PROPOSITION, which sets forth *the limits within which* or *the end for which* the subject of the composition is to be discussed, or else states *the precise form in some other particular* that the work proposed is to take;

(2) The DISCUSSION, which is *the body* of the composition, and contains *what is said* of the theme as limited in the Proposition.

The non-essential parts are;—

(1) The INTRODUCTION, which contains necessary *preliminary* matter;

(2) The CONCLUSION, which contains necessary matter by way of *summary*, of *general enforcement* of the truths taught, *etc.*

281. Thus, Matthew Arnold's essay *On Translating Homer*³ opens as follows;—

¹ § 170, *above*.

² *Essays in Criticism* (New York, 1877), pp. 284 ff.

³ Part Second, *below*.

"It has more than once been suggested to me that I should translate Homer. That is a task for which I have neither the time nor the courage; but the suggestion led me to regard yet more closely a poet whom I had already long studied, and for one or two years the works of Homer were seldom out of my hands. The study of classical literature is probably on the decline; but, whatever may be the fate of this study in general, it is certain that, as instruction spreads and the number of readers increases, attention will be more and more directed to the poetry of Homer, not indeed as part of a classical course, but as the most important poetical monument existing. Even within the last ten years two fresh translations of the Iliad have appeared in England: one by a man of great ability and genuine learning, Professor Newman; the other by Mr. Wright, the conscientious and painstaking translator of Dante. It may safely be asserted that neither of these works will take rank as the standard translation of Homer; that the task of rendering him will still be attempted by other translators. [Introduction.] It may perhaps be possible to render to these some service, to save them some loss of labor, by pointing out rocks on which their predecessors have split, and the right objects on which a translator of Homer should fix his attention." [Proposition.]

Then follows an elaborate discussion,¹ comprising, of course, the bulk of the essay; and then another single paragraph,² concluding the whole matter;—

"Here I stop. I have said so much, because I think that the task of translating Homer into English verse both will be re-attempted, and may be re-attempted successfully. There are great works composed of parts so disparate, that one translator is not likely to have the requisite gifts for poetically rendering all of them. Such are the works of Shakspeare, and Goethe's Faust: and these it is best to attempt to render in prose only. People praise Tieck and Schlegel's version of Shakspeare: I, for my part, would sooner read Shakspeare in the French prose translation, and that is saying a great deal; but in the German poets' hands Shakspeare so often gets, especially where he is humorous, an air of what the French call *niaiserie!* and can anything be more un-Shaksperian than that? Again; Mr. Hayward's prose translation of the first part of Faust—so good that it makes one regret Mr. Hayward should have abandoned the line of translation for a kind of literature which

¹Pp. 25-367.

²Pp. 367-8.

is, to say the least, somewhat slight—is not likely to be surpassed by any translation in verse. But poems like the Iliad, which, in the main, are in one manner, may hope to find a poetical translator so gifted and so trained as to be able to learn that one manner, and to reproduce it. Only, the poet who would reproduce this must cultivate in himself a Greek virtue by no means common among the moderns in general, and the English in particular—*moderation*. For Homer has not only the English vigor, he has the Greek grace; and when one observes the boistering, rollicking way in which his English admirers—even men of genius, like the late Professor Wilson—love to talk of Homer and his poetry, one cannot help feeling that there is no very deep community of nature between them and the object of their enthusiasm. 'It is very well my good friends,' I always imagine Homer saying to them, if he could hear them: 'you do me a great deal of honor, but somehow or other you praise me too like barbarians.' For Homer's grandeur is not the mixed and turbid grandeur of the great poets of the north, of the authors of Othello and Faust; it is a perfect, a lovely grandeur. Certainly his poetry has all the energy and power of the poetry of our ruder climates; but it has, besides, the pure lines of an Ionian horizon, the liquid clearness of an Ionian sky."¹

282. Unless something *must* be said by way of introduction or conclusion, the work consists of Proposition and Discussion alone. Especially if a work grows too long, or if there is danger of wearing out the reader's attention by unduly postponing "the gist of the matter," or by allowing the interest to flag after the discussion is fairly ended, an excellent rule is, Cut down the composition by lopping off both introduction and conclusion. For example;—

Mr. Arnold's essay *The Literary Influence of Academies*² opens abruptly thus;—

"It is impossible to put down a book like the history of the French Academy, by Pellison and D'Olivet, which M. Charles

¹Pp. 368-424, *Last Words*, really constitute a separate essay, with its own introduction (pp. 368-370), double proposition (p. 370), double discussion (371-389 and 389-423), and conclusion (423-424.)

²Id., pp. 39 ff.

Livet has lately re-edited, without being led to reflect upon the absence, in our own country, of any institution like the French Academy, upon the probable causes of this absence, and upon its results. [Proposition.] A thousand voices will be ready to tell us that this absence is a signal mark of our national superiority; that it is in great part owing to this absence that the exhilarating words of Lord Macaulay lately given to the world by his very clever nephew, Mr. Trevelyan, are so profoundly true; 'It may safely be said that the literature now extant in the English language is of far greater value than all the literature which three hundred years ago was extant in all the languages of the world together.' I dare say this is so; only, remembering Spinoza's maxim that the two great banes of humanity are self-conceit and the laziness coming from self-conceit, I think it may do us good, instead of resting in our pre-eminence with perfect security, to look a little more closely why this is so, and whether it is so without any limitations." [The same thought expanded.]

To be sure, the paragraphs that immediately follow this proposition contain, by way of preparation, "a very few words on the outward history of the French Academy;" but these belong to the discussion, not to the essay as a whole, and are aimed at making this discussion the more intelligible: they are introductory, of course, but only to the discussion, not to the whole work. So, the concluding paragraph of the essay—Mr. Arnold's opinion as to the kind of academy England will some day found—is rather a last paragraph of the discussion than a conclusion to the essay as a whole.

Obedience to this rule would have saved a certain preacher the mistake of correcting the excessive length of his sermons by making them (in his deacon's words) "all introduction."

283. But the rule must be construed liberally. Although, as Bacon says, "to use too many Circumstances, ere one come to the matter, is Wearisome," it is also true, as he says, that "to use none at all is Blunt;" and while a reasonably abrupt opening is by no means objectionable, excessive abruptness is commonly to be avoided. A brief introduction or conclusion may, therefore, be admitted, even when one is not in the strictest sense *necessary*. Thus ;—

The essay *On Translating Homer* might have ended without the conclusion quoted above, and might have begun as follows;—"It may safely be asserted that the task of rendering Homer into English will be attempted by yet other translators; and it may perhaps be possible" *etc.*; but the opening would then have been less graceful, the mention of Newman's and Wright's translations (which are, in fact, reviewed in the essay) must have been made elsewhere, and perhaps awkwardly; while the reader would have missed the last two sentences of the essay, two as beautiful sentences as were ever penned by English writer.

At the same time, the relative proportions of the non-essential parts of this essay—and the particular example is most instructive—may serve to emphasize the rule. Of nearly eighty-five closely-printed post-octavo pages they fill but two; and even these two might have been omitted. The rule is a good working *dictum*,—arbitrary, perhaps, and quite as often to be violated as to be obeyed; but it expresses a great truth, *viz.*, that it is always better to begin at once, even at the sacrifice of important matter, even at the risk of a moderately abrupt opening or close, than to allow a delay in coming to the point or an undue prolonging of the subject to exhaust or even severely tax a reader's—much worse, a hearer's—patience. The strain on the attention, to say nothing of the confusion of thought caused by an irrelevant introduction or conclusion, is so great as to make the omission of even admissible matter safer than the insertion of matter that is of doubtful importance.

284. It is not pretended that, in every work by a competent writer, these parts of the composition are thus clearly defined. Even the Proposition and the Discussion may not be marked off by as much as a paragraph-break. The whole matter may be left to the good sense and discrimination of the reader. But, of course, in any work in really good form, both the limitation of the subject that it is the office of the Proposition to set clearly before the reader, and the several statements about this Proposition that it is the office of the Discussion to make, will be so presented that the reader can easily and at once discover them. Thus, to take yet another example from the same writer ;—

Mr. Arnold's essay *Marcus Aurelius*¹ opens by quoting John Stuart Mill's assertion that Christian morality is inferior to the best morality of the ancients; criticizes this remark by showing the true ground and the inspiring motive of any system of morals, and that Christian morality both rests on this ground and has this motive; cites Epictetus and Jesus side by side; claims that Jesus' statements of certain great truths are far superior to those of Epictetus; has a sly "rap on the knuckles" for Mr. Mill; and then (in the first sentence of a new paragraph) suggests the subject of his essay, as follows;—"That which gives to the moral writings of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius their peculiar character and charm, is their being suffused and softened by something of this very sentiment whence Christian morality draws its best power."² The balance of the essay cares as little for orderly arrangement, and leaves the reader as unassisted as before. It mentions a "recently published" translation of Aurelius, praises this translation and then brings "one or two little complaints against" it, speaks critically of Aurelius's Greek, gives a brief biography of the Emperor, and finally quotes from his *Meditations* by way of illustrating his ethical opinions. The close is quite as abrupt and disjointed. In one paragraph, it remarks the catholicity of Aurelius's moral code; in a second, it speaks of the natural affinity of the Roman persecutor of the Christians for Christian morality, and raises the at once vain, yet alluring, question, What effect would this morality have had upon this persecutor of Christians, could he only have known it in its reality?

285. But this plan is attended with no little danger. Unless the Proposition (not formally expressed) is (1) perfectly clear in the writer's own mind, and (2) made equally clear to the reader or hearer, the whole work not only may become inartistic in form and unmethodical in its development of the subject, but also may violate the law of Unity;³ the writer becoming confused by the details of his work, and failing of his mission because the reader receives nothing intelligibly. The man who himself does not know where he is going will hardly guide others aright; he who is led blindfolded conceives

¹ Id., pp. 253 ff.

² P. 257.

³ § 287 below.

many a false idea of his destination, may have many a stumble or even fall.

285 a. A fair test of this doctrine is to read side by side two compositions such as the essays last quoted from. That on the Academies is clear, because its plan is distinctly laid down from page to page, and every step taken in pursuance of this plan is distinctly announced. The writer knows where he is going, and the reader where the writer is taking him. After the opening quoted above (one page), three pages and a half tell the history of the French Academy; two pages more comment on the hostility any plan to set up a high standard in matters of intellect and taste is sure to encounter; five pages discuss certain peculiar characteristics of the English nation; and the rest of the essay (except one paragraph) is filled with examples of what an English Academy might do for English literature. But the essay on Aurelius is a continual surprise. Mr. Arnold doubtless knew what he meant to say in his paper; yet his work looks very much as if he had started writing with only a vaguely defined purpose,—perhaps to review Mr. Long's translation. The consequence is a disjointed essay which, bold as the criticism may seem, makes most unwarrantable demands upon one's attention and ingenuity. The reader sets out with the broad subject *Marcus Aurelius*; learns, after four pages of tossing about, that Mr. Arnold intends to speak of Aurelius's code of morality; is then rudely carried off into five pages on Mr. Long's translation and the Emperor's Greek; meets then nine pages on the life of Aurelius and cognate questions; and is at last allowed (in eleven pages out of twenty-nine that he has read thus far) to hear what moral principles this remarkable man jotted down in his *Meditations*. The close (in two pages more) makes at least three separate remarks cognate with the general discussion of the subject rather than with the matter that has immediately preceded. Such a contrast as that between these essays could not exist, perhaps, in the work of a single writer, except as a result of difference of method, and no candid reader can hesitate for a moment, one would think, to say which method is preferable. Even Mr. Arnold's Homer paper, eighty-five pages long, is easily followed through its every winding; and this, quite as much because the clew to the maze has been securely placed in the reader's hand in that first sentence of the first paragraph, as for any other reason.

285 *b*. Important exceptions—or, rather, apparent exceptions—to this principle will be met under the heads of Excitation and Persuasion.¹

286. Of course, anything *mechanical* in this use of method will impair a writer's success; but the artist must everywhere "conceal his art;" and an extreme of formality were better, one would think, than confusion or failure. The chief end of discourse is to communicate thought; and failure in this particular is, therefore, total failure. Yet how many worthy books are not read, how many excellent addresses are not listened to, simply because their method is so outrageously bad, that readers and hearers alike refuse the labor necessary to be instructed by them! The assertion often made that a strict arrangement develops only formality, stiffness and awkwardness, and hampers or even dwarfs or enfeebles the mind of the writer, tying him down to mechanical processes when he most needs to be free,—this assertion can not possibly be true in all cases—is not true (as many teachers will testify) even in the elementary work of students. An orderly arrangement may guide a writer without affecting his liberty; while (as has been said), without such orderly arrangement, clear in his own mind, and clearly impressed upon the mind of his reader, he may fall into confusion, or spend his well-meant labor in vain.

287. To facilitate this methodical planning and construction of discourse, a synopsis of the whole work, ("skeleton" it is often called), may be clearly thought out or even written down, before the actual labor of composition begins. Even a systematic notation of the several divisions of the work by figures or letters may be employed; though this notation does not commonly appear in the finished work, except in compositions intended only to instruct or to set out statistics or similar details. Text-books use such a notation, and

¹ Part Second, below.

properly; but literary products (distinctively so called) commonly do not. Of course, such an outline must never be allowed to fetter the writer: it must be used, some one has aptly said, only as the mason uses his scaffolding, as a means to an end. Points may be omitted from it; new points be added; in fact, any liberty may be taken with it that tends to improve the composition. Sometimes, a writer works better without a synopsis. The subject, in its broad, general outline, is clear to him, and he can readily follow it through its every part. In such cases, let him by all means decline a "scaffolding": only let him be sure that his work, when finished, is as clear to his reader as to himself. Of course, too, if, at any point, when working without such help, he becomes embarrassed, he can jot down his outline, and so recover his "bearings." Freedom in one's methods of work is too precious to be lightly bartered away.

288. The forms that the several parts of the composition take are determined mainly by the subject-matter: the Proposition, however, needs a few words of special remark. Many writers state it definitely, as Matthew Arnold, in the first two of his essays quoted above; or Lord Macaulay, who begins his *History*, "I purpose to write the history of England from the accession of King James the Second down to a time which is within the memory of men still living." But other writers (or the same writers at other times) merely imply it in a sentence the chief purpose of which is different; as Mr. Arnold in his third essay named above. Sometimes it is found in an opening sentence or in the last sentence of the introduction; and it may even be fully expressed in the title of the work. To insist upon any one form,—indeed, not to insist upon variety in this as in other respects,—is a foolish as well as a useless dogmatism. A writer can ill afford to allow his openings to become so habitually alike that they constitute a mannerism. The solitary

horseman climbing a long hill, so much affected by a certain writer, has provoked for him the *soubriquet* of "the one-horse man." The danger in trusting to the title to announce one's proposition lies in the carelessness with which a title is often read. Indeed, the common (but most mistaken) practice of many persons is to "skip" title, preface, and all kindred matter.

