

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

May 31 1947

I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by Charles H. Reeves entitled Studies in The Technical Terminology of The Poetics of Aristotle.

be accepted as fulfilling this part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by:

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STUDIES IN THE TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY
OF THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE

A Dissertation submitted to
The Graduate School
of
The University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

1947

by
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B.A. Union 1937

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INTRODUCTION

The Poetics of Aristotle have from the Renaissance to the present offered many problems to scholars and critics. Foremost among these are the meaning and significance of μῦθος, the meaning of κᾶθαρσις, why Aristotle wrote the Poetics, and the relationship between Aristotle's criticism of the drama and Plato's. In the course of the investigations which these questions have generated, several words which Aristotle uses in the Poetics as technical terms have been discussed, chiefly μῦθος and κᾶθαρσις, to be sure, but also ἦθος, ὄψις, ἀναγνώρισις, and περίπτεται. Abeken, Bernays, Vahlen, Bywater, Causer, Howald, Pohlenz, F. L. Lucas, Philippart, Trench, and Gudeman have all contributed to these studies;¹ but no one work embraces a treatment of all these words, nor have they all been fully examined in the light of their historical development in the Greek language. Moreover, other technical terms, which I shall name below, deserve attention. It seems to me, therefore, that there is need of a systematic examination of the use of all major technical terms of the Poetics from the earliest surviving works of Greek literature down to the fourth century before Christ.

This thesis, then, is a study of certain technical

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1. For details see the Bibliography, Section B, and in particular Cooper and Gudeman, A Bibliography of Aristotle's Poetics.

terms selected from the Poetics of Aristotle. The purpose is to answer the following questions concerning the technical vocabulary of the Poetics: Does Aristotle employ for his technical terms words already used in the Greek language, or does he devise new words to express his ideas? If the former, does he use these words in a sense already familiar or does he endow them with a new meaning? The answers to these questions may make it possible to determine to what extent Aristotle's analysis of tragedy in the Poetics is his own, or to what extent it is borrowed from some other writer earlier than he. An examination, moreover, of the meaning with which Aristotle uses the word τέχνη, as well as the consideration of the significance of some of the terms properly pertaining to literary criticism, may make it clear from what point of view Aristotle wrote the Poetics and what his attitude toward poetry is. Certainly it should supply a clue to his theory of τέχνη.

A word is needed about the terms which have been chosen for study. It is evident, first of all, that τέχνη must head the list, for the meaning of τέχνη is fundamental to the entire subject. The other terms are more properly those of literary criticism. In the Aristotelian analysis of tragedy, six terms present themselves as the names of the constituent elements of every tragedy and Aristotle uses these terms as the framework of his discussion. They are μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, and ὄψις. In the

discussion of the mechanical construction of the plot, two terms appear, δέσις and λύσις. And in the treatment of how best to arrange the plot in order that it may achieve its proper function, three more arise, ἀναγνώρισις, περιπέτεια, and πάθος. If all the elements of tragedy are properly combined, and especially if the plot has been constructed with due attention to its parts and its means of working upon the feelings of the spectators, the result will be the evocation of the emotions of ἔλεος and φόβος and the play will have fulfilled its purpose. Finally, no list of the technical terms in the Poetics would be complete without κάθαρσις and μίμησις, which are of vital importance to the whole concept of tragedy.

These, then, are the technical terms selected for investigation, and they will be divided into chapters and examined in the following order:

- Chapter I - τέχνη
- Chapter II - μῦθος, ἥθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, ὄψις
- Chapter III - δέσις, λύσις
- Chapter IV - ἀναγνώρισις, περιπέτεια, πάθος
- Chapter V - ἔλεος, φόβος
- Chapter VI - κάθαρσις, μίμησις

The procedure will be twofold: one for τέχνη and another for the remaining terms. In the case of τέχνη, Aristotle neither defines the term in the Poetics nor provides

any indication that $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\upsilon\eta$ here has a meaning different from what it has elsewhere. The problem is, therefore, to determine the meaning of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\upsilon\eta$ in the works of Aristotle generally, as well as the relation between the Aristotelian significance of the word and its meaning in Greek writers earlier than Aristotle. Accordingly, the occurrences of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\upsilon\eta$ in Greek literature will be examined, from Homer to Aristotle, in an effort to trace the development of its meaning. When Aristotle is reached the occurrences of the word and its significance in all the works except the Poetics will be studied, the relationship between Aristotelian and earlier usage will be investigated, and finally the knowledge gained from the investigation so far will be applied to the use of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\upsilon\eta$ in the Poetics.

In the case of the other technical terms selected, the procedure will be somewhat different. Since most of these words are either defined in the Poetics or so employed that a hint of their significance is given, their occurrences in the Poetics will be examined first. In some instances this will suffice to establish the meaning of the term in the Poetics clearly and surely and it will be unnecessary to look further for Aristotle's meaning; in others, it will be advisable, in order best to learn the meaning of a term in the Poetics, to seek enlightenment from some of the other works of Aristotle. After the Aristotelian significance of a term has been discovered, with special reference to its meaning in the Poetics,

the occurrences of the word in earlier Greek literature will be reviewed, in order to learn whether Aristotle in his usage is following one or more of his predecessors or is using the term with a significance not previously attached to it.

There is one other point of difference in the manner of presentation between τέχνη and the remaining words. In the former the Greek of every passage discussed has been quoted. But once the method has in this way been demonstrated, it seems unnecessary to continue quoting Greek throughout the other chapters. To do so would render interminable a study already long enough and the constant recurrence of sections of Greek would make the text needlessly cumbersome and difficult to follow. The pertinent passages of Greek literature have, therefore, been cited by references in footnotes in chapter II and thereafter.

A note must be added about the mechanics of the procedure. In the examination of the occurrences of the various words in the pre-Aristotelian authors, the same order has been observed with each word. This order is a compromise between a chronological order and a grouping of writers according to type. It has seemed desirable to maintain some approximation of chronological arrangement in order to trace the development of meaning from age to age; but it has, on the other hand, seemed inadvisable to separate authors

of a particular group who might be expected to some extent to resemble one another in their vocabulary, as, for example, the tragic poets. Then, too, the dates of some writers are so uncertain as to resist an accurate chronological classification. For pragmatic reasons, therefore, the following order has been adopted: Homer, the Homeric Hymns, and Hesiod; the lyric poets through Pindar and Bacchylides; Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and the fragments of the Greek Tragedians; Herodotus; Aristophanes and the Fragments of the Old Comedy; Thucydides, the Old Oligarch, Xenophon, Lysias, and the other early orators; the Hippocratic Corpus; the pre-Socratics, Isocrates, and Plato. The geographers alone have been altogether omitted, on the ground that they offer but little material early enough and that unlikely to yield any results of importance.

There will be many words which do not occur in a given author or group of authors at all. It has appeared needless to mention each author by name under each term studied. Therefore, the absence of any reference to a writer will mean that the word under examination does not occur in the surviving works of that author.

In deciding the length of the citations, I have endeavored to supply enough of the context to render the meaning clear, while at the same time holding the total amount of Greek quoted (in chapter I) within a reasonable

limit. The result is that there will be some instances in which the amount of Greek reproduced may seem to be too little to afford the reader an adequate idea of the passage as a whole and the role in it of the term under consideration. Of these instances I may state that the quotation will always be at least sufficient, I hope, to perform the negative office of showing that the sense of the word in question is different from Aristotle's, and I shall further say that on no such scanty quotation will any important argument be allowed to depend. In this same connection, it is often difficult to classify a word, in a given context, under one specific meaning, and some of the classifications I shall make may be open to question. But the task of classifying had to be done in order to introduce the citation in a definite place. I may add, however, that in no instance has an arbitrary classification been made where there was any question of the anticipation of an Aristotelian significance, or where the particular classification might affect the course of the argument. For example, whether *διάνοια* in a given passage means thought or process of thinking will matter very little to the course of this study, so long as it is evident that *διάνοια* there has nothing to do with ^{the} *διάνοια* of the persons in a tragedy.

The effort has been made to quote or cite every instance of the selected words from Greek literature before Aristotle. In certain cases, however, this has proved impos-

sible, usually because of the limitations of space and time. Wherever the quotations or citations are incomplete, this fact will be stated and the absence of such a statement may be understood to imply that every pre-Aristotelian occurrence of the term under review has been quoted. Usually quotations are supplemented by simple references when the number of occurrences of a word in a particular sense in a particular author is excessive. But at least one example will be given of each different sense in which a particular author employs a word. And of words which are rare or which occur only a few times in a given author every occurrence will be cited.

In general the investigation will be confined to the actual terms selected for study. In a few cases, however, particularly when the term in question occurs but rarely, it has appeared that the use of a cognate word may throw needed light upon the matter. Examples of this are ἔλεος and ἑλεεινός, and ἀναγνώρισις and ἀναγνωρίζειν. In such cases the cognate has been investigated as far as seemed helpful. But the examination of the cognate never pretends to be exhaustive.

In gathering the material for this study I have used indices verborum or special lexicons wherever they existed. For only two authors, or groups of authors, were these lacking. The first is Hippocrates or the works of the Hippocratic Corpus. For this I employed the index in volume I, fascicle 1, of

Heiberg's edition. The other group of authors is the lyric poets, except for Pindar and Bacchylides. For this group I had recourse to indices in various editions of selections. These are listed in Section A of the Bibliography, where also are named all the other indices and lexicons used.

Besides collecting instances of the occurrences of words from indices, I read at length in authors where I knew in advance that I should find important material, as, for example, in the Republic of Plato and fragments of Gorgias; and I also read enough in other works to familiarize myself with the contexts of passages which promised to be useful. But I cannot pretend to have read all of every work mentioned in this thesis.

The texts from which the quotations for each author are drawn will be found in Section A of the Bibliography.

The abbreviations used for the authors and the names of their works are those listed in Liddell-Scott-Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1940, Aids to the Reader I, pp. xvi-xxxviii.

In referring to the pre-Socratics, the author's number in Diels' edition and the section letter are always given first, followed by the number of the fragment; as an alternate reference, the volume, page, and line in Diels are also given within parentheses. Occasionally the use of parentheses for the alternate citation has seemed awkward, as, for instance, when the entire reference is enclosed within paren-

theses (e.g., p. 35). In such a case, the two forms of the reference have been separated by a sign of equality.

Whenever I have quoted Greek, I have followed the spelling, accentuation, and punctuation of the edition listed in the Bibliography. This, rather than personal whim, accounts for any apparent inconsistencies in these details.

Whenever a passage of Greek, whether quoted or cited, has been translated in the text, the translation is enclosed within quotation marks. Any translation without attribution is mine; whenever I have used a translation made by someone else, the translator's name is given. Paraphrases of Greek passages, on the other hand, are marked by no special punctuation.

CHAPTER I

τέχνη

SECTION 1.

Aristotle, at the outset of the Poetics,¹ refers to the making of poetry as a τέχνη; and the word reappears fifteen times in the course of the treatise. It is clear at the start that poetry, whatever else it may be, is, for Aristotle, a τέχνη. It is customary to translate this word into English as art; the Poetics is described as a treatise on the art of poetry and regarded as a source of information about the Aristotelian theory of aesthetics. Now what is a τέχνη? Precisely what does Aristotle mean in speaking of the τέχνη of poetry? The answer to this may shed some light on the nature of the Poetics and so help in interpreting it correctly. With this in mind I shall, therefore, examine the use of the word τέχνη in the Greek writers who precede Plato and Aristotle, so as to discover what connotation it had in general use, before it became properly a technical term in the writings of Aristotle.

I shall start with Homer. τέχνη is used once in the Iliad, Γ61, in the speech in which Paris replies to the

1. 1447a21: ...οὕτω κἂν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις [sc. ἐποποιία, τραγῳδία, κωμῳδία, κτλ.] θᾶσσαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ,

rebuke of Hector:

Ἕκτορ, ἐπεὶ με κατ' αἶσαν ἐνείκεσας οὐδ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν, -
αἶε τοι κραδίη πέλεκυς ὥς ἐστίν ἀτειρής,
ὅς τ' εἰσιν διὰ δουρὸς ὑπ' ἀνέρος, ὅς ῥά τε τέχνη
νήϊον ἐκτάμνησιν, ὁφέλλει δ' ἀνδρὸς ἐρώην.

Here τέχνη means skill or cunning of hand, with reference to the craft of the shipwright. The same essential significance, skill or manual dexterity in working at a craft, belongs to τέχνη in the Odyssey:

[232 ὥς δ' ὅτε τις χρυσὸν περιχεύεται ἀργύρῳ ἀνὴρ
Ἴδρις, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδαεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη
τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελεῖει,

γ432

ἦλθε δὲ χαλκὸς

ὅπλ' ἐν χερσὶν ἔχων χαλκῆϊα, πείρατα τέχνης,
ἄκμονά τε σφυρὰν τ' εὐκοίητόν τε πυράγρην,
οἷσιν τε χρυσὸν ἐργάζετο....

λ613 μὴ τεχνησάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσαιτο,
ὅς κείνον τελαμῶνα ἐῖν ἐγκάτθετο τέχνη.

τέχνη appears in ψ161 also, in the same construction and sense as those of ζ234. In all these passages its meaning is that which we have already seen in the Iliad. Elsewhere in the Odyssey, however, it assumes a somewhat different connotation, that of craft or cunning to deceive another. Menelaus speaking of how elusive he had found Proteus says:

...οὐδ' ὁ γέρων δολίης ἐπελήθετο τέχνης.¹

Later he speaks of the deceitfulness of Aegisthus:

αὐτίκα δ' Αἰγισθος δολίην ἐφράσσατο τέχνην.²

And in the song of Demodocus τέχνη is used in a similar, though perhaps somewhat less sinister, sense to characterize the means whereby Hephaestus caught Ares with Aphrodite:³

0326 ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι
τέχνας εἰσορόωσι πολύφρονος Ἥφαιστοιο.

0330 ...Ἥφαιστος...εἶλεν Ἄρηα,
ὠκύτατόν περ ἔδοντα θεῶν...
χωλὸς ἔων τέχνησι....

τέχνη seems peculiarly to fit the wiles of Hephaestus, who is the god skilled at metal working and the handicrafts in general. In all these occurrences of the word in Homer, however, even when, as in the instances of Proteus and Aegisthus, no tangible object like a ship or a net is devised, the basic significance is the skill displayed in doing something. It is never knowledge unapplied, never skill divorced from accomplishment.

Although the Homeric Hymns are later in date than the poems of Hesiod, they may conveniently be considered at this

1. 0455.

2. 0529.

3. It may be noted that τέχνη in Homer is often equivalent to μηχανή in later prose.

point, since they do not differ from the Iliad and the Odyssey in their use of τέχνη. The instances required all occur in the Hymn to Hermes; the following six show the idea of skill in accomplishing something, of a craft requiring the application of particular knowledge:

108 οὖν δ' ἐφόρει ξύλα πολλά, πυρὸς δ' ἐπεμαίετο τέχνην.

166 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ τέχνης ἐπιβήσομαι ἢ τις ἀρίστη,
βουκολέων ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ διαμπερές·... .

447 τίς τέχνη, τίς μοῦσα ἀμηχανέων μελεδόνων,
τίς τρίβος; ...

463 τὸν δ' Ἑρμῆς μύθοισιν ἀμείβετο κερδαλέοισιν·
εἰρωτᾷς μ' Ἑκάεργε περιφραδές· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ σοι
τέχνης ἡμετέρης ἐπιβήμεναι οὐ τι μεγαίρω.

482 ...ὅς τις ἂν αὐτὴν
τέχνη καὶ σοφίῃ δεδαημένος ἐξερεεῖν,

511 αὐτὸς δ' αὖθ' ἑτέρης σοφίης ἐκμάσσατο τέχνην·

In the two remaining instances the meaning wiles, deceitful cunning, prevails:

76 ...δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης,

317 αὐτὰρ ὁ τέχνησιν τε καὶ αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισιν
ἤθελεν ἐξαπατᾶν Κυλλήνιος Ἀργυρότοξον·

But here again, the idea of skill, of a clever device, is essential; the connotation of deceit is effected by the context or by the addition of a qualifying adjective.

We find that this is true also of the use of τέχνη

in the works of Hesiod. In seven of the nine occurrences of the word, a modifying adjective, usually δολίη, but twice κακή, is added to give the sense of deceit or guile. All nine instances are found in the Theogony:

160δολίην δὲ κακὴν τ' ἐφράσσατο τέχνην.

496 νικηθεὶς τέχνησι βίηφί τε παιδὸς ἑοῖο.

(This line is rejected by Heyne.)

540 τῷ δ' αὖτ' ὅστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίη ἐπὶ τέχνῃ
εὐθετίσας κατέθηκε καλὴψας ἀργέτι δημῷ.

548 τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης
ἥκ' ἐπιμειδήσας, δολίης δ' οὐ λήθετο τέχνης.

555 ὥς ἴδεν ὅστέα λευκὰ βοὸς δολίη ἐπὶ τέχνῃ.

560οὐκ ἄρα πῶ δολίης ἐπιλήθεο τέχνης.

767 ἔνθα θεοῦ χθονίου πρόσθεν δόμοι ἤχθεντες

.....

ἑστᾶσιν, δεινὸς δὲ κύων προπάροιθε φυλάσσει
νηλεΐης, τέχνην δὲ κακὴν ἔχει. . . .

The next two instances, without this pejorative modification, mean handicraft or manual skill:

861πολλὴ δὲ πελώρη καίετο γαῖα
ἀτμῇ θεσπεσίῃ καὶ ἐτήκετο κασσίτερος ὥς
τέχνη ὕπ' αἰζηῶν ἐν εὐτρήτοισι χοάνοισι
θαλφθεῖς,

929 ἐκ πάντων τέχνησι κεκασμένον Οὐρανίωνων.

(This last refers to Hephaestus.)

Among the lyric poets the word is scarce, for only three of them, Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides, use it, so far as I have been able to discover.

Simonides 152 "Ισθμια δῖς, Νεμέαι δῖς, Ὀλυμπίαι ἐστεφανώθην
οὐ κλάτει νικῶν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τέχνηαι,
Ἀριστόδαμος θράσυνος Αλεῖος πάλαι.

Here τέχνη is contrasted with κλάτος σώματος; Aristodamus won his victories in wrestling not by the breadth of his body, not by brute strength, but by the skill which he had acquired in his chosen sport. Pindar offers eleven examples:

Q. VII 50αὐτὰ δέ σφισιν ὤπασε τέχνηαν
πᾶσαν ἐπιχθονίων Γλανκῶπις ἀριστοπόνους χερσὶ κρατεῖν.
ἔργα δὲ ζωῶσιν ἐρπόντεσσι θ' ὁμοῖα κέλευθοι φέρον.

The poet is here clearly referring to sculpture; the Rhodians had received from Athena the gift of skill beyond that of other mortals and so excelled in working with their hands that the statues along their streets looked alive. In Pythian XII, inscribed Μίδα ἀύλητῇ, he writes of Midas¹: αὐτόν τέ νιν Ἑλλάδα νικάσαντα τέχνη, ... where the τέχνη is obviously flute-playing. Elsewhere it is prophecy²: μαντευμάτων τ' ἐφάψατο συγγόνουσι τέχναις. And again, there is the general, per-

1. Line 6.

2. P. VIII 60.

haps metaphorical, use:

N. I 25 ... τέχναι δ' ἑτέρων ἕτεραι. "Different men excel in different ways." Men have various specialties in which to exercise their abilities. Three other passages display the dative τέχναις used in an adverbial sense, by the special activities of, by the agency of:

O. VII 35 ἀνίχ' Ἀφαιστοῦ τέχναισιν

χαλκελάτῳ πελέκει πατέρος Ἀθαναΐα κορυφὰν κατ' ἄκραν
ἀνοροῦσαις ἁλάλαζεν ὑπερμάκει βοᾷ.

O. IX 52 Ζηῦδος τέχναις ἀνὰ πωτιν ἐξαίφνης

ἄντλον ἐλεῖν. ...

P. III 11 εἰς Αἴδα δόμον ἐν θαλάμῳ κατέβη, τέχναις Ἀπόλλωνος. ...

Similar, but without the genitive which usually follows, is

P. IV 249 κτεῖνε μὲν γλαυκῶπα τέχναις ποικιλόνοτον ὄφιν, ...

Finally, τέχνη is thrice used to denote deceit, cheating, trickery:

N. IV 57 δάμαρτος Ἰππολύτας Ἀκάστον δολίαις

τέχναισι χρησάμενος.

τᾷ Δαιδάλου τε μαχαίρᾳ φύτευέ οἱ θάνατον

I. IV 36 καὶ κρέσσον' ἀνδρῶν χειρόνων

ἔσφαλε τέχνα καταμάρψαις. ...

P. II 31 ... τὸ μὲν ἦρως ὅτι

ἐμφύλιον αἶμα πρότιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμειξε θνατοῖς,

here Pindar is speaking of Ixion.

Bacchylides uses τέχνη twice:

X 31 εὖ τι δόλος κακόφρων,
 παῖδ' ἐν χθονὶ καλλιχόρῳ
 ποικίλαις τέχναις πέλασσευ:

Jebb translates¹: "Not that a malignant fraud made the boy a prey to crafty arts in the fair precincts of Olympia: ..."

XII 48 οἶαν τινὰ δύσλοφον ὦ --
 μηστᾷ λέοντι
 Περσείδας ἐφίησι<ν>
 χειῖρα παντοίαισι τέχναις.

Jebb²: "See how that scion of Perseus, skilled in every resource, lays a crushing hand on the savage lion; ..."

The tragic poets are much more generous than their lyric predecessors in the use of τέχνη. In what survives of the works of Aeschylus it appears fourteen times, eight times in Sophocles, and twenty-eight times in Euripides. Aeschylus never employs it to denote guile; rather, he adheres closely to the essential significance of skill or handicraft:

Pr. 47 ... πόνων γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶ λόγῳ
 τῶν νῦν παρόντων οὐδὲν αἰτία τέχνη.

Τέχνη here refers to the χειρωναξία of Hephaestus mentioned in line 45. The god has declared that he hates the handicraft

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1. R. C. Jebb, Bacchylides, The Poems and Fragments, Cambridge, 1905, p. 325.
 2. Op. cit., p. 339.

that is his, for the task of fixing Prometheus to his rock of torture is distasteful to him. "Why should you," retorts the jailor Cratos, "since your craft is in no way to blame for these present troubles?"

Pr. 110 ...ἡ διδάσκαλος τέχνης

πάσης βροτοῖς πέφηνε καὶ μέγας πόρος.

Pr. 254 ἀφ' οὗ γε πολλὰς ἐκμαθήσονται τέχνας.

Pr. 476 τὰ λοιπὰ μου κλύουσα θαυμάση κλέον,

οἷας τέχνας τε καὶ πόρους ἐμησάμην.

Pr. 496 κνίσῃ τε κῶλα συγκαλυπτὰ καὶ μακρὰν

ὄσφυν πυρώσας δυστέκμαρτον εἰς τέχνην

ᾧδωσα θνητούς, ...

Pr. 506 πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως.

Pr. 514 τέχνη δ' ἀνάγκης ἀσθενεστέρα μακρῶ.

In all these passages the meaning of τέχνη is constant. Smyth¹ translates it as art throughout, a correct rendering, provided art be understood in its sense of method, device, skill, rather than as creative aesthetic endeavor. For τέχνη here neither directly signifies nor implies anything about the expression of beauty or universal truth, but simply means a device for accomplishing a given end with the greatest possible efficiency. Its association with πόρος in lines 110 and 477 is worth noting,

1. Aeschylus with an English Translation (Loeb Classical Library 1922) vol. 1, pp. 211 ff.

as is also the distinction, in line 514, between τέχνη and ἀνάγκη, in which the skill and resourcefulness of Prometheus are declared inferior to fate or the will of Zeus. Elsewhere in Aeschylus τέχνη is applied to a specific craft, that of soothsaying, as in fragment 350, line 6:

κάγω τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἄψευδὲς στόμα

ἡλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βροῦν τέχνη:

The other places in which τέχνη indicates the mantic art are Septem contra Thebas 26, Agamemnon 249, 1134, and 1209, and Eumenides 17. One other occurrence of τέχνη requires mentioning and the tale is told for Aeschylus. In Prometheus 87 it means a piece of handiwork, the result of the operation of a craft.

...αὐτὸν γάρ σε δεῖ προμηθέως,

ὅτω τρόπῳ τῆσδ' ἐκκυλισθήσῃ τέχνης.

Crates is exulting over the enchained Prometheus.

Sophocles uses τέχνη three times in the general sense of skill, craft, or device:

Ant. 365 σοφόν τι τὸ μαχανόεν

τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων

τοτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει,

Notice τέχνας following and depending on τὸ μαχανόεν. The similarity in meaning between τέχνη and μηχανή in Homer has already been pointed out.

OT. 380 ὦ πλοῦτε καὶ τυραννὶ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης

ὑπερφέρουσα τῷ πολυζήλῳ βίῳ,

Ph. 138 τέχνα γὰρ τέχνας ἑτέρας
 προύχει καὶ γνῶμα παρ' ὅτῳ τὸ θεῖον
 Διὸς σκηπτρον ἀνάσσεται.

Three times τέχνη denotes a specific craft other than soothsaying:

Tr. 620 ἄλλ' εἶπερ Ἑρμοῦ τήνδε κομπεύω τέχνην
 βέβαιον...

of the occupation of herald.

Aj. 357 ἰὼ, γένος ναῖας ἄρωγόν τέχνας,
 of sailing.

Aj. 1121 οὐ γὰρ βάνανσον τὴν τέχνην ἐκτησάμην.
 i.e., τὴν τοξεντικήν.

Of τέχνη for the business of soothsaying Sophocles has six examples; I shall quote one and list the others.

Ot. 562 τότε οὖν ὁ μάντις οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ;

Ot. 357, 389, 709; Ant. 998; El. 1500. The meaning tricks, wiles, too, is exemplified. Neoptolemus points out to Odysseus, Philoctetes 88,

ἔφυν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐκ τέχνης πρᾶσσειν κακῆς,
 οὔτ' αὐτὸς οὔθ' ὥς φασιν, οὐκ φύσας ἐμέ.

Later in the same play the suffering Philoctetes, fearful of his enemies, urges Neoptolemus to guard well the bow of Heracles (l. 771):

.....ἐφίεμαι
 ἐκόντα μὴδ' ἄκοντα μὴδέ τῳ τέχνῃ
 κείνοις μεθεῖναι ταῦτα,...

OT 642 ξύμφημι· δρῶντα γάρ νιν, ὧ γύναι, κακῶς
εἶληφα τούμδον σῶμα σὺν τέχνῃ κακῇ.

Adverbially:

A1. 751 ἐς χεῖρα Τεύκρου δεξιὰν φιλοφρόνως
θεὸς εἶπε κάπεσκηψε παντοῖα τέχνη
εἶρξαι κατ' ἡμᾶρ τούφανες τὸ νῦν τόδε
Αἴανθ' ὑπὸ σκηναῖσι μηδ' ἀφέντ' ἔαν,
εἰ ζῶντ' ἐκεῖνον εἰσιδεῖν θέλοι ποτέ.

