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THE KANTIAN THING-IN-ITSELF

or

THE CREATIVE MIND.

By

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A Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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- Introduction -

To suggest a solution for the Thing-in-itself is to suggest at the same time a solution for the problem of value, which problem is the point about which moves a great deal of the philosophical discussion of modern and especially recent times.

Previous to modern times, it was generally taken for granted that things of the highest value must have a supra-natural origin.

But this traditional view may well be questioned. The feeling that values are not fixed and unchangeably determinate, but that they have a certain indeterminateness, leads to the suspicion that they may be quite natural and quite human. The genetic method of dealing with values shows us that valuation may be conceived as a systematic, progressive and continuous determination of the stream of conation and feeling in the individual mind. Presuppositions become actual in feeling and desire; and actual feelings, desires and dispositions, when formed, become presuppositions of new feelings and desires, and of further modifications of quality and degree.

Therefore, we have a psychological basis for the study of the laws of valuation. The concrete laws of the tendency to evaluate are not reducible to general laws of feeling, but rather of affective-volitional processes conceived as a whole. If we let the term "interest" designate the "conative" process, then we can say that the acquirement of

affective- volitional meaning is based on a law of "interest".

Therefore, on these findings we may safely say that value is a worth-experience, a feeling with certain presuppositions based on the law of "interest".

If the above statements, based on the findings of Urban, are true, then we have not only to deal with ultimate "norms", or so-called supra-natural "abstractions", but also with the facts of psychology as they become factors in the process of evaluation. If we hold that the act of evaluating has two aspects, the "normative" and the "psychological", we ought to be able to reconcile the two and combine them into one intelligible conception. In other words, we must learn how to interpret the "norm" of Kants' so-called "Intelligible" will in terms of the laws of the "Empirical" will.

These two tendencies seem to combine or to reconcile themselves, if we say that we first "feel" the value of aspects, and then "evaluate" them. This takes in the "function" with its "feelings" and "norms". Again, what appears on one level as "habit" may take the place of "meaning" on another level. "Selective thinking" is the systematic or progressive/^{and continuous} determination of the stream of thought in the individual's mind." When the acquired meaning of one attitude becomes dispositional, it then functions as an assumption or presupposition of new feelings and modes of valuation. The subjective feeling forms a "norm", but when this is projected it becomes a demand, the acknowledgment of which is the condition of further appreciation or "subjective" feeling. For instance, we first conceive God (a norm); we then project. The projection, being then "objective" demands appreciation. So God conceived is the first "norm",

while God objectified is the second "norm".

Therefore, as Thomas Reid suggests, "could we obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath past in the mind of a child, from the beginning of life and sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason - how its infant facilities began to work and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection - this would be a treasure of natural history, which would probably give more light into the human faculties, than all the systems of philosophers about them since the beginning of the world."

Having touched on the origin of values, let us now consider their nature and significance. If values are relative to human development and to reflective processes, is it not reasonable to suppose that they may be of the nature of means or ends? The development of an organism is dependent upon its adjustment to and its control of the environment. Is it possible that the organism for long continues to deem valuable those things which do not in some way serve these purposes? Some things thought to be of merely "intrinsic" worth, may yet be, in some subtle sense, of instrumental value. Even an heirloom in the form of an old spinning wheel, no longer used for spinning, serves a purpose: it is associated with ideals of thrift and industry which may in turn become the very stuff of manhood. This is just a crude example of how so-called "intrinsic" values or "ends-in-themselves" may be in reality "instrumental" in nature. On this basis, all of John Dewey's "intrinsic" values are at bottom "instrumental" in character. They are to be sure, the "unquestioned" values; but he himself goes on to say that they are "unquestioned" as to some partic-

ular situation. Therefore, they are "instrumental" in character. Especially emotional values, such as those which pertain to art, are thought of as "intrinsic". Indeed, they may be thought of in this way; but we ought nevertheless to remember that in this case "intrinsic" is an abstraction made for the moment, on the basis of some particular interest which, in fact, when looked at from a different angle, comes to be not purely "intrinsic", but rather one aspect of a more comprehensive whole of "instrumental" value. If a painting did not serve in the promotion of emotional experience, it would not for long be considered great. Even the family possesses no purely "intrinsic" value. It is rather a means to a further and indefinite end, than an end in itself. To be an end in itself, the offspring would have to be born minus the reproductive urge. The family would then be a "determinate" entity, - an absolute within itself. But this is not the case. Children, as a rule, are born with the urge to mate and reproduce the species. Any given family, or the family as a social organization, is always the potentiality of future families. The family is a natural order, set up in keeping with certain reproductive tendencies which become the means of further racial development. But even after offspring appear, the family does not cease to be "instrumental" in character. For, as a family, it is the means to a fuller and richer life, which is never static, but always progressive in nature. In other words, the whole "family regime" comes to be one big "instrumental" process of caring for, educating, and training children. And this program of rearing children to have families; to have families to rear children; to rear children to have families, - all becomes one "largely unconscious in-

strumental process" of promoting the interests of human life considered as a social whole. Anything that does not serve in this plan is soon consciously or unconsciously dropped by the way. In short, if we hold that there are "intrinsic" values, should we not say that they are after all but the reflective "abstractions" out of a larger whole? For, treated genetically, are not "instrumental" and "intrinsic" values very closely related? If we hold for any sort of development or evolution of values, we get a sort of value-movement, (Werthbewegung), in which process, so-called "intrinsic" values are always passing over into "instrumental" values, and "instrumental" into "intrinsic". Therefore, in a psychological analysis the sharp distinction between "instrumental" and "intrinsic" is broken down; and yet the "instrumental" argument has in some sense the greater weight, if we hold that all evaluation has a psychological basis, and is founded on the feeling of need. (See "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology", - Baldwin, p. 824).

However, I do not wish to be understood to say that all values are "practical" or "instrumental" in the narrow sense of these terms. As J. Arthur Thomson, in his "Introduction to Science", points out, men have a number of moods: he mentions the purely practical mood, the emotional mood, and the scientific mood. To these three I should like to add two others: the "metaphysical" mood, and the "logical" mood. For example, God may be thought of as a Limiting Concept or Logical non-Being; as a Universal and Metaphysical Ground; or as an Emotional Demand. In no one of these instances, however, is God to be thought of as an efficient cause: In the first case, the concept is a purely logical one; in the second, the manifestations and activ-

ities of God are within the series; and in the third case, God is a final cause, - the goal toward which the cosmic forces move. In the Metaphysical and Logical moods God will be more or less "impersonal"; but in the Emotional mood he will be "personal", in that he is the formulation, projection, and personification of a sort of emotional reflection, which demands a power greater than itself, to which one may feel obligated and to which he may look for guidance and protection. Such a power born out of the emotional mood will naturally take on the attribute of "personality". Therefore, all of these ways are, in a sense, legitimate ways of thinking of God. Only we should remember that each mood has its peculiar demands, and finds the concepts which best serve to satisfy those demands.

Therefore, that "thing" or "concept" is "instrumental" in the larger sense of this term, when it tends to produce or promote satisfaction in terms of the practical, the emotional, the scientific, the metaphysical, or the logical mood, or any two or more of these combined.

But neither the reference to an "emotional" mood, nor any other reference found in this thesis is to be understood as implying belief in any sort of "transcendental" existence, except when the term "transcendental" is capable of ^{being} interpreted in a logical sense. For it is possible that life in its highest form is simply a higher level of a natural evolution. In some sense reflection or the power to evaluate is analogous to the rose which is a product of a thorny bush. - It is like, yet it is unlike that from which it comes. The rose-bush with its roots, leaves, and thorns, is natural. Is not

also the rose? The ovum, the embryo, the child, are natural. Is not the power of man to reflect and to evaluate also natural? Where have we any right to draw the line? Where can we say the biological ends and the psychological begins?

On the basis of such reflection, the implication of which is evident, the thing-in-itself, ideals, and concepts of all kinds, including God himself, are just moments in the natural evolutionary process. That is, all these things are products of the evolution or unfolding of the natural "world-stuff". Richard Swann Lull, and others, are inclined to believe, not that man came directly from the monkey, but that the anthropoid apes and man came from a common ancestor, and he, in turn, from some primitive broad-nosed ape. Some believe that the mammals evolve from a primitive reptilian form. Others, that they came from the ^fan^thⁱbians, which in turn evolved from a fish-form, the latter from an invertebrate, and so on down to the protozoa. Still further, there seems to be evidence^o that earlier living forms evolve from the inorganic world. That is, that they were the products of some primordial "stuff".

Upon this basis, then, the power to evaluate, to form hypotheses, to formulate concepts, to believe in God, - all these processes are the natural functions of complex organisms, as eating and sleeping are the natural functions of both lower and higher organisms.

In a diffuse nervous system, like that of the sea-anemone, the external surfaces of the animal serve as receptors and communicate directly with the subjacent musculature. The nerve-net serves to spread the impulses throughout the body, but without involving a central organ. That is the sea-anemone has "receptors" and "effectors",

but no "adjustor" or central nervous system properly so-called. This central organ is a feature of the higher animals, and a recent evolutionary acquisition. The sense organ did not develop because we had a central nervous system, but the central nervous system developed because our very early ancestors had already acquired muscles and receptors. In highly differentiated types, the sense organs, - the eye, the ear, the organs of touch, of taste, and of smell, - to some extent supply the central apparatus with those elements out of which the intellectual life is builded. With the adjustor, there came the power to modify responses in relation to past activity. Thus was built up a storehouse of experience which became the seat of the intellectual life. As C. Lloyd Morgan would say, the cortex played back upon the sub-cortical or lower brain centers, the two synthesized, and experience and intelligence was the result; intelligence consisting in the ability to act in the light of the past; and so to evaluate.

Therefore, the adjustor, a later development, becomes the central region of evaluation. The cerebral cortex, about one cubic centimeter of protoplasm, containing nine billion, two hundred million cells, is the center of all human mental states, - sensations, memories, volitions, emotions, affections, the highest flights of poetry, the most profound thoughts of philosophy, the most far-reaching theories of science, - and the creator of a God who holds the world in his hands.

But this is not to say that the human mechanism is all there is to life. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that just the opposite is the case. It is true that all life involves mechanization; but it is not true that life is only a mechanism. A machine

may produce something very much unlike itself, - that is, in form and function. This human mechanism, this little lump of protoplasmic stuff, may produce something in form and function much unlike itself, - it may even create a world.

William Brown, in "psychology and the Sciences", says that the so-called real world is a wild abstraction. Biology, physics, mathematics, astronomy, etc., are all abstract sciences. In short any true reality involves the experience or possible experience of sentient beings.

Therefore, philosophy or metaphysics reduces itself to a process of evaluation; to discovering a method of interpreting mental phenomena in terms of meaning, purpose, and value.

How did such ever come to be the case? Why did man learn to make hatchets, axes, knives, weapons, and instruments of all kinds? On the other hand why have men come to have all sorts of intellectual tools?

It may be that to ask such questions is to answer them. However, we do not mean to kill the fox and spoil the chase. But one does begin to feel that these are vital questions. A simple Southern farmer cuts a hole in a gourd and hangs it on a snag over the spring. A child can tell you why the farmer does so, and what the gourd-dipper is good for. But when a simple primitive creates a spirit in order to explain the existence of the spring, all men begin to look for a world in which such spirits dwell. Does not man give shape to both gourd-dippers and water-spirits? And because each of them is necessary to the business of living? Are not spirits shaped by nature and the mind of man, as gourd-dippers are shaped by nature and

the hand of man? Are not both attempts to complete an imperfect world? The spirit is the means of the spring, and the gourd-dipper is the means of getting the water to the mouth.

Someone may say ~~that~~ there is a deeper reason why the primitive man created a water spirit. We may say there is a deeper reason why the farmer made his gourd-dipper. As we have said, both proceed on the basis of need. But is this all? Is there not back of the felt need that unique function called reflection? In its first stages, reflection may be something like awe or wonder. The human race in its slow development has passed through periods of childhood and youth. As the individual begins his intellectual life in wonder, questionings, and curiosity, so the race has advanced from a condition of childish wonder, questionings, and interpretations of mankind and the external world. In some sense, spirits and concrete tools are the products of this reflective wondering, along with a sort of instinctive consciousness of the necessity of adjusting oneself to the world by supplying here and there, out of the power of construction, that which is lacking. As the child thinks he sees in almost everything some living agency, the happenings about him being caused by real beings; so the primitive man saw in the wind some hidden spirit which bent the tree or turned things over, or moved them along the earth. A little more reflective wondering and men saw the sun, moon, and stars as gods marching round the world. They must be gods or beings of some kind; for only beings can move themselves or other beings. Where there is motion there is being, - Spirit only is "active". This is not such bad reasoning, - it is the doctrine of the good Bishop Berkeley.

We may say that these findings of primitive men are not correct,

but their wonder and curiosity were stepping stones to what we now call scientific knowledge. Aristotle says, "It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize". There may be people too low in intelligence to have curiosity or wonder; but most human beings, however primitive, have explanations for the common events of nature, such as day and night, life and death, sickness, health, sleep, moon, stars, sun, seasons, and the like. One of the commonest and most natural is the personal interpretation of Nature, which assumes all things to be alive and possessed of some sort of personality like man's own. There is only a step from here to the ideas of soul, immortality, God, and cause which all men more or less believe in. For, as Hobbes says, it is the peculiar nature of man to be inquisitive as to the cause of events, especially as to the causes of his own good and evil fortune. It is natural to think of anything that had a beginning as having had a cause. Unlike the beast, man observes how one event follows or is followed by another, and remembers antecedents and consequents. And when he cannot be certain, he supposes causes, such as are suggested by his own fancy. As Alfred Weber says in his "History of Philosophy", "Animated by an all-powerful instinct to discern the causes of things, and to comprehend them into the unity of a first cause, the human mind no sooner reaches certain elementary truths in physics, mathematics, and morals, than it hastens to synthesize them, to form them into universal theories, into ontological systems, i.e., to philosophize or to make metaphysics."

Looking forward to a more detailed explanation of the process of evaluation, of the rise of concepts, and of the origin and function of hypotheses, let us say here that all valuation is in some sense

I

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA
OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF.

In keeping with man's natural wonder and curiosity, it is possible that the concept of the thing-in-itself was one of the earliest abstractions of reflective man, due to a natural tendency to search for a cause of the world; for the unity to which all manifoldness might be reduced; or for the ground for each particular thing, or species.

1. In the so-called beginning of Greek Philosophy certain cosmologists repudiated the idea of God or spirit as being the cause of phenomena, and turned their attention toward some single element visible to the naked eye or evidencing itself in accordance with physical causation.

In the first place, the primal original ground is said to be "water". From water everything arises, and into water everything returns. Moisture is essential to the generation and nourishment of plants and animals, and even to the formation of rock and stone. Also, warmth is developed from moisture; so moisture or water is the plastic, universal, life-giving principle. From the condensation and expansion of this fundamental matter, all phenomena arise.

But for Anaximander some more immaterial, universal,

eternal something must be the undetermined ground or "ἀρχή" from which everything proceeds, and into which all things, in ^{the} order of time, return. This "ἀρχή" may, it is true, be material in some sense, but it is not material in the sense that any one of the four elements is material. It was rather the material matter before it had separated into material elements. It was the "chemical indifference" of elementary opposites. In that it is a chemical indifference, it lies at the basis of all determinateness of the finite and changeable, it itself being infinite and indeterminate.

In short, Anaximander manifests an unwillingness to qualify the boundless mass; all of which shows a tendency toward a more abstract mode of thought than we find in his predecessor's concrete sense-perceived substance.

Anaximenes attempts to compromise the situation by stating that the universal ground is the unlimited, all-embracing, ever-moving air, from which, by expansion and condensation, everything is formed - as fire, water, earth, stone. Air is a sort of semi-material substance, embracing physical characteristics, but at the same time containing an aspect of mystery; for air is physical in that it seems to be a part of the world, but it is full of mystery when it is thought of in terms of "breath", which is the condition of vital action.

These men sought for the universal essence of concrete being. They found this essence in a material or semi-material substance or substratum, the fundamental forms of nature or

phenomena being derived from this original matter or half-matter.

For still another one of these early Greek thinkers, all cosmical bodies or spheres revolve in fixed orbits about a common middle point, or central fire, from which light and warmth stream forth into the whole universe. Either this "inner" fire or "number", or both, are the forms to which all things may be reduced. If we emphasize "number" instead of "fire", it lies at the base of all things. Numbers are the true realities, the substances and the grounds of things, and all else is an expression of number. Number is placed behind phenomena as their basal principle and ground.

In this case we have either an actual material substance, or a purely ideal principle of all things, the archetype in accordance with which all things are formed and controlled. To say the least, there is here a more abstract concept than is found in "water" or "moisture". Men were gradually discovering that no purely material or concrete substance satisfied the demands of reflection.

Xenophanes, turning his attention toward the problem, found the solution in the idea of God. True, this God may have been thought of in either material or intellectual terms; but he was not an element, - he was God. And the probability is, that Xenophanes was struggling toward a spiritual cause of the world. At least his causal ground is highly

abstract when compared with the earlier concepts in Greek Philosophy.

Another group of thinkers differ from the earlier philosophers - from Empedocles, for instance - when they say that not earth, air, fire, and water are the primal substances, but rather certain minute/ⁱⁿ⁻divisible particles of matter, which are more elementary than the four elements.

These elements of the atomists are neither "spiritual" nor "material" in the true sense of the term, but rather "conceptual" - that is, they are not personified as God, nor are they comparable to any one or all of the four elements. They are not "perceived" but "conceived".

Over against Parmenides, the Eleatic, the atomists say that "non-being" exists; that it is not corporeal, but that it nevertheless exists.

For the atomist, the sensible qualities, as color, sound, taste, smell, which we attribute to the different bodies, are not in the things themselves as objects, but merely the effects of combinations of atoms in our sense organs. Atoms as such have no qualities except impenetrability, shape, and size.

So sense perception does not yield us a true knowledge of things; it merely tells us how these original basic qualities affect us.

Frank Thilly thinks that we have in the concepts of the atomists a distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities. Sense perception is obscure knowledge; thought,

which transcends ~~any~~ sense perceptions and phenomenal appearances, gives us true knowledge, or knowledge of the true realities. Here is expressed the same feeling that Kant later expressed, though not in the same terms: The thing-in-itself cannot be known in the sense of knowing sense-qualities; but it can be thought.

2. Plato sensed the problem, and undertook to solve it. The previous thinkers had confused "phenomena " with "primal substance", "primal substance" with "true Being", and again, "true Being" with "non-Being".

Plato points out that we have:

- (1) The world of Ideas or true Being.
- (2) The world of non-Being -- matter and Becoming.
- (3) And in the third place, and as a middle term between Being and non-Being, are sensible phenomena.

Now things are the "copies" in some sense of the Ideas, or true Being; or, things "participate" in the Ideas, deriving the Being which they possess from the world of true Being; or finally, the Ideas may be the "final end" of phenomenal things. But Ideas are not the only cause of phenomena. We must look elsewhere for the cause of the world of appearance.

The word " $\nu\lambda\eta$ " in Plato is thought to have the same significance as in ordinary speech; that is, it is thought to mean "wood", "timber", and sometimes just "material" - indefinite, undefined material - the "stuff" out of which things

may become formed. "ύλη" is not "matter in general", but rather a sort of "raw material" out of which things are made.

However, it is thought that Plato was not consciously seeking for the basis of the corporeal in a positive substratum. But matter is at least anterior to the elementary bodies, and is, therefore, not perceptible to the senses; for he would urge us not to call fire, air, or water the universal "ύλη". Gold continuously transformed into all sorts of figures would still be called gold; so there is a nature which in itself permits of manifold individuation. Therefore, after all, even though Plato may not have consciously sought it, he at least arrived at the concept of some sort of primordial substratum other than the simple elements.

At times in Plato, it seems that matter is either non-Being or partakes of non-Being; for he says that the only Being which phenomena have is derived from the world of true Being, the world of Ideas; and again, that matter and the things of matter are not created. So "non-Being" is in some way closely tied up with phenomena. Now phenomena are not caused by the Ideas in any true sense; therefore, it may be thought, if there is a cause of appearances as we now define it, it is non-Being. The Timaeus distinguishes the foundation of the corporeal from all Becoming. So there is a substratum or cause other than Becoming, - a substratum which remains the same in spite of the multiplicity and changes of its form. This could easily be non-Being.

Plato in the Timaeus does not use the expression "ύλη",

but he describes the basis of the sensual in such a way that Aristotle ascribes that denotation to him. Matter in both the Timaeus and the Philebus is the substratum of the sensible phenomena, and is described as "unlimited". We may ascribe to it all that is capable of "more and less", "stronger and weaker", etc. The unlimited, or matter, is that within which no fixed and exact determination is possible, - the element of "conceptless existence", of change, which never arrives at Being and Permanence.

So, in Plato, we find three orders of Reality:

- (1) The archetype, "self-identical essence", - the Ideas.
- (2) The sensible phenomena.
- (3) The groundwork and the receptacle of all Becoming.

This third order of reality is the common element which in some way passively underlies phenomena; is the active cause of them; or else is identical with them, - all except the world of the Ideas, constituting a world of non-Being and Becoming. But we are justified in supposing that there is an underlying substratum, - be it non-Being or not non-Being, be it material or mental in nature, - which supports or at least is the logical or metaphysical cause of all determinate matter. In the ceaseless flux of forms in the circle of Becoming, this common element or cause runs through them as a permanent and unifying substratum. All Becoming is in and about this substratum, and to it all returns.

But this " $\nu\lambda\eta$ " has no specific quality or definite form. Yet it is and must be. For the constant passing of elements,

one into another would be impossible if the determinate parts of matter were real, and not merely modifications of one common and therefore necessarily indeterminate third something. For Plato, this "third something" is an invisible and shapeless nature, capable of taking on any shape. Non-Being may take on specific shape in the world of perceptible phenomena; but the perceptual phenomena, in turn, are dependent upon the Ideas for their Being; for non-Being cannot impart Being or true Reality to the world of phenomena, but only individuate itself in the world of appearance, still remaining "non-Being", - not of the world of Ideas.

Therefore, the groundwork of sensuous existence is not spiritual in the sense indicated in the pre-philosophical period before Thales; it is not of the nature of any one of the four elements; neither is it spiritual or intellectual in the Xenophian sense; it is rather that out of which all particular forms of matter arise, and into which they resolve themselves. It is like the unhewn mass out of which the artist fashions his figures, - no man knows what it is or what it may become. But when it has "Become" "something" other than the unhewn, undefinable mass, it is too late to define it in its indefiniteness. Neither could you ever catch it in the transformation; for to the extent that it has "Become" it is definable, and to the extent that it has not "Become" it is still undefinable mass, - the unknown, the unlimited, non-Being. In some sense, then, matter or non-Being is the irrational remainder which is always left over when we abstract from things

that which in them is the copy of the Idea. For matter cannot have Being, neither can the world of the phenomena have Being or true Reality, except from the Ideas. Even though the phenomenal world may in some way emerge out of the realm of non-Being or indefinite matter, this non-Being is only the passive, metaphysical, or logical cause of such emergence; the active, positive process is the participation in, the copying of, or the struggle toward the world of Ideas, or True Being.

We might say that here lies the logical reason why Kant hesitated to identify the Thing-in-itself with the category of "causality" in any legal sense of the term.

For if the primordial substratum is thought of as unlimited matter or non-Being, it cannot well be the active, legal cause of phenomena. In fact, Plato sometimes represents it as a passive principle. It is not a "material something", but "space", the "empty", which receives into itself the form of the corporeal. The Timaeus never speaks of the groundwork of the sensibly-perceptible as that out of which things are "made", but as that in which things have "Become".

