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HERBART'S METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT OF THE EGO AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR HIS PEDAGOGICS.

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-by-

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INTRODUCTION

Herbart was one of a small number of philosophers who have been active in education, and his influence in this field has been far-reaching. He was born at Oldenburg, Germany, in 1776. His whole career was quiet and simple, though part of his life was lived in an age of military and political turmoil. He was a precocious youth and very early became interested in the higher studies, having begun the study of logic at the age of eleven, and metaphysics at twelve. From 1788 to 1794 he attended the Oldenburg Gymnasium during which time he delighted in reading philosophy and in writing metaphysical essays, and at his graduation he made an impressive speech on the "Causes of the growth and decay of morality amongst the common people". He continued his formal education for the next three years at the University of Jena where he became a student under Fichte whose attention he attracted by his essays on "The Science of Knowledge". In 1796 he also wrote an important monograph on "The Duty of the State in Education".

After leaving Jena, Herbart became the tutor of the three children of Herr Von Steiger, governor of Interlaken, Switzerland. Here he remained two or three years and then went to Bremen to prepare himself for an academic career in the university. His chief studies were Greek and mathematics, but at this time he also wrote philosophical and pedagogical essays one of which was "A Critique of the Conception of the Ego". He was a university teacher in the capacity of Privat Docent at Göttingen from 1802 to 1809. From there he was called to the chair of

philosophy at Königsberg where he remained for twenty-four years. He returned to Göttingen in 1833, and died in 1841.

To test his theories of education, Herbart established and maintained at Königsberg a pedagogical seminary and practice school. His disciples founded similar institutions elsewhere; and it was through these schools, attended also by foreign students, that the Herbartian doctrines were extended to other lands. A number of American students who attended the German schools were instrumental in bringing Herbartianism to the United States. Here its influence spread more rapidly than in any other country outside of Germany. At Saratoga, in 1892, an Herbartian Club was formed which published annually a volume devoted for the most part to an exposition of Herbartian doctrines.

The Herbartian movement in America did not proceed without opposition. At the Cleveland meeting of the Department of Superintendence, N. E. A., in February, 1895, a debate between the Hegelians and Herbartians was precipitated by the report of the Committee of Fifteen, of which William T. Harris was chairman. In this debate one of the Hegelians, defending the position of transcendental freedom, said in substance and in part, "Can the human Ego inhibit the stream of causation in which it finds itself?" Answering his own question, he stated that "If I cannot modify the stream of causation in which I find myself I am not responsible for my actions and am therefore not a moral being." "By means of transcendental freedom," he continued, "one may be like a tug boat with power to go against the stream instead of a log drifting with the current. By means of transcendental freedom Jesus could meet the devil on the mount and decline an offer

of the world with thanks. By means of transcendental freedom the martyr can willingly and deliberately bow his head before the block."

From the Herbartians came the reply: "What was it that enabled Jesus to overcome the temptations of the devil and refuse to worship him? Examining the account we find that Jesus answered the devil by saying, 'It is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and him only shalt thou serve'". Moreover, the Herbartians continued, "And not even the martyr can bow an empty head."

In this discussion of the will the participants were apparently concerned with the nature of the human Ego though at other times they would seemingly disregard the conception of the Self, or consider it of no importance for their pedagogical theories.

Philosophers, as a rule, have not concerned themselves with the educational implications and applications of their theories of being. To this rule, Herbart is one of the few marked exceptions in modern times. Educators, however, are not in agreement on this point. Some of them maintain that an ultimate understanding of his pedagogy must rest upon a knowledge of his psychology and philosophy, while others contend that his philosophy is something apart from his educational theories and has no consequences whatever for them. The latter seems to have been the prevailing view, at least among American educators.

Among those who deny that there is any necessary relation between the metaphysics of Herbart and his pedagogics may be mentioned the following:

(1) William T. Harris says, "To make use of Herbart in pedagogy we must to some extent ignore his philosophy. His usefulness in education is proportional to his uselessness as a philos-

opher. What can we do with a philosopher who omits the will from the three departments of the mind and retains only intellect and feeling?" (N.E.A., 1895, p. 345)

(2) Writing to Harris in 1895, Rudolph Eucken says, "My position with reference to the question at issue is quite similar to yours, and especially do I share your view on Herbart, according to which he may doubtless be regarded a great pedagogue, but not a leader in philosophy. This is the conviction of most learned men in Germany. Herbart's metaphysics scarcely finds a disciple among the younger generation. However, among teachers his pedagogy, owing to its systematic structure and careful elaboration, justly finds many disciples, but alas! these disciples are very apt to fall into the danger of adopting his dry and unspiritual view of the world owing to the usefulness of his pedagogy. A good part of the strength of Herbart's pedagogy rests upon the fact that no other well elaborated system is placed in opposition to it." (Ed. Review, Sept., 1895, p. 207)

(3) F. P. Graves states that "Herbart's metaphysical psychology grew out of his interest in philosophy, and was probably an after thought to his educational doctrines. It seems to have been largely developed to afford a scientific basis for the method of pedagogical procedure that he had worked out of his experience as a tutor and his acquaintance with the Pestalozzian practice." (Hist. of Ed. in Mod. Times, pp. 197-98)

(4) George P. Brown declared, "I do not understand it (Herbartianism) to be a system of metaphysics at all, but a method. Herbartian psychology seems to me to have little inspiration in it. Herbartian metaphysics I can find no use for." (Randels'

The Doctrines of Herbart in the U.S.)

