THE WRITER

BEING ONE OF A SERIES OF

HANDBOOKS UPON PRACTICAL EXPRESSION

A CORRELATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF

ELOCUTION AND RHETORIC

APPLIED TO EVERY DETAIL OF

ENGLISH COMPOSITION.

BY

GEORGE L. RAYMOND, L.H.D.,

PROFESSOR OF ORATORY AND ÆSTHETIC CRITICISM IN THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY AT PRINCETON; AUTHOR OF "POETRY AS A REPRESENTATIVE ART," "THE GENESIS OF ART FORM," "THE ORATOR'S MANUAL," AND THE ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LATTER IN "THE SPEAKER," ETC.

AND

GEORGE P. WHEELER, LITT.D.,

UNIVERSITY FELLOW IN ENGLISH, 1891-2, AND IN ORATORY AND ÆSTHETIC CRITICISM, 1892-3, IN THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY.

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THE PROBLEM.

"No general theory of expression seems yet to have been enunciated. The maxims contained in works on composition and rhetoric are presented in an unorganized form. Standing as isolated dogmas, as empirical generalizations, they are neither so clearly apprehended, nor so much respected, as they would be were they deduced from some simple first principle. We are told that 'brevity is the soul of wit.' We hear styles condemned as verbose or involved. . . . But, however influential the truths thus dogmatically embodied, they would be much more influential if reduced to something like scientific ordination. In this, as in other cases, conviction will be greatly strengthened when we understand the *why*. And we may be sure that a comprehension of the general principle from which the rules of composition result, will not only bring them home to us with greater force, but will discover to us other rules of like origin." — *Herbert Spencer.*

ITS SOLUTION.

"For my own part, I think that we ought to write and speak on the same principles and by the same laws." — *Quintilian.*

PREFACE.

THIS book is a result of several facts and inferences from them, appealing to thought in an order somewhat as follows: In many schools and colleges, for various reasons, usually because of a lack of means with which to pay separate instructors, Elocution and Rhetoric are taught together. Might it not be well to prepare a book, or a series of books, meeting the requirements of this arrangement? Not only, however, are these two branches taught together, but, as a result of teaching them thus, many have come to hold a theory that, even aside from any question of convenience, they ought to be taught thus. This theory may be owing in part to that accommodation of thought to fact, at which, under the slightest stress of necessity, certain minds always have a happy faculty of arriving; but it is owing in part also to something else. This is the observation, that, as a rule, aptitude for Elocution is accompanied by aptitude for Rhetoric; and that, even when this is not so, the one, after a time, usually creates an aptitude for the other, as in the cases of many clergymen, lawyers, and lecturers who, beginning by being merely good elocutionists, come, in time, largely because they know just where to pause for breath, and to bring in accents, to have rhythmical styles of writing, which readily accommodate themselves to the natural requirements of easy reading. Besides this, almost everybody knows that a good literary style is cultivated better by reading good literature than by studying Rhetorics, however excellent; and he knows also that

no small part of the beneficial influence of this literature, whether oratory or poetry, is derived from reading it aloud, which involves getting the benefit of its distinctively elocutionary effects. Now, might not systems of Rhetoric, more largely than at present, avail themselves of inferences that may be legitimately drawn from facts such as these? Might not these elocutionary effects of composition, and the methods of producing them, be taught? Why should not text-books begin to cultivate good style in a manner analogous to that in which it is now so often cultivated by reading? The moment that these questions are asked, they suggest another. Does not all that has been said thus far indicate that there is some connection between Elocution and Rhetoric more deeply grounded than any that we have so far considered? Is there any such radical difference between the two as to justify the radically different methods in accordance with which they have hitherto been taught? May they not, in fact, be radically alike? Let us consider this question for a moment. Elocution and Rhetoric both give expression to thought, and often, as in oratory, to the same thought. If this be so, the only difference between them must lie in the form in which the thought is expressed. What is this difference? Both use words; but in the one case they are used as tones, and in the other case as symbols; and, as will be shown presently in the Introduction, this is the only invariable distinction between the two. But now, when we recall the fact that words, in order to be what they are, must, all of them, be both tones and symbols, it certainly does not seem that there should be any great difference in principle between their appropriate use in an art which emphasizes the one fact and in an art which emphasizes the other. Why should not words as symbols be related to each other in a way analogous to that in which words as tones are related to each other? If we admit that this must be the case, another thought suggests itself. Inasmuch as Elocution is

the simpler art, and therefore the more easy to understand, might it not be wise to avail ourselves of our understanding of this, and apply it to the solution of the more intricate problems of Rhetoric? Might it not be especially wise to do so at the present time, in view of the very great progress, not paralleled in the case of Rhetoric, that has been made of late years in our understanding of the laws of Elocution? Within the memory of most of us, the methods underlying the effects of the latter art have been so satisfactorily studied that their essentials are now practically beyond dispute. Moreover, they have been so analyzed to their elements, so grounded upon first principles, and so comprehensively yet succinctly stated, that they are few in number, readily remembered, and easy to apply. The sixteen rules, for instance, for the use of the downward and upward inflections, not all of them together beginning to cover all possible exceptions, which were given in the latest and best book upon Elocution published in England, when, in 1876, an examination was made of their literature upon the subject, are all contained in an American manual published in 1879, in a single fundamental principle and its converse, and to this principle there can be no exceptions. The principles of Elocution, moreover, because of the thoroughness and comprehensiveness of the analyses and generalizations to which they have been subjected, are all put into positive form. None of these facts are true of Rhetoric. Its rules are numerous, difficult to remember, hard to apply; and many of the more important of them are put into merely negative form. They tell the student, for instance, that his style should be elegant and energetic, and that, therefore, he should not use colloquial, vulgar, weak, or verbose phraseology. Yet, as everybody must recognize, he could refrain from using all these, or even from suggesting them, and still have a style very far from either elegant or energetic.

As has been said, it is owing to the influence of thoughts

like these, and of inferences from them, that the present book has been prepared. It covers all the ground that is thought necessary for elementary instruction in this branch; and the exercises which, for the best results, should be written by the pupil partly in his own home and partly in the recitation-room under the eye of the instructor, are designed to make the book, above all things, practical. Indeed, in preparing it, the one object in view has been to furnish something that will teach writing itself, rather than merely give information about writing. For this reason the explanations in the text have been so worded, and the ordinary rhetorical terms so subordinated, that it is hoped that they will produce upon the pupil the impression that he is dealing not with the names of things, but with things themselves, and thus develop in him that interest and independence to which there is always some tendency wherever subjection to mere laws is made to give way to the freedom attendant upon following principles.

GEO. L. RAYMOND.

PRINCETON, June 1, 1866.

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THE WRITER.

INTRODUCTION.

1. As already stated in the Preface, Elocution and Rhetoric both give expression to thought, and often, as in oratory, to the same thought. They differ only in the mediums used for this expression. Both make use of words embodying ideas; but these words are considered in the former art as tones, and in the latter art as symbols. At first, some may be inclined to doubt the accuracy of this statement. It may seem to them that Elocution differs from Rhetoric in being spoken, and also in being accompanied by forms appealing to the eye, as in postures and gestures. But a moment's thought will recall the fact that Rhetoric also is often spoken, and read aloud, and that even when read with no audible sounds, the imagination seems to hear these; and that it also is accompanied by forms appealing to the eye, as in the printed text. Precisely, too, as in connection with gestures, we recall the general postures of the body, the special conformations of the hands, in their palms, fingers, and fists, and the movements of the arms, straight, circular, angular, upward, downward, or on a level, with more or less degrees of vehemence, so, in connection with the printed text, we recall the general look of the page, the special arrangements of sentences, lines, and stanzas, and the commas, colons, periods, interrogation-points, exclamation-points, and dashes, with a more or less vehement use of italics, caps, and small caps. But gesture and topography, analogous in their nature, and both helps well-nigh essential, the one to Elocution and the other to Rhetoric, are neither of them absolutely essential. It would be possible to hear Elocution without seeing gestures, and Rhetoric without seeing a printed text. What is essential is the representation of thought through the use, in the one case, of words as tones and, in the other, of words as symbols. And, as was said in the Preface, when we recall the fact that words, in order to be what they are, must, all of them, be both tones and symbols, it does not seem that there should be any great difference in

principle between their appropriate use in an art which emphasizes the one fact and in an art which emphasizes the other. It is in this conception of the necessarily intimate connection between the two that what follows here had its origin.

2. The main object of using words, whether in Elocution or Rhetoric, is to make them expressive of thought. There are two methods of accomplishing this end, — that of **comparison** and that of **contrast**. According to the former, words, or series of words, are made to seem to have certain effects — *slow* or *fast*, *high* or *low*, *loud* or *soft*, *smooth* or *harsh*, — because these effects are supposed to *imitate* by way of *comparison*, or at least to *suggest* by way of *association*, things of which the words, taken either singly or together, are symbols. That this principle receives extensive application in elocutionary delivery we all know. What good reader, for instance, would fail to speak the following as here indicated?

In quick time — He flew by like a flash o' lightning.
In low pitch — He growled out, "Who's there?"
With loud force — Forward, the light brigade!
With thin volume — Here's a knife; clip quick!

In the book entitled "Poetry as a Representative Art" it was shown in what senses the same principle is applied in Poetry. In this book there is to be an application of the same to Rhetoric; and though rhetoricians have often ignored the principle, we shall find abundant exemplifications of its effects, as well as evidences that these are neither unapparent nor unimportant.

3. According to the method of expressing thought through **contrast**, certain words or phrases, because considered by the speaker as possessing pre-eminent weight of meaning, receive what is termed emphasis. This emphasis is imparted by the difference or contrast that is made to appear between their pronunciation and the pronunciation of other words accompanying them. For instance, in the sentence *He is the dorsal fin of humanity*, it is the contrast given by the tones to *dorsal fin* that imparts elocutionary emphasis, and the contrast given in what the same words symbolize that imparts rhetorical emphasis.

It is important to notice, however, that *imitation* and *emphasis*, indeed *comparison* and *contrast*, different as they may seem at first thought, are really very closely related. For the *contrast* needed for emphasis never necessitates a difference from surrounding effects in more than one regard. In all other regards that to which it gives emphasis may *compare* with them. Besides this, the *contrasting*

feature itself may *compare* with something with which the surrounding effects do not compare. For this reason, an *emphatic* use of words may often be developed from an *imitative* use of them, and, in fact, involve it.

4. In Elocution there are four different spheres in which *contrast* may take place, and they correspond exactly to the four in which it has already been indicated, in the example used in the second paragraph above, that *comparison*, or *imitation*, may take place; namely, in *time*, *pitch*, *force*, and *quality*. The presence of all four may be recognized by emphasizing strongly a word like *London*, or a sentence like *I will go, if so*. In giving the emphasis it will be noticed that the syllable *Lon* and the word *go* are made to contrast with that which accompanies them by being made to receive a different amount of *time*, key of *pitch*, degree of *force*, and — though this last is more difficult to detect — kind of *quality*.

