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LETTERS

FROM

A FATHER TO HIS SON,

ON VARIOUS TOPICS

RELATIVE TO

LITERATURE AND THE CONDUCT OF LIFE.

VOL. II.

Written in the Years 1798 and 1799.

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in my opinion, more calculated to depress and paralyze the mind through despair, than to rouse it to generous emulation. An actual Aristides or Washington are abundantly more animating than the visionary and impossible *wise man* of the Stoics.

Adieu!

LETTER

## LETTER IV.



You must frequently, I doubt not, have felt equal surprise and disgust at the dogmatism with which the most opposite opinions relative to the comparative merit of authors are laid down in writing and conversation; and you must have wished for some positive criterion to apply to these opinions, in order to ascertain their solidity, at least to your own satisfaction, if not to the conviction of the disputants themselves. Attempts have been often made, in the walks both of literature and the fine arts, to establish such a criterion, and to ~~use it to prevent~~ ~~the deter-~~ ~~m-~~ ~~in-~~ ~~the~~

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wide differences still subsisting among those who lay claim to this quality, sufficiently prove the ill success of these efforts. Sensible as I am, that diversities either in original conformation, or in early associations, must ever prevent mankind from feeling exactly alike with respect to the objects presented to them, I have no sanguine expectations of a near approach to uniformity in their judgments; yet I conceive it possible that a train of thought may be suggested by which a tolerably unprejudiced mind may make some progress towards the attainment of rational principles in matters hitherto left to the decision of vague sentiment. I do not see why it should be less practicable to state the grounds of our preference of one work of genius to another, than of one moral action to another; and I conceive the same general method may be applied in both cases; namely, to consider what was the *end* in view, and how far the *means* employed have accomplished their purpose. All the works of human art may  
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be examined upon this principle; but I shall at present confine myself to the noblest of all, that of *writing*, or *literary composition*.

The first and most obvious purpose of writing is to communicate with all possible force and precision the ideas of the writer to the mind of the reader. This effect is absolutely indispensable; and therefore every failure arising from the feeble, the inadequate, the embarrassed, the ill-arranged expression of thoughts, is absolutely contrary to the perfection of a writing. I will not stop to particularize instances of this defect; yet I cannot forbear observing that many works which bear a high character, if judged of by the difficulty found in developing their meaning, the ambiguities and perplexities remaining after every effort of learning and sagacity to elucidate them, and the febleness with which they at last strike the mind of the reader, must be very short of that perfection which prejudiced admirers attribute to them. Great allow-  
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precision

ances, doubtless, ought to be made in favour of works composed in a language long extinct, and referring to modes of thinking or living long obliterated. Yet some of the works to which I allude are known to have presented these difficulties from the time of their first appearance, and a comparison with others of the same period will show that the faults belonged to the individual, not to the age.

What has been said above refers to *style* in its most confined sense, or the manner in which a writer gives enunciation to his ideas; and the point of perfection thus far is ~~that the language should be an exact transcript of the thought.~~ This alone includes many of the first qualities of writing. It supposes in the writer a perfect knowledge of the value and import of all the words he uses, as well singly as in combination; a knowledge which forms no mean part of philosophy, and cannot be attained without much reflection and research. It supposes him master of the art of combining clauses  
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and sentences so as to exhibit in the clearest manner the dependence of ideas one upon another, and the train or succession in which the process of argumentation consists. It requires him to have at hand a sufficient store of expressions, and yet to be possessed of judgment enough not to run into prolixity; to know how long he may dwell upon an idea with advantage, and when its further repetition would be wearisome tautology. It may likewise be extended to include that sense of ~~propriety and decorum, that air of good company,~~ which prevents an author from shocking his reader by vulgarisms, or disgusting him by singularities. By these, which I think are intelligible and positive requisites, a criterion may be established of writing, as far as it is the dress or image of thought.