(5) Confining his statement to one phase of Herbart's pedagogy, John Dewey has said, "I do not see how the psychology and pedagogy of interest among Herbartians can possibly be made to square with each other." (Randels, p. 36)

(6) In 1895 Nicholas Murray Butler stated, apologetically, that "It is undoubtedly true that we cannot accept Herbart's psychology as a satisfactory explanation of mental life. But it is not necessary that we should do so in order to secure the benefit of the educational theory and the educational practice that bears Herbart's name." (N.E.A., 1895, p. 349)

(7) Even Charles De Garmo, a recognized leader among American Herbartians, accepted the doctrine of interest and then side-stepped the issue in asserting that one need not feel called upon "to bread any lances in behalf of Herbart's psychology". (Randels, p. 22)

On the other hand we find representative opinions such as the following:

(1) "He (Herbart) linked his psychology closely to his metaphysics." — Christian Ufer (Ed. Review, Oct., 1896, p. 211)

(2) "The labors of Herbart in psychology are initiatory. In pedagogy they mark a summit. That ultimately this educator and psychologist is, like Locke, a philosopher, we have already stated. There are thus firm foundations for our Occidental pedagogy." — William J. Eckoff (Herbart's ABC of Sense Perception, p. 10)

(3) "The serious defects in the psychology of Herbart have led some of the thoughtful advocates of his system of pedagogy

to claim, that an acceptance of his pedagogy does not involve an acceptance of his psychology; but the fact is, Herbart's system of pedagogy is based on his psychology, and so a rejection of the latter removes the basis on which the former rests. Instead of his system of pedagogy, you have left only elements which may be utilized - fruitful suggestions; but the system as such is in fragments." — E. E. White (N.E.A. 1895, p. 346)

(4) "It is likely that his educational doctrines are but elements in his general metaphysic, and that they will suffer the fate of his general philosophy . . . Herbart always remained a psychologist in his handling of the problems of education." — Joseph Kinmont Hart (Dem. in Ed., pp. 322-23)

(5) "Herbart derived his conception of education from philosophy as he derived its aim from ethics." — Paul Monroe (A Brief Course in the Hist. of Ed., p. 322)

(6) "Only after great opposition on the part of his friends was Herbart allowed to indulge his inclination for philosophical thought, which went hand in hand with an interest in theoretical and practical pedagogics." — Harald Høffding (Hist. of Mod. Philos. vol. 2, p. 249)

(7) "His educational principles flow directly from his philosophy." (Kiddle & Schem's Cyclopaedia of Ed., p. 419)

(8) "Herbart dealt the power theory of mind its death blow. So far, he may be accounted a 'new' psychologist. Nevertheless, he still based his psychology directly upon metaphysics. The system of competing ideas which he substituted for the older faculties is meaningless and unsubstantial unless it is backed up by his metaphysical system." — E. B. Titchener (Readings in Hist.

of Ed., Cubberly, pp. 644-45)

(9) Finally we have Herbart's own testimony in which he says, "I, for my part, have for twenty years called to my aid metaphysics and mathematics, besides self observation, experience and experiments, in order only to find the foundation of true psychologic knowledge." (Felkins' Intro. to Herbart's Sci. and Prac. of Ed., p. 185) Again, "Psychology is the primary auxiliary science of the teacher; we must have it before we can say of a single lesson what has been taught rightly and what wrongly." (Ibid., p. 7)

Such, then, are the opinions, pro and con, on the relation between Herbart's metaphysics and his pedagogics. What are the facts? Does Herbart's metaphysical conception of the Self have any implications or consequences for his pedagogics? To answer this question is the object of the present undertaking.

HERBART'S THEORY OF BEING

The central principle of Herbart's thinking is the abstract law of contradiction, namely, that contradiction is not permissible. Interpreted metaphysically, nothing can be ultimately real of which two contradictory predicates can be asserted. To predicate unity and multiplicity of the same object is contradictory. Hence real being is one, without the manifold, and is therefore without change. The inherent contradiction in human thought was observed by the Greek Skeptics, especially by those of the school of Pyrrho who taught that: (1) "We can know nothing of the nature of things, but only of the states of feeling into which they put us; (2) The only correct attitude of mind is to withhold all judgment and restrain all action; (3) The result of this suspense of judgment is ataraxia, or imperturbability." (Cushman's Hist. of Philos. vol. 1, p. 266) Thus thought was discredited, for its contradictions are insoluble. Hence truth, for these Greeks, does not exist.

Hegel, on the other hand, maintained just the opposite view. Is thought self-contradictory? What of it? It is the very nature of thought to be self-contradictory and to know this is the highest truth. Instead of denying reality because of contradictions in thought, unlike Herbart, Hegel incorporated these contradictions as the very warp and woof of his theory of being. In doing this he was forced to renounce the first principle of formal logic, namely, that a thing cannot be different from itself. But for him the greatest truth was the cosmic law of contradiction.

For Herbart philosophy did not mean skepticism. To philosophize is to free our conceptions of their vicious self-contradic-

tions by simplifying and revising them. Cushman illustrates Herbart's point of view in the following words, — "We think of the world as consisting of things, persons, relations, and laws; but such a view of the world is founded upon the fallacy of thinking an object at the same time as one and as many. This general fallacy takes four specific forms: inherence, change, continuity, and selfhood. For example, it is contradictory to think of a plant as one thing in which many qualities inhere; it is contradictory to think of a plant as the same when it passes through many changes; it is contradictory to think of space as continuous and yet divided into parts; and it is contradictory to think of the self as always the same and yet as a stream of conscious states." (Hist. of Philos. vol. 2, p. 334)

The self-contradictions of experience proved to Herbart that they are phenomena and are not real. Phenomena point to reality as their background. Seeming implies being. Appearances must be appearances of something. If nothing existed, nothing would appear to exist, but things are not what they seem.

Herbart and Kant both held that we can experience only phenomena. They also agreed that the nature of things-in-themselves cannot be known. But Kant reasoned from phenomena to consciousness, while Herbart reasoned from phenomena to things-in-themselves. For Kant phenomena are the creative work of consciousness; for Herbart consciousness has no creative power, but itself depends on the existence and independence of a plurality of independent reals. Thus all the independent functions that Kant attributed to consciousness were given by Herbart to things-in-themselves.

To account for reality and phenomena, the method of Herbart

was to posit a world of many reals and explain the phenomena in terms of the relation existing between these reals. The reals have only simple and unchangeable determinations. They are subject to no phenomenal limitations; they may even occupy one point of space at the same time. They have absolute position and exist not in phenomenal but in "intellectual" space. They cannot limit one another. They can be disturbed but not destroyed. The only capacity which they have, in and of themselves, is that of self-preservation through resistance.

Besides the simple and unchangeable relations among the reals, Herbart also conceives them as "coming and going in intelligible space". Why and how the reals act and interact he does not explain, not even how they get and exercise their one function of self-preservation. The actual relations between the reals we cannot know. They are not essential to any of the reals. Neither do they have their basis in the reals. We can know only the seeming relations among them, the relations of phenomenal space, — of inherence, continuity, and change. These Herbart calls "contingent views" (Zufällige Ansichten). Though Herbart would begin and end his metaphysical system with experience, experience for him is thus not real, but phenomenal.