5. In the application of these facts, here in the Introduction and also further on in the body of the book, the main divisions, as well as the arrangements of topics under them, will be based upon methods of expression in these four elements of *time*, *pitch*, *force*, and *quality*; and under each head reference will be made to both their *imitative* and their *emphatic* uses, it being understood, however, that the two are sometimes, as indicated in the last paragraph, practically inseparable.

6. The use of **Time** as an element of elocutionary emphasis is an adaptation of two natural requirements of utterance. The first of these is the necessity of *pausing* after every few words, in order to draw in the breath. It is evident that this pause may be appropriated to *imitate* the interruption or cessation of movement, or that it may be appropriated for the uses of *emphasis*. When made in any way, it necessarily separates certain words considered as collections of tones — and, therefore, the ideas expressed in them — into *groups*. It is superfluous to point out that a similar principle may be applied to the same words considered merely as symbols of ideas, and accordingly may be treated under the head of **Rhetorical Grouping**. This difference, however, needs to be noticed between grouping in Elocution and in Rhetoric. The former, as in uttering the sentence, *I tell you, sir, that we are weak*, in which one makes a decided pause neither before nor after *sir*, may be independent of topographical marks of punctuation. The latter is usually indicated by them.

7. The second natural requirement of which elocutionary emphasis in time is an adaptation is the necessity of *accent*. This arises from the fact that successive syllables flow through the throat with alter-

nate active and passive movements, like water through the mouth of a bottle, the active movement being always more prominent than the passive. As a result, unless the second of two consecutive syllables or monosyllabic words, the first of which is accented, is to be slighted, the voice, before passing on to the second, must pause after the first syllable long enough for a silent passive movement. The *imitation* of the effects of objects moving slowly often requires this pause. So too does also the *emphasis* of the thought that is to be expressed. For instance, to take in the full meaning of the sentence, *'Tis not my trade*, the hearer must think of *not my* and *trade*, all three. He would not have time to think of each, unless each were uttered slowly. The same principle can be made to apply not only to words, but to phrases, clauses, and sentences. In these, too, ideas, in the degree in which they are considered *important* by the speaker, are characterized by *slow* movement, and ideas of an opposite character by *fast* movement. In Elocution the general result of an artistic adaptation of pauses and variations in time, as produced in connection with the requirements of breathing and accent, causes what is termed *rhythm*. It is here again superfluous to point out that the same principles may be applied to the effects of consecutive words upon the imagination, irrespective of the actual hearing of their sounds. They will be found treated in this book under the headings of Rhetorical Movement and Rhythm.

8. As applied merely to sounds and hence in Elocution, the general effect of a combination of the elements of Pitch is to produce harmony. This is a reason why we may find an analogy to the effects of *pitch* in that which, as applied in Rhetoric to the meanings that are in *sounds* after they have become words, produces harmony in the sense. The use of pitch in Elocution has to do first of all with the utterance of tones on a *low key*, as it is termed, to represent a motive that is *serious*, *grave*, and *dignified*; on a *high key*, to indicate one that is *light*, *buoyant*, and *flippant*; on a *single key*, to indicate *sameness* or *self-poise*; and on different ones, to indicate *variety* or a *lack of self-poise*. The Germans have discovered that every vowel has a pitch peculiar to itself. (See "Poetry as a Representative Art," page 98.) The sound of long *u* is lowest, that of long *e* highest, and those of *o*, *ah*, long *a*, and short *i* between these. But if this be so, the use of words containing these vowels makes it possible to represent to the imagination of the reader, irrespective of his actually hearing their sounds, the effects of what we may term Rhetorical Key.

9. The majority of vowels necessitating low pitch are the same as those that necessitate long time, and of those necessitating high pitch

the same as those which are short. For this reason there is little difference practically between the representation of *movements* of different kinds and of *keys*, and in this book very small space is devoted to the latter. But the subject is of interest on account of its bearing upon the system as a whole.

Key, as we shall find, has to do with the representation of *sense* as well as of *sound*. But the most important use of *pitch* in Elocution is in connection with emphatic *downward* or *upward* slides of the voice as given mainly upon single words. With reference to these slides, the principle is that the *downward* direction *closes*, and, if an inflection, emphatically *checks*, the current of thought, points out to the audience that which has been said, leads them to reflect upon it, and so produces a *conclusive*, *decisive* effect, and indicates what is comparatively *important*, *positive*, or *affirmative*. The *rising* direction opens, and, if an inflection, emphatically *opens the channel of thought*, as if to speed its current forward. Those listening to it feel, therefore, that the speaker has not yet arrived at a word, or completed an idea, upon which he wishes them very particularly to reflect. This direction of voice produces, therefore, an *anticipative* or *indecisive* effect, and indicates what, as compared with the falling direction, is *subordinate*, *negative*, or *questionable*. Besides this, there is often, on the same passage or syllable, a movement both downward and upward, or what, if on a single word, is termed a *circumflex* inflection. This, of course, imparts something of the effects of both the falling and rising movements, though often, especially in the inflections, in accordance with the principle of contrast, it is chiefly employed to give increased effect to the falling or rising movement of the voice with which the circumflex ends, the end of this inflection being that which indicates its main significance. We can epitomize all this by saying that the downward inflection *points to* an idea, the upward *points away from* it, and the circumflex inflection points both *to* it and also *away from* it. To recognize the accuracy of these explanations, we have only to notice how the significance of the following sentences is changed upon our uttering them with a falling (\) or rising (/), or with a circumflex inflection ending with a falling (^) or a rising (ˇ) movement:—

If sò I will gò.	If só I will gó.
It mùst be so.	It múst be so.
It depènds.	It depénds.
John declaims wèll.	John declaims wéll.
Of coùrse it ìs.	Of coúrse it ís.
You are nòt to do thàt.	You are nót to do thát.
Isn't she beàutiful?	Isn't she beáutiful?
Yŏu—you meant no hârm.	Yŏu—you meant no hărm.

10. If now, in order to find terms that will apply as well to Rhetoric as to Elocution, we try to express, in a single word, the general effect of each of these directions of pitch, we may do so by saying that the *downward* inflection, in *pointing to* an idea emphasized, through the intonations, as being important in itself, indicates the immediate *relevancy* of the idea to the general thought; that the *upward* inflection, in *pointing away* from the idea, emphasized, through the intonations, as being important only in connection with other objects of consideration, indicates the *reference* of the idea to these; and that the *circumflex* inflection, in *pointing* both *to* an idea and also *away* from it, indicates both *relevancy* and *reference*, or a double relationship, which may be termed *equivocacy*. It is apparent that, in principle, the same tendencies underlie what may be and are treated in this book under the headings of **Rhetorical Relevancy, Reference,** and **Equivocacy.**

11. The use of **Force,** as an element of elocutionary emphasis, is an adaptation of the natural possibilities connected with both *accent* and *breathing*, as shown in degrees of gradation, or of regularity in the utterance of *loud* or *soft, abrupt* or *smooth* tones or series of them. Its effect, when made representative of thought, is to reveal the *reserve of energy* by way either of *imitation* or of *emphasis* through making what may be termed, as contrasted with surrounding effects, a particular *selection* or *arrangement* of the tones. These intensify extraordinarily certain words, phrases, clauses, sentences, or paragraphs, or parts of them, as in what are termed *stress* and *climax*. Of course, the same principle applied to words considered not as tones but as symbols would lead to a particular *selection* or *arrangement* of them either singly or in groups, in what will be termed **Rhetorical Force in Selection and Arrangement.**

12. **Quality,** as an element of elocutionary emphasis, is an adaptation of the necessarily different component effects of *breath* or *resonance* entering into the tones, making them more or less *harsh* or *musical*. When not *imitatively* produced, these tones are always expressive of certain states of the *feelings*. If, for instance, we frighten a man severely, we may make it impossible for him to use any other sound than a *whisper;* if in connection with this, we *anger* him, he will *hiss;* or, if at length he recovers his voice, he will use the harsh, jarring, interrupted hard-*g* quality of tone, termed the *guttural;* or, if that which he would repel is too great to make anger appropriate, it may widen and stiffen his throat so as to produce the hollow, almost inarticulate indication of *awe* and *horror* given by what is termed the *pectoral* quality. Release him now from the influence of fright,

anger, or horror, and put him into a *gently satisfied* mood, and he will use his nearest approach to *pure* quality. Stir him then to *profound emotion*, inspired by what is *deeply satisfying*, and all his vocal passages will expand again, and he will produce his nearest approach to the full, round, resonant quality termed *orotund*. If, now, we apply this same principle to words considered not as tones but as symbols, we shall find ourselves necessarily making such *selections* and *arrangements* of phraseology as, owing to their *sounds*, are *imitative* of certain objects having *sounds* which we wish to have suggested; or such as, owing to their *sense*, necessarily call up certain phases of *feeling;* and we can find no better term for this than **Rhetorical Quality,** as manifested in the **Selection** and **Arrangement** of words.

13. Of course these different elements of Rhetorical expression that have been mentioned can be fully discussed and described only under their own headings. Here it is necessary to add only that all of them together, namely, **Grouping, Movement, Rhythm, Key,** Relevancy, Reference, Equivocacy, Force in Selection and **Arrangement,** and **Quality in Selection** and **Arrangement** are exhaustive of the elementary principles of the whole subject.

187. Re-write the following in poetic diction:

The carriage leaves Eaux-Bonnes at five. The sun is scarcely risen, and is still below the mountains. On the western side the light begins to shine, but not brightly. The mosses are yet wet with the dew. The forests begin to be seen along the mountain slopes. It can hardly be believed that these hardly perceived hills can ever look beautiful. The light grows brighter, and life fills the air. A bright light shines around a single mountain-top that is darker and higher than the rest. All at once, the sun appears between two bright points, as one would light a bonfire. It is now day.

LESSON XVI.

THE SELECTION, LIMITATION, AND DIVISION OF SUBJECTS.

188. A subject should, if possible, be fresh, as distinguished from trite; interesting, either because of its nature or of the occasion; full of information and conviction, such as are derived from knowledge concerning the matter treated and from beliefs concerning its truth; and, above all things, definite, in the sense of being not too broad in character, and therefore devoid of point.

For instance, "*Wealth*" would be too *broad* a subject. To treat it properly one should confine himself to *some particular phase* of it, as "The History of Wealth," "The Methods of Acquiring Wealth," "The Importance of Wealth," "The Dangers of Wealth," "The Aristocracy of Wealth," "The Love of Wealth," "The Worship of Wealth," "The Distribution of Wealth," "The Influence of Wealth upon Morals," "upon Culture," "upon Society," "upon National Prosperity," "upon Popular Government," etc.

189. Kinds of Subjects: For practical purposes, it is necessary to consider only two kinds of subjects; namely, those treating of thought in the abstract, which may be termed **Demonstrative**, and of things in the concrete, which may be termed **Descriptive.**

A. As Demonstrative, we may class those ordinarily treated under the heads of Exposition and also of Persuasion. Exposition is a statement of the divisions into which (as, for example, when explaining a machine or its workings; or when criticising a poet, or his poems), a general theme may be analyzed, so as to demonstrate, in the sense of showing to the reader what are its essential attributes. Persuasion is a statement of the same of such a nature as to demonstrate a certain truth, in the sense of inducing the reader to agree with the conclusion of the writer or speaker with reference to it. It is evident that the same general principles apply to both these forms, except that in the one case the intellect only is addressed, and in the other case the intellect and also the motive nature, including both the emotions and the will.