We may conclude, then, that there is some other principle which is everything that Idea is not, and to which sensuous existence owes its imperfections. This principle, be it material or of the nature of mind, in some way forms the basis of the phenomenal world. As such it may be thought of as the raw material out of which phenomena are made. It is in some sense perishable and unreal, - imperfect - non-Being. It is at least evident that Plato sought for something other than the

Ideas as the cause of the world of sense. This substratum or logical cause, untouched by ideal principles, must be conceived as being devoid of all qualities, - formless, indefinite, imperceptible, - non-Being. But this "non-Being" is not "non-existence;" it is merely a "lower order of existence". It is a sort of substratum for the diversity of the many different objects.

3. As for Aristotle, everything in the world is moved by an inner urge to become something greater than it is. Matter and form are only relative terms. The man is the form of which the child was the matter; the child is the form and its embryo the matter; the embryo the form, the ovum the matter. This regression may be carried on until we reach the conception of formless matter, that is, "materia prima". But such formless matter would be "no-thing", for everything that is a real thing has form. So matter is the possibility of form; and form is the actuality, the finished product of formless matter. Form is not only the form, but it is shaping force or inner necessity and impulse. Form is the realization of the potentialities of matter. But as Alfred Weber says, it must be remembered that the matter of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, is not the matter of the materialists, but what Schelling and Schopenhauer would call "Will", or the "Will to Be"; it is not body, but the transcendent substratum, the principle of corporeality, that which makes the body a body, but is itself an incorporeal thing, in

nature mental or mathematical.

But motion, according to Aristotle, has a source. How did the vast process of motion and formation begin? This motion must have had a beginning, a source. Aristotle could have resorted to the idea of an infinite regress, but the idea of a prime mover was more logical and practical. So he posited an unmoved mover, - a being incorporeal, indivisible, spaceless, sexless, passionless, changeless, perfect, and eternal. God does not create the world, but He moves it. However, He does not move it as a mechanical force. - God is not the legal cause of the world. He is a sort of total motive for all the operations in the world. God moves the world not as modern theologians have imagined, but as the beloved object moves the lover. He moves the world as the ideal of the "Good" moves him who wishes to be good. God is the final cause of nature, the drive and purpose of things; the form of the world; the principle of its life; the energizing entelechy or soul of the world. God is not a person, but a sort of magnetic power who moves all else by his mystic influence.

Therefore, in reality, God, - and God as a postulate, - is the thing-in-itself for Aristotle. Another step, and Aristotle would have saved philosophy much confusion as to the real nature of the noumenal realm.

4. The founder or precursor of Scholasticism, John Scotus Erigena (810-877), influenced by Plato and Aristotle, proceeds to make some further distinctions as to nature:

There is that which creates and is not created, that is, the cause of all that is existent, or non-existent; that which is created and creates; that which is created and does not create; and finally, that which neither creates nor is created, - the end of all things.

The fourth of these divisions corresponds to the problem of the thing-in-itself, in that it neither creates nor is created: it is non-Being, and the passive, metaphysical, or logical cause of both phenomena and Being, in that there could be no "Being" without "non-Being", and that it is in some sense the cause of "phenomena".

But by "non-existent" Erigena does not mean that which has absolutely no being. He rather means that which is above and beyond both sense and reason. The material, since it comes and goes, is not truly existent like the intelligible.

There is no doubt but that Erigena is here catching up the thread dropped by Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, though he may not have added much to the solution of the problem, he at least helped to hand it on to those who were more vitally interested in the problem from a purely philosophical point of view.

5. In the writings of Galileo we find a recognition of the problem after its having been for some time obscured by theological and semi-theological concepts. For even Erigena, after stating the problem, lapses into mere theological speculations, consoling himself by the supposition that God is the

beginning, middle, and end of all things; from him they come; in him, and through him, they exist; and to him they return.

But Galileo (1564-1641), independent of theological speculations, stated the problem in a scientific way: A material or corporeal substance has boundaries, and is of some shape or other; relatively to others, it is great or small; it is in this place or that place; in this or that time; it is in motion or at rest; it touches or does not touch another body; it is unique, rare, or common. But on the other hand, I do not find myself absolutely compelled to apprehend an object as white or red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or silent, smelling sweetly or disagreeably. If the senses did not point out these qualities, it is possible that language alone could never have arrived at them. So I am inclined to think that these tastes, smells, colors, etc., in regard to the subject in which they appear to reside, are nothing more than mere names, and exist only in the sensitive body. There is nothing in external bodies for ~~exciting~~ exciting tastes, smells, and sounds, except shape, quantity, and motion; and if ears, tongues, and noses would be removed, I am of the opinion that there would be an end of smells, tastes, and sounds, which, apart from the living creature, are mere words.

We have spoken of the atomists as having given expression to the doctrine of the thing-in-itself. It is said that Galileo was well acquainted with the theories of Democritus; and Democritus was one of the atomists. Therefore, Galileo

being acquainted with the theories of Democritus, whom he considered greater than Aristotle, came to feel that all change is nothing but change in the relation of parts of objects. All is the result of the movements of atoms. Sensible qualities are subjective, and are based on quantitative relations; all "qualities" are explained by "quantities". There is little doubt, therefore, that Galileo, being acquainted with Democritus and the other atomists, received from them his belief in "primary" and "secondary" qualities.

6. Therefore we may say with Henri Bergson, that there is no such thing as "individuality"; and with Solomon that "there is nothing new under the sun"; and that, therefore, John Locke did not, magic-like, draw from out his own ingenious brain the concept of "primary" and "secondary" qualities, but that he was, rather, the heir and steward of a great inheritance, investing the same, with good returns, that he might, like a good steward, hand on more than he had received.

Therefore, we may say that Locke was the first of the great modern philosophers to recognize the profound significance of our problem, to face it squarely, and to make an honest effort to solve it. The pre-cosmologists were too theological; the problem was too new to be thoroughly understood by the cosmologists; the atomists, to some extent, saw the problem, but became too thoroughly obsessed with the idea of indestructable atoms; Erigena is thought to have stated the problem in his four divisions of nature -- but this division

is really the basis upon which the absoluteness of God is to be proved; Galileo, like Erigena, saw the difficulty and stated the problem, but offered no adequate solution in anything like an extended treatment-- due, no doubt, to the fact that he was mainly interested in the astronomical aspect of nature; Plato and Aristotle, more than any other men before Locke, saw the problem and set the philosophers on the right track, but until Locke the most of them shunted off into abstract theological speculations, and so missed the real issue.

But Locke, like a real son of the English race, showed his pluck by setting for himself a hard task which he proceeded to perform in a philosophical fashion, freed from all religious and semi/religious prejudices.

In the first place, there is for Locke an outer, material substance, which is the unknown support and cause of the union of several distinct, simple ideas.

But our ideas lead us to believe that there are two kinds of qualities of material substance, that is "primary" and "secondary". The primary qualities are constant and unchangeable, and always present when matter is present. These qualities are called "primary" because they are inseparable from matter. They are such as extension, solidity, motion and rest, duration and position in time. The objects, being made up of certain primary qualities, produce in us, through our senses, certain secondary qualities, as sound, color, odor, etc.

Beneath these primary qualities, however, is "substance", which is the normal support of the primal qualities. The

and range of human knowledge, are to be answered only through insight into the nature of the representations which are the elements of knowledge. By the results of these representations, he seeks to explain his problem in a simple, historical way; and to give, through psychological analysis of the representations, a descriptive statement of the development of the knowledge of an individual subject. He accepts, willingly or unwillingly, the existence of metaphysical realities. On one side, there is a number of material things; on the other, a number of knowing subjects, who are provided with different psychological possibilities. It is supposed that there is a mechanical influence through which sensations generally arise. Bodies produce sensations in us, probably by means of "shocks", just as bodies affect each other. The experience out of which all knowledge arises is a product, which comes through the reaction of the understanding to the influence of outer things as conditions.

The elements which constitute the corner-stones of the knowledge-structure are representations, or Ideas. These spring from two sources; from the senses and from reflection (the outer and inner senses). The Ideas are divided into "simple" and "complex". Both of these classes are again divided into sub-classes. There are four kinds of simple Ideas: (1) The Ideas which are produced by means of a simple outer sense. (2) The Ideas which are produced by means of several outer senses. (3) The Ideas which are produced by the inner sense. (4) The Ideas which are produced by means of

both the inner and outer sense. The complex Ideas fall likewise into four classes: (1) Mode, which can be neither simple nor mixed. (2) Substances - (that is, neither the concept of substance, - generally single substance, - nor collective substance). (3) Relation. (4) Abstract Ideas.

For Locke, there seems to be no specific difference between the thing-in-itself and phenomenon. But Locke, as to this point, can best be understood in the light of Kant. The primary qualities, according to Locke, seem to be the mathematical definition of size, form, position, and movement, - yet perhaps Locke should have spoken here rather of "quantities" than "qualities", - which really are the characteristics of outer things. For Locke, our Ideas are exact copies of every quality in the object, and these qualities would come to be actual realities in the world whether or not there were beings to perceive them. In the case of the secondary qualities, however, one cannot maintain that our Ideas are like them, or correspond to them. Secondary qualities are nothing but energies which are aroused in us, and which we distinguish as colors, sounds, etc. Thus one sensation comes to be different from another. But in another place Locke hesitates to resort to this method of explanation, believing that there should be another means of solution. The simple Ideas, which correspond to the nature of the atom, carry with them, in their own nature, no visible necessary connection or inconsistency with any other simple Idea. Therefore, for Locke, the secondary qualities are dependent either upon the motion of atoms,

or else upon a yet "less conceivable" cause.

At times, Locke identifies Ideas with sensation. In this sense, Ideas are impressions which outer objects produce in the mind. The understanding must take up the impressions, whether it will or not. When these impressions are given by outer objects the mind can change or destroy them just as little as a mirror can change or destroy the form of an object which is stood before it. On the contrary, he speaks in another place of an Idea of sensation, as if an Idea and sensation were different from each other; and appears to say that perception must arise in order to change our impression into an Idea. Again, perception is identified with sensation in ^opposition to impressions. Yet again, the Idea is that which is the object of the understanding, as was suggested in the beginning of this section. Only in this sense is it possible for Locke to speak of Ideas of yellow, white; heat, cold; soft, hard; and all those which we call sensible qualities. Only when the ~~mind~~ Idea is so considered is it conceivable how Locke can so often identify the Idea with the quality of the thing.

Therefore, we may conclude that a psychological research into the nature of the Idea as a psychological occurrence cannot in the least explain the theoretical-epistemological meaning of the Idea. In fact, Locke admits this to be the case: "We know so little what figure, size, green ~~smell~~ color, or sweet smell produce, that we cannot once conceive how size, figure or motion, can ever produce in us an idea of color, taste, or tone; there is no conceivable relation between the two."

7. Locke and Kant: A Comparison. According to Locke, the real element of knowledge, as we have seen, is generally that which is supplied from without. Bodies produce representations through some sort of impulse. To say that the given Ideas are added to by the understanding is idealistic; so Locke denies that the understanding can contribute to the reality of the Ideas or representations.

However, there are implications to the contrary. For Locke's idea of "substance" - that is, the idea of "something or other" - is very similar to Kant's Transcendental Object, that is, the thought of "something in general". Both are products of abstraction; and therefore work a real advance over most of Early Greek speculation on the subject. Locke's admission that there is a "substance" upon which the primary qualities depend, if thought of as a logical dependence, is similar to Plato's non-Being before it becomes individuated; it is also similar to Kant's thing-in-itself, if we discover that the thing-in-itself, like non-Being, is the metaphysical or logical cause or condition of phenomena. There is, at least, a thread that binds the thoughts of these thinkers together.

But both Plato and Locke fail to give any adequate solution of the relation of the thing-in-itself or non-Being to phenomena. With Plato, non-Being is sometimes different from, and sometimes identical or almost identical with phenomena; while with Locke, "substance", the "thing-in-itself", or "non-Being" is at least not related to phenomena, as is Kant's "thing-in-itself". For with him, substance is only the

ground of the primary qualities; while the primary qualities, in turn, become the ground of the sense or secondary qualities.

8. Kant: Schopenhauer is, therefore, probably correct when he says that Kant's greatest service is the differentiation of phenomena from the thing-in-itself. We may say that Kant to some extent failed in his effort to completely differentiate between noumena and phenomena; but certainly, logically speaking, he intended to do so. It may be that the confusion as to whether or not he did differentiate these two existences is due to the impossibility of always being able to tell when he is speaking of them in a "logical" sense, and when he is speaking of them in a "pragmatic" sense. For certainly the "Regulative Ideas" belong, logically, to the realm of the Reason; but they are as certainly not intended to be divorced from the realm of experience. Rather, just the opposite.

Therefore, to say that for Kant the concept of phenomena in the experience of knowledge is of great significance, is not to say that he did not also concern himself mightily with the realm of the noumenal, and that he did not cause the problem of the "thing-in-itself" to stand out as never before. He even in some way makes the characteristics of phenomena depend upon the nature of the noumena, and yet shows that they are logically different existences. He objects to the doctrines of both Locke and Leibniz, saying that Leibniz intellectualized phenomena; while Locke sensitized the concepts of

the understanding.

(1) Let us first consider Kant's things-in-themselves in their relation to each other:

In three places in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant seems to deny that the Transcendental Object is to be identified with the thing-in-itself. The Transcendental Object is not an object of knowledge in itself, but only the representation of phenomenon. He elsewhere says that "the whole indefinite thought of 'something in general' cannot be called noumena" - for I know not from it what it is in itself, except merely from the object by means of a sensuous intuition. Again, Kant says that the concept of a noumena^{on} is not the concept of an object. But it may be that Kant here means that the "thing-in-itself" cannot be thought of as an "empirical object", and likewise of the Transcendental Object. So the Transcendental Object may be the same as the thing-in-itself, both being different from empirical objects. Form elsewhere Kant actually identifies the Transcendental Object with the noumenon or the thing-in-itself. "The understanding thinks an object in itself, but only as a Transcendental Object". We call these objects transcendental because the representation of them is not sensuous.

But Kant hesitates to found nature on the noumena. He at times leans toward another thing-in-itself as the cause of the sensations. Yet he elsewhere points out that the Transcendental Object is the cause of sensations. Again, he seems to clearly distinguish between the thing-in-itself and phenomenon.

intuition and to the "a priori" forms of sensibility. On the other hand, things-in-themselves are the objects of Reason.

So, for Kant, there must be an objective ground. But what is this objective ground? It is not a "nature" as such: for nature is not a world of things-in-themselves, but just the classification of appearance or phenomena. Kant had no intention of transforming the world and man into mere representation. He makes use of the weapons of Bishop Berkeley in order to destroy the Cartesian idealism. Berkeley's dogmatic idealism denied the existence of matter or a spacial outer world in addition to ideas. So does Kant. For him the whole outer world in space arises from our ceaseless representation. Again, in another sense, Kant does not deny the existence of the outer world. The same may be said of Berkeley. Berkeley bases the transcendental ground of such modifications in God; while Kant, on the other hand, uses the concept of the thing-in-itself as a support for the realistic world.

It is thought by one authority that Kant, in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, attaches a double affection to the subject, first through the thing-in-itself and second through outer appearance. However, the subject who is affected may be the same in both cases. True, the thing-in-itself affects the Transcendental Subject, through which affection arises the whole world of experience, of which the empirical "I" is a part. The outer phenomena affect the empirical subject, upon which arises sensation and representation as events in the individual consciousness. Vaihinger thinks that Kant

here approaches the concepts of Beck and Fichte.

Perceptions, says Kant, are empirical representations from the influence of moving energies of matter which affect the subject. These energies affect the subject because he is a physical being. The inner changes wrought in him by the activity of consciousness are perceptions. The moving energies of matter are, in the mind of the subject, the cause of his perception. For physics, however, they are causes in themselves which affect the senses; while the objects of sense, metaphysically speaking, are appearances. But Kant has no faith in physics, for it deals not only with "appearances" but with "appearances of appearances".

However, it sometimes seems that Kant retains some sort of mechanical causal relation between the thing-in-itself and the knowing subject.

Erick Adickes, in Kant und das Ding-an-sich, states that it would be a great mistake for one to consider the thing-in-itself and appearance as two absolutely different realities, both alike real, standing overagainst each other, as archetype, copy, or image. However, there is a "something" which is given to our experience only as appearance; while on the other hand, there is given to us an existence which seems to be entirely independent of appearance.

We must not, however, identify the thing-in-itself with the inner or with the reality of objects of appearance. For only by making oneself free from all forms of human conceptions and ornamentation could ^{one} ~~one~~ approach the thing-in-itself.

But even that would not prove satisfactory to knowledge, for it would have to enter into the structure of "Intellectual Intuition" in order to provide the stuff of knowledge. But one and the same object is at one and the same time thing-in-itself and the bottom of appearance. However, the thing-in-itself in the appearance is not knowable. Yet it appears in the appearance, - that is, manifests itself in it.

We can have knowledge of things-in-themselves only in so far as they are objects of sensuous intuition. So all rational knowledge is limited to the experience of objects. Yet, we must be able to think the same objects as things-in-themselves; for Kant makes a distinction between "knowing" and "thinking". The thing-in-itself cannot be "known", but it can be "thought". This is not only true of the thing-in-itself, but of many other things. God, for instance, cannot be known, in the sense that Kant speaks of knowledge; but will anyone say, therefore, that God cannot be "thought"?

Therefore, as was suggested, the object has two kinds of meaning: it is at once "appearance" and it is the thing-in-itself. But may these not be one and the same object? May not the distinction be only a logical one?

(2) The "I-in-itself". Things-in-themselves cannot be known or defined. In man, there is no possibility of the intuition of the Self. He cannot know that he exists; for he knows himself through the condition of Time, which makes impossible any adequate definition of the thing-in-itself as it

applies to the subject. But that an "I-in-itself" lies at the bottom of our consciousness of phenomena is just as self-evident to Kant, or, if possible, more evident, than that every outer appearance corresponds to a thing-in-itself. Yet, Kant says that the "I" as a "thinking being" is hardly like the "I" as a "sense-being". We are not quitenone and the same subject. As object of the inner empirical intuition, that is, so far as I become affected by sensations in Time, which take place at the same time or in succession of each other, I know myself only as I appear to myself, and not as a thing-in-itself. This seems to be what Kant means to say; but, as we shall see, the implications of his system as a whole seem to point in a somewhat different direction.

It is at least evident, then, that one and the same being is "I-in-itself" or "thing-in-itself" and "appearance." So what is said of the Self must also be said of other things. In each and every thing, then, there is manifested a "thing-in-itself", an unknowable "something" that runs through each individual thing, binding its manifoldness together. We must either accept this statement or say that the thing-in-itself is nothing but phenomenon freed from all subjective conceptions and ornamentations.

(3) The Things in Themselves as Affecting Causes. At one point we are told that the thing-in-itself is not a substance, and that it does not work as a cause, except as part of a real whole. We can easily see how this may be true;

for even though the thing-in-itself be the cause of our sensations, it need not be the cause of our knowledge; for knowledge involves not only sensations but the categories of the understanding, and the Pure Intuition of Time as a schema. Kant says that the possibility of the thing-in-itself as a cause of knowledge is to him inconceivable; for the whole idea of cause is relative to things in a world of phenomenal experience. However, it is pointed out in the Critique of Pure Reason that the thing-in-itself is the definite cause of appearance or representation. The thing-in-itself lies at the bottom of the appearance of matter. But Kant also denies that the thing-in-itself is a cause of our sensations in any "mechanical" sense. He thinks such a notion is inconceivable.

We have to do only with appearance, or our representations. How things-in-themselves are possible is outside of the sphere of our knowledge. Kant sometimes leads us to think that the physical object is not in itself actual, but mere appearance; that the object in itself is unknown. But stimulus is not the result of these unknown causes, but merely the appearance of their influence on our senses. The non-sensuous cause of these representations is entirely unknown, and therefore, could not be intuited as an object; for, like an object, this non-sensuous cause would again have to be placed in space and time, without which condition we could not possibly have an intuition of it. But we might at least call the Transcendental Object the merely intellect-

ual cause of appearances. But to do so gives us that to which the sensuous, as receptivity, corresponds. We can think of this Transcendental Object as extending to and as being in relation with our possible perceptions, and say that it is given in itself before all experience.

Every appearance is a proof of a fundamental underlying thing-in-itself. So things-in-themselves must in some way be causes of appearances, as those appearances affect us. Things-in-themselves must in some sense be objects in themselves; at the same time they may be unknown.

Therefore, the thing-in-itself may not in any direct way be the cause of our sensation; yet it, as a Transcendental Object, is the only conceivable cause of appearance; but this does not mean that it is cause in any legal sense of the term. For the thing-in-itself, conceived as Space, the Empty, the Nothing, or non-Being, could not possibly be an active, legal cause of anything. For the thing-in-itself is not a thing of the world of phenomena, which it would have to be in order to be a cause in the ordinary sense of that term. But this is not to say that the thing-in-itself may not in some way be the passive, metaphysical, or logical cause of all phenomena, and so of all sensation. Certainly, "not-A" is in some way necessary to "A", and so the metaphysical or logical cause of "A". For there could be no "A" without "not-A", for "A" is produced by limitation; and it is "not-A" that produces the limitation and enables one to apprehend "A" as "A". Take "not-A" away, and certainly

there is no "A". Likewise, the thing-in-itself is in some such way the cause of phenomena, - the "something" or the "nothing", - the "indeterminateness" upon which all "determinateness" is dependent, but which never enters as a real member into the world of objects; just as "not-A" never enters into "A", but yet determines "A".

So the thing-in-itself possesses reality of a vital sort, but not perceptual reality as does appearance. In other words, our thoughts in some measure constitute the concept of the thing-in-itself as a theoretical, epistemological, limiting, concept.

4. Things in Themselves and the Categories. Can categories not be thought of as things-in-themselves? As to the answer to this question Kant has left us in some uncertainty. At times he explains the concepts of the understanding as not applying to our sensuous space-time concepts, but as being bound up in sensuous intuition. Again, we get the impression that "pure thought" is not so entirely different from "noumena", from things-in-themselves, if we only assign to ourselves a non-sensuous intuition. The noumena^{on} signifies or implies the problematical concept of an object for an entirely different understanding than ours. However, this understanding, which must be known, not through categories, but intuitively, is yet a problem. Only an archetypal intellect, an Intellectual Intuition, an absolute creative understanding, could have a knowledge of the thing-in-itself, that is, an absolute knowl-

edge. Because only in an archetypal intellect could thought and thing, representation and existence, be united. In other words, our thinking, under present conditions, does not produce the real thing, but only ~~experianxxx~~ appearance.

Erick Adickes, in Kant und das Ding-an-Sich, points out the fact that when Kant speaks of the thing-in-itself as the cause of sensations, he has in mind not the category of causality, but the idea of freedom, which is the transcendental correlate of causality. That is, causality as applied to freedom is in ^opposition to causality as it exists in the phenomenal realm. But both of these types of causality, the Empirical and the Intelligible, are methods of causality, and so fall under the category of "Causality". But of this matter we shall speak more hereafter.

However, if the category of pure causality is thought without sensuous schema, then it may be combined, through freedom, with Intelligible Causality. And Kant really speaks, in the Critique of Practical Reason, of an application of this kind, and even uses, in a like manner, the "Category of Causality" and the thing-in-itself. That is, every cause involved in freedom falls under the form of the Category of Causality. It is here that the thing-in-itself is made use of, that is, when Intelligible Causality is spoken of.

Therefore, to the question, "How is the agreement between the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories) and the thing-in-itself, to be explained?", Kant would prob-

ably have answered, that "One needs the thing-in-itself, to which the objects of nature correspond; but the mind also turns toward an inner existence, establishing upon the basis thereof the same organization for all masses that it maintains for itself." So, in thought there comes to be set up a universal organization upon the basis of reflective consciousness, a kingdom of things-in-themselves.

However, Kant did not dare to carry out the above idea to its ultimate conclusion, for he had a strong realistic tendency, of which the necessary consequence was that he labored under a strong conviction that there are actual, constitutive, thing-in-themselves, possessing a real and substantial existence. Without some sort of "objective realities", thought could know nothing, - it could only play with representations." True, the intelligible can never be immediately known, because we cannot perceive it, except in so far as it appears in the object; but it must yet be thought of as conformable to the empirical character. So, we must generally place a transcendental object at the ground of our thought of appearance, though we may not know what it in itself may be. That is, by thought, through the pure categories of the understanding, we cannot give to this possible existence any definite character.