To explain the multiplicity of phenomena it was necessary for him to posit a plurality of monads or reals instead of a single real. His system is therefore one of pluralism. In attributing to things-in-themselves the basis and starting point of all activities rather than to consciousness, his doctrine becomes a realism. Herbart also turns away from materialism since for him matter is not reality.

The Soul

Among the many realms of Herbart's world are found also the Soul realms. Of all the realms the Soul Monad is the most important and Herbart makes it the foundation upon which he erects the superstructure of his psychology.

The Ancient Greeks thought of the Soul as something static while the modern philosophers have held it to be dynamic. Mental life was explained by Democritus as the impinging of atomic effluxes from without upon the fire atoms of the Soul. For Plato the Soul is as passive as wax and consists of three parts of functions, -the reason, the will, and the sensuous appetites. Aristotle defines the Soul as the entelechy of the body, that is, the animating essence of the body. He thinks of the mind as a non-material substance and emphasizes its functional aspects.

Locke conceived the Soul to be a substance but denied that its nature could ever be known. For him the mind is a tabula rasa which receives its ideas through the senses. By means of abstraction, the faculties, which the mind is supposed to possess, render these ideas intelligible. Hume denied the existence of a Soul substance. Impressions, sensations, and feelings are not experiences caused by the Self. These experiences and the Self are one and the same. Bain and Sully held a like view; and James also has taken essentially the same position in his "stream of thought" hypothesis. For Hegel the Soul is a dynamic living totality which, as an effect, reveals the cause thus manifested. Feuerbach inverted this view into a nominalistic materialism. He conceived the Soul as nature "in its otherness". Voltaire thought of mind

as material; "I am body, and I think; more I do not know". (Perry's Ap. to Philos. p. 251)

For Herbart the metaphysical Soul is a real, a simple and unchanging Monad or Being originally without any plurality of states and without any inherent capacities, activities, or powers. This is the state of the Soul before its union with the body; and as such has no content, a view supported by Locke in his proof of the non-existence of innate ideas. Herbart himself describes the Soul as "a simple essence (Wesen), not merely without parts, but also without any kind of diversity or multiplicity in its quality; hence it has no space relations. In thinking it, however, with other essences, it is included necessarily in space, and for every moment of time it is located in a definite place. This place is the simple in space, or what is the same, the nothing in space, a mathematical point. Furthermore the Soul has no time relations. In thinking, however, wherein it is included with other essences, it must be conceived as in time and indeed as in eternity, although this eternity, and still more the temporal duration, must not be predicated of the Soul. The Soul has no innate natural talents nor faculties whatever, either for the purpose of receiving or for the purpose of producing. It is, therefore, no tabula rasa in the sense that impressions foreign to itself may be made upon it; moreover, in the sense indicated by Leibnitz, it is not a substance which includes in itself original activity. It has originally neither concepts, nor feelings, nor desires. It knows nothing of itself, and nothing of other things; also in it lie no forms of perception and thought, no laws of willing and action, and not even a remote predisposition to any of these. The simple

nature (Das einfache Was) of the Soul is totally unknown and will forever remain so". (Par. 150-53, Herbart's Text Book in Psychology, Smith's trans.)

One's conception of the nature of the Soul very largely determines the nature of his philosophy of education. The three perennial problems of education are, (1) What is the nature of the Being to be educated? (2) Wherein does education consist? And (3) What is the result aimed at in education?¹ One can scarcely consider the means and method and aim of education until he has accepted as a working hypothesis some definite view of what the being to be educated really is. No one was more keenly aware of this than Herbart, and it is difficult to imagine Herbart the metaphysician who had a very definite metaphysical doctrine with regard to the nature of the Soul, turning to the problem of education with no reference to such conception. It is equally difficult to understand what grounds there are for supposing that Herbart proceeded to build his pedagogics without any reference to the Being for which it was intended. In reality there is no valid reason for assuming that he did this, and, as we shall attempt to show, there is nothing in his pedagogics which is necessarily inconsistent with his metaphysical system. Herbart states, for example, that "the Self, according as one conceives it, is either the most fruitful principle or the most dangerous enemy of psychology". (Sämmt. Werke, Hrsg. von G. Hartenstein, vol. 2, p. 316) Again, he says that "in the example of the Soul psychology shows us an excellent internal development of a simple

¹ See Davidson's Education as World Building, p. 326 Ed. Review, Nov. 1900.

essence"; and further, "we cannot have a correct definition of life without the help of psychology." (Text Book in Psychology, Smith's trans. p. 124) Herbart believed that it is fruitless to discourse on things which we know nothing about. "What is the use of the interpretation of things," he says, "and of words about them, as to what they ostensibly mean, before one knows what the things are?" (Sämmt. Werke, Hrsg. von G. Hartenstein, vol. 2, p.293)

THE PEDAGOGICS OF HERBART

For Herbart the human Soul is not a germ which develops, like a plant, in accordance with a pre-determined end. Originally the mind is undetermined either for good or ill, and herein is found the necessity for education.

The aim of education is the development of moral character, — the formation of the good will which is founded upon right insight. The worth of an individual consists not so much in what he knows, but in how he wills. Hence the task of education is one of government, instruction, and discipline, by means of which a circle of thought may be created as the source of the will. "Those only possess the full power of education," says Herbart, "who know how to cultivate in the youthful Soul a large circle of thought closely connected in all its parts, possessing the power of overcoming what is unfavorable in the environment and dissolving and absorbing into itself all that is favorable." (p. 31, Allgemeine Pädagogik, Hrsg. von Theodor Fritzsche)

Instruction

For Locke instruction is the least part of education. Herbart, on the other hand, considers it the most important part. But he recognizes no instruction which does not educate. In a letter to Jachmann in 1811 he said, "Instruction will form the circle of thought, and education, the character. The latter is nothing without the former — herein lies the whole sum of my pedagogy." (p. 236, Allgemeine Pädagogik, Hrsg. von Fritzsche)

The child gains experience through its contacts with nature from which knowledge arises; and attains to sympathy from intercourse with human beings. Thus a circle of thought is already formed by the time the formal education of the child begins. The child's world, however, is necessarily defective and incomplete. Referring to these deficiencies, Herbart writes, "The gaps left by intercourse in the little sphere of feeling, and those left by experience in the larger circle of knowledge, are for us almost equally great, and in the former, as in the latter, completion by instruction must be equally welcome." (p. 136, Science of Education, Felkins' trans.) The first task of the teacher is to examine the mental world of the pupil and make it the starting point of instruction. The content of the child's mind must be supplemented and modified but not suppressed. The material presented by the teacher can be understood or apperceived by the pupil only when it is related to the ideas already in the child's mind, and when it is explained in the light of these same ideas.