B. Again, with subjects that are Descriptive, we may class not only those that are ordinarily termed thus, which deal with objects as they are perceived, or may be supposed to be perceived, when standing next to one another in space; but we may class here, too, those usually termed Narrative, whether *biographical* or *historical*, which deal with events as they are perceived, or may be supposed to be perceived, when following one another in time. It is evident that here, too, the same general principles apply in both cases, except that in the one the effects are in time and in the other in space.

C. Versification, which is ordinarily treated as a fifth form of composition, as distinguished from *Exposition*, *Persuasion*, *Description*, and *Narration*, is separated from these mainly by a principle in the form (See §§ 39, 40), having nothing to do with the principle with which they are separated from one another; and in accordance with this latter principle, it is not separated from any of them at all, except in the ways already treated under the head of Quality in §§ 170, 171. For this reason *Versification* need not be considered in this connection.

190. Introductions and Conclusions: The general principles underlying these are the same.

It is better for the beginner to postpone thinking of either till after the main body of his production has been prepared. Otherwise, upon the *Introduction* especially, he may waste time, and end by making it the whole production itself or else [illegible] for this. Moreover, the form of the Introduction depends upon the form of the general presentation, which, therefore, should be first determined. As a rule, both *Introductions* and *Conclusions* should be *brief.*

A. In character, they may be either direct or indirect. The *direct* Introduction states what the writer intends to tell or prove; the direct Conclusion sums up what he has told or proved: e.g.,

Browning begins his poem entitled "Sordello" by stating what he intends to tell: —

"Who will may hear Sordello's story told."

He ends it by stating what he has told: —

"Who would has heard Sordello's story told."

Wendell Phillips begins his oration on Toussaint L'Ouverture by stating what he intends both to tell and to prove.

"I have been requested to offer you a sketch of one of the most remarkable men of the last generation, the great Toussaint L'Ouverture. My sketch is at once a biography and an argument, — a biography of a negro statesman and soldier, an argument in behalf of the race from which he sprang."

He ends his speech on "A Metropolitan Police," the subject of which was really "Agitation," by stating what he has proved: —

"Agitate, and we shall yet see the laws of Massachusetts rule even in Boston."

B. The *indirect* Introduction or Conclusion gives either a *statement* of a general principle to be unfolded, or a *story* or *quotation* illustrating a specific application of this principle.

Henry Clay begins his speech "In Defence of the American System" by stating a general principle, thus: —

"In one sentiment, Mr. President, expressed by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, though perhaps not in the sense intended by him, I entirely concur. I agree with him that the decision on the system of policy embraced in this debate involves the future destiny of this growing country."

Edward Everett ends his oration "On Temperance" by stating this general principle: —

"Let us, sir, mingle discretion with our zeal; and the greater will be our success in this pure and noble enterprise."

Daniel Webster begins his speech, "In Reply to Hayne," with this illustration: —

"When the mariner has been tossed for many days in thick weather and on an unknown sea, he naturally avails himself of the first pause in the storm, the earliest glance of the sun, to take his latitude, and ascertain how far the elements have driven him from his true course."

Edward Everett ends his oration on "The Importance of Scientific Knowledge" with this illustration: —

"When an acorn falls upon an unfavorable spot, and decays there, we know the extent of the loss — it is that of a tree like the one from which it fell; but when the mind of a rational being, for want of culture, is lost to the great ends for which it was created, it is a loss which no man can measure, either for time or for eternity."

191. Methods of Treatment: Certain general methods are necessary to success in the treatment of all classes of topics. The *first* is to *define the limits* of a subject by way of **exclusion**; in other words, by separating it from all of which it is not to treat. This is done mainly by way either of *negation* or of *contrast*.

If, for instance, we wish to define a single term, we can do this to some extent by indicating what it is *not*, or with what it may be *contrasted*. Thus "straight" may be said to be something that is not bent or crooked; and "opaque" something that is not transparent. Evidently the same principle may be applied universally, and so as to cover the whole topic that one is discussing. For instance, if one be *demonstrating* the efficiency of a machine, he may say that he is to consider it *not* as a work of art to be looked at, nor as a means for producing the most artistic work, but, in *contrast* to each, as something that will produce results the most rapidly or abundantly. Or, if he be *demonstrating* the truth of an abstract proposition, he may say that he is to consider its bearings *not* upon wealth or culture or religion or morals or government or politics, as the case may be, but upon something that he *contrasts* with these. Or, if he be *describing* an object of sight, he may say, that he is to consider the qualities *not* in accordance with that, or in *contrast* to that, which *might* be considered were he treating, say, of a landscape as a place for a battle, or for a farm, or for the site of a city, or for the model of a painting; or which *might* be considered, if treating of the life or character of a man who had been a merchant, or a soldier, or a statesman, or a poet.

192. The second method of treatment is to *define the limits* of the subject by way of **inclusion**: in other words, by making it comprehensive of all of which it is to treat.

A. This is usually done by putting what is to be proved or shown into a clear, concise statement, which is termed a Proposition.

In treating of certain phases of science, for instance, the general limit may be indicated by a *proposition* like "Heat expands bodies," or, "All matter gravitates;" or, if treating of politics, by a proposition like "Universal suffrage elevates the common people," or, "A secret ballot secures independence in the voter." It will be observed that the necessity for a proposition, as thus explained, follows logically upon what was said in § 189 with reference to avoiding subjects too *broad* in character. At the same time, there is evidently a difference between a *subject* and a *proposition*. Even if the whole of the former be included, as is sometimes the case, in the *proposition*, this latter often requires a statement altogether too extended to serve in place of the subject itself.

B. In **Demonstration**, the *Proposition* is sometimes accompanied by an indication of the main lines of thought, or, as we may say, the outlines of thought through which the *proposition* is to be substantiated.

These are frequently identical with those of the *Main Divisions* constituting what we term the *Analysis* of a subject, made in accordance with principles to be considered under the next head; yet this is not the case in every instance. A general outline of Wendell Phillips's oration on Toussaint L'Ouverture is given in his Introduction, as quoted in § 190 A., page 168, but this, by no means, includes an analysis of his whole presentation.

C. Sometimes, too, the general lines of thought, whether or not they have been announced at the *beginning* of a composition, or of a section of it, are all of them brought together and expressed with great effect in what is termed a summary; and the factors of this also may be identical with the *general analysis* of the whole; yet they need not be so always.

D. A *Proposition* may serve to determine the general limits of the treatment in cases, too, of Description and Narration.

It may be declared, for instance, that "Apparently accidental circumstances may decide the destinies of nations; and as a proof of this, and wholly with reference to its bearings upon this, a certain battle-field may be described. Or the proposition may be that "Bigotry interferes with a nation's commercial development;" and as a proof of this, and wholly with reference to its bearings upon this, a narrative may be given of the "Expulsion of the Jews from Spain," and its consequences. Thus a proposition, in connection with either a description or a narrative, may serve to give interest to it. That either of these forms of composition can illustrate a certain definite point or points is no less true than that a demonstration can prove it. Indeed, this is the chief fact to be borne in mind when preparing work of this character. It is less important that a subject should be new than that it should be given a new *point* in the way of an application. Just as the painter when he copies a familiar landscape, by putting into it his own individuality, and causing us to see it with his own eyes, can make his picture original and artistic, so a writer, by giving a new point to an old story can make it far more interesting and effective than a new story could possibly be, in case it had no point; i.e., no idea which it suggested or enforced.

E. In the cases of both *Description* and *Narration*, however, to a much greater extent than in *Exposition* or *Persuasion*, the limits may be assigned without the employment of anything like a *Proposition*.

A Description may be given merely for its own sake; in other words, to convey a clear conception of a certain scene or series of events, without reference to any associated thought that it is desired to suggest. In such cases the outline suffices every purpose, when it merely furnishes a comprehensive conception of the *general appearance* of that which is to be represented; as when, for instance, a valley is described as oblong, square, triangular, semicircular, straight, winding, etc.; or a hill as conical, truncated, dome-shaped, etc.; or a town as long, round, straggling, compact, etc. So in Narration, an outline sufficient for the purpose may be furnished by merely mentioning in their order of sequence certain important events, characteristics, or epochs, as when, for instance, in the life of a man, his ancestors are first mentioned, then the surroundings of his boyhood, and so on through his manhood to his death; or as when, in the history of a country, the origin and character of its early settlers are first mentioned, then the circumstances of the founding of its government, and then its development, etc. Sometimes in *Narration*, however, as in *Demonstration*, the *outline*, in the sense of *limits*, can hardly be distinguished from the same term used in the sense of a *skeleton* or *analysis*, which we are to consider in the next paragraph. Indeed, the same confusion exists here as in those visible objects to which the word *outline* is applied primarily. It sometimes refers to the *visible limits* or *contour*, and sometimes also to the *lines* separating one *part* or *division* from another.

193. We now come to a third method of treatment. It has to do with filling up the limits assigned to the subject by analyzing it into different parts or Divisions, and thus furnishing it with what is sometimes termed an *Outline*, but which, to avoid the confusion of meanings mentioned at the end of the last paragraph, is better termed a *Skeleton* or *Framework*.

A. The rules ordinarily given for the construction of the *main divisions* of a subject are as follows:

First: To secure unity, there should be *one principle* in accordance with which all the divisions are made.

It would not be proper to divide North Americans into Canadians, Yankees, Southerners, and Mexicans. The first and last divisions are made upon the principle of naming people after the countries to which they belong; the other divisions are not.

Second: To secure distinctness, the thought in each division should *exclude* thought properly belonging to other divisions.

The word Southerners in the last example does not necessarily exclude Mexicans; nor in dividing the powers of a man into physical, nervous, and mental, would either physical or mental exclude nervous.

Third: To secure completeness, all the divisions taken together should *exhaust* the subject.

North America contains more people of more nations than those mentioned in the example illustrating the first rule.

Fourth: To secure progress the divisions should be arranged so as successively to make an *advance* in the line of thought.

Exactly what constitutes an advance in the line of thought depends upon the circumstances and aim of the presentation. A physician, wishing to make clear some principle ruling in one's physical nature, might begin by speaking first of the operation of an analogous principle in the mental nature, whereas a metaphysician, wishing to prove something with reference to the mental nature, would more appropriately arrange his divisions in the opposite order. Again, in a description of mountains, a man writing to direct another how to reach them, might begin by mentioning objects nearest him; but another writing to convey a conception of their artistic effect might begin by mentioning the objects in the remotest distance.

B. These principles thus stated, however, are negative in character. Besides them the student needs something positive. He needs this, too, not only for the sake of the divisions considered in themselves, but for the sake of that for which the divisions chiefly demand attention here; namely, for the sake of stimulating what rhetoricians term *Invention*.