288 a. The Proposition is not necessarily a judgment the truth or falsity of which is to be enforced on the reader. In Argument,¹ of course, such a judgment stands as proposition; but in Narration, in Description,² in other kinds of composition, the Proposition sets forth only the purpose of the writer, the circumstances of his writing, etc.

2. CANONS.

289. The Composition as a whole, no matter what its subject, obeys four general rules. They are;—

(1) UNITY. Each part of the composition must be subservient to one theme, and one proposition under that theme.

Everything else must be rigidly excluded; or, if anything out of strict unity is admitted, its insertion must be justifiable on sufficient grounds. Even in extended works, much interesting matter has always to be left out, lest the attention be unduly diverted from the main line of thought. A reasonable quantity of such material, however, is sometimes inserted in foot-notes or appendices; but even here the limits of advisability are soon reached. Speaking of De Quincey, confessedly a great sinner in this respect, Mr. Minto sums up the case most cleverly;—"Should these digressions, obviously breaches of strict method, be imitated or avoided? The experienced writer will please himself, and consult the effect that he intends to produce. But if he digresses after the model of De Quincey, he may rest assured that he will be accused of affectation, and will offend all that read for direct information concerning the subject in hand."

¹ 395, below.

² 372 ff, below.

(2) METHOD. The development of the subject must follow a natural (that is, the logical) order.

This canon has already been applied in the section on the parts of a composition, but it is equally applicable to every other detail. As no little force is gained by properly distributing the greater divisions of the whole work, so a like force is imparted by assigning to every sub-division, every paragraph, every sentence, just its own place,—the place determined for it by the nature of the thought expressed, by the special work which that particular part of the discourse has to do, and by other considerations, to be mentioned under several heads of Part Second, below.

(3) SELECTION. From the matter found to be relevant by Canon (1), the writer must choose what is most important in accordance with his proposition and his purpose in writing.

This rule is most binding, of course, when the composition is limited in extent; but it has force in all cases. The wider the scope of the author, the greater is the mass of material he collects, and the greater the necessity for a judicious selection from this mass of just those things which *he* especially needs to set down. Hence, no rule of Composition—not even the law of Unity—can be of greater importance than this law of Selection. A wise choice of material ensures the success of a book; the failure to make this choice may so heavily "handicap" the work as to leave it no chance in the race. Such unsorted work is sometimes said to be "padded." De Quincey's failures in this particular are often commented on, and would doubtless have ruined the chances of works less remarkable in other respects. And here again can the value of a commanding use of method be seen. In most cases, the writer will choose his material wisely, only after he has grasped securely and held before his mind (like a visible object between his finger and his thumb) the whole outline of his composition.¹ *Vice versa*, the

¹ De Quincey is a conspicuous exception. The law of Method he practises most successfully, using artistically the several means of indicating the plan of his work, apologizing for his digressions, giving notice of his return from them, and in every way carrying his reader along with him. Yet he had not learned the law of Unity—much less its more exacting sister-rule of Selection.

secret of many a failure in Method has been a failure in Selection; the want of power to choose wisely serving, as a rule, to debar the writer from making a judicious arrangement of material.

(4) COMPLETENESS. The proposition must be discussed fully.

Everything *essential*, everything that is necessary to set the subject as defined in the proposition completely before the reader, must be included. The sin of incompleteness is, of course, far less common than its opposite of overcrowding and irrelevancy; but its effects are none the less injurious to the work, and the vice itself, therefore, none the less carefully to be guarded against.¹ A judicious Brevity may leave one's readers or hearers wishing that the book, the sermon, the lecture had been longer: Incompleteness leaves the mind unsatisfied, as a piece of music leaves the ear, when it closes upon any chord but that of the tonic. One cannot help feeling that the writer has pledged himself to more than he has fulfilled, or, perhaps, has attempted more than he was able to accomplish.

¹Appendix, p. 335.

V.

FIGURES OF SPEECH.¹

290. "A Figure of Speech is a deviation from the plain and ordinary mode of speaking, with a view to greater effect;"² as, That *lamp lighted in Paradise*, instead of *Love*; Saturn, *quiet as a stone*, for Saturn *motionless*. So;—

The *vanward clouds* of evil days.—To sit *upon an Alp as on a throne*.—Tragedy! O, sir, *nothing of the kind!*—For thou, dear, noble *Elizabeth*,³ around whose ample brow I fancy a tiara of light or a gleaming aureola.

"A casement
 . . . *diamonded* with panes of quaint device
 Innumerable, of *stains* and splendid *dyes*,
 As are the *tiger-moth's deep damasked wings*."

291. It is a question, perhaps, whether the many "artifices of style gradually accumulated" by rhetoricians under the head of Figures of Speech admit of strict classification. "Such an accumulation," says Mr. Minto,⁴ "could hardly be other than heterogeneous;" and even Prof. Bain,⁵ who attempts only "the most common figures," and whose division is based on the "three simple modes of working" to which "all our intellectual powers are reducible," leaves one group of figures unclassified. Some points, however, have been made towards a classification; and by combining these points, all the most important figures can be grouped under certain well-defined heads.

292. (1) "A limited number of figures" are deviations from the ordinary modes of speech in the "use of *single words*."⁶ Thus, *lamp*, *clouds*, *diamonded*, *stains* and *damasked*, in the examples cited above,⁷ all contain figures of this sort. They are easily distinguishable both from the formal similitudes there cited, *quiet as a stone*, *upon an Alp as on a throne*, and from such peculiar sentence-structures as are observable in the fifth and sixth examples of that paragraph. Now, for these single-word figures Mr. Minto has proposed to reserve the name

¹ § 170, above.

² Bain, Part I.

³ De Quincey's sister, long dead.

⁴ *Manual*, p. 14.

⁵ Part I., §§ 2, 40 ff.

⁶ Minto.

⁷ § 290.

340. Bain has aptly defined two elements of Taste, one *permanent*, and one *variable*. Certain questions of taste though men should dispute about them forever, do not admit of discussion. The points at issue have been decided by an appeal to fundamental and unchallengeable truths: the questions are closed. Many rules of Rhetoric are of this kind,—the doctrine of judicious Brevity, the necessity of Clearness, the evil effect of incessantly recurring mannerisms, the excellence of an idiomatic style, the importance of being oneself in composition, *etc.* But on other questions, tastes vary in different ages and in individuals. Neither the drama of the Greeks nor the “license of personal vituperation” they allowed their orators are in taste to-day. English literature of the Classic Period—loosely 1660 to 1789—accepted many rules of composition which the common sense reaction of the succeeding period abrogated. Lessing gave form as well as life to German literature, till his time almost a wilderness. So, “the emotional constitution, the intellectual tendencies, and the education of each individual” cause divergencies of taste. Poetry appeals to many minds that music fails to touch, and *vice versa*. Men “of wider literary knowledge and superior discernment groan inwardly, some of them outwardly, at the judgment of the multitude in the matter of sublimity, pathos, and humour.” Further, there are schools of writers, each with its own admirers and its own clamorous defenders. In a word, as there are “many men,” so there are “many minds;” and, provided the disagreement turns solely on matters of a personal, individual character, “there is no disputing about tastes.” Perhaps the whole case for both elements of Taste may be summed up in a single law;—Men differ most when their sensibilities are engaged; their intellectual judgments are more nearly at one.

PART SECOND.

INVENTION.

SUB-DIVISIONS.

341. INVENTION states the Rules that direct and control the Discovery of Matter for the Composition.¹ These rules concern either the subject about which one writes, the *Theme*,² or else the composition itself, what one writes about the Theme, the *Discussion*. Hence, two subdivisions of Part Second,—(A) THE THEME, (B) THE DISCUSSION.

342. The word *Discussion* is used here in a slightly broader sense than in § 280, *above*. There it meant the *body* of the composition, as opposed to the Proposition, the Introduction, and the Conclusion: here it includes these parts as well as the Discussion properly so called. But, all told, these parts add but little, in proportion, to the Discussion Proper; and the extension of the term to include everything but the Theme is, hence, not a material variation of its meaning. Besides, although the parts named must be considered as belonging to the Discussion in this broader sense of the term, yet the rules to be stated for the Discussion apply to it most particularly in its narrower meaning. The Introduction and the Conclusion have already been characterized as *non-essential*; and the Proposition itself is in a certain sense *outside* the composition, since, in any case, it is determined rather as a part of the development of the Theme than as a part of the Discussion properly so called.

¹ § 23, *above*.

² Greek *πρόθεμα*, to put (forward as the subject of a composition).

(A) THE THEME.

343. The Theme may be (1) *given*, (2) *suggested* (or, at least, *limited*) by the *occasion* for which the composition is intended, (3) *left* wholly to the *choice* of the writer. For example;—

(1) The lawyer has his "case" brought to him; and it is to *that case*, and no other, that he must address himself, whether in the papers filed as preliminaries to the trial, or in what he may say before judge or jury. His theme is chosen for him: should he for any reason speak on a subject not fairly raised by the case, the judge but discharges a plain duty in demanding that he shall keep to his subject. So, the legislator must speak on the bill before the house. A "Duluth" Knott or a "Sunset" Cox may spend his store of humor or wit on his colleagues; but there is no pretence that in this sort of talk the house is occupied with the debate.

(2) The sacred preacher has, indeed, a wide range of subjects for his sermons; but, nevertheless, he meets much adverse criticism, if he steps far beyond the limits of the religious or the moral. Important public questions that affect these sides of man's nature,—even the political life of the people considered as one means of their education by Divine Providence,—may (perhaps, should) receive his attention; but merely secular topics, topics not even remotely his, are justly objected to in the pulpit. Besides, the many special occasions that arise in the year, even in the churches that do not observe a fixed order of services, often limit the preacher in his choice of subject; while many occurrences are not unusual that render one subject more fit than another. The preacher's subject is, of course, not set; but in many ways his choice is biased.

(3) The public lecture, the magazine article, the *opus magnum* of a scholarlike Casaubon, have their subjects at the will of their authors. Circumstances, to be sure, may influence even these cases; but, so far as any subject of composition is at will, the subjects of these and other such works are so.

344. In all three instances, however, ample room is left the writer to exercise his judgment.

(1) In the suit at law, not a little depends upon how a case is put before the court. The question that presents itself on the surface is not always the real point at issue; and the lawyer may therefore abundantly employ his ingenuity in finding this real question: in fact, by thus "making" his case, he all but chooses his subject. For example, John Hampden, sued in the time of King Charles the First for non-payment of taxes, showed the magistrate that the real question was whether the King should be allowed to usurp unconstitutional powers. Many a proposed act of legislature has been successfully represented or misrepresented by a re-reading of its title or by an open or covert sneer. The repeal of the Corn Laws in England was, on different views of the bill, either an act to put bread into the mouths of starving women and children or a measure to ruin the English farmer. A certain "bill for the Relief of the Surviving Officers of the Revolution"¹ was kindly mentioned by Mr. Webster as proposing "an annuity:" a senator from Georgia had sneered at its beneficiaries as willing to accept "a pension."

(2) The clergyman, more than any other public speaker, will find room for a wise judgment in selecting his theme. The pro's and con's are often nicely balanced in regard to a subject; and a mistake on his part is commonly fatal. When Slavery was still a factor in American politics, a famous clergyman preaching on the Psalms in course, found himself face to face with the story of Doeg the Edomite who betrayed to Saul the hiding-place of David. A general discourse on Doeg's treachery would have avoided the "burning question" of the day, the Fugitive Slave Law. But the preacher held decided Anti-Slavery views, and he considered his meeting thus incidentally a text that allowed him to free his soul of a long undischarged weight of responsibility, a call from Heaven. Till then, had he introduced the subject, he must have gone out of his way to bring it into his pulpit; and his conscience had hitherto absolved him. But now the question had presented itself to him: to evade it would be cowardice. His sermon broke some old friendships, might have rent his church asunder; but the topic was not of his choosing, and consequences, he felt, might wisely be left to Him in whose name he stood before the people.

(3) Even the writer whose choice seems wholly unbiassed can not be absolutely indifferent to circumstances. A number of

¹ U. S. Senate, April 1828.

considerations determine him,—considerations that must be detailed in full. The same considerations are often of value, too, in the second case.

345. Whenever the subject is not definitely given,—cases (2) and (3), § 343, *above*,—the writer must determine, before attempting a selection, (a) the occasion for which he intends his composition, (b) the character of the persons he may reasonably expect to address, and (c) the end he has in view in writing. His selection will then be made in accordance with his determinations upon these three points. In case (2), condition (a) will be in some measure satisfied; but there will still remain to be settled the *particular* circumstances under which the discourse is to be delivered. Of course, a writer may work in ignorance of points (a) and (b) or in indifference to them; but what he writes will then be addressed to minds of a certain order only, and be suited to occasions of only a certain sort. When brought into use, it will either prove adapted as if by chance, or else have to be recast.

346. Further, (d) the theme must be one that the writer is *capable of handling*. Not that he must know beforehand all that can be said about it: on the contrary, the strongest incentive a writer can have, is the interest that his subject has for his own mind; and this interest is never greater than when it is prompted by the discovery of something new. All that is meant by the rule is that the writer must be prepared by previous studies, *etc.*, to understand his subject, to learn what he will need to know of it, and, hence, to be able to express worthy thought about it.

347. (e) "Fertile" subjects are especially to be avoided. They are commonly hackneyed and, hence, difficult to make interesting. They involve, too, a great body of details, for the definition and classification of which a vigorous mental grasp is needed, and the presentation

of which to the reader requires a commanding use of method. If such a subject *must* be written on, the writer will find his powers tested to their utmost: he will need to call to his aid every help that Nature or Art can render him.

348. The theme obtained, it must be developed: (a) its exact meaning must be determined; and (b) the particular form it is to take in the work in hand must be selected. This selection may have to be postponed until the student has read on the subject proposed, and has collected at least a part of his material; but in actual literary work, the purpose in writing is always known, and the material to be used is selected in accordance with this purpose, not the purpose determined in accordance with the material used. The Proposition may then be distinctly written out; and now the writer is ready to outline his Discussion, to set down its several heads and sub-divisions, and to arrange for necessary introductory or concluding matter. Of course, formality in this process is fatal: the finished work must show as slight traces of the mechanical part of composition as may be. *Ars est celare artem*. Yet, consciously or unconsciously, the writer does take each of these steps, and must take them.