The course of instruction advocated by Herbart consists of two groups of studies: (1) The historical, which includes sacred and profane history, literature, language, and art; and (2) the natural sciences, including mathematics, natural history, geography, etc. Herbart would make use of this material analytically and synthetically. Analytic instruction pertains chiefly to the material of the child's experiences and his intercourse with human beings. "The contemporaneous environment can be analyzed into separate things, the things into their component parts, and these last again, into properties." (p. 155, Science of Ed., Felkins' trans.) Intercourse can also be analyzed. "A genuine understand-

ing of the feelings of others presupposes the comprehension of one's own. Therefore we must analyze the youthful soul to itself; it should discover in itself the type of the movements of the human mind." (Ibid. pp. 171-73) Herbart thinks that "synthetic instruction which builds with its own stones, is incomparably richer than the individual environment of the child".

Instruction must supplement experience and intercourse because: (1) experience is insufficient; it is a mass of "dispersed and formless fragments"; (2) sympathy is insufficient for "it is not the spirit of intercourse"; and (3) both are insufficient for they do not bring the child into contact with the ideal. Instruction alone shows "that contrast between the actual and what ought to be, which is indispensable to action".

Interest

The final aim of instruction is morality. But to realize this aim a nearer aim is essential, namely, a many-sidedness of interest. Herbart defines interest as "that species of mental activity which instruction must create, but which has no place in mere knowledge. For we conceive the latter as a store which the man may entirely dispense with, and yet be no other than with it. He who, on the contrary, holds his knowledge firmly and seeks to extend it is interested in it." (Felkins' Intro. to Herbart's Sci. and Prac. of Ed., p. 94) There are two kinds of interest, — receptive, and apperceptive. The teacher arouses the former that the pupil may memorize as quickly and easily as possible. The aim of receptive interest is simply to impress the material upon the child's mind and nothing more. In apperceptive interest the object

is to enable the pupil to understand what he learns in terms of what he learned before. His apperceptive masses, or existing store of ideas, gives meaning to the new material.

The desirable qualities of interest are: (a) far-reaching, (b) immediate, (c) many-sided, and (d) balanced. A far-reaching interest is manifested in a life aim and tenacity of purpose, and is the source of both desire and will. Interest must be immediate. It must arise through a feeling of value in the work at hand, and not from the hope of some external reward. A many-sided interest is necessary to widen the circle of thought and to prevent egotism. And finally, in order to avoid narrowness amidst a many-sided interest, a balanced interest is essential, that is, the individual must be interested equally in all the classes of many-sidedness, and not emphasize one or more of them to the partial neglect of the remaining classes.

Many-sided Interest

Of the different qualities of interest, Herbart stresses, in particular, that of many-sidedness. "Many-sided interest," he says, "originates in the wealth of interesting objects, and to create and develop it is the task of instruction."

He divides many-sided interest into two main classes each of which is subdivided into three other classes as follows:

1. Interest arising from knowledge
 - (a) Empirical
 - (b) Speculative
 - (c) Aesthetic

2. Interest arising from human intercourse
 - (a) Sympathetic
 - (b) Social
 - (c) Religious

Empirical interest arises from knowledge gained by experience and observation. It is interest chiefly in the novel, and is largely sensory. Speculative interest arises from the consciousness of the hidden and the mysterious and seeks the causes and meaning of phenomena. Aesthetic interest is the emotional response to the good and the beautiful. It has its origin neither in phenomena nor in their causes, but in "the approval which their harmony and adaptability to an end win from us". Sympathetic interest has its source in the joys and sorrows of others, and is aroused by the reproduction of these emotions in the individual. Social interest is aroused through a feeling of sympathy which extends beyond the home ties and encompasses the wider human relationships. Religious interest springs from an enlarged sympathy, from a feeling of dependence and need, and the contemplation of the destiny of man.

The Formal Steps of Method

The Herbartian method of presenting a lesson to the child is based upon psychologic principles and is embodied in the four formal steps of: clearness, association, system, and method.¹ Herbart considered these the necessary steps to produce reflective thought in the pupil. But he looked upon them as factors in the process of thinking rather than the logical subdivisions of a lesson period. He prescribes the use of the formal steps in stating that "in every group of its objects, instruction must

¹ This classification of Herbart was modified by his disciples into the five steps of: preparation, presentation, association, generalization, and application.

care equally and in regular succession for clearness of every particular, for association of the manifold, for coherent ordering of what is associated, and for a certain practice in progression through this order". (Felkins' Intro. to Herbart's Sci. and Prac. of Ed., p. 108)

Clearness is attained by means of (1) analyzing the pupil's mind to determine whether he has the necessary apperceiving ideas, and whether these are in the right order and sufficiently clear to receive the new material. The deficiencies in the child's circle of thought must be corrected as far as possible before the substance of the lesson is presented. (2) The material of instruction must not be presented haphazardly, but with clarity and order. Not only are the individual parts of an object to be learned, but also the relation of these parts to the whole. This is accomplished through alternation of concentration and reflection, that is, concentration upon the parts, and reflection upon the meaning of these in their relation to each other and to the whole. When the presented facts are learned, they are compared and contrasted with other known facts. Hence the pupil is led to see the causal relations in phenomena, and to formulate laws and truths for himself. This step is known as association.

To further clarify and unify the concepts of the learner, the associated material is arranged in a coherent and logical order, or system. Herbart defines system as "the right order of a copious reflection". "Die rechte Ordnung einer reichen Besinnung heisst System." (p. 69, Allgemeine Pädagogik, Hrsg. von Fritzs)

"Method is the improvement of reflection." "Der Fortschritt

der Besinnung ist Methode." "It permeates system, produces new elements of the same, and watches over the consequences of its application." (Ibid. pp. 69-70) In other words, method is the application of system to new data.

Government

The object of government, in connection with pedagogy, is to create a spirit of order and check all tendencies which hinder the work of instruction and discipline. It is only an indirect factor in the development of character. The function of government applies only to the present whereas both instruction and discipline build for the future.