Finally, the product of skill in action, the handiwork, is indicated by τέχνη:

OC 472 κρατῆρές εἰσιν, ἀνδρὸς εὐχειρος τέχνη,
Fr. 156 ὁ δὲ ξυθ' ὀπλοῖς ἀρρῶξιν Ἥφαίστου τέχνη.

Euripides employs τέχνη to designate the seer's craft in the Phoenissae, 772:

ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην μαντικὴν ἐμεμψάμην
ἤδη πρὸς αὐτόν, ὥστε μοι μομφὰς ἔχειν,

in line 954 of the same play, and in the Iphigenia Taurica, 712. Four times elsewhere he applies τέχνη to a particular craft other than the prophetic:

Supp. 381 τέχνην μὲν αἶεὶ τήνδ' ἔχων ὑπηρετεῖς
πόλει τε κάμοι, διαφέρων κηρύγματα·

the herald's trade;

Supp. 904 γνῶμη δ' ἀδελφοῦ Μελεάγρου λελειμμένος,
ἶσον παρέσχευ ὄνομα διὰ τέχνης δορός,
εὐρὼν ἀκριβῆ μουσικὴν ἐν ἀσπίδι·

of using the spear;

IT 53 κάγω τέχνην τήνδ' ἣν ἔχω ξενοκτόνον
τιμῶσ' ὑδραίνειν αὐτὸν ὡς θανούμενον,
κλαίονσα,

the business of killing strangers; the word here assumes the connotations of rite and of function or office;

Rh. 924κακτυφλώσαμεν
θάμυριν, ὅς ἡμῶν πόλλ' ἐδέυνασεν τέχνην,
the musical.

The sense of trick, stratagem, wile, device, occurs eleven times in the plays and fragments of Euripides:

Med. 322 ὡς ταῦτ' ἄραρε, κούκ ἔχεις τέχνην ὅπως
μενεῖς παρ' ἡμῖν οὔσα δυσμενῆς ἐμοί.

Ion 1279 ἴδεσθε τὴν πανοῦργον, ἐκ τέχνης τέχνην
οἶαν ἐπλεξε· βωμὸν ἔπηξεν θεοῦ,
ὡς οὐ δίκην δώσουσα τῶν εἰργασμένων.

Hipp. 680 φεῦ φεῦ· πέπρακται, κοῦ κατέρθωνται τέχναί,
δέσποινα, τῆς σῆς προσπόλου, κακῶς δ' ἔχει.

Hel. 1621 ὦ γυναικείαις τέχναισιν αἰρεθεῖς ἐγὼ τάλας·

The remaining lines in which the sense of guile or trick seems apparent are Alc. 34; Hel. 930; IA 745; IT 24; Or. 1497; Rh. 953; and Fr. 323. 1. Then there are instances of the general meaning of τέχνη as skill, device, means, or craft, ten in all:

Fr. 88. 1 γυναῖκες, ὁρμήθητε μηδ' ἀθυμίαν

σχέθη τις ὑμῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ σκεθρῶς ὁρᾷ
 ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη τοὺς νομίζοντας τέχνην.

Hipp. 669 τάλανες ὧ κακοτυχεῖς
 γυναικῶν πόταμοι.
 τίνα νῦν ἢ τέχνην ἔχομεν ἢ <τίνας>
 σφαλεῖσαι κάθαρμα λῦειν λόγους;

Hec. 836 εἴ μοι γένοιτο φθόγγος ἐν βραχίοσι
 καὶ χερσὶ καὶ κόμαισι καὶ ποδῶν βάσει
 ἢ Δαιδάλου τέχναισιν ἢ θεῶν τινας,
 ὥς πάνθ' ὁμαρτῇ σὼν ἔχουσιντο γουνάτων
 κλαίουτ', ἐπισκῆπτοντα παντοίους λόγους.

IT . 1032 δειναὶ γὰρ αἱ γυναῖκες εὐρίσκειν τέχνας.¹

Ale. 785 τὸ τῆς τύχης γὰρ ἄφανές οἱ προβήσεται,
 κᾶστ' οὐ διδακτὸν οὐδ' ἀλίσκεται τέχνη.

Hipp. 916 ὧ πόλλ' ἁμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,
 τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
 καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κἀξευρίσκετε,
 ἐν δ' οὐκ ἐπίστασθ' οὐδ' ἐθηράσασθέ πω,
 φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;

1. Some may prefer to place this with the preceding group:
 "Women are clever at finding tricks to deceive." The distinction between the general meaning and that implying deceit is sometimes hard to draw.

This passage gives us certain information: a τέχνη can be taught by one person and learned by another; it is a specific skill, not an innate characteristic of a man; it is not wisdom and cannot take the place of intelligence. More than this the remaining Euripidean instances¹ of τέχνη in its general sense cannot tell us.

Among the surviving fragments of Greek tragedy apart from the great Athenian trio, τέχνη occurs five times, always, so far as can be told, in its sense of skill or dexterity in doing something:²

Agathon 6, p. 764 Nauck τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

id. 8, p. 765 καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῇ τέχνῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη προσγίγνεται.

Antiphon 4, p. 793 τέχνη κρατοῦμεν ὧν φύσει νικώμεθα.

Ion 38, 1, p. 739 ἀλλ' ἐν τε χέρσῳ τὰς λέοντος ἦνεσα ἢ τὰς ἐχίνου μᾶλλον οἰζυρὰς τέχνας.

Adesp. 267, p. 890 τέχνης γὰρ οὐκ ἤμαρτες

In prose, Herodotus writes of a craft or a skill as τέχνη:

II 53.2 οὗτοι δὲ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην "Ἕλλησι καὶ

1. Ba. 675, 806; Fr. 186. 2; 636.1.

2. All references to the fragments of Greek tragedy are by Augustus Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1889.

τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμὰς τε καὶ τέχνας
διελόντες καὶ εἶδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες. The word seems here to
gain the shade of a function or a specialty.

VI 60 οἱ κήρυκες αὐτῶν καὶ αὐληταὶ καὶ μάγειροι ἐκδέκονται
τὰς πατρῷας τέχνας. Heraldry, flute-playing, cooking are
all τέχναι. Plato denies that cooking is one,¹ but of that
later. II 86.1 and II 164.1 show the word used similarly.

II 83 refers to the practice of prophecy: μαντική δὲ αὐτοῖσι ὧδε
διάκειται. ἀνθρώπων μὲν οὐδενὶ πρόσκειται ἡ τέχνη, τῶν δὲ
θεῶν μετεξετέροισι.

In five places Herodotus speaks of medicine as ἀτέχνη:
III 125.1... ἰητρον τε ἔοντα καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀσκέοντα ἄριστα
τῶν κατ' ἐωυτόν.

III 130.2... ὁμιλήσας δὲ ἰητρῷ φλαύρως ἔχειν τὴν τέχνην.

III 130.1 σταθέντα δὲ ἐς μέσον εἰρῶτα ὁ Δαρεῖος τὴν τέχνην εἰ
ἐπίσταιτο....

Similarly III 129.3, 131.1. From II 166.2 we learn that a
τέχνη is cultivated : οὐδὲ τοῦτοις ἐξεστὶ τέχνην ἐπασκῆσαι
οὐδεμίαν... . From I 73.3, that it can be learned : καὶ δὲ σφι
παρέδωκε τὴν γλῶσσάν τε ἐκμαθεῖν καὶ τὴν τέχνην τῶν τόξων.

Another craft, incidentally, is here specified, that of shooting
with the bow. II 167.1 reinforces the point about learning
τέχναι. Finally, there is the adverbial use : I 112.1
μηδεμιῇ τέχνῃ, on no account, in no wise; "way, manner, or

1. Grg. 463b.

means whereby a thing is gained without any definite sense of art or craft."¹ IX 57.1 ἰθὲν τέχνη "in earnest" (Powell) or "straightway."²

The writers of comedy make no great innovation in the use of τέχνη; they increase the number of individual τέχναι specified, but nowhere fit the word to a sense which could not have been foreseen. Aristophanes yields forty-six examples of the term; from them we can see the chief change in the use of τέχνη is a shifting of emphasis. The passages in which the word has its general meaning, except adverbially, are fewer in relation to the whole number of examples; it more often designates the trade of a handicraftsman or even the occupation of a laborer without notable skill than it does a device, method, or plan of dealing with a situation. It is, in other words, less like μηχανή. And it means guile or trick only twice. The passages which show the general meaning follow:

Pl. 511 εἰ γὰρ ὁ Πλοῦτος βλέψει πάλιν διανείμειν τ' ἴσον αὐτόν, οὔτε τέχνην ἄν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὔτ' ἄν σοφίαν μελετῶη... .

Τέχνη here is contrasted with σοφία: the latter is theoretical or scientific knowledge, perhaps, while the former is knowledge and skill applied to making or doing something. But it is dangerous to try to hold Aristophanes to fine-drawn philo-

1. Liddell-Scott - Jones, s.v. τέχνη, I 3, p. 1785.

2. Ibid.

sophical distinctions which belong rather to Plato and Aristotle.

Pl. 905 τί δαί; τέχνην τιν' ἔμαθες;...

Τέχνη commonly means trade, craft, business, or occupation, even when no specific trade is mentioned:

Fr. 149. 2ἕνα γὰρ ἀφ' ἐκάστης τέχνης

εἰλόμεθα κρινῆ, γενομένης ἐκκλησίας,

Eq. 1241 τέχνην δὲ τίνα ποτ' εἶχες ἐξανδροῦμενος;

V. 1431 "ἔρδοι τις ἦν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην."

Ar. 1387 κρέματα μὲν οὖν ἐντεῦθεν ἡμῶν ἡ τέχνη.

Pl. 160 τέχνηαι δὲ πᾶσαι διὰ σὲ καὶ σοφίσματα
ἐν τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐσθ' ἡρμημένα.

A list follows of several of these τέχνηαι, which I shall note individually a little later. The other lines in which τέχνη signifies a trade, business, or occupation are Eq. 141 and Pax 544. Next come the two instances of τέχνη as guile or trick:

Eq. 62 ὁ δ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὀρᾷ μεμακκοακότα,
τέχνην πεποιήται. τοὺς γὰρ ἔνδον ἄντικρυς
ψευδῆ διαβάλλει· κᾶτα μαστιγούμεθα
ἡμεῖς.

V. 192 πονηρὸς εἶ πόρρω τέχνης καὶ παράβολος,
"far advanced in villainy."

Τέχνη appears in the dative, usually in the phrase πάσῃ τέχνῃ, eleven times; this is its adverbial function, in which it signifies by all means, in every way. A single example

will suffice for illustration:

Th. 64 ὦ δαιμόνιε τοῦτον μὲν ἔα χαίρειν, σὺ δὲ
'Αγάθωνά μοι δεῦρ' ἐκκάλεσον πάση τέχνῃ.

The other occurrences of this sort are Eq. 593; Nu. 885, 1323; Lys. 412; Th. 430, 271; Ra. 1235; Eq. 366, 534.

Aristophanes furthermore adds to the list of τέχναι specifically mentioned in literature many new ones. And one which I have already listed from Herodotus he repeats, the practice of medicine:

Pl. 407 τίς δῆτ' ἰατρός ἐστι νῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει;
οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς οὐδὲν ἔστ' οὔθ' ἡ τέχνη.

The others follow:

Eq. 144 ἄλλαντοπώλης; ὦ Πόσειδον τῆς τέχνης,
i.e., sausage-selling. It is referred to again in Eq. 1397
and 1407:

Av. 1422 μὰ Δί' ἄλλὰ κλητὴρ εἰμι νησιωτικὸς
καὶ σκυφάντης - Πι. ὦ μακάριε τῆς τέχνης.

The informer's skill is here specified.

Pax 1212 ἀπώλεσάς μου τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸν βίον,
spoken by the crestmaker of his business of crest-making.

Ec. 364 τίς τῶν κατὰ πρῶκτον δεινός ἐστι τὴν τέχνην;

The pathic is here indicated. Besides these, in the speeches immediately following Plutus 160, several other crafts or trades are named: shoemaking (ὁ μὲν σκυτοτομεῖ), bronze-working (χαλκεύει τις), gold-fusing (ὁ δὲ χρυσοχοεῖ), robbery and

burglary (ὁ δὲ λωποδυντεῖ....ὁ δὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ), the fuller's craft (γναφεύει), the washing of sheepskin (πλύνει κώδια), tanning (βυρσοδεψεῖ), onion selling (πωλεῖ κρόμμυα). Finally, there is one τέχνη which above all others engages Aristophanes' attention: seventeen times he speaks of the poetic τέχνη, usually that of tragedy in particular. A few examples will be enough to show what the word connotes when applied to writing poetry:

Ra. 769 ἐκεῖνος εἶχε τὸν τραγῳδικὸν θρόνον,
ὡς ὢν κράτιστος τὴν τέχνην... .

Ra. 779 μὰ Δί' ἄλλ' ὁ δῆμος ἀνεβόα κρίσιν ποιεῖν
ὀπότερος εἴη τὴν τέχνην σοφώτερος.

Ra. 939 ἄλλ' ὡς παρέλαβον τὴν τέχνην παρὰ σοῦ τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς
οἶδοῦσαν ὑπὸ κομπασμάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐπαχθῶν.

Ra. 1368 ἴτε δεῦρό νυν, εἵπερ γε δεῖ καὶ τοῦτό με
ἀνδρῶν ποιητῶν τυροπωλῆσαι τέχνην.

In all these lines the author refers to the writing of tragedy. Manifestly he regards it as a τέχνη. In line 939 the word τέχνην might be taken to mean the poetic form, the form of tragedy, a special kind or branch of poetry in general, distinguishing tragedy from other kinds of poems, such as the epic and the epinician ode. Or it may mean the poetic craft or art, referring to the point of development to which Aeschylus had carried the writing of tragedies. For the rest, τέχνη in connection with poetry seems to connote the skill, the crafts-

manship of the poet, the ability he displays in handling the means at his disposal, his control over his chosen medium of expression, his power most effectively to achieve his end.

Aristophanes uses τέχνη once to refer to his own art of comedy:

Pax 746 τοιαῦτ' ἀφελὼν κακὰ καὶ φόρτον καὶ βωμολοχεύματ' ἀγεννη

ἐποίησε τέχνην μεγάλην ἡμῖν κἀπύργωσ' οἰκοδομήσας.

"Our τέχνη" is obviously comedy. It may here be noted, too, that τέχνη in this passage may be interpreted as "our profession" or "our business." It can have, that is, even when it indubitably refers to the activity of the poet, the suggestion of calling, profession, business, one's chief occupation. But this is the only instance in Aristophanes in which such an interpretation may reasonably be made, referring to the profession of the poet. The remaining occurrences of τέχνη in connection with poetry are all from the Ranae: 93, 762, 766, 786, 793, 811, 831, 850, 961, 973, 1495.

Among the other comic writers I have been able to come upon only two examples of τέχνη. The one, listed by Kaibel¹ (p. 139) as Pseudepicharmus 257. 5, is of little note, being simply a statement that man has discovered no craft, but that the god has given skill. The other is from a fragment of Epicharmus, 171. 8 (p. 123 Kaibel):

ὥσπερ γάρ ἐστ' αὐλησιν αὐλητὰς μαθὼν

1. Georgius Kaibel, Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, I, Berlin, 1899.

ἢ ὄρχησιν ὄρχηστάς τις ἢ πλοκεὺς πλοκάν,
 ἢ πᾶν γ' ὁμοίως τῶν τοιούτων ὃ τι τὸ λήϊς,
 οὐκ αὐτὸς εἶη καὶ τέχνη, τεχνικὸς γὰρ μάν.

The passage is a discussion of the distinction between a virtue or a skill and the man who possesses it: so, the αὐλητὰς has the accomplishment of αὐλησις. As I take the lines quoted, the writer, after instancing a number of particular skills with the appropriate designation of the man who possesses each, concludes with the general statement that a man is not himself a skill, but is skillful.

Thucydides, who uses τέχνη twelve times, employs it in a more limited range of meanings. Once it is a strategem. Writing of the operations of the armies around Amphipolis in 422 B. C., he says of Brasidas¹: καὶ ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, δεδιὼς τὴν αὐτοῦ παρασκευὴν καὶ νομίζων ὑποδεεστέρους εἶναι, οὐ τῷ πλήθει..., ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀξιώματι..., τέχνη δὲ παρασκευάζετο ἐπιθησόμενος. In three instances² τέχνη appears in the dative in the adverbial sense; these all occur in legal formulae in the account of the terms of the treaties which closed the Archidamian war. For example, V 18.4: ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Λακεδαιμο-

1. V 8.2.

2. V 18.4; 47.2; 47.8.

νίους καὶ τοὺς ζυμμάχους ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ζυμμάχους
μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ζυμμάχους ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς
ζυμμάχους, μήτε τέχνη μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ. Τέχνη here again
resembles μηχανή in meaning. In the remaining eight appearances
of the word it has the significance of skill, craft, accomplish-
ment. Two illustrations will suffice:

II 47.4 οὐτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἤρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἀγνοίᾳ,
ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ μάλιστα ἔθνησκον ὅσῳ καὶ μάλιστα προσῆσαν, οὐτε
ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεία τέχνη οὐδεμία· ...

I 142.6 τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι οὐ ῥαδίως
αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται. ...

I 142.9 ...καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται καὶ δι'
αὐτὸ καὶ ὀκνηρότεροι. τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἐκείνῳ πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι. To

master a τέχνη, it is clear, requires practice. The other six
passages containing the word are I 49.2; 71.3; II 87.4; VII 36.4;
70.3; 70.7.

In the Respublica Atheniensium found among the works
of Xenophon, but whose author is known as the Old Oligarch,
τέχνη is used once¹, with the significance work, trade, craft,
or the product of a craft.

The term occurs eighteen times in the works of Xeno-

1. I 12.

phon himself. It sometimes denotes skill or device; for example, de Equitum Magistro V 14: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐγὼ καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τούτοις τις μηχανήσεται ἢ βία ἢ τέχνη αἰρεῖν τοὺς ἐναντίους βουλόμενος οὐν τῷ θεῷ πράττειν συμβουλεύω, ... Here skill or cunning is set over against strength or force.

Eq. II 2 χρή μέντοι ὥσπερ τὸν παῖδα ὅταν ἐπὶ τέχνην ἐκδῶ, συγγραψάμενον ἃ δεήσει ἐπιστάμενον ἀποδοῦναι οὕτως ἐκδιδόναι. -- Of apprenticing a boy to learn a craft.

Cyr. VI 2, 37 ἄξω δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατιωτικῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις χαλκίας τε καὶ τέκτονας καὶ σκυτοτόμους, ὅπως ἂν τι δέη καὶ τοιούτων τεχνῶν ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ μηδὲν ἐλλείπηται. -- Of the manual skills or handicrafts.

Id. VII 2, 13 ...αἱ τέχναι σοι, ὥς πηγὰς φασὶ τῶν καλῶν εἶναι, ... -- the arts or crafts are the source of fine things.

Mem. II 1, 17 ...οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ... -- another specific craft, that of kingship, is listed.

Cyn. XII 7 ...ἵνα μὴ ἀφαιροῖντο τὰς θήρας αὐτῶν οἱ ἔχοντες ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, i.e., of hunting. Finally, the adverbial use, in the phrase¹ πάσῃ τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανῇ.

1. An. VII 2, 8. The remaining references for Xenophon:

Cyn. I 14, XIII 4; Cyr. V 3, 47; VIII 3, 1; Eq. Mag.

IV 20; H. G. III 3, 7; VII 1, 4; Mem. I 2, 31; III 10, 1;

IV 2, 11; Lac. I 3.

One passage will do to show the ordinary significance of the word in Lysias.

XXIV 4-6 φησὶ γὰρ ὁ κατήγορος οὐδὲ δικαίως με λαμβάνειν τὸ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀργύριον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ σώματι δύνασθαι καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ τέχνην ἐπίστασθαι τοιαύτην ὥστε καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ διδομένου τούτου ζῆν. καὶ τεκμηρίοις χρῆται τῆς μὲν τοῦ σώματος ῥώμης, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἀναβαίνω, τῆς δ' ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ εὐπορίας, ὅτι δύναμαι συνεῖναι δυναμένοις ἀνθρώποις ἀναλίσκειν. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς τέχνης εὐπορίαν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον τὸν ἐμὸν βίον, οἷος τυγχάνει, πάντας ὑμᾶς οἶομαι γινώσκειν. ... τέχνην δὲ κέκτημαι βραχέα δυναμένην ὠφελεῖν, ἣν αὐτὸς μὲν ἤδη χαλεπῶς ἐργάζομαι, τὸν διαδεξόμενον δ' αὐτὴν οὐπω δύναμαι κτήσασθαι. It is here what a man makes his living at, his business, craft, or trade. Lysias mentions a few by name:

Fr. 69 'Αλλὰ διὰ τὸ τρεῖς τέχνας ἐργάζεσθαι, τὴν τε λιθουργικὴν καὶ λιθοτριβικὴν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ τετρυφικέον. Stone-masonry, stone-polishing, and playing the voluptuary.

Fr. 1, 2 "κατασκευάζομαι δ'" ἔφη "τέχνην μυρεψικὴν; ..." The perfumer's craft.

I 17 "ἔστι δ'," ἔφη, "Ἐρατοσθένους Ὁῆθεν ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ὅς οὐ μόνον τὴν σὴν γυναῖκα διέφθορεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς· ταύτην γὰρ [τὴν] τέχνην ἔχει." And last, the adverbial dative appears three times¹, always accompanied by μηχανῇ in such a phrase as μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμίᾳ or πάσῃ τέχνῃ καὶ μηχανῇ.

1. XIII 95; XIX 11, 53. The other references in Lysias: VI 7; XXII 16, 20; XXIII 7; XXIV 19.

So far I have been considering the works of men in the general tradition of Greek Literature, men who, while themselves possessing skill, do not discuss the nature of that skill. They are men who wrote either to entertain or to instruct, often both. But they do not describe the methods which they employ to reach their goals. With Hippocrates, or the writers of the Hippocratic Corpus, we are face to face with men whose especial skill is not literary but medical¹ and whose chief purpose is to describe this medical skill, to convey to others a body of knowledge of a very technical sort. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect some change in the use of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$, nor is that expectation disappointed. Since no adequate index to the Hippocratic Corpus exists, it has proved impossible for me to unearth all the occurrences of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$ therein; but from what I have been able to observe, I judge that to do so would serve no good purpose. The word appears very frequently; I have myself noted over seventy examples and seen many more, and am convinced that there must be hundreds of others in the entire collection. Once it is used in the general sense of

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1. This statement is true for the most part; but it is just to point out that the author of at least one treatise in the corpus was probably not a physician by profession, but a literary apologist for medicine. The de Arte is attributed by Gomperz (Griechische Denker I pp. 374 ff.) to Protagoras;

skill or craft.¹ In every other noted instance it means the craft or skill of medicine, ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη. More often than not the adjective ἰατρικὴ is not specified with it, nor is any other identifying word or phrase. Hippocrates and his colleagues and successors need none. To them there is one τέχνη, medicine, in which they are interested beyond all others. And for the reader the context makes the significance of the term clear.

What, then, is this τέχνη of medicine? W. H. S. Jones, in his translation of Hippocrates, normally renders it as the art; ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη is the art of medicine. In passages in which Plato refers to medicine as a τέχνη, Jowett commonly renders the term in English as art. But as English is used today in general speech, it is somewhat unusual, if not out of the fashion, to speak of the art of medicine. The more popular expression is the science of medicine. We may read on every hand,

A. E. Taylor (Varia Socratica p. 225) thinks it the work of an adherent of the Eleatic doctrine of being; and W. H. S. Jones (Hippocrates, Loeb Library 1923, p. 187) suggests that Hippias composed it. But those who have studied it to this extent agree that it was written by one of the sophists in the latter part of the Fifth Century B. C.

1. I. L. Heiberg, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, I 1. Berlin, 1927. de Arte 1 (9, 2).

in advertisements for patent remedies, in discussions of health in the army, or even in journals of a more learned sort, that modern medical science has (by a personification) discovered this, or thinks that. And I suspect that the majority of our population believes rather firmly that medicine is a science. Why, then, is there this difference? Why is modern medicine called a science while the ancient is dubbed an art? The belief is rather widespread, to be sure, among those who are not familiar with the achievements of ancient civilization, that science is a peculiarly modern thing, something especially our own, in which nobody before the sixteenth century had any share. But the translators of Hippocrates and Plato cannot be numbered among these. It will be useful, accordingly, to look into the nature of Hippocratic medicine, so as to find out whether it differs essentially from the modern.

Plato, in the Phaedrus¹, has something to say of medicine and of Hippocrates:

ΣΩ. ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς ὅσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙ. πῶς δῆ;

--- ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, Ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, εἰ μέλλεις, μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνη, τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφήν προσφέρων ὑγίειαν καὶ ῥώμην ἐμποιῆσειν, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιδιδύσεις νομίμους

1. 270 b-d.

πειθῶ ἦν ἄν βοῦλη καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.

--- τὸ γοῦν εἶκός, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

--- ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἷε δύνατον εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

--- εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

--- καλῶς γάρ, ὃ ἐταῖρε, λέγει· χρὴ μέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἰπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

--- φημί.

--- τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἰπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἄρ' οὐχ ὥδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅτου οὖν φύσεως· πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστίν οὗ πέρι βουλευσόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἀπλοῦν ᾗ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἔαν δὲ πλείω εἶδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἐνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἐκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

So medicine must acquaint itself with the nature of the body as a whole and with its component parts, studying each in detail to ascertain its function, its relation to the other parts, and its inherent capacity of action and reaction. Without sound investigation and careful classification, Plato continues¹, the physician's method would be like the progress of

1. ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος εἰσὶν ὅσοι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορεῖα.

a blind man.

Further light on the nature of Hellenic medicine must come from the Hippocratic writings. First, a passage from chapter 20 of de Prisca Medicina¹:

...λέγουσι δέ τινες ἰητροὶ καὶ σοφισταί, ὡς οὐκ εἴη δυνατόν ἰητρικὴν εἰδέναι, ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καταμαθεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς θεραπεύσειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τείνει τε αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆης ἢ ἄλλοι, οἱ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὃ τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον, καὶ ὁπόθεν συνεπάγη. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν, ὅσα τινὲς εἴρηται ἢ σοφιστῇ ἢ ἰητρῷ ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος, ἥσσον νομίζω τῇ ἰητρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ, νομίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γινῶναι τι σαφὲς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἰητρικῆς, τοῦτο δὲ οἶδόν τε καταμαθεῖν, ὅταν αὐτὴν τις τὴν ἰητρικὴν ὀρθῶς πᾶσαν περιλάβῃ, μέχρι δὲ τούτου πολλοῦ μοι δοκέει δεῖν. λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίην, εἰδέναι, ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστὶν καὶ δι' οἷας αἰτίας γίνεται, καὶ τᾶλλα ἀκριβέως. ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκέει ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἰητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι καὶ πάνυ σπουδάσαι, ὡς εἴσεται, εἴπερ τι μέλλει τῶν δεόντων ποιήσῃν, ὃ τί τέ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενά τε καὶ πινόμενα καὶ ὃ τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ὃ τι ἀφ' ἐκάστου ἐκάστῳ συμβήσεται, καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς οὕτως· πονηρόν ἐστιν βρῶμα τυρός· πόνον γὰρ παρέχει τῷ πληρωθέντι αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τίνα τε πόνον καὶ διὰ τί καὶ τίνι τῶν

1. Heiberg, op. cit., p. 51, 6-25.

ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνεόντων ἀνεπιτήδειον... Rash and over-simplified generalizations are to be avoided; detailed information is essential. The writer regards with hostility speculative philosophy. Only by actual investigation, he holds, can correct knowledge of the nature of man be gained.