There are, we conclude, a number of statements which lead us to believe that the Categories are involved in, or that they may actually be reduced to, things-in-themselves. For the word, "Category", is used in two different senses: it is the expression for the synthetical function of our unity of

Transcendental Apperception; and it is also used to distinguish the pure "a priori" concepts. Therefore, the categories are not reduced to phenomena, but to objects in general; and so can be reduced to or made use of as things-in-themselves. Things-in-themselves are in some sense the ground of appearances. But we cannot think such a relation except through the categories and their schemata. So, analogous to these relations, we have admissibly built into the world of appearances our "a priori" forms of the understanding. Therefore, things-in-themselves and categories cannot be of a wholly different nature.^S

5. The Thing-in-Itself as a Limiting Concept: We cannot transcend our experience or have "a priori" knowledge of the supersensible or things-in-themselves. Knowledge implies perception, and things-in-themselves cannot be perceived by the senses. Neither, as Hegel has pointed out, can the thing-in-itself be arrived at by the process of physical analysis. As the intellect is discursive and not intuitive, we could never, even by analysis, see the whole of a thing face to face. If we apply categories to this thing-in-itself, we cannot justify them. We cannot prove, for example, that everything that exists, exists as a substance in an intelligible world. We can, however, think such a thing-in-itself as existing just beyond the point to which our knowledge reaches; we can speak of it as that to which none of the predicates of sense-percept-

ion apply; we can say that it is not in Space or in Time (Space and Time used in the Kantian sense); that it does not change, etc. But no category can be applied to it, for we have no way of knowing whether anything corresponding to it exists.

But the thing-in-itself is not, however, a contradictory concept; for we cannot hold that the phenomenal order is the only possible form of perception. True, we can have sensible knowledge only of sensible things, not of things-in-themselves. But the senses cannot presume to "know" all that the intellect can "think". Things-in-themselves may be realities in a form other than that of phenomena, and yet have no constitutive existence.

Therefore, things-in-themselves are just "guide-posts", as one authority says, which tell us that the realm of sense is not the only one; that the world of sense is not actually a world but an island. But it is an island because of the thing-in-itself, - otherwise, no one knows what it might be. For the "Indeterminate" is necessary to the existence of the "Determinate". It is the "non-Being" which makes possible "Being", for "Being" must be limited in order to be "Being". So, in both "thought" and "thing" an "unlimited", as a boundary, ~~is~~ is necessary in order that ~~that~~ "thought" or "thing" may have ~~a~~ shape or definiteness. For either "Being" or "non-Being" stretched out to infinity, end in "non-Being".

6. - However, in spite of the apparent demand for the thing-in-itself, some philosophers have attempted to dispense

With the concept.

David Hume insists that because we observe a relation between perceptions and objects, we cannot conclude that the perceptions are caused by the objects. If we abstract both primary and secondary qualities from matter, we leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our impressions, - a notion so imperfect that no skeptic will think it worth while to contend against it. We do not know whether there are things-in-themselves or not. The objects of our knowledge are ideas of our own impressions. We cannot prove that the impressions are caused by outer objects, by things-in-themselves, by substance, by ourselves, or by God. Knowledge is a relation of ideas, and reasoning by means of such ideas.

But the thing-in-itself takes on many forms, and it may be that Hume did not escape from it after all; for he at least believed in the existence of a God.

G.E. Schulze, in his "Enesidemus", also attacks the new critical philosophy as presented by Kant and Reinhold. He thinks this philosophy restores skepticism instead of doing away with it, leaving philosophy where Hume left it. It denies the possibility of knowing the thing-in-itself, and yet assumes its existence, and applies the categories to it, after saying that they are ~~valid~~ valid only in the world of experience. The only way to overcome the skepticism and the contradictions ~~and the contradictions~~ implied in the notion of the thing-in-itself, according to S. Maimon in "Versuch uber die Transcend-

ental-philosophie" - (1790), is to abolish the thing-in-itself as inconceivable and impossible.

William James says the whole of our experience, if such there be, leans on "nothing". Nothing outside the flux of experience secures or makes possible these experiences. Behind the bare phenomenal fact there is "nothing", - no thing-in-itself, no absolute, no unknowable. It is absurd to attempt to explain the given concrete reality by an assumed reality of which we can form no idea, except through symbols drawn from our own experience.

Yet William James' "nothing" may be the very thing of which he would deny the existence, for it is well known that he believed in an extra-mental or supra-natural world of some sort. And it may be that the "reality of which we can form no idea, except through symbols drawn from our experience" will prove to be the thing which for James does not exist. Therefore, would it not have been just as easy and even more logical for him to have confessed a belief in the thing-in-itself, in the Kantian noumena?

F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819), however, says that we are immediately certain of the thing-in-itself. It is directly revealed. It springs from our direct perception of the object; we come face to face with the real, not merely with ideas. He puts the thing-in-itself in the same category with spirit, freedom, and divine Being. He may be correct, for God or Being, freedom, immortality, and the thing-in-itself, or noumenon, are all alike in that they are "limiting concepts". Therefore, Erigana

- was really discussing the problem, even though he did emphasize the theological aspects of it. For, as we have suggested, Erigena thinks of God as the beginning and end of all things; he is the "nothing" out of which the world was made; his incomprehensible essence is, for Erigena, the substance of all definite things; he, God, is the thing-in-itself. Logically, he may have been correct. For apparently the thing-in-itself may be conceived under many different forms. That God is for Erigena the thing-in-itself seems to be evident from the fact that the nature which "neither creates nor is created" is not a fourth nature, distinct from the three first, but is identical with the "creating and uncreated nature", - that is, God, - the Term in which all things end; the divine Substance in which all things are grounded. That is, the thing-in-itself, so far as he has the idea in mind, is God himself.

But Erdmann says that this fourth class, that is, that which "neither creates nor is created", is, logically speaking, the "nothing". So, even though the thing-in-itself is thought of as God, it is still a Limiting Concept, - that beyond which or into which knowledge cannot penetrate, but which can be "thought" and "valued".

Jacob Fries (1773-1843), seeks to combine the teachings of Kant and Jacobi. The principles of Reason, which Kant seeks to prove "a priori", are immediately known in consciousness; we become directly aware of their certainty. True, only that which is sense-perceived can be known, in the Kantian sense of the term; but they are nevertheless objects of faith, which satisfy the demands of the heart. He might have

said that they also satisfy the demands of reflection; that things-in-themselves are demands, just as God, freedom, and immortality are demands.

As for Kant himself, it is shown in the Critique of Pure Reason that the thing-in-itself cannot be known. But the concept evolves throughout the Critiques. It is at first a mere abstraction, a "Gedankending"; but it finally becomes a necessary Idea of Reason, a regulative principle, expressing the rational demands of reflection, and is not fundamentally different from the demand made for the soul, the world, and God. The thing-in-itself, which was at first an abstraction, came to be thought of as freedom, practical reason, or will, and made the ground of theoretical reason. For instance, the moral law within us is a sure guarantee of the existence of a supersensible world. Of course we do not possess the power of intellectual intuition which would enable us to meet the thing-in-itself face to face. But the same may be said of God, freedom, and immortality. But shall we deny the existence of the latter? Then why the existence of the former? For after all, can we not say that we know if we firmly believe in the moral law? Is the moral law not for the Reason what sensation is for the Understanding? If sensation proves the existence of phenomena, then why may not the feeling or conviction of the moral law prove the existence of God, the soul, immortality, and the thing-in-itself, or noumenon?

In line with this argument, F. A. Lange (1828-1875), states that such religious and metaphysical speculations are

the products of a kind of "constructive instinct" in man. They may have no theoretical value, as the existence of an ideal world cannot be proved. But they do have for man a certain amount of practical value. All of which is to say that the thing-in-itself, like other kindred concepts, may be a judgment of value. It may be in its different forms and phases the expression of the constructive genius of man, as he attempts to lay for his world a foundation, or to rear a suitable superstructure upon the world that is, - the analysis and demonstration of which process is the task of this thesis.

But before any definite attempt at reconstruction, let us proceed to give some critical consideration to the previous attempts to solve the problem in hand, hoping thereby to get some insight as to the possibilities of the problem as a whole.

II

A CRITICISM AND EVALUATION OF

THE PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS.

1. The Early Greek Philosophers, beginning with Thales, repudiated the mythical interpretation of the world, and turned their attention toward discovering a more realistic world-essence. But not being aware of the subject-object problem, they did not realize the part played by the mind in the building of the world. Therefore, they naturally supposed that the thing-in-itself was some fixed and realistic material essence.

This changed attitude upon the part of the Greek was and was not an advance. Of the two, the mythical interpretation is possibly the truer one. But the realistic interpretation, within certain limits, promises a better understanding of the world as a whole, and enables man to study phenomena as he might not otherwise be able to do. So, if the Greek had retained his myths and added to them a world of "stuff," then mixed them properly, he might have arrived at a better solution. But, as we know, a reaction against a philosophy always carries the reactionist too far in the opposite direction; which was the case with Thales and many of his successors. However, there is advancement even among these early philosophers. The first of them asked only: "What is the 'material' cause of things?", - that is,

What is the primitive and indestructible body of which all sensible things are the perishable transformations? But their successors, - Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists, - saw that from such a point of view it is more plausible to regard sensible bodies as complexes of many different and equally primary constituents; and thus materialistic monism gave way to pluralism on the question of the material cause. But now they began to ask, half unconsciously, a third question: "What provides the motive impulse by which these constituents have been brought into just these specific combinations?" This resolved itself into the question: "What is the efficient cause?" But, as order, arrangement, organization, are naturally recognized as good, and their opposites as evil, there arises the idea of a final cause, as present in nature. Thus arises the idea of end or purpose. But what is the explanation of the presence of Order, Beauty, Goodness, and their opposites? What is the nature of this final cause? The first specific attempt to define this final cause was made by Anaxagoras, of whom Aristotle, in his "Metaphysics", has said, that he seemed, by contrast with his predecessors, like a sober man compared with idle babblers, in that he spoke of this final cause in terms of mind. For Anaxagoras, mind is, formally at least, the source of all cosmic order. But the other question: "What is the source of Mind?", these Greeks did not ask.

2. Plato also thought of the thing-in-itself in ab-

abstract terms, but was not in a position, historically, to deal adequately with the problem. He confuses the problem, in that both " $\upsilon\lambda\eta$ " and " $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ " contribute to the reality of an object. For the " $\upsilon\lambda\eta$ " is the "timber" out of which it is made, and the " $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ " gives it its chief reality. But ought we not let " $\upsilon\lambda\eta$ " be the realistic stuff and the " $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ " the concept of human contribution, synthesizing the two? But this is what Plato did not quite wish to do. However, we ought to bear in mind that the "matter" of Plato is not matter in the sense in which it was spoken of by the early Greek philosophers, nor as it is made use of in the science of physics; but that it was in reality of the ~~the~~ nature of potential mind.

3. Aristotle, either purposively or accidentally, came near to the solution, when he made matter or the indeterminate the stuff of the form or the determinate, and left them both, as some interpret, shot through with energy, or God, or the efficient cause. If he had only reflected that he was the projector of this "energy" or "efficient" cause!

4. Erigena touched the matter at a vital point. But being mainly interested in it from a theological angle, he did not deal with the whole question as he might have done. In him, speculative reason was beginning to be hampered by the spirit of Scholasticism. However, he makes an advance, in that the thing-in-itself, for him, is God, and not some

material substratum.

5. John Locke, being an empiricist, in the common sense use of that term, generally hesitated to characterize Substance as spiritual, mental, or semi-mental. Though he made a contribution by his analysis of the problem, he made no real advance over Plato or Aristotle, except that for him, rationally interpreted, space, time, both simple ideas, and complex ideas, are all, in reality, constructs of the mind; for he says that the secondary qualities are not like the qualities which excite them; and that the complex ideas become complex by means of a mental operation in which simple ideas are arranged and combined. But if complex ideas have a mental constituent; and secondary qualities are unlike the powers, qualities, or quantities which excite them; then one might be led to suspicion that even primary qualities are not independent of the contribution which is made by the agent in the act of knowing; and that the world of knowledge is a world of meaning partly evolved out of rational beings, who have, as Locke himself says, at least the "faculty" of knowing. But to have even the "faculty" is to make it impossible for the mind to comprehend without at the same time making a contribution to that which is comprehended. Again, Locke really wavers as to the nature of Substance; it is sometimes a substratum, sometimes a combination of qualities, and sometimes an idea of the mind.

6. Kant holds, in general, that the thing-in-itself is a realistic something. But if such were the case, then the

thing-in-itself would be infinitely divisible, and so not different from phenomena. At points he almost or quite identifies it with phenomena. But of what use could a thing-in-itself be if it were in essence like phenomena? Again, if the thing-in-itself is unlike phenomena, it could not then be the cause of phenomena, in any legal sense of that term; for a cause must be able to pass over into effect. Therefore, a realistic thing-in-itself could, in one sense, be neither like nor unlike phenomena. But if it is not a realistic something like phenomena in essence; and if it cannot be realistic something unlike phenomena in essence; then it must be conceptual in essence.

In the formal sense, at least, Kant himself established the principle that thought is spontaneous and self-determining. But he failed to deal with the implications of this admission. It was Fichte who first noticed the failure; and who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for the categories, endeavored to supply something of the kind. Aristotle set down ten categories, - Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Space, Time, Situation, State, Activity, Passivity, - Substance being the logical source of all those that follow. Now may it not be that "Substance" is the "I" and that Aristotle's and Kant's categories proceed from this "I", the "I" being, in some sense, the pivot of reality? At least, for Fichte, the Ego is the starting point. But in reality the germ of Fichte's "Ego" is evident in the categories; for the categories must have an intelligent or rational source.

But Fichte's Ego is not really free and spontaneous thought. It is supposed to receive its first excitation by a shock or impulse from without. Against this shock the Ego will react, and so become conscious of itself. In the meantime, the nature of the impulse remains beyond our knowledge. So the Ego, after all, is conditioned. So Fichte did not, for our purposes, advance very far beyond Kant. For what Kant called the thing-in-itself, Fichte sometimes called the impulse from without, - an indefinite, non-Ego in general. So neither Kant nor Fichte really carried out to its ultimate conclusions the suggestion of free and spontaneous thought.

But Kant will admit that the categories are features of both mind and things. The mind enjoys itself categorically in contemplating the corresponding categorical feature of the object which it contemplates. But do we not enjoy the categories in things mainly because we first discover them in ourselves, or because that it is in us that they first become determinate? Supposing that there is no objective category, man would have no way of cognizing the things without the categories that belong to him. But when he does cognize, he sees out there that which he has in some sense thrown into and around the object; otherwise he could never have taken in the object. Yet it is natural for him to objectify and to imagine that the qualities which are in him are also in the object. If, as Kant says, "Time" is a "schema" of sensations and categories, then it must be a fundamental aspect of mind. Kant says, however, that Time is a pure intuition,-

a form. But is not a form an abstraction upon the basis of which phenomena may be explained? "Mind", as S. Alexander says, is a form of "Time", and of the nature of deity, both being concepts upon the basis of which phenomena may be explained, whether that phenomena be of the subject or of the object. That is, "Mind" is a counterpart, correspondent, or synonym for "Time". For "Mind", being that comprehensive term by which all mental phenomena may be explained, is like "Time", in that were there no succession of moments, then there would be nothing to comprehend in the term, "Mind". Both are principles of unity. Now these may be and are extended into the phenomenal and objective world, because they are first evident in man when he comes to cognize the world. They are postulate which tend to explain the behavior of man and things. Then "Time", in that it is necessary to bound up with "Space", is in some sense the mind of space. They telescope, as it were; for as we can not imagine the behavior of body without a mind, just so we cannot imagine space without a succession of moments of time which constitute a continuum which accomplished the space and then logically holds it together, - that is, grounds its existence. For if moments of time had not followed each other the space would never have been accomplished. So "Time" may be the thing-in-itself of "Space", as "Mind" is the thing-in-itself of body.

This is not wholly out of line with Kant; for he says that "Time" is the condition of inner sensation, as "Space" is the condition of outer sensation. There is here a recognition

of "Time" as being more subjective than "Space"; having more of the character of mind than has space, even though both are in a sense pure intuitions, and so of the nature of mind. However, if Time has a Mind aspect, so must Space, as Time and Space are not separable. It may be, then, that Time is really a kin to Space as Mind is a kin to body, - without the one the other could not be, yet the one is not the other, but the thing-in-itself that belongs to the one is the logical cause of and the means of explaining the other. This is in keeping with Bergson, who finds "Time" to be the animating, spontaneous principle of the universe, calling the same "duree".

Now if categories are features of both mind and things; and if Time and Space are aspects of both mind and objects, with Time as schematic and especially subjective; and if Time creates Space by the process of succession, then may not Time or Mind be in some sense the source of the cognized world, its own succession of moments being the ground of Space or an extended existence? In short, if Time is the schema of categories and sensations, and so the condition of experience; then Time must be of the essence of Mind. But if Time is of the essence of Mind, and Time is necessary to experience, then Mind is fundamental to an experienced world and possibly necessary to the construction of that world. - Just as, according to Kant, Time is necessary to the construction of knowledge. In short, Time is of the nature of Mind, Mind is of the nature of Deity, and Deity is of the nature of spirit, which spirit may be finite or infinite. But in either case, it is the center of experience.

In "Selections from Kant", - Watson, page 87, Kant, in speaking of Time as a schema says, "This schematism of our understanding, in its application to phenomena and to their pure form, is an art hidden away in the depths of the human soul, the secret of which we need not hope to drag forth to the light of day."

But may it not be that this "art hidden away in the depths of the human soul" is, in a sense, the source of Kant's whole world? May it not be that the whole synthetic process involved in the understanding, together with the categories, and the pure intuitions of Space and Time, are, in sum, just another name for the I-in-itself? Out of this "I" in its "Indeterminateness" is involved the "Determinates" of Time, Space, Categories, God, Freedom, and Immortality, all of which of the nature of noumena. But of the nature of noumena because they are out of "the depths of the human soul". In short they are the noumena of the noumenon.

In other words, for Kant, "Time" and "Space" are of a subjective nature. Space and Time are not properties of things, nor are they separate things of nature; they are just conditions of our sense-knowledge of things. Therefore, they are real only as facts of our consciousness. Space and Time are just forms of human perception. Our world seems to be in Space and Time simply because it is our own nature to view it as spacial and temporal. Space and Time appear to us as belonging outside of us, merely because they are conditions in us of our seeing and feeling things. It is like wearing green goggles. - We always perceive under these forms of sense, and so Space and Time cannot but seem to us

as being objective and real.

But if Time and Space thus govern our knowledge process, then may it not be true that Time and Space are the fundamentals of the Self? May it not be true that ^{the} Self is in some sense constructed out of Time and Space? Consciousness may be said to be made up of a succession of heart- and pulse- beats. This succession demands Time, and Time demands Space. But whatever is for the Self will be for the objective world; therefore, Time and Space, as realities of consciousness, become realities of the so-called objective world. The fact that so-called objective Time and Space are governed by that Time and Space which inhere in the Self, can be made plain to oneself by a little experiment: Start toward some given point, say five miles away. If you are in haste to cover the distance, you will think of it as being far and as taking considerable time. But if you have plenty of leisure, the distance will seem less than in the first case, and the time consumed will seem comparatively short. Now, why so? In the first case, when you are rushed, the space which begins in the self is projected so rapidly that one's legs cannot keep pace with the projection. The result is that one feels that he is behind time, and so behind in space. In short, he projects more space, which in turn, demands more time, than might otherwise be the case. But what about the second case? Well, you have five miles to go. - You have plenty of time. Therefore, you project the distance slowly. Projecting the distance slowly, you are able to keep up with your own projection. Keeping up with your own projection, you of course have plenty of time, so the five miles is a short distance, and is covered by you in a

short space of time. That is, all distance is a projection of pulse-beats. If the pulse-beats are above normal, the distance is long; if the pulse-beats are below normal, or normal, then the distance is short. For, if distance is projected too rapidly, one must be always running to catch up with it; but if distance is projected slowly, then one has time enough to keep up with it. So space and time are the products and the projections of the beats of consciousness. If one could always go as fast as one wished; that is, if one only needed to wish in order to be at any point, then, there would not be long distances and short distances. - It would be the same distance, or, rather, no distance, to all points. Kant, in the "Selections from Kant". - Watson, page 127, says, "Even in the case of interchanges, we have to figure Time, the form of inner sense, as a line, and the inner changes themselves as the generation of that line, that is, as motion". But if the inner changes generate time, they must also generate space. Therefore, both Space and Time are forms of inner changes, Time being a succession of pulse-beats, and Space the length of the line generated and projected by the succession of the changes in consciousness.

But if Time and Space are thus created out of the Self as conditions of knowing, or, as forms of experience, may not many other supposed realistic conditions be projections of those things which have their origin in some sort of a psychic unit? If Time and Space thus come to be the conditions, grounds, or things-in-themselves of Mind or Self, may not the Self be a thing-in-itself that, because of its very nature, proceeds to construct a whole world, just as we have seen it constructing so-called objective Space and Time? That is, consciousness, being made up of Space and Time elements, projects these elements as objective Space and Time. But if Space and Time are created in the Self and then projected, may not many other things be created or become determinate in the Self, be projected by it, and then be thought of as constitutive and realistic in nature?

According to Aristotle, Time is just a condition of motion, - the measure and number of motion. But if Time is the measure of motion, it is then of the nature of Number. However, Number presupposes a person who can count. So it follows that Time presupposes a Soul, and that it cannot exist without a person who has within him the power to number. Therefore, if Time, which is generally thought to be independent of the mind, is actually created by the mind, may not many supposed objective and constitutive realities be traceable to "numbering" and reflective souls?

This would make unnecessary an objective and realistic thing-in-itself. For the mind now becomes the creator. Kant

says that the postulates of Freedom, God, and Immortality are demanded by man as a moral agent. Then if these are demanded by man as a moral agent, may it not be that all other postulates, together with these, are demanded by man as a rational agent, in his attempt to construct a world to his liking? It is not natural for a being of reflection to dwell in a matter-of-fact world. Still more, it is not possible for reflection to exist in such a world; for, for reflection, there can be no such world. As soon as man begins to know, he has already made impossible a factual existence. Man has no distinctive moral faculty that can posit Freedom, God, and Immortality, and stop there. These are not pure moral concepts. - They are intellectual concepts or rational demands. But if man as a rational being can postulate God, Freedom, and Immortality, the same being necessary to satisfy certain demands of his reason, then why may he not continue indefinitely? What brings him to such a sudden stop? Is it possible that the "I" is thus limited?

Now, if God, Freedom, and Immortality are postulates, - contents of the noumenal realm, - things-in-themselves, - then may not all other concept-values be of the same nature? That is, like those above, may it not be that all concepts are created by the reason and used as instruments relative to certain specific problems to be solved, just as God is postulated because He promises to fulfill our rational demand for happiness; and as Immortality is postulated because it promises an endless continuation of that which we now value.

So does man lay the foundations of his world. So does he build his temple and ornament it with a tower. In other words, the building of an ideal, intelligible, and logical world, is just a continuation of man's desire, need, and instinct, to build houses, cities, and institutions. No rational or reflective being can be conceived as living in a world to which he makes no contribution. Kant himself admits that the mind in some sense constitutes the so-called natural world-order. But the world that is, is a combination of the object and the subject in a synthesis which we must call experience, there being no clear line of demarcation between "things" and "concepts". But what is the chief factor in the knowledge-situation?