Thus, suppose the subject selected to be *Self-Preservation*. The first question must be, What does the term mean? Is self-preservation only an instinct that keeps men from unnecessarily endangering life or limb, that makes them avoid danger and suffering when nothing is to be gained by incurring either; or is it a cowardly self-love that, indulged freely, would render deeds of heroism or self-sacrifice impossible? Or, again, does the word mean only the judicious care of one's life and health and the promotion by every wise means of bodily vigor to old age? On the definition accepted will turn, of course, the form the work is to take,—the Proposition, the matter proper for the Discussion, every part of the composition from its first word to its last. In the first case, the Proposition might be, *Self-Preservation is a Law of Nature*; the Discussion, an illustration of the law and a definition of the privileges it confers and the

duties it imposes. In the second case, the paradox might be affirmed that, although self-preservation has its root in selfishness, yet, because a genuine sympathy comes only through suffering, and self-preservation inclines a man to avoid suffering for himself, the instinct of self-preservation will irresistibly draw him through his sympathies to deeds of self-sacrifice and even heroism in behalf of others. If the third definition were accepted, the essay might consist of such a series of hygienic suggestions, and such moral applications of them, as the occasion and other circumstances would warrant.

349. Thus, out of a single theme, (stated most broadly, to be sure,) three distinct compositions suggest themselves. Nor was the subject at first glance most promising. A young writer, working without the directions here given, would in all probability have set down the disjointed thoughts that occurred to him, as they occurred to him, without defined purpose in writing, and without consistency with either this purpose or one another. He would have achieved such a result as "young Mr. Brown" achieved, when he refused "to be put into the leading strings" of a proposition, and tried to write on *Fortune* instead of on the thesis *Fortune Helps the Brave*.¹ He would ignominiously have failed; while the experience of every teacher of Composition proves that reasonably good work can be done by even young writers, if they are taught the subject in this systematic way.²

¹J. H. Newman, *Lectures on University Subjects*, p. 150.—Dr. Newman's idea, however, that a young writer should always have a proposition stated for him, —that (in the University tutor's words in the Brown case) "it would have been very cruel to have told a boy to write on 'fortune'; it would have been like asking his opinion of 'things in general,'"—loses sight of the valuable discipline a student receives in stating his own proposition. Besides—supposing always that idle jottings about *Fortune* or any other subject are rigorously forbidden by the instructor—why not allow the young writer the freedom that a choice of propositions gives him? Few subjects of thought, few themes forced on a man by his experience, come in the shape of a sentence. Does not every one, sooner or later, formulate for himself judgments about Life and Death and numberless other topics? Since Whately, Rhetoric has too often taught Logic, and not the Art of Discourse.

²Among the many thousand compositions read by the author as professor of Rhetoric, only a mere handful have been like young Mr. Brown's.

(B) THE DISCUSSION.

350. The collection of matter for a composition on any theme is guided chiefly by the *purpose* of the writer; for it is this purpose, in the main, that determines the *mode of discussion* proper to the given work.¹ At the same time, certain general rules can be stated; though, of course, no special directions can be given to meet each theme. Hence, two chief heads of this sub-division of Invention—I. *General Rules*, II. *The Modes of Discussion*.

350 a. To give specific directions for the discussion of separate themes, Rhetoric would have to teach men universal knowledge;² whereas what a writer needs to know on a given subject he must learn from the authorities on that subject. Earnest writing presupposes earnest reading—and not this alone, but earnest thought and an earnest effort to make what is read one's own, or even to be stimulated by it to truly original thought. Simply to appropriate another man's work, even if one expresses it in one's own words, is the flagitious act called by the hard name *plagiarism*, or *literary theft*: to "assimilate" what one reads, making it the source of new life and power, is work worthy of the highest intellectual and moral powers in man. The best work on important subjects must be grounded on the work of one's predecessors;³ and, hence, whatever has been written on a subject *must* be considered as at a later writer's disposal. But this principle gives no license to literary theft, nor does it warrant the transferring from another writer's pages to one's own his matter bodily.⁴

¹§ 355, below.

²Appendix, p. 331.

³§ 351, below.

⁴Except, of course, in quotation-marks.

I.

GENERAL RULES.

351. (1) *Exhaustive* treatment of a subject requires on the writer's part a complete knowledge of that subject,—especially, a wide acquaintance with the views of all previous writers. In this way, not only will completeness be secured, and the repetition as original of opinions tried and found false or inadequate, be prevented; but, and especially, will the stimulus that knowledge broad and deep always applies to thought, most surely be felt by the writer. It is only when the mind is heavily charged with truth, that the finest display of power in writing is possible. For example, Mr. Dowden, in *Shakspeare: His Mind and Art*, says that, although he was writing from a new point of view, yet, "in order to get substantial ground to go upon," he had "thought it necessary to form acquaintance with a considerable body of recent Shakspeare scholarship;" and that, although he was avoiding "purely scholastic questions," and was aiming "to approach Shakspeare on the human side," yet he believed "that Shakspeare is not to be approached on any side through dilettantism." So, Motley and Macaulay—doubtless every great writer—spent years of patient, pains-taking toil, often among musty, worm-eaten state or private papers, before a single volume of their works was possible.¹

352. (2) *Within limited portions of a subject* very good work can be done without an exhaustive knowledge of the subject as a whole. But constant watchfulness will then be necessary, lest an essential relation between the department under treatment and those left out of sight

¹See Dr. Holmes's *Memoir of Motley and Trevelyan's Macaulay*.

escape attention. De Quincey's and Herbert Spencer's essays on Style are examples of work good as far as it goes, but misleading because it is incomplete.

353. (3) *For certain specific purposes*, partial knowledge is often sufficient. For example, to show that Phonetic Spelling will or will not overthrow the etymological basis of the English language, one need not have as much knowledge of the proposed "Reform" as would be requisite, were the question that of the merits or the demerits of the system as a substitute for the received spelling.

354. In all cases, however, there must be at least as much knowledge of a subject as is necessary to bring that subject, in the form in which its treatment is proposed, fully before the writer's mind. Preparation less than this is superficial: more may actually be a hindrance; for the mind, like the eye, may read itself blind. Thus, a study of Shakspeare's *Hamlet* for the purpose of illustrating the state of the English language at a certain epoch, must include whatever is necessary to accomplish this purpose: but anything more would be out of unity. The author not only may be a specialist: he often must be. On the other hand, comparatively defined questions may require painfully extended work. The text of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* offers a diligent scholar work for many years.

II.

THE MODES OF DISCUSSION.

355. The second factor in determining the matter of a composition is the *purpose* of the writer;¹ and this, as it is always to communicate thought, must be to address primarily and chiefly either the *Understanding*, the *Feelings*, or the *Will*.² An address to the understanding, however, may present either an *intuition*, a *perception*, a *conception*—in other words, a *term*—or else a *judgment*, a comparison of terms.³ Hence, four Modes of Discussion;—(I.) EXPLANATION, which sets forth the nature of *Terms*; (II.) ARGUMENT, which deals with *Judgments*; (III.) EXCITATION, which seeks to arouse the *Feelings*; and (IV.) PERSUASION, which aims at influencing the *Will*.³

356. Moreover, these four Modes of Discussion are related to each other in the order stated; and, when two or more of them occur in the same composition, they must stand in this order, except in certain cases to be noted below. A very little reflection will prove the truth of this; for terms can not be compared, until they are understood, and appeals to the feelings or the will can be successful, in minds that are properly constituted, only after the judgment is convinced. Moreover, the will is most commonly to be reached only through the feelings; and even in those cases in which the feelings are appealed to, before the judgment is convinced, or contrary to conviction, the understanding must be at least so far touched as to bring the object of the feeling (or something that is falsely affirmed to be that object) clearly before the mind addressed.

357. The positive processes just described include, also, their opposites, or negatives,—the replacement of a false notion or judgment by the truth, the allaying of feelings already excited, and the changing of a determination already reached.

358. In practice, the processes of Explanation, Argument, etc., can never be carried on strictly alone. Even when the

¹ § 350, above.² §§ 5, 6, above.³ § 75, above.

purpose of the composition is only one or another of the four possible, the others may be more or less involved. Thus, Explanation often brings on Argument; nothing (or but little) is ever accomplished with uninterested or inattentive hearers; and neither powerful arguments nor seductive motives suffice to enlighten the ignorant or to remove prejudices.

(I.) EXPLANATION.

359. Explanation—from the Latin *planus*, level, plain—is the process of making *intelligible* the nature or the meaning of an object or a word. It includes, also, the converse process of removing obscurity from objects or words. Another term for the same thing is *Exposition*; but this word is more formal and technical than Explanation, and therefore less available for use here. In this use, Explanation has the same sense as that which it has in everyday life—the setting out of what a thing is, or what a word means.

360. The Theme in Explanation is always a *noun*, the *name* of an object of thought. It is presented intelligibly to another mind, only when it is shown 1. *clearly*, and 2. *distinctly*; that is, 1. when it is separated from all *other* objects, (as *man* from *horse*, *dog*, etc.,) and 2. when its *own separate parts* are plainly set forth, (as *man* in his *essential attributes*—*rationality*, *mortality*, etc.; in his *component parts*—*head*, *trunk*, *limbs*, etc.; or in other such details.)

361. The difference between *clear* and *distinct* presentation is aptly illustrated by a familiar occurrence at dusk. On a lawn planted with trees and bushes, and ornamented, perhaps, with statuary, a distant object is seen that resembles a man, but which may be a bush or a statue. On closer inspection it proves to be a bush. The object is then *clear*, for it is entirely separated from all other objects. But a yet narrower examination shows the bush to be a closely trimmed evergreen, easily mistaken, at a distance and in the dark, for a statue or a man. Now the object is *distinct*: not only its class, but its essential features as of that class, are fully made out. Similarly, the

traveller in the Tyrol spies at a distance an object perched on the highest point of a rock. At first it seems to be but the top-most crag of a ragged mass of hill; but, as the road comes nearer, the object is plainly an animal. Next, it is a chamois; and the delighted tourist thinks he has seen a real example of the now rare, if not extinct, mountain goat. Alas! on coming closer, his chamois is indeed a chamois, but one carved from the solid stone, and set by some clever hands on an almost inaccessible pinnacle of rock.

362. The intelligible presentation of an object of thought proceeds by two means,—1. DEFINITION, 2. EXPLANATION PROPER. Definition (from the Latin *de*, from, and *finis*, a limit, or *boundary*) presents the object *clearly*, separating it from all other objects, and setting its limits or boundaries. Explanation Proper presents an object *distinctly*, exhibiting it in its several parts, and giving a full account of these parts by one or more of several subordinate processes to be described below.

I. DEFINITION.

363. The most exact DEFINITION is that of a *species* by its *genus* and *differentia*,¹ the so-called "logical definition." For example;—

<i>Species.</i>		<i>Differentia.</i>	<i>Genus.</i>
A whale	} is a	{ mutilate ² rational	mammal.
Man			animal.

364. But logical definition is often impossible. Either the genus to which an object belongs or its differentia is not known, and the definition is thus left incomplete. Many simple ideas, *color*, *beauty*, *goodness*,³ *life*, etc., defy definition. So, no one has ever told the world what *electricity* is. In such cases, other modes of definition must be used;—

(1) *Division* or *Partition*⁴; as, The animal kingdom consists of Radiates, Mollusks, Articulates, and Vertebrates; The

¹ § 370, below.

² Atwater, *Logic*, p. 76.

³ Having fins instead of legs.

⁴ § 366, below.

prismatic colors are red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet; (2) *Colligation*, the reverse of (1); (3) *Substitution* of narrative or descriptive phrases or of symbols or names; as, Wisdom leads to virtue and happiness; Religion is piety;¹ (4) *The Method for Individual Objects*; as, Abraham Lincoln was the president of the United States who issued the Emancipation Proclamation.—By the last method, the individual is assigned to its *species*, as if this were a *genus*, and some *distinguishing mark* is taken as *differentia*. Such definitions are most like logical definitions.

365. Definition is controlled by certain general principles, of the first importance in composition;²—

(1) A definition should be co-extensive with the objects included in the term defined: otherwise it is too broad or too narrow. For example, to define a *horse* as an *animal* implies that *all animals are horses*; to define an *animal* as a *horse* implies that *nothing not a horse is an animal*. Of course, exposition by exemplification,—setting forward the horse as a type in certain respects of all animals,—is perfectly legitimate;³ but it is not definition. (2) Negative definitions, except of negative words and conceptions, are useless. Thus, *Men are not birds* is perfectly useless as a *definition*. (3) Definitions "in a circle," or "in vague, ambiguous, or senseless language," should be avoided; as, Life is the vital force; Poetry is the stuff of which our life is made. (4) A single surplus word in a definition may imply a falsehood. For example, The opposite sides of a parallelogram are parallel *and equal*.⁴

2. EXPLANATION PROPER.

366. Explanation Proper involves one or more of *six* processes;—⁵

(1) *Narration*, "the relation of the *particulars* of any *transaction* or *event*, or of any *series* of transactions or events;"⁶ as, the story of a battle, a campaign, etc.;

(2) *Description*, the enumeration of the *essential qualities* of a thing or species; as, a sketch (in language) of a battle-field, an account of a chemical substance, etc.;

¹ Atwater, p. 79.

² Atwater, pp. 73 ff.

³ § 366 (5), below.

⁴ Appendix, p. 329.

⁵ Day, § 73.

⁶ Webster's Dictionary, 1864.

(3) *Division*, the separation of a *class* into its *specific* parts; as, *animals* into *radiales*, *mollusks*, etc.;¹

(4) *Partition*, the separation of an *individual* into its *component* parts; as, a ship into *sails*, *masts*, *hull*, etc.;

(5) *Exemplification*, the exhibiting of a *member* or of certain *members* of a *class* as *representing* the *whole* class; for example, *the horse* as representing *all animals*;

(6) *Comparison and Contrast*, the exhibiting of an object by ~~showing~~ *the resemblances* or the *differences* between it and another *object* or other objects of the same class; as, Christ's parable of *the sown seed* and the *spoken word*; St. Paul's antithesis between *faith* and *works*.

357. The distinction between *Division* and *Partition* is most clearly made by Dr. Atwater.² The *divisum* (the class divided) can always be predicated of each of its subordinate classes; as, *All radiales are animals*: the *partitum* (the individual separated into its component parts) can not be predicated of one of these parts. *Sails* are not a *ship*: only the sum total of the component parts makes the *partitum*.³

363. Of the six processes defined in § 366, *Narration and Description*, though they present the object *through its parts*, present it *as a whole*; *Division and Partition*, on the other hand, exhibit the parts *as parts*; while *Exemplification* and *Comparison and Contrast* set forth a *characteristic* part (or parts) *as a means* to desired knowledge. The six processes, therefore, are in one view three *pairs* of processes, and will first be so discussed. Further remarks on them as single processes will follow.