Epid. I 10 (L. II 670): τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ νοσήματα, ἐξ ὧν διαγιγνύσκομεν, μαθόντες ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσιος πάντων καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐκάστου, ἐκ τοῦ νοσήματος, ἐκ τοῦ νοσέοντος, ἐκ τῶν προσφερόμενων, τοῦ προσφέροντος--ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾶον γὰρ καὶ χαλεπώτερον ἐκ τούτου--, ἐκ τῆς καταστάσιος ὅλης καὶ κατὰ μέρη τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ χώρης ἐκάστης, ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους, ἐκ τῆς διαίτης, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἐκ τῆς ἡλικίης ἐκάστου, λόγοισι, τρόποισι, σιγῇ, διανοήμασιν, ὕπνοισιν, οὐχ ὕπνοισιν, ἐνυπνίοισι, οἷοισι καὶ ὅτε, ... καὶ ὅσαι ἐξ οἷων ἐς οἷα διαδοχαὶ νοσημάτων... ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅσα διὰ τούτων σκεπτέον.¹

Epid. I 11 (L. II 676-8): (after a discussion of the symptoms in fevers) πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐπικαίρα σημεῖα τούτοις ἐστὶν ἡδελφισμένα, περὶ ὧν τὰ μὲν πού γέγραπται, τὰ δὲ καὶ γεγράφεται. πρὸς ᾧ δεῖ διαλογιζόμενον δοκιμάζειν καὶ σκοπέεσθαι, τίνι τούτων ὄξύ καὶ θανατῶδες ἢ περιεστικόν καὶ τίνι μακρὸν καὶ θανατῶδες ἢ περιεστικόν καὶ τίνι προσαρτέον ἢ οὐ καὶ πότε καὶ πόσον καὶ τί τὸ προσφερόμενον ἔσται.

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1. Omitted are long lists of further symptoms, such as coughing, chills, hemorrhages, and the like.

De Arte 7 (13, 14ff.): οἱ μὲν [sc. ἰατροὶ, γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσα γνῶμη μεθ' ὑγιαίνοντος σώματος ἐγχειροῦσι λογισάμενοι τὰ τε παρεόντα τῶν τε παροικομένων τὰ ὁμοίως διατεθέντα τοῖσι παρ-εῖναι, ὥστε ποτὲ θεραπευθέντα εἶπεῖν, ὡς ἀπῆλλαξαν.... .

In the De Prisca Medicina, 13-15, the writer vigorously attacks those who would treat disease according to an arbitrary theory previously set up. A theory, he holds, when it has no relation to actual knowledge, when it is not based on the observations of past treatments and experiments, is useless, for it will afford no reliable guide to selecting the particular treatment proper to a given malady. And in chapter twelve he says:¹

οὐ φημι δὲ δεῖν διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην ὡς οὐκ εἰδῶσαν οὐδὲ καλῶς ζητούμενην τὴν ἀρχαίην ἀποβαλέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔχει περὶ πάντα ἀκρι-βεῖην, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς οἶμαι τοῦ ἀτρεκεστάτου δύνασθαι ἡκεῖν λογισμῷ ἐκ πολλῆς ἀγνωσίης θαυμάζειν τὰ ἐξευ-ρημένα, ὡς καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐξεύρηται καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης.

In this same spirit, I suggest, should we now re-gard the medical practice of the Hellenes. They possessed a smaller body of knowledge than the physicians of the present; there were many facts about the human body which they never discovered; their concept of the nature of disease was erro-neous; the means of investigation at their disposal were far fewer than those of today. Yet the attitude is the same. Hu-man illness is viewed not as a matter for abstract speculation,

1. Heiberg, op. cit., p. 44, 2-7.

nor as a visitation of the wrath of the gods, but as something corporeal, having a specific corporeal cause, perceptible to the senses and so subject to research. A body of knowledge, derived from the investigation and classification of many individual phenomena and from general statements therefrom induced, is applied to healing particular cases of disease. Ancient medicine should, therefore, be granted the same term as modern. If the one be called an art, the other, too, should be so called; if the one a science, so, too, the other.

It now remains to decide which term, science or art, should be granted to medicine, and by which term τέχνη in Hippocrates is properly to be translated. The question is one of usage. Medicine is now clearly regarded as a science and colloquially so denominated. And, since language is a living thing and constantly changing, no one may reasonably object to this terminology. But it should be borne in mind what science in this colloquial sense means. It is not what we may call pure or abstract science, a body of abstract knowledge, largely theoretical, even though the theory be derived from experiments. Rather, it is what we may describe as applied science, in which the theoretical knowledge of pure science is applied to doing some particular task. This is the newer and more colloquial, though none the less valid, meaning of science. And it is in this sense that the Hippocratic τέχνη is a science. But it is an art, too, just as is the medical practice of today; for an art is a way of doing something, a

manner of applying skill and knowledge and a set of precise rules toward accomplishing a definite end. Of art, however, this is the less colloquial and more formal sense. For art colloquially is coming to have a strong connotation of aesthetics, so that it suggests a means of expressing beauty in some sensible medium. But medicine has nothing to do, of course, with the expression of beauty. So, while there can be no objection to translating τέχνη as art or to calling medicine an art, especially in a formal composition, there is this danger in doing so, that it may create an erroneous impression, that it may cause a misunderstanding.

Among the surviving fragments of the pre-Socratics, τέχνη occurs infrequently. It usually has one of its standard meanings, either skill or craft in general, or a particular craft. Among the sophists it usually designates rhetoric. One new employment appears: it comes to mean a textbook on some specific craft. I shall cite first the instances in which it means skill. Musaeus (Diels 2B4=I 22, 22): ὡς αἰεὶ τέχνη μέγ' ἀμείνων ἰσχύος ἐστίν.

Pittacus of Lesbos (Diels 10.3=I 64, 20): θεράπευε εὐσέβειαν
...σωφροσύνην....οἰκονομίαν, τέχνην.

Empedocles (Diels 31B23=I 321, 10): ὡς δ' ὁπότεν γραφῆες ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν / ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε, Τέχνη has the same meaning as in the fragment quoted above and is used in the same connection. Empedocles goes on to speak of the mixing of colors and the representing of men, trees,

beasts, fish, and the like.

Anaxagoras (Diels 59B21b=II 43.21): ἄλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῦτοις ἀν-
χέστεροι τῶν θηρίων ἐσμέν, ἐμπειρίαι δὲ καὶ μνήμη καὶ σοφαί καὶ
τέχνη κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν σφῶν τε αὐτῶν χρώμεθα καὶ βλέπτομεν καὶ
ἀμέλγομεν καὶ φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες. *Dexterity*
is the signification here.

Democritus (Diels 68B59=II 157.16): οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε σοφίη
ἐφικτόν, ἣν μὴ μάθῃ τις. *Tέχνη is something acquired, some-
thing learned; no one is born possessing it.*

Democritus (Diels 68B157=II 175.6): ὦν Δημόκριτος μὲν παραινεῖ
τὴν τε πολιτικὴν τέχνην μεγίστην οὖσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς
πόρους διώκειν, ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίνονται τοῖς ἀν-
θρώποις. *Statecraft.*

Gorgias, Encomium of Helen 19 (Diels 82B11=II 294.10ff): εἰ
δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἀμάρτημα
μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον· ἦλθε γὰρ, ὡς ἦλθε, τύχης
ἀγρεύμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλευμασι, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις, οὐ τέχνης
παρασκευαῖς.

Gorgias, Enc. Hel. 10 (Diels 82B11=II 291.3): γοητείας δὲ καὶ
μαγείας διισσαὶ τέχναι εὐρηνται, αἳ εἰσι ψυχῆς ἀμαρτήματα καὶ
δόξης ἀπατήματα. *In both the quotations from Gorgias τέχνη
has the meaning of skill or dexterity or craft.*

Archytas, the general and philosopher of Tarentum,
injects a mathematical note¹: καὶ δοκεῖ ἃ λογιστικῶς ποτὶ τὰν

1. Diels 47b4 (I 438.7).

σοφίαν τῶν μὲν ἄλλῶν τεχνῶν καὶ πολὺ διαφέρειν, ἀτὰρ καὶ τὰς γεωμετρικὰς ἐναργεστέρῳ πραγματεύεσθαι ἃ θέλει. Diels translates thus: "Und die Rechenkunst hat, wie es scheint, in bezug auf Wissenschaft vor den anderen Künsten einen recht betrachtlichen Vorrang; besonders aber auch vor der Geometrie, da sie deutlicher als diese was sie will behandeln kann..."

From the Anonymus Iamblichi, a treatise on politics and ethics written in the age of the Peloponnesian War, although found among the works of Iamblichus, I take the following¹: καὶ τέχνην μὲν ἂν τις τὴν κατὰ λόγους πυθόμενος καὶ μαθὼν οὐ χείρων τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἂν γένοιτο ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἥτις ἐξ ἔργων πολλῶν συνίσταται, ταύτην δὲ οὐχ ὀλίγον τε ὥστε ἀρξαμένῳ οὐδὲ ὀλιγοχρονίως ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ συντραφεῖναι τε αὐτῇ, δεῖ καὶ συναυξηθῆναι τῶν μὲν εἰργόμενον κακῶν καὶ λόγων καὶ ἡθῶν, τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύοντα καὶ κατεργαζόμενον σὺν πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ. The unknown author draws a contrast between τέχνη and ἀρετή. The former is a skill which can be learned, but has nothing to do with a man's moral character; the latter, while it can be acquired, comes only after a long time and painstaking effort, since it is a habit which lies at the base of a man's character to incline him this way or that toward action.

Τέχνη occurs several times in the collection of essays

1. Diels 89, 2 (7) = (II 401, 7-13).

known as the ΔΙΣΣΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ. It means a craft or a skill, and often the craft of words, rhetoric. A single example will suffice to give testimony for the ΔΙΣΣΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ in this investigation¹: ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας τρέψομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν γὰρ τραγωδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις <κα> πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ, ὁμοίᾳ τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος.

There are no further examples of τέχνη among the fragments proper of the Pre-Socratics. Often, however, later writers refer to earlier philosophers and sophists and describe, in whole or in part, what they taught. And in such passages τέχνη is by no means rare. Very often it means rhetoric; but otherwise it has no meanings which have not already become familiar to us in the course of this study. To this there is but one exception, the employment of the word τέχνη to designate a text-book, especially one on rhetoric or eristics. But of these late occurrences of τέχνη no examples are needed.

Isocrates is another specialist writing often on his specialty. But he writes orations of a general nature also, with the result that his use of τέχνη is not limited to the skill of discourse. He offers, for instance, examples of several individual skills or crafts: the mantic (XIX 45), farming (XII 46), ship-building (XII 116), informing (XV 314), and the now familiar guile (IX 36), while once he speaks of text-books

1. 3, 10. See Diels II 410.. 30.

or manuals (XIII 19), using the word τέχνη. Twice he refers to the art of Homer¹, and once he speaks of the skills of pleasure as contrasted with those of necessity². And he refers to τέχνη in the general sense of skill or a craft too often to permit of convenient enumeration here. In this general sense his usage does not differ from the authors who wrote before him and from whom numerous examples have already been extracted.

Isocrates was by profession devoted to educating the young. In particular he applied himself to the task of training men to be orators; but his broad conception of what constituted a good speaker led him to direct the thoughts of his pupils toward moral excellence, since, he maintained, to become a distinguished orator a man must first acquire the virtues and make himself a good citizen. Believing this he turned his attention toward the problem of how best to train a citizen

1. IV 159. ...καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βουλευθῆναι τοὺς προγόνους ἡμῶν ἐντιμον αὐτοῦ, ὡς Ὁμήρου, ποιῆσαι τὴν τέχνην ἐν τε τοῖς τῆς μουσικῆς ἄθλοις καὶ τῇ παιδεύσει τῶν νεωτέρων. ...

X 65. ...καὶ μέρος μὲν τι καὶ διὰ τὴν Ὁμήρου τέχνην, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην οὕτως ἐπαφρόδιτον καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὀνομαστὴν αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν ποίησιν.

2. IV 40. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς τε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου χρησίμας καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἡδονὴν μεμηχανημένας τὰς μὲν εὐροῦσα, τὰς δὲ δοκιμάσασα χρῆσθαι τοῖς λοιποῖς παρέδωμεν.

and worked out a theory of education. Naturally enough, he was interested in the nature and function of τέχνη—or the τέχνηαι—and some of his reflections on the subject he included among his orations. To examine some of his remarks on τέχνη will help in discovering what the word in its narrower sense meant to him.

XII 208. ὅτι τὰ παραλελειμμένα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οὐχ οἱ τυχόντες εὐρίσκουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ τὰς τε φύσεις διαφέροντες καὶ μαθεῖν πλεῖστα τῶν πρότερον εὐρημένων δυνηθέντες καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τῷ ζητεῖν μάλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθελήσαντες.

The crafts were no haphazard discoveries; men of outstanding natural abilities exerting great effort both of memory and of ingenuity brought them into existence and pushed forward their development.

XV 201. καὶ ταῦτα [i.e. unreasonable demands of Isocrates' educational methods, προστάττονσιν οὐθ' ἡμῶν ἀκηκοότες τοιαύτας ποιουμένων τὰς ὑποσχέσεις οὐτ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις καὶ παιδείαις οὐδὲν ἑωρακότες τούτων συμβαῖνον, ἀλλὰ μόλις μὲν ἡμῖν τὰς ἐπιστήμας παραγιγνομένας, οὐχ ὁμοίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὅτι ἂν μάθωμεν ἐξεργαζομένους, ἀλλὰ δύο μὲν ἢ τρεῖς ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν διδασκαλείων ἀγωνιστὰς γιγνομένους, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἰδιώτας ἀπαλλαττομένους. The fault of critics is to expect too much from a τέχνη, which cannot, unaided by the natural talent of a man, make him learned or successful at his pursuits. Pupils differ; some learn slowly, others rapidly; some readily

master what they have to learn; others, never; but this cannot be held to reflect upon the skill or craft they would acquire. A τέχνη can aid a man to make the most of his inherent capacities; it cannot supply them.

XIII 21. καὶ μηδεὶς οἶέσθω με λέγειν, ὥς ἔστι δικαιοσύνη διδακτόν· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἡγοῦμαι τοιαύτην εἶναι τέχνην, ἥτις τοῖς κακῶς πεφυκάσι πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωφροσύνην ἂν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιήσειεν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ συμπαρακελεύεσθαι γε καὶ συνασκήσαι μάλιστα· ἂν οἶμαι τὴν τῶν λόγων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. "And let no one think that I say that justice can be taught, for, on the whole, I consider that there is no such τέχνη as can implant self-control and justice in those who are by nature ill disposed toward virtue; yet I do believe that the study of public address can do much, at any rate, in inciting and helping a man toward justice." A τέχνη clearly has its limitations. It has no moral connotation and cannot determine a man's character, although it can, under some circumstances, assist a man somewhat toward gaining ἀρετή. But this is incidental. It has, qua τέχνη, nothing to do either with the moral order of the universe or with the essence of human character. Yet apparently there was a wide-spread opinion in Isocrates' day that virtue could be taught. For in another passage he repeats his denial with equal vigor:

XV 274. ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τοιαύτην μὲν τέχνην, ἥτις τοῖς κακῶς πεφυκόσι πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωφροσύνην ἐνεργάσαιτ' ἂν καὶ δικαιοσύνην,

οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε νῦν οὐδεμίαν εἶναι, τοὺς τε τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ποιουμένους περὶ αὐτῶν πρότερον ἀπερεῖν καὶ παύσεσθαι ληροῦντας πρὶν εὐρεθῆναι τινα παιδείαν τοιαύτην, ...

XIII 12. θαυμάζω δ' ὅταν ἴδω τούτους μαθητῶν ἀξιουμένους, οἱ ποιητικοῦ πράγματος τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα φέροντες λελήθασιν ὡς αὐτοὺς. It is folly to apply an art with hard and fast rules to a creative activity. Life and the debates of men do not proceed according to mathematical formulae. A given combination of letters will always compose the same word. But a set combination of words is not always equally useful. The more difficult a skill or craft may be, the harder it is to master, naturally enough; so that it is one thing to learn the letters of the alphabet with their sounds, and quite another to learn the best way to conduct a debate or a discussion. There can be no one set of rules for all skills, and different crafts demand differing degrees of intellectual activity. They will need a longer or shorter period to be taught in, and they will be imparted to pupils with varying success. But they all are alike in this, that they can be taught, that they have been developed out of experience, and that they have definite principles of their own. Finally, they are distinguished from ἀρετῇ by being strictly intellectual or manual or both and having nothing properly to do with moral right and wrong.

Much the same use of τέχνη is found in the works of

Plato, who has frequent occasion to employ the word in the dialogues. It is unnecessary to cite here all the occurrences of τέχνη among them, and it would be burdensome to attempt it. I shall simply offer an example or so of each variant significance, so that the range of meanings may be perceived.

Prt. 315a: καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκίμεϊ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μαθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος. He is learning a profession, that of the sophist.

And again, Prt. 312b: τούτων γὰρ γραμματικοῦ καθαριστοῦ παιδοτριβοῦ, γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. Here the word δημιουργὸς adds a suggestion of working with the hands, of craftsmanship, to the wider meaning of profession. And this craftsmanship as a means of gaining a livelihood, a business for profit, is contrasted with the acquisition of a skill as a part of the education of a gentleman. Elsewhere, Plato speaks of the banausic or vulgar skills¹: αἳ τε γὰρ τέχναι βάνανσαι που ἄπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι.

Or again, τέχνη sometimes has its general meaning of skill, craft, device, or means. Phd. 89d: ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὲ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, ...

But this use of the word is relatively rarer in Plato than in some of the authors who preceded him. Again, in

1. R522 b.

Euthydemus 282d, Jowett translates τέχνη¹ "in a more artistic style." Another instance of the general sense is found in the Phaedo 90b:... ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, ... Plato, too, like other writers, at times mentions specific kinds of τέχνη:

Th. 150b6: τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρα ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκα μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα.

R. 332c: ...εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο· "ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται;" τί ἂν οἶε ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; ---Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. ---'Ἡ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται; ---'Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα. ---Ἔϊεν· ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;

Not infrequently in Plato the word τέχνη is found in close association with ἐπιστήμη. Thus, while he can at times use τέχνη in a pejorative sense of banausic art, he dignifies it, at other times, by using it almost interchangeably with ἐπιστήμη, and giving it practically the significance of science.

R. 522c: οἷον τοῦτο τὸ καινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε

1. σφῶν δὲ ὁπότερος βούλεται, ταῦτόν τοῦτο τέχνη πράττων ἐπιδειξάτω ἡμῖν.

καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι---ὁ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη
μανθάνειν.---ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει, ὥς πᾶσα τέχνη τε
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίνεσθαι;

So, in the Gorgias 448c he speaks of how τέχνη arises out of
ἐμπειρία, experience: ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀν-
θρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρρημέναι· ἐμπειρία
μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία
δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι
ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοί. ---

But, although Plato here asserts that τέχνη is a result of
ἐμπειρία, he is equally definite in pointing out that it is
by no means the same thing; indeed, he contrasts the two
words strongly. Τέχνη leaves ἐμπειρία far behind as a kind
of human knowledge; the latter is without order and without
the benefit of general principles; it cannot explain the
reasons for things, not even for its own practices. But
τέχνη draws on a body of organized knowledge with general rules
to guide its procedure. It can be taught and it can offer
reasons for what it does.

Grg. 463a-b: Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία,
εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς
καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις·
καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακεῖαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ
τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ
ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ· ὁ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὥς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος,

οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.

---- 500a-b: Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων. --- πάνυ γε. --- Ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστὶν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; --- τεχνικοῦ. ---

Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαίαι μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χειρόν, αἱ δὲ γινώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθόν καὶ ὅτι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην.

---- 500e-501b: ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σφισμένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίνεσθαι, ὥς δὲ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς.

In the Cratylus 414b Plato offers a tentative definition of τέχνη, preparatory to discussing the etymology of the word to show how the form corresponds to the inner meaning. Ὦν γ' ἔστιν ἕν καὶ "τέχνην" ἰδεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται εἶναι. ---

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.--- οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε ἔστιν νοῦ σημαίνει, τὸ μὲν
 τοῦ ἀφελόντι, ἐμβαλόντι δὲ οὐ μεταξὺ τοῦ χειρὶ καὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ
 <τοῦ νοῦ καὶ> τοῦ ἤτα; This definition of τέχνη as a habit or
 state of the mind foreshadows, as does also his statement that
 τέχνη is developed out of experience, the more elaborate
 treatment of the same aspect of the term in the works of
 Aristotle.

Throughout the dialogues Plato inserts, in his ap-
 parently careless way, statements about τέχνη which enable us
 to fill out what we know of his opinions on the subject. And
 many of these, again, will recur in Aristotle in an expanded
 and more systematic form--recurrences which I shall indicate
 in particular when I discuss τέχνη in that author:

Phdr. 269e-270a: πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται
 ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως περί· τὸ φὰρ ὑψηλόνουν
 τοῦτο καὶ πάντη τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθ' ἐν ποθεν εἰσιέναι.
 And he cites as an example Pericles, who had associated for
 long with Anaxagoras.

--- 277b-c: πρὶν ἄν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἐκάστων εἰδῇ περί ὧν
 λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ' αὐτό τε πᾶν ὀρίξεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται,
 ὀρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ' εἶδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπι-
 στηθῇ, περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν κατὰ ταῦτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον
 ἐκάστη φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν
 λόγον, ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς
 λόγους, ἀπλοῦς δὲ ἀπλῇ, οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι

καθ' ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πείσαι, ὥς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος. Exact and scientific knowledge is a prerequisite of successful--that is, true--τέχνη. This knowledge is especially necessary for correct and effective speech. Here then, is a suggestion of the method of τέχνη: information about each thing, definition and classification from what this information offers, the identification of the proper form in each case, and the embodiment of all this knowledge in appropriate language. For only so can clarity be ensured; and clarity, since it is essential to teaching, is essential to τέχνη, a prime characteristic of which is that it can be taught.

Grg. 450a: πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνονται ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἶον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. Here there is reference to the media of the arts and crafts. A few lines later the remarks on the media of expression are supplemented (d-e): ἕτεραι δὲ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργον ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἶον ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοῖς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν.

Interestingly enough, τέχνη here includes what we should term sciences and skills--sciences like ἀριθμητική and γεωμετρική and skills like πεπτευτική. One might ask why the drama, too, is not found here. But then, the list makes no pretense to being complete; and, furthermore, the drama probably contains too large an element of action to be placed in this category.

Twice, however, τέχνη is mentioned in connection with poetry: Phdr. 245a: ... ὅς δ' ἄν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικᾶς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὥς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἠφανίσθη.

Ion 533e: πάντες γὰρ οἱ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐνθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως. ...

Mere τέχνη will not suffice the poet. He must, to produce good poetry, have inspiration, be possessed of the divine madness. Yet τέχνη, too, is at times helpful, for it can lead to discovering many useful things: ἡ γὰρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὗρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων¹.

There are other observations dealing more strictly with the nature of τέχνη itself:

R. 342e: ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὐπὲρ εἰσὶν τέχναι.

1. Min. 314b.

The crafts rule and dominate the subjects on which they are exercised. This is not quite the same as the view later expressed by Aristotle, that τέχνη is a form and imposes its form upon what is to be made. But it may be rather similar; for if τέχνη rules and dominates its subject, it must determine what is to become of that subject. Plato, however, pursues the question no further, so it is impossible to determine precisely how he intended his remark to be taken. For one thing, he is not here confining his discussion to the making of things, whereas it is in writing of genesis, natural and otherwise, that his successor describes τέχνη as a form in the soul of the maker. But he does recognise τέχνη as an agent or cause of coming into being, for in the Laws 888e occurs a phrase which will recur in almost the same words many times in Aristotle: λέγουσί ποῦ τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην.

In the Republic 601d Plato draws a distinction among the kinds of τέχνη: περὶ ἑκάστου ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; --- ναί.

Elsewhere he speaks of the divisions or kinds of knowledge in general:

Phlb. 55d-e: οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν οἶμαι δημιουργικόν ἐστι τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἢ πῶς; --- οὕτως. --- ἐν δὲ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν

πρῶτα εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἔχόμενον, τὸ δ' ἦττον ἐνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὥς καθαρῶτατα νομίζειν τὰ δ' ὥς ἀκαθαρτότερα. --- οὐκοῦν χρή. --- τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἐκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς; --- ποίας καὶ πῶς; --- οἶον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἂν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἐκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο. --- φαῦλον μὲν δῆ. --- τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας. ---- 580: οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πῶ, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστῃ καὶ ἀρίστῃ καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὰκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν' εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὄνινᾶσα, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν.

Plt. 2580-e: τὴν οὖν πολιτικὴν ἀτραπὸν πῇ τις ἀνευρήσει; δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀνευρεῖν, καὶ χωρὶς ἀφελόντας ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδέαν αὐτῇ μίαν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐκτροπαῖς ἐν ἄλλο εἶδος ἐπισημνημένους πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὥς οὖσας δύο εἶδη διανοηθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ποιῆσαι. ... ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀριθμητικὴ μὲν καὶ τινες ἕτεραι ταύτῃ συγγενεῖς τέχναι ψιλὰ τῶν πράξεων εἰσι, τὸ δὲ γινῶναι παρέσχοντο μόνον; --- ἔστιν οὕτως. --- αἱ δέ γε περὶ τεκτονικὴν αὖ καὶ σύμπασαν χειρουργίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσαν σύμφυτον τὴν ἐπιστήμην κέκτληται, καὶ συναποτελοῦσι τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν σώματα

πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα. ---τί μὴν; --- ταύτη τοίνυν συμπάσας ἐπιστήμας διαίρει, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπών, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικὴν. --- ἔστω σοι ταῦθ' ὥς μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ὅλης εἶδη δύο.