Every attempt to account for the world by means of a realistic thing-in-itself has thus far failed. The realistic things-in-themselves of the early Greeks are now known not to be things-in-themselves in any true meaning of that term. Just so can no realistic thing-in-itself ever satisfy the demands of reflection. These notions were, as Aristotle said, simply the crude beginnings of what may come to be a real solution of the problem. They, at least, represent the demands of reflection for a more and more abstract explanation of the ground of phenomena or the world of experience. But at the same time, their dissatisfaction with such realistic conclusions represents the evident inadequacy of such conclusions. Man seeks to attain to a larger control of the world than is afforded by water, air, earth, or fire, or any other

independent and realistic element or substance. His means of control must not be something given in the realistic data, but something developed or invented by himself. The animal is largely satisfied with a natural lair, and is contented to use the simple tools with which it first finds itself provided, - claws, teeth, etc. - as a means of sustaining itself in its world. But man builds houses and ornaments them; makes tools; and makes tools to make tools. Also reflection, which is itself a tool, creates other tools in the conceptual sense for the ordering of the world and for the satisfactory manipulation of phenomena.

No doubt we have all taken note of the fact that our sense of harmony with the world of nature at any one time is proportioned to our degree of normality. Is this not to say that we project our enjoyed harmony into the so-called objective world? When the individual is out of harmony with himself as an individual, so is all the world out of harmony. When the heart skips a beat in its rythmical progression, just so does the world proceed irregularly and in jerks. Philosophy, reality, value, are matters of temperament. The world of data is, and is progressively knowable. And value or reality is the valuation of the situation by a reflective mind, The reflective mind being a variable, but chief factor in the process, reality or value will vary in keeping with the fluctuations of the individual ego, taking on many different forms and assuming many different phases according to the particular tendency and need of the particular mind so evaluating.

In fact, Kant himself wanted to say that the mind is the chief factor in the knowing situation; but he was afraid to be called a follower of Bishop Berkeley. The Categorical Imperative is the only real noumenal in Kant's world. But this is out of the "I". Then the "I" must in some sense be the source of the thing-in-itself.

Therefore, in his idealistic moments ^{Kant} bordered on saying that the "I-in-itself" is the chief or first thing-in-itself. The first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason", would make the thing-in-itself a concept, not a realistic something. In the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason", Book II, ch. I, in speaking of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Kant says, "It is easy to see that 'I think' is the common vehicle of all conceptions, and therefore of transcendental as well as empirical conceptions". In the same chapter Kant speaks of the "I" as a "thing-in-itself". Again, Kant says, "The conception of a thing that can exist by itself as a subject, but cannot exist as a mere predicate, does not carry with it objective reality". In this discussion, therefore, the thing-in-itself is a concept, without any objective or constitutive reality. There is, as Kant says, "no knowledge of the subject as an object". So the noumenon, in this case at least, is not a realistic entity, but a concept. In the same edition, Book II, ch. II, Kant refers to the world as a whole as only an idea. In the same chapter he says, "We assume that the world, or the whole series of phenomena, is a thing-in-itself. But Kant was driven from this position because he could not bear to be called a psychological or subject-

ive Idealists. But, properly worked out, his own view would not have committed him to that of Berkeley, but would have resulted in a philosophy something like that which Fichte aimed at, only the mind would have been the free source of the thing-in-itself, and itself the chief thing-in-itself. It would not have been dependent upon a conceptual^{or}/realistic stimulus in its initial activity, but rather the creator of a conceptual stimulus in order to explain the realistic data of experience. For in the "Metaphysics of Ethics", the noumenal or thing-in-itself is the moral will. Then what may be their ultimate relation? If they should turn out to be one and the same, then the noumenal or thing-in-itself might prove to be the "I-in-itself". And if out of this I-in-itself should come "Freedom", then might not other things-in-themselves follow in its wake? Or, Freedom, the noumenal, and the I-in-itself, may prove to be one and the same. For Kant himself says in his "Prolegomena" : "Thus we are able, in rational being, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is determined in them as things-in-themselves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states". Also in Abbott's "Kant's Theory of Ethics", there seems to be a Freedom is the keystone to the whole system of Pure Reason, all other concepts (God and Immortality, for instance) remaining in Freedom unsupported. But attaching themselves to the concepts of Freedom, they then obtain consistency and objective reality. That is to say, the possibility of the ideas of God and Immortality are proved by the fact that Freedom actually exists. So by this, Freedom may be the first thing-in-itself, or, rather, the

first act of the thing-in-itself, and a basis for the other kindred concepts. But this is another way of saying that the first thing-in-itself may be the I-in-itself. Again, the law of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into a sphere quite different from the empirical. It may be, then, that the will, plus the feeling of freedom is the source of all things-in-themselves as well as those concepts of God and Immortality.

In conclusion, there is for Kant a logical boundary between sensibility and the intellect, sensibility receiving the impressions, co-ordinating them, and making intuitions of them; the intellect synthesizing the intuitions, that is, judging and reasoning. In sensibility, there are the "a posteriori" intuitions of Space and Time. In the understanding are a number of "a priori" concepts, which are like the many compartments in which reason stores up and elaborates the product of experience. However, with all these seeming divisions, the faculty of knowledge is yet a unity; and this essential^{unity} of reason in the diversity of its operations, is the "ego". Reason or the noumenal aspect of the Self, is a sort of mistress who rules over these realms, - the realm of theoretical reason, practical reason, and aesthetic. She is respectively, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. But she unifies and harmonizes the activities of the "ego".

Also, there is a logical boundary between pure reason and practical reason. Pure reason declares that every occurrence in the phenomenal order is a necessary effect. But what about moral liberty? Kant does not admit an absolute incompatibility between them. The conflict of reason and conscience can only be

a seeming one. It is possible to resolve the antinomy without violating the rights of the intelligence, or of the will. However, the solution would be impossible if the "Critique of Pure Reason" absolutely denied liberty. But in fact, this work only excludes Freedom from the phenomenal world, and not from the intelligible and transcendent world. Freedom, impossible in the phenomenal order, is possible in the absolute order. Therefore, Freedom is conceived by Kant himself as a "noumenon". It is intelligible; and practical reason adds: It is certain. So there is no real contradiction between the faculty of knowledge and the will. Our acts may be determined in Space and Time; but indetermined and free as to our intelligible character, in so far as our intelligible character is independent of these two forms of sensibility.

This would not be a reconciliation, if time and space were objective realities. But if time and space are modes of seeing things, and do not affect the things themselves, then determinism is reduced to a mere theory or general conception of things; and the "ego" is still the point at which all roads meet.

Therefore, as Weber says, if the thing-in-itself does not exist as a quantity, as a cause, or as a reality, then it exists only in thinking subject; like Space, Time, and the Categories, it is identical with the subjects which conceives it. Hence it is an inconsistency of the Kantian philosophy to conceive existence of the thing-in-itself outside of and by the side of Reason. The true consequence of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is the monism of the "ego", together with the conclusion or implication that it

is the creator of the logical world-order. In the end, the theoretical reason is subordinated to practical reason, and to the moral conscience. There is, for Kant, a connecting link between theoretical reason and practical reason; and this connecting link is the thing-in-itself, the noumenon, the intelligible order, supposed by theoretical reason, postulated and openly affirmed by the moral conscience. The "two Reasons" would contradict each other, if the one denied what the other affirmed. But the theoretical reason does not reject the absolute; it simply recognizes its inability to know it, and to demonstrate its existence. But what theoretical reason cannot do, practical reason must do; and so there is not a contradiction, but just a division of labor, one phase of the "ego" supposing, but not knowing, it being reserved for another logical aspect of the "ego" to both know and be that which is only thought by theoretical reason. The "Critique of Pure Reason" denies liberty in the phenomenal world; but it conceives liberty as a prerogative of the thing-in-itself, while maintaining the impossibility of theoretical demonstration. The thing-in-itself is free. Now, practical reason categorically affirms the liberty of the acting subject, the freedom of the "ego". Hence the "Critique of Practical Reason", instead of contradicting the idealistic conclusions, confirms them: the "ego" itself is the thing-in-itself. The "object" which seems to determine us from without, is merely the "subject" acting within ourselves: object and subject, being and thought, nature and mind are unified in the thing-in-itself, which is, by implication, the I-in-itself. If the "I" were de-

terminated by an "object-in-itself", the "two Reasons" would absolutely contradict each other; the "ego" would hence forth be a slave in theory and in practice, and moral freedom would be an illusion. However, there is not a contradiction, but a reconciliation. The moral will becomes the mediating bond between theoretical and practical Reason. (See "Metaphysic of Morality" and "Critique of Practical Reason", especial the latter)

Therefore, after all Kant is monistic. It is true that he postulates Immortality and God apart from the "ego". But this double affirmation is just an accident in the system, essential to which is the affirmation of the absolute freedom of the "ego". The "ego" which Kant holds to be free is not the empirical ego, but the noumenal ego. But to speak of the immortality of an ego that does not exist in time, and for which there can be no "before" or "after", is an inconsistency, similar to that other inconsistency that the thing-in-itself is distinct from the personal subject. However, both of these inconsistencies have no organic connection with Kant's system as a whole. In reality, the thing-in-itself is the I-in-itself, native to which are the ideas of Freedom, God, and Immortality, together with the disposition to project the same. In the "Metaphysic of Morality" (Watson's Selections, page 251), Kant states that Freedom is a property of the will to be a law to itself. On page 257, he states that "Freedom" x x x is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no way be presented in accordance with the laws of nature, and, therefore, not in any possible experience". In short, Freedom, like other intelligible

objects, is just a presupposition of reason or the I-in-itself. Freedom, God, Immortality, and all other transcendental ideas, are the rungs of the ladder whereby man climbs up into the Intelligible World.

III

A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE IDEA OF THE
THING-IN-ITSELF.

1. The I-in-Itself. Reality is elusive. Like a flash of light, truth rushes in, but quickly the darkness falls. Throughout the ages, men have sought to snatch the golden thread. For a moment men of genius have just touched it, but, alas, magic-like, it slipped through their fingers and was gone. Anaxagoras, in some dim way knew that the world is full of meaning. Socrates communed with a "voice", but knew not from whence it came. Plato sensed the truth, but doubted his own genius. While Aristotle, full of the spirit of the "Nous", came nearly falling over the brink of the common world into the very stream of eternal reality. But Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, like other men, did not for long hold the golden thread. However, they knew, at their best moments, that the world can best be explained by the "Immaterial Hypothesis". They knew that Nous, or Reason, or God, was the secret to the world. Like the Hebrew prophets, they might never have really seen God at any time, yet they had that intuitive sense of his existence. But why he existed, they did not know. But that he did in some sense live, and that he was in some sense the ground of the rational world, they were immediately sure; and they were mainly correct. They, like Immanuel Kant, at the moment when his unconscious genius possessed him, together with F.H. Jacobi, Jacob Fries, and F.A. Lange, knew that the most significant and

eternal reality is not something realistic, but something spiritual in nature. Even men like Thomas Reid who held consistently that, for scientific procedure, causation is nothing more than invariable sequence or succession, yet thought that there was another and metaphysical meaning to causality.

But, unfortunately, none of these men could or did hold the golden thread long enough to be able to trace it to the spool from which it was unwinding itself. But even though they were not able to trace it back step by step to the point from which it was unrolling, they at least caught a vision now and then of a golden thread unwinding from the spool of human consciousness; and this thread, they thought, was like the one which they at moments touched with their fingers. But there were many obstacles in the way. - Hills, rivers, forests, and philosophic debris of all kinds. - So that they could not well retrace the way of the coming of the thread. But, as we have said, visions of the truth flashed upon them: Aristotle at points thinks of God as representative of all reality. He is the universal cause, - the absolute reality. He is the undivided thing-in-itself. And in some sense man partakes of or is, immediately, this universal soul. Maine de Biran, in general, contrary to Kant's conclusion, starts from the analysis of the first fact of consciousness, and on that analysis he attempts to found a theory of understanding and reason. In opposition to the doctrine of the Categories, which is quite a priori in Kant, he maintains a psychological genesis of the general principles of thought. The ego per-

ceives itself as a cause, and so becomes the pattern and model of every idea of power, force, and cause. Unity, simplicity, existence, and so forth, are ideas which the ego obtains by means of an abstraction wrought upon itself, and which ~~in~~ in a way isolates its own attributes. If we find these attributes again in objects, it is because they have been, so to speak, projected by the ego. Reason is the spontaneous result of a sort of self-analysis of consciousness. Victor Cousin says that pure apperception does not entertain explicitly any idea of the limited or of the unlimited, of the relative or the absolute, of the finite or the infinite; it contains all these things implicitly, and reflection forthwith converts them into distinct and necessary truths. There are times, says Cousin, when the decision of the soul is spontaneous and self-inspired, - times when it attains to heroism and self-sacrifice from its own first impulse. In both the domain of action and knowledge, the creative and original function belongs to free spontaneity. The facts of consciousness are alone directly given to us. Out of these we make our world. Even George Santayana admits that consciousness is not worthless; indeed, even for him it is the only seat and source of "worth". The physical as such has no significance. Merely because a thing happens to exist gives it no claim to our approval. It is in the recognition, not of existence or causality, but of preferableness, that value lies. One task of reason is to constitute that ideal realm wherein nature takes on form and value as viewed from

the vantage-ground of human interest, and becomes rational in proportion as the life of impulse is brought into a harmonious whole. We have a right to, and we do turn the facts of life into myths and symbols; but we must not go on and substantialize these myths and symbols. We must not forget ~~that~~ their poetic function. - We must not forget that they are pictures and statues from out our own intellectual studio. Fichte, though he did not remain consistent, said, until self-consciousness acts, no one has the notion, "I". The "I" is the first emergence of self-consciousness. Then self-consciousness is the "I". Therefore a product of self-consciousness is a product of the "I" itself. But we can agree that all valuation is an act of self-conscious reflection. Then, all valuation must be the act of the "I" itself. Then the source of all value, or the first value, must be the "I" itself. But Kant himself is committed, for he says that the idea of God is gotten by realizing, hypostatizing, and finally personifying a necessary postulate of the reason. But is this not to make the "I" the source of the idea of God? - The source of the idea of God, not as "Being" in the theological sense, but as "Value"? And this would be to find the "I" to be the spool from which unwinds the golden thread of all valuation. In "Kant, and the Moral Life", by Scott, there is really a recognition of the I-in-itself as the first and chief thing-in-itself. Professor Tichener says that "We live in a world whose center is ourselves." "We live in a universe which revolves about the 'Me'". Professor Munster-

berg points out the same truth when he says, "In our practical experience things have their meaning just through our attitude; their existence is bound up with our interest in them." In Hegel's Logic, by Harris, it is pointed out, that Hegel's real beginning is with the Principle of self-activity vs. mind. Mind is the fundamental ground of all objective being and of all subjective consciousness. Even the Instrumentalists, who ordinarily will have nothing to do with metaphysics, define purely subjective experience as the "indeterminate". But the "indeterminate" is one aspect of the I-in-itself. That is, the non-Being or negative of the I, which makes possible the "determinate" "I". The subjective "indeterminate" is, then, just a part of the cosmic ground for the I-in-itself, or, a vital part of the I-in-itself; which is a sort of "Becoming", consisting at any one time, of both Being and non-Being.

Upon this basis, we are now prepared to proceed to a somewhat new definition of the I-in-itself. It is, tentatively at least, the dynamic, spontaneous, living, thinking being, with his needs and interests. It is the "I-think" "act of spontaneity", "pure apperception", and "original apperception", of Immanuel Kant. (see "Selections from Kant"; - Watson, pg. 65.) That is, the I-in-itself, - and at least in point of significance; the first thing-in-itself, - is the individual functioning organism. Kant himself says that an I-in-itself lies at the bottom of our consciousness of phenomena. He also says that the "I" as a thinking being, is not quite like the "I" as a sense-being. But this sense-being of Kant's is, in fact, the dynamic spontaneous, living being, with his interests and needs; that is, it is the original thing-in-itself. And the "I" as a thinking being is in reality identical with this sense-being; for sensing and thinking are not disparate exercises. Sensing, and doing, and thinking, are all

one process of a being trying to create a situation which will be conducive to all his needs, and to the satisfaction of all his interests. This I-in-itself or ultimate thing-in-itself may be compared with a rapidly flowing stream, while the things-in-themselves of the I-in-itself are the banks and bends of the land that control the going of the stream. In this sense, things-in-themselves may be thought of as means, negatives, or limits. That is, the things-in-themselves in this connection are the governing forces just outside its activity; the means by which the I-in-itself guides or directs itself; or, the limit of the reach of the I-in-itself, the I-in-itself positing the so-called unknown to explain the known. This so-called unknown is not, however, unknown; for it is created by the I-in-itself; and every I-in-itself knows its own offspring. The soul, for instance, is that which it means to explain, not an unknown entity within itself. It is the postulate which best accounts for the complex of human behavior; and, as such, it is known to be just what it is known to do. Of course, the soul cannot be known as "postulated", but it can be and is known as a "postulate". The thing-in-itself cannot be known when we insist that it is "unknowable"; but when we admit that it is a postulate for a specific purpose, then it is known to be what it really is. The difficulty has been that men postulate the "unknowable", then play hide-and-seek with it. Like children, they hide it away, then look everywhere where it is not in order to prove that it cannot be found. Philosophers are this much like children, - they like to keep fooling themselves. As

Bishop Berkeley says, "We first raise a dust and then complain we cannot see". In reality, none of these so-called "Unknownables" transcend the world of experience. - The mind just deceives itself into trying to think that they do. The other worlds are not beyond. - They are the worlds we live in here and now. There is no fundamental difference between knowledge and faith. What we think, we project; then imagine that it is beyond. But in one sense, at least, it is not beyond.- It is here. We are living in the midst of what we deem is beyond us. The Nazarene knew this when he said, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you."

Now this I-in-itself, being set up, begins by positing many things that are necessary to its activity, just as a man when he enters a profession provides himself with the tools necessary to the prosecution of his chosen profession. In the first place, this "I", consciously or unconsciously, creates all those tools which are necessary to its own immediate activity, - that is, ideals, aims, mind, soul, and concepts of all kinds, - those instruments which working all together will tend to make harmonious the many and varied aspects of being. This "I", then, as a sort of projecting, creates those things-in-themselves which are necessary to the explanation and manipulation of given systems of facts. In both cases, however, the things-in-themselves so created by the "I", are secondary to it, being only means to its satisfactory existence. They are postulated because needed as instruments to explain phenomena in general, or in order to unify and systematize the behavior of active and thinking being.

Now, in all this we have not meant to say that the "I" posits itself in the sense that Fichte speaks of positing. For the I-in-itself does not posit^e itself. - It simply is. But Fichte in some sense is correct, - in the sense that the I-in-itself posits its negative, its limit, or some hypothesis by which it may direct itself, the I-in-itself still being the stream of reflective, conscious need.

However, the problem is not so simple as the above statements might indicate. The I-in-itself is not simple, but complex. It is and it is not; it is determinate and indeterminate; it is positive and negative.

As we have said above, the I-in-itself posits things-in-themselves as guides, limits, or negatives; but these are not of the same nature as the "negative" that inheres in and is a part of the I-in-itself. This "negative" of which we now speak is necessary to the very existence of the I-in-itself, whereas the guides, limits, and negatives spoken of above are not, logically, necessary to the I-in-itself, only in the sense that the I-in-itself, out of its very nature, posits them.

Then what is the nature of this "I-in-itself-negative"? It is not purely conceptual as are the minor things-in-themselves. It may be defined as potential, rather than merely conceptual. It may be conceptual, in that there is a dim intuition of it as potentiality which may in time become actualized. It is felt to be a real existent indeterminate which may evolve into the determinate. It may be called the

noumenal realm, or man's mental lumber-yard, out of which he gets all sorts of raw "stuff" for the building of himself and his world. The non-Being of this lumber-yard is always taking on concrete form in the self. A sort of synthesis of negative and positive is forever taking place. As Aristotle says, "Becoming is always between that which is and that which is not". That is, Becoming is between Being and non-Being. But it is non-Being that makes possible Becoming; for without non-Being, Being could not be; for Being itself is a process of "Becoming". Therefore, both "Being" and "non-Being" are involved in the activity of the "I"; that is, both the positive and the negative are true parts of the I-in-itself, the I-in-itself being represented by what we may call "Becoming"; for we have spoken of the "I" as being the active and thinking organism, with its needs and desires, such organism depending for its very existence upon the continuous interplay between the positive and negative "I", or between Being and non-Being.

But someone may object that the negative or non-Being is non-existent. But not so. Plato, Erigena, Hegel, and others have realized that non-Being is not synonymous with non-existent. With both Plato and Erigena, non-Being is only a lower form of existence. - It is that which has not yet become determinate. With Hegel both non-Being and Being are aspects of "actual Being," - The lumber in the lumber-yard is not non-existent, in the sense that it is "not". It is non-existent only in the sense that it is "not-house". That

is, this lumber, like the negative self, has a logical non-existence or non-being before it becomes "house". That is, non-existence simply means a lower order of existence.

Furthermore, like the lumber-yard of any prosperous builder, the lumber-yard of the rational, reflective, growing man will not grow less and less as he draws upon it. Rather, it will remain equally as large, or it may even grow larger. For as the business of building increases, and as the profits of business are good, the master-builder must be able to draw larger and larger amounts from his lumber-yard. He must, so to speak, posit the existence of increasing supplies out of which he may continue to build. He will figure on the possibilities of his business and maintain his lumber-yard accordingly.

Again, as one builds and prospers, his intellectual lumber-yard naturally increases, because that which he has already built awakens the consciousness of potentialities which might otherwise have continued to sleep.

In more abstract terms, we may say that the noumenal realm is man's realm of "capacity" overagainst his realm of "ability". We cannot imagine one, all of whose "capacity" has been transformed into "ability". But we do know that as "ability" increases, "capacity" increases; that is, at least the consciousness of capacity increases. Now, "capacity" is the lumber-yard, that is, the lower order of existence overagainst "ability" or that which has already been formed or achieved.

In short, the "lumber" or "capacity" is the negative aspect of the self, while the so-far-finished structure of the self is the "house" actually builded, or the "ability" already acquired.

This view of the self, or I-in-itself, excludes that troublesome idea of two disparate worlds, the noumenal and the phenomenal. For the "negative" and "positive" are not two separate or disparate realms, but just the two aspects of one self. The noumenal self is just as much a part of the self as the negative pole is a real part of the steel magnet.

Still further, to describe the self or world as merely positive, or actual, is to exclude all development. If there is to be growth; if the self and world have possibilities of development, - that is, if there is to be a building-up of a larger and larger positive self or positive world, then there must be, or be posited to be, material which can be drawn upon as such building or development progresses. As Plato might say, ~~the negative self and~~ the negative self and the negative world is the "timber" out of which the actual self and the actual world are always being made.

But this view of the I-in-itself will also help us to solve another aspect of the situation. Kant and others have had trouble in discovering the relation between the noumenal or thing-in-itself and phenomenon. The idea of

the thing-in-itself as a cause has confused the whole issue. But we may clarify the matter by letting the lumber in the lumber-yard be rather the logical cause of the house, in that it is, previous to the "house", "not-house", and then becomes "house". Likewise, "capacity" is the logical cause of "ability", for it is because of the existence of "capacity" that "ability" comes into existence. It is also because of the logical opposite of "ability" that we can speak of "ability", just as the logical opposite "bad" is necessary for the concept, "good". In the same manner, there must be, logically, a "not-self", before one can speak of a "self".

This treatment will also aid in solving the problem of Being and non-Being, in the so-called objective world. If the I-in-itself is composed of negative and positive aspects, will it not, in its attempt to interpret the world, attempt to do so in the light of its own nature? If so, the world will also have its Being and its non-Being aspects.

It follows therefore, that non-Being may be of several kinds: for instance ^{not} ~~no~~-chair may mean (1) all other ~~aspects~~ objects that are not chairs; (2) all material that is suitable "timber" for chairs; (3) the logical non-being or indeterminateness which makes possible the existence of the chair as a determinate or definite object; and (4) non-Being may also be defined in terms of limiting concepts. - Those concepts which represent the limits of the knowledge of phenomena, but which are resorted to as means of explaining

such phenomena, - as, atoms and electrons are the ground of the chair. But in all of these cases non-Being may be said to be a way of dealing with that which is given, - concerning which more is to be said hereafter.