But the merit of the *thoughts* themselves cannot be separated from our notion of good writing; and many of its qualities must have a reference to the *powers of conception* in the mind whence the ideas

proceed. Here, it must be confessed, our criterion becomes more vague; and we are in danger of being thrown into all the fluctuation of opinion attendant upon subjects of mere taste. Our only resource in this case is a comparison between the effects apparently intended to be produced by the writer, and those really produced;—in other words, what he has attempted, and what he has done.

The attempt in some cases is so simple that it is not difficult to pronounce concerning its success. The enunciation of a truth, and the statement of a plain argument, as in scientific topics, are complete with respect both to conception and expression, when all that is wanted, and no more, is communicated to the reader in its most precise and intelligible form. Clear notions, in subjects of this kind, almost necessarily clothe themselves in proper language; and no one, while receiving the whole instruction he seeks for, feels a want of any thing more perfect. Mathematical demonstrations, and didac-

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tic lessons of art or science, are of this kind. In these, if the writer is methodical, clear, and concise, he has done his part.

The narration of a matter of fact perhaps comes next in point of simplicity; but here, diversity of conception has a much wider scope. Circumstances strike different persons so differently, that two are rarely found to agree in their account of the same transaction, if in any degree complicated. Independently of the propensity to alter and exaggerate, the selection of incidents varies much in different narrators. Some dwell minutely upon what to others would appear frivolous and uninteresting. Some dramatise a story by assigning to each actor his own peculiar language; others relate the whole in their own words. In general, he is the most perfect narrator, who puts his reader most completely in the state of a spectator; who transports him to the very spot, marks out to him all the personages by their characteristic features, and fills the

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the scene with manners and action. For success in such an attempt, nothing is so necessary as an imagination capable of receiving and retaining strong impressions. Where this exists, and the subject of description is an interesting one, no great artifice of language is requisite for producing a complete effect; and frequently, the most perfect simplicity, and the absence of all design, prove most successful. The story of Joseph in the Old Testament is manifestly written without the least art or effort, yet a more affecting one is perhaps no where to be met with. Many other narrations in the Jewish scriptures are equally unpretending and equally excellent; and it is a remarkable circumstance, that the oriental style, so strained and figurative in lyrical, prophetic, and even didactic compositions, should be so simple in the description of facts. But this kind of negative merit is almost all that is wanted in the species of writing in question; and if the relator has taste enough to abstain from affected phraseology,

logy, unseasonable digressions, and impertinent remarks, he can scarcely fail, with a selection of striking incidents, to produce the desired effect.

The next in order of simplicity seems to be, an attempt to convince by a process of argumentation addressed to the reason. When a person is master of his subject, and has it laid up in his mind in its proper ordonnance of gradation, proceeding from the simplest propositions to the more complex, and establishing a regular series of deduction till he arrives at the intended conclusion, it may be thought that his power of communicating to others the notions he himself entertains, will follow almost of course. Yet, I believe, experience has shewn that men of undoubted intellectual sagacity have not always been happy in attempts of this kind; and on reflection it will be seen that literary talents, if not of the highest class, yet rare and respectable, are required for attaining the first rank as a logical or argumentative writer. Great precision in  
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the use of words, clear arrangement of all the members of a sentence, closeness of method, strength and conciseness of expression without harshness or obscurity, are essential to perfection in this department of writing; and if somewhat of the grace and amenity of language be added, which is not incompatible with the other requisites, the effect of conviction may be promoted, by leading on the reader pleasantly through a topic perhaps naturally dry and unalluring. I conceive Cicero and Hume to be examples of this union of every useful and agreeable quality in discussions purely philosophical.