194. Invention. There are methods through which, when no thoughts concerning a subject readily suggest themselves, a man can come to invent thoughts concerning it, and can develop these in an interesting and effective way. Such methods are almost always acquired, being a result of conscious or unconscious cultivation. As a rule, a man who composes well is one who first desires to do so, and then, by trying hard to accomplish his purpose, ends by training himself thoroughly for the work.

195. Invention as related to the Analysis of Subjects.

A. It is mainly for the purpose of obtaining something to say, that it is important for the writer to begin by dividing his *one general subject* of consideration into *different special subects* of consideration. These will furnish him with material for presentation, even if he does no more than to state and explain them. But to do the latter in a manner which will cause his readers to regard and remember what is said, necessitates divisions conceived and arranged *logically*, as it is termed. The ability to present thought in this manner, however, is not so much a matter of logic as of art. As such, it does not invariably necessitate either logical training or even a logical mind. The art, too, as will be shown here, may be acquired with comparative ease. Many persons acquire it naturally by

applying unconsciously to the subject a principle underlying the expression of thought in many other relations. Why cannot other persons be instructed so as to apply the same principle consciously? They certainly can be. The principle is that, in accordance with which, when we have any thought in mind to which we try to give expression, we instinctively associate it with certain sights or sounds of the external world. Otherwise, as thought itself is invisible and inaudible, we might not be able to make others acquainted with it. For instance, this term *expression*, just used, means a pressing out — an operation that can be affirmed literally only of a material substance which is forcibly expelled from another material substance; but, because we recognize a possibility of comparison between this operation and the way in which immaterial thought is made to leave the immaterial mind, we use the term as we do. So with thousands of terms like *understanding, uprightness, clearness, fullness*, etc. Carrying out the same principle, the ancients represented whole sentences through the use of hieroglyphics; and geometricians and scientists, even of our own times, represent whole arguments — the logical relations of abstract ideas and the physical relations of intangible forces — through the use of lines and figures. In a similar way, and with a similar justification, we may apply the principle to the expression of thought in a subject considered as a whole.

B. The sights or sounds in external nature to which we may compare this thought may be conceived of as occupying chiefly a certain portion of space, as a house does; or of time, as a melody does. Most things, however, and all things having life, while chiefly occupying the one or the other of these elements, actually occupy both, or, at least, suggest both; like a man's body, for instance, which has both shape and movements. For this reason the arts of sight must usually represent in space not only what occupies it but also time. Thus a picture often portrays an event; and this requires a suggestion, at least, of a series of actions. In fact, the ability to embody such a suggestion furnishes one reason why a product of the higher art of painting ranks above a photograph. On one side of a canvas, for example, a painter may depict a man as drawing a bow, and on the other side of the same canvas he may depict an arrow that has evidently just left the bow as having hit its mark. In the arts of sound, among which we must class all compositions involving a use of language, a corresponding principle operates. Think how large a proportion of the most artistic, in the sense of being the most effective, passages in poems and orations, describe visible persons or events. The words occupy time; but they represent to imagination, so that one seems to see them face to face, things that exist only in space.

C. Not merely as judged by separate illustrations, but by general arrangement, that essay or oration is the most successful which presents the thought in this depicted or graphic way, — a way that causes the reader or hearer to seem to see the whole line of the argument mapped out before him, the entire framework of the ideas built up and standing

in front of him. But before a writer or speaker can produce such an effect, he himself must be able to see his subject lying before him, or rising in front of him; in other words, he must be able to *conceive of it as comparable* to some external object whose *shape* or *movement* can be perceived. The principle that is now to be unfolded, being based upon this kind of a conception, is, therefore, of such a nature as not merely to simplify the work of dividing subjects, but also to make the presentation of them more effective.

196. Let us first consider the methods of forming two general divisions suggested by the appearances of objects.

A. Bearing in mind that we are to conceive of our topic as represented by something that is visible, we may start by remarking that this may be perceived either in *space*, in which case it has *location;* or in *time*, in which case it has *movement*. If we perceive it in space alone, we may notice *The Object* and also *Its Relations* to other objects, or — what is the same thing expressed differently — we may notice *Itself* and also *Its Surroundings*. This will give us two divisions into one or the other of which can be put everything that it is possible to say about the object, and for this reason about the topic also, which the object is supposed to represent. These two divisions, thus derived, may now suggest others, analogous to them in principle but differing in phraseology, in order to meet the requirements of different subjects to which they are to be applied. Instead, for instance, of saying *Object* and *Its Relations*, we may say, if treating of persons, *Individual* and *Community;* if of their character, *Private* and *Public;* if of their influence, as in the case of a statesman, *At Home* and *Abroad;* if we are dealing with corporate as well as individual life, we may discuss their *Character* and *Associations;* or their *Constitution* and *Circumstances;* or, if we are referring to principles, natural or philosophic, we may speak of their *Elements* and *Affinities*, or their *Essence* and *Environment*. Practically, in fact, there is no end of the ways in which we may change our phraseology, and yet not depart from the general method in accordance with which it is suggested.

B. Again, if we choose, we may confine our attention to only the object itself. In this case a thorough examination must include a consideration of its *Outside* and also of its *Inside*, or, to use the technical terms that conventionally designate these respectively, its *Conditions* and also its *Qualities*. Here, again, we have two divisions, into one or the other of which we can put everything that it is possible to say about the object considered only in itself. And, changing the phraseology in the way and for the reasons indicated in the last paragraph, we may go on and form such divisions as *Externally* and *Internally*, *Superficially* and *Intrinsically*, *Appearance* and *Reality*, *Class* and *Kind*, *Reputation* and *Character*, *Accident* and *Essential*, *Form* and *Spirit*, and others like these.

C. Once more, we may consider the object only in time, or as related to movement; and this again will lead us to put everything into two

divisions; namely, the *Object* and its *Actions*, analogous to which we can form other divisions, like *In Itself* and *Its Results*. *Cause* and *Effect*, *Character* and *Influence*, *Nature* and *Acquirements*, *Matter* and *Manner*, *Means* and *Methods*, *Theory* and *Practice*, and *Principle* and *Tendencies*.

197. Three General Divisions.

A. Recalling now what has been said in the three paragraphs above, we shall notice that the *Relations* of the object as suggested by what surrounds it in space, the *Object* itself, and its *Actions* as they are perceived by its movements in time, can also furnish divisions, into which to put all that can be said of an object or of a topic. But holding still to our purpose, which is to compare the topic as a whole to some perceptible object, let us suppose this, first, to be one appearing in space, and, therefore, characterized mainly by shape; and let us make three divisions suggested by it, somewhat analogous, though not closely, to *Relations*, *Object*, and *Actions*. Plato was evidently thinking of these when he said that every work of art must have *Feet*, *Trunk*, and *Head*. Following out his suggestion, we may make divisions like *Bottom*, *Sides*, and *Top;* *Foundations*, *Walls*, and *Roof;* *Mineral*, *Vegetable*, and *Animal;* *Physical*, *Intellectual*, and *Spiritual;* *Grounds*, *Beliefs*, and *Speculations;* *Certainties*, *Probabilities*, and *Surmises;* *Fact*, *Theory*, and *Practice*, etc.

B. Now let us compare our topic to an object appearing in time, and therefore characterized mainly by movement. This is evidently what Aristotle did when he said that every work of art should have *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. Following out his suggestion, we may make divisions like *Past*, *Present*, and *Future;* *What I recall*, *What I see*, *What I anticipate;* *Antecedents*, *Achievements*, and *Expectations;* *Source*, *Nature*, and *Results;* *Derivation*, *Condition*, and *Tendencies;* *History*, *Character* and *Destiny*, and so on indefinitely.

198. Four General Divisions.

Going back now to the fact mentioned in the fourth paragraph above this, namely, that we may divide the object into its *Outside* and its *Inside*, or into its *Condition* and *Qualities*, we may extend *Relations*, *Object*, and *Actions* into *Relations*, *Conditions*, *Qualities*, and *Actions*, and thus obtain *four divisions*. These, too, by the way, are the very terms that are used in logic to indicate the leading attributes of objects, and a knowledge of which is especially helpful when one is describing or defining; as when we say of a man, that in his relations he is *social*, in his condition *healthy*, in his qualities *intellectual*, and in his actions *energetic*. Making the same changes in phraseology as in the previous cases, we may parallel these divisions by such as the following: as applied to a person or community, by *Surroundings*, *Constitution*, *Disposition*, and *Occupation;* by *Associations*, *Culture*, *Temperament*, and *Achievements;*

as applied to natural objects, or systems of philosophy or government, by *Connections, Phases, Character,* and *Influence;* by *Affinities, Forms, Elements,* and *Operations;* by *Rank, State, Kind,* and *Powers,* and so on.

199. So far our divisions have all been based upon a comparison of a topic to the conditions of an object, as appearing either in space or time. But, besides conditions, the object, as has been said, has QUALITIES.

A. This fact suggests that we may ask, What *kinds* of Relations, of Conditions, of Qualities, or of Actions can be affirmed of the object? and also that the answer in each case can suggest divisions for our topic. Thus, the idea of the kinds of Relations suggests that we can consider those which are on *One Side* and the *Other Side; Before* and *Behind; Antecedents* and *Consequents; Means* and *Ends;* at *One Extreme* and the *Other Extreme;* that the object has a *Bright Side* and a *Dark Side;* and as applied to abstract ideas, that it may have certain features that are *Advantageous* and others *Disadvantageous;* certain *Superior* and others *Inferior.*

B. The idea of the kinds of Conditions suggests that we may consider some *High* and others *Low;* some *Rich* and others *Poor;* some *Prosperous* and others *Unprosperous;* some *Noble* and others *Ignoble;* some *Free* and others *Restrained;* some *Susceptible* and others *Insensible;* some *Safe* and others *Dangerous,* etc.

C. The idea of the kinds of Qualities suggests that we may consider some *Good* and others *Bad;* some *Fine* and others *Course;* some *Common* and others *Uncommon;* some *Pleasant* and others *Disagreeable;* some *Admirable* and others *Despicable;* some *Trustworthy* and others *Untrustworthy;* some *Positive* and others *Negative,* etc.

D. The idea of the kinds of Actions suggests that we may consider some *Slow* and others *Fast;* some *Beneficial* and others *Injurious;* some *Skilful* and others *Bungling;* some *Efficient* and others *Inefficient;* some *Subjective* and others *Objective;* some *Profitable* and others *Unprofitable;* some *Peaceable* and others *Hostile.*

200. Such formulæ as these can be *used,* first, for the main divisions of a topic.

A. Suppose, for instance, that one be asked to address a gathering interested in a certain cause. Referring to it, he will have something to say, in case only he can think of divisions like these: *What I recall, What I see, What I anticipate.* Or suppose that he is to preach on a text like "I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation," he can present the subject both textually and logically by saying, I am not ashamed of the gospel, because, in its *Source,* it is of God; in its *Nature,* a power; and, in its *Results,* salvation.

The formulæ can be used also for *subdivisions* of the main divisions.