369. (1) *Narration and Description* are (to borrow a Greek word) *antistrophic*: where each is weakest, the other is most strong. (a) A narrative details at length a *course* of events, shows a series of *dissolving* views; presents ever *changing* scenery;—functions that language is especially fitted to perform. A description, on the other hand, exhibits a *state* of things, photographs

¹ § 354 (1), above.

² *Logic*, pp. 71 ff.

³ On this point Day is wrong, and is not followed here.

its object at a *definite* moment of time and in a *fixed* expression, offers to view scenery that is always *the same*;—functions fulfilled by language only with difficulty and when used by a master; for the picture that a description would call up can be only suggested in words, can not be fully exhibited. (b) The historian, however, has a *multitude* of details to set forth, details that are often *complicated* to a high degree and *perplexing* to both writer and reader; while *the necessary length* of a narrative, (for it must tell everything, and that completely,) often endangers its success. In a connected story, subsequent details, intelligible only in the light of those that have preceded them, fail to produce their desired effect, if the preceding details have been forgotten; while, if the narrative repeats itself at these critical points, it becomes prolix. The "word-painter," on the other hand, has *fewer details* to exhibit; these details are commonly *less complicated*, and therefore, *less perplexing*; while *the necessary* (certainly, *the desirable*) *brevity* of a description enables even a hearer to keep it well in hand. Words, it has been said, can only suggest a picture: hence, in a description, they need never be many, if well-chosen. (c) For this reason, *Narration* is especially the work of the writer; *Description*, of the painter or the sculptor. Language has its limitations, just as painting and sculpture have theirs.¹ But it is important not to infer too much. Just as a picture may suggest a long story, if a critical point in the tale be taken for representation, so description may be effected in words, if the words are aptly chosen. On the other hand, the phrases "word-painting" and "historical picture," unless understood in a very moderate sense, are actual contradictions in terms,—too often the cant of men who forget that the chief excellence of a composition is its expressing worthy thought, not its bearing tawdry

¹ § 8, above.

ornaments, and who believe (or affect to believe) that a page may glow like the canvas of a Tintoretto, a canvas read like a page from Macaulay.

370. (2) Division and Partition must be carefully distinguished. The one is applied to *classes* of objects; the other, to *individual* objects. Classes are either *genera* (higher classes) or *species* (lower classes); the essential difference or differences between any species and its nearest genus constituting its *differentia*. Of course, the same class may be at once *genus* to a species below it and *species* to a genus above it. Natural historians, philologists, many writers on subjects that require and admit of systematic classifications, have used other terms, *Kingdom, Class, Order, Variety, Family, Group, etc.*; but these are nothing more than *genera* or *species*, according to the relationships in which they stand.

371. (3) Exemplification and Comparison and Contrast agree in always presenting *single* parts of objects. Further, Contrast is only Comparison *by negatives*; so that the double process of Comparison and Contrast is, in fact, but one process,—a double mode of Explanation, not two separate modes. Of course, in all cases, objects compared must be also different, objects contrasted must be also alike. Otherwise, the objects in the one case would be the same, in the other case utterly without relationship. The ground of the process is in the part or parts that the objects have *in common*.

(1.) NARRATION.

372. A narrative may follow (a) the strict order of *time*, (b) the order of *change in the subject* (c) that of *cause and effect*; and, though the several forms may be united in the same composition, one or another will predominate and give character to the narrative. History of the first form is *Chronicles* or *Annals*; of the second form, *Proper History*; of the third form, *Philosophical History*. Proper

History (b) rests upon (a), and both it and (a) are presupposed in (c). Further, as (a) is the form natural to the narratives of children, so it is the form of the earliest histories; and as (b) and (c) correspond to a proportionate mental development, so they are the forms of later and the latest histories. As examples, Prof. Day cites Herodotus, Gibbon, and Guizot: other examples, and all of histories of Greece, are Thucydides, Grote, and Curtius.

373. In any form, Narration obeys the following laws, extensions of Canon (2) of the Whole Composition;—

374. (a) The events narrated must commonly be set forth in the order chosen, whether of time, of change, or of cause and effect.

375. But (a) "A recent state, of things more familiar to the persons addressed," may be first exhibited, and then "the previous steps by which that state was arrived at." The history of Language is a notable example of this law. The philologist begins with what is about him, and, from this present, by a careful comparison of its several parts with one another, constructs the past. So, Morley introduces his *First Sketch of English Literature* with the following significant words;—"As soon as we can feel that *we belong to a free country* with a noble past, let us begin to learn *through what endeavours and to what end it is free.*"¹

376. (b) The complication of details is often best unraveled by following each stream of events as if it were a separate narrative; care being taken, however, to keep the several streams united by bringing on each, in its turn, to the great epochs of the story. This plan is especially useful, when the narrative exhibits "a principal action with subordinates," several "concurring streams of nearly equal importance," the state of parties, or a "plurality of departments." For example, the history of England is necessarily complicated by the entangling of the nation in foreign affairs; and the reader's attention must often be diverted from England to the foreign

¹ 289, above.—As stated here, the laws are condensed from Bain's extended account of the process (Am. Ed., pp. 166 ff.) Fresh examples, however, have been taken in nearly all cases.

² Page 1.—The italics are inserted here.

lands concerned. In each case, the points of divergence and of return must be clearly indicated, and every other means be taken to notify the reader of the exact relation held by the subordinate story to its principal.—The history of the United States before 1789 must trace thirteen streams of colonial history flowing side by side.—Either English or American political history is largely a story of the struggles of two great bodies of the people (or of their leaders in or out of the national legislature) each to secure the adoption of its policy by the national administration.—The Departments of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, of the Treasury, *etc.*, are convenient heads under which to group the history of an administration.

377. (b) A brief summary (*résumé*, recapitulation,) of antecedent events often forms a proper introduction to a narrative, and is sometimes necessary. Thus, Macaulay's first two chapters contain a summary of English history from the Roman conquest of Britain to the Death of Charles II. in 1685; Froude's Chapter II. is concerned with "the Last Years of the Administration of Wolsey." In like manner, the writer may stop at certain points in his story to resurvey the ground passed over. The chapter of Freeman's *General Sketch of History* closes with a brief *résumé* of its contents.

378. (c) A narrative may consist of a series of *cross-sections* of the theme, made at different epochs of its existence, connected by a thread of story, and each delineated as a *status quo* rather than as a part of a movement or action. Or, in ordinary narrative, such a cross-section may now and then be introduced, in order to keep the reader aware of the state of affairs to which the story has brought him, and from which he must make a new start. Froude and Macaulay again furnish examples;¹ and, nearer home, Prof. McMaster's account of "the State of America in 1784" is a brilliant specimen.² A short extract from this account will show even more clearly the method referred to;—

"The Americans who, toward the close of 1783, celebrated with bonfires, with cannon, and with bell-ringing, the acknowledgement of independence and the return of peace, lived in a very different country from that with which their descendants are familiar. Indeed, could we, under the potent influence of some magician's drugs, be carried back through one hundred

¹Froude, ch. i.; Macaulay, ch. iii.

²John Bach McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States*, ch. i.

years, we should find ourselves in a country utterly new to us. Rip Van Winkle, who fell asleep when his townsmen were throwing up their hats and drinking their bumpers to good King George, and awoke when a generation that knew him not was shouting the names of men and parties unknown to him, did not find himself in a land more strange. The area of the republic would shrink to less than half its present extent. The number of the States would diminish to thirteen, nor would many of them be contained in their present limits or exhibit their present appearance. Vast stretches of upland, which are now an endless succession of wheat fields and corn fields and orchards, would appear overgrown with dense forests abandoned to savage beasts and yet more savage men. The hamlets of a few fishermen would mark the sites of wealthy havens now bristling with innumerable masts, and the great cities themselves would dwindle to dimensions scarce exceeding those of some rude settlement far to the west of the Colorado river. Of the inventions and discoveries which abridge distance, which annihilate time, which extend commerce, which aid agriculture, which save labor, which transmit speech, which turn the darkness of the night into the brilliancy of the day, which alleviate pain, which destroy disease, which lighten even the infirmities of age, not one existed. Fulton was still a portrait painter, Fitch and Rumsey had not yet begun to study the steam-engine, Whitney had not yet gone up to college. Howe and Morse, McCormick and Fairbanks, Goodyear and Colt, Dr. Morton and Dr. Bell, were yet to be born."¹

(2.) DESCRIPTION.

379. Description, like Narration, has three forms: it may exhibit (a) strictly the spacial parts, (b) the parts of a substance,—especially, its attributes,—as representing that substance, (c) the substance itself in its relations to its parts or attributes. Further, all three forms may concur in a single composition; and they are related to each other as are the corresponding forms of Narration.²

380. The Canon of Method has here the following applications;—

¹Vol. i. p. 2.

²§ 372, above.

381. (a) When addressed only to the *understanding*, when intended simply to present intelligible and (as far as possible) complete ideas, without regard to the vividness of the picture as a whole, Description may proceed by a mere enumeration of the parts or attributes. In this way a text-book of natural history describes animals or plants, an inventory or a catalogue describes the objects it names, and even the didactic poet,—Virgil, for instance,—describes a fine cow or a handsome colt.¹

382. (b) When addressed to the *imagination*, Description must produce *illusion*; that is, it must call up a vivid picture of the object described, and thus enable the reader, in his absorbing consciousness of the presence of this picture, to forget the words employed to summon it. Hence, such a description will always be brief and suggestive, never enumerative; for language, ill-fitted to description,² embarrasses rather than promotes illusion, imprisons rather than sets free the imagination. Homer, for example, portraying the divinely beautiful Helen, for whose sake two Greek worlds were convulsed with strife, speaks only of her coming to the walls of Troy to see the battle, and of the impressions her beauty made on the old men who sat there. Imagination does the rest.³

"Small blame is theirs if both the Trojan knights
And brazen-mailed Achaians have endured
So long so many evils for the sake
Of that one woman. She is wholly like
In feature to the deathless goddesses."⁴

"What can give a more vivid idea of her beauty," adds Lessing, "than that that cold-blooded age should deem it well worth the war which had cost so much blood and so many tears." "Constantinus Manasses," on the other hand, who "sought to adorn his bald chronicle with a picture of Helen," enumerates the points of her beauty as might a colorer of photographs;—"She was a woman right beautiful, with fine eyebrows, of clearest complexion, beautiful cheeks; comely, with large, full eyes, with snow-white skin, quick-glancing, graceful; a grove filled with graces, fair-armed, voluptuous, breathing beauty undisguised. The complexion fair, the cheek rosy, the countenance pleasing, the eye blooming, a beauty

¹ *Georgics*, iii. 51, 79.

² § 369, above.

³ Barring "a passing mention that she had white arms and beautiful hair." (Lessing.)

⁴ *Iliad*, iii. 156, translated by Bryant. (Lessing, xxi.)

unartificial, untinted, of its natural color, adding brightness to the brightest cherry, as if one should dye ivory with resplendent purple. Her neck long, of dazzling whiteness; whence she was called the swan-born, beautiful Helen."¹ The passage fills eleven fifteen syllabled lines; and reading it, says Lessing, "is like seeing stones rolled up a mountain, on whose summit they are to be built into a gorgeous edifice; but which all roll down of themselves on the other side. What picture does this crowd of words leave behind? How did Helen look? No two readers out of a thousand would receive the same impression of her."

383. (c) *Illusion* is produced by mentioning certain *individualizing or associated circumstances, thoughts or feelings*, and then leaving the reader to himself. Thus (as has been seen) Homer describes Helen; thus Shakspeare leaves his readers to construct his characters. Of Portia, for instance, he says;—

"In Belmont is a lady richly left;
And she is fair and, fairer than that word,
Of wondrous virtues:
Her name is Portia, nothing undervalued
To Cato's daughter, Brutus' Portia;
Nor is the wide world ignorant of her worth,
For the four winds blow in from every coast
Renowned suitors, and her sunny locks
Hang on her temples like a golden fleece;
Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strand,
And many Jasons come in quest of her."²

Nothing more: the curious reader must draw his lady of Belmont from these hints. Even Portia's character is thus delineated;—

"nothing undervalued
To Cato's daughter, Brutus' Portia;"
"the full sum of me
Is sum of something, which, to term in gross,
Is an unlesson'd girl, unschool'd, unpractis'd."³

So Bassanio's ambassador is pictured;—

"A day in April never came so sweet,
To show how costly summer was at hand."⁴

And so Edmund is described in *King Lear*.⁵ Gloucester, Edmund's father having said, "I have often blushed to acknowledge

¹ Cited by Lessing, *Laocoön*, xx.

² *The Merchant of Venice*, I. i. 161.—Portia elsewhere adds of herself, "By my troth, Nerissa, my little body is weary of this great world."

³ III. ii. 159.

⁴ II. ix. 93.

⁵ I. i. 10.

him," Kent replies,—“I can not wish the fault undone, the issue of it being *so proper*.” Later, Edmund claims for himself as compact dimensions, as generous a mind, as true a shape, as his brother's, and even “more composition and fierce quality than go to the making of a whole tribe of fops.”¹ One conceives a handsome, strong, intellectually able, high-spirited villain; but Shakspeare only starts the reader, the imagination does the rest.

384. (d) In such passages, Illusion is dispelled almost by a touch. Add but a word, and the effect is spoiled; many additional words veil the picture in a cloud that even the most vivid imagination can not penetrate. Indeed, when the conception desired by the writer is offensive or horrible, such additions are made *aforethought*, in order to temper the otherwise unendurable effect.² Thus, the crook-backed Earl of Gloucester paints his own portrait;—

“But I, that am not *shaped for sportive tricks,*
Not made to court an amorous looking-glass;
 I that am rudely stamp'd, and want love's majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
 I, that am curtail'd of this fair proportion,
 Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
 Deform'd, unfinish'd, sent before my time
 Into this breathing world, scarce half made up
 And that so lamely and unfashionable,
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them;
 Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace,
 Have no delight to pass away the time
 Unless to *spy my shadow in the sun*
 And *descant on mine own deformity.*”³

The words in italics alone help the reader to conjure up the monster whose crimes form the story of the play: the rest serve only to break the otherwise offensive impression.

385. (r) Hence, the failure of many descriptions in novels and poems. At best they are but faithful copies of their originals, interesting enough as such, but destitute of the picturesque. At other times, they fall as flat as a handbill announcing the personal details of a lost child or a stray horse. Most readers skip them, impatient of the delay they cause; and this, although a wide-spread opinion of their excellence inclines these readers to believe themselves guilty in so doing. Mr. R. D. Blackmore, for example, is famed for his descriptions both of forest and of sea-shore scenery. Yet even with really suggestive descriptions he mixes dreary inventories. Nowelhurst Hall, as a house “too

¹ *King Lear*, I. ii. 7.