If the manner of the former of these writers in his stricter philosophical works be compared with that in his popular ethical pieces, and his orations, a just idea may be formed of the progress from an address to the reason alone, to an attempt to persuade by addressing the affections likewise. This combination is *oratory* or *eloquence*; and there are few occasions of importance in human life in which the  
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possession of this quality, either in speech or writing, is not felt as a high degree of superiority. Its field, too, is so large, that its point of absolute perfection is scarcely assignable; and *genius*, that celestial faculty, to the powers of which no limits can be assigned, finds in it sufficient play for all its energies. Rhetoric has long ago been defined "the art of persuasion;" its end, therefore, is sufficiently obvious; and it may be said, in a general way, to be perfect when it attains that end. But there will commonly be room to ask, Would not something more excellent have answered it better? might not a more skilful orator gain over conviction to the opposite side of the question? Reason, by itself, is a principle of tolerably equal operation in minds properly disposed to receive it; but where the passions are of the party, no one can be sure of the event. Taste also assumes great sway where appeals are made to the imagination or to the finer feelings; and admiration may contribute to bias  
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the decisions of the judgment. The perfection of oratory, then, will be seen to be a very complicated consideration, referring not only to the subject treated of, but to the persons to whom it is addressed. Let us, however, limit the case to an address to persons prepared by a certain degree of refinement in manners, and of acquaintance with the beauties of literature; to persons, also, of sense and knowledge of the world, and under no immediate impression of enthusiasm. In these circumstances, I conceive that argument should be the staple, the main body, of the discourse; and that the appearance of a declamatory effusion of common-place rhetoric should by all means be avoided. But argument may be greatly assisted by the variety of lights in which it is placed—by strong descriptions, pathetic or humorous, resulting from real or hypothetical consequences of the matter in debate—by drawing to a luminous point or focus all the inferences and deductions flowing from the train of reasoning

reasoning—and by a style of language animated with energetic expressions and lively images. In these particulars consists the true art of oratory, an art which it is in vain to teach by formal rules, enjoining certain divisions and subdivisions of a subject, and directing the orator when to be warm, and when to be cool, when simple, and when metaphorical. Such systematical rhetoric produces nothing but pedantic and tedious harangues, which weary the patience of every hearer, and though they may be applauded in the schools, are of no use or effect in real life. The orator who wishes to persuade, must take his rules from his subject, his audience, his own feelings, and his own peculiar talents; for talents of very different kinds may by proper management be made equally to concur in the grand effect of persuasion. In some, a rapid strain of argument, strictly deduced from the matter in debate, delivered in earnest, glowing, but not choice or ornamented language, and dwelling

dwelling long and fully upon the same topics, has proved highly successful. Such appears to have been the eloquence of the Grecian Demosthenes; and such is that of a speaker, certainly not his inferior in powers of mind, the English Fox. This species, however, seems better adapted for oral delivery, than for writing. To the hearer its effect is enhanced by the accompaniments of voice and action; nor is he liable to be offended with negligencies or tautologies which might give disgust in the leisurely survey of a reader. On the contrary, the wide reach and compass of thought, the splendour and copiousness of illustration, the profuse imagery and poetical conceptions of a Burke (a man whom I know not where to parallel), might often bewilder and fatigue the hearer, while to the reader they have afforded the highest gratification, and often proved irresistibly convincing. The strong, pointed, homely sense of a Paine, however, has not been inferior in efficacy to his antagonist's profusion

fusion of excellencies; and thus every different mode of oratory, if practised by a master, may produce in its favour the criterion of perfection. This is, to convince the reason in the very face of prepossession; to wield at will the passions; to calm the furious and rouse the torpid; in short, to effect by the mere power of persuasion, all that can be done by brute force or all-subduing gold.

The perfection of historical composition demands a still greater assemblage of literary qualifications. Oratory, in the direct form of harangues, once constituted a part of it; and some of the best specimens of eloquence of this kind are to be found in histories. But though this practice is now abolished (I think, judiciously, as it injured the most essential of all impressions, that of veracity), yet occasions continually occur in an interesting narrative in which scope is given for the most genuine eloquence. And notwithstanding it may be true, that authentic history, however written, is capable of giving

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pleasure, yet I presume there are few readers to whom it would be indifferent whether they took the relation of Agrippina's landing at Brundisium, of the trial of Strafford, of the death of Mary queen of Scots, from a Tacitus, Hume, or Robertson, or from one of the vulgar chroniclers of the time. Moreover, we expect from the complete historian a lucid arrangement and skilful development of facts, often involved and perplexed with contradictions; sagacity to trace the connexion of causes and effects; penetration to detect the motives and true characters of men, however disguised by artifice; together with that philosophical spirit and freedom from prejudice which entitle the writer to assume the office of an instructor, and point the great lesson of human events. Possessed of these requisites, the historian may be allowed considerable latitude in his style. If he is merely perspicuous, correct, and elegant, he will avoid blame; but he will not attain the praise of a fine writer without the power of enriching his

language, when the subject favours him, with every figure that can give it force, majesty, and beauty. Historical writing is in prose, what the epic is in verse—a field for every varied exertion of which the composer's mind may be capable.