B. Suppose that one be treating of Political Life, he can speak of it, first, *In Itself;* and under this he can refer to its *Character* and its *Influence,* and to the latter both *At Home* and *Abroad.* Then, second, he can speak of its *Surroundings,* both *Private* and *Public;* and of both of these he may mention what is *Advantageous* and *Disadvantageous;* and perhaps, too, *Pleasant* and *Disagreeable.*

201. Two divisions, of course, one of which is complementary of the other, are more in accordance with the principles of Logic than are a larger number. At the same time these are not necessarily illogical. Aristotle, for instance, in Book II. Chapter x. of his Rhetoric, says, "All things are done by men either not of themselves, or of themselves. Of things not done by men of themselves, some they do from necessity, others they do from chance; of those done from necessity, a part are from external force, the others are from force of natural constitution. So that all that men do, not of themselves, are either from chance or from nature or force."

202. The *number of divisions* may be *extended greatly* with no decided detriment to the logical effect, if only the order of observation be followed.

The sole reason why certain of these divisions — those like *Foundation, Walls,* and *Roof,* for instance — are important, is because of the order that they introduce into description. A hearer could not be interested in an account of a cathedral, nor remember it, if the describer were to mention one feature of the foundation, then one of the roof, then one of the walls, and then another of the roof again, and so on. As a rule, he is expected to say everything that he has to say of the foundation before beginning about the walls; and to end describing these before referring to the roof. Because in such cases all that is essential is to preserve the order of thought, it is feasible sometimes to analyze one or more of the factors of divisions, such as Individual and Community, into many heads, like *Individual, Community, Race,* and *Humanity;* or divisions, like At Home and Abroad, into *Home, Town, District, Country, World,* and *Universe.* Often it is possible to fulfil the requirements of order, and at the same time, because of allied principles of analysis, together with slightly different methods of applying them, to combine certain of the sets of divisions that have been made.

Thus, Rise, Culmination, and Decline, in connection with History, Character, and Destiny, may give us Rise, History, Culmination, Character, Decline, Destiny.

203. There is a connection worth noticing now between the methods that have suggested all these sets of divisions and a well-known rule of

NOTE. — This subject is continued on page 180.

HINTS FOR MAKING DIVISIONS AND SUBDIVISIONS OF SUBJECTS, AND ALSO DEFINITIONS.

Compare the subject to some existence, manifesting itself

In SPACE — and (or) — In TIME.

In considering which, we look first at

THE LOCATION ABOUT IT, then AT IT, then INTO IT, then at the MOVEMENT BEYOND it.

TWO DIVISIONS.

RELATION.			OBJECT. CONDITIONS.		QUALITIES.	ACTIONS.		
Object	and	its Relations.	Outside	and	Inside.	Object	and	Its Actions.
In Itself	and	its Surroundings.	Externally	and	Internally.	In Itself	and	Its Results.
Constitution	and	Circumstances.	Superficially	and	Intrinsically.	Cause	and	Effects.
Character	and	Associations.	Appearance	and	Reality.	Character	and	Influence.
Elements	and	Affinities.	Class	and	Kind.	Nature	and	Acquirements.
Essence	and	Environment.	Reputation	and	Character.	Matter	and	Manner.
Individual	and	Community.	Accident	and	Essential.	Theory	and	Practice.
Private	and	Public.	Form	and	Spirit.	Principle	and	Tendencies.
At Home	and	Abroad.				Means	and	Methods.

THREE DIVISIONS.

Built up like Things in Space.

Bottom.	Sides.	Top.
Foundations.	Walls.	Roof.
Lower.	Medium.	Higher.
Mineral.	Vegetable.	Animal.
Physical.	Intellectual.	Spiritual.
Grounds.	Beliefs.	Speculations.
Certainties.	Probabilities.	Surmises.
Facts.	Theory.	Practice.

Following like Things in Time.

Beginning.	Middle.	End.
Past.	Present.	Future.
What I recall.	What I see.	What I anticipate.
Antecedents.	Achievements.	Expectations.
Source.	Nature.	Results.
Derivation.	Condition.	Tendencies.
Rise.	Culmination.	Decline.
History.	Character.	Destiny.

FOUR DIVISIONS.

RELATIONS.	CONDITIONS.	QUALITIES.	ACTIONS.
* Surroundings.	Constitution.	Disposition.	Occupation.
* Associations.	Culture.	Temperament.	Achievements.
† Connections.	Phases.	Character.	Influence.
† Affinities.	Forms.	Elements.	Operations.
† Rank.	State.	Kind.	Powers.

*May apply to Persons or Communities. †May apply to Natural Objects or Systems of Philosophy, Government, etc.

DIVISIONS OF ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.

RELATIONS.	OBJECT.	ACTIONS.
* Being.		Being.
Organized Being.		Organized Being.
Animal.		Animal.
Vertebrate.		Vertebrate.
Mammal.		Mammal.
Man.	A Man.	Man.
GENERIC.	☞SPECIFIC.☜	GENERIC.

* Hopkins's Outline Study of Man.

Humanity.	Race.	Country.	Government.	Country.	Race.	Humanity.
Physical.	Intellectual.	Moral.	Spiritual.	Moral.	Intellectual.	Physical.
Nature.	Human Nature.	Æsthetic Nature.	Art.	Æsthetic Nature.	Human Nature.	Nature.

TWO DIVISIONS, COMPARED TO THE KINDS OF

RELATIONS.		CONDITIONS.		QUALITIES.		ACTIONS.	
One side.	Other side.	High.	Low.	Good.	Bad.	Slow.	Fast.
One extreme.	Other extreme.	Rich.	Poor.	Fine.	Coarse.	Beneficial.	Injurious.
Bright side.	Dark side.	Prosperous.	Unprosperous.	Common.	Uncommon.	Skilful.	Bungling.
Antecedents.	Consequences.	Free.	Restrained.	Exalted.	Degraded.	Efficient.	Inefficient.
Means.	Ends.	Encouraging.	Discouraging.	Admirable.	Despicable.	Subjective.	Objective.
Advantageous.	Disadvantageous.	Susceptible.	Insensible.	Trustworthy.	Untrustworthy.	Profitable.	Unprofitable.
Superior.	Inferior.	Safe.	Dangerous.	Positive.	Negative.	Peaceable.	Hostile.

rhetoric, which is, that in treating a subject, thought should move by successive steps from the generic to the specific, or from the specific to the generic. This connection is owing to the fact that, in passing from the generic to the specific, thought usually advances by a process of analysis from what has to do with only the relations, or at least the environments, of a subject to that which may be said to belong to it more specifically, being, as it were, at its core. Again, passing onward from this, thought usually does so in order to show the actions or influence of that which is, in this sense, specific upon that which is more generic in its environments and relations. Dr. Mark Hopkins, for instance, in his "Outline Study of Man," illustrates this method by starting with the general conception of being, and passing from that through Organized Being, Animal, Vertebrate, Mammal, and Man, to a specific Man. Then, affirming something of this man, he retraces his steps exactly in reverse order, applying what has been said, first, to Man, then Mammal, Vertebrate, Animal, Organized Being, and finally to Being. So one may start with the general conception of *Humanity*, and advancing through *Race* and *Country* to *Government*, and affirming something of this, apply what is said in succession to *Country*, *Race*, and *Humanity*. So moving through *Physical*, *Intellectual*, and *Moral*, to *Spiritual*, he may apply what is said of this in succession to it in its *Moral*, *Intellectual*, and *Physical* relations; and moving through *Nature*, *Human Nature*, and *Æsthetic Nature*, to *Art*, he may apply what is said of this in succession to *Æsthetic Nature*, *Human Nature*, and *Nature*. It is evident that whenever we begin by observing in this way the more general relations or features of a subject, and pass from these to those that are more specific, and, having treated of the latter, go on to show the influence that they exert first in their more specific, and then in their more generic relations, we pursue an order of thought which fulfils the principle underlying all the methods that have been here unfolded.

A. Enough has been said now, however, to make clear what this principle is, as well as to suggest the methods through which it may be applied. It is hardly necessary to add that the sets of divisions that have been given, illustrating these, may be almost infinitely varied; or that, for this reason, there is no necessity that they should be used or imitated slavishly. In fact, it is hardly possible that, for any length of time, they should be used thus. The principle at the basis of them is so easy to understand and master that any endeavors to carry it out will, after a few attempts, give a man such a command of it as to render him practically independent of any prescribed methods of procedure.

B. For convenience in consultation, all that has been said on this subject is summarized in the chart on pages 178 and 179. The pupil who will use the chart when preparing outlines or analyses will soon become so familiar with the principles of observation in accordance with which the different classes of divisions are derived, as to be able to do without it.

EXERCISES.

204. Give definite *limitations*, either by *another statement of the subject* indicated or by a *supplementary proposition*; and then prepare *main divisions*, and, if possible, *subdivisions*, for the following topics, or for a corresponding number of those given in the List of Subjects at the end of the next Lesson:

Washington (as a Patriot or General, etc.).	Monasticism.	Slavery.
Grant.	Chivalry.	War.
Literary Life.	Republicanism.	Science.
Military Life.	Despotism.	Art.
	Socialism.	Genius.

Example: "Intemperance." Change this subject to "The Duty of the State to legislate with Reference to Intemperance," or form a proposition like "The State should prohibit the Manufacture and Sale of Intoxicating Beverages." Main divisions and subdivisions could then be made as follows:

The *Derivation* of the evil of Intemperance (in the *Individual* and the *Community*). The *Condition* of the evil (as shown in the *Individual* and the *Community*), and its *Tendency* (upon the *Individual* and the *Community*).

LESSON XVII.

THE TREATMENT OF SUBJECTS AS DETERMINED BY THEIR AIMS AND READERS.

205. HAVING defined the limits of a subject by *excluding* that of which it is not to treat, by *including* that of which it is to treat, and by giving the whole a *framework* or *skeleton* through separating it into certain *main divisions*, it remains now for the writer, as a fourth method of treatment, to select the material to place in these.

It needs to be said, however, that although it is at this point in composition that one is mainly conscious of selecting his material, neverthe-

less the work of selection, in accordance, too, with the same general principles that are now to be unfolded, really begins with the choice of his subject, and is necessarily carried on, more or less, through all the subsequent methods that have been thus far unfolded.

206. The Selection of the Material depends, first, upon the **Aim** of the composition.

If, for instance, one's subject were "War," and his aim were merely that of Exposition, it would be appropriate for him to explain the methods of obtaining recruits, of drilling them, of handling arms, of studying the topographical features of a battle-field, of determining the key of a position, and of marching troops so as to seize and hold this. But if his aim were that of Persuasion, if he wished to induce men to enlist as soldiers in view of a threatened invasion of his country, any of the topics just mentioned would be out of place. Instead of referring to them, he would do better to explain the emergency, to dwell upon its dangers, to warn against delay in preparing to meet them, and to remind every citizen of his duty in view of them. Again, in describing a stretch of country, if one's aim were to give a conception of it as a battle-field, he would naturally mention the lines delineated by the windings of a river and its depth at different points, the density of surrounding forests, and the height and relative perpendicularity of the hills and rocks. If his aim were to give a conception of it as a farm, however, he would attain this better by mentioning the effects of the river in irrigating its soil, the exact nature of this soil, and the kind and extent of the vegetation, forests, or rocks found in it; or, if his aim were to give a conception of it to an artist desiring a subject for his brush, he would do better by dwelling merely upon appearances —the smooth or ruffled surfaces of its river, its pools or cascades, and the hues of the flowers or trees or rocks surrounding it.