The measures employed for the government of children are: occupation, supervision, threatening, and punishment.

Herbart would make occupation the basis of all government. What the child learns in connection with this phase of government is immaterial so long as his evil tendencies are thwarted or subdued. Children should be allowed, as far as possible, to select their own occupations. Play is a valuable form of occupation in that it prevents the formation of wrong habits that usually arise from idleness.

Strict supervision is opposed by Herbart on the grounds that children resort to deceit in order to escape it, and that it destroys self-reliance. It defeats the very end of all education, the formation of character. Mere passive obedience fosters dependence, and when supervision is removed the child is left with no moral stamina with which to fight his own battles.

When occasion demands, threats may be used in government. If

these should prove unavailing, punishment should follow. The tone of government is "short and sharp". Punishment should be administered without exciting the mind of the child with any explanation as to why it was inflicted. While corporal punishment should be rarely applied, it cannot entirely be dispensed with. Herbart thinks that it does not hurt the boy to remember that he sometimes had the rod when a child.

Discipline

Instruction forms the circle of thought without which character is impossible. It gives the individual moral insight, the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. But the knowing of right and wrong is no guarantee that the will arising from mere instruction will always be employed in accordance with the understanding of right. The will may be in harmony with moral insight under ordinary circumstances when life runs smoothly, and then break down when vicissitudes arise. It is to destroy such a possibility that discipline is essential. A capricious will must be prevented and one formed, instead, which will remain firm in the stress and storm periods of life as well as in those of serenity and ease.

Discipline consists in determining, restraining, and regulating conduct. Giving joy by deserved approbation Herbart calls "the fine art of discipline". Reproof should be resorted to only when it threatens to cancel an approbation already won. Through frequent drill and exercise of the moral judgments habits of life are formed that will always remain in harmony with moral insight.

THE INFLUENCE OF HERBART'S THEORY OF THE SELF UPON HIS PEDAGOGICAL DOCTRINES

With the foregoing sketch of Herbart's metaphysical doctrine with regard to the nature of the Soul, and the essential features of his pedagogical theory before us, we turn to the problem with which this thesis is especially concerned.

Is there no relation whatever between them as many of his critics have contended? Or, on the other hand, is there an intimate relation between them as an equal number of critics have held? Are there any weak points in his pedagogics? If so, what are they, and are such defects traceable to the influence of his metaphysical conception of the Self? What are the strong points in his pedagogical system, and are they in any way traceable to his metaphysics? Is it true that one who makes moral character the corner stone of his pedagogical system denies the freedom of the will without which moral character is inconceivable? In view of the fact that his pedagogics was written before his metaphysics shall we say that he wrote the latter in support of the former as some have contended?

Whether or not there is any relation between the metaphysical and pedagogical systems of Herbart, depends upon the construction which can be placed upon a metaphysical concept which is sufficiently vague to admit of more than one interpretation. It is not the purpose, here, to support or defend either his metaphysics or his pedagogics. The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain, as far as supporting facts can be found, the extent of the relation

or connection between them. In a word, the purpose is to show whether Herbart's whole system of thought is consistent with itself; and inasmuch as Herbart himself was a staunch advocate of the principle of consistency, this fact lends added interest to the inquiry.

What, then, are the consequences of Herbart's concept of the Self with regard to the major aspects of his pedagogics?

The Aim of Education

What are the consequences for the aim of education? For Herbart the aim of education is the development of moral character, the product of an enlightened will in harmony with the understanding. Right insight is the principle of the will, and all actions conform to the ideas in the Soul. Since the metaphysical Soul has originally no faculties or content whatever, and no power except that of self-preservation through resistance, the individual becomes solely the product of external forces. Herein lies the possibility and necessity of education, and the opportunity and responsibility of the educator. Herbart's metaphysical system is mechanical. His psychology conforms to mathematical law. The law of cause and effect is not suspended in the mental world any more than in the physical; consequently one can never escape the effects of his education. The presentations from without form the circle of thought, and action generates the will out of desire. The continued exercise of the will in harmony with moral insight finally becomes habitual and thus the character is eternally fixed.

It was impossible for Herbart to conceive of a will independent of ideas. The mind cannot think in a vacuum. The Hegelians would say that action is unworthy of the name unless the individual

also has the power not to act; that action is apart from the motive. Herbart held that to deny motive is to abolish the standard of moral worth. He maintained that the freedom of the will is not incompatible with determinism. The will becomes free in proportion as the circle of ideas is extended. It therefore is the result of knowledge. "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

Herbart was uncompromising in denying transcendental freedom of the will. Such a will is capricious and destroys the possibility of education. His own words follow: "Not the faintest breath of transcendental freedom may blow through any cranny into the domain of the educator. What in the world can he do with the lawless miracles of a supernatural essence whose help he cannot count on and against whose disturbing influences he can use neither foresight nor precautions? Is he to furnish occasions, to remove hindrances? After all, then, that absolute faculty was hindered? After all, are there, then, occasions for it outside of its own purely original commencing? After all, then, the intelligible, again, is immeshed in the mechanism of the objects of nature? Let us hope the philosophers will reflect better upon their own concept. Besides, transcendental freedom neither should nor can be found in consciousness, as if it were an internal phenomenon. But that freedom of choice which we all find within ourselves, which we honor as the fairest phenomenon of ourselves, and which we would like to emphasize among all the phenomena of self, is exactly what the educator strives to effect and retain." (p. 96, Herbart's ABC of Sense Perception, Eckoff) Again, "could the eye see its own seeing, man would be able to perceive immediately that

he wills only representations, or, to speak more exactly, that his knowledge is only a perfected and his volition a checked resurgent representation." (Ibid., p. 58) In opposing transcendental freedom, Herbart argues as follows: "Those who assume a transcendental freedom of the will are bound to attribute to it an infinite amount of power over the passions, or otherwise incur the charge of the grossest inconsistency. For the word transcendental, in this connection, indicates an opposition to all causality of nature; hence the natural power of the passions would be capable of nothing whatever against such a freedom. The relation, however, of nothing to something is as something to infinite magnitude; so that if the power of passion be considered something, transcendental freedom must be considered infinitely strong. It is unnecessary here to discuss further the fact that, on account of its own action, transcendental freedom falls into the same causal relation from which it ought to be free." (Note 1 Sec. 235, Text Book in Psy., Smith's trans.)