Proceeding to the second division of this section, it may be, as has been suggested, that the thing-in-itself has two distinct aspects: in one sense, the thing-in-itself is the I-in-itself; while, in another sense, it may take the shape of things-in-themselves. That is, things-in-themselves may be the postulates formulated by the I-in-itself.

2. The Children of the I-in-itself: Now, as we have before suggested, if the I-in-itself is of a given nature, it will interpret the world in keeping with that nature. We have said that the world is possessed of Being and non-Being aspects, because the I-in-itself, which evaluates the world, is possessed of such aspects.

In the treatment of the I-in-itself relative to things-in-themselves, we also said that the I-in-itself posits things-in-themselves for its own immediate use; but that it also posits things-in-themselves as to the objective world, projecting the same into that world. If things-in-themselves are necessary for the rationalization of the self, the self will also demand things-in-themselves for the rationalization of the world.

For instance, reason is just a conceptual analysis of

the individual on logical grounds. That is, there is, in reality, no dualism of self and reason. The personality is, generally speaking, one, as psychology will bear us out. The person is a whole; but for analytical and logical purposes we introduce the notion of "reason". It is here a value-judgment. - A means of explaining human behavior. It is a "notional" cause of certain phases of activity. Reason is personified into a directing force or power,- the thing-in-itself of certain types of action.

According to men like Wilhelm Wundt, mind, intellect, and reason are purposive in nature, and so judgments of value. They may also be used as instruments for dealing with certain sets of facts. But this is to say that they are of the nature of things-in-themselves, in that they may be thought of as the ground of certain psychological phenomena. They are of subjective origin. But they may be objectified, logically speaking, and so thought of as having actual and constitutive existence. In short, mind, intellect, reason, are not "metaphysical substances", but rather are they "logical subjects".

But if it has been so natural for man to postulate such concepts as relating to his own intellectual constitution, when they have no existence as such, then is it not easy to believe that he has, upon the basis of them, proceeded to order the objective world? If these concepts help to explain his own character, then it is unconsciously presumed that they are the key to the understanding of the world as a

whole. As we know, this is the basis upon which Hegel proceeded; for his whole system is an amplification, extension, and objectification of that which he finds to be true of the individual self. In man, reason is the essence and norm of thought; but in things it is the law of their evolution.

Therefore, consciousness, mind, intellect, reason, and all sorts of other concepts are as formulated, the children of the I-in-itself, - the legitimate offspring of the universal and absolute thing-in-itself, which are made use of in the explanation of both the self and the world. However, the self must be interpreted in terms of the world, as well as the world in terms of the self, concerning which more shall be said hereafter.

In short, as Reinhold says, reason, and each of the knowing faculties, as sensibilities, understanding, are things-in-themselves, that is, they are the imperceptible grounds of the empirical activities of the kinds of cognitions in question, each one serving in its own way to explain a given set of observed phenomena. True, from the viewpoint of associational psychology, these things-in-themselves may not explain anything. However, they do serve as central ideas about which to group certain findings.. They take the place of "genus" in science. - Under them one may subsume the different types of behavior that are observed in actual experience.

But these things-in-themselves are, to begin with, not outside of consciousness, but inside of it. For, as Solomon Maimon says, the assumption of a reality to be placed outside of consciousness involves a contradiction. What is thought is in consciousness; and in this case what is thought

is thought of as necessary in order to explain the given in consciousness.

However, whether things-in-themselves are created for the purpose of explaining the phenomena of the self or the phenomena of the world, they are born out of the "I" under the stress of reflective need, mingled with a spirit of curiosity and wonder. Sigismund Beck is almost right when he thinks of Kant's "consciousness in general" as taking the place of the things-in-themselves. In a sense, any consciousness is a "general consciousness", only, for practical purposes we must begin with consciousness in the biological sense, that is, the consciousness which we really experience as individuals. When we do so, we discover that even the "general consciousness", together with all sorts of things-in-themselves, may be largely the work of our own creation; which goes to show that the balance of power may lie in the individual I-in-itself as a conscious and reflective unit, remembering, however, that it does not act independently of the "All". But it is better to say, not that the "All" acts for the "I", but that the "I" in a sense acts for the "All", in that the "I" is, so far as we know, the highest type of conscious and reflective activity. In fact, Fichte saw the reasonableness of a reconstruction of this kind; for, as Herbart says, Fichte's "I" is Kant's "consciousness in general" in a completely developed form. That is, the "I" is at the heart of the "consciousness in general" or the "Transcendental Apperception".

Again, Kant says that reason dictates the moral law as a Categorical Imperative, because the world is found to be unsatisfactory. But if reason dictates the moral law, and the moral law is the basis for the creation of a new world, as it is in Kant; then, after all, Kant's system has an "ego-centric" phase; and the I-in-itself is a chief factor in the building of the world. Therefore, Kant, as Joseph Royce suggests, heroically creates his world out of the fibre of his own moral manhood.

Therefore, we may conclude, with Hugo Munsterberg, and others, that the I-in-itself is a big factor in the making of reality; and that the potentialities that form the only possible metaphysical background of reality are not the potentialities of so-called existing, objective, and constitutive objects as such, but the potentialities of the will, as it acts in behalf of the needs which are involved in its very existence. In the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant himself says, that, "while reason can know nothing purely of itself, yet that which it has itself put into nature must be its guide to the discovery of all that it can learn from nature". In the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason", pg. 127, Kant states that "Der Verstand ist Selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur".

IV

THE NATURE OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES.

1. Hypotheses: Any provisional, tentative explanation of phenomena, any suggested law which has not been completely verified, is called an hypothesis. These are of two kinds: (1) The phenomenal hypothesis, - as, air vibrations are the cause of sound. Here one phenomenal occurrence is used to explain another. (2) The conceptual hypothesis, - as the supposition that ether is necessary to the transmission of light. In this case "ether" is not a phenomenal occurrence, - it is a pure postulation.

Now it is when the phenomenal explanation of any fact is either impossible or incomplete that we resort to the second type of hypothesis, that is, to the conceptual type.

Every science is based upon a number of these conceptual hypotheses or postulates, that is, upon certain fundamental and essential presuppositions, without which science would be impossible. Science generally accepts such postulates as true, leaving to metaphysics the task of inquiring into the validity of such assumptions, and into the nature and reality of the thing assumed.

Therefore, this thesis, being a research in the field of metaphysics, we must confine ourselves more closely to what we have called the "conceptual hypothesis", which is derived from the Greek words " $\under$ " $\pi\acute{o}$ ", "under", and " $\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ", "placing", and so is synonymous with the Latin word "suppositio",

meaning a "placing under". It is the imagining of some thing, force, or cause, which underlies the phenomena with which we happen to be dealing, and is the agent of their production without being capable of direct observation. In this sense, an hypothesis is any concept or supposition which is used in order to organize a group of facts, as for instance, the hypothesis or theory of evolution.

But what about induction and deduction? Some have insisted that we do not begin with deduction, but with induction. True, the inductive methods are attempts to eliminate hypotheses. But the term "induction" is usually employed in a sense sufficiently broad to include the method of hypotheses. In reality, the inductive method of John Stuart Mill has the hypothetical element. For what reason could there be for making a complete enumeration of the particulars of a group, if not for the purpose of corroborating the hypothesis which begins to form as soon as thinking begins relative to a given situation. If no hypothesis began to form itself when thinking was initiated, it is not likely that the process of enumeration could or would continue.

Therefore there is a sense in which deduction precedes or at least accompanies "induction". For what leads men to circumscribe the area of investigation, if it is not that there is already in the mind some idea of the result which is likely to be reached? Now the use of such a tentative idea involves "deduction" or a preliminary hypothesis of some sort. Thought could not proceed without this prelim-

inary idea, which leads on to investigation. If it did proceed without it, it would overlook many facts which deserved to be taken into account. So a preliminary hypothesis of some kind is necessary to all thinking.

Therefore, the existence of hypotheses is contemporaneous with knowledge, in the sense^{that} we now speak of knowledge, which makes the reflective mind an inextricable factor in the knowledge process; which is to say, that the world is in some sense constructed by the mind and according to the needs of the knowing subjects. Hypotheses may not be, and often are not in the so-called facts, but are contributed to them by the mind as a means of manipulating them. As J. A. Stewart says of the "Ideas" in "Plato's Doctrine of Ideas", pg. 27, "they are, in fact, ways in which the mind reacts, according to its own peculiar constitution, upon the influences which come to it from without; ways in which it, bit by bit, makes its world."

In short, postulates or hypotheses are not absolute. - They are conceived for a given purpose. The ultimate presuppositions of jurisprudence, ethics, and metaphysics are, at bottom, nothing but hypotheses. - Just controls for rational procedure.

James Welton, in his "Manual of Logic", Vol. 2, says that every supposition we make so as to account for any event whatever is an hypothesis.

Then our suppositions as to the ground of the world; as to the ground for our own existence; as to the ground for our own future, - all these are hypotheses. That is, we are always asking the questions: "What is the logical basis for the world, for personality, and for the future life?" To the first question, "What is the logical basis for the world?" men have said, "Force", "Power", "Energy", or "God". To the second

question, "What is the logical basis for personality?", men have postulated a soul. As an answer to the third question, "What is the logical basis for the future life?", men have postulated immortality.

That is, the thing-in-itself for the world is Force, Power, Energy, or God. The thing-in-itself for personality is the soul. The thing-in-itself as a hope for continuation ~~for~~ of life is the "principle of immortality". "Thou hast set Eternity in my heart", was the Hebrewistic way of stating a belief in the thing-in-itself, as the same relates to human personality and to a continuation thereof.

That is, men have always sought for the Source or Cause of the world and of life. They have always supposed that there was some metaphysical something underlying the phenomenal processes, and which direct the course of such processes. The Platonic Ideas, Berkeley's Eternal Spirit, Kant's Transcendental Ego, Schopenhauer's Will, Dr. Driesch's Entelechy, M. Bergson's Life, the Animists' Soul, the Subject of many psychologists, and the Force of many physicists, - all involve the metaphysical concept of Source, which refers to some (often extra-mundane) Power of the activity of which process is a manifestation. - Some metaphysical reality of which the world of science is the phenomenal expression. Thus, for T.H. Green an Eternal Consciousness is necessary for the very existence of an order of phenomena. For Green, it is a source of the relations which constitute nature; which relations result from its combining and unifying action;

and the animal organism is its vehicle. This Eternal Consciousness is operative throughout the succession of events which constitute the growth of the individual mind acting on the sentient life of the soul and using it as its organ.

Therefore, does not any hypothesis of the purely conceptual type run into and become synonymous with the thing-in-itself? (*) As we have seen, the idea of God is synonymous with the idea of the thing-in-itself. But God is for Kant a postulate. Therefore, any postulate or hypothesis may be said to be of the nature of the thing-in-itself.

In connection with this thought, Mary Everest Boole, in her little book, "Philosophy and Fun of Algebra", in the chapter, "The Great 'X' of the World", makes some very interesting statements, in which the Hebrews are represented as asking all sorts of questions about "Who" or "What" made things be. But nobody knew anything about it. So Moses, seeing that this chaotic state of affairs would not be good for the people, said to them, No one of us has ever seen the "Maker" of things. We can all see things growing, but never the force that makes them grow. That is our "X", said he; our "Unknown". We are going to begin by stating that we do not know. We shall call the maker of things, "I Am", or, "That Which Is", Whatever It Is", and we are going to

*NOTE:- Thenceforward when "thing-in-itself" is used in any form other than in the form of "I-in-itself", it is to be understood as meaning an hypothesis made by the I-in-itself.

make two hypotheses to start with: we are going to try thinking of "I Am" as Unity; One, and not several or a fraction. We will also try thinking of "I Am" as "No-thing", that is, that "I Am" is not a ~~xxxxxx~~"thing". When we find that any particular proceeding or behavior destroys men, or makes them too sickly or weak or stupid or quarrelsome to manage other creatures and keep the upper hand of the world, we will say, for short, that "I Am" does not like or does not intend the people of Israel to go on with that kind of behavior. Now, these two hypotheses are as much as we can deal with for the present. Anybody who wants to think out other hypotheses than those will have to think to himself or else go out of the country that I am going to manage.

Therefore, it turns out that when men are up against real problems, they begin to imagine ways of solving them. Now these imaginable ways or solutions are hypotheses or the things-in-themselves of the given situations.

Therefore, presuppositions, conceptual hypotheses, and things-in-themselves are all in reality things-in-themselves; for things-in-themselves may take on many forms, the situation, problem, or realm of discourse, largely determining the form. For instance, the chief things-in-itself of the world as a whole is God, while the chief thing-in-itself of the individual personality is the soul. But it is clear that both are conceptual hypotheses, in the sense that they have been resorted to in the absence of any possibility of a phenomenal explanation, and in that they are not capable of

any complete verification.

2. Values: As in the case of hypotheses, values are phenomenal or conceptual. That is, they are pure "thing-values" and pure "concept-values". This does not mean that the concept-value is out of relation to the thing-value; but logically, at least, there is a distinction between the two phases of value.

Now, as in the case of hypotheses, it is with the concept values that we must here deal. Also, it is with beliefs, as beliefs, that we are now concerned. That is, what is the nature of beliefs?

John Dewey, in his "Experience and Nature", states that reflection is the instrumentality of securing freer and more enduring goods; that is, reflection is a unique good. Its instrumental efficiency determines it to be a candidate for a distinctive position as an immediate good, since beyond other goods, it has power of replenishment and fructification. That is, the subject-matter of intellect is not isolated with reference to the scope of value and valuation. There are not two realms, one of intellectual objects without value, and the other of value objects without intellect.

This is to say, as we have already intimated, that value, hypotheses, and things-in-themselves must ultimately be referred to an individual ego, not forgetting, of

course, that this ego is a miniature of the racial mind,- that is, that it is in some sense the representation of all that has been or is thought. - A unit composed of all sorts of elements contributed by manifold interactions. But this does not destroy the fact that the evolution of knowledge begins with a reflective individual, as that individual begins to build a world to his own liking. True, each individual must be a sort of ganglion within a boundless infinite, and may in some sense sacrifice for interests outside of himself. But his motives for procedure will^{be}/the common wants and ideals that inhere in the individual himself.

Therefore, the individual or I-in-itself proceeds by forming hypotheses and by creating values. But as we have said, values are beliefs which are immediate; that is, like hypotheses, they are not dependent upon verification. So, being of the nature of hypotheses, and being initiated by the individual himself in his reflective activities, they are the nature of things-in-themselves. Also, like reflection, and hypotheses, values are in some sense always means of solving or dealing with specific sets of facts. A belief in devils or demons, is, or was, for instance, one way of explaining many diseases. In reality, the hypothesis itself is a result of the evolutionary process. Therefore, postulating, evaluating, and conceiving of grounds or things-in-themselves are all one

and the same process.- That is, the activity of the I-in-itself as it proceeds to create instruments and to construct a desirable world. An illustration of this process may be drawn from Kant's statements concerning the Transcendental Ego and the Rational Soul: the Transcendental Ego of Kant corresponds in general to what we have called the I-in-itself; while the Rational Soul corresponds to what we have called the thing-in-itself as a postulate.

We may conclude, then, that things-in-themselves in their fundamental aspects, are like values and hypotheses, or that values and hypotheses are just other methods of dealing with the problem of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself being, in fact, a value-judgment. In other words, any one concept may be an hypothesis, value-judgment, or a thing-in-itself. For instances, for Kant, God is a postulate; for Josiah Royce, he is a value-judgment; but for Aristotle, Erigena, and men like Jacobi, he is the thing-in-itself.

V

THE COMPOSITION OF THE WORLD-ORDER.

But is the world made up just of concepts, hypotheses, conceptual values, or things-in-themselves? Are concepts and data of thought of the same function? They are, we believe, of the same fundamental nature; but this does not mean that they are of the same function. The root of the plant and its flower are of the same essential nature, but have not the same function.

May it not be so in the world of knowledge? May it not be that there are different functions, but one nature? May it not be that a thing is its function? That is, that all things are in some sense definable in terms of function? When a thing functions so and so, we call it "mind"; when it functions in some other way, we call it "matter"; and when it functions in still another way, we speak of it as "purpose".

In the first place, then, we may say that we have something which functions as data of knowledge, letting this data represent not only the so-called realistic world, but also the mechanism of the one in whom goes on the knowledge process. Now the mechanism of the world and the mechanism of the knower have one function, while the reality produced by these related functionings has another function, that is, the function of what we call "consciousness". Scott, in his "Kant and the Moral Life", makes the world to consist in

given realistic data, and the universals furnished by the mind. But may these universals not be a functioning result of a relational functioning? That is, alike in nature, but different in function?

If this is the case, then, there may always be an interplay of so-called subject and object, the subject being one function and the object another function, the interplay being the relation of these functions.

On this basis we could say that the mind does not create nature as a whole, but is a factor in making the world in which thinking and living actually proceed. That is, so-called objects and the activity of consciousness are both involved in what we call "experience".

Idealism believes that there is ever something beyond, - God, Nature, Oversoul. Our senses perceive only the phenomena of life; but behind the range of human senses lurk things not phenomenal. In a sense, these men are right; but, in another sense they are wrong. In that sense perceptions are of a more concrete and more tangible nature, they may be called evidences of data or phenomena. In that concepts are in some sense that which is in addition to or of a different function than data or the so-called sense-perceived, they may be said to be of the nature of "noumena". But, in that both sense perceptions and concepts are natural to man, both processes are evidently "natural", and only aspects of one human phenomena of thinking or reflecting, each having its function in the process as a whole. True, the so-called not-phenomenal does lurk behind, is set under, or is built

upon the so-called phenomenal. But this is so because man, the first and chief factor in the knowledge process, has in this way set his world in order.

In other words, is it not reasonable to suppose that the relation between the mind and the world (so-called objective world) is analogous to that between the mind and the body? So far as experience goes, the mind cannot exist without a body, and the body cannot exist without that peculiar function which we call "mind" or "spirit". This seems even more likely when we remember that man is a part of the natural order. Being a part of such a natural order, his mind would have in some sense the same relation to the whole of the natural order that it has to his individual part of the natural order. In short, the ~~mind~~ world is "stuff" and "mind". But it is "stuff" and "mind" because man is also of the same substances. That is, man, being of these two functions, insists or demands that the world must conform to the same.

Just as men have tried to set up a dualism between mind and body, so have they ~~set~~^{up} a dualism in the world; that is, have demanded that the world be "matter" and "mind." But is it not more likely that the world is "matter-mind", and that man is "body-mind"? That is, that these distinctions are mere conveniences for dealing with phenomena? The world may be logically many, but metaphysically one. In nature, it may be one, but in function it may be many.

Then, may not both concepts and data be termed existences? May a universal, for instance, not be both existent and at the same time significant in meaning, reference, or

use? A value judged need not be divorced from reality. Reality and existence need not be thought of as two separate things. If ideals, concepts, hypotheses, values, or things-in-themselves are the products of a natural and existent world, then why are they not likewise natural and existent? This does not mean that they may not be very unlike and very different in function. They are just different aspects of one and the same world. - If not of one and the same world, and if not of the same fundamental nature, how do they ever get together? John Dewey insists that ideals arise out of realistic situations, but that ideals should serve in realistic situations. This is making the difference for which we are now contending; that is, that the world is one metaphysically, but in function many.

F.C.S. Schiller, in his "Riddles of the Sphinx", holds that the world is one. Body and soul, ^{matter}/~~xxx~~ and spirit, are but different aspects, the outside and the inside of the same fact: the material is but the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual state. For, if the phenomenal world is a stress between the deity and the ego, the soul is but the reaction of the ego upon the divine action which encases it as the body. But he goes on to say, that this very analysis of a stress, this very distinction between force and resistance, action and reaction, is a logical and not a real one. They are distinguishable in thought, but inseparable in reality.

Therefore, knowledge or experience is the interplay or

interaction of different functions of existence, involving a given data, mental projections of a reflective mind, and the purpose of an organism whose harmonious adjustment is demanded by its very existence. All of these functions are the necessary aspects of one whole of reality, evaluation being reserved for the self-conscious and reflective organism, which is the center of the knowledge process as such.

VI

THE MIND'S TENDENCY TO PROJECT

AND TO PERSONIFY.

But, we may ask, why do we get a complex world as described in the previous section? The general answer is, that the mind's disposition is to project and to personify its concepts and ideals. That is, that the "I" is a factor in the whole of reality, and that any reality is relative to him who experiences it.

However, we may ask still further, why does the mind thus project its concepts and ideals? Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology" indicates that the term "objective" indicates a "controlling and determining" function.

Therefore, concepts and purposes, functioning as controls, are naturally projected, and so become a part of the real and objective world. Man's own body is objective in that it largely controls his activity. His possibility of mobility is largely regulated by his physical organism. His ideals and concepts, likewise, being once conceived, begin to control his whole behavior, and so in his thinking become objective. All things, including concepts, are to be made use of or avoided. If they are to be avoided, one must go around them in his thinking, just as he would go around a hole in the ground in order to keep from falling into it. If concepts are to be used, one must approach them, examine, grasp, and wield them just as he would grasp and make use of a mechanical tool. So in either case, there is an element

of control, which results in objectivity. As we have said, let a thing come to be a control, and it is as objective as one's own house, table, or bed. The insistence ^{that} of God is objective lies in the fact that the concept of Him has so long controlled the human race.

M. Fouellee', in the explanation of his leading idea, that is, the hypothesis of the "idees-forces", says that an idea is not a mere representation. It is not a mental reproduction of a real or supposed object outside of itself. An idea is at the same time a force working for its own realization. For instance, liberty is not a reality given objectively, of which we have an idea because we perceive it; but, on the contrary, it is because we have an idea of our own liberty, because we believe in it, because we adapt our conduct to this belief, that we are actually free, and that our freedom is effectual in the world of phenomena. Our ideas and feelings are conditions of a real internal change, and therefore factors in mental evaluation, not mere signs of an evaluation taking place independently of them, because of exclusively physical causes. Again, every internal change, being inseparable from an external change or motion, produces effects upon the external world. Therefore, ideas having acted inwardly, at the same time find outward expression with all the resulting consequences. Thus the internal and the external efficacy of mental states are inseparable, because of the fundamental unity between the physical and the psychical.

So there are not two worlds, but only one, to which we

make our contribution, the different aspects of which, - data, concepts, and purposes, - may be said to equally control us. But if they equally control us, they will be equally objective. However, men have not generally understood how that which is initiated by the individual can become objective; and so the problem of subject and object, mind and matter, the thing-in-itself and phenomena. But when we have once discovered that thoughts are as objective as things, and learn what the contribution is that we make to the world of experience, then shall we have begun to solve the problem of the subject and the object, and this other problem of phenomena and the thing-in-itself. Just what proportion of the world is contributed by reflection, man may not know; but he at least may discover the nature of that contribution which he himself makes.

This does not destroy the fact that man's power of knowing and thinking are regulated by the potentialities belonging to the world, and so to a creature of a natural realm. Contrary to modern realism, there is more than an external relativity, due to the fact that there is this fundamental internal dependence of the individual upon the whole of that which has had the power to make him the peculiar being which he finds himself to be.

Now, again, his physical and mental constitution will make demands in keeping with the tendency along which it has come into existence. But has not every organism in its evolution been forced; if it was to continue its existence, to seek and to avoid certain objects? In other words, the whole

history of any organism is one of seeking or avoiding objects. In the primitive state, man has those things which are to be sought, and those which are to be avoided. Therefore, these actual objects, being controlled by man's will, when he begins to have abstract concepts, have the same tendency to objectify them. In line with this idea, one author takes the attitude that the worship of actual objects preceded the worship of God or gods.