207. Again, the selection of the material depends upon the Audience to be addressed, whether *hearers* or *readers*.

A. Alexander Bain, in his "Rhetoric," to illustrate this subject, quotes a passage from Macaulay in which he refers to a paper drawn up by the House of Commons of England to induce the House of Lords to pass certain resolutions already passed by the lower house in favor of the freedom of the press. "They pointed out," says Macaulay, "concisely, clearly, forcibly, and sometimes with a grave irony which is not unbecoming, the absurdities and iniquities of the statute which was about to expire. But all their objections will be found to relate to matters of detail. On the great question of principle, on the question *whether the liberty of unlicensed printing be, on the whole, a blessing or a curse to society*, not a word is said. The Licensing Act is condemned, not as a thing essentially evil, but on account of *the petty grievances, the exactions, the jobs, the commercial restrictions, the domiciliary visits*, which

were incidental to it." After mentioning some of their petty but convincing reasons, Macaulay adds, "Such were the arguments which did what Milton's Areopagitica [the famous essay of the poet in favor of the liberty of the press] had failed to do." Locke, it is said, further, in a note, is believed to have drawn up the paper. Macaulay goes on: "If this were so, it must be remembered that Locke wrote, not in his own name, but in the name of a multitude of *plain country gentlemen and merchants*, to whom his opinions touching the liberty of the press would probably have seemed strange and dangerous. We must suppose, therefore, that, with his usual prudence, he refrained from giving an exposition of his own views, and contented himself with putting into a neat and perspicuous form *arguments suited to the capacity of the parliamentary majority*."

B. So, too, in descriptions of situations or events, if one be speaking of the scene of a conflict between the French and the Germans, in case his audience be *French*, he will awaken more interest if he dwell upon the positions, movements, difficulties, and achievements of the *French* troops and officers with whom his audience presumably have more acquaintance and sympathy; or, again, if he be speaking of the same conflict before a *popular audience*, and later before a class in a *military academy*, the facts upon which he can dwell in order to accommodate his presentation to the degrees of intelligence with reference to military manœuvres, will in both cases be different.

208. As a rule, a hearer or reader may be addressed in one or all of three ways; namely, through informing the **understanding**, through exciting the **emotions**, or through stimulating the **imagination**.

209. The method of informing the understanding is employed mainly, though not exclusively, in Exposition.

According to this method, which is generally termed that of particulars, facts are introduced affording *individual* or *concrete instances* illustrating the general principles that are to be expounded. For instance, if one be writing of *art*, he mentions certain paintings, statues, buildings, or poems, etc.; if he be writing of the laws of *physical science*, he mentions certain properties like motion, inertia, velocity, equilibrium, elasticity, polarity, or heat, etc.; if of the laws of the *human mind*, he mentions certain functions like consciousness, memory, understanding, feeling, will, etc. This method, applied in connection with the general principle that the material must be selected with a view to the audience addressed, causes the writer to select in all cases facts the import of which will be most likely to be understood and appreciated by the reader.

210. The method of exciting the emotions is employed mainly, though not exclusively, in Persuasion.

The end of this method is best attained in the degree in which the writer succeeds in accommodating that which is urged to the principles of conduct in those addressed. Aside from what may be done in this direction by *informing the understanding*, the feelings can be influenced directly by showing the connection between the course advocated and the personal pleasure or pain of the hearer; or between it and the satisfactory expression of that natural sympathy for others which actuates, or should actuate, every one. Of course, of the two motives, the personal one is the lower; and yet, in many spheres, an appeal to it is legitimate. Thus, as an incentive to *industry*, it is appropriate to urge considerations of future independence, ease, comfort, wealth, and influence; or as preventives of *immorality*, it is appropriate to urge considerations of future disease, disgrace, misery, and eventual loss in the next world. Of the motives appealing to sympathy for others, there are evidently many phases, social, æsthetic, patriotic, moral, and religious.

211. The method of stimulating the imagination is employed mainly in Descriptions and Narratives; but so far as these enter, by way of illustration, into writings that are distinctively expository or persuasive, it is employed also in these latter forms of composition.

To *stimulate the imagination*, which implies stirring the sources of thought by way of suggestion so as to cause the reader to conceive for himself the full import of the picture that the writer desires to have presented, is one of the last results of literary art, and perhaps the most important of them. It is a result, too, for which a *wide acquaintance* with the products and styles of the *foremost writers* seems almost indispensable. For this reason, it has been thought that the best way of indicating here the chief characteristics of the method, is to show how they are illustrated in the works of one who is generally acknowledged to stand at the head, both in the order of time and of merit, of all descriptive writers; namely, Homer. The following is taken from Chapter xxii. of Raymond's "Poetry as a Representative Art."

212. These poems of Homer have stood the tests of centuries, and there are reasons why they have survived them. The consideration which should interest us most in the present connection, is the fact that the poems were produced by a man who spoke directly from the first promptings of nature; a man upon whom the methods of representation in other arts, and of presentation as used in science and philosophy, had had the least possible influence. In his works, therefore, better than in any others with which in our day we can become acquainted, we may study the tendencies of poetry in its most spontaneous and unadulterated form.

A. The first noteworthy feature with reference to his methods may be indicated by saying that the Homeric representations are all mental. By saying this, it is meant that they show that there is a mind between the phenomena of nature and the account of them that we get in the poetry — a mind addressing our minds. Not that this mind distorts the objects which it has perceived and describes; the fact is the opposite. Homer's representations are accurate, yet not like those of a photograph. He suggests his picture by telling us about those features of it that have had an effect upon him as a thinking being, or, what is the same thing, that he expects will have an effect upon us. What he tells us is true to nature, but not, by any means, all the truth concerning it. Certain parts of the scenes presumably witnessed have arrested his attention, and suggested certain inferences to him. These parts, consciously or unconsciously, he selects and arranges in ways that arrest our attention as they have arrested his. In this sense it is that his descriptions are mental. Let us look now at some of them. Here is one of his accounts of a man, and another of a homestead, both very simple, but for this reason, too, admirably adapted to our present purpose.

"And first, Æneas, with defiant mien
And nodding casque, stood forth. He held his shield
Before him, which he wielded right and left,
And shook his brazen spear."

Iliad, Book xx.: *Bryant's Trans.*

"He wedded there
A daughter of Adrastus, and he dwelt
Within a mansion filled with wealth; broad fields
Fertile in corn were his, and many rows
Of trees and vines around him; large his flocks,
And great his fame as one expert to wield,
Beyond all other Greeks, the spear in war."

Iliad, xiv.: *Bryant's Trans.*

B. Notice now, in the second place, that these descriptions are fragmentary, the items mentioned in them being few. They present us with just such incomplete glimpses as one would obtain or remember in circumstances in which the persons or objects observed would form parts of larger objects of consideration, while at the same time all of them, or perhaps he himself, might be in motion.

C. Notice, in the third place, that the descriptions are specific. Of the few items that are mentioned, we have a very definite account in the "defiant mien," the "nodding casque," the shaking "shield" and "spear," the "mansion filled with wealth," the "broad fields fertile in corn," the "rows of trees," the "vines," the "large flocks," and the "expert" in wielding "the spear." There is no uncertainty of outline here, and therefore there is no doubt in the mind of the reader as to whether or not the author has taken his descriptions from nature. The

whole impression conveyed is that he is describing the appearance of some particular man and homestead, and of no other.

D. Notice also, in the fourth place, that the descriptions, while specific, are also typical. The features spoken of are such as to indicate the genus or kind of person or thing that is represented. So fully is this the case, that the few specific items mentioned, like the few bold outlines of a painter's sketch, suggest everything that the imagination really needs in order to make out a complete picture. This fact makes it possible for them to be few and definite, and yet distinctly representative. They do not include all the objects that might be seen, all that might be photographed, but only a few of them. At the same time, they are those which in the circumstances would be likely to attract any one's eye, those from which, and from which only, even if one saw the scene, he would be likely to draw his impressions with reference to the whole of it. Some of my readers may remember that J. G. Holland, in the work called "Timothy Titcomb's Letters," when giving advice to young men intending to go into ladies' society, does not bid them attend mainly to that which will make them appear intelligent or even moral. He writes from the view-point of a man of common-sense, understanding human nature, and advises them to attend to their neckties. The truth is, that our first view of a person always lights upon some one or two prominent features, the eyes, lips, smile, hand, gait, coat, or necktie, as the case may be, which, by absorbing our attention, causes us to overlook everything else. In fact, we always remember people, and houses, and localities, by these single and simple, often very absurd, things which are instantly suggested whenever our minds recur to that for which, so far as concerns our recollection of it, they stand. It is mainly this fact with reference to memory that Robert Bulwer-Lytton illustrates in his touching little poem, "Aux Italiens."

. . . . . .

"Meanwhile I was thinking of my first love
  As I had not been thinking of aught for years;
Till over my eyes there began to move
  Something that felt like tears.

I thought of the dress that she wore last time
  When we stood 'neath the cypress-trees together,
In that lost land, in that soft clime,
  In the crimson evening weather;

Of that muslin dress (for the eve was hot),
  And her warm white neck, in its golden chain,
And her full soft hair, just tied in a knot,
  And falling loose again.

And the jasmine flower in her fair young breast
  (O, the faint, sweet smell of that jasmine flower!)
And the one bird singing alone to his nest;
  And the one star over the tower.

I thought of our little quarrels and strife,
  And the letter that brought me back my ring;
And it all seemed then, in the waste of life,
  Such a very little thing!

For I thought of her grave below the hill,
  Which the sentinel cypress-tree stands over;
And I thought "Were she only living still,
  How I could forgive her and love her!"

And I swear as I thought of her thus in that hour,
  And of how, after all, old things are best,
That I smelt the smell of that jasmine flower
  Which she used to wear in her breast.

It smelt so faint, and it smelt so sweet,
  It made me creep, and it made me cold,
Like the scent that steals from the crumbling sheet
  Where a mummy is half unrolled.

And I turned and looked: she was sitting there,
  In a dim box over the stage; and drest
In that muslin dress, with that full soft hair,
  And that jasmine in her breast.

. . . . . .

My thinking of her, or the music's strain,
  Or something which never will be exprest,
Had brought her back from the grave again,
  With the jasmine in her breast.

. . . . . .