On the question of morality, Herbart held essentially the Socratic view, namely, that virtue is knowledge. This position was the inevitable consequence of his denial of the transcendental freedom of the will. It might be objected that this leaves out the ignorant man from any claim to morality; and that, furthermore, there are well informed men who are not moral. In reply, Herbart would re-assert that ignorance is vice; that the moral man is not ignorant; and that the knowledge of the immoral individual is only apparent — that he lacks the large circle of thought closely connected in all its parts, without which character is impossible. One's character is grounded in his desires; and he desires what he

persistently thinks about.

As commonly understood, one is moral if he follows his conscience. "Let conscience be your guide," is the popular injunction. According to Kant, conscience is an inherent understanding of the right and wrong, a spark of divinity with which all human beings are endowed prior to their coming into the world. Herbart, on the other hand, would deny the categorical imperative and make conscience the result of education. The idea of right and wrong must be acquired. It is a matter of knowledge. Knowing is doing. The individual is born with no moral insight, no will, and no character. Hence the child, as such, is not a responsible being, a fact recognized in jurisprudence where juvenile delinquencies are treated in a different manner than the misdemeanors of adults who are presumed to know the moral law. The common expressions such as, "that will teach him a lesson", and "you ought to know better" are only simple ways of consciously or unconsciously expressing the dependency of morality upon understanding. And furthermore, it was this same thought, that knowledge is the keynote of character, which inspired Jesus on the cross to pray for his enemies and say, "Father forgive them for they know not what they do".

One's conduct is considered moral in so far as it conforms to the ethical standards of the society of which he is a part. Since these standards differ in time and place, morality and conscience are not absolute, but relative, terms. An act may be right in one age and wrong in the next; moral in one country and immoral in another. "The virtues of Piccadilly are the vices of Peru." Thus the Spartan youth could conscientiously violate the

seventh commandment, while for the Athenian such conduct was plainly immoral. Again, in the seventeenth century, for example, parents in the Connecticut Colony were justified in putting to death their obstinate and rebellious children, but such behavior on the part of parents today is not only immoral but criminal.

Facts, such as these, are consistent with the theory of Herbart that the source of morality is knowledge; for if mankind were endowed with the idea of right and wrong from the same divine origin, morality should be a constant and not a variable. A universal morality does not exist because, in Herbartian terms, the circle of thought in the minds of the people is limited by the culture of their own particular land and age. In other words, a broad sympathy, a profound, enlightened human understanding, can be effected only through a common experience grounded in knowledge.

Such, in brief, is the relation between Herbart's concept of the Self and his aim of education. The consequences of the former for the latter may be summarized as follows: (1) Character can be realized only through education — through the presentations brought to the Soul from without; for the Soul has no activity of its own and originally no content; (2) Since morality is grounded in knowledge, "the limits of the circle of thought are the limits for the character"; (3) Achieving the aim of education is of more importance, and places a greater responsibility upon the educator, than if the Soul were regarded as endowed with self-activity or as having a content originating from within.

The Means of Education

What are the consequences for the choice of subject matter,

its arrangement, school government, and discipline?

The means of education for Herbart consists in instruction, government, and discipline — factors which contribute to the ultimate aim of education. The chief of these is instruction, which has to do with the selection and arrangement of subject matter. In his whole scheme of pedagogy Herbart ever held in view the final aim of education, and he did nothing and advocated nothing which, in his mind, would not contribute directly or indirectly to this end. He considered the nearer aim of a many-sided interest a necessary means for realizing the ultimate aim of moral character. Hence the subject matter should be conducive to a many-sidedness of interest. Herbart recognized the inadequacy of experience and human intercourse. These processes, alone, produce beings of narrow, pre-conceived ideas over which, in time, even truth itself cannot prevail. Men are brought up in their own communities, imbibe the customs of the group, and repeat them until habit renders the individuals incapable of thinking themselves into the minds of the rest of their fellow men. And "this is what happens," says Herbart, "where society is composed of men of widely different modes of thought; each brags of his own individuality, and no one understands his fellows." (Sci. of Ed., Felkins' trans., p. 142) Not only would Herbart destroy the prejudices of these groups; he would even go beyond the State. Fichte advocated a national and civic education. Herbart, on the contrary, was concerned with the individual and his relation to all mankind. "Interest in education," he says, "is only an expression of our whole interest in the world and in humanity." (Sci. of Ed. p. 141) Again, "Let no one say that we Germans are too cosmopolitan as it is. Too little patriotic —

that, alas! unfortunately is true; but is it necessary for me here to reconcile patriotism and cosmopolitanism"? (Ibid. p. 167) Speaking further on the limits of experience and intercourse, he says, "If we again remember our aim — many-sidedness of interest — it easily occurs to us how limited are the opportunities which circumstances afford, and how far beyond them the really cultivated mind travels. Besides, the most advantageous environment is so limited that we could not by any means take the responsibility of confining the culture of a young man within it, if not compelled by necessity. If he has leisure and a teacher, nothing exempts the latter from the duty of enlarging his pupil's mental scope by description, from taking from time the light of the past, and revealing the ideas of the immaterial world." (Ibid. p. 138) The "light of the past" is revealed in the historical subjects, the languages, literature, and art, which Herbart would use to supplement human intercourse. The science courses, including subjects such as mathematics, natural history, and geography, are necessary to modify and complete experience.

That Herbart should formulate and stress the doctrine of a many-sided interest is a natural consequence of his theory of the Soul. Since the Soul is a passive Monad with no faculties and no power of self-realization, a well informed being — one with an enlightened understanding, must be the product of the widest possible touch with the world about him. As a logical consequence of denying the "faculties" of the Soul, Herbart left no foundation for the doctrine of formal discipline, namely, that the value of the mental training which a subject may give — such as improving the memory, enhancing the faculty of reason, developing the powers

of imagination and observation, and strengthening the will — is sufficient to justify it even if it has no content value to meet any of the real needs of life. The supposed advantages accruing from this doctrine Herbart would achieve by means of a many-sided interest. Modern research has proved the formal discipline theory to be untenable. However, from the concept of a self-active metaphysical Soul a consistent theory may be constructed either for or against the doctrine of formal discipline. But once granting Herbart's view of the Soul, only one deduction is possible, namely, the denial of formal discipline.