But there was that disposition to project the self, and to interpret the world in terms of the same. The Omahas, for instance, regard all animate and inanimate forms, all phenomena, as being pervaded by a common life, which was thought of as being continuous with and similar to the will-power they were conscious of in themselves. This mysterious power in all things was called "Wakonda". Through it all things were related to man and to each other. In the idea of the continuity of life a relation was maintained between the seen and the unseen, the dead and the living, and also between the fragment of anything and its entirety. Thus an Omaha novice might at any time seek to attain "Wakonda" by what was called the "rite of the vision". He would go out alone, fast, chant incantations, and finally fall into a trance, resembling what in modern times has been called "Cosmic Consciousness", in which he would perceive the inner relations of all things and the solidity of the least object with the rest of the universe.

These people may not have been as advanced as the modern

Realist, but they knew that no one thing had in fact a "prefixed measure and boundary".

In reality, man projects so much of himself into the world, and the world projects so much of itself into him, that the word "juxtaposition" in no sense describes the knowledge-situation. The data of the world, the unique concepts of reflection, and the purposes that arise out of this combination so control men that the whole knowledge-world, including fancy and imagination, become naturally objective. God, concepts, laws of all kinds, universals in general, and the thing-in-itself, have been thought of as objective and constitutive existences. And this tendency has not been wholly bad or at all unnatural. I venture to say that so long as these concepts actually control men in their activity and thought that they will be thought of as, not necessarily constitutive in existence, but at least as objective in their nature. The scientist, for all practical purposes, thinks of the law relative to his particular science as being objectively true, - as existing in the concrete. Why? Because in his investigations he is being always controlled by it. Just so in the case of all the thoughts and things that control men. - They will unavoidably objectify themselves. Man being of a world which has, before his birth, in some sense controlled the possibilities of his very existence; and having been born and reared in the midst of objects and agents which controlled him, will, when he begins to think, conceive of the world which he creates as like the world out

of which he came, and in the midst of which he began his biological existence and the building of his own particular world. If a nurse or mother makes the child go here or there; do this or that; and the nurse and mother are objective, then when he has thoughts and ideas that make him go here and there; do this or that, they too must be objective. So does the child, "become a man", build up his world. But he is no less the chief factor; for he provides the material that makes the world of experience what it is. Like a honey-bee, he adds the formic acid that makes the world to have those things which seem good to his taste. But his contribution is in the world and is thought of as being just as objective to him as the nectar and formic acid combination is objective to the honey-bee.

However, as Socrates believed, and as Stoicism persisted, ideas or universals, in fact, have no constitutive existence. They are neither outside of things, as Plato generally thought, or as he has been interpreted as thinking; nor in things, as Aristotle taught; they are rather mere abstractions of thought to which nothing corresponds in reality; yet, when projected, must naturally be thought of as objective and constitutive, in that that which controls becomes objective; and become objective, it comes to be thought of as real in the sense that other objective things are real, that is, as constitutively real. For the nature of the mind is to attribute constitutive existence to all that which tends to control its activity,

whether that which controls is concrete data, or the concepts of the mind. In a word, as James Mark Baldwin indicates, the world as it presents itself to our immediate perception, does not disclose the unity, the permanence, or the purpose which reflection and reason demand as an intelligible account of experience. Therefore, the mind forms a conception of some substance, activity, or principle which it regards as self-existent and ultimate, and which is at the same time thought of as the cause or grounds of the phenomenal realm. These projective concepts are in a sense a part of the world; but, as we are now thinking of them, they are that part of the world which is contributed by the reflection of man.

Not to understand the movements of the mind indicated above is to become involved in all sorts of difficulties. Both the Realist and the Idealist fall into the ditch of philosophic folly because they do not remember the subtleties of reflection. The Realist imagines the object to have existed before he appeared upon the scene just as it appears after he has appeared and begun to know it; the Idealist imagines that it did not at all exist until he appeared and began to know it. The fact of the matter is, that we must begin with a data of some sort. But when we do so, there is immediately an evaluation of that data, both of which, as one, are objectified by the mind. For, in the light of all previous discussion of the problem, there is no way in which we may wholly separate the datum in a knowledge situation from the contribution made by the mind. But the Realist holds

that the object is in no sense an objectification of the mind's content; and the Idealist holds that the object is wholly an objectification of the mind's content. Both are equally in error.

It is this confusion of the Realistic and Idealistic trends of thought that darken the understanding relative to the Ideas of Plato. We ought not to imagine that Plato's mind was unlike the ordinary reflective mind. Plato, as suggested by J.A. Stewart in "Plato's Doctrine of Ideas", arrived at his Ideas in a perfectly natural way. From the psychological point of view both his Ideas and our things-in-themselves may be understood. The Idea is simply the mind's way of reacting to a given situation. The thing-in-itself is the instrument hit upon by reflection in the presence of chaotic data. But in the case of the thing-in-itself, just as in the case of Plato's Ideas, there is that tendency to project, which ends which an objective entity. Therefore, not only datum plus evaluation is objectified, but the evaluation-content itself may be in a measure abstracted and objectified as an independent entity. If Plato had known even as much about the inner workings of the mind as is now known, he would have been quick in seeing why his Ideas took on objective existence like archetypal forms laid up in heaven. For, as J.A. Stewart says, "Mental Images, being products of x x x imitation, organic or consciously designed, by which we adapt ourselves to a uniform environment suitable to our permanent nature, always tend to assume the character of archetypes overagainst sensible particulars."

As it was, Plato knew that Ideas were, but he knew neither their origin nor their nature. But in his failure, he was not less subtle than the most of the schools of modern philosophy. Socrates blazed the way for a real solution, but his successors did not follow his suggestions. Yet, to know oneself, the subtle activities of the deceitful mind, is to have found the key to many of the world's mysteries.

In a word, this process of world-building goes on in terms of the Self. Charles Darwin, in "The Descent of Man", states "that as soon as the important faculties of the imagination, - wonder and curiosity, - together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man would naturally crave to understand what was passing about him." In the same work, pg. 110, it is stated that "Some explanation of the phenomena of life, a man must feign for himself; and to judge from the universality of it, the simplest hypothesis, and the first to occur to men, seems to have been that natural phenomena are ascribable to the presence in animals, plants, and things, and in the forces of nature, of such spirits, prompting to action as men are conscious they themselves possess."

But it may be objected that science is well on the way toward a complete analysis of the world, looking forward to the time when the world shall be directly and scientifically known. However, when we bear in mind that science is quite dependent upon hypotheses, we lose faith in the positivistic ideal. In reality, no matter how completely we may come to control nature, we shall persist in making use of assumptions regarding the unknown or the not-yet experienced. In short,

man will persist in projecting "things-for-him" into a realm of "things-in-themselves". For regarding both sense and reason, we often find ourselves in error, and come to a point where we feel the need of making assumptions. Again, even though man should succeed in making a complete analysis of the world he could not know that he had done so; and so would continue to make his assumptions; for he would not be able to compare his ideas of reality with that ideal reality which would always move on before him, objectifying itself and continuing as the changing goal of his desire, promising always to become a better and better means to the solution of his problem.

VII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES.

We have discovered that things-in-themselves may be of the nature of hypotheses, concept-values, or things-in-themselves generally referred to as such.

Also, we have found that these, together with data, make up the world of experience, all of which is of course shot through with the purpose of the individuals to create a world in which he can best realize his own possibilities.

Furthermore, we have found that this world of experience notwithstanding the so-called subjective contribution which is made by the individual, is, to all intents and purposes, an objective one, in that all that which controls becomes objective.

But if things and concepts control, they must do so because for the time being they are working. If one takes up a tool for the purpose of accomplishing a given task, and for some reason the tool fails to be adequate to the work in hand, he will immediately cast it away and seek another. The tool so cast away may control his activity in his act of casting it away; but in reality this activity is a part of the movement made in the direction of choosing and putting into use another tool that does promise to serve the purpose. Likewise, if a concept is a controlling one, it is because that concept is making itself useful in the experience of the individual for whom it is a control. Therefore, concepts of all kinds,

whether they be called hypotheses, values, or things-in-themselves, or controls, or instruments for the accomplishment of desired ends. It is interesting, then, to note that the thing-in-itself, which has for long been thought of as a noumenal product, as a noumenal entity, - as something different in essence from the world in which men live, - is actually an instrument in the hands of him who has created it out of his own reflection for the specific purpose of manipulating the "stuff" of his data-world, just as a man will make a plow to plough his field and a hoe with which to dig around the plants that grow in the field.

Therefore, the concepts which we have previously mentioned, as mind, soul, reason, God, etc., come to be the instruments invented by reflection for the purpose of ordering the world to satisfy the logical demands of that reflection. J.A. Stewart, in "Plato's Doctrine of Ideas", pg.7, says, "the *εἶδος* is not an impression of sense passively received; it is a product of the mind's activity, an instrument constructed by the mind, whereby it 'makes nature' 'molds environment', so as to serve the purposes of human life". The same may be said of all other concepts or things-in-themselves. They are really points of view which one takes in order to manipulate phenomena; and are common to philosophy, religion, and science.

This will be clear if we for a moment call up the idea of the thing-in-itself as a negative concept. As we have said, there is a distinction between "value-things" and "value-concepts". Value-things are not things-in-themselves, while value-concepts are of the nature of hypotheses; and so of the nature of things-in-themselves. The statue of the sculptor is a value-thing. But necessary to it is the value-concept. This value-concept is like the mould in which certain articles are moulded. That is, as the mould is the passive or logical cause of the molded article, so is the concept of a statue the passive or logical cause of the statue. That is, as the inner

form of the mold determines the outline of the molded article, so the concept when accomplished determines the form, feature, and figure of the statue.

This concept is here also a limiting concept; for using the analogy of the mold, the concept limits at each point the extension of the statue and makes it impossible for the features thereof to extend further than is in keeping with the demands of the concept.

But to say that such a concept is a limiting concept is to say that it is an instrument and a judgment of value; for things cannot be judged valuable unless they are good; and to be good is to be good for something, as Plato said long ago. In the case of a concept, as in that of the mold, it is chosen as the means by which a certain concrete piece of work may be accomplished. In other words, man creates the instrument which we call reflection, or rather it is created out of the evolutionary process. However, man having gotten an inkling of his creative capacity, in turn, by means of the first instrument, creates all sorts of other tools as means of accomplishing desired ends. He wishes to explain or to interpret himself, and so he creates the hypothesis called the soul; he wishes to explain the world, and so he creates the hypotheses of God, by which he proceeds to explain all the phenomena in the universe.

Now, if reflection, which is a tool, creates tools, these tools so created must be of like nature as reflection, both being the work of an evolving knower. Therefore both re-

flection and concept-values are of the nature of things-in-themselves, reflection being the activity of the I-in-itself as it creates lesser things-in-themselves as the specific tools or instruments necessary for the accomplishment of certain ends, the I-in-itself having first been created by a gradual evolution or unfolding within the world, the race, and the individual.

We have spoken above of value-concepts as limiting concepts, - passive or logical causes. But this is not the only way in which things-in-themselves may serve. Value-concepts may be thought of as active causes when manipulated by reflection; that is, for instance, patriotism may become a very active instrument in time of war. Again, the value-concept of God may become a very active means of controlling society or organizations. But even in these cases, it is in some sense the ideas concerning patriotism and God that limit the activity of the individual. If one in time of war goes beyond the limit of the given definition of patriotism, he is called a traitor. If one pass beyond the limit of the activity which is allowed to him by the content read into the idea of God, he is immediately a heretic. But in any case, the concepts are means of getting certain results.

Therefore, things-in-themselves are passive or logical causes, in the sense that God may in some sense be the logical cause of the world, in that he may in some sense represent non-Being; but things-in-themselves may also be thought of as actual instruments for accomplishing purposes, as the

theory of evolution' is the hypothesis by means of which science attempts to explain the evident changes or developments that have taken place in the life-series.

We have spoken of God as non-Being, and as an instrument for social adjustment. These two ideas may at first seem not to be related to each other. But upon closer examination, I am convinced that they are quite intimately related. In reality, the idea of God becomes an instrument for social adjustment and for the integration of human personality just to the extent that it is represented as being a negative: it must be not-man, not-society, not-organization. It is to be an objective standard. When it ceases to be this objective standard, it ceases to control the thoughts and actions of men, and so ceases to function as an instrument for social control. God, in order to control, must be not-man, in order that man may add to himself that which is not man, but God. So God, the soul, etc., all serve best their purpose when they retain that negative aspect which we have described as being characteristic of things-in-themselves.

This negative aspect of things-in-themselves is a necessary one; and in a sense is the very "stuff" out of which the positive features of a situation reconstruct themselves.

This negative aspect of things-in-themselves may be due to the fact that the chief thing-in-itself, that is, the I-in-itself, has both its negative and positive aspects. Therefore, just as the I-in-itself is always creating itself out of its negative aspect, just so is each situation re-creating itself

out of the particular thing-in-itself which belongs to it; for instance, society may recreate itself by building into itself the characteristics or attributes of that Being which is the negative of a given social order. And a man may recreate himself by striving to take on the characteristics which are posited as belonging to God,^{or} as inherent in his soul or his ideal self. It is just to the extent that man attributes the characteristics of good to his negative self that he is able to reconstruct himself into an ideal creature. For the negative self is the store-house, the lumberyard, from which he must draw new material, which, in turn, becomes the means to an end, that is, a more desirable personality.

But if things-in-themselves are such useful things, why have some men apparently gotten along so well without them? Perhaps, however, it was not because they actually got on without them, but because they were able to deceive both themselves and others.

Esther Crane, in "The Place of Hypotheses in Logic",
upon insists ~~that~~ the necessity of the hypothesis. The hypothesis, or the thing-in-itself, whichever we may choose to call it, is necessary to all thought. It is the sole adequate means of dealing with and thinking about phenomena.

Sedgwick and Tyler, in "A Short History of Science", claim that the hypothesis is natural to all reflection. It was the disposition of even primitive man to make and to

proceed upon certain postulations, more or less consciously formed. The whole of the science of mathematics is based upon the tendency of the mind to arrange and set in order according to certain postulates and axioms. The postulations of geometry and mathematics generally are only relatively true. In fact, they are of the nature of hypotheses created solely for the manipulation of concrete phenomena. A straight line is only a convenient hypothesis, which, according to Einstein^a and others, is in no sense true of the world, unless the actual world be thought of as the given plus that which is contributed by reflection.

So it may be doubted if any man really proceeds without some sort of hypothetical concept. The early Greek philosophers were materialists; but they postulated a universal change or mutation of all things into all. There was not only one primary matter common to all things, out of which they were made; but there was some moving principle or efficient cause which associated the elements of the natural substance. This moving principle they called the "animi mundi". With Thales, as we have seen, this principle was described as water. For Heraclitus, it was fire. Anaximenes, seeking a less material substance, postulated air. While the Stoics postulated one infinite, eternal, almighty Mind, which, being diffused through the whole universe of well-ordered and regularly disposed matter, actuated every part and was, as it were, the soul of the vast body called the world.

For Cadwallader Colden, a materialist of the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, the world is a dualistic dynamism, matter being extended, active, and unintelligent; and mind extended, active, and intelligent. Substance is power and force, known not in itself, but in its effects.

Descartes, as is known, tried to get away from all hypotheses; but is after all as dependent upon the hypotheses of the soul and of God as any man could well be.

Therefore, as LevyBruhl says in the "History of Modern Philosophy in France", any philosophical doctrine can be but a great hypothesis. So any man who pretends not to use these hypotheses, either deceives himself, or else is no philosopher.

Claude Bernard, a French physiologist, attempted to determine exactly the object of physiological science. In the beginning, Claude Bernard disencumbers physiology from the last remnants of metaphysics. Science, said he, must only concern itself with phenomena and their laws. It has nothing to do with the so-called "vital principle" in order to explain those phenomena, which, considered singly, are never other than physical and chemical phenomena. But after all, he could not bring himself to the point of reducing physiology to physics and chemistry; for he goes on to show that life has something specific and irreducible to a physical and chemical mechanism. He then emphasizes the part played by what he called the "Dominating Idea", which seems to preside over the evolution of the living being.

Auguste Comte says that there have been three stages

of thought, - the theological, the philosophical, and the scientific; and that the third stage is the highest. When men have reached this stage, they then know that there are no things-in-themselves. But, peculiar to say, Comte then proceeds to postulate what he calls his "Great Being". He seeks to do away with the metaphysical idea of the immortality of the soul, substituting the positive idea of incorporation into the "Great Being", which may be defined as the ability of the social consciousness to bear along with it the consciousness of the individual who has, as a unit, ceased to be. Is this escaping from hypotheses? Comte, also, apparently, inconsistently with his idea as to the stages of thought, makes much of religion. It is, for him, the agent and the essential sign of progress. In his "Politique Positive", Comte undertook to prescribe in detail the dogmas, worship, and management of the new religion, taking pattern from the Catholic organization, which he looked upon as a masterpiece. In all this, Comte was forsaking the positivistic attitude and becoming a value-philosopher. As a result of this tendency many of his disciples refused to submit to the High Pontiff of the religion of Humanity. They were right when they said that they had not left Comte, but that Comte had abandoned himself. But he was unfaithful to his own principles and to the positive spirit only because he continued to think. All of his later works have a strong sentimental and mystic coloring, which is absent in his first and positivistic works. We do not mean to say that his system

as a whole is not positivistic; but we do mean to point out that no man can well be always positivistic in his life and thought.

Locke, Hobbes, Hume, William James, all tried to shake off the idea and use of the hypothesis as the same relates to the thing-in-itself. But all of them believed in God; and Hobbes' "Motion" is a warning to all that the lot of having to have an hypothesis is likely to fall to any man.

In short, any philosopher or scientist who posits laws of any kind, - whether called gravitation, relativity, ether, force, energy, power, - is falling into the use of hypotheses and is getting into the realm of things-in-themselves. He, like all men, is making use of that heretofore thought-to-be useless thing-in-itself as a means for explaining or manipulating his phenomena.

Again, both metaphysics and religion are in some sense based on the thing-in-itself; and probably not until men have ceased to wonder, and to feel the religious impulse, will there be no use for the concept. So long as men feel, and think, and wonder, and aspire, and are reflective in the sense in which we now speak of reflection, will the thing-in-itself be with us. So long as man is related to the world as he now is, religion and metaphysics and the concepts relative to the same, will be among his chief concerns.

Therefore, even though the positivistic attitude may be a trend in the right direction, no man need yet claim that he is free from the power of metaphysics and religion. Theology

and metaphysics have not only afforded to man in past times a temporary explanation of certain natural phenomena, but they have also supplied and are still supplying him with a general view of the universe, a conception of mankind, - of its destiny, of the use it makes of its forces. - In short, with a rule of conduct and a discipline. And there is the secret of the tenacity with which men cling to their religious and metaphysical beliefs. These metaphysical and religious postulates seem after all to serve best. Men find in them answers to what they conceive to be vital questions; and they will never forsake these points of view unless a better answer to these questions comes to them from elsewhere. So far, the positive spirit has given no better answers than men have been able to find in religion and metaphysics. Therefore, things-in-themselves still are, and promise for a long time to be, the chief instruments of man's satisfaction and progress. The positive spirit has represented the partial and special point of view, whereas philosophic systems and religions represent the synthetical and the general point of view. For them, the spirit of God moves upon the face of the deep, and ^{COSMOS} ~~XXXXX~~ comes out of chaos. Now, this latter point of view, the synthetical, is so far no less indispensable than the positivistic. It is so indispensable that man will never abandon it so long as his reflection is directed either upon himself or upon the universe; for so long as sensation follows sensation; and so long as there seems to be different objects in the world, men are going to

postulate, at least, the unifying principles of soul and God.

Therefore, in concluding the remarks of this section, let me warn all men to beware of those philosophical "Monsters" who spurn a belief in things-in-themselves; for they are either deceivers, or else they are being deceived, or both. They remind me of a member of a certain religious institution who wished to prove to his fellows that he was a holy man, by eating very little food. But the milk soon began to be missing from the cellar of the dining-hall. A watchman was placed there; and soon the very "religious gentleman" was caught in the act of consuming great quantities ^{of} 3.5% butter-fat milk. Now, these philosophers who wish to appear as being purely scientific, as they say; who refuse to begin with, or to even proceed by means of hypotheses; who refuse to partake openly at the philosophical board, - nevertheless, when no one is looking, drag up out of the cellars of half-forgotten philosophies, all sorts of old "things-in-themselves" incognito. On the front doors of their "philosophical houses", they hang a sign, saying: "Wenn Sie das Ding-an-sich sind, dann müssen Sie nicht herein kommen. Wir brauchen Sie nicht." But on the back door they hang another sign which reads slightly different: "Guten Tag, Herr Ding-an-sich! Bitte, wollen Sie nicht herein kommen? Wir haben Sie im Hause sehr nötig; aber Sie müssen sehr ruhig sein. - Niemand muss wissen, das Sie hier sind."

VIII

THE TRANSFORMATION OR DISAPPEARANCE OF
THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES.

It has been stated that so long as man's present relation to the world continues, the idea of the thing-in-itself is indispensable. But suppose the scene should shift, and man should find himself in perfect harmony with the world of nature as a whole? Is it not the friction which arises between the so-called objective world and reflective self-consciousness that makes it necessary for this self-consciousness to seek instruments of adjustment? In line with this statement is the statement of Henri Bergson, in "Creative Evolution", to the effect that the degree of self-consciousness is always in proportion to the friction between the state which is and the state which is desired by reflection.

Therefore, if man should ever again come into harmony with the whole of nature; if, as Josiah Royce would say, the whole universe should become one perfect and harmonious social order, then the race would enjoy its old oneness with nature, - only, of course, on a higher level.

Is it not true, as Edward Carpenter, E. H. Hollands, and others have suggested that the race has experienced a sort of psychological evolution, the main stages of which may be described as that of simple consciousness and self-consciousness? Has there not been a sort of gradual development or refinement of consciousness, which at a certain stage has spontaneously given birth to the phenomena of religious and

metaphysical beliefs?

If this is true, as has been suggested, may not another stage follow these two? For hundreds of centuries man possessed a degree of consciousness not very different from that of the higher animals, though probably more quick and varied. He saw, heard, felt, and noted. But he probably had no consciousness of himself as a being separate and apart from his impressions. He was just an instinctive part of nature. Self-consciousness was there, no doubt, but embedded in the general world-consciousness. For a long time the tribes of men, like the tribes of the higher animals, were well adapted to their surroundings and harmonious with the earth and with each other. There must have been some period resembling a "Golden Age"; some condition which, compared with subsequent discord and misery, merited the name "golden". It was during this period of man's oneness with nature that "Totems" arose, representing the kinship which man felt to his winged and forefooted mates. Pre-civilized man, as we know, worshipped the animals and was glad to be called after them. Out of the idea of the totem came the religion of the primitive; not religion in the sense that we speak of it; but in the sense that religion in man is the sense of ties binding his inner self to the powers of the universe around him. However, it was only in the second stage, that is, the stage of self-consciousness, that man began to be at all keenly conscious of his religious emotions.

Therefore, the second stage is marked by a characteristics

which are not discoverable in the first. There is a moment in the evolution of a child, - somewhere about the age of three, - when the simple, almost animal-like consciousness is troubled by a new element, - that of self-consciousness. So, in the evolution of the race, there was a period when upon men in general there dawned the consciousness of themselves; of their own thoughts and actions. The old simple acceptance of sensations and experiences at their face-value gave place to what we now call reflection. How do these sensations affect me? What can I do to modify them? How can I get pleasure, and avoid pain? These were some of the questions that arose. The mind now revolves about a new center; around that center which we have tried to describe or define as the I-in-itself. This self or I began to spin like an eddy around its own axis. It studied itself first, and became concerned about its own pleasures and pains; and so losing touch, in the meanwhile, with the larger life of which it had been an intimate part. The old unity of the spirit; the old solidarity between nature and the tribe was broken up. The magic mirror of the soul, reflecting nature as a whole in calm and simple grace, was suddenly cracked across. The new self-conscious man became in a measure alienated from his tribe. He lapsed into strife with his fellows: ambition, vanity, greed, the love of domination, the desire for property and possessions, took hold of him. The influence of fellowship and solidarity grew feebler. He became alienated from his great "Mother". His instincts were less and less sure: and that in proportion

as brain-activity and self-regarding calculation took their place. Finally, the crisis came: Cain murdered his brother and became an outcast. The "Garden of Eden" and the "Golden Age" closed their gates behind him. He then entered upon a period of suffering; upon a period of "friction" with man and nature, which only served to augment his self-consciousness. A period of labor, toil, and sorrow began. And in this distressful state he continues today. But can this be the best for which the race may hope? Will not the seed of the woman yet bruise the serpent's head?