Such, then, is the use of τέχνη by Plato. He uses it a few times in the old general sense of craft, skill, or device; he designated specific trades and professions as τέχνη, such as the banausic pursuits. Medicine is a favorite example of τέχνη in its more elevated and precise sense. In this latter use he closely resembles Isocrates, his contemporary, and many of the qualifications of a τέχνη, such as that it can be taught, are common to both writers. Plato at times, however, goes even further than Isocrates in bringing τέχνη close to ἐπιστήμη; often the two seem synonymous. Herein Aristotle will be found to agree with him. The important point in this sense of the term is that a τέχνη is familiar with causes; it can not only give an account of what happens but also explain why it happens. It is the result of experience with particular phenomena, but itself is beyond the stage of mental development represented by experience; it has established general principles. What I wrote of the translation of τέχνη in Hippocrates applies with equal, if not greater, force to the translation of the word in its more elevated sense in Plato. For, to assemble the various statements about τέχνη and therefrom to compound a rough definition of

the word in its higher sense, a τέχνη is a state of the mind which enables the possessor to make, use, or imitate something according to definite rules, to make further discoveries in his own province of endeavour, and to teach other men what he knows; it has been brought into existence out of experience but differs from experience by having an explanation of causes and a set of general principles, and in being such that it can be taught. This is very much the same meaning which was assigned to τέχνη in its more formal sense in Hippocrates and Isocrates, as it is the meaning Aristotle will adopt with expansion of treatment and an increase of formal precision.

When I point out once more that Plato, like his predecessor and his contemporary, holds that τέχνη cannot wholly substitute for innate ability, as his remarks about the necessity for the madness of the Muses in writing poetry show, it will be clear, I believe, that the word art is unsatisfactory as a translation of the Greek τέχνη. Applied science or productive science would be far better as a rendering of its more formal sense; and such words as craft, profession, business, device, trade, occupation, and skill will translate adequately its other senses. I admit that art is, formally speaking, a correct translation, but today art has acquired a whole set of connotations foreign to τέχνη and misleading to a reader who may not stop to reflect on the derivation of art in English and the use of τέχνη in Greek. Finally I should

like to mention here that Professor Warner Fite has a very interesting section on this point¹; he has stated the case a little more strongly than I have, perhaps; but in the main there is much to be said for his opinion.

1. The Platonic Legend, New York and London, 1934, pp. 203-211.

SECTION 2.

At length we come to Aristotle. He uses τέχνη very frequently in the works which we have from his hand. It is clear, too, at first glance, that he uses the word in a variety of ways, as have all the writers I have discussed before him. To make a beginning of bringing order out of the chaos of this variety, a general division may be made between the looser uses, on the one hand, in which the word acts as it does in any author, without being carefully defined, without taking a particular place in a philosophical scheme, without assuming peculiarly Aristotelian connotations; and the more formal uses, on the other, in which Aristotle studies what the word means, offers his definitions, and sets it to denote certain particular functions in his own system of thought. It will be best first to dispose of the former group.

Τέχνη appears in connection with the banausic crafts, which Aristotle more than once singles out for treatment. In the Rhetoric 1367a31 he refers to a βάνανσον τέχνην. In the Politics are several such references: 1258b26: τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν... . This is one of the divisions of μισθαργία, "service for hire," made in a discussion of the ways of making a living. 1291a2: δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάνανσον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι...). 1337b9ff.: βάνανσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς

πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διδὲ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας δοῦναι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χειρὸν διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινὴν.

The final example I shall take from the E.E.: διηρημέ-^{1215a26}
νων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν<οὐδ'>ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὥς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμῶν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικὰς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν καὶ πράξεις καπηλικὰς).

Aristotle, too, mentions various specific τέχναι:

Metaph. 1070a29: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας ἐστίν.

Metaph. 981b24: διδὲ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν.

Pol. 1288b10: ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἐν τι τελείαις οὖσαι, μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἀρμόττον, οἷον ἄσκησις σώματι ποῖα τε ποίῳ συμφέρει, καὶ τίς ἀρίστη... . ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον. From this we also learn what the proper field of a τέχνη is: it should concern itself not piece-meal with isolated facts or

groups of facts, but with an entire single class of phenomena, with all the aspects of a given problem or set of problems.

In the Rhetoric τέχνη often designates the particular subject of that investigation, rhetoric. It usually is specified in some such phrase as τέχνηαι τῶν λόγων or Καλλίππου τέχνη. A few of the instances are 1354a12; 1399a16; 1400a4; 1401b16; 1402a17; 1403b35; and 1416b20.

Τέχνη often occurs in Aristotle in its general sense of skill, craft, or device:

Se. 170a31-36: ...καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τέχνην ἐστὶ ψευδὴς συλλογισμός, οἷον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν ὁ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κατὰ ἰατρικὴν ὁ ἰατρικὸς. λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνης ἀρχάς. δηλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτέου τοῦς τόπους· οὗτοι γὰρ κοινοὶ πρὸς ἀπασαν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν.

_____ 172a29: ὥστε φανερόν ἐστι οὐδενὸς ὠρισμένου ἢ πειραστικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐστὶ· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τέχνηαι χρῶνται καὶ κοινοῖς τισίν.

Ph. 193a16: ...τὴν κατὰ νόμον διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην...

_____ 193a31: ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται, καὶ τὸ φυσικόν,

Mete. 353b28: διὸ τὰ μὲν αὐτόματα βεῖ τὰ κρηναῖα καὶ ποτάμια, ταῦτα δὲ ἡ τέχνη. τὰ φρεατιαῖα, τέχνης προσδεῖται τῆς ἐργασομένης.

_____ 390b14: τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα οὐδενὶ ἂν ἔτι δόξειεν

τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ, οἶον κεφαλὴ ἢ χεὶρ ἢ πόδες, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοῦ χαλκοῦ μὲν ἢ ἄργυρου γενέσθαι αἰτία ψυχρότης καὶ θερμότης καὶ κίνησις, τοῦ δὲ πρίονα ἢ φιᾶλην ἢ κιβωτὸν οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μὲν τέχνη, ἐκεῖ δὲ φύσις ἢ ἄλλη τις αἰτία.

HA 588a25: ὥς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις, οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζώων ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις.

Interestingly enough it is here implied that τέχνη is a δύναμις. Note also the association of τέχνη with σοφία and σύνεσις.

PA 645a8-15: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν, sc. ζώων, πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἶον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν.

GA 762a16: ἡ δὲ σῆψις καὶ τὸ σηπτὸν περίττωμα τοῦ πεφθέντος ἐστίν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται καθάπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης δημιουργουμένοις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει ποιεῖν. νῦν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἢ τέχνη τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀφαιρεῖ, τὸ δ' ἢ φύσις.

_____ 767a17: ...πάντα γὰρ τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ τέχνην ἢ φύσιν λόγῳ τινὶ ἐστίν.

_____ 775a21: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐλάττω πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἔρχεται θᾶπτον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἔργοις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ φύσεως συνισταμένοις.

Mech. 847a16-21: Όταν οὖν δέη τι παρὰ φύσιν πράξαι, διὰ τὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπορίαν παρέχει καὶ δεῖται τέχνης. διὸ καὶ καλοῦμεν τῆς τέχνης τὸ πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπορίας βοηθοῦν μέρος μηχανήν. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐποίησεν Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· τέχνη γὰρ κρατοῦμεν, ὧν φύσει νικώμεθα.

Pr. 956b13: Διὰ τί οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῶνται ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πονηροὶ εἰσιν; ἢ ὅτι ἡκιστα λόγου σοφίας κοινωνοῦσι διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τέχνας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τοῦ βίου εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἀκρασίαις τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου εἰσίν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀπορίαις;

Metaph. 1013a13: ἡ δὲ ,sc. ἀρχή, οὗ κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινεῖται τὰ κινούμενα καὶ μεταβάλλει τὰ μεταβάλλοντα, ὥσπερ αἱ τε κατὰ πόλεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ δυναστεῖαι καὶ αἱ βασιλεῖαι καὶ τυραννίδες ἀρχαὶ λέγονται καὶ αἱ τέχναι, καὶ τούτων αἱ ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ μάλιστα.

_____1046b36-1047a3: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτ' οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμῳ εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναί ἐστιν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτὲ καὶ λαβόντα, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γὰρ λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τιπὶ ἢ χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, αἶψα γὰρ ἔστιν), όταν παύσονται, οὐχ ἔξει τὴν τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών;

_____1074b11: καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας...

EN 1094a1: πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ... .

_____1097a16: φαίνεται ,sc. τὸ τέλος, μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πρά-

ξει καὶ τέχνη....

___1104a7: τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ. τοιοῦτον δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.

___1153a23-26: τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι.

Pol. 1268b36: ...αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις...

___1282a1: ...τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας...

besides medicine. Note the association of τέχνας with ἐμπειρίας.

___1327b25: sc. ἔθνη, τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης... . Here τέχνη is associated with διάνοια.

___1337a19: ...πρὸς πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας... .

___1339a37: Τέχνη in this passage is equivalent to profession.

Rh. 1358a6: ...ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις...

___1362a2: Τέχνη as craft, skill, device, or artificial contrivance is contrasted with εὐτυχία.

___1392a26: καὶ ὧν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι, δυνατὰ ταῦτα καὶ

ἔστι καὶ γίγνεται.

____1392b5,6: ...ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς... . διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας... .

____1404a22: ...διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἥ τε ῥαψῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτική καὶ ἄλλαι γε.

Besides the general sense as illustrated above, Aristotle uses τέχνη in another rather general but different meaning. For τέχνη is often used in immediate juxtaposition with ἐπιστήμη, with which, indeed, it sometimes appears to be synonymous.

Metaph. 1981b2a: εἶρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τίς διαφορά τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν.... .

____1046b3 : ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀνύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου· διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. Here the ἐπιστήμαι are described as ποιητικαί, creative, concerned with making, an adjective which is peculiarly appropriate to τέχνη, one of the chief characteristics of which is that it is creative, or concerned with making. The likeness of τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη is, accordingly, especially striking in this passage. It is noteworthy also that τέχναι, causes which exist in the soul - and in the reasoning part of it, as Aristotle elsewhere declares - are

stated to be δυνάμεις , capacities or faculties, inasmuch as they are causes of change in others or in something else, or in their possessor qua other.

Metaph. 1064a1: πᾶσα δ' ἐπιστήμη ζητεῖ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὴν ἐπιστητῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑκάστη τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ μαθηματικῶν. Medicine and gymnastic, usually cited as examples of τέχνη, are here used to illustrate a statement about ἐπιστήμη . It would be possible to substitute for ἐπιστήμη τέχνη as subject of ζητεῖ without destroying the truth of the sentence; for τέχνη, too, investigates the causes of what it deals with. And here again science (ἐπιστήμη) is described as being concerned with making (ποιητικῶν). Clearly Aristotle, when writing in an off-hand way, feels no great difference between τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, although, when it is to the purpose to do so, he can and does make a careful and a clear distinction between them. This distinction I shall examine later.

Metaph. 997a5: ὅμα δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται αὐτῶν [sc. οὐσιῶν] ἐπιστήμη; τί μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον τούτων τυγχάνει ὄν καὶ νῦν γνωρίζομεν (χρῶνται γοῦν ὡς γινωσκομένοις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι). ...

Rh. 1392a25: ...καὶ ὅν ἐπιστημαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι, δυνατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι καὶ γίγνεται.

The passage from the Politics 1288b10, already quoted above, is introduced by the words ἐν ὅπασαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς

ἐπιστήμας, and the delimitation of the scope of a τέχνη, also noted above, is equally valid for an ἐπιστήμη, for, no distinction being made in the participial phrases containing the delimitation, they modify either word.

APo. 71a4: πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως; φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν. αἴτε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τοῦτον τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τεχνῶν.

SE. 170a31-34: ...καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τέχνην ἐστὶ ψευδὴς συλλογισμός, οἷον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν ὁ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κατὰ ἰατρικὴν ὁ ἰατρικός. λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνης ἀρχάς. Geometry is used as an illustration of τέχνη; yet geometry is commonly termed an ἐπιστήμη and rightly so, since it is a science of things which do not change, a province which, according to the strict definition given in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics,¹ is especially the property of ἐπιστήμη.

EN. 1094a7: πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη. ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. Every τέχνη must have an end; of a few the ends are here set down. The illustrations adopted for τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν are all frequently met, both in Aristotle and in other writers, as τέχνηαι.

1. 1139b18 ff.

So far passages have been considered in which Aristotle uses τέχνη in much the same senses as do other Greek writers; I must turn next to a series of uses in which he departs from earlier usage and changes the meaning of τέχνη to something peculiar to himself, elaborating or refining it to suit his own purpose.

Among these many have to do with coming into being as a result of the exercise of the scientific faculty of production; some passages simply state the fact of genesis of this order, while others elaborate the nature of the process and furnish details connected with it.

990. 335b30 ff.: τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὕλης τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἑτέρας δυνάμεως - ὁῦλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τέχνη καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει γινομένων. οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ὕδωρ ζῶον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον κλίνην, ἀλλ' ἡ τέχνη - ... The parallel construction contrasting τὰ φύσει with τὰ τέχνη γινόμενα will appear frequently. It is the property of matter to be acted upon and moved; there is another faculty or capacity which moves and makes, namely, τέχνη in the one case and in the other φύσις, or the formal cause operative through φύσις.

FA. 640a30-33: τῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τέχνης, μὲν οὖν προὔπάρχει τὸ ποιητικὸν ὁμοίον, οἷον ἀνδριαντοποιητικὴ. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται αὐτόματον. ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ὁ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν.

Here τὸ ποιητικόν is an efficient cause, which is required by the products of skill, and which must be like, homogeneous, with them, as, for instance, the statue requires the statuary's craft. Τέχνη is the conception of what is to be made, without the matter, i.e., before it has been embodied in matter.

734a31: λόγος δὲ τούτου, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τὸ δυνάμει ὃν γίνεται ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ γινομένοις.¹
 What exists only potentially, the matter, when acted upon by what exists in actuality, the form, comes into being as a fully existent particular, whether the form be in the species itself, as in τὰ φύσει γινόμενα, or in an external agent, as in τὰ τέχνῃ γινόμενα.

734b21: ...ὅτι ὅσα φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνῃ, ὑπ' ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει τοιούτου.

735a2: ἡ γὰρ τέχνη ἀρχὴ καὶ εἶδος τοῦ γινομένου, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ. "Τέχνη is the cause and the form of what comes into being, but it is in something other than the thing produced," and it there exists - in the mind of the maker - potentially perhaps. Aristotle elsewhere has more to say of whether the form exists really apart from the particular.

740b26-29: Ὡς περ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης γινόμενα γίνεται διὰ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἔστι δ' ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν διὰ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς τέχνης, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μορφή τῶν γινομένων ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὕτως ἡ τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, ...

1. Cf. Plato, Lg. 888e.

The movement of the instruments is the result of the action of τέχνη, which is the shape or form of the product.

Metaph. 1032a12-15: τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν φύσει γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ τέχνη, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, πάντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπὸ τέ τινος γίγνεται καὶ ἔκ τινος καὶ τί· τὸ δὲ τί λέγω καθ' ἐκάστην κατηγορίαν· ἢ γὰρ τόδε ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποῖον ἢ ποῦ. Nothing comes uncaused into being, or ex nihilo. As for the categories of which becoming may be postulated, in the Physics 226a23-26 there is a passage which limits them to the number here specified:¹ ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε οὐσίας οὔτε τοῦ πρὸς τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λείπεται κατὰ τὸ ποῖον καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποῦ κίνησιν εἶναι μόνον· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτων ἐναντίωσις. It is, of course, impossible to speak of there being a motion in the essence, for such would be equivalent to the passing away or coming into being discussed in the Metaphysics 1032a12-15. But this section on the modes of speaking of genesis is valuable for determining how we are to understand the terms ποίησις and ποιητική. Ποίησις can, it appears, refer not only to the making of something to come into existence, but also of effecting certain changes in something already in being; thus, it can describe coming into being in the absolute sense κατ' οὐσίαν, or in a more limited sense, in respect of quantity, quality, or place.

Metaph. 1032a20: ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνη ἔχει

1. See Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford, 1924; note, vol. II, p. 182.

βλην....

___1032a25: ...οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὴν φύσιν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι γενέσεις λέγονται ποιήσεις. πᾶσαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας. ... ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. (1032b εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν).

Genesis from τέχνη is making, ποιήσεις. In this type of making - that by skill or productive science - the form, i.e., the τί ἦν εἶναι, the formal cause, the what it was to be, and the first cause are in the soul of the man who is making.

Metaph. 1034a9-14: Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὐ, οἷον οἰκία. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἡ βλῆ ἡ ἄρχουσα τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ γίγνεσθαι τι τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, ἐν ᾗ ὑπάρχει τι μέρος τοῦ πράγματος, - ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἷα κινεῖσθαι ὑφ' αὐτῆς ἢ δ' οὐ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν ὥδι οἷα τε ἡ δὲ ὠδύνατος.

___1034a24: δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινα πάντα γίγνεται ἐξ ὁμωνύμου, ὥσπερ τὰ φύσει, ἢ ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου (οἷον ἡ οἰκία ἐξ οἰκίας, ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ· ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος)...

___1070a4 ff. μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἐκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἡ γὰρ τέχνη ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων. Every substance is generated from something homogeneous to it; in generation by τέχνη, the

cause of becoming is not in the thing produced itself, but in someone external to it. The illustration ἄνθρωπος...ἄνθρωπον γέννῃ has been criticized as ill chosen,¹ since in the case of human reproduction the cause is both formally and efficiently outside the child produced, ἐν ἄλλῳ rather than ἐν αὐτῷ, and so, apparently, the reverse of what Aristotle is trying to illustrate. To regard the matter with common sense, however, it is manifest that the process of man's begetting man is altogether one according to nature, rather than one of applied science. Moreover, in the making, ποίησις, of the latter, the cause is in another in the sense of being in someone of a different species. If a man make a boat, the formal cause, the concept of the boat in the man's mind, is indeed homogeneous with the actual boat made, but it is in no boat but a human being, altogether different in species and genus. I therefore suggest that the illustration may be far from being so malapropos as has been asserted.

EN 1175a24: ...καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης... .

Pol. 1333a23: ...τὰ κατὰ τέχνην...τὰ κατὰ φύσιν.... The familiar contrast is here.

In another group of passages Aristotle announces that τέχνη imitates nature:

Mete. 381b3 ff.: ὅπτησις μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔψησις γίνονται μὲν τέχνη

1. See Ross, op. cit. note, vol. II, pp. 354-5.

ἔστιν δ', ὥσπερ λέγομεν, τὰ εἶδη καθόλου ταῦτα καὶ φύσει·
ὁμοία γὰρ τὰ γιγνόμενα πάθῃ, 'ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμα· μιμεῖται γὰρ ἡ
τέχνη τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς τροφῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι πέψις
ὁμοία ἐψήσει ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ θερμῷ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ
σώματος θερμότητος γίγνεται.

Ph. 194a21-27: ...εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ
αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέχρι τοῦ (οἶον
ἱατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμου τὸ τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὅλην, ὅτι
κλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ 'ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς
φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρων τὰς φύσεις. Aristotle
leaves little doubt that τέχνη does imitate nature.

199a15-17: ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις
ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν
τέχνην ἔνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν...

Pol. 1337a2: πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται
τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν. Τέχνη not only imitates, but also sup-
plements and completes the work of nature. Both proceed in an
orderly way toward a definite end, the final cause.

Finally, there are many passages in which Aristotle
discusses the nature of τέχνη in such a way that it is pos-
sible by examining these to discover just what he means by
the term in his own philosophical system:

APo. 100a3-14: ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ
λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία·

αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνημαὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. οὐτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι αἱ ἕξεις, οὐτ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἐνὸς στάντος ἑτερος ἔστη, εἴθ' ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὕσα οἷα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο. From this it is clear that τέχνη originates from experience. The same view is set forth in the Metaphysics, A. chapter 1.

Metaph. 981a1-7 καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ὁμοίον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. Again, τέχνη is the product of experience, the possession of which distinguishes it from mere chance. It is further evident here, as also in the preceding passage, that τέχνη is dependent upon a grasp of universals rather than of particulars, a doctrine which we shall later see emphasized.

Appt. 46a4: Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιοῦν καὶ μάθημα. δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἐκάτερον¹ ἀθρεῖν, καὶ τοῦτων ὡς

1. ἐκάτερον ABC, Waitz, Tredennick, Jenkinson, Tricot.

πλεϊστον εὐπορεῖν,

_____46a17-22: Ἰδία² δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην εἰσὶν αἱ πλεῖσται, sc. ἀρχαί, διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐμπειρίας ἐστὶ παραδοῦναι. λέγω δ' οἶον τὴν ἀστρολογικὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς ἀστρολογικῆς ἐπιστήμης· ληφθέντων γὰρ ἱκανῶς τῶν φαινομένων οὕτως εὐρέθησαν αἱ ἀστρολογικαὶ ἐπιδείξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλην ὁποιοῦν ἔχει τέχνην τε καὶ ἐπιστήμην. Here we see that τέχνη is developed by the inductive method: the body of knowledge which is essential to any science is built up by the advance from the particular to the general. Experience supplies a series of observations in some specific province of investigation, from a consideration of which general rules or causes (ἀρχαί) may be stated.

Metaph. 1047b33: Ἀπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἶον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἔθει οἶον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἶον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν, ὅσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. Scientific and artistic abilities are acquired through the use of reason.

Ph. 194a33-194b8:..ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὅλην αἱ

ἕκαστον other MSS., Bekker. Ἐκάτερον in the context refers to the major and minor premises of the syllogism.

1. Ἰδία Alexander of Aphrodisias, Waitz, Tredennick, Jenkinson, Tricot. Ἰδίᾳ MSS., Bekker.

μὲν ἀπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρ-
 χόντων (ἔσμεν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα·
 εἴρηται δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας). δύο δὲ αἱ ἄρχουσαι τῆς
 ὕλης καὶ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἡ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ
 ἀρχιτεκτονική. διδὼ καὶ ἡ χρωμένη ἀρχιτεκτονική πῶς, διαφέρει
 δὲ ἢ ἡ μὲν τοῦ εἶδους γνωριστική, ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονική, ἢ δὲ ὡς
 ποιητική, τῆς ὕλης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κυβερνήτης ποτὶν τι τὸ εἶδος
 τοῦ πηδαλίου γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, ὁ δ' ἐκ ποίου ξύλου καὶ
 ποίων κινήσεων ἔσται. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἡμεῖς
 ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει
 οὕσα. Here τέχνη fashions its matter. There is also a two-
 fold division of τέχνη into that which uses the product and
 that which actually directs the making of it. The former
 knows the ultimate form of what is to be made and in a sense
 directs what the matter shall be, since the matter must be ap-
 propriate to the use to which the product is to be put; while
 the science which immediately governs the making actually de-
 termines the material. We create the matter for the sake of
 the function.

So far it has been seen that τέχνη is a result of
 experience and is formed by the inductive method, that it is
 acquired by the exercise of reason, that it can be either the
 science of producing something or the skill of using what has
 been produced, and that in the latter capacity it has knowledge
 of the form, and in the former of the matter as well. I shall

proceed with a series of instances which further develop the theory of τέχνη by outlining its function:

EE. 184a2-8: οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδῶσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἴτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι μηδ' ὅθεν δυνήσεται κορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων· οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν, τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν. The implication is that τέχνη carries the knowledge of causes and the ability to teach.

Metaph. 981a24-28: ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἶόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, . . . τοῦτο δ' ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ' οὐ. Understanding and knowledge of the cause characterize τέχνη.

____ 981b8: ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ μὴ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. . . Obviously, τέχνη, as distinguished from ἐμπειρία, carries understanding and the ability to teach and is therefore more truly a form of knowledge than the latter.

Pol. 1331b37: . . . δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμας ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρωτερά κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις. . .

In the sciences, both applied and theoretical, it is necessary to control both ends and means.

____1282b14: 'Επει δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος... The end in every τέχνη is a good.

____1281b9-15: ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μῦθον, πάντα δὲ πάντες, ὥς κρύνουσιν ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτω διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνηχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπεὶ μεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὲ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἑτέρου δὲ τινος ἕτερον μῦθον. The principle of selection in the creative process is here stated.

In two passages Aristotle reiterates a characteristic of τέχνη which has already been noted, that it is concerned with the universal rather than the particular:

Metaph. 981a16:...ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ γνῶσις ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου,... .

Rh. 1356b30:...οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἑκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἐστὶν ἡ καλλία, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἑκαστον ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν),¹ οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ' ἑκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον σωκράτει ἡ ἱππία, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῖσδε, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική. In other words, τέχνη, as a body of knowledge, is knowledge of universals. Indeed, to Aristotle

1. Punctuation Bekker's.

as to many other Greeks, knowledge must have universal causes as its object; for otherwise it cannot be knowledge, but only experience or some unreliable form of opinion. It is clear, moreover, that Aristotle definitely regards τέχνη as a form of knowledge: he frequently couples it with ἐπιστήμη, he contrasts it with ἐμπειρία, and he states that it understands causes, that it comprehends both matter and form, and that it can teach - all characteristics of knowledge.

In another group of passages Aristotle discusses the relation of τέχνη to causation more fully, integrating his concept of productive science with his doctrine of matter and form:

Metaph. 1025b22: ...τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἡ νοῦς ἡ τέχνη ἡ δυνάμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, ἡ προαίρεσις· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρακτὸν καὶ προαιρετὸν... .

The cause of things which are made is in the maker, either intellect or creative science or some other faculty.

1032b15-23: τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἡ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται ἡ δὲ ποίησις, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἶδους νόησις ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως ποίησις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μεταξὺ ἕκαστον γίγνεται. λέγω δ' οἶον εἰ ὑγιάινει, δέοι αὖ ὁμαλυνθῆναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι; τοδί, τοῦτο δ' ἔσται εἰ θερμανθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστὶ; τοδί. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδί δυνάμει· τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη ἐπ' αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅθεν ἄρχεται ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ὑγιάίνειν, αὖ μὲν ἀπὸ τέχνης, τὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ Here τέχνη supplies the form

in the soul. This is seen more clearly in two passages already quoted:

____1032a26-28: ...αἱ δ' ἄλλαι γενέσεις λέγονται ποιήσεις. πᾶσαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας.

____1032a32-b2: ...ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν). The form, i.e., the essence and primary substance, of things which come into being by being made (ποιήσεις) is in the soul of the maker.

____1033b8φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὅτιδήποτε χρή καλεῖν τὴν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μορφῇ, οὐ γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ γένεσις, οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ γίγνεται ἢ ὑπὸ τέχνης ἢ ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ ὑπὸ δυνάμεως). Τέχνη imposes the form, which does not exist apart from its particular, except in the mind of the maker, nor does it come into being independent of either maker or matter. The creator, that is, does not bring the form of what he is making into being apart from the matter of it. The form and matter both start to exist only with the product itself.

____1070a13-18: ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ' ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἢ ἄνευ θλῆς καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει.... . The forms of things produced

by τέχνη do not exist apart from the things themselves, unless it be held that the productive essence is the form.