As a further consequence of the theory of an inert Soul, instruction becomes almost omnipotent. The Soul is entirely at the mercy of the external world. The human Ego does not construct the world; it receives the world. If there are no inherent, native tendencies in the Soul to aid instruction, neither are there any such to hinder the educator from presenting at will what he thinks the Soul should receive. The only limitations of instruction are the bodily conditions of the pupil and his acquired experiences and human intercourse. The Souls of all human beings are originally alike. All pupils with identical educational influences would develop exactly alike, provided that (1) their bodily constitutions were completely identical; (2) their acquired capabilities were the same; (3) the hidden and uncontrollable influences which assist in education were in their minutest details identical as to quality and degree.¹ This statement could not be true of beings having Souls with inborn tendencies to shape their

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See p. 4, Ufer's Pedagogy of Herbart, Zinser's trans.

own destinies — unknown variables which the educator cannot even determine, much less, control.

School government is only an indirect means of achieving the aim of education. Its purpose is neither to add new presentations nor to make habitual older concepts. It is a negative good. Pupils are prevented from disturbing the normal work of instruction, but are allowed to participate in harmless exercises; not for the purpose of self-realization, but for the sole aim of avoiding undesirable presentations. This mechanical scheme is in harmony with Herbart's whole system of education and metaphysics. Had he thought of the Soul as self-active and as having an individuality of its own, the occupations of the children would not have been looked upon as a necessary evil, but, on the contrary, it is conceivable that he would have considered these exercises essential to the development of the pupil, if not, indeed, the very essence of education itself.

Discipline has for its object the fixation of character through the exercise of the will. Its use presupposes a knowledge of right and wrong on the part of the pupil, and therefore begins later than instruction and continues parallel with it. It is "the method by which the circle of thought may be brought to generate the good will". The pupil submits to discipline because he sees the reason for it. "He who wastes time must lose pleasure; he who spoils his things must be deprived of them; he who eats too much must have bitter medicine." (p. 163, Int. to Herbart's Sci. and Prac. of Ed., Felkins') The moral judgments must be exercised repeatedly that they may become habitual and remain firm against all the undesirable presentations in after life.

Whatever their theories of the Self, educators have almost universally recognized the value of the formation of right habits. Rousseau, who contends that the only habit to form is that of forming no habits at all, seems to be the one outstanding exception; though he, too, well understood the effect of habit; it was only through his misguided theory of society that he would free the individual from the thrall of social custom and make of him a "noble savage".

To what extent educators have derived the theory of habit from experience, and to what extent from their conception of the Self, is difficult to determine. Likely, for the most part, from experience. Educators are seldom profound philosophers. Herbart, however, was a notable exception; and whether or not his position with regard to discipline and habit is a consequence of his concept of the Soul, it is at least not inconsistent with it. Indeed, he has a more valid claim to it, from the standpoint of metaphysics, than those who assume a self-active Being; for if habit is changed at all, it is effected solely through external forces since the Herbartian Soul has no capricious "undisciplined spontaneity" or transcendental freedom with which to disturb or destroy the work of the educator in forming the habits of youth.

Thus the consequences for the means of education are: (1) In allowing the Soul no dynamic power or faculties, Herbart discarded the formal discipline theory and substituted, as a means for producing a well balanced, educated individual, the doctrine of a many-sided interest; (2) Since the metaphysical Soul is given only a "vigorous life of inertia", instruction becomes well-nigh omnipotent, its limitations being the bodily conditions

and the acquired capabilities of the pupils; (3) The children's exercises in school government are negative functions instead of vital acts of self-realization; (4) The effect of discipline, when rightly achieved, is permanent, for the individual is fortified against harmful external presentations and the Soul has no power to interfere from within.

The Method of Education

What are the consequences for his theory of apperception and the formal steps of instruction?

Apperception is the process by which the ideas in the Soul receive and assimilate new presentations. It is based upon the power to see likenesses and differences. If the new presentations are analogous, that is, if they have elements in common with the ideas already in the Soul, they become fused or blended with them in the apperceiving process; but if the ideas are either identical with those in the Soul, or wholly unlike them, they are not apperceived. The former simply coalesce to make the presentations clearer than before, while the latter, unrecognized, are cast aside.

What is in the Soul, then, at any given time, determines what shall be admitted later. The existing apperceptive masses may be therefore either an aid or a hindrance in the acquisition of further knowledge, and hence suggest the kind of material to be used and the method of approach for the instructor.

According to the older faculty psychology, any kind of material can be learned. The faculties of the Soul have the power to receive this material and, through abstraction, incorporate

it into the mental system. As a consequence of this theory education becomes a pouring-in process. The task of the pupil consists chiefly in memorizing the various rules and formulae and other data which the master may present.

On the other hand, Herbart's theory of the learning process admits of no such implications. The mere memorizing of material for which there is no sufficient apperceptive background is meaningless and useless, and is therefore not actual learning. From his doctrine of apperception Herbart derived the formal steps of method. He would take the pupil as he is and analyze his mind to discover the points of contact for the new material. The presentations must be detailed and clear, they must be associated with previously known facts, the associated material arranged in a coherent logical order, and finally applied to new data.

As a further implication of his doctrine of apperception, Herbart regarded individual instruction as preferable to group instruction. He would have the child taught in the home, if possible, for in the public schools the pupil necessarily comes into contact with children unequal morally and intellectually. Hence uniform instruction is difficult, for the material cannot be made to suit the minds of all alike. Furthermore, the coming under different masters from time to time destroys the standard of authority and lowers the efficiency of instruction, for the new master is unacquainted with the apperceptive masses of the child and is therefore unable to apply the material of instruction to the best advantage.

The formal steps of method, then, and the importance which Herbart attaches to individual instruction long continued under

one master, are direct and necessary consequences of the doctrine of apperception which, in turn, is traceable to his metaphysical concept of the Soul. Apperception is a mechanical process of competing ideas — of complexes, blendings, and arrests, the forces of which Herbart would determine mathematically. It would be impossible to calculate the forces of opposing concepts for a Soul having an unknown and unknowable individuality of its own. That his theory of mental activity is derived from his concept of the Soul, we have no better authority than the words of Herbart himself who says, "The easily conceivable metaphysical reason why opposed concepts resist one another is the unity of the soul, of which they are the self-pervations. This reason explains without difficulty the combination of our concepts (which combination is known to exist). If, on account of their opposition, they did not suppress one another, all concepts would compose but one act of one soul; and, indeed, in so far as they are not divided into a manifold by any kind of arrests whatever, they really constitute but one act." (p. 16, Text Book in Psy. Smith's trans.)