² Lessing, xxiii.

³ Richard III., I. i. 14.

respectable for any loose doings of any sort,” or as the prospective home of the retired seaman, sets the reader's imagination to work; but what of the rest of this paragraph?

“Nowelhurst Hall looks too respectable for any loose doings of any sort. It stands well away from the weeping of trees, like virtue shy of sentiment, and therefore has all the wealth of foliage shed, just where it pleases, around it. From a rising ground the house has sweet view of all the forest changes, and has seen three hundred springs wake in glory, and three hundred autumns waning. Spreading away from it wider, wider slopes ‘the chase,’ as they call it, with great trees stretching paternal arms in the vain attempt to hold it. For two months of the twelve, when the heather is in blossom, all that chase is a glowing reach of amaranth and purple. Then it fades away to pale orange, dim olive, and a rusty-brown when Christmas shudders over it; and so throughout young green and russet, till the July tint comes back again. Sometimes in the spring morning the black cocks—‘heathpoult,’ as they call them—lift their necks in the livening heather, swell their ruffling breasts, and crow for their rivals to spar with them. Below the chase the whiskers of the curling wood converge into a giant beard, tufted here and there with views of a varying richness; but for the main of it, swelling and waving, crisping, fronding, feathering, coying, and darkening here and there, until it reach the silver mirror of the spreading sea. And the seaman, looking upwards from the war-ship bound for India, looking back at his native land, for the last of all times it may be, over brush-wood waves, and billows of trees, and the long heave of the gorse-land: ‘Now, that's the sort of place,’ he says, as the distant gables listen: ‘the right sort of berth for our jolly old admiral, and me for his butler, please God, when we've licked them Crappos as they deserves.’”¹

So, writers of a far higher reputation err in the same way;—

“The Faun is the marble image of a young man, leaning his right arm on the trunk or stump of a tree; one hand hangs carelessly by his side; in the other he holds the fragment of a pipe, or some such sylvan instrument of music. His only garment—a lion's skin, with the claws upon his shoulder—falls half way down his back, leaving the limbs and entire front of the figure nude. The form, thus displayed, is marvellously graceful, but has a fuller and more rounded outline, more flesh,

¹ *Cradock Nowell*, ch. i.

and less of heroic muscle than the old sculptors were wont to assign to their types of masculine beauty. The character of the face corresponds with the figure; it is most agreeable in outline and features, but rounded and somewhat voluptuously developed, especially about the throat and chin; the nose is almost straight, but very slightly curves inward, thereby acquiring an indescribable charm of geniality and humor. The mouth, with its full yet delicate lips, seems so nearly to smile outright, that it calls forth a responsive smile. The whole ~~statue—unlike~~ anything else that ever was wrought in that severe material of marble—conveys the idea of an amiable and sensual creature, easy, mirthful, apt for jollity, yet not incapable of being touched by pathos. It is impossible to gaze long at this stone image without conceiving a kindly sentiment towards it, as if its substance were warm to the touch, and imbued with actual life. It comes very close to some of our pleasantest sympathies.¹

What idea does one who has never heard of a faun get of this statue? And does not each man who has heard of and conceived a faun simply replace the printed words with his own previously imagined idea? Such descriptions may sometimes be necessary;² but they add nothing to the novel as a work of art.

386. Even though most strongly tempted to inventory-description, one writer³ has set a good example in resisting the temptation;—

“But, after all, the great wonder, the glory, of these Pompeian houses is in their frescoes. If I tried to give an idea of the luxury of color in Pompeii, the most gorgeous adjectives would be as poorly able to reproduce a vivid and glowing sense of those hues as the photography which now copies the drawing of the decorations; so I do not try.”

387. (*f*) Descriptions of the “inventory” kind, however, are useful in many subjects, and often necessary. They properly begin with an outline, (comprehensive statement, general plan,) the details of which are to be filled in afterwards. This outline may even rise to the picturesque; for it may serve, as does the plate that accompanies and illustrates the text, to present the description as a whole. For example, Hawthorne, in the passage quoted above, doubtless believed a detailed picture of

¹ Hawthorne, *The Marble Faun*, ch. i.

² 387, below.

³ W. D. Howells, *Italian Journeys*, p. 99.

the Faun necessary; as, equally without doubt, he believed the many descriptions of his romance essential to its local coloring. But, to lighten the reader's task, he sets out the object fully in his first sentence,—“the marble image of a young man . . . figure nude,”—and then fills in the details. Indeed, it is only these first sentences that aid the imagination: the rest may address the understanding, but they add nothing, perhaps, to the picture. So, in the following description of a portrait of Edmund Spenser,¹ the writer possibly had no alternative; but it may be questioned how far an artist painting from this description would reproduce the original;—

“Short curling hair, a full moustache, cut after the pattern of Lord Leicester's, close-clipped beard, heavy eyebrows, and under them thoughtful brown eyes, whose upper eyelids weigh them dreamily down; a long and straight nose, strongly developed, answering to a long and somewhat spare face, with a well-formed sensible-looking forehead; a mouth almost obscured by the moustache, but still showing rather full lips, denoting feeling, well set together, so that the warmth of feeling shall not run riot, with a touch of sadness in them.”

388. (*g*) Where a picture is too extended for presentation on a single canvas, a succession of views may be brought forward, a sort of panorama or series of dissolving views. This method of description has been aptly called “*the traveller's point of view*,” and is much used. Its advantage is in its combining the vividness of picturesque description with the special fitness of language to narrate. The plan has been successfully pursued by M. Taine in his *Tour through the Pyrenees*;—

“The carriage leaves Eaux-Bonnes at dawn. The sun is scarcely yet risen, and is still hidden by the mountains. Pale rays begin to color the mosses on the western declivity. These mosses, bathed in dew, seem as if awakening under the first caress of the day. Rosy hues, of an inexpressible softness, rest on the summits, then steal down along the slopes. One could never have believed that these gaunt old creatures were capable of an expression so timid and so tender. The light broadens, heaven expands, the air is filled with joy and life. A bald peak in the midst of the rest, and darker than they, stands out in an aureole of flame. All at once, between two serrate points, like a dazzling arrow, streams the first ray of the sun.”

¹ G. W. Kitchin, Clarendon Press Edition of Spenser's *Faery Queen*.

Subsequent sections describe the country beyond Pan, and the towns of Coarraze, Lestelle with its chapel, Saint P^é, and Lourdes. Here and there appears a thread of narrative, like the first sentence in the paragraph quoted; but oftener the mere mention of a new place keeps up the sense of movement.

389. (h) Description is often involved in other kinds of composition. A narrative may be simply a string of bead-like descriptions upon a slender thread of story; an argument may be rendered more convincing by a vivid presentation of the scenes to which reference is made; while, in appeals to the feelings or efforts to arouse the will, descriptions of the objects of feeling or of the ends proposed often constitute the whole work. Examples are Taine's *Iyrenees*, just cited; Webster's well-known description of the murder of Mr. White, at Salem, Mass.; and his notable (but less known) picture of the "few old gray-headed, poor, and broken warriors of the Revolution" who appealed to Congress in 1828 for relief in their decrepitude.

(3) DIVISION.

390. Division is governed by the following laws,² applications of Canons (1), (2) and (4), § 289;—

(a) It must proceed from the given genus to the species immediately below,—from *proximate* genus to *proximate* species. For example, *animals* are properly divided into *vertebrates*, *articulates*, etc.; each of these *sub-kingdoms* into its *classes*; each *class* into its *orders*; and so on. A division into *men*, *fishes*, *reptiles*, etc., would be scientifically useless.

(b) There must be but one *principle of division*; though the same *divisum* may often be classified *successively* upon several different principles. Thus, a library cannot be arranged at once by *subject*, *size*, and *cost*; though all the books it contains may be *successively* arranged by each of these distinctions.

(c) The classes obtained must be *mutually exclusive*, and, of course, will be, if rule (b) is strictly applied. Otherwise, they overlap, and the mind is puzzled rather than aided by the attempt at explanation. Thus to classify men as *Jews*, *Mohammedans*, and *Believers in God* would be faulty, since both Jews and Mohammedans are also believers in the true God.

² Atwater, *Logic*.

(d) The sum of all the parts should exactly equal the *divisum*. For example, the sum of the classes *organic* and *inorganic substances* exactly equals the *divisum chemicals*.—This rule is simply an extension of rule (b).

(e) Division *a priori*, (into one class and its inevitable contradictory; e. g., *partridges* and *not-partridges*;) is "a completely useless division." A useful division presents all the classes needed to exhibit the theme. At the same time, a convenient designation for a number of objects or even a number of classes often results from an *a priori* division. Thus, the terms *non-metals*, *invertebrates*, etc. are valuable designations, however useless as heads of a classification.

(4) PARTITION.

391. The laws of Partition are the same as those of Division except rule (a). For example, to distribute the component parts of *Man* into *head*, *limbs*, and *mental or moral faculties*; to assign his *liver* and his *heart* to the class *entrails*, but his *kidneys* to another class, *members*; to omit any of his component parts; or to describe him as made up of *feet* or *hands* and *all his other parts*;—Each would be an invalid partition.

(5) EXEMPLIFICATION.

392. As a means to Explanation, examples must be,—

(a) *Intelligible* or even *familiar* to the persons addressed; as, *the immediate neighborhood* of a child's home by way of teaching him Geography, political or physical;

(b) *Enough in number* to relieve all difficulties, and to cover every point of the subject to be explained; as a mere *handful* of words to show how the addition of *s* forms the usual English plural; but *many* and *carefully chosen* sentences to exhibit the nature of English syntax;

(c) *Simple at first*, if possible; *more complicated afterwards*, if necessary; as, the ordinary *suction-pump* by way of preliminary description of the steam-engine; many and more intricate examples by way of detailed illustration of its construction;

(d) *Free from all distracting circumstances*; as, wholesome, natural stories in illustration of right living, not sentimental

or even sensational love-tales that debauch the intellect while they fail either to arouse the feelings or to stimulate the will.¹

393. In systematic treatises, examples must usually follow the rules or principles they explain; but they may often and with advantage stand first, arousing the reader's curiosity and stimulating his mind to unwonted effort. Thus, long before a child can conceive the idea *noun*, he can be made familiar with the office of nouns in a sentence. Then to teach him that nouns are the names of objects is an easy task; whereas the reverse of this process has perhaps never been successful. The child has learned the required definition by heart, has committed the examples in the same useless fashion, and, after all, has learned both definition and function of the part of speech (if, indeed, he has learned them at all) in the exercise of *parsing*. Many recent and most approved modes of teaching the objective sciences, Botany, Mineralogy, *etc.*, proceed on this plan.

6. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST.

394. Comparison and Contrast includes not only the *direct* methods of exhibiting objects in the light of their resemblances and their differences, but also the *indirect* methods of *Repetition*, *Obverse Repetition*, *Illustration*, and the *Presentation of Difficulties*. Repetition and Illustration are indirect methods of Comparison; Obverse Repetition and the Presentation of Difficulties, indirect methods of Contrast. Repetition adds to a statement already complete another or others like it in thought but different in expression. For example;—

“Rugged furrows, seamed with yawning gashes; reddish wounds, torn and crossed by pallid wounds; scar upon scar.”²

Illustration compares examples under the rule or principle with similar cases not under the rule or principle. For example;—

“Could knights in armor pursue the herdsman into his bog? What could they have taken as prisoners, except a few half-starved goats? The daring climbers, hunters of the bear and

¹The rules are condensed from Bain.

²Taine, *Pyrenees*, p. 170.

[the] wolf, would willingly have played at this game, sure of winning at it warm clothes, arms, and horses. It is *thus*¹ that independence has lasted in Switzerland.”

Obverse Repetition adds to a statement its contradictory denied. For example;—

“Beside him sat an English girl and her mother. The young woman had not succeeded in extinguishing herself, she was frozen at her birth.”

The Presentation of Difficulties is the method of stating objections *etc.* to truth, only in order to contrast them when refuted with the truth itself. Thus, Paley's *Moral Philosophy* “proceeds in the *disquisition*”, only after the reader's “own doubts and solicitude about” the question to be discussed have been excited. In other subjects than Moral Philosophy, a capital incentive to *hard work* is a humiliating sense of one's own *ignorance*.

(II.) ARGUMENT.

395. The theme in Argument is always a *judgment*, the assertion of the agreement or the non-agreement of two terms; for example, *The whale is not a fish*; *The Constitution of the United States ought to be amended*. The Discussion establishes the truth or falsity of this judgment;—in other words, *convinces* the reader that the judgment is true or false.

396. This judgment, however, is not always given as the *subject of composition*. In actual work, subjects are rarely so presented: they rather come in a shape not prepared for discussion; for example, the case at law, the fact of a crime—a fact that demands explanation—that is, tracing to a criminal as its author; *etc.* In the usual school or college exercises, it is, therefore, an excellent plan, in order to allow the writer the greatest freedom.

¹So far the case referred to is that of the people of Bigorre: now the *similar* case of Switzerland is cited.—The words *illustration* and *example*, however are often exchanged.

in choosing his proposition, to state subjects as broadly as possible: then the particular judgment that it is proposed to establish,—the judgment, in other words, that is selected as proposition,—must often be determined with great care.

Thus, suppose a writer had a subject assigned him as Cowper had when Lady Austen bade him write her a poem on *The Sofa*. He might do as Cowper did, string on this slender thread many and diverse pearls of thought, bringing all modes of discussion, perhaps, under contribution in the course of his work; or, reaching more or less immediately one of Cowper's propositions,—

"Like a coy maiden, Ease, when courted most,
Farthest retires,"—

he might make this judgment his proposition, developing and establishing the moral truths contained in it. Even when the subject admits of only argumentative treatment, no little skill may be used in stating the proposition. A certain sermon on the text, "And Jesus stood before the governor: and the governor asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And Jesus said unto him, Thou sayest," argued the dilemma, "Either Jesus was what he claimed to be, the long-expected Messiah, or he was an out and out impostor."

37. The work of determining exactly what is the question involved in a given subject, is materially promoted by a knowledge of the meaning of the following terms;—(a) the *subject* of discussion, (b) the *question raised*, (c) the *point at issue*. The subject of discussion is the theme stated in its most general terms; for example, *Liberty*. The question raised is the particular question proposed for argument under this subject; for example, Is liberty an inalienable right of man's? The point at issue is the special question on the answer to which the question raised must turn; for example, Ought the power to control (govern) oneself to be a condition to the enjoyment of liberty? The theme in Argument then will be, The power to control (govern) oneself ought (or ought not) to be a condition to the enjoyment

of liberty. So, the resistance of the American colonies in the last century was ungrateful rebellion, if the point at issue between them and the home government was the refusal of the colonies to pay a mere pittance begged of them to relieve the burdens of the motherland; but, if that point was the right of the home government to impose taxes on British subjects without the consent of their representatives in Parliament, then the resistance was lawful opposition to tyranny.