This observation leads me to the species of composition with which I mean to conclude; Poetry—the most difficult of all to reduce to the laws of critical judgment. The distinguishing purpose of poetry has often been stated to be that of *pleasing*; but various explanations seem necessary before this principle can be adapted to use. Perhaps the whole business of *versification* may at once be referred to the *pleasure* it is by experience found capable of giving to the ear; an idea I should willingly admit, as it would establish an easy discrimination between poetry and prose by a single characteristic, which otherwise is not to be found. But in order to estimate the value of the other ingredients of which poetry is composed, we ought, I conceive, to proceed beyond

the simple notion of pleasing, and expand our idea of the art to the comprehension of *all that in writing is capable of imparting to the mind every impression in its most exquisite degree.* It would lead me too far were I to enumerate the various figures of poetry, and attempt to show how each contributes to the augmentation of *impression.* It is obvious, however, that the figures of comparison illustrate and enforce the original idea; and that prosopopœia and personification bring the scene directly before the eye, and bestow on it life and action. That the peculiarities of poetical language also give *pleasure* I mean not to deny; and perhaps poets have in some cases more attended to the amusement of their readers, than to the enforcement of a particular subject. This seems especially to be with some writers the intention of *simile*, which, if pursued to minuteness, as many of Homer's, substitute a new picture to the imagination, often to the temporary obliteration of the original one. But this is really a fault when it  
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interrupts the course of a narrative of itself highly interesting.

The poetry of description and of sentiment is no other than *eloquence in verse*; and the advantage of this form over that of prose arises from the pleasure, and indeed, in some cases, the consonance of effect, obtained by measured harmony, together with the licence of using without restraint those figures which give glow and animation to language. One of the most perfect examples of the efficacy of these means is Pope's epistle of Eloisa to Abelard, of which the thoughts are almost all to be found in the real correspondence between those celebrated characters: but how are they heightened, how adorned, how animated by the rich melody and vivid expression of that great master! Compare, too, the sketch given by Virgil of the battle of Actium with any prose relation of the same event. With how much more force and distinctness is the scene brought to view! how is it aggrandized by a selection of great in-  
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cidents, and the suppression of every thing petty and trivial! above all, what dignity is thrown about it by the introduction of fictitious personages, superior to human! It is this use of *fiction* that many critics have regarded as the principal characteristic of true poetry; and doubtless, when it contributes to enhance the desired impression, it is the noblest exertion of poetical genius. But how frequently is it found that the introduction of celestial beings only tends to degrade the human; and that the mixture of preternatural events *unrealizes* (if I may use the expression) the natural part of the fable? The mere production of wonder and surprise, which some have represented as the most essential business of poetry, is often attempted with at least as great success in prose; witness the Arabian Nights, and the whole class of novels and romances. On the other hand, some of the finest poems are limited to what is strictly natural in description, only heightened by a selection of the most striking circumstances and the

the most perfect specimens, and set off with all the glow and relief of strong colouring.

I return then to the criterion of perfect poetry, and venture to suggest that it consists in the *force* with which it impresses the heart or the imagination, joined to the *pleasure* it affords by the artifice of its numbers, and by the variety and splendour of its diction. The number of subjects on which poetry is employed, and the different forms it is made to assume, will ever allow a wide scope to the diversities of taste in selecting its favourites; nor can any general rules controul the effect of partial associations. It is, however, desirable that the mind should acquire a sensibility to excellence of as many kinds as possible; and he is the happiest reader of poetry who can enjoy the masterpieces of every age and country, and in every species of poetical composition. There seems to be a greater propensity to make comparisons of merit in this, than in any other department of

literature; and in none does dogmatism of opinion so much prevail. It is an usual thing for those who are the most rapturous admirers of one author, to affect the profoundest contempt for another, perhaps his rival in general fame. Yet I imagine the criterion above mentioned, if fairly applied, will afford as decisive a test of poetical merit, as exists for many other kinds of literary excellence. One exception, however, must be admitted. It is impossible for any one to acquire an adequate feeling of the beauties of *versification* in a foreign language; and therefore he should decline all comparisons in this point except between the writers in his own.