The consequences, then, for the method of education may be enumerated as follows: (1) Only that kind of material can be actually learned which contains elements in common with it already in the Soul. It is the duty of the instructor therefore to determine the points of contact, and to select and present the material in such a way that it can be readily assimilated. This method of instruction is embodied in the four formal steps, and is a direct consequence of the doctrine of apperception; (2) As a further consequence of this doctrine, Herbart would prefer individual instruction to group instruction, and that, also, under one

master; for uniform group instruction is difficult, since the apperceptive masses of the pupils are not alike, and the changing of masters disturbs the contacts for authority and for the presentation of new material; (3) The mechanical doctrine of apperception is consistent with the theory of a barren unit Soul; for if the Soul were a manifold, concepts would not oppose each other and the unity of consciousness would be destroyed; and furthermore, if the Soul contained a vital essence of its own, mental life could not be subjected to a mathematical regime as the doctrine of apperception implies.

In addition to the foregoing consequences for the aim, the means, and the method of education, it may be noted here that in the case of the educational theory of Herbart, at least three of its major principles seem to merely filter through a psychological medium in the course of their derivation from a rarer metaphysical source. They are (1) that education is not real, for reality is unchangeable, and the educator can only manipulate the iridescent colors on its surface; but for Herbart true worth is derived from appearances and not from reality, as the value of a diamond may be said to reside in its fires. (2) Education is not free. Ideas arise from the interactions of reals over which the Self has no power. Freedom exists as an externally produced harmony, but it is not real and has no tendency toward becoming transcendental. (3) Education does not proceed by an organic or evolutionary unfolding of the human spirit. It is not a development in the strict sense. While it is true that the blendings and fusions of the mental elements partake of the

nature of development, it seems to be a fundamental and consistent assumption of the mathematical psychology of Herbart that the ideational units remain true throughout every fusion to their isolation, independence, and mutual externality.¹

The assumption that all human Souls are originally alike precludes the theory of mental heredity. But for Herbart progress is not an evolution of the human Soul but consists in appropriating the achievements of the race, or, in his own terminology, it is attained through the aesthetic revelation of the world.

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See Cole's Herbart and Froebel: An Attempt at Synthesis, pp. 64-65.

CONCLUSION

Thus we have attempted to show the consequences of Herbart's theory of the Soul for the major problems of his pedagogics, and for his system of education in general. It might still be objected, however, as Graves has intimated, that his metaphysics was but an afterthought elaborated to support a preconceived pedagogical theory, a fact which would account for the harmony existing between the two systems.

It is true that the metaphysics was published later than the pedagogics. Herbart's chief work on education, *General Pedagogics*, was issued in 1806. But in the same year he also wrote the *Chief points of Metaphysics*, though his *General Metaphysics* did not appear until 1829. Herbart himself contended that his pedagogy was not apart from his metaphysics and practical philosophy; and as against Graves' opinion we have Herbart's own statement: "My *General Pedagogy*, though it appeared earlier than the *Practical Philosophy*, was acquainted with the latter. The completed sketches of both, as well as the sketch of the metaphysics lay side by side... To remove, however, the possibility of anybody's fancying that the book pretended to be understood altogether by itself, the explanation of the main concepts was intentionally given with such aphoristic brevity as to make its insufficiency patent to everybody." (pp. 285-86, *Herbart's ABC of Sense Perception*, Eckoff) Again, writing to Jachmann who criticised the *General Pedagogics*, he said, "Meine Pädagogik war nichts ohne meine Ansichten der Metaphysik und praktischen Philosophie." (p. 229, *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, Hrsg. von

Theodor Fritzsch) These statements of Herbart, together with the fact that he was a student of metaphysics from the time he was twelve years old, and a philosopher at twenty, as Compayré points out, prove that the misgivings of those who hold that the metaphysics was designed to support his pedagogics, are not well taken.

Concerning the subject of interest, Dewey thinks of the term as meaning "that self and world are engaged with each other in a developing situation". He would connect interest with action. For Herbart interest arises externally; it is caused by a presentation more prominent than others which are therefore repressed and obscured. But action does not take place objectively until interest passes into desire, though inner action does occur along with interest. Since interest has its source in external objects and not in a self-active Soul, it is something which instruction must create. This mechanical theory of interest seems entirely in accord with Herbart's mechanical theory of being. It is true that one may not be able to see how the mechanically competing presentations — the self-pervations of a static Soul against other reals — can single out one presentation in preference to another; but it is also true that the ultimate cause of the capacity to see likenesses and differences, no matter what the nature of the Soul assumed, we do not know. Whether Herbart's theory of interest is correct or not, it is not inconsistent, as Dewey would have it, with his metaphysical and pedagogical systems.

Harris contended that Herbart's usefulness in education is proportional to his uselessness as a philosopher. "What can we do with a philosopher," he says, "who omits the will from the three departments of the mind?" The fact is, as we have shown, that

Herbart makes the will the central principle of his pedagogics; and the freedom of the will progresses with the attainment of knowledge. Harris, like most of his contemporaries, could not conceive of a will without transcendental freedom, the freedom which enables one, like a tug boat, to go against the stream; but the fallacy of likening transcendental freedom to the power of a tug boat is that this power of the boat is mechanical and originates from without. It is precisely this supplying of power from without which constitutes the task of education for Herbart. Transcendental freedom for him is incompatible with a passive Monad Soul, and is furthermore an indeterminable phenomenon which destroys the possibility of certainty in the work of education. Herbart "will not believe himself understood," as Eckoff insists, "by any one to whom it still remains a riddle how determinism and morality can coexist." Compayré has stated that "there is little relationship, it would seem, between the laborious genius of Herbart and the intellect, clear, but at times rather superficial, of the Americans." That the pedagogy of Herbart was accepted and his metaphysics rejected by his followers may partly be explained by a further observation of Compayré, that "human indolence gladly reposes on the soft bed of ready-made doctrine, in which everything, even to the smallest details has been foreseen."

Herbart's concept of the Soul and his theory of pedagogy are essentially consistent. The ism in Herbartianism, as Tompkins says, is born of Herbart's philosophy. The central principle of his thinking is the abstract law of contradiction which harmonizes all the details of his metaphysical and pedagogical systems.

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