398. The judgment thus obtained as the point at issue in any argument, may be (a) "known both in its matter and in its truth" or (b) "unknown either as to its truth or as to both its matter and its truth."¹ In (b) it is an *Hypothesis*, a tentative judgment held only for the purposes of *Investigation*: in (a) it is a *Theory*, an established principle exhibited for the purposes of *Conviction*. Thus, when Galileo, first suspected the motion of the earth, his proposed judgment, the earth moves, simply was an hypothesis. Kepler and Newton, who established the truth of Galileo's suspicion, placed the judgment in the category of theories. To-day a widely received hypothesis of electricity regards it as a subtle force possessing certain attributes and qualities: as yet no theory of electricity has been evolved.

399. In all cases, Argument proceeds by the exhibition of PROOFS,—“the conceptions or judgments on which the proposition to be confirmed depends.”² The general nature of this process is set forth in Logic, and does not properly belong to Rhetoric; but certain truths of Logic essential to the due comprehension of the rhetorical laws, must be briefly stated.

400. (a) Reasoning is (a) *Immediate*, from one judgment directly to another; (b) *Mediate*, from one judgment to another through a third. For example, (a) All men are mortal; No man is immortal. (b) All M is P; All S is M; All S is P.

¹ Day, § 119.

² Day, §§ 125 ff.

401. (b) Proof is (a) *Direct*, "when applied immediately to the establishment of the proposition;" (b) *Indirect*, "when applied to the overthrow of objections."¹ (β) is known as *Refutation*. For example, (a) Daniel Webster,² defending the life-tenure of office for the Massachusetts judges by asserting that only with it could they be independent, cites the venality of the English judges before 1688, the noticeable change after the establishment of life-tenure for them, the illegal forfeiting of the colonial charter of Massachusetts by judges dependent on the Crown, and the complaint of the Declaration of Independence itself that the British King had made colonial judges venial by limiting their tenure of office. (β) In his famous speech on the Knapp trial, before he says one word on the direct evidence against the prisoner, he refutes certain objections on which the counsel for the defense had made no small part of their stand; *viz.*, that he had been brought into the case "to hurry" the jurymen "against the law and beyond the evidence," that unusual means had been taken to discover the perpetrators of the crime, *etc.* His replies to these objections are made, not as proving the guilt of the prisoner, but simply in order to free the minds of the jurymen from everything that might deprive the direct evidence of its full weight.

402. (c) Proofs have been classified and sub-classified as follows;—All proofs are either *Analytic* or *Synthetic*; Synthetic proofs are either *Intuitive* or *Empirical*; and Empirical proofs are *A priori*, *A posteriori*, and *Examples*.

Analytic proofs are given in the terms of the judgment itself; Synthetic proofs come from outside the judgment. Thus, the assertion, God did not create man a two-legged animal, and leave it to Aristotle to make him rational, carries with it its own proof, for the definition of man is *rational animal*; but the assertion, Man is mortal, contains nothing in either term by way of proof of the judgment.

Intuitive proofs are furnished by the mind itself; Empirical proofs, by experience. Thus, one's own existence is proved by one's own consciousness.³ That water freezes at a certain temperature, or that heat expands iron, can be known only from observation.

A priori proofs, or proofs from *Antecedent Probability*, are arguments from *whole to part*,—either from *substance to attribute*

¹ Day, § 125 ff. ² Remarks in the Mass. State Constitutional Convention.

³ "Cogito, ergo sum," said Descartes: "I think, therefore I exist."

or from *cause to effect*. *A posteriori* proofs, or *Signs*, are exactly the reverse of *a priori* proofs; they are arguments from *part to whole*,—either from *attribute to substance* or from *effect to cause*. Examples rest on "the common property or relation that exists between parts of the same whole."¹ They are arguments either by *Induction* or by *Analogy*. Thus, the facts that a certain substance is gold, and that a certain man, having swallowed a certain dose of arsenic, died shortly afterwards, are respectively *a priori* proofs that the substance is malleable, and that the dose of arsenic killed the man. *Vice versa*, the facts that gold has been dissolved by a single acid, and that water has frozen, are respectively *a posteriori* proofs that the acid was *selenic acid*, and that the temperature of the water had fallen to the freezing point or below it. The arguments by *Induction* and by *Analogy* can be exemplified by formulæ;—*A, B, C, etc.*, cases observed, all show a common property X: therefore, *D, E, F, etc.*,—all other like cases,—will show the same property; *A* and *B* resemble each other in having the common relation X: therefore, they will resemble each other in having the relation Y.

403. The words *cause* and *effect*, as used here, mean more than *physical cause* and *physical effect*. They intend anything that, in the loosest sense of the phrase, *accounts for* the effect, or which is *accounted for* by the cause. The inclusion of *substance* and *attribute*, too, in the definitions of *a priori* and *a posteriori* proofs seems just. Inferences from either to the other are certainly not examples; yet both are known by experience, and, therefore, proofs of them are empirical.

404. (d) Arguments of the several classes differ in value from apodictic certainty (a) to the lowest degree of mere probability. (a) Analytic and intuitive arguments are of class (a); empirical arguments never rise to apodictic certainty, but may reach the highest degree of probability. The weakest argument is that by *Analogy*: its chief use is to *refute objections* by showing that like objections in similar cases have no weight. Concurrent arguments, if drawn from wholly independent sources, are cumulative in force, but, otherwise, are of no greater value than each would be alone. This truth needs especially to be remembered in weighing Testimony or Authority, (*a posteriori* arguments respecting matters of *fact* or matters of *opinion*.)

¹ Day, § 147.

Either is truly cumulative, only when the several witnesses are undeniably independent.

405. The successful presentation of a new judgment may depend quite as much on (a) the state of the mind addressed, (b) the mode of presenting the proposition, or (c) the arrangement of the several proofs, as on the intrinsic value of these proofs. Each of these points, which are strictly rhetorical, needs elaboration.

406. (a) The mind addressed may be "without any belief;" "in weak faith," or "in positive disbelief;" and belief may vary in degree, "from a faint probability to absolute [apodictic] certainty."¹ In each case, the method of argumentation is in some respects different.

First, to a man who professes strict impartiality because he has as yet reached no conclusion on the subject of discussion, the method of Investigation may properly be proposed. For example, the value of the study of modern languages for discipline is both affirmed and denied: a discussion of the subject may, therefore, properly open with the question, Is the study of modern languages as conducive to mental discipline as the study of the ancient classics? *Secondly*, to one who believes, indeed, but is seeking further and stronger grounds for his weak faith, only supporting evidence should be presented; as to one whom it is proposed to rob of even his weak faith, only destructive argument should be addressed. "If a man will know of the doctrine whether it be of God," said the Saviour, "let him do the will of my Father which is in heaven;" that is, let him assume it true, and test its truth by practising it. On the other hand, modern Scepticism says, "Miracles are scientifically impossible; and the whole Christian system rests on the story of the Resurrection of Christ." *Thirdly*, when positive disbelief is to be met, two methods are possible;—either sudden, bold attack, in supreme confidence that one is right, or else wary approach through principles generally conceded, but which lead ultimately to the truths in dispute. For example, the public improvements that a certain city needs are refused by a state legislature the majority of which really believes that no necessity exists for the im-

¹ Day, § 130 f.

provements. In this case, argument may proceed either from a bold assumption that the buildings or water-works or apparatus for lighting or other such public arrangement is shabby or old-fashioned or long since insufficient, or else from a conciliatory setting out of the many beauties of the city; its advantageous situation, the natural pride every citizen of the state has in it as the metropolis of his state, and so on, until the point of safety has been reached at which the suggestion may be ventured that this really noteworthy city would be even more an object of everyone's affection and pride, were its buildings only newer, its main streets lighted by electricity, etc.

407. Compositions intended to be delivered can, of course, be the more easily accommodated in this respect; for the speaker is able, in many cases, to estimate fairly well his probable audience, while the writer is far less able to judge what readers his argument will reach. Hence, argument intended to be read must either be specifically addressed to one class of minds, or else cover ground enough to enable it to reach one class of readers after another. Thus, the argument by dilemma mentioned above¹ would have no weight with a man who denied the authenticity of the New Testament; Mr. Morrison's *Proofs of Christ's Resurrection*, a summary of the evidences to the Resurrection as an historical event, would have no weight with one who denied the possibility of such an event. A complete defence of Christianity must refute all the objections brought against it or likely to be brought against it.

408. (b) The Proposition must commonly be stated at the outset;² but, (a) if it is complex, it may be set forth *seriatim*; (β) if the subject is likely to be unpleasant, certain general considerations calculated to excite interest may be stated first; while (γ) if prejudices exist, only the general subject must be distinctly stated, and the proposition be brought in later, as if by way of necessary conclusion from conceded premises; or (δ) the question raised

¹ § 396.

² § 285, above.

may be proposed for investigation, and every care be taken to preserve absolute impartiality in the discussion. The last three cases need exemplification.

(α) In *Ad Fidem*, the Rev. Dr. Burr proposes, not only to present some of the evidences of Christianity, but to bring his hearers into a particular "moral state in which alone [he believes] they can fairly use the evidences." He therefore unfolds his plan little by little; his first eight lectures "prepare the ground" for his house; the rest "build it." (β) In the same work, (a volume of Parish Lectures, and addressed, therefore, not to believers only,) Dr. Burr evidently takes especial pains to make his subject attractive, and to postpone arguments that might prove unpleasant, until an interest in the general subject has been aroused. (γ) In another work, *Pater Noster*, Lectures addressed to the students of Amherst College, his plan is evidently that of allaying prejudices by proposing, in the extreme of fairness, to test Christianity by experience.

409. (c) The arrangement of the several proofs in an argument is also a matter of the first importance. It depends on the following principles;—

(α) The state of the mind addressed may influence the order. (α') If the hearer is without belief, or if there is "weak faith" to be strengthened, the less powerful arguments naturally stand first, so that the strongest impression may be made last. But to this rule circumstances may indicate exceptions. (α'') If there is "positive disbelief" to be overcome, this opposition must be borne down at once, and that by unmasking the "heaviest guns."¹ This done, the order of what follows is of secondary importance, except that the argument must not close so weakly as to leave an impression that damaging concessions have been made to the other side. Two methods of avoiding this unfortunate result have been suggested;—a capable reserve may be kept up to give "the finishing stroke;" or the arguments, exhibited from strong to weak, may be recapitulated in inverse order. The danger of tediousness, however, is always great in recapitulations.

¹ Cf. 406, *Thirdly, above*.—The two rules are not contradictory; for this rule refers only to the order of presenting the proofs, that to the whole process of argument.

(β) Proofs depend upon each other. "Some are explained by others; some presuppose others; some have great weight if preceded by certain others, and are of little moment unless so preceded." These principles determine the following rules;—(β') "*Analytic* proofs precede all others." The terms of the proposition must be explained; and proof that comes out during this process will clearly be of primary importance. (β'') *A priori* proofs precede both *signs* and *examples*. A sufficient cause once shown, (e.g., a motive to the commission of crime,) proofs from the effects of that cause back to the cause itself, or from examples of the action of such a cause back to the cause, acquire double weight: no amount of a *posteriori* proof or examples can make an allegation of crime seem probable, when no motive can be found for its commission.

410. The process of Argumentation varies further as the speaker has or has not on his side the *Burden of Proof* (*onus probandi*.) In the former case, he must make the attack, must act on the offensive: in the latter, (when he is said to have the *Presumption* in his favor,) he may simply stand on the defensive. The Greek word *apology* (*ἀπολογία*, a pleading off,) was once commonly used, and is still used occasionally, to denote an argument of this sort; though it may mean an argument, which, though really intended to enforce belief, takes the form of a reply to possible or actual objections. Thus, even in the early Christian centuries, when the *onus* was upon Christianity to establish its truth, and to convince men of its superiority to all other systems of religion, it nevertheless carried on its struggle with error, as it now does, chiefly by apologies.

411. The importance of determining on which side the Burden of Proof rests, lies, not only in the fact that thereby the labor of proving one's thesis may often be saved, but also (and still more) in the fact that to undertake to prove what may fairly be *presumed* is to endanger one's own position. It would be arrant folly to *volunteer* a defence of the veracity of a witness, till this had been impugned: the very offer to do so would arouse suspicion.

412. The Presumption is always on the side (*a*) of the *negative of every issue*,¹ (*b*) of *what exists*, as opposed to a change, (*c*) of the *innocence* of a person accused, and (*d*) of *what promotes the well being of men*, as opposed to what is restrictive and injurious. Thus;—

He who maintains that Anglo-Saxon is the same language as modern English, or that Shakspeare did *not* write the plays received as his, must show reasons for his thesis; the advocates of the substitution of modern languages for the classics in the college curriculum, or of the admission of women to colleges for men, certainly *had* the burden of proof, whether this has more recently shifted or not. So, charges against a man in politics, simply because he is in politics, on the assumption that all politicians are dishonorable men, fall of their own weight; as the reactionary policy of a Julian or a James the Second was censurable as tending to impair the prosperity of his realm.

413. Presumptions may be *opposed to each other*; or they may shift from one side to the other, even in the course of a single argument.

Thus, the presumption that once existed against the admission of scientific and modern language studies to the college curriculum has been borne down by the opposing presumption in favor of what will benefit mankind; the allegation that the education of women should be as thorough and as advanced as that of men finds few disputants, however much men (and women, too) may question the propriety of admitting women to men's colleges. So, Luther nailed theses to the church-door at Wittenberg; while to-day, in Luther's and all the other protestant churches, the burden of proof rests on a *non-protestant* theology. In a single suit at law the presumption raised by a charge in a "book of original entry" may be shifted to the defendant's side by a showing of fraudulent book-keeping or of a receipt for the amount claimed.

In the first case a balance must be struck, and a decision be reached by this means; while, in all the cases specified,—espe-

¹That is, on the side that does not make the affirmation. This affirmation may be a negative judgment, or the negative side of the issue may be expressed in an affirmative judgment. For example, *The earth does not move*, or *The sun does move* (if now opposed to the established truth that the earth moves round the sun.)

cially when the argument is by way of refutation,—it is politic as well as right to concede whatever the other side can fairly claim.

414. Argument is often joined in the same discourse with Explanation,—as, of the terms employed, the attendant circumstances, *etc.*¹ Such explanations may commonly be placed in the introduction; but they may sometimes be better inserted between the parts of the argument. The self-evident rule on this point is to place such helps to the proofs where they will help most,—especially where they will best serve to render the argument intelligible and convincing.