But O, the smell of that jasmine flower,
  And O, that music! and O, the way
That voice rang out from the donjon tower:
  Non ti scordar di me,
  Non ti scordar di me!"

a. It is in accordance with the workings of observation and memory illustrated here, that the poet, if he wishes to describe persons or things precisely as they would be recalled by a narrator in the circumstances, must be careful to mention but a few items in his representation, and these very specifically, so that they will seem to have been

seen by him, and not merely imagined. He must choose these items, too, so that they will be characteristic or typical of the whole nature of the objects or transactions of which they form parts. He must dwell upon those features which would naturally attract the attention of a spectator and impress him. These principles are so important and so frequently illustrated in the poetry of Homer, that, before dismissing the subject, it will not be out of place to give several examples of them. Notice everything in the following, but especially the italicized phrases:

"The helm
Of massive brass was vain to stay the blow:
The weapon pierced it and the bone, and stained
The brain with blood; it felled him rushing on.
The monarch stripped the slain, and, leaving them
With their white bosoms bare, went on to slay
Isus and Antiphus, King Priam's sons."

Iliad, xi.: *Bryant's Trans.*

"Meanwhile
Antilochus against his charioteer,
Mydon, the brave son of Atymnias, hurled
A stone that smote his elbow as he wheeled
His firm-paced steeds in flight. He dropped the reins,
Gleaming with ivory as they trailed in dust.
Antilochus leaped forward, smiting him
Upon the temples with his sword. He fell
Gasping amidst the sand, *his head immersed*
Up to his shoulders, — for the sand was deep, —
And there remained till he was beaten down
Before the horses' hoofs."

Iliad, v.: *Idem.*

"And now the mighty spearman, Phyleus' son,
Drew near and smote him with his trenchant lance
Where meet the head and spine, and pierced the neck
Beneath the tongue; and *forth the weapon came*
Between the teeth. He fell, and in the fall
Gnashed with his teeth upon the *cold, bright blade.*"

Iliad, v.: *Idem.*

"Their belovèd wives meanwhile,
And their young children, stood and watched the walls,
With aged men among them, while the youths
Marched on, with Mars and Pallas at their head,
Both wrought in gold, with golden garments on,
Stately and large in form, and over all
Conspicuous in bright armor, as became
The gods; the rest were of an humbler size."

Iliad, xviii.: *Idem.*

"Meantime the assembled Greeks
Sat looking where the horses scoured the plain
And filled the air with dust. Idomeneus,
The lord of Crete, descried the courses first,
For on the height he sat above the crowd.
He heard the chief encouraging his steeds,
And knew him, and he marked before the rest
A courser, chestnut-colored, *save a spot*
Upon the *middle* of the *forehead, white*,
And *round as the full moon*. And then he stood
Upright, and from his place harangued the Greeks."

Iliad, xxiii.: *Idem.*

b. The following is a very different kind of description, but notice in it the same characteristics — what an air of reality is given to the whole by the specificness with which a few features only, and these the typical features likely to impress the spectator, are mentioned. Speaking of Hecamede, it is said:

"First she drew forth a table fairly wrought,
Of polished surface, and *with steel-blue feet*,
And on it placed a brazen tray which bore
A thirst-provoking onion, honeycomb,
And sacred meal of wheat. Near these she set
A noble beaker which the ancient chief
Had brought from home, embossed with studs of gold.
Four were its handles, and each handle showed
Two golden turtles feeding, while below
Two others formed the base. Another hand
Could scarce have raised that beaker from its place,
But Nestor lifted it with ease. The maid,
Fair as a goddess, mingled Pramnian wine,
And grated o'er it, with a rasp of brass,
A goat's-milk cheese, and, sprinkling the white flour
Upon it, bade them drink. With this they quenched
Their parching thirst, and then amused the time
With pleasant talk. Patroclus to the door
Meantime, a god-like presence, came, and stood.
The old man, as he saw him, instantly
Rose from his princely seat and seized his hand,
And led him in and bade him sit; but he
Refused the proffered courtesy, and said:"

Iliad, xi.: *Idem.*

c. William von Humboldt, in his criticism of Goethe's "Hermann and Dorothea," directs attention to a similar characteristic in the passage in which Goethe makes his hero describe his first meeting with the heroine. Here are Hermann's words:

"Now my eyes, as I made my way along the new street there,
Chanced to fall on a wagon, built of the heaviest timber,
Drawn by a pair of steers of the largest stock and stoutest.
By their side a maid with vigorous step was walking,
Holding a long staff up to guide the strong pair onward,
Starting them now, then stopping them, deftly did she guide them."

d. One who was less of an artist, instead of revealing in a single glance the sturdy swinging gait and deftly wielded staff, which were enough to account for the young peasant's falling in love with Dorothea, would have given us a lengthy description of the color of her hair and eyes, the crook of her nose, the pout of her lips, the whiteness of her teeth, the number of the dimples on her cheeks, with a minute enumeration probably of all the articles of her wearing apparel, as in the following from "The Lovers of Gudrun," by William Morris:

"That spring was she just come to her full height,
Low-bosomed yet she was, and slim and light,
Yet scarce might she grow fairer from that day;
Gold were the locks wherewith the wind did play,
Finer than silk, waved softly like the sea
After a three days' calm, and to her knee
Well-nigh they reached; fair were the white hands laid
Upon the door-posts where the dragons played;
Her brow was smooth now, and a smile began
To cross her delicate mouth, the snare of man;
For some thought rose within the heart of her
That made her eyes bright, her cheeks ruddier
Than was their wont, yet were they delicate
As are the changing steps of high heaven's gate;
Bluer than gray her eyes were, somewhat thin
Her marvellous red lips; round was her chin,
Cloven and clear wrought; like an ivory tower
Rose up her neck from love's white-veiled bower.
But in such lordly raiment was she clad
As midst its threads the scent of southlands had,
And on its hem the work of such-like hands
As deal with silk and gold in sunny lands.
Too dainty seemed her feet to come anear
The guest-worn threshold-stone. So stood she there,
And rough the world about her seemed to be,
A rude heap cast up from the weary sea."

The Earthly Paradise.

e. Imagine a man telling a story in natural conversation, and going into these minute particulars. Imagine him noticing them in the presence of the character described. To conceive of his doing it, is almost impossible. Therefore the detailing of them imparts an air of unreality

to the narrative, and for this reason makes it also uninteresting. There is much excellence, however, in these lines of Morris, aside from that which is here criticised. To recognize just how uninteresting this kind of description can be, as well as how much less it really tells us about the persons described than the kind of representation exemplified in Homer and in Hermann's glimpse of Dorothea, let us take a passage less excellent in other regards than that of Morris. It is from Southey's "Thalaba," by many considered his best poem:

"The stranger was an ancient man,
Yet one whose green old age
Bore the fair characters of temperate youth;
So much of manhood's strength his limbs retained,
It seemed he needed not the staff he bore.
His beard was long and gray and crisp;
Lively his eyes and quick,
And reaching over them
The large broad eyebrow curled.
His speech was copious, and his winning words
Enriched with knowledge that the attentive youth
Sat listening with a thirsty joy."

Notice this also:

"Black were his eyes and bright;
The sunny hue of health
Glowed on his tawny cheek;
His lip was darkened by maturing life;
Strong were his shapely limbs, his stature tall,
Peerless among Arabian youths was he."

Idem.

f. All that is given us in these descriptions might be said of a thousand men that everybody meets in a lifetime.

E. This passage suggests a fifth characteristic of the Homeric descriptions, which probably is the underlying and determining cause of the last three. It is that they are *progressive*, — the fact that they always represent what is in motion. They are constructed in fulfilment of that principle of nature first noticed by Lessing in his celebrated criticism on "The Laocoön," in accordance with which words represent ideas, feelings, events — whatever it may be to which they give expression — that *follow one another in the order of time*. In the last passage quoted from Homer we are not told what Hecamede found on the table; the poet pictures the maid in the act of spreading the table and putting the different articles of food on it. So in the following we are not told how Patroclus or Juno looked when dressed; but we are told how they dressed themselves. The successive words in the descriptions are all made to represent successive acts.

"He spake: Patroclus, then in glittering brass,
Arrayed himself; and first around his thighs
He put the beautiful greaves, and fastened them
With silver clasps; around his chest he bound
The breastplate of the swift Æacides,
With star-like points, and richly chased; he hung
The sword, with silver studs and blade of brass,
Upon his shoulders, and with it the shield,
Solid and vast; upon his gallant head
He placed the glorious helm with horsehair plume,
That grandly waved on high. Two massive spears
He took, that fitted well his grasp, but left
The spear which great Achilles only bore,
Heavy and huge and strong, and which no arm
Among the Greeks save his could poise."

Iliad, xvi.: *Irregular.*

"She entered in
And closed the shining doors; and first she took
Ambrosial water, washing every stain
From her fair limbs, and smoothed them with rich oil,
Ambrosial, soft, and fragrant, which, when touched
Within Jove's brazen halls, perfumed the air
Of earth and heaven. When thus her shapely form
Had been anointed, and her hands had combed
Her tresses, she arranged the lustrous curls,
Ambrosial, beautiful, that clustering hung
Round her immortal brow. And next she threw
Around her an ambrosial robe, the work
Of Pallas, all its web embroidered o'er
With forms of rare device. She fastened it
Over the breast with clasps of gold, and then
She passed about her waist a zone which bore
Fringes an hundred-fold, and in her ears
She hung her three-gemmed ear-rings, from whose gleam
She won an added grace. Around her head
The glorious goddess drew a flowing veil,
Just from the loom, and shining like the sun;
And, last, beneath her bright white feet she bound
The shapely sandals. Gloriously arrayed
In all her ornaments, she left her bower."

Iliad, xiv.: *Idem.*

a. So when Homer describes a camp, he connects it with action; we are told of a process of building or of demolition.

"And ere the morning came, while earth was gray
With twilight, by the funeral pile arose
A chosen band of Greeks, who, going forth,
Heaped round it from the earth a common tomb
For all, and built a wall and lofty towers
Near it, — a bulwark for the fleet and host.
And in the wall they fitted massive gates,
Through which there passed an ample chariot-way;
And on its outer edge they sank a trench, —
Broad, deep, — and planted it with pointed stakes.
So labored through the night the long-haired Greeks."

Iliad, vii.: *Idem.*

b. Even in Homer's references to natural scenery we find everything in constant motion. Notice these traits in his description of the fire kindled by Vulcan in order to save the Greeks from the Trojans:

"The ground was dried; the glimmering flood was still.
As when the autumnal north-wind, breathing o'er
A newly watered garden, quickly dries
The clammy mould, and makes the tiller glad,
So did the spacious plain grow dry on which
The dead were turned to ashes. Then the god
Seized on the river with his glittering fires.
The elms, the willows, and the tamarisks
Fell, scorched to cinders, and the lotus-herbs,
Rushes, and reeds, that richly fringed the banks
Of that fair-flowing current, were consumed.
The eels and fishes, that were wont to glide
Hither and thither through the pleasant depths
And eddies, languished in the fiery breath
Of Vulcan, mighty artisan. The strength
Of the greatest river withered."