Ross¹ has the following note: "Aristotle is not referring to the general fact that forms come into being not by a process but instantaneously (Z1033b5), but to some mode of 'being and not being without generation and destruction' which is peculiar to the forms of artefacta. This can only be the artist's instantaneously thinking of them and ceasing to think of them. So Alexander interprets the words."

There remains one considerable group of references in the Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle elaborates his definition and theory of τέχνη, examining it as an intellectual excellence:

EN. 1139b16: ἔστω δὲ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς. "Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason... ." ²
This list of the intellectual excellences or ἀρεταί, occurs in Book VI, introducing the discussion of them in detail.

1. Op. cit., vol. II, p. 356.

2. The Works of Aristotle Translated into English: vol. IX, Ethica Nicomachea, by W. J. Ross. Oxford, 1925.

Chapter 4 contains the extended treatment of τέχνη:

____ 1140a1-23: τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστευόμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἔξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἔξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἔξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἡ οὐ τέχνη, ταῦτόν ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆς. ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἡ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινα περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστίν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ.

“τέχνη τύχην ἑστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.” ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὅσπερ εἴρηται, ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆς ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικῆς ἔξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

This is a carefully considered statement of Aristotle's views on τέχνη, terminating in a precise definition of the term. Τέχνη is a state or quality of the mind, involving

a true course of reasoning, and concerned with making. It deals with the variable. Its opposite is ἀρεχρία, which differs from it in being founded upon false reasoning. From the context it is evident that Aristotle is here writing of τέχνη as an intellectual virtue, although there are two other passages a little further on in the same work which have led some scholars to question whether he really did regard it as a virtue. These I shall consider below. Meanwhile, it is possible, by examining some of Aristotle's statements about the other intellectual virtues, to learn how τέχνη differs from them.

First of all, τέχνη is to be distinguished from ἐπιστήμη. It is true that Aristotle often writes, both in the Ethics and elsewhere, as if the two terms were almost synonymous; instances have already been cited in which they are coupled in use and apparently in meaning.¹ But these instances need not deceive, for in them Aristotle is speaking loosely, as he often does, without stopping to make his more precise meaning clear. And again, the two terms have certain things in common, for both are intellectual virtues and both are forms of knowledge. Their frequent conjunction is simply an instance of a practice of Aristotle's in which he employs a term at times in a rather general, usually popular sense, much as it is used in the language of the day, while at other times he gives to the same term a particular meaning in his philosophical system, often quite different from its exoteric meaning. Sometimes the term will appear to have even a third signifi-

1. Metaph. 981a1-7; Abr. . 46a4,17-22.

cance midway between the general and the most strictly defined. Certainly this is true of τέχνη, so that it should cause no wonder to observe, on the one hand, that it is often joined in use with ἐπιστήμη, and to learn, on the other, that the two really are quite distinct in meaning when properly and carefully employed.

While τέχνη, then, is based on the inductive method, ἐπιστήμη is essentially deductive. To be sure, the first principles, the prior knowledge, on which ἐπιστήμη depends, are discovered by ἐπαγωγή, inductive reasoning, or perhaps by νοῦς, which seems to be much the same thing. But this is antecedent to the point at which ἐπιστήμη starts. Τέχνη, on the contrary, has to develop its own principles by its own process of induction. Νοῦς does not serve τέχνη. Ἐπιστήμη is treated as follows:

EN. 1139b25-36: ἔτι διδακτὴ ἅπασα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν.¹ ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς· ἐπαγωγή ἄρα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐξῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς.² ὅταν γὰρ πῶς πιστεύῃ καὶ γινώριμοι αὐτῷ

1. Ado. 71a1 Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προὔπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

2. Ib1d. 71b9: ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἶόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν

ᾧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

Thus ἐπιστήμη is deductive, τέχνη inductive. The latter, moreover, is a ἔξις ποιητική, a quality of the mind concerned with making, a creative quality; while the former is a ἔξις ἀποδεικτική, a demonstrative quality. Finally, τέχνη is concerned with the variable, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν... οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. But the object of ἐπιστήμη is what exists of necessity, the eternal and unchanging.

EN 1139b20 πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν...

1139b22-24 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίου ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἅπλως πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀφθαρτα.

σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἴωμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστίν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐστὶ.... ὥστε οὐ ἅπλως ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, φάμεν δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. Ἀποδείξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν. Ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάμεθα. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν,

1140b31: 'Επεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων...

Tέχνη is also to be distinguished from φρόνησις. Both, to be sure, are περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, but, as has been seen, the variable is subdivided: τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν. ἑτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πράξις... ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγον ἔξις πρακτική ἑτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγον ποιητικῆς ἔξεως. Of these, the ἔξις ποιητική is τέχνη, the ἔξις πρακτική is φρόνησις.

EN 1140a25-30: δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσεσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἶον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὃν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη. So φρόνησις is practical wisdom about conduct in general; it counsels its possessor how to live the good life. The ability to achieve particular ends κατὰ μέρος, οἶον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, is the province of τέχνη.

1140b1-7: ...οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη,

ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖται τοῦ δεικνυμένου. Συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην.

ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἷη· ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.¹ Practical wisdom "is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man."²

1. Cf. M.M. 1197a1-17: ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ, ἐν οἷς αἴρεσις καὶ φύγη καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν πράξαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι. ἔστιν δὴ τῶν ποιουμένων καὶ πραττομένων οὐ ταῦτ' οὐδὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος, οἷον παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, ἐπειδὴ ἔστι ποιητικὴ οἰκία, οἰκία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθέν· τέλος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν, οἷον παρὰ τὸ καθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐθέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πράξις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πράξιν καὶ τὰ πρακτὰ ἡ φρόνησις, περὶ δὲ τὴν ποίησιν καὶ τὰ ποιητὰ ἡ τέχνη· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ποιηταῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἔστι τὸ τεχνάζειν. ὥστε ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἷη ἕξις τις προαιρετικὴ καὶ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων καὶ πράξαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι, ὅσα εἰς τὸ συμφέρον ἤδη συντείνει. ἔστιν δ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ, ὡς δόξειεν ἂν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη.

2. Ross's Oxford translation.

____1140b21-25: 'αλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἥττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τις ἔστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

This last passage offers some difficulty, for, although it apparently indicates another distinction between τέχνη and φρόνησις, viz., that the latter is an ἀρετή, whereas the former is not, in doing so it contradicts what has already been said of τέχνη, so that the problem, to which I have earlier referred, arises, whether τέχνη is an ἀρετή or not. On the one hand, it is listed among the intellectual virtues in 1139b16, has chapter IV devoted to it, and is defined as a virtue in 1140a20; on the other, in 1140b21-25 it is treated as if it were not an ἀρετή and in 1141a5 it is omitted from the recapitulation of the intellectual ἀρεταί.

In investigating the answer to this difficulty, one meets first of all the question whether there are actually five intellectual ἀρεταί or only two. Prantl¹ maintains the latter view. According to him σοφία and φρόνησις are the only virtues; the other qualities listed are subordinate to them and cannot be regarded as ἀρεταί. He holds that these conclusions are supported by 1143b15: τί μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ φρόνησις

1. Carl von Prantl, Ueber die dianoetischen Tugenden in der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles, Munich, 1852.

καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τί ἑκατέρω τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρω, εἴρηται. Of the parts of the soul, the λόγον ἔχον μέρος¹ is in turn divided into that which is concerned with τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, of which σοφία is the distinctive ἀρετή, and that concerned with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, the peculiar virtue of which is φρόνησις. Of the other three qualities listed by Aristotle, νοῦς, according to Prantl, is no virtue but das Unmittelbare, i.e., the mind itself; ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη are not virtues, since there is an ἀρετή of each, namely, σοφία which is the ἀρετή both of the former and, in the highest instance, of the latter also.

To Prantl's views Zeller is opposed. Taking up the argument from the last point, i.e., that σοφία is the ἀρετή τέχνης, he says:² "Und die letztere heisst allerdings c. 7.1141a, 12 ἀρετὴ τέχνης,³ aber nur um den unbestimmteren Sprachgebrauch,

1. Nicomachean Ethics 1139a4.

2. Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, 4th ed., Leipzig, 1921. Zweiter Teil, Zweite Abteilung, p. 649, n. 2.

3. EN 1141a9-12: τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον φειδίαν λιθοργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιὸν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν.

As Zeller says, Aristotle is here simply giving an example

wornach σοφία für jede, auch die künstlerische Meisterschaft steht, von dem bestimmteren auszuscheiden, nach welchem sie eine besondere dianoëtische Vollkommenheit, die in der Erkenntniss des Nothwendigen sich bewährende, bezeichnet. In dieser engeren Bedeutung genommen ist die Weisheit nicht ἀρετή τέχνης, denn die τέχνη hat es ja gerade mit dem ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν zu thun. Auch abgesehen hievon scheint mir aber Prantl's Ansicht nicht richtig; theils weil Aristoteles c.2, Anf. ausdrücklich die dianoëtischen Tugenden als Gegenstand der folgenden Erörterung bezeichnet, und nirgends andeutet, dass in dieser Beziehung zwischen den fünf Stücken, die er c. 3 aufzählt, ein Unterschied sei; theils weil der aristotelische Begriff der Tugend auf alle fünf passt. Denn wenn jede löbliche Eigenschaft eine Tugend ist (Eth. I, 13, Schl.: τῶν δὲ ἕξων τὰς ἐκαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν), so sind die ἐπιστήμη und die τέχνη unzweifelhaft ἕξις ἐκαινεταί (als Beispiel der ἕξις wird gerade die ἐπιστήμη hervorgehoben Kateg. c. 8.8, a, 29. 11, a, 24), und wenn anderswo (Top. V, 3. 131, b, 1) als das eigenthümliche Merkmal der ἀρετή angegeben wird: ὁ τὸν ἔχοντα ποιεῖ σπουδαῖον, so passt diess gleichfalls auf beide.

of the popular usage of words which he uses more precisely; he means to base no conclusions on such usage, but merely to point the contrast between it and his own usage, and to afford himself an opening into his own exposition of σοφία.

Das gleiche gilt aber auch von dem νοῦς, sobald man nur unter demselben nicht diesen bestimmten Theil der Seele, sondern eine bestimmte Beschaffenheit dieses Seelentheils versteht, wie man diess muss, wo der νοῦς neben der ἐπιστήμη u. s. f. steht; c. 12, Anf. wird er auch wirklich ausdrücklich als ἔξις bezeichnet; ist er aber eine ἔξις, so muss er auch eine ἔξις ἐκείνη, eine ἀρετή sein."

Zeller's arguments sufficiently refute the views of Prantl, in my opinion, although there is justice in the latter's emphasis on the parts of the intellectual soul and the fact that each has its excellence. In other words, it is true, so far as it goes, to say that σοφία is the ἀρετή of the thinking soul as it is concerned with τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, while φρόνησις is its ἀρετή in respect of τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. Greenwood puts it in this way:¹

"The way is now cleared for as careful an examination as can be made of Aristotle's view of intellectual ἀρετή in detail. From what has just been said it follows that intellectual ἀρετή is of two main kinds and two only. For all proper objects of intellectual activity are of two main kinds and of two only: either μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and at the same time μὴ πρακτά, or else ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and at the

1. L. H. G. Greenwood, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six, Cambridge, 1909, introduction, p. 25.

same time *πρακτά*. This distinction must correspond exactly to that between the intellectual activities themselves, the parts or faculties of the soul that possess these activities, and the *ἀρεταί* or good permanent qualities of the parts of the soul: 1139a16 ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οὐκ αἰετὸν. For according to Aristotle's psychological theory, the thinking soul is potentially the same as the objects of thought, as *δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἶδους ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης*: therefore whatever distinction exists between the objects of thought must exist also in the thinking soul. The *ἀρετὴ* of the one part of the soul Aristotle calls *σοφία*, of the other part *φρόνησις*. This nomenclature does not prevent the subdivisions of either *σοφία* or *φρόνησις* being quite properly called *ἀρεταί* themselves: nor does it prevent the use of the name *φρόνησις* in a narrower sense: neither does it indicate a distinction essentially more radical than that made between *ποιητικὴ* and *πρακτικὴ ἀρετὴ*, or than that made between *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη*. But it does indicate just the distinction which is of prime importance as regards the settlement of the great question of the Ethics, What is the greatest good for man? the distinction upon which, for this reason, the whole discussion of VI is founded."

So much, then, for the impeachment of Aristotle's list of five intellectual virtues: it appears reasonable to believe that he meant them all to be accepted as *ἀρεταί*, rather than to limit the *ἀρεταί* to two. But one further

question remains. Granted that all the intellectual qualities in the list are to be held as ἀρεταί, does τέχνη belong in the list?

Aristotle first gives us the list in 1139b15, where he specifically states that there are five terms to consider and clearly names τέχνη as one of them. He goes on, moreover, to discuss τέχνη at length and carefully to define it, 1140a1-23, a definition which is unequivocal in designating it as an ἀρετή. Yet further on, in 1140b21-25, he implies that it is not an ἀρετή, for he speaks of a τέχνης ἀρετή, refers to a man's falling into error in τέχνη, and finishes by saying of φρόνησις that it is an ἀρετή and not a τέχνη. Greenwood¹ says of this passage: "I think it is possible to translate 'It is plain, then, that φρόνησις is an ἀρετή which is not τέχνη': no τις being understood with τέχνη. This allows ἀρετή τις to be taken as referring to διανοητική ἀρετή, which is certainly rather abrupt after the use of τὰς ἀρετὰς just before in the sense of τὰς ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς, but is evidently the sense required. 'Ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ will then be quite unemphatic, and οὐ τέχνη will be the point of the sentence." He goes on to discuss the interpretation of the earlier part of the passage, so as to show that "τέχνης ἔστιν ἀρετή means that τέχνη may be an ἀρετή or may not, φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετή means that φρόνησις must always be an ἀρετή." This reasonable interpretation depends upon another point that Greenwood

1. Op. cit., p. 186.

makes, to the effect that Aristotle in Book Six has two senses of τέχνη in mind, one the strictly defined meaning of 1140a20, μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς, which is there contrasted with ἀτεχνία, α ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς; and the other a more general meaning, which would include both the τέχνη of 1140a20 and ἀτεχνία, which might, indeed, be paraphrased as ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῇ περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Obviously, in the former sense, τέχνη is an ἀρετή, while in the latter it may or may not be, depending on whether it is μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς or ψευδοῦς. The latter, as is seen from 1141a9-12, is the popular usage, the former the strictly Aristotelian. I think this dual meaning of the word - something typical of Aristotle - is the key to the present passage.

There is one other passage which might be taken as casting into doubt the legitimacy of τέχνη as an intellectual ἀρετή, for in it Aristotle repeats his list of virtues omitting τέχνη.

EN . 1140b31-1141a8: Ἐκεῖ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὗτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τοῦτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀποδειξίν ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχό-

μενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. This list manifestly does not include τέχνη yet if the context be considered, the omission need occasion no surprise. Aristotle is looking for the first principles of deductive reasoning and scientific knowledge. He finds by eliminating all the other possibilities that νοῦς is what he seeks. Now he does consider τέχνη early in the passage and eliminates it, just as he eventually eliminates ἐπιστήμη, σοφία, and φρόνησις. Why he happens to leave τέχνη out of the list, while putting the others into it, must remain uncertain. Perhaps he feels that it is the least likely to be confused with νοῦς, whereas the others might each in a sense be identified with it, so that greater care and precision are required to rule them out. But no matter what the reason¹ may be, the important thing is not that τέχνη is omitted from the formal list, but that it does appear in the first part of the passage, to be duly eliminated like the others. Finally, my contention that τέχνη has as much right to its place in the list as any of the other terms is supported by its appearance in a similar passage in the Posterior Analytics 89b7-9:

1. For various conjectures see J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Oxford, 1892, vol. II, p. 51, and Greenwood, op. cit., p. 163.

τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας, τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς, τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς θεωρίας μᾶλλον ἐστίν.

The strongest argument, however, in favor of the view that Aristotle regards τέχνη as an ἀρετή is the fact that he takes the trouble carefully to define τέχνη in such a way as to leave no doubt of his meaning, and to discuss it at length among the other intellectual virtues. For although he writes of it at times as if it were not a virtue, yet when he is using the word most carefully and actually defining it, he clearly regards it as a virtue. After all, he has a right to his own definition of the word. Furthermore, the fact that he defines it seems to show that he knew the word was popularly used in various senses other than his own and that the definition was needed to clarify his position. And if at times he deviates from his own particular usage and relapses into using the word in a wider sense, it is not to be wondered at, for he is dealing with a word which is of fairly frequent occurrence in Greek and which is used to express many fairly common ideas. The same sort of thing happens in other languages. For the fact that a philosopher endows a well-known word with a characteristic meaning in his own philosophy does not remove that word from general circulation or relieve it of the accumulated meanings of generations. Nor does the philosopher cease

to employ the common language of his contemporaries because he has formed a specialized vocabulary of his own. It is reasonable, therefore, to grant that Aristotle, although he employs τέχνη in many places and with various meanings, also uses it in a very special sense,¹ in which it is one of the intellectual ἀρεταί.

A brief survey of what Aristotle elsewhere says about ἀρετή, and in particular intellectual ἀρετή, will perhaps throw some light on the implications of τέχνη as an ἀρετή. EN 1101b31-32: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης·... . Praise belongs to virtue, for virtue leads men to accomplish noble things.

1103a3-10: διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα

1. Cf. Stewart's note on φύσις, op. cit., vol. I, p. 169:

"φύσις, like many other leading terms, has both a generic and a specific sense in Aristotle - a circumstance which often involves the philosopher himself, as well as his interpreters, in considerable confusion. In its generic sense it = 'laws of nature'; in its specific sense, 'laws of organic nature,' or 'biological laws,' - i.e. laws of nature which result in the production and maintenance of definite living structures. It is in connection with this narrower sense of the term that we must take all Aristotle's most characteristic statements about φύσις... ."

δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικὰς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἡθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐξιν· τῶν ἐξων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν. Virtue is divided into intellectual and moral virtue; the states or qualities which are praiseworthy we call ἀρεταί.

____1103a14: διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἣ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, Intellectual virtue requires experience and time, since it owes its birth and development to teaching.

____1103a31: τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. We gain virtues only by practicing them, like any other skill.

____1103b7: ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη. Every virtue, like every skill, is produced and destroyed by the same causes and through the same means, i.e., experience and practice. Τέχνη here seems to mean craft or skill, for Aristotle goes on to offer the καθαριστής and the οἰκοδόμος as illustrations.

____1106a11: εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. Virtues are acquired states or qualities.

____1106a15: ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἢ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, Every

virtue brings that of which it is the virtue into good condition and causes it to perform its function well.

____ 1106a22: ...καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἣν ἡ ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. The virtue of man will be the state of mind and character which makes him good and enables him to do his own work well.

To summarize, then, virtue, or ἀρετή, according to Aristotle, is a praiseworthy quality or state, acquired through experience and practice from teaching - a state which brings that to which it is proper into its best condition and causes it to perform its function well. Virtue for man makes him good and makes him do his own work well. So τέχνη, as an intellectual virtue, is praiseworthy, for it is a ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική; as a ἔξις it is acquired through experience and practice; it correctly and ably deals with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν; and it is concerned with making. Each τέχνη does its work well, since it is a ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς, understanding its subject matter, together with cause and effect, and subjecting the matter to the form. In short, it is a branch of knowledge, comprising the rules of how to make things and directing the actual processes of the making. And in so far as it is an ἀρετή, the rules are correct and the direction is efficient.

It is time to review Aristotle's use of τέχνη. First of all, he employs it in its old general sense of a

skill, a craft, a device. Closely allied to this are his references to the banausic crafts, without which life in a civilized community cannot be carried on. These are meanings which the word has carried in the Greek language from very early times onward. Then he gives examples of various specific τέχναι, rhetoric, medicine, ship building, and architecture. Many of these we should today call applied or creative sciences, rather than arts. And finally, we find him using the word as a rough equivalent of ἐπιστήμη. This, too, suggests that in his mind the aspect of science overshadows that of what we might call art or fine art, with the aesthetic connotations that the latter term has gathered in modern times. But it is always science concerned with making. In this regard he follows Hippocrates and the medical writers, Isocrates, and Plato. So far, he has developed in line with his predecessors and has done no violence to the usage of those who wrote before him. In another series of passages he uses τέχνη to designate a way of bringing something into being, as contrasted with γένεσις κατὰ φύσιν. Here again, there is no sharp break with other Greeks, for Plato was well aware that many things are brought into existence by τέχνη. It is only in the frequency with which he refers to this process that he begins to diverge from his predecessors, and in the detailed examination which he devotes to it that his divergence becomes marked. For as he scrutinizes γένεσις κατὰ τέχνην,

the term τέχνη begins to assume shades of meaning distinctly Aristotelian; it finds its place in the ontological doctrines of Aristotle and comes to occupy a special place in the metaphysical system of Aristotelian philosophy, with a specified relation to matter and form and substance in the characteristic Aristotelian theory of causation. Finally, in his study of ethics, Aristotle completes the conversion of τέχνη into a term peculiarly his own, integrated into his views on knowledge and the intellectual virtues.

Thus at length τέχνη emerges as an Aristotelian term. In its strictest Aristotelian usage, as carefully defined intellectual ἀρετή, playing a definite part in the ethical system of the Stagirite and closely woven into the theory of matter and form, τέχνη bears a burden of meanings which would have been strange to Plato, Isocrates, and Hippocrates. The reason for this is easy to see: Aristotle simply came after them and developed a philosophy of necessity unknown to them. But even here, in its most peculiarly Aristotelian sense, τέχνη displays certain persistent characteristics. Basically, to all these men, it is a system of knowledge, it has its roots in experience, it comprehends causes, it can be taught, and it is concerned with making. The basic core of meaning is common to all these writers and to many others as well; the refinements are wholly Aristotle's.

It is possible to conclude, as a result of this in-

vestigation of τέχνη, that Aristotle took a word ready to hand, a term in common and frequent use in the language of his day, and made it over into something peculiarly his own. It had a wide variety of meanings, ranging from device, skill, or craft, to art and science; practically all of these appear in the writings of Aristotle, for he used the language as he found it. But alongside these general meanings he singled out for particular use the one sense, already developed for him by Hippocrates, Isocrates, and Plato, as well, no doubt, as by others, of a body of knowledge concerned with making something or producing a given result, and from this one sense he advanced to convert the term to his own use and endow it with additional significance not dreamed of by those who had gone before him.

Even in this final development the word is not stereotyped, but continues to have a kind of double significance. In one meaning, the Aristotelian τέχνη is an intellectual virtue, a *ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική*, unerring and praiseworthy. In the other, it is a *ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική*, and this includes the former, for in this meaning τέχνη can be wrong; it is not always praiseworthy; it may or may not be *ἀρετή*. But both meanings include most of the Aristotelian characteristics of τέχνη: in both it is a *ἔξις* concerned with making, inductive knowledge of *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, comprehending both the matter and the form of what is to be produced, imposing the form, which exists in the mind of the

τεχνίτης, upon the matter and thus bringing the product into existence; in both it understands causes and first principles and can be taught. The only difference is whether it knows and does all this invariably without error, being of necessity right because it is itself an ἀρετή, and therefore by definition infallible; or whether it is sometimes right and sometimes wrong in what it knows and makes, being capable of error, but also being capable at times of true and unerring knowledge and creative activity - at such times having an ἀρετή.

One last word about the translation of τέχνη. It is by now clear, I think, that what I have already written of the translation of the word in Hippocrates and Plato is even more strongly applicable to Aristotle. To render the Aristotelian τέχνη into English as art, although it is correct according to the lexicon and is supported at once by tradition and by the use of modern authority, is bad, for, while τέχνη may sometimes mean art, with all its aesthetic implications, it far more often does not. The English art has acquired too many aesthetic connotations, too many associations with the beautiful, and too much the suggestion of inspiration to serve as a reproduction of Aristotle's τέχνη. The underlying ideas are making and knowledge. I therefore suggest, in this connection as before with reference to Hippocrates and Plato, that the proper translation for τέχνη is productive science or applied science or creative science.

SECTION 3.

At the beginning of this study of τέχνη I spoke, referring to the Poetics of Aristotle, of the concept of poetry as a τέχνη, upon which that treatise is based. It is now possible, returning, to apply the results of the investigation to the interpretation of the Poetics. Since τέχνη occurs several times therein, I shall first of all examine these instances, bearing in mind what Aristotle means by the term.

1447a20-21: ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες (οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας), ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τοῦτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις.... . Here τέχνη is contrasted with συνηθεία, the point being that those who imitate by τέχνη have the advantage of knowing just what they are about, while the others work by habit and their success is largely accidental, since they are at an earlier stage of intellectual development, so far as μίμησις is concerned, than the former. This passage also points out the function of the τέχνη of poetry, to imitate, and indicates the means by which the τέχνη accomplishes its function.

1447b29: ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν. This refers to the difference of means whereby the subdivisions of τέχνη carry out their function. The subdivisions mentioned are dithyrambic and nomic

poetry, tragedy, and comedy.

1450b20: ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὀψέων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἔστιν. The tragic effect, being of the essence of tragedy, exists even apart from the presentation on the stage by the actors; the spectacle is more properly the province of the scenemaker's τέχνη than of the poet's.

1451a7: τοῦ μήκους ὅρος <ὁ> μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἔστιν... . It is not the duty of poetry to set the limit to the length of the plot in so far as it is relative to the public performance and the spectators. The poetic τέχνη does determine the length of the plot, however, in so far as it must be of suitable length properly to accomplish the imitation, i.e., to present the story adequately but not in such excessive detail as to overburden the memory and obscure the essential structure.

1451a24: ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικεν καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἥτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν [τοῦτ' = unity]. An example of the contrast between τέχνη and φύσιν.

1453a22: ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγωδία ἐκ ταύτης τῆς συστάσεώς ἐστι. The σύστασις meant here is the description of the plot most appropriate to a tragedy, one in which a man rather like ourselves, neither notably more virtuous nor vicious, is seen passing, as a result not of a crime

but of an error in judgment, from happiness to misery. Of such a composition is the plot which will best enable tragedy to perform its function. In order that it may best fulfill its purpose, the plot must be determined according to τέχνη. 1454a10: ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης εὗρον τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις.... . Accident led the early dramatists to devise the right sort of plot, accident and experiment. But now that drama is established, τέχνη investigates the plots of the early writers and from its observations formulates rules to guide the future poet, who need not depend on τύχη, since he will have τέχνη to teach him how to make a good plot.

1460b13-21: πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἁμαρτία, ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία· εἰ δὲ τῷ προελέσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴκον ἄμφω τὰ δεξιὰ προβεβληκότα, ἢ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην τέχνην ἁμάρτημα (οἶον τὸ κατ' ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην) ἢ ἀδύνατα πεποιήται ὅποτ' ᾖ οὖν, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτήν. Poetry has its own canons of correctness, which is judged according to the skill of the representation; correctness in poetry is very different from that in politics, for instance, or any other applied science. Since the essential function of the τέχνη of poetry is representation, errors in the manner of the representation, being

errors of the essence, are more reprehensible in the poet than mistakes which simply betray ignorance of the subject matter not of poetry but of some other science, for these latter mistakes are, as it were, accidental errors. A man may be a poor biologist but a good poet.