415. Further, certain personal relations,—for example, between the speaker and his opponent, the speaker and his audience, *etc.*,—as well as certain relations between the audience and the proposition advanced, the mode of discussion, and the occasion of speaking, may also demand attention in an argumentative composition. Such matter will commonly stand in the introduction; or, if it must be admitted into the body of the discourse, should always be distinctly marked as constituting a digression. An introduction of this kind has been called the Introduction Conciliatory. Thus, Mr. Webster, in a speech on the Panama mission,² defends his own *consistency* in opposing a certain amendment, and in the same speech, describes as follows the special relations he and his fellow public men held to the questions before them as representatives of a great people;—

"Mr. Chairman: it is our fortune to be called upon to act our part, as public men, at a most interesting era in human affairs. The short period of your life, and of mine, has been thick and crowded with the most important events. Not only new interests and new relations have sprung up among States, but new societies, new nations, and families of nations, have risen to take their places, and perform their parts, in the order

¹A notable, and very familiar, example is Webster's description (in the Knapp murder case) of the death of old Mr. White.

²U. S. House of Representatives, April, 1826.

and the intercourse of the world. Every man, aspiring to the character of a statesman, must endeavor to enlarge his views to meet this new state of things. He must aim at adequate comprehension, and instead of being satisfied with that narrow political sagacity, which, like the power of minute vision, sees small things accurately, but can see nothing else, he must look to the far horizon, and embrace, in his broad survey, whatever the series of recent events has brought into connexion, near or remote, with the country whose interests he studies to serve."

416. The Conclusion of an argumentative composition is generally occupied with a summary of the argument presented. The full force of an argument is more or less dissipated, of course, by the necessity the writer—much more the speaker—is under of presenting it part by part: the summary serves to bring these parts into their smallest compass, and thus to show their relations. But the conclusion may also be either explanatory or further confirmatory; and it is frequently occupied with an appeal to the feelings or the will. In the latter cases, it will be guided by rules to be stated below.

(III.) EXCITATION.

417. The theme in Excitation is always an object of thought towards which the feelings may be called out. Hence, it will always be expressed by a noun or noun-clause; as, "The Sufferings of the Poor," or "That the poor are suffering."

418. Passion is aroused either by *Pathetic Explanation*, the proper setting forth of the object of feeling, or by the *Employment of Sympathy*. The latter alone will excite blind, unintelligent feeling, for "passion" (as Antony says) "is catching;" but both fairness and good policy urge the laying of a sufficient ground for the feeling appealed to. *Vice versa*, while explanation alone may suffice to evoke feeling, an unsympathetic speaker or one who is plainly "acting his part" will inevitably fail of

his end: dispassion, too, is catching; and discovered hypocrisy only disgusts. Pathetic Explanation is effected by the processes set forth under the head of Explanation above; but these processes will be modified according to principles to be stated presently. The Employment of Sympathy is governed by rules entirely its own.

419. Regard for the persons addressed is nowhere more imperative than here: "ignorance or mistake may occasion an entire failure."¹ Three states of mind are, of course, possible,—favorable disposition, indifference, and unfavorable disposition. A mind favorably disposed or indifferent may be approached directly; but a mind that is in a position of unqualified antagonism must be addressed with great caution. In this case, the unfavorable feeling must first be allayed; or "other feelings, in their nature incompatible with those to be allayed, and yet not directly opposed to them, may be awakened, and thus the unfavorable feelings be displaced."² Prof. Day cites an apt example of these two methods;—

Brutus, who finds the people disposed to demand rather grimly the reasons why their favorite, Cæsar, was murdered, appeals to their love of country, and so displaces their love for Cæsar; Antony most craftily hides his real feeling, "appears, at first, as the friend of Brutus, disclaims all intentions of praising Cæsar, gets the attention of the crowd, fixes it on Cæsar, and then, though at first he speaks of Cæsar's faults, gradually passes to defend his character." The effect is just what Antony intended. The rage of his hearers at Cæsar's usurpations and tyranny gradually subsides; Brutus's warnings are forgotten; the feelings of the mob are turned in the opposite direction; and they leave Antony, clamoring furiously for the blood of Cæsar's enemies."

420. The place of the Proposition in Excitatory Discourse has been much debated. Whately thinks that an appeal to the feelings should never "be introduced as

¹Day, § 189.

²Day, § 191.—Day's whole passage, §§ 185-208, is worth careful study.

such, and plainly avowed;" for, if the purpose is to suggest motives that the hearer ought not to act on, then plainly cautious approach is necessary; whereas, even if the motives are such as he may rightly act on, the hearer will nevertheless resent "the apparent assumption of superiority in a speaker who seems to say, 'Now I will exhort you to feel as you ought on this occasion;' 'I will endeavor to inspire you with such noble, and generous, and amiable sentiments as you ought to entertain;' which is, in effect, the tone of him who avows the purpose of Exhortation."¹ But, as Day points out, bad as "*such* avowals of intention are on every principle of correct taste," it is their form, rather than their being avowals of intention that is objectionable; and they are as objectionable in one sort of discourse as in another. "In pronouncing a eulogy," for instance, "in endeavoring to inspire sentiments of confidence and courage," or "in seeking to strengthen the sentiment of Christian gratitude for the blessings of the gospel," there surely can be no impropriety in setting the Proposition at or near the beginning of the work; or, if there is, the Thanksgiving Day preacher blunders who proposes "the timely fruits of the earth" as a reason for gratitude to God, and Demosthenes was no orator when he told the Athenians that, if Philip's growing power had not made them afraid, he would briefly give them reasons for entertaining such a fear.² Whately's statement is by far too sweeping: the truth is, that, in Excitation,—and, indeed, in discourse of all kinds,—the Proposition *must* stand wherever it will *contribute most* to the end in view in writing. Doubtless, reasons will often exist for postponing its introduction; but, *vice versa*, good reasons often determine its bold presentation at the start. *Other things being equal*, Variety may be allowed to control a writer in this particular.

¹ II. ii. § 1.

² 194.

421. When, however, opposition is reasonably to be expected, or when known prejudices are to be met, a gradual approach to the subject is judicious. Obscurity as to what the speaker "is coming to" will excite curiosity and secure attention; adroit management will also engage the interest; and thus the most resolute opponent will be outgeneralled.

For example, a famous living preacher, who has loosened more purse-strings, and led the way to more true charity, perhaps, than any other one man, always approaches his theme gradually. Perhaps without intention, though apparently by intention, he announces a text that does not even suggest a "begging" sermon. The flood of his eloquence is irresistible. Before they know it, his listeners are committed to principles the logical consequences of which they little suspect; and then a sudden turn in the sermon applies one or more of these principles to the charity, the church-work, the toiling and suffering missionaries. The generous response of the audience is secured; and the indirect approach has accomplished infinitely more than a direct appeal could have achieved. A feeling of agreeable surprise is felt, almost epigrammatic in its power, and resistance is disarmed. On the other hand, the case of another preacher is doubtless typical. He was famous for sermons of this class that were simple presentations of the "object," supported by the most irresistible logic. They were always announced on the previous Sunday, they always occupied the whole hour, (Dr. — never preached short sermons,) and they always presented a distinctly avowed proposition, "This object demands your unqualified sympathy and support." The preacher was not eloquent, except as worthy thought is always eloquent; his manner was quiet, but deeply charged with sincere sympathy with his subject; yet his congregations were never smaller on one Sunday than on another; and it was actually said of him that men who went to church resolved not to give, always gave liberally before they came away.

422. The presentation of the *object* of feeling—the process already called Pathetic Explanation—is governed by certain special rules. These, as stated by Prof. Day, are four; but Day's first and third rules may conveniently be combined;—

423. (a) The Canon of Selection must have wide scope in Pathetic Explanation. Only those points or features in the object that are especially adapted to the feelings or sentiments to be awakened, and only the most prominent and striking features and outlines of the object should be presented. More will only obscure the reader's view, and so tend to defeat the writer's aim. In the passage already cited from Shakspeare's *Julius Cæsar*, Brutus speaks mainly of Cæsar's usurpations, Antony mainly of his love for the people; and each selects the details especially suited to his own purpose.

424. (b) Particular rather than general views of the object must be taken. Examples under this law, too, will be found in the extract from the *Julius Cæsar*. So, Sheridan's Invective against Warren Hastings describes "the paroxysm, fever, and delirium," the natives hastening their own death by tearing open their wounds, and their prayers to God that their blood might cry aloud for vengeance.

425. (c) Clearness and distinctness are not necessary; something may wisely be left to the imagination. Thus, Antony does not tell the Roman mob how much Cæsar had left each citizen in his will; and, in fact, he did not dare to, the amount was so small.—In the motto, "Not one cent for tribute, millions for defence," the accurate "one cent" expresses the conclusion the American people had reached, not to yield to tyranny, while the vague "millions" was an appeal to patriotism.

426. The emotion that controls the speaker's mind, and into sympathy with which he would bring his hearer, may be expressed either directly or indirectly. By the first method it appears naturally: rein is given to his feeling. By the second method, the feeling appears only "by glimpses." A sob that will break through one's self-control,—the "One, two, three, fire; he's dead!" of the maniac duellist,—and Antony's cunning disclosure of his love for Cæsar,—are apt examples of the second method cited by Prof. Day.

(IV.) PERSUASION.

427. The object in Persuasion is always to move the will, to urge it to a resolve to do or not to do a certain

act, to adopt or to refuse to adopt a certain course of conduct. This act or course of action is the theme of the composition, and is, of course, expressed by a noun or a noun-clause. For example, *Repentance; I will arise and go to my father; Your man shan't stand; Not one cent for tribute, millions for defence.*

428. Persuasion proceeds (a) by explaining the decision urged, (b) by assigning motives. Hence, fair and judicious Persuasion involves Explanation, Argument, and Excitation.

Thus, Edmund Burke, endeavoring to dissuade the British parliament from levying taxes on America, first explains that the whole scheme was a going "out of the plain high road of finance," a giving "up of most certain revenues and the clearest interests, merely for the sake of insulting the Colonies;" then argues that, while tea could readily "bear an imposition of three-pence, no commodity will bear three-pence, or will bear a penny, when the general feelings of men are irritated, and two millions of men are resolved not to pay;" and finally appeals to the interest of England itself in favor of a conciliatory policy towards America.

At the same time, the will, like the feelings, may be influenced unintelligently, and then but too often wrongly.

429. A motive is anything that "occasions or induces free action in man." By a minute classification, moral philosophers have distinguished motives according to several principles; but these the writer will learn best from the books of Moral Philosophy. However interesting a summary of these principles might be, and great as their value undoubtedly is to the writer, their discussion except at a length that would be out of all proportion to the necessary limits of the present work, is dangerous. The following general truths, however, may be at least stated;—

(a) Motives differ in strength, and, hence, consummate skill is often required in their presentation.

(β) Motives high "in their own purity and excellence are ever to be preferred;" and such as are lower in character

should always be exhibited as subordinate to the higher, or as reinforcing them. The good of mankind, the promotion of public ends, the reasonableness of considering others' rights as well as one's own,—these and other such motives are superior to feelings of narrow selfishness or of a brutal intrusion upon the rights or privileges of others. Honor, the doctrine of *noblesse oblige*, etc., are other examples.

(b) Motives must be chosen by "the specific tendencies of the minds addressed." For example, a notably selfish man can rarely first be reached by an appeal to his consideration of others, a coarse man by feelings of delicacy, a bigoted man by the beauty of toleration.

(c) The larger the audience, "the more freely may the higher motives be urged, since the higher are the more universal." Doubtful as this statement may seem, it is unquestionable. The mass as a whole, whatever may be true of individuals, is most susceptible to the noblest influences. Pessimistic views on this topic are as untrue as they are depressing.

430. The state of the mind addressed is a vital question: success in persuasion requires prudence, tact, high intelligence, and remarkable powers of other sorts. The mind addressed may be in any of three states;—(a) Indecision, (b) Indifference, (c) Adverse decision. In each case great care, sometimes extreme strategy, will be required in one's approach. Many a failure to persuade is doubtless explained by the unwariness, the awkwardness, sometimes the downright brutality, with which the attempt was begun. It is far easier to talk a man into stubborn resistance than to bring him into intelligent compliance. Especially, when efforts are made to induce a victim of some evil habit to abandon that habit, caution, deep sympathy, the avoidance of everything that may even seem like self-assertion or self-sufficiency, are absolutely necessary. It was the remark of a most pious woman, deeply stirred by the sight of the sin and misery around her, that, in her opinion, the first lesson a minister of the gospel needed to learn, was a knowledge of his fellow men and of human nature.

431. The rule for the Proposition is the same as in Excitation: it may safely be announced whenever the needs of the discourse shall demand it. To spring the proposition on a prejudiced listener is, indeed, unwise; but there is surely as great imprudence in arousing his suspicion by evidently talking "all round" the subject, because one is afraid to declare it.

432. The Arrangement of a persuasive discourse will be determined mainly by the laws thus laid down. Of course, regard must also be had to the purpose in writing; and the student must remember that, in all kinds of composition, any principle of Rhetoric may for the nonce be of superior weight to the special rule for the particular subject in hand. But, other things being equal, a knowledge of the persons addressed, and a careful estimate of the real character of the motives to be presented, will give method to persuasion. One truth, however, should never be forgotten, that, although it may sometimes be necessary to approach men through an unworthy appeal to their lower natures, yet the work of persuasion can not rightly be looked upon as ended, till action has been secured based on the higher, and, therefore, sufficient, grounds. Otherwise, the writer may fail of his end, or even find that he has only induced a stubborn continuance in regretted courses of action or a stubborn refusal to move from the ground first taken.

APPENDIX.

I. THE DEFINITION OF RHETORIC.

Two objections have been brought against Prof. Day's definition of Rhetoric, accepted in the text;—(1) That it is equally true of Grammar; (2) That it characterizes Rhetoric only as an art. Each of these objections demands attention.

First, According to the objectors, Grammar as well as Rhetoric teaches the laws of speech and writing: Rhetoric seeks to make discourse effective; it teaches men, not only how to convey intelligence to other minds, but how to obtain over these other minds a mastery. The time-honored definition of Grammar describes it as teaching men how to speak and write. Surely Rhetoric is something more than this; and in what, if not in adapting discourse to its purpose, or end in view?