Iliad, xxi.: *Idem.*

c. So a snowstorm seems interesting to him mainly because it is doing something, and can be used as an illustration of something else that is doing something; e.g.,

"As when the flakes
Of snow fall thick upon a winter-day,
When Jove the Sovereign pours them down on men,
Like arrows, from above; — he bids the wind
Breathe not! continually he pours them down,
And covers every mountain-top and peak,
And flowery mead, and field of fertile tilth,
And sheds them on the havens and the shores
Of the gray deep; but there the waters bound
The covering of snows, — all else is white
Beneath that fast-descending shower of Jove; —
So thick the shower of stones from either side
Flew toward the other."

Iliad, xii.: *Idem.*

d. Look now at the way in which Homer describes the scenes by which some of his heroes pass in flight. How few comparatively are the objects noticed in them, yet how specifically do they indicate the typical features, which in the circumstances one would see and remember, and from which, in the rapid glance that he would have of everything, he would derive all his impressions.

"They passed the Mount of View,
And the wind-beaten fig-tree, and they ran
Along the public way by which the wall
Was skirted, till they came where from the ground
The two fair springs of eddying Xanthus rise, —
One pouring a warm stream from which ascends
And spreads a vapor like a smoke from fire;
The other even in summer, sending forth
A current cold as hail, or snow, or ice.
And there were broad stone basins, fairly wrought,
At which in time of peace before the Greeks
Had landed on the plain, the Trojan dames
And their fair daughters washed their sumptuous robes.
Past these they swept; one fled and one pursued, —
A brave man fled, a braver followed close,
And swiftly both."

Iliad, xxii.: *Idem.*

e. Now contrast with these the following description. It is not a poor one of its kind; but all must perceive that a poem characterized by many passages like it could not be in the highest degree interesting. Such descriptions, on account of their lack of the qualities noticed in those of Homer, tend to interrupt the plot and the interest felt in its characters. Besides this, of the many items mentioned here, few are described with sufficient specificness to make us feel that they were really perceived, and not merely fancied.

"It was broad moonlight, and obscure or lost
The garden beauties lay;
But the great boundary rose distinctly marked.
These were no little hills,
No sloping uplands lifting to the sun
Their vineyards with fresh verdure, and the shade
Of ancient woods, courting the loiterer
To win the easy ascent; stone mountains these,
Desolate rock on rock,
The burdens of the earth,
Whose snowy summits met the morning beam
When night was in the vale, whose feet were fixed
In the world's foundations.
. . . . . .

Silent and calm the river rolled along,
And at the verge arrived
Of that fair garden o'er a rocky bed,
Toward the mountain base
Still full and silent, held its even way.
But farther as they went, its deepening sound
Louder and louder in the distance rose,
As if it forced its stream
Struggling through crags along a narrow pass.
And lo! where, raving o'er a hollow course,
The ever-flowing flood
Foams in a thousand whirlpools. There adown
The perforated rock
Plunge the whole waters; so precipitous,
So fathomless a fall,
That their earth-shaking roar came deadened up
Like subterranean thunders."

Thalaba, vii.: *Southey.*

f. The following description, similar in general character, is more interesting, because it is more specific and shorter:

"Onward amid the copse 'gan peep
A narrow inlet, still and deep,
Affording scarce such breadth of brim,
As served the wild duck's brood to swim,
Lost for a space, through thickets veering,
But broader when again appearing,
Tall rocks and tufted knolls their face
Could on the dark-blue mirror trace;
And farther as the hunter strayed,
Still broader sweeps its channels made.
The shaggy mounds no longer stood,
Emerging from entangled wood,
But, wave-encircled, seemed to float,
Like castle girdled with its moat;
Yet broader fields extending still
Divide them from their parent hill,
Till each, retiring, claims to be
An islet in an inland sea."

Lady of the Lake, i.: *Scott.*

g. But this is still more interesting, because it represents action that is closely connected with the plot.

"Then did Apollo and the god of sea
Consult together to destroy the wall
By turning on it the resistless might
Of rivers. . . .
. . . nine days against the wall

He bade their currents rush, while Jupiter
Poured constant rain, that floods might overwhelm
The rampart; and the god who shakes the earth,
Wielding his trident, led the rivers on.
He flung among the billows the huge beams
And stones which, with hard toil, the Greeks had laid
For the foundations. Thus he levelled all
Beside the hurrying Hellespont, destroyed
The bulwarks utterly, and overspread
The long, broad shore with sand."

Iliad, xii.: *Bryant's Trans.*

h. The principles that apply to these representations of persons and scenes in nature apply also to conversations in dramatic poems. All lengthy descriptions or declamatory passages that have nothing to do directly with giving definiteness, character, and progress to the plot, detract from the interest of the poem, considered as a whole. The effect of these things upon the form is the same as that of rubbish thrown into the current of a stream — it impedes the movement, and renders the water less transparent. This is the chief reason why the works of the dramatists of the age of the history of our literature commonly called classical, like Dryden, Addison, Rowe, Home, and Brooke, notwithstanding much that is excellent in their writings, have not been able to maintain their popularity. Ordinary audiences do not care to be preached at in this style:

"These are all virtues of a meaner rank —
Perfections that are placed in bones and nerves.
A Roman soul is bent on higher views:
To civilize the rude, unpolished world,
And lay it under the restraint of laws;
To make man mild and sociable to man;
To cultivate the wild, licentious savage
With wisdom, discipline, and liberal arts,
The embellishments of life; virtues like these
Make human nature shine, reform the soul,
And break our fierce barbarians into men."

Cato, i. 4: *Addison.*

i. Of course, when, without reference to a story necessitating a series of events, it is desired, as is often the case, especially in *prose*, to describe in detail an object in space and its exact surroundings, the effects of progress and movement are much less important. At the same time, even in such cases, progress in the sense of an indication of the order of observation, as explained in § 202, is essential to hold the interest of the reader, and thus to insure the highest success.

LIST OF SUBJECTS.

EXPOSITORY AND PERSUASIVE.

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The Brotherhood of Man.
Gothic Architecture as an Exponent of the Religious Sentiment.
Free Thought.
Deformity in Uniformity.
Partisanship.
International Arbitration.
American Statesmanship of To-day.
Capital and Labor.
Religious Intensity.
Europe and Republicanism.
Fame and Greatness.
Radicalism.
Mental Instincts.
[redacted]
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Success conditioned upon Law.
German Influence in Literature.
Public Treatment of Public Men.
Literature as a Social Force.
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The Literary Man of the Middle Ages.
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The Conservatism of Education.
The Poetry of War.
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The Modern Social Panacea.
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The Federal Idea in History.
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The Evolution of Labor.
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Infidelity and Scepticism.
The Contribution of Christianity to English Jurisprudence.
Problems of the Nineteenth Century.
What Philanthropy owes to Christianity.
Assassination as a Political Weapon.
The Fanatic and the Statesman.
Dangerous Tendencies in American National Life.
Loyalty to Duty.
The Mobility of American Society.
The Worth of Memorials.
The American Englishman.
The Evils of the American Newspaper.
Municipal Rule in Great Cities.
[redacted]Reform in our Government.
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The Influence of Rivers upon History.
Pessimism and Optimism in Literature.
The Temperance Question in Politics.
The Religious Element in the History of the Drama.
The Spain of the Sixteenth Century.
English and American Philanthropists.
The French Literature of the Second Empire.
Memory in Education.
Civilization and Chemistry.
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Modern Inventions as related to Human Happiness.
Partisan History.
The Unrest of the Age, as expressed in its Poetry.
The Revival of Greek Learning in Western Europe.
The Moral Dangers of a Commercial Life.
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The Novel as a Didactic Agency.
The Caprices of Fashion.
Journalism as a Profession.
Habits of Observation.
The Iconoclasm of Modern History.
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Impulse and Principle.
Characteristics of the Scientific Mind.
Illiteracy as a foe to Civilization.
Independence a factor in the Formation of Character.
The Limits of Toleration.
The State and the Convict.
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Stoicism and Christianity.
The Christian Element in Patriotism.
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God in the Constitution.
Vox Populi, Vox Dei.
The "Machine" in Politics.
The Ideal Element in Life.
The Meaning of American History.
Harmful Sympathy.
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The Modern Elegy.
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The True Office of Criticism.
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The Temple and the Cathedral.
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The English Republicans of the Eighteenth Century.
The Relation of Physical and Mental Culture.
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The Influence of Roman Law.
The Practicality of Idealism.
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The Philosophy of the Strong.
The Fall of the Myth.
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The Power of Music.
The Effects of War.
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The Importance of restraining the Passions.
The Power and Abuses of Faith.
The Effects of Labor.
A Republican Form of Government.
New England and Old England.
Effects of the Discovery of America.

Reform Schools: their Character and Usefulness.

The Magnetic Needle and the Bible.

The Telescope and the Microscope.

The Slavery of Evil Habits.

Prospects of the English Language.

The Climate of America.

The Effects of Music and Painting compared.

Socrates and Franklin compared.

Importance of Agricultural Colleges.

Was the Purchase of Alaska by the United States of America a wise measure?

Ought the Printing and Sale of Bad Books to be forbidden by Law?

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Which did the most for his Country, Franklin or Washington?

Have Wars been Productive of Greater Good or Evil?

Is the Civilized preferable to the Savage State?

Ought the Right of Suffrage in a Republic to be limited by an Educational Provision?

Is a Hilly and Mountainous Country preferable to one that is level?

Have we reason to expect as Great Improvements in the Useful Arts duringt he next hundred years as during the past hundred?

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The Landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth.

The Detection, Trial, and Execution of Major Andre.

The Passage of the Declaration of Independence, in 1776.

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The Death and Funeral of Abraham Lincoln.

The Burning of Moscow.

The Discussion between Hayne and Webster in the American Senate.

The Salem Witchcraft.

The Story of the "Merchant of Venice."

The Duel between Hamilton and Burr.

The Great Chicago Fire.

The Legend of Rip Van Winkle.

The War of 1812.

The First Railway.

The First Steamboat.

The Shooting of President Garfield.

The Bridging of the East River.

The Life as illustrating the Character of Socrates; of Lord Bacon; of George Washington; of Milton; of Cowper; of Byron, etc.

The Destruction of Pompeii.

The Earthquake at Lisbon in 1755.

The American Civil War of 1861.

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The Gold Fever of '49.

The Rise of the Republican Party.

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A Winter Night.

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A Snow Scene.

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A Country Road.

A Rainbow.

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A Waterfall.

A Thunder Storm.

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Twilight.

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A Ruined Mill.

A Deserted House.

An Old-fashioned Kitchen.

An Old Graveyard.

An Art Gallery.

A Museum.

A Country Church.

The Abode of Poverty.

An Ocean Steamer.

A Castle.

The Old Garret.

A Prison.

A Factory.

A Blacksmith Shop.

A Library.

Mount Vesuvius; Mount Etna, Mount Hecla.

The River Amazon; the Mississippi; the Danube.

The Caspian Sea; the Dead Sea; Lake Superior.

The City of Mexico; the City of Pekin; the City of Athens; the City of Washington.

The Parthenon; the Coliseum; St. Peter's Cathedral at Rome.

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The Mississippi Valley.

The Falls of Niagara.

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