1460b23: πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The poetic τέχνη.

1460b26-32: εἰ μέντοι τὸ τέλος ἢ μᾶλλον < ἢ μὴ > ἥττον ἐνεδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν περὶ τούτων τέχνην, ἡμαρτησθαι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως μηδαμῇ ἡμαρτησθαι. ἔτι προτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμαρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἥδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν. Poetry must be correct within the range of its own τέχνη and everything, even an error of fact, must serve the end of poetry. But it is well to be correct also in matters pertaining to other τέχναι, provided such accuracy does not stand in the way of poetry's achieving its end.

1461b24: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀδύνατα... ἢ ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην.

Aristotle here lists five grounds on which poetry has been criticised. Bywater says:¹ "παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην must refer, as Twining has seen, to the technical inaccuracies of description considered in 25, 1460b16 sqq. It is to be ob-

1. Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, p. 350.

served that the present statement clearly recognizes two kinds of error, only incidentally distinguished in the early part of the chapter (25, 1460b20), the fault of impossibility and the fault of technical inaccuracy. The distinction is a very real one in controversy; to say of a picture, for instance, that it is not scientifically or historically correct is not quite the same thing as saying that it represents an impossibility. Κατὰ τέχνην is apparently used as an equivalent for the κατ' ἐκδοσὶν τέχνην in 25, 1460b19. The older interpreters understand the passage differently. Goulston takes it to mean 'tanquam ea quae a poeticae vel alterius artis norma ac veritate discedunt,' thus giving κατὰ τέχνην a sense wide enough to include poetry as well as ἱατρικὴ, πολιτικὴ, etc. Heinsius (after Victorius) renders it by 'ut quae cum ipsa artis poeticae pugnant natura' - just as though the text had either κατὰ τὴν τέχνην (which Hermann wished to restore) or κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην. The objection to such interpretations is sufficiently obvious. The criticism that something is poetically wrong is not one of the ἐπιτιμήματα considered in this chapter; and it cannot be met by any of the counter-arguments which Aristotle has suggested for the use of the apologist."

1462a1: ὥς δ' οὗτοι [δ'] ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἡ ὅλη τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ἐποποιίαν ἔχει. Here the τέχνη is tragedy.

1462b12: εἰ οὖν τοῦτοις τε διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἔτι τῷ τῆς

τέχνης ἔργῳ - in other respects and also in the poetic effect, i.e. in the function of the τέχνη.

These are all the occurrences of τέχνη in the Po-
etics. It can be seen that the definition^{of} τέχνη obtained from the study of its use in the rest of Aristotle's writings fits the word in all the instances of its use in the Poetics. Or, to be precise, the definition which fits is that of τέχνη as a ἐξὶς μετὰ λόγου ποιητική, rather than the very narrowest sense of a ἐξὶς μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, in which τέχνη is an ἀρετή. This latter sense does not suit the Po-
etics, since in that work Aristotle speaks of the possibility of an essential error in the τέχνη of poetry. But the slightly wider, yet still quite Aristotelian meaning clearly applies to the Poetics. It is possible, therefore, to draw certain conclusions from this information.

In the Poetics Aristotle is dealing with poetry as a τέχνη. Now it has been seen that a τέχνη is a reasoned creative quality concerned with the variable. It has a body of principles drawn by inductive reasoning from empirical observations and applies this abstract knowledge to the accomplishment of its ends. It can be taught and learned, but is not to be confused with native ability, which is something quite separate. In so far as it may be regarded as an ἀρετή, it is an intellectual, not a moral ἀρετή; that is, it is an ἀρετή in so far as it performs its function well, using a

correct body of knowledge: then it is a *ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου ἀλη-
θεὺς ποιητική*. Properly, it has no moral significance. And
it is equally evident, I think, that the term has no aesthetic
significance. It is morally and aesthetically neutral. Its
excellence is purely intellectual and creative. While, how-
ever, *τέχνη* has its end (*τέλος*), it is not an end in itself,
it is not its own end. In this respect, it differs from *φρό-
νησις*, which is its own end. The end of a *τέχνη* is something
outside the *τέχνη* itself. And thus, while *τέχνη* itself has
no aesthetic significance, a *τέχνη* can serve an aesthetic end.

So in discussing poetry, Aristotle does not deny it
its aesthetic qualities, any more than he denies the importance
of natural aptitude for writing it. But it is not with these
matters that he is concerned in the *Poetics*. The *τέλος* of
the *τέχνη* of poetry may be an aesthetic *τέλος*, but that is
not principally what Aristotle is writing about. His subject
is the *τέχνη* itself and how it works. The end of tragedy, for
example, is the *κάθαρσις* of pity and fear. But Aristotle con-
tents himself with pointing this out as a relevant fact and
says no more of it. He spends much time, however, explaining
how this tragic effect may best be achieved. The function of
the *τέχνη*, on the other hand, is *μίμησις*; and this he
treats at length, indicating the various means of imitating or
representing things, the proper objects for representation,
the correct methods of employing the means, and the like. In

brief, Aristotle is writing of poetry as a τέχνη . Now a τέχνη requires a set of first principles and universal rules, which are to be established inductively as a result of observations of many experiences, and which, when established, will guide the creative efforts of those who follow the τέχνη. Just such a set of principles he seeks to establish for poetry. He investigates the works of many poets, he analyses his observations, and produces the principles which he intends for the guidance of future poets. He does not pretend to inspire them; he does not suppose he can endow them with an aptitude which nature may have withheld from them; but he does offer them assistance of value. In the place of experiment he offers them knowledge. He may not assure them of writing great poetry, but he can prevent them from writing poems which are bad. He aims to help the poet as a technician, not as a man possessed of divine madness.

The Poetics, then, are empirical in origin and are designed not to establish eternal laws of aesthetics, but to show poets how best they can perform the function of their τέχνη, how they can discipline their poetic frenzy.

CHAPTER II

μῦθος

Μῦθος is the first of six terms which Aristotle applies to the elements or constituent parts into which he has analyzed tragedy and around these six words his discussion of tragedy in the Poetics chiefly centers. It is appropriate to begin the examination of the use of μῦθος in the Poetics with the definition which Aristotle provides.¹ He states that μῦθος is the composition of the incidents in the action, the way in which the things that happen are put together. The word is usually translated into English as plot or fable. I shall render it as plot in this study. To the definitions of the other terms which occur in the same passage I shall return later. Another passage,² which is a continuation of the former, lists the six elements of a tragedy and classified them. Two parts constitute the means of imitation, λέξις and μελοποιία; one, the manner, ὄψις; and three, the objects, μῦθος, ἦθος, and διάνοια. These six elements form the standards according to which a tragedy is judged as either good or bad.

At the opening of the Poetics³ the composition of

1. 1450a 3-7.

2. 1450a 7-15.

3. 1447a 9.

the plots is announced as one of the leading subjects of the investigation. Next there is a pair of passages,¹ historical in nature, tracing the development of tragedy and of the function of the plot. Describing in these the development of the drama, Aristotle dwells on the role of the plot and the changes which it underwent. In ~~two~~² other passages he emphasizes the importance of $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$, assigning it the first place among the six elements of tragedy. His statements of the primacy of plot are strong and forthright, rejecting all possibility of regarding character, thought, or diction as more important. The conclusion of this argument³ is that plot is the essence and, as it were, the soul of tragedy. Reiterating this supremacy,⁴ he states that, while pity and fear may proceed from the spectacle, the production of the play on the stage, the plot, apart from $\theta\psi\iota\varsigma$, if properly constructed, can produce these affections, for it is by the plot that the end of a tragedy is most efficaciously attained. It is interesting to note the constant reference to the arousing of pity and fear as the end of tragedy; that which dominates it and moulds the production of it.

1. 1449a 19-21, 1449b 5-9.

2. 1450a 15-25, 29-35.

3. 1450a 38 - b 4.

4. 1453b 1-7.

Next come some remarks on the best length for a plot and what its limits should be.¹ A plot should have a definite beginning, middle, and end, and, while it requires length enough to make it serious and effective, it must be brief enough to be easily remembered. Of the unity of the plot,² Aristotle writes that it is not enough that a plot concern only one man; it must represent a single action, so that no part may be removed or changed without affecting the story as a whole. Another pair of passages³ treats of the source for plots and of how source material is to be used. Poets should be reasonable about how they deal with the traditional stories in their plots. While the main facts of the traditions are to be respected, the poets must adapt the matter in hand to their own purpose and may employ the details as they will. It may also be noted that, in the instances just cited, the word *μῦθος* may be understood in its sense of tradition, rather than in its strict sense as a term of literary criticism.⁴ Aristotle further points out that the poet must be the poet rather of his plots than of his verses.

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1. 1450b 32, 1451a 3-6.
 2. 1451a 16-19, 21-22, 30-35.
 3. 1451b 23-26, 1453b 22-26.
 4. 1451b 27-29.

The kinds of plot are next examined. Of the simple type, the worst is the episodic, by which is meant a plot in which the incidents follow one another neither necessarily¹ nor probably. Again, plots are said to be either simple or complex, for all actions which plots imitate are by nature² of the one description or the other. The peripety and recognition must arise from the composition of the plot proper, in such a way as to follow from what has gone before either of necessity or in accordance with probability.³ The requirements for the best plot are that it must be single rather than double, and must display a change from prosperity to disaster, through error, not viciousness, on the part of a man like us or better, not worse.⁴ Finally, the instructions⁵ are given for the proper way of bringing in the denouement: it must follow as a necessary consequence of the plot.

⁶ Another passage offers advice on how to go about composing a plot in appropriate diction; briefly, the poet should put the scenes vividly before his eyes. In other

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1. 1451b 33 - 1452a 1.
 2. 1452a 12-14.
 3. 1452a 18-20.
 4. 1453a 12-17.
 5. 1454a 37-b 2.
 6. 1455a 22-26.

words, he should use his imagination. Elsewhere it is stated that the plots of narrative poetry should be like those of tragedy.¹ Finally, there are several miscellaneous occurrences of $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$.² None of these adds to the meaning of the word which has already become clear.

All the instances of $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in the Poetics have now been examined. Next I shall turn to an examination of the use of $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in Greek literature before Aristotle, in order to see whether any earlier author has employed the word to mean the σύνθεσις or σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων.

Homer employs the word $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ frequently, always with the meaning of words, speech, or discourse. $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ signifies words arranged in connected speech for the transmission of thought; it never means individual words or names, disconnected and carrying no thought. The term thence comes to mean sometimes conversation, sometimes a speech or address of a somewhat formal sort.³

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1. 1459a 17-21.
 2. 1451b 11-15, 1452a 10-11, 37, b 9, 28, 1453a 17-19, 37, 1454a 12-14, b 35, 1455b 7-8, 1456a 8, 13, 28, 1460a 33.
 3. Examples of the general and basic meaning may be seen in Γ303, Ψ271, 491, Ω200, κ561, μ278, 319, ν37, and ω213, all of which introduce a speech or discourse and show $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ dependent upon a verb of speaking. In Z343, K61,

Again, $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\alpha\varsigma$, while always having the basic meaning of speech or discourse, acquires by reason of the context a variety of additional connotations. Sometimes it means narration, account, or message.¹ Elsewhere it signifies a command or counsel.² Or it can mean an answer,³ or sometimes abuse or vituperation.⁴ It may mean encouragement or exhortation,⁵ while at other times it signifies a promise or threat;⁶ or, again, it may mean prayer or desire or wish.⁷ It sometimes signifies the interchange of conversation.⁸

and $\epsilon\lambda 83$, also, it depends upon such a verb. The following instances show $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\alpha\varsigma$ with the same meaning after verbs of hearing or perceiving: B200, $\Gamma 212$, T84, 185, $\alpha 361$, and $\kappa 189$. It sometimes depends on other verbs, as in I 51, T107, $\gamma 23$, and $\delta 774$; or it can be conjoined in construction with nouns and adjectives, as in I 625, Y248, $\phi 71$, and $\psi 62$.

1. K288, $\gamma 94$.
2. A33, 565, $\Psi 157$, $\rho 177$.
3. H406, I627, O202, $\rho 574$.
4. B224.
5. $\Delta 323$, K190.
6. A388, E715.
7. $\beta 77$, $\delta 647$, o196.
8. B796, $\delta 214$, 239.

Finally, $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ by extension comes to mean inward discourse, inner words, speech - or, rather, thought - not yet put into words.¹

This completes the account of the meaning, or variety of meanings, which $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ assumes in the works of Homer. Of the whole number of instances only a selection has been cited. It would make this study excessive in length to indicate each passage in the Iliad and Odyssey in which $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ occurs. The examples given will serve to illustrate Homer's use of the word, nor is the meaning of $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in his poems so finely drawn a question as to require the citation of every example available.

$\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ occurs a few times in the Homeric Hymns with precisely the same meaning as in Homer.² Hesiod's usage, also, is the same as Homer's.³

$\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ appears in the works of three of the lyric poets, Theognis, Pindar, and Bacchylides. In Theognis⁴ no change from the Homeric meaning can be discerned. The word still means word, speech, or discourse, connected, intelligible, and spoken. With Pindar, however, although the word

1. A545, A442, T502.

2. H.Ap. 286, h.Merc. 29, 154, 162, h.Bacch. 25, 54.

3. Th. 24, 169, 665, Op. 194, 206, Fr. 163, 271.

4. Thgn. 437, 756, 1236.

occurs in its old sense,¹ a different meaning first makes its appearance. It has acquired the sense of tale, story, fable, or fiction.² But we have no example of this new sense in what survives of the work of Bacchylides, whose usage³ seems to differ in no respect from that of Homer.

Turning next to the tragic poets, we find that Aeschylus employs the word both in its older general sense of spoken word or discourse and in its derivative sense of tale or story.⁴ Sophocles uses $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ only with the older Homeric meaning.⁵ He has no certain instance of the later sense of tale or story. Euripides uses $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in three senses:

1. N. VIII 33.

2. Q. I 29, N. VII 23.

3. B. X 90, XIV 39.

4. The instances of the former sense are Suppl. 274, 447, Pers. 154, 162, 698, Th. 1051, Pr. 505, 641, 647, 685, 826, 954, 1080, Ch. 452, 554, Eum. 82, 582 and 1021.

In one passage, Ch. 314, $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ means a proverb or saying. The examples of the meaning of tale or story are Pers. 713, Ch. 166, 743, Fr. 139.

5. Aj. 188, 226, 770, El. 50, 373, 639, Ant. 11, 272, 1190, Tr. 62, 67 (it might be possible to take $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ here to mean tales or stories), 341, Ph. 1410, 1417, 1447, OC. 357, 1162, 1581, Fr. 462.

the oldest and more general sense of speech, discourse, or word;¹ the sense of story, tale, or account, without any suggestion or implication of fiction or falsehood;² and the sense of fable, legend, or tale, with the implication of fiction or falsehood.³

Μῦθος is found twice among the fragments of Greek tragedy, both times in the sense of word, speech, or discourse.⁴

In Herodotus, on the other hand, the meaning of fable prevails,⁵ the earlier sense appearing not at all.

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1. Alc. 519, Med. 174, Hipp. 1313, Hec. 124, Ph. 445, Fr. 364.5.
 2. Med. 72, Hipp. 609, Heracl. 952, Ion 1340, El. 302, 346, Hel. 143, 770, Ph. 469, 1335, IA. 44, 874, Rh. 874.
 3. Hipp. 197, HF. 100, IT. 900, El. 743, IA. 72, Fr. 488.1.
In addition to the passages from Euripides already cited, the following may be listed: Med. 143, 354, 654, 1082, 1127, Hipp. 9, 1288, Hec. 835, 967, Andr. 744, 1109, Heracl. 180, 784, Suppl. 109, 295, 478, 566, 840, 1066, Tr. 231, IT. 1049, 1078, 1293, 1442, El. 659, 1295, Hel. 316, 1010, Ph. 453, 915, Or. 617, 758, 1176; IA. 318, Rh. 4, 84, Fr. 255.1, 284.26, 391, 916, 954, 1117.45, 1117.49.
 4. Moschion 5, 3. p. 813; Adesp. 268. p. 890.
 5. II 23.1, 45.1.

In Comedy, Aristophanes employs $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in two senses, that of word, discourse, or speech,¹ and that of story, fable, or legend.² Among the comic fragments it is found³ once, with the meaning of story or account.

$\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ does not occur in the works of Thucydides or Xenophon or in the orators prior to Isocrates.

Among the pre-Socratics the word is found always with the meaning of speech, discourse, or word.⁴ Often it connotes the words or doctrines of the writer.

We turn next to Isocrates, in whose works $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$,⁵ occurring four times, in every instance means fables.

Plato employs $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ frequently throughout his dialogues and in a variety of senses. The basic meanings of word, or speech, on the one hand, and story, on the other, are still to be seen, but both have developed many additional

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1. V 725, Pax 131, Pl. 177.
 2. V 566, 1179, L. 781, 806.
 3. Pherecrates, 145, 2. p. 188 (T. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, Leipzig, 1880, vol. I).
 4. Musaeus, B11 (I~~24~~1.19), Parm. B2, 1 (I~~23~~1.7), B8, 1 (I~~23~~5.2), Emp. B17, 14-15 (I~~31~~6.8-9), B23, 11 (I~~32~~2.3), B24, 2 (I~~32~~2.7), B62, 3 (I~~33~~5.6), B114, 1 (I~~35~~5.12), Critias, B6, 10 (II~~37~~9.2).
 5. I 50, II 49, IV 158, IX 66.

senses. The earlier meaning is less common than the later. In this sense it may connote speech or address,¹ statement² or conversation,³ a saying,⁴ or the thing said, the rule. Another group of instances shows $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ as story, account, fiction, legend, or myth. Among these, again, the meaning is at all times narrative, account, or story: the author that is, remains neutral as to the truth or falsehood of the $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ and introduces no moral implications.⁵ At other times $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ appears with the sense of fiction, tale, or fable, with the implication of doubt or of actual falsehood.⁶

Elsewhere Plato uses $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ to mean tradition or legend⁷ - something definitely handed down through a period of time from a former generation and which may or may not be true.⁸

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1. Lg. 812a.
 2. Lg. 771c.
 3. Lg. 719c, 790c.
 4. Lg. 773b.
 5. R. 415a, Phdr. 237a, Plt. 268e. Tl. 29d, 59c, 68d, 69b, Epin. 975a, 980a.
 6. Grg. 523a, R. 330d, Tht. 164d-e, Lg. 752a.
 7. Lg. 683d, 804e, 865d, 887d, 927c, 944a, Ep. XII 359d.
 8. In addition to the examples of $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in Plato already cited, there are the following instances: Alc. 1 123a,

The history of μῦθος is now clear. From its earliest known meaning in Homer, of speech or discourse, it developed in Aeschylus and Pindar the meaning of story. It signifies fable in the latter, but without the suggestion that a fable is a fiction unworthy of belief. This connotation of disbelief enters only with Herodotus and Euripides, and from their time forward becomes gradually the prevailing sense of the word. Plato has examples of all the senses, to be sure, but with him, too, the implication of falsity is the most common meaning. No writer, however, has applied the term to the drama. The plot of a play, of course, may be regarded as a kind of fiction, but it is a very special sort, indeed, and is, according to Aristotle, if properly constructed, truer, in a general sense, than if it had been taken accurately from an episode which really took place.

It must be conceded, therefore, that Aristotle's use of μῦθος in the Poetics is quite his own, and that he is following no other writer in making it into a term of literary criticism.

Cra. 408c, Prt. 320c, 324d, Grg. 527a, Phd. 60c, 61b, Th. 156c, Sph. 242c, Plt. 272c, Phlb. 14a, Ti. 22c, 23b, 26c, e, Lg. 636c, 645b, 664a, 712a, 841c.

ἦθος

ἦθος appears in the list of the six constituent elements of tragedy already cited under μῦθος¹. It is defined² as follows: "character is that by virtue ~~of which we~~³ say that the agents are of a certain quality."

A group of passages discusses the historical development of ἦθος in Greek drama. Since the dramatists imitate men in action, these must be either good or bad, for characters are in general bent in one of these two directions and everyone may be distinguished by either virtue or vice.³ Aristotle goes on to point out that it is this difference that distinguishes tragedy from comedy. "Poetry was divided according to the characters of the poets."⁴ ἦθος may not here have its strictest technical sense, since it refers to the characters not of persons in a play but of the poets themselves. The distinction, however, is very slight, since the meaning is basically the same, that by virtue of which we say that someone is of a certain quality. It simply has been applied to the poets rather than to their creations. Again,

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1. Po. 1450a 7-15.
 2. 1450a 3-7.
 3. 1448a 1-4.
 4. 1448b 24-27.

many of the younger tragedians, we are told, stand toward their predecessors as Zeuxis to Polygnotus, "for Polygnotus was a good painter of character, but the work of Zeuxis has none."¹

Elsewhere Aristotle discusses the place of $\eta\theta o s$ in a tragedy and its relation to $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta o s$. There are two causes of the actions of the agents in a tragedy, character and thought;² but $\mu\tilde{\upsilon}\theta o s$ is more important than either. The essential part and, as it were, the soul of tragedy is the plot;³ the characters are second. It is harder to write a play with a good plot than to master diction and create excellent characters, a fact which is another proof of the prime importance of plot. New poets, as, in general, the earlier dramatists also, succeed with their diction and characters before⁴ they do with their plots.

Aristotle discusses $\eta\theta o s$ in some detail, treating of its nature and how to fashion excellent characters for a tragedy. Character reveals the moral purpose of the agents. Where there is no choice involved there is no character revealed in the speeches, which may, however, reveal thought,

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1. 1450a 25-29.
 2. 1449b 36 - 1450a 3.
 3. 1450a 19-25, **38-b4**.
 4. 1450a 36-38.

if they are proving anything or making anything clear.¹ The four points at which to aim in creating characters are that they shall be good, appropriate, like the reality, and consistent.² Poets should strive for probability or necessity in the development of their characters,³ and should idealize them slightly.⁴

Such is Aristotle's use of *ἦθος* in the Poetics.⁵ The term has a definite meaning in the criticism of tragedy, a meaning which is, as usual, closely bound up with the whole of Aristotle's thought on the subject of poetry. *ἦθος* is that which reveals the quality and moral purpose of the persons in a tragedy. It is second in importance to *μῦθος* and must be distinguished from *διάνοια*.

It now remains to examine the occurrences of the word *ἦθος* among the writers of Greek who preceded Aristotle, in order to determine whether any of them anticipated him in his use of the word in the Poetics.

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1. 1450b 8-12.
 2. 1454a 16-19, 22-28.
 3. 1454a 33-36.
 4. 1454b 8-13.
 5. The word occurs in three other passages in the Poetics, none of which, however, adds anything to the meaning already observed: 1460a 11, 1447a 27-28, 1460b 2-5.

Homer employs ἥθους three times, always in the plural,¹ meaning haunt or abode or accustomed place. Hesiod three² times uses the word in the same sense. But he also shows another sense of ἥθους,³ not seen in Homer; that is, character or disposition. Of the two lyric poets in whose works ἥθους is found, the first is Theognis, in whom the meaning is in every case character or disposition;⁴ the other is Pindar, who uses ἥθους once in the sense of abode or haunt⁵ and in three passages in the sense of character or disposition.⁶ Aeschylus has the same usage as Pindar.⁷ Sophocles uses it only in the sense of character or disposition,⁸ as does Euripides also.⁹ Two instances in the prevailing usage of the

1. Z511, O268, ζ411.

2. Op. 167, 222, 525.

3. Th. 66, Op. 67, 78, 137.

4. 213-218, 963-970, 1071, 1244, 1259-1262.

5. P. IV 258.

6. O. XI 20, XIII 13, N. VIII 35.

7. Suppl. 64, in the sense of abode or haunt; Pers. 648, Pr. 184, A. 727, in the sense of character or disposition.

8. Aj. 595, Ant. 705, 746.

9. Med. 103, Ion 736, El. 385. Besides these, the following instances may be found: Med. 238, Hipp. 1116, 1219, Suppl. 869, 907; El. 363, Hel. 274, IA. 709, Fr. 200.4, 364.22, 637.7, 1013.

major tragedians are found among the fragments of Greek tragedy.¹

In Herodotus ² $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ has two senses, that of abode or accustomed seat, used of a nation, and that of custom.³ In Aristophanes the word, occurring only twice,⁴ means character or disposition;⁵ in Thucydides it means custom; while in Lysias,⁶ the Hippocratic Corpus,⁷ and the pre-Socratics,⁸ it means character or disposition. In Isocrates $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ is used in two senses:⁹ the first is manner, custom, or habit, the second

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1. Adesp. 451, p. 926; 562, p. 951.
 2. I 15, II 93.2, VII 125. Further examples are I 157.1, II 142.4, IV 76.2, 80.1, V 14.1, 15.3, VII 100.1, 75.2, VIII 100.5, 101.3.
 3. II 30.5, VIII 144.2. Also I 165.3, II 35.2, IV 95.2, 106.
 4. Nu. 959, V. 877.
 5. II 61.4, VI 18.7.
 6. Fr. 114.
 7. Aer. 4 (58.27), 12 (67.21), 16 (70.13), 23 (76.7), 24 (77.16), 24 (78.5), Medic. 1 (20.11).
 8. Heraclit. B78 (I168.17), B119 (I177.6), Emp. B17, 28 (I317.9), B110, 5 (I352.24), Democr. B57 (II157.12), B192 (II185.11), Critias B6, 14 (II379.6).
 9. III 56, IV 82, VII 40. Further instances are II 31, IV 152, VII 41, VIII 69, 102, IX 48, X 37, XII 197, 212.

is character.¹ In Plato it can be found in all its various senses. It may mean abode, haunt, or wonted place;² it can mean custom, usage, manner, or habit;³ and, finally, it may appear as character or disposition.⁴

Such is the use of *ἦθος* among the Greeks who wrote before Aristotle. It is nowhere applied to tragedy, or to the drama at all, nor is it anywhere used in Aristotle's sense of that which indicates the moral purpose of a person.

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1. I 15, V 114. Besides these, the following: I 4, 36, V 26, XII 139, XIV 34, XV 54, 122, XVI 28.
 2. Ti. 42e, Lg. 625a, 865e.
 3. R. 548d, Lg. 695e, 773b. Besides these are the following: Smp. 207e, R. 541a, 558d, Lg. 656b, 670e, 704d, 705b, 708c, 711b, 735c, 751c, 855a.
 4. Grg. 484d, Smp. 195e, R. 401b, 557c, Plt. 308e, Lg. 650a, 930a. In addition to these, the following may be listed: Ly. 222a, Cra. 406a, 407b, Grg. 513c, Phd. 81e, Smp. 183e, R. 375c, e, 400d, e, 401a, 402d, 409a, d, 424d, 490c, 496b, 501a, c, 503c, 535b, 544d, 549a, 577a, 604e, 605a, Phdr. 243c, 277a, 279a, Plt. 309b, 310a, c, e, 311a, b, Criti. 121b, Lg. 636d, 659c, 669b, 679b, 705a, 741e, 770d, 775d, 776a, 777d, 790a, 791d, 792e, 793e, 836d, 837c, 862b, 896c, 901a, 903d, 908e, 922b, 924d, 928e, 929c, 963e, 968d; Epin. E 976b, Ep. IV 320d, VI 322d, 323a, VII, 330a, 334d, X 358c.