From the notion above given of the perfection of poetry, I think it will follow as a corollary, that true taste cannot approve any of those devices for making it easier to the composer which have been lately practised, consisting of loose versification, the absence of rhyme where expected, prosaic simplicity of language, and the

the like; for, that the real purpose of such liberties is to favour the laziness of the writers, and not to add an agreeable variety to their performances, I am well convinced. As poetry is a luxury and not a necessary, its multiplication is not an object to be studied at the expence of its excellence; and a little of it, of the finest kind and richest flavour, answers its purpose much better than an abundance of ordinary growth.

What, then, after these particular inquiries, shall we say constitutes the general perfection of writing? I can discover no other universal principle in this case, than that which is applicable to every effort of art—the degree in which it accomplishes the purpose intended. This consideration will, no doubt, ever leave room for some diversity of judgment; since neither the purpose, nor its attainment, will appear exactly in the same light to all. Yet I cannot but think that it offers a more promising access to uniformity, than might be conceived

ceived by one who had never seriously dwelt upon it. Erroneous judgments, especially of the unfavourable kind, are often made from the unreasonable expectation of what was never designed—of what was impossible to be effected.

Let the critic then begin with obtaining a clear idea of what he ought to look for in a work of literature, and not pronounce its condemnation because he does not find what ignorance alone could have led him to expect. With a judgment so prepared, and a mind free from ordinary prejudices and partialities, he will probably seldom fail of deciding rightly concerning that *approach* to perfection, which is all that the condition of human nature will permit to the most exalted genius.

Farewell!

LETTER

## LETTER V.

ON AUTHORITY IN MATTER OF OPINION.

DEAR SON,

I NOW mean to fulfil an expectation I formerly raised, of making the important topic of *authority* the subject of a letter. It is the authority exercised over the understanding, to which I shall confine my discussion; a species, concerning which it may be assumed, that man has given up none of his rights on entering into society, and therefore that it is at all times fully open to inquiry. There have been ages, indeed, in which submission to authority was considered as one of the most sacred duties; and no arguments were allowed to be adduced against the dictates of those who had obtained, no one exactly knew

then judge of the encouragement such an employment of the faculties affords. How easy would it be to multiply examples to this effect, were it necessary!

Another division of studies may be formed (not, indeed, with strict accuracy of arrangement, but sufficient for the present purpose) upon a view of what *man has done*, considered as a creator in art and science. A multiplicity of objects here opens upon the mind, of which I shall content myself with selecting two or three for particular consideration.

As the noblest distinction of a human being is the use of language, that art which teaches to use it in the best manner, or the *art of composition*, may take the lead under this division. By studying its principles, so as to be able to enter into all the beauties and delicacies of fine writing, a source of entertainment of the highest kind is provided, independently of the power acquired of imitating what we admire. I have already touched upon this subject in my letter on the advantages  
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resulting from a taste for poetry, but it is capable of great extension by comprehending the art of criticism in all its branches. This comprizes an accurate research into the nature of language in general, and the genius of those particular languages in which the student is conversant; an acquaintance with the character of style in all its diversities, and the various figures of speech employed to adorn or invigorate it; a knowledge of the essential distinctions between the different species of composition; and a familiarity with all the principal works of different ages and countries, in order to trace imitations and form exact ideas of comparative merit. The number of capital productions in verse and prose to which the ancient and a few of the modern languages give access, is so great, that the critical study of them will furnish employment for all the leisure any scholar can command; and so seductive is this branch of literature, that persons classically educated are often seen to make it almost the sole  
occupation