But all this proceeds upon a time-honored misconception of the office of Grammar, which has not necessarily anything to do with speaking and writing. Grammar seeks only to discover and establish in a system the theory of the sentence: Rhetoric deals with the whole composition, and with the sentence as only one part of this whole. Grammar is not an art, but a science: it aims at knowledge, not at skill.¹ The ancient definition of Grammar simply confused it with Composition; for, the moment Grammar gives lessons in composition, that moment it becomes Rhetoric, on however low a plane. Campbell long ago commented on the close-lying border lands of Grammar and Rhetoric; and, but for his faulty definition of Rhetoric, he might have commented, also, on the erroneous definition of Grammar. Further, the words *effective, etc.* add nothing to Prof. Day's definition of Rhetoric: the qualification they express is already in the word *art*; for all arts aim at efficiency. and the only possible results of adding a qualifying term to the definition are to set up a tautology and to give color to the unjust aspersion of Rhetoric as an art that teaches an *unusual, bookish, or fussily ornamented* style of writing—the very mode

¹ See p. 331, below.

of expression that a true Rhetoric pillories as mere "jewelry and rouge,"—the acme of the unrhethorical, because it is unnatural and displeasing to every cultivated mind.

Secondly, Rhetoric is often defined as a science as well as an art; but in no true sense is Rhetoric a science. It discovers nothing; it simply states laws that are true in the nature of man, and grounded on principles furnished by its nomothetical sciences.¹ To argue this question fully needs the light of certain distinctions to be set out in the next section of this Appendix. Before passing to these distinctions, however, a glance must be thrown at several other definitions of Rhetoric, ancient or even still adopted by many writers.

(1) The Ancients, whose only means of addressing large bodies was speech, and who had only written books, and but few of them, naturally thought of Rhetoric as the art of *Oratory, or Spoken Discourse*. (2) Many writers, both ancient and modern, have limited the art to *Prose Composition*, excluding Poetry (for both Romance and Poetry) as fine arts. **The end of Poetry (and Romance), they say, is to please; while Rhetoric strives after an outward end, "that mastery over other minds which it does not quietly wait for, but obtains by a struggle."**² (3) Whately, accepting Aristotle's dictum, "Rhetoric is an offshoot [*ἀντιρροπος*] from Logic," still further limits Rhetoric to *Argument*, and practically considers *Persuasion* as the end of the art. (4) On the other hand Quintilian extended the province of the art. In his view, Rhetoric was "more like an encyclopædia of all arts and sciences, than a limited and specific branch of knowledge."³ It included "everything that could conduce to the attainment of the object proposed—Law, Morals, Politics, etc., on the ground that a knowledge of these subjects is requisite to enable a man to speak well on them."⁴

Of these definitions, the following criticisms seem just. (1) The Ancients' definition of Rhetoric was due solely to their circumstances. Had they known printed books, or had seen the manuscript copies of their books, I have no doubt, they would doubtless have extended the scope of their art. As things were, they were by no means ignorant that much of their teaching applied equally to writing.⁵ (2) The restriction of Rhetoric to *Prose Composition* is often useful by way of limiting the scope

¹ § 16, above.

² § 73, above.

³ Theremin, *Eloquence A Virtue*, I. ii.

⁴ Shedd, *Literary Essays*, p. 106.

⁵ Whately, § 1.

of a text-book or a course of study; but it can not be maintained in a definition of the art. Many rules apply equally well in all kinds of compositions; and any restriction would be unscientific. (3) So, too, with regard to the proposed limiting of Rhetoric to *Argument or Persuasion*: the full definition of the art is squarely against the advocates of restriction; and nothing would be gained by it, but much lost. (4) Quintilian's extension of the art is equally unwise. Rhetoric is no more maker of knowledge to supply the known laws of a science, as Architecture is Architecture to supply bricks or mortar or other materials for building. One might almost as well insist upon its founding men with mental faculties. At the same time, the old notion that only a well-intentioned man can write well, in this art, as everywhere in nature, nothing comes out of nothing, —is an important truth. Dr. Shedd's maxim, printed on the title-page of this volume, is even more binding on the writer, who addresses his thousands, than on the speaker, who has comparatively a small audience.

II. THE SCIENCES THAT GIVE LAWS TO RHETORIC.

The relations of Rhetoric to its nomothetical sciences will be better understood, perhaps, in a careful consideration of the following distinctions.

1. **SCIENCE, ART, CRITICISM.**—Science analyzes the finished art-product or other fact presented to it, in order to discover the laws of its being. By way of preparation, it observes and classifies all the related facts and processes. Its work, therefore, is one of *discovery*, and tends to *knowledge*. Art teaches the rules by which this finished product is constructed; either grounding these rules upon the related science or sciences, or stating them arbitrarily. Its work, therefore, is essentially *constructive*, and tends to *skill*. "It uses knowledge, not a knowledge, but a power."¹ Criticism examines the product, in order to give value upon its merits or demerits, by comparing knowledge of both the art-rules and the scientific principles. Its work, therefore, is *judgment*, and tends to *the improvement of the art-product*.

2. **PURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE.**—Science is either Pure or Applied;—Pure, when it teaches necessary truths as abstract

¹ A. S. Hill, p. iii.

propositions; Applied, when it adapts these truths to particular concrete cases. "Applied Science is a knowledge of facts, events, or phenomena, as explained, accounted for, or produced by means of powers, causes, or laws. Pure Science is the knowledge of these powers, causes, or laws, considered apart, or as pure from all applications." Hence, the principles of pure science are always true, true in themselves and in all possible cases: the principles of applied science are true only as applied, and in the special cases.

3. THEORY.—Theory is a body of scientific principles underlying and explaining or justifying the rules of an art; or it is the study of these rules viewed in the light of their underlying principles. Hence, it is properly opposed to Practice,—a sense, says Sir William Hamilton,¹ in which it both was known to the Ancients and is now commonly used on the continent of Europe.

Hence, (1) Art is more than Applied Science; for the latter is content to *know* the truth in the special case, while the former is dissatisfied until it has *done* the work that the application of the truth enables it to do. Art promotes *skill*; Applied Science teaches special *truths*. For example, Surveying may be taught either as an applied science or as an art. As the one, it seeks only knowledge for its own sake; as the other, it seeks to make skilled surveyors. (2) Science and Art are incompatible terms,—terms, that is, which are not affirmable of the same object at the same time. The same name, indeed, may be given to both science and art;—for example, to Mechanics, which is either "the science of the action of forces on bodies" or the art of constructing machines and other mechanical contrivances;—but, unless the two things so named are only one and the same thing, it is no more true that they are at once a science and an art, than it is that two men, both named John Smith, are only one man. Confusion is often created by this loose way of speaking, and serious errors have been inculcated by it. (3) Science and Theory, though often interchanged, are, in fact, essentially different terms, and should not be confused. The scientific principles on which an art is based are often drawn (as is the case in Rhetoric) from several nomothetical sciences; and, in this case, though they constitute a *theory*, they can not be said to constitute a *science*: they are only excerpts from *several* sciences. Even when they all come from a sin-

¹ *Metaphysics*, Edited by Bowen, p. 113.

gle science, they are, with reference to the art, plainly not a science but only a body of scientific principles underlying the rules of an art,—that is, a *theory*. This error has led to erroneous definitions, as well as to false, and, therefore, misleading, conceptions of the nature of art.

In order of *time*, the art-product is always evolved first; then come rules; and finally, the underlying theory is made out, and both rules and theory are arranged in a system. (1) Practice necessarily precedes theory; for neither scientific principles nor rules for work can be discovered except through experience, and this experience "can have no foundation, other than previous practice. Such must obviously be the case with all the arts. Many a house must have been built, before a system of architecture could be formed; many a poem composed, before an art of poetry could be written."¹ (2) Rules are always suggested by the work already done, and are inferred from it. At first, they are but "rules of thumb,"—mere *dicta* of experience, liable to revision, correction, and even retraction; but later, when brought to the bar of Criticism and carefully tested, they become more accurate and more trustworthy.² This criticism, it is true, is at first uncertain, because without a sufficient foundation in knowledge; but, the underlying art-theory being once detected,—knowledge exists abundantly, and Criticism has a fair field. (3) Finally, guesses are made at the "why" of the rules; scientific principles are brought forward to explain or justify them;—that is, a theory of the art is constructed; while the rules themselves are more and more revised, till they are perfected into a system. Thenceforward, the art, its theory, and intelligent criticism of the art-work are mutually dependent; each throws light upon the others; each helps to make the others perfect.

In the light of all this, Rhetoric is plainly not a science, but an art. Its end is to construct the composition, not to discover knowledge. Its rules are the *dicta* of experience; its underlying principles, truths drawn from four nomothetical sciences; and the phrase *science of Rhetoric* is simply a blunder for *theory of Rhetoric*.

¹ John Quincy Adams, *Lectures*, I. pp. 73, 74.

² In Pope's trite couplet,—

"Those rules, of old discovered, not devis'd,
Are Nature still, but Nature methodiz'd."

III. THE TRUE METHOD OF STUDYING RHETORIC.

The principles thus established would seem to determine, also, beyond dispute, the correct method of studying Rhetoric. (1) The goal before the student should be skill in writing and speaking; (2) the order of study should be the order of development, and no one of the three elements, *Practice, Rules, Principles*, should be omitted; (3) the study should rest on *all* the nomothetical sciences—not on any number less than all.

And yet the study of Rhetoric has constantly proceeded in violation of one or more of these principles.

(1) Rhetoric has been treated as if its chief end were to make *critics*, not *writers*. It has tended to skill in judging, not in constructing. Hence, not only has undue importance been attached to the form of discourse, and too little attention been paid to the thought expressed, but the course has been narrowed to a theoretical discussion of rules and principles, while practice in composition has been wholly or in great part omitted.

(2) The natural order of teaching the art has been inverted, and one or more of its three elements been omitted or else unduly emphasized.¹ Hence, three mistakes in the methods of teaching;—(a) Rules and principles are put before practice in writing, although it is practice that in the highest degree makes rules and principles intelligible. Earlier practice in composition, (such as is, or certainly was, common in the preparatory schools,) is confined to the writing of themes; and the student, who is ill-prepared for such work, gains but little benefit from it. Simple exercises in sentence-building or in the recasting of work that is more or less defective,—exercises that tell most powerfully on all subsequent practice, and which need only the briefest rules by way of suggestion to guide the student,—such exercises are rarely employed.² (b) A second blunder results from the error already noted, the error of treating Rhetoric as the art of Criticism. Men whose end in teaching is only to make competent judges of discourse, can not be expected to value highly either

¹ In all arts, the *greatest* amount of attention must, of course, be given to practice; but this greatest amount is not necessarily an undue amount.

² *How to Write Clearly* is a capital book for the purpose.

rules for composition or practice in it. Hence, their instruction omits both rules and practice, while it gives at length abstract discussions of the scientific truths (especially, the truths of *Æsthetics*) that underlie the art. Rhetoric with them becomes a philosophical study, both interesting and profitable in itself, but contributing as little as may be towards the making of competent writers. (c) Still more serious, because (if possible) more misleading, is the error of teaching Rhetoric by practice alone,—practice guided only by “rules of thumb” and the study of worthy models. Whatever value an empirical study of Rhetoric may have, formal Rhetoric has also its place in the course; for, had not practice needed the guidance of underlying truths, only one element of art would in all probability have been developed. The very men who quarrel most bitterly with formal Rhetoric are often the men who, unconsciously, to be sure, seek its aid. Macaulay is a notable example.¹

(3) Rhetoric has not been based on all its nomothetical sciences, but now on one of them, now upon two. Campbell starts from his famous dictum, “It is by the sense that Rhetoric holds of Logic, and by the expression that she holds of Grammar.” Blair grounds his work on *Æsthetics*. Theremin thinks Eloquence a virtue. Whately says Rhetoric is an offshoot of Logic. Day seems to have been the first to state formally the truth that Rhetoric rests on four nomothetical sciences. The opposite belief has enfeebled and belittled the art, and disgusted many really sensible persons, who have (unfairly, no doubt, but not unnaturally) charged the vices of “fine writing,” puerility, desultoriness, *etc.*, on the art that professed to teach something better, but failed. As a result, “Rhetoric has become extremely superficial in its character and influence, so that the term ‘rhetorical’ has become the synonym of shallow and showy.”² “Considered as jewelry and *rouge*,” says another author, “Rhetoric is sufficiently contemptible.”³

¹ Compare the parallel cases of Engineering and other scientific professions. The civil engineer was once trained in the field, the geologist in the bowels of the earth. To-day they are instructed—some say over-instructed—in colleges, and in nothing more than in the underlying truths of their arts. Who would think of showing a raw country boy a finished bridge or a “crack” coal-mine?

² W. G. T. Shedd, *Preface to Theremin*, p. x.

³ T. Starr King, in Whipple's Introduction to *Substance and Show*, p. xii.

IV. CERTAIN TECHNICAL TERMS OF RHETORIC.

The following table will help the student as he reads the older modern or the ancient writers on Rhetoric;—

Greek.	Latin.	English.
Ἡ (ῥῆσις) ῥητορικῆ.	(Ars) Rhetorica.	Rhetoric. ¹
Ἐσκασίς.	Exercitatio.	Composition. ²
Ἐύρεσις.	Inventio.	Oratory. ³
Ἄλογος.	Oratio, Eloquentia.	Invention. ⁴
Ἀλογότης.	Eloquentia.	Composition. ⁴
Ἄλιος.	Elocutio.	Discourse. ¹
Ἐρητορία.	Oratoria.	Eloquence. ⁵
		Eloquence. ⁶
		Elocution. ⁶
		Style. ⁷
		Oratory.
		Elocution.

Certain terms—*oratory*, *eloquence* (in the sense of the Greek *λογιότης*), and *elocution*—refer wholly to spoken discourse. The other terms have the double reference to either speech or writing.

V. THE LATIN WORD TROPUS.

What did *tropus*—Greek *τρόπος* and *τρόπη*—mean? Cicero (Brutus, xvii.) defines *τρόπος* as *verborum immutationes*, and says that the Greeks called *sententiarum orationisque formas σχήματα*. But Quintilian says, "Tropus est *verbi vel sermonis* . . . mutatio," and, "vertique formas non *verborum* modo, sed et *sensuum et compositionis*. Quare mihi videntur errasse, qui non alios crederunt *tropos*, quam in quibus *verbum pro verbo poneretur*."¹ Curiously enough, no Greek writer now extant seems to have used *τρόπος* in its rhetorical sense, and Lucianus alone of Greek writers (A. D. 160?) has *τρόπη* in this meaning. [See Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*, s. *vv.*] More than this, the confusion of *trope* and *figure*—especially the modern use of *figure* as *genus*—had begun in Quintilian's time.²

¹ § 1, above. ² § 10 ff, above. ³ § 23, above. ⁴ § 3, above.

⁵ Obsolete in this sense.—Eloquence seems to be used sometimes by Campbell to mean as much as Rhetoric. (See. I. 1.)

⁶ Thersimin defines Eloquence as "thought in a flood."

⁷ VIII. vi. 1-3. Cf. IX. i. 4.

⁸ IX. i. 2.

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