It may be concluded, therefore, that Aristotle is original in his adaptation of the word $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ to the needs of literary criticism and his employment of it as a technical term in his analysis of tragedy.

διάνοια

The third fundamental part of tragedy, according to Aristotle in the Poetics, is διάνοια. It appears in the list of these parts¹ already cited under μῦθος and is defined as follows: "...I mean ... by διάνοια the speeches in which persons prove a point or reveal their opinion."² "Third is διάνοια: this is the ability to say everything possible and fitting, a thing which in the speeches is the function of politics and rhetoric; for the ancient poets used to make their personages speak like politicians, whereas the writers of today make them speak like rhetoricians."³ "... διάνοια is seen in the parts in which people are proving that something is or is not so or are making clear some general proposition."⁴ These are Aristotle's definitions of διάνοια. It is usually translated as thought, and rightly so. But it might be observed that διάνοια in the Poetics is almost equivalent to our point of view. It is the whole intellectual background and equipment of a person in a tragedy, as revealed in his speeches and actions. It is to be distinguished from μῦθος, which, being concerned with the moral pur-

1. 1450a 7-15.

2. 1450a 3-7.

3. 1450b 4-8.

4. 1450b 11-12.

pose of the agents, is revealed only in making a choice.

Three passages discuss the place of δῖάνοια among the constituent parts of tragedy and its relation to μῦθος¹ and ἦθος. Διάνοια and ἦθος are the two causes of action; even the presence of δῖάνοια carefully worked out in the speeches cannot render a tragedy successful, if the μῦθος be² badly handled; δῖάνοια ranks third among the parts of tra-³gedy.

Aristotle's treatment of δῖάνοια itself follows.

"The other parts have already been discussed, but it remains to speak of λέξις and δῖάνοια. We must assume what is said of the latter in the Rhetoric, for it belongs rather to that discipline. Διάνοια comprises all those things which must be accomplished by speeches; these may be subdivided into proving, refuting, arousing feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like, and making things seem greater or less. It is clear, too, that even in actions it is necessary to proceed from the same ideas whenever one must make an impression of pity or horror or grandeur or probability. But there is this difference, that in actions the effect must appear without explanation, while in the speeches it must be prepared by the speaker and result from what he says. For

1. 1449b 36-1450a 3, cited also under ἦθος, p. 120.

2. 1450a 29-35, cited also under μῦθος, p. 108.

3. 1450b 4-8.

what would be the function of the speaker, if the desired effect were achieved even without his speech?"¹ Aristotle elsewhere states that excessively ornate diction obscures the characters and thoughts.² Finally, he points out that epic poetry should have the same elements as tragedy, except for μελοποιία and ὄψις.³

These are all the instances of διάνοια in the Poetics. A consideration of the use of διάνοια by the writers who precede Aristotle is now in order.

The word is used by none of the writers of epic; we first meet it in Alcaeus;⁴ but it is obviously impossible to determine from the context the sense in which διάνοια is here used, since the context is largely absent and the restorations purely conjectural. The next occurrences of διάνοια are found in the plays of Aeschylus, who uses it in the sense of mind.⁵ Sophocles has no instance of διάνοια and Euripides only one,⁶ in the sense of thought or notion. Herodotus uses

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1. 1456a 33 - b 8.
 2. 1460b 2-5, to be cited also under λέξις, p. 136.
 3. 1459b 7-16.
 4. 35a, 1.
 5. Suppl. 109, Th. 831, A. 797, Eu. 985, 1013.
 6. Supp. 57.

¹
 δῖάνοια in two senses, that of intention and that of opinion,²
 while the six instances in Aristophanes all have the sense of
 thought or notion.³ Thucydides, who is next to be considered,
 employs δῖάνοια in three ways, to mean, first, purpose, in-
 tentation, or plan;⁴ second, thought, notion, opinion, or idea;⁵
 and third, mind or intellect, or sometimes spirit.⁶ Lysias,
 likewise, has δῖάνοια in the three senses: purpose, three
 times;⁷ thought or opinion, four times;⁸ and mind, twice:⁹
 and he has it in still one other sense, that of meaning.¹⁰

In Hippocrates, in the one instance in which δῖάνοια

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1. I 46.2, I 90.3, II 162.5, VIII 97.2, IX 45.3.
 2. II 169.2.
 3. Nu. 944, V. 1019, 1044, Pax 750, Ra. 1059, Ec. 581.
 4. I 130.1, II 89.6, VI 15.4, VII 60.4. Besides these pas-
sages, the following may be listed: I 132.3, 138.1,
140.1, 144.1, II 20.5, IV 52.3, V 9.6, VI 21.1, 38.4,
65.1, 76.2, VII 60.1, 73.1.
 5. III 36.2, 82.3, V 105.4, VI 31.1.
 6. II 43.1, V 111.2. Also I 84.3, II 61.2, VI 11.6.
 7. II 58, 60, Fr. 53.2.
 8. I 3, II 29, XXIV 3, 21.
 9. III 44, XXIV 16.
 10. X 7.

appears in the pre-Aristotelian parts of the Corpus, the meaning is purpose.¹ Among the fragments of the pre-Socratics, the word is found only once,² in Democritus, with the meaning of thought.³ Isocrates uses it to mean thought, opinion, or notion;⁴ to signify mind, intelligence, or intellect;⁵ and in the sense of purpose.

The works of Plato must next be examined for the uses of διάνοια to be found therein. The first meaning in which it is employed is purpose or intention;⁶ it also means thought or notion;⁷ but its most frequent meaning is the

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1. VM. 5 (39.14).
 2. B191 (II 184.12).
 3. IV 82, V 2, XII 244. In addition, the following may be listed: I 41, 50, II 24, IV 2, 186, V 21, VIII 32, 63, X 38, XV 7, 43.
 4. IV 50, XV 207. Also I 32, III 16, VI 10, 92, 110, XII 130, 265, XV 82.
 5. VII 69.
 6. Ap. 41d, Cra. 418c, Lg. 685e. Further instances of this meaning are La. 180a, Mx. 240c, 244c, Prt. 324b, Grg. 514a, Phdr. 234b, Tht. 168b, Ti. 38c, 76d, Lg. 686b, 740a, 926b, Ep. VII. 323d, 324a, 326b.
 7. Phd. 63c, R. 476d, Tht. 208c, Lg. 683c. Additional instances are Ion 530d, Mx. 248b, Prt. 352a, Smp. 219d,

thinking faculty, intelligence, understanding, or mind.¹
 In a few instances it means thought, or process of thinking,²
 and finally, it has occasionally the sense of thought ex-
 pressed, or meaning.³

This completes the survey of the use of *διάνοια* by the predecessors of Aristotle. It has been found that the word is used neither in epic nor, with the one exception of Alcaeus, in lyric poetry. It appears first in Aeschylus,

R. 393a, 527b, Th. 155d, 195c, Sph. 260c, Criti. 108b, Lg. 691d, 828d, 888a, Ep. VII. 327b, 328c, 331a.

1. Cra. 416b-d, R. 403d, 511d-e, Th. 150c, Sph. 250c.

Further instances of this sense are the following:

Chrm. 157c, Cra. 396b, 407b, Prt. 326b, 337c, Phd. 65e, 66a, 67c, 79a, Smp. 219a, R. 371e, 396e, 400e, 410c, 412e, 458a, 469d, 476b, 486a, d, 500b, 511a, 534a, 560b, 568a, 603b, Phdr. 239a, b, 244c, 247d, 249c, 256a, c, 259e, 265e, 279a, Th. 160d, 173b, e, 188b, d, 189d, 194a, Prm. 135b, 143a, 165a, b, Sph. 227c, 229c, 238b, 265c, Ti. 71c, 74e, 88a, c, Lg. 799a, 916a.

2. R. 524d, Th. 170b, Sph. 263e. Also R. 359b, 395d, 470e, 503a, 522c, 529d, 577a, Prm. 158c, Sph. 263d, 264a, Lg. 909e, 967a.

3. Alc. 1. 104e, Ion 530c. The following may also be listed: Ly. 205b, Cra. 418a, Phdr. 228d, Criti. 113a.

where it means mind. It is absent from the works of Sophocles, while in the plays of Euripides it means thought, notion, or idea. Herodotus uses it to signify intention and opinion and to these two meanings Thucydides adds the sense of mind or intellect, a sense not, however, new with him. Aristophanes uses it to mean only thought or notion, ~~and~~ Hippocrates has only the meaning of purpose. The usage of Lysias follows that of Thucydides, adding the significance of thought expressed in words, or meaning. Among ~~the~~ pre-Socratics, only Democritus employs the term and only in the sense of thought or notion. Isocrates has examples of $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ in all its senses, as has Plato also. The latter distinguishes the actual process of thinking as a further sense of the word.

Of all these meanings, however, none is quite equivalent to the special meaning which Aristotle gives to $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ in the Poetics. For $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ there certainly does not mean mind or intellect, although it might be said to mean the mind as cultivated and taught, to the extent that this cultivation of the mind is revealed in the speeches and actions of the persons in a play. Neither is purpose properly the equivalent of the $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ of the Poetics, since the latter is by no means confined to the revelation of the purpose or intention of the agents. Thought or notion or opinion, the remaining sense of the word in the vocabulary, is, perhaps, somewhat closer to the significance of $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$ in the Poetics,

but, again, it is not altogether the same. For δῖαβολα means not a particular thought, opinion, or notion, but the whole body of these which an agent possesses, and it includes, besides, the process of making them manifest through speech and action. It is this process which is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Aristotelian δῖαβολα. The suggestion was advanced in the discussion of Isocrates' usage, that δῖαβολα often seems in his work to resemble the English point of view. And this English expression is not far from Aristotle's meaning in the Poetics. But his is, I think, broader, for it is necessary to bear in mind that the δῖαβολα of the Poetics means point of view not toward one problem alone, but toward life and the world in general; and δῖαβολα also includes the intellectual equipment of the mind of an agent, his education or lack of it, and the way in which he makes all this manifest in the course of a play.

It may, therefore, be asserted that Aristotle's use of δῖαβολα in the Poetics is original with him and that no earlier Greek writer, from whom he could have borrowed, had developed this sense of the term.

λέξις

The fourth element of tragedy¹ is λέξις. It is listed and defined as follows: "Since they present the imitation by action, first of all one of the parts of tragedy must of necessity be the arrangement of the spectacle (ὄψις), and next melody (μελοποιία) and diction (λέξις), for these latter two are the means of the imitation. By diction I mean this, the composition of the verses, and by melody what is quite obvious."² "Fourth of the elements in language is diction; I mean, as I have said before, the expression of thought in words, a function which is the same in verse as in ordinary speech."³ Λέξις, or diction, is, then, the actual composition of the verses, the interpretation of meaning by means of words.

Other passages briefly give the history of λέξις in tragedy, telling of how the short plots and ludicrous diction⁴ of the earlier dramas were discarded and of how the tetrameter gradually yielded to the iambic trimeter, which more closely approximated the rhythm of daily speech.⁵ The rela-

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1. 1450a 7-15.
 2. 1449b 31-36.
 3. 1450b 12-15.
 4. 1449a 19-21, cited also under μῦθος, p. 108.
 5. 1449a 22-24.

tionship between λέξις and the other elements of the drama is elsewhere discussed. Λέξις is definitely subordinated to μῦθος: the poet may produce a play with highly polished diction, but it will be a failure unless the μῦθosis also properly constructed;¹ and beginners at play-writing almost always succeed in ἦθος and λέξις before they do in μῦθος.²

In another series of passages Aristotle treats λέξις itself. One sort of enquiry under diction investigates the forms of the spoken language, as, for example, the distinction between command and entreaty, and the like.³ In order to achieve vividness and congruity of style, the poet should as far as possible visualize the scene he is presenting.⁴ A list of the parts of diction, containing various grammatical terms, is given.⁵ Excellence of diction demands clarity but not meanness, and permits the use of dialect, metaphor, and other devices.⁶ Speeches in something other than the idiom of ordinary conversation acquire a non-prosaic air.⁷ But

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1. 1450a 29-35, cited also under μῦθος, p. 108.
 2. 1450a 36-38, cited also under ἦθος, p. 120.
 3. 1456b 8-12.
 4. 1455a 22-26, cited also under μῦθος, p. 110.
 5. 1456b 20-21.
 6. 1458a 18-23.
 7. 1459a 2-3.

excessively¹ ornate diction obscures the characters and the thoughts. Finally, λέξις² is said to be part of epic poetry as well as of tragedy.

This brings to a close the account of the use of λέξις in the Poetics. The investigation of the use of λέξις among the earlier Greek writers will follow.

Λέξις is found in no author before Plato and Isocrates.³ In the latter it always means style. This is wider, perhaps, in scope than diction; nor is the composition of tragedy anywhere in Isocrates specifically alluded to. The meaning, nevertheless, is not far from that of Aristotle in the Poetics.

Plato's usage is more varied. In several passages⁴ λέξις means speech, that is, oral discourse; its sense in

1. 1460b 2-5.
2. 1459b 7-16, cited also under διάνοια, p.128. Λέξις occurs in five other passages of the Poetics. In two of these, 1460b 11-13 and 1461a 10, it means poetic diction, while in the other three 1452b 22-23, 1459a 10-13, and 1461a 27, it is used in a general, not a technical sense.
3. V 4, 27, 94, IX 10, XV 47, Ep. IX 5.
4. Ap. 18a, Chrm. 160c, R. 396c, 400d, 473a, Plt. 277c, Lg. 809e, 816d, 916e.

others is style or diction.¹ An examination of these passages shows that *λέξις*, while often meaning simply style or diction, as in Isocrates, has yet, in certain instances in the Republic acquired a rather particular sense and may in this sense be regarded as a technical term. In this technical Platonic sense *λέξις* refers to the manner of poetic presentation, varying as the presentation is now dramatic, or again narrative. It will be recalled, on the other hand, that in the Poetics Aristotle has analyzed the poetic τέχνη² into the objects, the means,³ and the manner of the imitation; and that in his analysis of tragedy in turn into its component parts he ascribes three of these to the object, two to the means, and one to the manner.⁴ Now the two parts concerned with the means are *λέξις* and *μελοποιία* and the part concerned with the manner is *ὄψις*.⁴ It is therefore evident that Aristotle not only has not taken his use of *λέξις* in the Poetics from the technical Platonic sense, but has actually developed a sense which is at once quite different/^{from} and incompatible with Plato's.

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1. Ap. 17d, Hp. Ma. 300c, R. 396b, e, 397a-b, c, 398b, 400d, Tht. 204c, Lg. 795e.
 2. 1447a 15-17.
 3. 1450a 7-12.
 4. 1447a 21-23, 1448a 19-24.

On the other hand, both Isocrates and Plato, when the latter is using λέξις in the general rather than the technical sense, use the word with a meaning similar to Aristotle's. For λέξις in the Poetics, being concerned with one means of imitation, language, signifies the choice of appropriate and elegant language--the words and the way the meters are composed--in which to present the tragedy. And in Isocrates as well as in Plato, λέξις suggests a conscious and careful attention to language, so that the means of presenting facts and arguments may be appropriate to the matter set forth. It is, therefore, just to conclude that Aristotle, while he differs from Plato's technical use of λέξις, is on the whole following both Plato and Isocrates in the meaning which he assigns to λέξις in the Poetics.

μελοποιία

Μελοποιία¹ is the fifth term listed among the constituent parts of tragedy. Aristotle declines to define it, on the ground that it is unnecessary to do so.² The treatment of this word is very brief, consisting of one passage,³ which declares that μελοποιία is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories. It seems clear, however, that by it Aristotle means the music which accompanies tragedy. In the only other occurrence of the word in the Poetics,⁴ it is stated that μελοποιία is not one of the parts of epic poetry.

The occurrence of μελοποιία among the pre-Aristotelian authors is equally rare. Although μέλος, in the sense of verse, song, or poetry is used frequently in Greek literature from Homer onward, μελοποιία is not to be found before Plato. Aristophanes, however, thrice employs the verb⁵ μελοποιεῖν and once the noun⁶ μελοποιός; the former means to compose lyric poetry, the latter, a lyric poet. Μελοποιία⁷ in the two places in Plato where it occurs, means music.

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1. 1450a 7-15.
 2. 1449b 31-36, cited also under λέξις, p. 134.
 3. 1450b 15-16.
 4. 1459b 7-16, cited also under διάνοια, p. 128.
 5. Th. 42, 67, R. 1328.
 6. R. 1250.
 7. Smp. 187d, R. 404d.

Such is the use of *μελοποιία* in Greek literature before Aristotle. So far as can be discovered, Aristotle's use of *μελοποιία* is no different from Plato's. Indeed, it is worthy of note that he not only refrains from defining it, but even states that its significance is manifest. There can be no question, then, in this case, of his originality. He has taken a word already in use and employed it in the meaning already known, music, without adding to its significance or changing it in any way. The fact, however, that he does not attempt to define a word to which he is giving no new meaning--ὄψις is another example of this--suggests the reflection, though it cannot prove the fact, that when he does define a term he is using it in a new or more restricted sense.

ὄψις

The sixth element of tragedy¹ is ὄψις. Its relationship with the other elements, especially μῦθος, is discussed in two passages, which state that ὄψις, or spectacle, while attractive, is very little a proper part of the poet's science, for tragedy is effective even without the staging and the actors and the spectacle is rather the province of the scene-maker,² and that the plot should be able, without the spectacle,³ to arouse pity and fear. Among the species (εἴδη) of tragedy, which classify the play according to the predominant element of the plot, ὄψις appears as the fourth.⁴ Finally, there are two allusions to the fact that ὄψις forms⁵ no part of epic poetry, although it is a part of tragedy.

It next remains to examine the usage of the Greeks who wrote before Aristotle.

Homer uses ὄψις in two ways, one objective, meaning⁶ aspect or appearance, and the other subjective, meaning vision,⁷ the faculty of sight, the power of seeing. The latter

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1. 1450a 7-15.
 2. 1450b 15-20.
 3. 1453b 1-7, cited also under μῦθος, p. 108.
 4. 1456a 2-3.
 5. 1462a 14-17, 1459b 7-16, cited also under δῆλον, p. 128.
 6. Z468, Ω632.
 7. Y205, ψ94.

is the meaning, too, in the one instance of ὄψις in the
Homeric Hymns.¹ Hesiod does not use ὄψις, nor does any of
the lyric poets except Pindar, who employs it once to mean as-
pect or appearance.² In the works of Aeschylus the word ap-
pears with three significances. First, it means a sight, in
the sense of the thing seen, a spectacle.³ From the general
meaning of a thing seen it is an easy step to the more parti-
cular meaning of a specific kind of thing seen, namely, a
vision or apparition.⁴ Aeschylus' third sense is that of the
act of looking or seeing, a seeing, a looking, a gaze.⁵ In
some of the examples of this last meaning, ὄψις can be seen
starting to develop the special sense of presence, view, or
range of vision.⁶ In Sophocles a similar variety of meanings
may be seen, as well as one example of the sense of aspect or
appearance, which occurs in the Philoctetes.⁷ Very close to
this is the meaning of spectacle in another passage,⁸ where

1. H. Pan. 39.

2. N. X 15.

3. Supp. 567, 1058, Pers. 48.

4. Pers. 518, Th. 711, Pr. 645, A. 425.

5. Suppl. 174, Pers. 183, Ch. 215.

6. Pers. 183, Ch. 215.

7. 1412.

8. Fr. 871.3.

the interpretation of aspect might easily be maintained. The sense of apparition occurs once,¹ and the subjective meaning, gaze, act of seeing, or looking, is found several times.² Then *ὄψις* comes to mean the organs of sight, the eyes.³ Finally, the word occurs once in a fragment⁴ where its meaning cannot be determined. Euripides employs *ὄψις* in an even wider variety of meanings. Three times it means face or countenance;⁵ in seven instances it is thing seen, sight, or spectacle;⁶ and there are four instances in which it signifies apparition.⁷ Among the subjective meanings we may name the sense of sight, faculty of vision, or power of seeing,⁸ and next the act of looking, perception by seeing, or gaze.⁹ The sense of presence, view, or range of vision is frequent in Euripides.¹⁰

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1. El. 413.
 2. Aj. 876, OT 1238, 1375, OC 577.
 3. Ant. 52, OT 1328, Fr. 747.
 4. Fr. 539.
 5. Med. 905, Hel. 557, Fr. 53.4 (In this last the meaning might be taken as aspect or appearance.).
 6. Heracl. 930, Supp. 945, HF 1132. Besides these, there are the following: Hel. 71, Ph. 671, Or. 727, Ba. 1232.
 7. Hec. 72, 77, 704, IT 151.
 8. IT 1167, Cyc. 628, Fr. 1117.41.
 9. Alc. 862, Heracl. 684, Ion 43, IA 233.
 10. Med. 173, IT 902, Or. 513. Also Med. 775, Hipp. 25, IT 1212, Ion 389, 1557, El. 1237, Ba. 1257, IA 998, Fr. 1117.24.

Finally ¹ὄψις in several passages means the organs of sight, the eyes.² Among the fragments of Greek tragedy, it occurs four times, once in the sense of presence or view;² once as sight or gaze or act of seeing;³ and twice as eyes.⁴

Herodotus uses ⁵ὄψις frequently. In the sense of thing seen, sight, spectacle, or, especially, dream, he has it forty-four times; six times it has the meaning of vision or eyesight;⁶ in twenty-four instances it means presence, range of vision, or view;⁷ and once it means appearance or aspect.⁸ Aristophanes uses ⁸ὄψις only three times. Once it

1. Ph. 764, Cyc. 459. Also Cyc. 463, 486, 595, 697.
2. Agathon 22, p. 767.
3. Sosiphanes 2, p. 820.
4. Isidorus 1, p. 829, Chaerephon 1, 1, p. 781.
5. I 38.1-2, 39.1. The remaining instances are: I 107.2, 108.2, 120.1, 121.1, 209.1, 209.3, 209.5, 210.3, II 136.1, 139.1-2, 139.3, 141.3, 152.1, III 30.2, 65.2, 65.4, 124.1, 124.2, 125.4, 149, IV 172.3, V 55, 56.1, 56.2, 62.1, VI 107.1, 107.2, 108.1, 118.1, 131.2, VII 12.1, 151, 163.2, 18.1, 18.4, 19.1, 47.1, 47.2, VIII 54.
6. II 99.1, 147.1, IV 7.3, 81.1, IX 93.3, 93.4.
7. I 136.2, II 2.4, 121.1. Further instances are III 11.2, 27.2, 28.1, 42.1, 63.1, 68.2, 128.3, V 13.1, 18.1, 106.1, VI 30.2, 94.2, 134.1, VII 6.4, 29.1, 136.1, 146.3, 210.1, VIII 26.1, 106.4, 114.1.
8. VII 61.1.

means face,¹ once thing seen, sight, or spectacle,² and once it may be interpreted as either of these two meanings.³ The examples of the use of *ὄψις* in Thucydides are relatively abundant. One sense in which it is often used is that of aspect or appearance.⁴ Once it is used for face,⁵ and four times for thing seen, sight, or spectacle.⁶ The subjective meanings are also exemplified, among them that of the faculty of vision, the power of sight or seeing.⁷ It signifies the act of looking, or gaze, three times,⁸ and, finally, contrary to what is found in Herodotus, it is only once used by Thucydides to mean presence.⁹ In the works of Xenophon the same meanings are found: appearance or aspect;¹⁰ thing seen or spectacle;¹¹ faculty of

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1. Th. 1154.
 2. Ra. 1335.
 3. Th. 905.
 4. I 10.2, 10.3, IV 34.1. Additional instances are IV 126.5, VI 46.3, VII 44.2, 71.3.
 5. VI 58.1.
 6. II 88.3, VI 24.3, 31.1, 31.6.
 7. III 38.4, 112.4, IV 126.6, VII 75.2.
 8. I 73.2, IV 34.3, VI 49.2-3.
 9. II 37.2.
 10. Oec. 6.16, 10.12, An. II 3.15, VI 1.9.
 11. Eq. 2.5, 11.11.

sight or power of seeing;¹ gaze or act of looking;² presence,³ sight, or range of vision;⁴ and, finally, eye,⁵ a meaning used by neither Herodotus nor Thucydides. In Lysias are found three examples of *opsis*, of which two mean aspect or appearance and the other face.⁶ The use of *opsis* in the works of Hippocrates is more restricted than that of the writers lately under consideration, for there are only two senses: either eyesight or the faculty of vision,⁷ on the one hand, or eye or eyeball,⁸ on the other. Among the pre-Socratics the predominant meaning is power of seeing, eyesight, or function of

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1. Mem. IV 3.14.
 2. Mem. III 10.6, Oec. 8.10, Cyr. IV 3.16, Smp. 4.22, Cyn. 9.4.
 3. Cyn. 6.18.
 4. Mem. III 10.8, Hier. 1.11. In addition there are the following: Mem. I 4.6, 4.11, Smp. 1.9, 5.6, Cyn. 5.27.
 5. X 29, XVI 19.
 6. Fr. 63.
 7. De Arte 12 (18.5), Medic. 2 (21.8), Alim. 27 (82.2), Flat. 3 (93.5), Vict. I 23 (VI 496L.). Further instances of this sense follow: de Arte 9 (15.9), 10 (16.17), 10 (16.21).
 8. VM. 19 (49.25), Alim. 26 (81.17), Flat. 10 (97.18).

vision,¹ but the sense of eye appears once² and so does that of act of seeing, view, glance, or glimpse.³ Isocrates employs ὄψις in three senses. In the first place, it has the meaning of appearance or aspect;⁴ once it means a vision, apparition, or portent;⁵ and in one other instance it means the faculty or power of seeing.⁶

The first sense of ὄψις to be noted in Plato is that of aspect or appearance,⁷ which is, perhaps, the most general of the objective group of meanings. Akin to the meaning of aspect is the more specific one of face or form,⁸ of which several instances are found in the dialogues. Elsewhere Plato uses the word to signify the visual impression or image of an object.⁹ This use is new with him, for it has

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1. Heracl. 22B55 (I 162.11), Emp. 31B3, 10 (I 310.9), 31B64 (I 336.9), Democr. 68B11 (II 140.16), Gorg. 82B11 (II 293.7), Antipho Soph. 87B1 (II 338.2).
 2. Heracl. 22B26 (I 156.13).
 3. Anxag. 59B21a (II 43.15).
 4. II 32, X 42, 61, XII 39.
 5. IX 21.
 6. XII 150.
 7. Phd. 60e, R. 376b, 452b, Phlb. 28e, Ti. 50e.
 8. Ly. 207a, Euthd. 271b, Phdr. 240d, 254b, Prm. 127b.
 9. Phd. 74d, Thet. 195c, Ti. 80e.

been seen in the examples from no other author. The sense of thing seen, or spectacle, or sight, on the other hand, is an ancient meaning of the word, of which he offers a number of instances.¹ Of the sense of vision or apparition there are two examples in the dialogues.² But by far the greatest number of instances of *opsis* in Plato occurs in the subjective sense of power of sight or seeing, eyesight, or faculty of vision,³ a sense, again, which is as old as Homer. In the sense of act of looking, or gaze, Plato uses *opsis* three times;⁴ that of presence or range of vision occurs only once,⁵ as does that of eye or pupil of the eye.⁶ Finally, Plato uses *opsis*⁷ in another and new way, to mean the visual stream.