In other words, will man not yet come into another stage of existence, in which he will find himself more at one with the whole of the world? Will man forever remain an outcast or an exile? Millions of men and women are today shut in with all sorts of diseases the chief cause of which is an over-self-consciousness.

Therefore, one of two things must happen: the race will either continue in this way until, as Havelock Ellis would say, it destroys itself by its own inventions, - by its own so-called civilization; or else a new element must enter; a new birth of some kind must take place.

Therefore, it is hopeless destruction, as the night-butterflies scorch themselves to the death in the flames of the arc-light; or else it is the entering into another stage of consciousness. - Into a stage of consciousness which will supersede the present one. In the latter case, the mind of man as at present constituted, will have to undergo a trans-

formation; that is, consciousness as we now know it will have to be purified and transmuted. Since the miseries of the world have dated from the fatal attempt to make the little personal self the center of effort and activity, and since the effort has led to disunity and discord, both within the mind itself, and within the body of society, there is nothing left but a return to a consciousness which shall have unity as its foundation principle. But this new stage of consciousness could not possibly be of the simple inchoate character of the first stage; for it will carry with it the enrichments of ages; having been deepened and extended by the experience of the second stage. The treasures gained by reflection will not be lost, they will as we have said only be purified and transmuted.

Is there not even now, and has there not for a long time been, a tendency for life to seek its source? Is such a tendency not present in all religions and in the rites and ceremonies of primitive peoples? In the "Grizzly" tribes of the North American Indians a man kills a bear, but not in the public hunt. So, as a sacrifice; and instead of retaining the flesh for himself, he shares it with the whole tribe in a common feast. In this, and in many other similar rites, one sees the three-phases of tribal psychology: the first, is when the individual remains within the compass of the tribal mind; the second, in which the individual steps outside in order to gratify his personal self; and the third, in which he submits to some sacrifice, and is again received back into

the unity of fellowship. Again, in religion, the Divinity which gives his life for his flock is no longer just an ordinary Bull or Lamb, but Adonis or Osiris or Dionysus, or Jesus. He is betrayed, and suffers; but rises again, redeeming all with himself. And the corn, and the wine, and the flesh which was his body, and which he gave for the sustenance of mankind, are consumed in a holy supper of reconciliation. In other words, the ritual of salvation always has in it the idea of the return to unity, or at-one-ment.

May it not be that all such ideas as those noted above mark the tendency toward the return to something like a consciousness of one cosmic universal life? As with the blossoming of self-consciousness in the human mind came the dawn of a cycle of experience which is like the exile from Eden, so now the redemption, return, or restoration has to come through another forward step in the same domain. - Abandoning the quest and the glorification of the separate isolated self in the sense that Schopenhauer thinks of it, we shall probably return to that oneness with nature which will make unnecessary those concepts created as instruments in order to mend the cracks in Nature's ^{broken} mirror. For, if the thing-in-itself was not existent in the stage of simple consciousness, may it not be that it will be absent in the universal-consciousness period? In this period man will enjoy a oneness with Nature which will make it impossible for him to posit existences overagainst himself; he will enjoy reality immediately and within himself; and so will not look for it beyond.

This tendency and the possibility of its continuation may be illustrated by the fact that God was once largely thought of as "immanent", the same period being followed by one in which men persisted in thinking of him as "transcendent". But, peculiar to say, the period in which men thought of God in terms of the "transcendent", was followed by another period in which they returned to the idea of God as "immanent", - in which period we now live. Then, Henri Bergson may be correct; and reality may be that which is immediately known, or immediately knowable, - instinct, intuition, or sympathy, being the means of knowing it.

The merging of reflective man with the rest of the world's life seems even more probable when we note the individual examples of such a tendency. William Brown, in "Psychology and the Sciences," shows that primitive man was guided by both intuition and reason, but mainly by intuition; while reflective man is now guided mainly by reason. But are not men like Henry Wordsworth, Henry D. Thoreau, and John Burroughs, examples of how a high stage of reflection can become harmonized with life as a whole; these men's power of reflection leading them, not away from the whole of the world of life, but back to it? Henri Bergson admits that there is some reason in all intuition, and some intuition in all reason. May not the two finally be brought together by the common element in each? If there has been a time when intuition ruled, and it is now true that reason rules, may not they each soon have learned by experience that it is "not good to dwell alone"?

If experience should teach all men such wisdom as has been suggested, then might not the race as a whole come into that third period of which we have spoken.

In reality, do not all thinking men at times, in their best moments, enjoy what we may call a sort of "frictionless existence?" At times, just for a moment, we seem to drop into the very stream of reality. But we have so trained ourselves in self-consciousness that the flesh of "frictionless joy" lasts but for a moment. However, the fact that we ever have such moments may be a promise of better things for the race as a whole, and of its inherent possibilities, when men shall experience reality without its having to be chopped-up, catalogued, and accounted for; when no postulates or hypotheses, as such, will be necessary in order to deal with the world, the same being known and experienced directly, as seems to have been the case in very primitive times. For then men did not resort to spirits, etc., in order to explain the world; but, as E.W. Hopkins says in the "Origin and Evolution of Religion", and Allen Menzies, in his "History of Religion", chap. 5, they worshipped only objects which were directly experienced. An experience like this, only on a higher plane, and carrying with it a deeper insight and appreciation would not be an undesirable one, but one that might save the race from many of the accompanying curses of modern civilization.

This does not mean, however, that the individual will not, in some sense, always ascribe meaning to the object, and that each individual object will not have its peculiar significance. Things will get their meaning in relation to selves as bio-

logical centers; but these centers, being in harmony with universal or metaphysical experience, will not divide reality into "actual" and "conceptual". The significance of the object itself and the contribution made by the "I" will be ~~known~~ known and enjoyed as one, there being no need to differentiate between data and the contribution made by the "I". The world will be no less full of meaning; but the individual will have no feeling that he must, as an individual, fill out, by his own efforts, a world that is incomplete. - He will, of course, be always making a contribution, but he will not be doing so in the same sense that a scientist now makes use of a postulate in order to understand or to explain nature. So-called "actual reality" and "conceptual reality" will be merged into one reality. In other words, there will be an I-in-itself, but no things-in-themselves; for things-in-themselves are evolved out of the cosmic order through highly complex organic centers for the purpose of enabling such centers of activity to again find a necessary and satisfactory harmony. That is, things-in-themselves are in one sense mere reflections cast upon and magnified by the mirror of memory, and used as instruments of adjustment. But if the I-in-itself is in immediate touch with reality, then no process of adjustment is necessary. However, things-in-themselves will still in some sense continue to exist, only not as "instruments" in the sense that we must now use that term. They will exist as ^{vital} ~~xxx~~ realities in the interaction between the data and the subject, in some such sense as beauty in art is now enjoyed, - that is, immediately.

In other words, the grounds of things-in-themselves will continue to exist; for instance, that time-space continuum which makes possible the identity of personality will still be a part of reality; but it will not take the form of a postulation, as it now must. In a word, things-in-themselves will still be aspects of reality, but not separate existences. Having evolved out of the cosmic process, things-in-themselves will become merged, as it were, with the whole of reality. They, together with other aspects of reality, will be present as a part of the "content" of contemplation, but not as "objects" of contemplation.

Therefore, Spinoza may not be wrong when he thinks of reality as: (1) Being; (2) as Known; (3) as Growing-into-Being; and (4) as Growing-into-Knowledge. For when Being is known, and men are merged, save the "I" as "I", and the knowledge of the world has become more comprehensive and more profound, there will then be that unity of man with the rest of reality, which will not take away from him ought that contributes to his significance, but will rather add to him much that he now lacks in his attitude toward reality as a whole.

We may on the basis of the above observations, conclude that there is some evidence for the argument that man may later bear a somewhat different relation to the whole of reality. True, there are two tendencies: the centrifugal or self-consciousness tendency would fling man as a specific, well-defined, and circumscribed entity, out into the trackless

spaces; but the centripetal tendency would attract him toward the center of light and life, and make him real in his relativity to all the rest of reality. But as to which of these forces is calculated to win, possibly no one knows. It may be that both shall win: the centripetal, in that present postulations in the form of things-in-themselves shall be merged into the I-in-itself, and through the same, into the rest of reality. The centrifugal, in that man shall always enjoy the consciousness of his own ego. For, by implication, the I-in-itself is of a more substantial character than are things-in-themselves. The "I" is a thing-in-itself chiefly in the sense of a cause, ground or substratum of things in themselves. It is true, as we have said elsewhere, that the I-in-itself has a cause or ground. But it, in turn becomes a ground for things-in-themselves. So we may say that the "I" is the heart of the cosmos, or is at least closer to the heart of the cosmos than are things-in-themselves. The I-in-itself is to things-in-themselves, as real and constitutive beings are to nymphs and fairies. The "I" involves both "stuff" and "function"; which things-in-themselves are absolute existences or abstractions, no less real, but of a somewhat different nature than the functioning "I". This "I" of itself gives birth to things-in-themselves, but these things-in-themselves have no power to propagate themselves. They become the rational controls and instruments of the "I" in its process of further begetting or in its manipulation of the phenomena or data with which it is being continuously confronted. So the changes in things-in-themselves takes place, not through any power inherent in the things-in-themselves, but through the evolution of the

of the world that was so determinate as these common elements. With them, it was at least less determinate; and less definable in materialistic terms than are the four elements. Even Empedocles felt the need of some more immaterial principle, - something other than a combination of earth, air, fire, and water; so he posited "Love" and "Discord", "Love" being the God with which all things are shot through, and which is destined to triumph over "Discord".

1 The atomists stand almost midway between the thing-in-itself as a realistic something and as a mere concept. Atoms are, it is true, thought of in realistic terms; but they are, of course, mere conceptual entities; for no one ever saw an atom.

But when we get to John Locke and to Immanuel Kant there is a very evident confusion as to whether the thing-in-itself is realistic or merely conceptual in nature.

There has at least been this transformation, then, - men can no longer say that the thing-in-itself is a common and visible element. Even though it may be thought of in realistic terms, it is, by implication, more conceptual.

2. - In the second place, there has been a transformation of things-in-themselves as conceptual: Using again the idea of the atom, it was first thought of as an indivisible unit. Things were constituted by a combination of atoms. - But there was no internal connection of any kind. Things were just a combination of atomistic juxtapositions. But it

is now thought that the atom is not a unit with a prefixed measure and boundary. But, on the contrary, that it is a little universe of itself; a core of proton around which revolve multitudinous electrons; a combination of small units negatively and positively charged.

Leibnitz thought the atomists were right when they postulated for the explanation of phenomenal bodies simple, indivisible, eternal units. But they were wrong when they thought of these invisible, minute corpuscles as indivisible. For everything that is material, however small it may be, is divisible even to infinity. Therefore, if we are to think of true "indivisible units", we must confine ourselves to the realm of the "immaterial", and say that the smallest units of which things are composed are immaterial constituents. Physical points, like the atoms, are thought of as physical, and so not true points. Again, mathematical points are indivisible, but not real. But metaphysical or substantial points, the incorporeal, soul-like units, alone combine in themselves indivisibility and reality. So the monads are the true Ideas and the true atoms, the chief characteristics of which are indivisibility, individual perfection, and force.

Again, the concept or hypothesis* of cause has also undergone many changes: it has been defined as Energy, Power, Source, Life, Entelechy, Psychic Entity, l'elan vital, and Evolution.

However, the concept of an ether is one of the best il-

*From this point forward the terms, "hypothesis", "value", and "thing-in-itself", will be used interchangeably.

illustrations of how a conceptual hypothesis can become transformed in a few hundred years: Newton proposed the hypothesis of corpuscles. A century later this hypothesis was shown by Young to be unverifiable, he proposing the hypothesis of waves in an elastic ether. About three-quarters of a century later, this also proved to be unverifiable, and was replaced by Maxwell's hypothesis of waves in an electro-magnetic ether. While today many physicists say that there is no such thing as ether.

3. The most remarkable transformation of things-in-themselves has, however, taken place in that phase of the problem which we have, for convenience, termed "spiritual": In the field of psychology proper, there has been significant reconstructions. The self has been thought of as an entity within itself; as a psychic something that is pre-established to run parallel with the physical activities; as a monitor which sits aloft in the pineal gland; as the stream of consciousness; and as a bundle of habits and impulses. Finally, for the radical behaviorist, there is no self at all as such, - in the sense that "self" means "soul". Mind, for Dr. Abbot, who writes in the Psychological Review, Volume XXIII, pages 117 ff., (1916), is but a term for brain-functioning: as the function of the lungs is respiration, and the function of the legs is ambulation, so the function of the brain is cogitation. In other words, we have come all the way from thinking of the soul as being a mysterious and metaphysical substance, to

thinking of it in very materialistic, or, even in logical terms, which is, of course, to do away with it as a separate existence.

As to sub-consciousness, which is at least partly a postulate, there have been and are many theories: We may choose the "Cosmic Consciousness", ^{the} "Subliminal", the "Focus-Marginal", the "Dissociation", or the "Store-house" theory.

As to "spirit" in the objective sense, it is possible that very primitive man worshipped only concrete, realistic objects. But succeeding this stage there was a long period when "animism" was the common belief. - All things have spiritual counterparts which support them and are their causes.

But probably succeeding this ~~view~~ was the belief in gods who to some extent took the place of the "little spirits". These gods were assigned larger realms than had been assigned to the spirits. For instance, there was the goddess of Beauty; the god of thunder; the goddess of grain and the harvest; and the gods of the seasons.

But men came to feel that one God was more useful than many, and so the Orphics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Hebrews, and others, adopted the belief in one God, instead of many local gods, or at least in order to unify the activities of the local gods.

But even in this one God there have been many changes. We have only to glance at Greek philosophy and at Hebrew history in order to see the tremendous transformation that

has taken place. For instance, in Hebrew Theology, as is well known, we have many succeeding contents of the God-concept.

But this is not all. The idea of God has undergone still further change. For James Ward, in his "Realm of Ends", God is finite, and not the cause of the world. Over against the idea of God as an efficient cause stand man-like Hocking and Josiah Royce, and others who contend that God should not be conceived primarily as Cause, but as Meaning.

Men like Darwin, Paley, Pascal, Fontenelle, and Voltaire, however, have tried to show that God is the legal or efficient cause of the world. They have all made use of that famous analogy of the watch and the world. God is the super-human watchmaker who has put the world-machine together with surprising skill, and intervenes miraculously, on rare occasions, when he sees that the works are getting out of order.

But not withstanding the general belief in this famous analogy, there may be some arguments against it, and in favor of men like Hocking and Royce.

Paley, together with those others whom we have mentioned, assume that a watch found in a desert, which presupposes a man as its maker, is an analogous to the world and God as its creator. But the following suggestions will show that there is no analogy between these two cases, and that these men do not prove what they intend to prove:

(1) - (a) Knowing from past experience that men make watches, and having seen watches that were made by other men,

we have a right to infer that some man made the watch found in the desert.

(b) But having had no experience of other gods or the same God creating other worlds, we have no right to infer that a God created this one.

(3) - (a) The material for the watch having been already in existence, the man who made the watch could have been only the architect or artificer thereof.

(b) Therefore, if we are to stick to the analogy, we must suppose that the material out of which the world was made was in existence before God formed it into a world, making God, not a creator, but a mere architect.

(3) - (a) Man is the legal or efficient cause of watches.

(b) But it may be that God is only the logical or metaphysical cause of the world.

(4) - (a) Again, it may be acknowledged that the watch is a pure mechanism.

(b) But to make the world analogous, is, at least, to say that the world needs no God.

(5) - (a) It is easy to show that the watch is the work of reason and reflection.

(b) But that the world as a whole is a self-consciously rational order has not yet been shown. So, to make God the creator of the world might not be to do him any honor.

(6) - (a) In short, when we lose sight of God, Nature becomes our standard of reality. If we have a God we like to make his existence as sure as that of Nature. So the most of the proofs for God have begun with Nature, and have tried to make his existence secure by showing him to be in some valid connection with this world, such as that of cause to the world as effect. So then God, as the cause of the world, would ~~be~~ be real even as the world is real.

(b) But this is not the way to find God or to prove his existence. If we should prove a first and conscious cause, we could only prove such a cause as equivalent to its effect. We could prove only such goodness as is equivalent to the mixture of goodness and evil that we find in the world; and this would possibly not be any credit to God. ~~7~~Such a Being would be a very limited Being. Who could worship or look up to a God who is logically no greater, no better, and no more real and immutable than the world! We might better just believe in the world as we find it; and proceed with the task of mastering it, without any reference to God at all.

But in reality such proofs are not true to the spirit of real religion; for it is well known that men have lifted their minds to God, rather because the world is unsatisfactory, than because it satisfies. We demand a God who is greater, better, and more real ~~and~~ than the world; and our demand creates the "object" of our demand. Ideals of all kinds are creations of

reflection under the stress of situations and conditions that are somewhat unsatisfactory, or that demand a universal by which they may be rationalized and set in order.

Therefore, the idea of God may be a value-judgment, in the form of logical or metaphysical non-Being. For instance, Space may be thought of as the logical cause of the worlds in space. For all that is not "worlds" is "space". The Space between the worlds and around the worlds is logically necessary to the forms and sizes of the worlds. That is, in order to have "worlds" we must have "not-worlds".

So God as a cause is not transcendent in the sense that he is apart from; but transcendent only in a logical sense. That is, in fact, God is in and of the rest of reality; but for purposes of thought he must logically transcend the rest of reality. He is the non-Being that makes possible Being; but he is in and of Being, "Being" not being able to exist without "nonBeing"; for if Being attempted to exist without non-Being, it itself would become indeterminate and so lapse into non-Being. Therefore, Being and non-Being demand each other, that is, logically speaking.

As "not-worlds" is necessary to "worlds", just so it may be that "not-space-worlds" is necessary to "space-worlds". That is, that all that is not space and worlds must be thought of as God, whether he be in or out of the system of "space-worlds". This is to say that God is not the creator or legal cause of the world in the sense that Bishop Paley et al. suggested; but that God is, and is necessary; that he is a limit-

ing concept; non-Being. - And so a judgment of value, as Immanuel Kant long ago suggested. God's value for man is, therefore, not his ability to have created the world, but the meaning which the very concept itself involves.

Therefore, these men prove, not that God is a "Creator" but that he is in some sense a "Maker":

"None but a power omnipotent and wise
"Could frame this earth, or spread the boundless
 skies.
"He made the whole; at his omnific call
"From formless chaos rose this spacious ball,
"And one Almighty God is seen in all."

To this conclusion I have no objection, provided that I may be permitted to define the process: God is, indeed, the "Maker" of the world, in some sense, just as men are the "makers" of watches, chairs, tables, houses, and other things. For man, being a logical and reflective creature, simply demands, on the basis of his own experience, that if the useful things with which he deals have had a "maker", and were made for a purpose, just so ought it to be in the case of the world. So man posits a personality sufficiently powerful to perform the task which he, man, demands to be done. Therefore, God is the "Maker" of the world; but partly at least because reflection demands that he be such. In one sense, then, God may be thought of as making the world as men make things; but, in another sense, God is only the "Maker" in the logical sense; that is, his act is a logical demand. If he makes the world as men make things, he does so only because intelligence de-

mands that he do so.

In short, man reads his thoughts, feelings, characteristics, capacities, and abilities back into the world as a whole, or else builds them into personalities which behave much like himself, except that these logical and idealistic personalities may be more just, more holy, or more powerful than himself. Man magnifies the constructs of his own reflection; not, however, because he is "conscious" of his part in their construction, but because he is largely "unconscious" of the part which he plays in such a process. He imagines these beings to be largely independent of his own mind, because they are, as if they were the beings of dreams, so magnified that they seem to belong to another order than that to which man belongs.

It is by this process that God becomes a cause. However, not an efficient, but a final cause. In short, God is not a propelling force, but a dynamic and attractive force. He moves the world as the beloved moves the lover, or as the "Good" moves him who wishes to be good. But God is a final cause both before and after being realized in reflection, if we think of him as active in the movements that constitute the series of cosmic changes that make possible his final realization in human reflection.

So, without qualification, we ought to object to the idea that man plays such an important part in the construction of the world. However, when we remember that the logical basis for God is immanent in the world, and that reflection is simply the determinate aspect of the whole of reality; and that man makes rational judgments because he is a part of a rational world-order, then the part which man plays seems less objectionable. We are not contending that a man, out of his own individual powers of conception, creates a world or an idea of God; but only that God first fully realizes himself in the rational and logical thought of reflective beings, the end toward which the cosmic forces have forever moved. But you say that man gives form to the universal and final cause of the cosmos is just to say that God, through man, demands his own exist-

ence; and this is to say that without man God would not exist under the particular form that he now does. Therefore, both God and man are factors in the world-process, when we look at it, not theologically, but metaphysically; and the final form of God is not simply "God" in the Platonic and "medieval" sense, but "God-man", a concept common to many or all great religions.

Again, if reflective man, the highest type of world-phenomena, is not instrumental in this process, then we must say that, either the lower orders of animals, or the blind and chaotic forces as a whole, have lifted God into existence; which hypothesis, it seems to me, would do him no special honor. For God to be the determinate work of reflective man, and for the two to live, and evolve, and will in mutual co-operation, as being inspired by each other, and in some sense mutually dependent upon each other, is to do honor to both God and man. - Is to make gods of men, in the profoundest sense of that term, and to make God no less a great, just, and holy God. For, as someone has said, the least creature of all mortals, acknowledged as a "willing subject", has more dignity and value than even an almighty God, if that God be thought of simply as a gigantic, psychological mechanism, - that is, as an object the reality of which demands the form of constitutive existence.

It is something like this that we wish to say: As Spinoza said, God might have created things otherwise; but seeing that man, too, is a part of created nature, he too would have been

different in the universal change of all things, in "order that he might be able to understand them". Now this is a significant statement, in that it places the mind of man at the center of the situation, and refuses to consider the very possibility of the universe being other than such as the mind of man should comprehend. The emphasis is no longer, as in Descartes, on the power of God, but on the mind of man. Therefore, Spinoza goes on to say that the philosopher does not inquire into what God can effect with his supreme power; but judges concerning the nature of things from the laws or tendencies which God has implanted in him.

Therefore, man does not work alone in creating the logical cause of the world. For, as Spinoza would say, God is the cause of the world as the apple is the cause of its red color, and not as the father is the cause of the child, or as the sun is the cause of heat. The father is the external or efficient cause of the child; and heat has an existence apart from the sun. But God is not related to the world quite in this way. He is not its transcendent and transient cause, but its immanent or indwelling cause. (see "The Ethics". - Spinoza, pg. 62 & 68) But if he is its "immanent" cause, then he is in some sense the cause of the "I" that knows him; for as we have said in the introduction, God should be thought of as a being within the series of changes that take place in the world. But being within the series, he is in some sense the "I" itself. So the "I", in positing God, is only coming to know and to define itself. But in coming to know and to define itself, it is transmuting the indeterminate into the determinate, and creating a biological unit which is capable of

evaluating, and so of building up or "determining" reality.

So, after all, man is the conscious agent and a chief factor in this process. The different ideas of God could not be said to represent different constitutive Gods. In fact, these different concepts only represent the universal in a given system of facts. The God in question at anyone time is the universal under which a given set of facts is subsumed. For instance, the World-Soul of the Greeks, or the Holy Spirit of the Christians, simply represents the universal under which certain facts are subsumed, or the hypothesis by means of which certain facts may be explained. For instance, the peculiar phenomena of Pentecost are explained by the presence of the Holy Spirit, an hypothesis generally made use of when it is logically impossible for the Father or the Son to be present. In short, each set of facts may have its own universal, hypothesis, or thing-in-itself. For some, God is the sum-total of the social consciousness. The phenomena of the social group are noted; and the hypothesis of God is made use of to explain such phenomena. The thought-to-be unknown is made use of in order to explain that which is supposed to be known. For, logically, the known can never be explained by itself. The hypothesis of God is just as scientific and just as legitimate as any so-called scientific hypothesis, both being of the nature of postulates, on the basis of which data may be rationalized.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note, that though the early Greeks demanded many Gods, each one being assigned to his own specific jurisdiction, yet no one of the Gods, nor all of the Gods together were thought of as the efficient cause of the world. Neither were they generally personifications. In fact, though the Greeks did

not realize it, these Gods were the logical means of accounting for the different observed sets of phenomena. - That is, the Greeks' way of setting their world in order. The Gods did not create the world; but the Greeks conceived the Gods as logical supports for realistic situations. They concerned themselves very little as to the creation of the world, but created Gods to keep the existing world in running order, just as men today organize big businesses, divide the tasks, and create offices and officers in order to keep the business going in a desirable way.

In short, the very idea of cause itself, in the ordinary sense may be fallacious. Is it necessary to believe that all things must have efficient causes external to themselves? "There is no logical necessity of a cause for every event. No matter of fact can be demonstrated to exist, because the contrary of every such existence is entirely conceivable. The universe may be self-organizing, like the animate beings with which we are familiar: it need not have a cause for this order, in some Being beyond Nature invested with the attributes of human nature." (See "Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume", - Hendel, pg. 403.) Plotinus, Aristotle, and the Greeks generally, may, therefore, have been more correct than those who have championed the argument that, in order to do honor to God, we must believe him to have been the legal, efficient, and constitutive cause of the world. Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason", book 2, chapter 2, says, "It is vain to seek in the causal connection of phenomena for an original act by which something may come to be that before was not." Our logical demands, properly understood, may be of tremendous assistance to us; but misunderstood, they

may come to be hindrances to a real knowledge of life and the world. Men ought to spend a great part of their time in searching ^{out} the subtle conceits of their own mental activities.

So, the transformation of things-in-themselves goes on; but man seems to keep his place in the midst of the stage, even though he appears to be always willing to grant that position to some other Intelligence. The evolving hypotheses remain relative to man's needs. New hypotheses have come into existence, and old ones have transformed themselves in keeping with the demands of human reflection. There is little under the sun so fixed that it will not shape itself to suit the need of man's logical demand. Those things which refuse to serve as means to purposed ends are dropped along the way, or else are so reconstructed and transformed as to satisfy the need of man. A man's universal or hypothesis must suit itself to his universe of discourse. He may demand at one time Tiw; at another, Woden; and at still another, Thor. It all depends upon his realm of discourse as to what the particular thing-in-itself may be.

Therefore, as we have tried to show throughout this section, and as Williams James so well says, in "The Will to Believe", we have a right to believe any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will; but, as a rule, we have a tendency to disbelieve all facts, theories, or hypotheses, for which we find no use. In other words, our ideas are hypotheses about reality: as hypotheses they are means of reconstructing reality to suit our needs, or instruments by means of which we conduct ourselves with reference to the world-data. When our needs take on new phases, and when the

world- or knowledge-data is transformed in the process of evaluation, then our hypotheses must reshape or reconstruct themselves if they are to continue to have any fundamental value or reality.

CONCLUSION

A brief summation, together with some implications of the views which have been emphasized, will conclude the task of this thesis.

Due to the failure of most thinkers to discover the possible origin of the thing-in-itself, the historical development has been marked by great confusion, with a resulting unfruitfulness.

In general, there has been a conviction that the thing-in-itself must be some realistic or spiritual something, existing independently and constitutively overagainst both man and natural phenomena. But such cannot be the case. For if realistic, it would be subjected to the laws or definitions of phenomena; and if spiritual, in the ordinary sense of that term, it could not possibly be a real cause of phenomena. For a cause, to be a real cause, must be able to pass over into the effect. In the case of spirit, this could not be true; for spirit, in the sense generally used, is not like, but unlike matter or phenomena. Therefore, the thing-in-itself can be neither realistic nor spiritual, in the sense in which those terms are generally used. So the thing-in-itself may be a unique element contributed to the situation by the reflection and the logical demand of man.

Therefore, the thing-in-itself is a demand of reflection; the reflective I-in-itself the original thing-in-itself, as far as the knowledge-process is concerned; and all minor

things-in-themselves the legitimate offspring of the I-in-itself.

A still clearer understanding of the nature of things-in-themselves is arrived at when we discover that they are like values or hypotheses; and that the knowledge-world is made up of data; which is progressively knowable and indefinitely analyzable; things-in-themselves; and purpose: for any object is data plus purpose, the purpose always involving the hypothesis which makes possible the intelligent use or manipulation of the given data. Rationalism begins with universals, Empiricism with particulars, but Pragmatism or Instrumentalism starts with both particulars and universals, which grow up together, and which cannot get along without each other. As Hugo Munsterberg points out in his "Psychology and Life", psychology is not at all an expression of reality, but a complicated transformation of it, worked out for special logical purposes in the service of life.

Therefore, things-in-themselves come to be controls. But being controls, they naturally objectify themselves, and so become an indivisible part of what we think to be the given world; for, in reality, the supposed given world is a very complex affair; being made up of data, together with all sorts of contributions made by reflection.

But, still further, if things-in-themselves are controls, they are also instruments, in that the idea of control involves the idea of instrumentality. - A rope as a lasso controls a wild horse, and is also the instrument by which he is con-

trolled. A concept in theology controls a man's activity, and is also the instrument by means of which he regulates his world.

But if things-in-themselves are controls and instruments, and if life is a scene of changing needs and desires, as I think all admit, then things-in-themselves as instruments or controls must change in order to continue to be instruments and controls.

Then, if it is true that the I-in-itself is the origin of things-in-themselves, and that things-in-themselves are a big part of the world as known, then the implication is, that values, hypotheses, or things-in-themselves, have a quite fundamental reality. Neither will this reality be wholly dependent upon the form which things-in-themselves take. For, as we attempted to show in the last section, they are always parts of reality, whether they take the form of instruments or constitute a part of the content of the whole of cosmic reality.

But as to the instrumental phase of things-in-themselves, does not the recognition of the instrumental value of our hypothesis introduce us to reality? Therefore, to know the concept, its meaning and value, is certainly to come into some sort of touch with reality. Bishop Berkeley long ago pointed out the fact, that if an experience furthers experience, then that experience which so functions is real. The ideas of cause, soul, God, are just as necessary to the imagination of man, as food and air are necessary to ~~the~~ his physical

existence. Neither does this necessarily depend wholly upon the consciousness of need; for food and air often function independently of the conscious need of the individual. In the present stage of thought-life, soul, God, etc., function as conscious necessities; but it is not impossible to suppose that man might come into a stage of thought in which he would be unconscious of these existences, as such, and yet they, nevertheless, be actually functioning in his life.

Again, some one has said that, "we are determined to judge as well as to feel and to breathe". Then, if judging is only one aspect of a natural process, why are not the products of that judgment as real as any other phase of the process? H.F. Osborn, in his "The Origin and Evolution of Life", shows that life is a higher aspect of an evolution which began in inorganic "stuff". Therefore, reflection, an aspect of life, is a higher form of the evolutionary process. But life is natural; then reflection must in some sense be natural, the distinction between so-called matter and reflection, being one, not of "nature," but of "function." But if reflection is thus shown to be natural, then its products must also be natural. - Then the thing-in-itself, whether thought of as an ideal, a value, or an hypothesis, is just another stage in this process of natural evolution, or unfolding. Someone has said, that self-discovery is as much a part of the order of nature as the discovery of a bird's nest, and that the evaluations which it renders possible and actual are as existential as the processes of building a

house.

Therefore, we may conclude that things-in-themselves have no less reality than other existences. Shadworth Hodgson, an English philosopher of the Victorian Era, says that the "mirage" of absolute existence, wholly apart from knowledge, is a common-sense prejudice. The very term "existence", says he, implies relativity to some sort of consciousness or other. Our ethical judgment and our moral nature brings us into practical relation with the thing-in-itself, and so permits a positive knowledge of it. As Tennyson would say in language more poetical:

"Closer is He (God) than breathing;
Nearer than hands and feet".

F. H. Bradley, in his "Appearance and Reality", repudiates the idea of the thing-in-itself; yet goes on to say that reality consists of "experience". But this may be saying just what he did not mean to say about the thing-in-itself. For if experience is reality, and the thing-in-itself is in and of experience, then the thing-in-itself must also be real.

Bishop Berkeley, in "Hylas", says that in reflection we have an immediate knowledge of self as an active being, and by inference therefrom of other finite spirits and of God. Remember that "other finite spirits and God" are things-in-themselves objectified, and you have the theory for which we have been contending.

According to Hegel, the thing-in-itself is known immediately; because the thing-in-itself is not outside of thought;

but, on the contrary, is a product of thought, - of thought which has been pushed on to "abstraction". But if we use, ~~xxx~~ not the word, "abstraction", but the word, "projection", we have the thing-in-itself as a real constituent of the world that is known; that is, we have a real part of the whole of reality, which part is necessary to the very unity and wholeness of that reality.

So the thing-in-itself by regression comes back to the phenomenon, - that is, to man; to the finite; to the external, as alone real and thinkable. And precisely as it is natural, finite, and becomes external, it, together with the other phases of our world, is fundamentally ~~xxxxxxx~~ real.

But we must remember that the world which we have tried to describe as real, ~~is~~ not one which is made up by means of the juxtaposition of the factors noted. We have only tried to set down the factors involved in the making of this world, not to set their limits. In fact, however, we believe it is the action, reaction, and internal inter-relation of these factors that gives the world its chief significance. - That is, that makes it a world of vital reality. The world of knowledge is not a product of a mechanical laboratory; on the contrary, it is bone, and blood, and flesh. The world of knowledge lives and breathes, being shot through with the eternal purpose of man to live and to shape the world to his liking.

Here is the reconciliation of the subject-object problem.

When we know that knowledge and reality is not a system of external relations, but rather a system of interaction and inter-relations, then we have, not two worlds, but one; at the center of which is man, who produces his world, not out of himself, but by making his reflective contribution to that which we may call a world-data, but of which he is still a part in the larger and more metaphysical sense of that term.

In short, this thesis is an attempt to escape from that spiritual astigmatism, with which the mind is generally afflicted, and which has impelled it to bifocalize the world from every angle of observation, - physical and psychical, mechanical and teleological, appearance and reality, phenomena and noumena, and many other nonsensical compartmentalizing, choosing here and there some cosmic "ansicht" as the measure of wisdom. The Socratic Bergson, as Hartley Burr Alexander, author of "Nature and Human Nature", has called him, together with others, has protested against this method. He reminds us that discursive reason is at best but a preparation for more thorough understanding and for completer sense; and that man's part is to know first of all his proper self.

It is something like this that we have tried to do in this thesis: to discover the nature of the self; to know the possible contribution which it makes to the world; and, finally, to escape from the results of the tricks which the mind continually plays upon itself, a task to which Francis Bacon, John Locke, and others, have especially devoted themselves.

But to know the self, is to a large measure to know the world; for man, being of the world, is in some sense the "implicitness" of the world become "explicit". Consciousness and reflection behold the world, not as separate from, but as part of itself. As a flower that is of a stem; that is, in turn, of the soil, turns back and beholds the stem and the soil, but only as the implicit become explicit; - so consciousness, which is of the world, turns back and beholds and evaluates the world of which it is itself a part. But this is not to say that the flower is not different in function, and that it has not its own peculiar reality and individuality. Neither do we mean to say that consciousness has not a uniqueness. It is unique, in that it is that phase of reality which is able to evaluate the whole of reality, and to look back upon that out of which it comes. Thus mind or consciousness has a two-fold character: by virtue of its contrast with nature or the rest of reality, it is one side of a relation; but, by virtue of its comprehension of nature it is the whole within which the contrast occurs. Nature is prior to the self in some sense; but when the self is once in action it has the power to retrace the steps by which it has come into existence, and in some sense to comprehend the whole cosmic order out of which it arose. There is something of all the plant in its flower; just so is there something of all the world in the mind. As the flower is the comprehension of all the plant; just so is mind or consciousness that which comprehends the world. In the flower and the

seed are hidden all the seeds and flowers of the past of the species. In consciousness is hidden some of all the realities that preceded its becoming determinate. This does not mean that man is a microcosmic speck and that his mind is simply the phosphorescent glow of a physiological process. No; just to the contrary, it means that he contains within himself the profoundest aspects of reality, in that he can comprehend the whole of which he is, biologically speaking, only a small part; but of which he is, metaphysically speaking, possibly the most significant aspect. ^{answer to the} The question, "What is man that Thou art mindful of him?", is, "Thou hast put all things under his feet".

But to say, as we have intimated, that the I-in-itself is an amplification of cosmic forces, is to suggest that its products are still further developments of the same process. That is, things-in-themselves will be amplifications of consciousness, just as consciousness or reflection is an amplification of the potentialities of the cosmic life; all of which is consistent with this thesis as a whole.

Again, if it be true that consciousness and reflection ~~are~~ ~~xxx~~ the implicit become explicit, or determinate, then it may be that all the possibilities of conscious reflection are implicitly existent; and that things-in-themselves of all kinds are the rational and logical demands of man because they are implicit in the world. Therefore, to conceive of things-in-themselves is just to give shape to that which has been eternally potential. For instance, to conceive God is to

prove his existence; which existence becomes, in turn, a demand of that consciousness which has in the process become explicit or determinate. In reality this is what Descartes meant by his argument for God. He did not run into the error of St. Anselm and say that the idea of God proves God's existence. For Descartes, God does not exist because we conceive him; but, rather, we conceive him because he exists. Being rational, we conceive that which is rational. Being a part of a rational order, the individual will make evaluations that are rational. We cannot well conceive of a rational being coming out of an inherently irrational order. Therefore we must assume that both the individual and the world-order are rational, and that the individual is rational because he is a product of that which is rational. Again, as W.E. Hocking says, in "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", in finding God as a necessary object of experience, we have sufficiently and decisively proved his existence. What other proof can we have that any being exists than to find that being in our experience? For man's power of recognizing existence is summed up in the word, "experience".

The world, then, is an unfolding; but the products of the unfolding never cease to be a part of the whole, - never, in fact, come to be different from the whole, save in the uniqueness of their function. Therefore, the I-in-itself which is the source of conscious evaluation, has a logical right to read back into the world all that which it discovers

in itself, and by projection to reconstruct the world somewhat in keeping with its individual demand, its individual demand not being, however, out of all relation to the rest of the race and to the rest of reality. In "Selections from Kant", - Watson, pg.141, Kant, in speaking of the Transcendental Ideas, says, "They are not near fictions, but spring from the very nature of Reason itself, and therefore, stand in a necessary relation to the whole use of understanding". He should have regressed another step. For if we say that concepts are in a sense the necessary outcome of experience, then it is logical to take another step and say that experience has a necessary relation to the world as a whole. If Ideas ~~are~~ concepts are not "abstractions" neither is experience an "abstraction".

Yet, lest there still be room for misunderstanding, let me say another word as briefly as possible. The Seventeenth Century was obsessed with the idea of a mechanistic universe. But the Eighteenth Century followed, with its discovery of the inner life, Immanuel Kant of Konigsberg leading the way, and being followed by Fichte, and he, in turn, by the two Schlegels, Schelling, and Novalis. Now it is ^{not} quite this tradition that I have attempted to perpetuate, however much I may realize the importance of keeping in touch with the main stream of thought in any given field. The "I" which I have tried to define or to characterize is not the "I" of Kant, for no one quite knows what that was, even though, as we have seen, there are some very significant implications; it is not the "I" of Fichte, for that "I" had need to be bumped into existence by a world from in front; and it is not the

"I" of the Romanticists, - the Schlegels and others, - for this "I" was Fichte's "I" gone mad with its sense of freedom. But the world of the "I" which I have tried to set out is not like a child's playhouse, that may be set up, and torn down, and set up again, in keeping with every whim of individual fancy. There is something stable about it even though it be not "fixed" . The "I" may reconstruct itself and its world, but it cannot do so simply by the power of its own individual whim. This "I" or "I-in-itself" is conditioned by the unconditioned; it is in some sense determinate; but it is determined by the indeterminate, of which it continually partakes; it is the explicit of the implicit, by which it has been shaped and by which its possibilities have been and are always being more or less regulated. William James in his "Human Immorality", expresses the idea that consciousness comes to and through our bodies from a kind of cosmic reservoir. But while this "I" has been determined by the indeterminate, it itself, in turn, determines. It is not "that which is neither created nor creates"; it is rather "that which is created and creates". The whole cosmos is its ground; but it is in turn the chief ground of all "knowing" processes, together with all the things-in-themselves involved therein. In the "Selections from Kant". - Watson, pg. 50, Kant says, "Synthesis in general, x x x x, is due solely to the operation of imagination, a blind, but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are seldom even conscious. To bring this synthesis to conceptions is the function of under-

standing, and it is only by this operation of understanding that we obtain what can properly be called knowledge." "And "Pure Synthesis viewed in its most general aspect, is the pure conception of understanding". Again, pg. 77, Kant says, "Imagination x x x pertains to sensibility. At the same time its synthesis is the expression of spontaneous activity; for unlike sense, imagination is not simply capable of being determined, but it is itself determining; and hence it can a priori determine sense in its form, in accordance with the unity of apperception." (See also pp. 79, 81, 87). This whole process represents the activity of the I-in-itself. True, this "I" is made by the past, but, by use of its imagination, it takes part in the making of both the present and the future; it may be somewhat passive in receiving the past, but it is active and at least partly free in its reconstruction, and in the projection of this past into the future. In the "Critique of Judgment", pg. 8, Kant says, "The will, regarded as the faculty of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world, viz., that cause which acts in accordance with concepts. This "I", or Kant's will, stands in the center of the stage, not only in the sense that the world revolves about it but in the sense that it is the pivot upon which reality turns. It is the point at which potentiality becomes actual reality. It is created by the past, in the evolutionary process; but having itself ^{been} created, it proceeds to create; and the world out of which it arose comes to be a different world, in that the new creations of the "I"

mix and mingle with and add meaning to the drab world in which the "I" was once shut up. Having awakened, the "I" rises up, sets its house in order, sweeps out those things which are undesirable, and ornaments and decorates in keeping with its new-found need. As Thomas Reid puts it, "The mind may be compared to an apothecary or chemist, whose materials indeed are furnished by nature, but, for the purposes of his art, he mixes, compounds, dissolves, evaporates, and sublimates them, till they put on a quite different appearance".

But let us try to state the matter a little more clearly: Reality may be defined in two ways, that is, as purely metaphysical reality, and as purely logical reality. The cosmic basis of experience is that metaphysical ground which preceeds and underlies all purely biological experience, together with those demands which come to be a part of the experience of higher organisms. Now we have said in the preceeding paragraph, that reflection is the pivot upon which reality turns; which, when amplified, means that purely metaphysical reality is, in reflection, transformed into logical reality. The "I" or "I-in-itself" becomes the "prism": It receives into itself the undifferentiated and indeterminate "stuff". But by means of the "prism", the "undifferentiated" is "differentiated" and broken up until reality appears to consist of "many" rather than of "one". Also each "determinate" produced by the "prism" takes on its peculiar color, the "prism" or "I" apparently having the power to break up reality into many differently colored parts, as Cause, Time, Space, Matter, Mind, Soul, God, and an indefin-

ite number of concepts, each of which has its cosmic ground. For we cannot think of "something" as coming out of "nothing".

It is insisted by some authorities, Bertrand Russell, for instance, that man is subordinate to nature in the realm of physical facts, but that he is independent of nature in the realm of values. These men say at the same time that man is a natural creature. But if man is a natural product of a natural world-order, how can it be said that his process of evaluation is independent of nature? As we have tried to show in our introduction, value has a psychological basis; which may be interpreted to be a naturalistic basis. Therefore, it is better to say that the world, including the world of values, is a continuous one. The colors of the spectrum are not new and independent creations; they are the original constituents of the light-ray which is subjected to the prism.

In short, this is to say, that conceptual reality is not to be wholly divorced from the rest of the world-order. Kant himself (in the *Prolegomena*.- Carus, pg. 115,) says: "Thus we are able, in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is determined in them as things-in-themselves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states, without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature." The thing-in-itself as the I-in-itself is, therefore, not out of accord with, but in keeping with, nature, - in some sense a product of nature, and in some sense the continuation of nature, in that it has the power to amplify the materials received by it. In the "Critique of Judgment", pg. 13, Kant says, "There must be

a ground of the unity of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains". In short, Kant holds that "to explain the phenomena of organic life and the purposiveness of nature, we must hold that the world of sense is not disparate from and opposed to the world of thought, but that nature is the development of freedom." Therefore, the world of value ought not to be divorced from, but be considered as a continuation of, the natural world-order.

In a word, ideals ought not to be thought of as being snatched out of the empty void. For in reality, postulates, values, or things-in-themselves, do not come to us in the form of individuals "innate ideas": it is rather out of the stress of human experience, in relation to the rest of reality, that the will adopts its aims and its deepest meanings. Whatever is present in the ideal is first present in the rest of reality. In the order of existence, we are first passive and then active: though no analysis is able to separate our passivity from our activity. Things change only in form and function. As Aristotle says, the world had no beginning, neither can it ever have an end. But this does not mean that the world is not full of variety: for the indeterminate is always becoming determinate, and vice versa; non-Being is always becoming Being; and Becoming itself is always full of new functions, in that it is always made ^{up} of lesser or greater proportions of Being and non-Being. In spite of the fact that the world was, is, and always will be ^{by} fundamental ~~of~~ the same in its metaphysical constituents, yet

there is always something new "under the sun"; for that which functions today may not do so tomorrow; and that ~~be~~ which is not today, may be and function tomorrow as a vital instrument in the world's changing life.

That is, all of that which is experienced and all of that which may be experienced is, in fact, real or potentially so. If I am not real, then nothing is real: something in my conception of my reality starts from me; and my objects become real, as if infected with the contribution which I make. But it is still true, that unless the whole of nature is real, nothing is real, not even myself: which fact compelled Descartes, in spite of his rationalistic tendency, to demand God as a "conserving cause". Something in my conception of reality is borne in upon me from beyond. I am real in part by virtue of what is not myself. That is, the real must partake of the qualities of myself and of nature as a whole. Reality is not nature or myself: rather it is nature and myself, as we meet and exchange thoughts with each other. In short, as we have tried to show, both the indeterminate and the determinate aspects of the world are both changing and real. This is especially true when applied to man. As Leibnitz says, "The stags and the hares of our time do not become more full of shifts than those of former times; while, on the other hand, men become more skillful by finding always new contrivances". From which he draws the conclusion that the sources of necessary truth within us distinguish us from the lower animals. That is, we are not only biological creatures, but metaphysical beings,

and bring with us into the world native capacities, born or formulated out of the indefinite past. For nature never goes by leaps. Life is made up, not only of the big or conscious perceptions, but of unconscious perceptions. The continuity of life has made possible a building-up of these little perceptions into a conscious individual. The little perceptions have been gradually coordinated into one conscious and reflective personality, with its activities and demands; just as the infinitesimal sounds produced by each wave unite and become the audible moaning of the sea. In other words, out of the Indeterminate, by a series of concatenated processes, there are evolved organisms which have the power to reflect upon their experiences, and to create and amplify conceptual stimuli ad infinitum as a continuation of the cosmic processes which created the organisms themselves.

THE KANTIAN THING IN ITSELF

or

THE CREATIVE MIND

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