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1. Phdr. 250b, Lg. 887d. See also Epin. 985b and Ep. VII 344b.
 2. R. 572a, Lg. 910a.
 3. Chrm. 167e, Phd. 111b, R. 353c, Tht. 156b, Lg. 961d. Besides these the following may be listed: Hp. Ma. 299b, Alc.1. 133b, Men. 76d, Smp. 219a, R. 507d, 508a, c, 529d, 532a, 603b, Phdr. 250d, Tht. 156d-e, 164a, 185a, 206a, Sph. 266c, Phlb. 39b, 41e, Ti. 45c, 47a, b.
 4. Cra. 396b, R. 519b, Tht. 156c.
 5. R. 401c.
 6. Alc.1. 133a.
 7. Ti. 67c-d.

This last meaning is, as has been noted, new with Plato and highly specialized. It may be regarded as a technical meaning given to a word in general circulation. Plato, in his effort carefully to analyze and explain the phenomenon of seeing, has taken a word already widely used in the language and made it fit his need in a particular situation. Nor is this sense of visual stream the only new one which Plato developed. The use of ὄψις to signify a visual impression or image has already been observed, and it has been indicated that this sense, too, is original in Plato and highly specialized. Thus during the examination of the Platonic usage in this one word, ὄψις, two new technical senses have come to light, both furnishing excellent illustrations of the very process which is being studied in connection with Aristotle's technical vocabulary in the Poetics.

It remains, then, now that the review of earlier usage has been completed, to see whether Aristotle has been anticipated in his meaning of the term ὄψις in the Poetics by any earlier writer. The general significances respectively objective and subjective of aspect and eyesight have been found to be as old as Homer, with the additional meanings gradually being accumulated. It is evident that the subjective group of meanings--faculty of vision, eyesight, gaze, view, presence, eye, and visual stream--may be eliminated at once from consideration, for no such meaning could be regarded

as equivalent to that of $\delta\psi\iota\varsigma$ in the Poetics. Of the objective group, on the other hand, while certain of the meanings, such as face, visual image, aspect, and apparition, may similarly be dismissed, one sense, that of thing seen, or spectacle, deserves serious consideration. The question is whether this meaning of $\delta\psi\iota\varsigma$ anticipates the Aristotelian meaning in the Poetics. It will readily be seen that the sense of thing seen is too wide, too general, to be equated with the $\delta\psi\iota\varsigma$ of Aristotle. Nowhere has this meaning of thing seen been applied to the theatre or to anything resembling a theatrical production. A glance at the evidence gathered from Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Lysias, and Isocrates will confirm this. In no instance has the meaning of spectacle or thing seen been applied to something especially arranged to be seen. The things seen, in other words, have in every case been purely accidental. A given scene existed and happened to be observed. No one produced it for the specific purpose of being looked at. But nothing has been said of the evidence from Plato. Of three of the instances of the sense of thing seen, taken from the dialogues, the same thing is true that has been said of the other authors. But the fourth example, Laws 887d, is different from the others. Here just the requirement which has been missed in all the other instances is present. Plato is speaking in this passage of spectacles especially prepared and produced to be looked at. To the general idea of something seen has been

added a purpose and a preparation and a production. This is essentially the significance of *opsis* in the Poetics. It is true that in the Laws Plato does not employ the word *opsis* expressly of the drama. The shows or spectacles he speaks of are probably smaller, less elaborate, and less formal. But, on the other hand, his language does not wholly exclude the possibility of including plays among them. In either case, from similar spectacles of an earlier day tragedy had descended. It therefore appears that Plato may have anticipated, in the Laws, Aristotle's use of *opsis*.

To turn to the Poetics briefly, it is noteworthy that in that work Aristotle has nowhere defined *opsis*.

Muthos, *hithos*, *diavolia*, and *lexis* are all defined, but not *opsis*. This suggests the consideration that he may have regarded it as unnecessary to define a term, the meaning of which, already known, has not been changed at his hands. Aristotle is normally careful about definitions, inserting one wherever he thinks that his own usage is sufficiently removed from the current one to render it needed. There is, then, nothing in the Poetics to lead one to suppose that *opsis* is there employed in a novel or recondite fashion.

It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that in the technical use of the word *opsis* in the Poetics Aristotle is not original, but is following the precedent set by Plato.

CHAPTER III

δέσις - λύσις

Next to be considered in Aristotle's analysis of tragedy is a pair of terms, δέσις and λύσις. In the Poetics¹ he introduces and defines these two words as follows: "Of every tragedy part is δέσις and part λύσις; the things which happen outside the play and often some of those which occur during it make up the δέσις, and the rest the λύσις. By δέσις I mean the part of the play from the beginning until the point at which the fortunes of the agents are about to change..., and by λύσις the rest, from the beginning of the change until the end. For example, in the Lynceus of Theodectes the δέσις is the actions preceding the play and the seizure first of the child and afterward of the parents, and the λύσις is the part from the accusation of murder until the end." Here δέσις is stated to be the complication of the plot, that is, the parts of the story which precede the beginning of the play and that part of the action of the play itself which extends to the point at which the hero's fortune reverses its direction. Λύσις, or the resolution or denouement of the plot, is the rest of the action from the turning point to the end.

In another passage Aristotle, writing of how the

1. 1455b 24-32.

denouement should be brought about, says that it should arise¹ out of the plot itself, so as to seem probable. Elsewhere he asserts that the δέσις and λύσις form the basis for comparisons among plays.² These are the only passages in the Poetics in which δέσις and λύσις are to be found in the sense of complication and denouement. Λύσις, however, occurs in³ three other places with the more general meaning of solution of a problem. But it is with its technical sense of denouement or resolution of the plot that I am here concerned.

The review of earlier Greek literature will, in the case of δέσις, be very brief, indeed, for it occurs only once, in Plato,⁴ where it means a binding together.

The examination of λύσις will be somewhat longer. It is found first in Homer, once with the meaning of liberation, as of the ransom of a corpse,⁵ and once in the sense of release or deliverance from death.⁶ Hesiod also has two instances of the word, using it once in the sense of release or resolution, with the suggestion of cessation,⁷ and again as

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1. 1454a 37.
 2. 1456a 9.
 3. 1460b 6, 1461b 24, 1462b 18.
 4. Cra. 418e.
 5. Q. 655.
 6. I. 421.
 7. Th. 637.

release or redemption from debt.¹ The word is employed by two of the lyric poets, Theognis and Pindar. The former uses it always in the sense of release or deliverance,² and the latter in the same way in one passage,³ but in another⁴ he uses it to signify a resting place for the evening meal. Sophocles has four examples of the word,⁵ in all of which the meaning is release or deliverance. It is noteworthy that in two of these⁶ the connotation of atonement and purification is present. *λύσις* is found twice in Euripides,⁷ in both instances meaning release or deliverance. In two instances in the fragments of Greek tragedy⁸ the meaning is the same. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Lysias each use *λύσις* once, in the sense of release or deliverance.⁹

It is possible to distinguish a number of shades of meaning in the Platonic use of *λύσις*. The usual sense of

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1. Op. 404.
 2. 179-180, 1007-1011, 1383-1385.
 3. N.X. 76.
 4. O.X. 47.
 5. El. 573, Ant. 597, OT 921, Tr. 1171.
 6. Ant. 597, OT 921.
 7. Alc. 214, Andr. 900.
 8. Aristias 2, p. 726; Neophron 1. p. 730.
 9. Hdt. VI 139.1, Thuc. II 102.5, Lys. IV 13.

release or deliverance occurs five times¹ and that of atone-
 ment once;² in one instance the significance of loosing or
 letting loose is used of the soul at death³ and, finally,
 the sense of dissolution or breaking up is found in four pas-
 sages.⁴

The examination of the appearances of δέσις and
 λύσις in Greek literature before Aristotle is now complete.
 Of δέσις it may at once be concluded that the Aristotelian
 meaning is wholly Aristotle's own and altogether new with him.
 In the case of λύσις, while many examples of its use among
 earlier writers have been seen, in no instance has the mean-
 ing of λύσις in the Poetics been anticipated or even remotely
 foreshadowed. Here again can be observed what has been noted
 elsewhere, the practice of Aristotle in adapting to his own
 purposes a word already well known and widely used in the Greek
 language and in so adapting it endowing it with a significance
 peculiarly Aristotelian. It is reasonable to assert, there-
 fore, that λύσις, like δέσις, is, as a technical term in the
Poetics, original with Aristotle.

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1. Phd. 82d, 83b, R. 515c, 532b, Phdr. 244e.
 2. R. 364e.
 3. Phd. 67d.
 4. Phlb. 31d, e, Ti. 38b, Lg. 945c.

CHAPTER IV

ἀναγνώσις

Aristotle, using ἀναγνώσις seventeen times in the Poetics, makes amply clear what he means by the word, which is in every instance used as a special term of literary criticism. The meaning does not vary, but is the same throughout.

Ἀναγνώσις is a part of the plot of a tragedy and one of the strongest elements of attraction in a play.¹ Elsewhere ἀναγνώσις is defined: it is a change from ignorance to knowledge on the part of those marked for good or evil fortune and brings them into a state of either love or hate. It is most effective when accompanied by peripeties. This conjunction, in fact, of discovery and peripety will arouse pity or fear, thus fulfilling the purpose of tragedy. Finally, peripety and discovery are two parts of the plot, while κῆθος is the third.² Again, it is better to have a man do a deed in ignorance and to have the discovery afterward, for thus the repulsive element will be avoided and the discovery will be more astounding.³ Another passage lists the six species of ἀναγνώσις, with examples for each, that arising from the action itself, with the surprise proceeding

1. 1450a 34.

2. 1452a 29 - b11.

3. 1454a 4.

from probable incidents, being declared best, and that from reasoning next in excellence.¹ A complex tragedy is all peripety and discovery.² Finally, we are informed that ἀναγνώσις is a part of epic as well as of tragedy.³

This exhausts the appearances of ἀναγνώσις in the Poetics. There is one other passage, however, which should be cited here,⁴ for, although ἀναγνώσις does not there occur, ἀναγνωσιμὸς is used as its equivalent. The discovery, writes Aristotle, should arise out of the structure of the plot. This passage contains the sole occurrence of ἀναγνωσιμὸς in the works of Aristotle, nor does it occur anywhere in Greek literature earlier than Aristotle, so far as can be ascertained from what remains. The word is evidently a variant for ἀναγνώσις, the form which Aristotle manifestly preferred as his technical term for discovery.

Ἀναγνώσις itself is found only once⁵ in the body of Aristotelian writings outside the Poetics and there it simply means recognition, without any reference to literary criticism or the drama. This would seem to be the general

1. 1454b 19, 30, 37, 1455a 1-3, 12, 16, 19.

2. 1455b 34.

3. 1459b 7-16.

4. 1452a 14-21.

5. EE 1237a 25.

as opposed to the particular sense. This general sense is a natural derivative of the general sense of the verb ἀναγνώ-
ρίζειν, which, while it is used often in the Poetics in the
same restricted meaning as ἀναγνώσις, is used elsewhere¹
in Aristotle's works with the general meaning of recognize.

It remains to learn what the use of ἀναγνώσις
was in Greek literature before Aristotle. The enquiry is
soon completed, for it does not occur at all before Plato,
and in his writings only once,² where the meaning is recogni-
tion. The verb ἀναγνώριζειν, similarly, is not found in any
Greek author before Plato, who uses it three times,³ all in
the sense of to recognize. Plato, then, used both the
verb ἀναγνώριζειν and its noun ἀναγνώσις, though sparingly,
in the general senses, respectively, of to recognize and re-
cognition. This is, moreover, the only meaning in Plato.

Aristotle, in his turn, has both verb and noun in
the same general meanings as Plato. But, in addition to this,
he has devised a new and special sense for the words as terms
of literary criticism. ἀναγνώσις assumes a particular
meaning in the study of tragedy and related forms of poetry,
a meaning found nowhere else in Greek literature before Aris-
totle.

1. APr. 67a 24, de An. 425a 24, Pr. 918a 8.

2. Tht. 193c.

3. La. 181c, Plt. 258a, Prm. 127a.

περιπέτεια

Closely connected with ἀναγνώρισις in the Poetics is περιπέτεια. The two form the principal elements whereby the plot of a tragedy accomplishes its function of arousing pity and fear and Aristotle regards them as parts of the plot.¹

"Περιπέτεια is the change of the action to the opposite, as has been described, and this, too, as we say, in accordance with what is probable or necessary..."² This is how Aristotle defines peripety. He says also that a plot containing a peripety is complex and that the reversal should arise from the composition of the plot itself.³ Discoveries, too, or recognitions which result from a peripety are better than the others.⁴ The poets who have tried without success to represent the tale of one of the Homeric epics in a single play yet in their peripeties, as well as in their simple actions, show remarkable skill in aiming at what they want.⁵ Several other instances of περιπέτεια in the Poetics have already been cited under ἀναγνώρισις, but it seems unnecessary to introduce them again here, since they contribute nothing to our understanding of the word.

1. 1450a 34.

2. 1452a 22.

3. 1452a 14-21, cited also under ἀναγνώρισις, p. 157.

4. 1454b 29.

5. 1456a 19.

Besides these occurrences in the Poetics, περιπέ-
 ρεια is used by Aristotle twice elsewhere.¹ In both in-
 stances, although no immediate connection with tragedy is
 specified, the metaphor is clear; the meaning is a reversal
 of fortune, substantially the same, except for the divorce
 from tragedy, as that in the Poetics. I think it is possible
 that the more general sense, in this case, is an extension
 of the narrower dramatic one.

Turning to the pre-Aristotelian writers, we find
 that περιπέρεια is used by none of them. The adjective περι-
 πέτης, however, appears in Herodotus and the tragic poets.
 "They brought about a sudden reversal in their fortunes,"²
 that is, they were ruined. In another passage³ the word
 clearly refers to the costume of Iphigeneia; there is no
 question of a reversal of fortune. Elsewhere⁴ the word re-
 fers to physical position, and, again,⁵ is used in a rather
 unusual passive sense, the sword on which, or, around which
 he had fallen. Finally, it once⁶ means turning or changing
 suddenly.

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1. HA 590b 14, Rh. 1371b 10.
 2. Hdt. VIII 20.
 3. A. A. 233.
 4. S. Ant. 1223.
 5. S. Aj. 907.
 6. E. Andr. 982.

As we see, περιπετής is used in four Greek writers earlier than Aristotle. In Aeschylus and Sophocles it refers to physical position, with the sense of falling round, embracing, or veiling, a sense which appears to be a literal derivation from the component parts of the word. In Herodotus and Euripides, on the other hand, this literal sense has already yielded to a figurative one, expressing the idea of a change or fall in fortune. It is from this figurative meaning of the adjective that the formation of Aristotle's περιπέτεια is to be traced. But the word itself is used by no one before him.

The question remains whether Aristotle invented the word περιπέτεια outright or took it over from someone else. To this there can be no certain answer. All that can be definitely asserted is that the word is preserved nowhere in Greek literature before him. He may have found it in use among those who wrote for the theatre in his time. Whether or not it had found its way into the written language, it may still have been current in speech. But we do not know. It is certain, however, that Aristotle is the earliest writer in whose works the word occurs referring to the construction of the plot of a tragedy. Bywater holds that the fact that he twice uses it in the Poetics without explaining it before he offers its definition means that it "must be presumed to have been already an established and well understood

term of dramatic technique.¹¹ He states the case too strongly, for this fact need force no such presumption. First of all, Aristotle elsewhere uses terms which he later defines; second, he reserves his definition for its proper place in his analysis of tragedy, without letting the casual occurrence of the word force him to the definition prematurely; third, the wait which the reader has to endure after his first sight of the word until he comes to the definition is, after all, only a short one (two Bekker pages); and, fourth, the fact that Aristotle does define the word suggests that he is using^{it}, if not for the first time in the language, at least in a new sense peculiar so far to himself. Words which Aristotle takes the trouble to define are very often words to which he has given a new and special meaning. In any case it is manifest that he thought his meaning of *περίπτεσις* in the Poetics, whether by reason of novelty or of an unwanted restriction, sufficiently in danger of being misunderstood to justify him in defining it.

1. Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Oxford, 1909, p. 199.

πάθος

Aristotle, in analyzing the constitution of the plot of tragedy, identifies three parts or elements, by virtue of which the plot can succeed in arousing the emotions of pity and fear, thus properly performing the function of a tragedy. Two of these, ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια, have already been dealt with; the third is πάθος. "A third part is Suffering; which we may define as an action of a destructive or painful nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings, and the like."¹ This is Aristotle's definition of the term and it is with this particular sense of πάθος as a term of dramatic criticism that I am now concerned. The word has, of course, various other meanings, even in the *Poetics*, but they are of a more general significance or of a meaning having essentially nothing to do with literature.

In the specific sense of this definition πάθος appears in two other passages of the *Poetics*. It is an action which will arouse pity and fear. Aristotle says that when a deed of violence is wrought by one enemy upon another the pity and fear are not owing to their relationship, since it is such as to lead one to expect violence between them, but simply to the horrible deed itself. A ghastly action will in itself revolt us, but the most effective tragic pity and fear proceed from a horrible deed perpetrated by a man

1. 1452b 11. Bywater's translation, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

upon his friend or a member of his family.¹ Again, after a discussion of the horrible actions in which the Atridae and other houses of the heroic age were involved, we are told that such terrible incidents are worthy material for a tragedy and, since they are confined to a few families, it is from the history of these that the plots for tragedies must for the most part be drawn.²

These are the only occurrences in the Poetics of $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in its restricted meaning as a term of literary criticism. Before the other instances are cited, therefore, it will be well to note certain occurrences of cognate words in which the critical meaning of $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ is referred to. The $\tau\rho\alpha\gamma\omega\delta\iota\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\theta\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ is one in which the element of $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ predominates, one filled with action of a destructive or painful nature.³ Elsewhere we read again of the $\tau\rho\alpha\gamma\omega\delta\iota\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\theta\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$, and $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\mu\alpha$ is substituted for $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in conjunction with $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\nu\acute{\omega}\rho\iota\varsigma$ and $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\iota\alpha$, but the context makes it certain that the meaning is that of $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in the sense of 1452b 11.⁴ The adjective $\kappa\alpha\theta\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ appears nowhere else in the Poetics;

1. 1453b 14-22.

2. 1454a 13.

3. 1455b 34.

4. 1459b 7-11.

the noun πάθημα, once,¹ in the definition of tragedy, where it means emotions, referring to ἔλεος and φόβος.

Πάθος itself is found four more times in the Poetics. Twice it means emotion² and twice it has the general meaning of accident, affection, something that happens to someone.³ There can be no question of Aristotle's having invented or having been the first to use πάθος. He himself uses it often throughout his works and in a variety of meanings. It simply remains to consider how his predecessors used the word, in order to learn whether any of them anticipated him in his use of it as a formal term of literary criticism.

The word πάθος is used by no writer earlier than Aeschylus and Herodotus. Pindar, however, uses πάθη (Doric πάθα) in the sense of calamity, disaster, or misfortune.⁴ Aeschylus has the word in twenty-four instances, in all of which, with one possible exception, it is used in the sense of calamity, disaster, or misfortune.⁵ In the possible exception⁶ πάθος may mean experience, what one has experienced,

1. 1449b 28.

2. 1455a 31, 1456a 38.

3. 1447a 28, 1460b 12.

4. O. VI 38, P. III 42, 97, P. VIII 48.

5. Supp. 112, Pers. 254, 292, 2194, 436, Th. 850, Pr. 703, A. 177, 533, 669, 893, 1137, 1176, 1210, Ch. 516, 547, 976, 1009, 1016, 1070, Eu. 121, 145, 497, Fr. 190.

6. A. 177.

whether good or bad, although the passage is usually translated "learn by suffering." In Sophocles, similarly, $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ means suffering, calamity, or misfortune,¹ whether visited upon the victim by some wholly alien force or brought upon him by his own transgressions, and the same meaning is found in Euripides.² In Herodotus it means the same as in the tragedians, except that it refers to misfortunes on various scales. First, on the grand scale it can mean a national or military disaster;³ second, it can mean a personal calamity;⁴ and, finally, he uses the plural meaning suffering.⁵ Among the writers of comedy the only one who employs $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$, Aristophanes, uses it in the same sense as the tragic poets.⁶ Thucydides uses $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ most frequently in the sense of disaster,⁷ but in two passages he uses it to mean experience,

1. Aj. 215, 260, 313, 836, 932, El. 210, OT. 732, 840, 1297, 1330, Ant. 541, 1316, Tr. 153, 256, 261, 855, 1269, Ph. 854, 899, OC. 604, 1078.

2. Med. 658, Hec. 104, 589, Supp. 11, 791, Ph. 1341, 1551, 1734, Or. 2, 843, 1455, 1500, Ba. 971, Fr. 125.2, 981.

3. I 91.2, 153.1, III 147.1, V 46.1, 87.2, 87.3, VI 18, VII 107.1, VIII 100.4, 101.2, 129.3, IX 107.1.

4. I 13.1, 137.1, II 133.1, III 40.4, V 55, 95.2, VI 117.3, VIII 90.4, 109.5, 119, IX 94.1.

5. II 171.1, V 4.2, 67.5.

6. Ach. 1191, V. 328, Lys. 479, Th. 1058.

7. I 106.2, II 54.1, 86.5, III 113.2, 113.6, IV 14.2, 25.11, 55.1, VII 30.3, 33.3.

fate, that which happens to someone.¹ Lysias, the orator, twice has the word in the sense of misfortune.² In Hippocrates $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ means affection, what is the matter with a person, disease.³ There is only one occurrence of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ⁴ among the surviving fragments of the pre-Socratics. Diels translates the passage: "Arzneikunst heilt des Leibes Krankheiten, Weisheit befreit die Seele von Leidenschaften." Liddell-Scott-Jones⁵ cite the passage, giving emotion or passion for the meaning. In the works of Isocrates $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ appears seven times, four with the general meaning of that which one suffers or undergoes,⁶ and three with the meaning of suffering or disaster.⁷

Plato employs $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ often and in a variety of senses, ranging from the most general, in which it means what happens to a person or thing, through shades such as state of mind and feeling, to suffering. I shall take the general meanings first. $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ often has no coloring whatever, serving the

1. IV 30.1, VI 55.4.

2. XXIV 10, XXXII 10.

3. De Arte 8 (14.20), Decent. 6 (27.14), Aēr. 22 (74.15 & 18).

4. Democr. (Diels 68b 31 = II 152.3).

5. A Greek-English Lexicon, new edition, Oxford, 1940, vol. II, p. 1285.

6. VIII 115, XV 64, XII 95, XV 310.

7. IV 168, XII 63, Ep. II 12.

purpose of a cognate accusative and simply filling a grammatical need without adding any meaning of its own to the sentence.¹ In two passages $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ means effect.² Slightly removed from the very general meaning, too, is the sense of condition, state of affairs, circumstance.³ Elsewhere $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ means experience, or something which happens to someone,⁴ and in a few passages⁵ it comes to mean trait or character. Closely allied to this last meaning is that of state of mind or opinion,⁶ and another meaning logically developed from the general is affection, that which affects one,⁷ and sometimes, again, the word means feeling.⁸ From feeling the transition to the sense of emotion⁹ is easy. Finally Plato

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1. Alc. I 118b, Hp. M. 364a, Phdr. 250a, Sph. 245a, Plt. 269b, Lg. 801b, 876d.
 2. Phdr. 252c, Tl. 78e.
 3. Hp. Ma. 285c, Smp. 191a, Phdr. 245c, 251d, Sph. 228e, 243c, Plt. 273c, Tl. 43e, Lg. 819d.
 4. Ap. 22c, 41b, Prt. 352e, Grg. 482c, Phd. 96a, R. 432d, 579d, Sph. 248d, Plt. 277d, Ep. VII 351d.
 5. R. 376a, 604e, Prm. 129c, Phlb. 15d.
 6. Lg. 888c, 900b.
 7. Gra. 411c, Tl. 52d.
 8. Grg. 481c, 513c, Lg. 811c.
 9. Phdr. 254e, 265b, Phlb. 32b.

uses $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in the sense of suffering or disaster.¹

To summarize, it has been found that $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ first used, so far as existing evidence permits us to judge, by Aeschylus, has at the start the sense of suffering, calamity, disaster, or misfortune. In this meaning the word is found not only in Aeschylus, but in Sophocles and Euripides as well, and in Herodotus, Thucydides, Lysias, Isocrates, and Plato also. The meaning of experience or fate is not found until Thucydides, and only twice in him. In Hippocrates the word has the rather particular meaning of disease or affection. Thus it is not until Isocrates and Plato that the general senses of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ come into wide use, but they then predominate. This history may perhaps be attributed to the nature of the subject matter of the various writers, or to the changes in usage which take place in a language over a period of a century or more.

As for the development of the meaning of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in connection with its role in the Poetics, it may be stated that, although no writer prior to Aristotle used the word in the same technical sense in which it is there employed, it already possessed a well-established meaning closely akin to its sense in the Poetics, and the step whereby Aristotle transformed it from a word meaning suffering or disaster to a term of literary criticism, meaning the representation on the stage of actions

1. Gra. 419c, R. 378a, 380a, 606b, 612a, Criti. 111b, Lg. 639b, 741c, 879b.

of a destructive or painful nature, while a definite step, is a small one. Although no earlier writer had actually used $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in Aristotle's sense, many had foreshadowed his meaning.

CHAPTER V

ἔλεος - φόβος

The words ἔλεος and φόβος must next be considered. While they are hardly technical terms in the sense in which μῦθος or ἀναγνώσις may be so described, they yet occupy so central a position in the Aristotelian analysis of tragedy that no one who endeavors to study that analysis can properly ignore them. For they in fact comprise the end of tragedy, the function of which is in effect a κάθαρσις of such emotions, a κάθαρσις which cannot take place unless pity and fear are aroused. It is to this end, then, that the poet devises his plot, introduces character, and labors to compose his verses, since, if, despite his efforts, he fails to arouse pity and fear, his tragedy, having fallen short of its objective, will prove unsuccessful.

It will be best to proceed without further preamble to the examination of the references to pity and fear in the Poetics. "A tragedy, then, is an imitation of a serious and complete action of some magnitude, in language with pleasing additions, each kind being used separately in the parts; an imitation by action, not narrative, accomplishing through pity and fear its catharsis of such emotions."¹ This passage, Aristotle's definition of tragedy, sets forth very clearly

1. 1449b 27.

the place of pity and fear and their function in tragedy.¹

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1. Concerning the interpretation of the word $\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ in this definition a considerable controversy has arisen. Into the details of this dispute I do not propose to enter, since to do so would lead me into a long digression which would be aside from the purpose of this study. Suffice it to say that Bernays (Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotelische Theorie des Dramas, p. 27ff) advanced the opinion that $\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ in this passage is equivalent to $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and that Aristotle means, therefore, that tragedy will effect the catharsis of only two emotions, pity and fear. Others hold that $\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ does not stand for $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and that, therefore, Aristotle includes not only pity and fear, but other similar emotions also, as the proper objects of the tragic catharsis. Among recent commentators, Bywater (Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, p. 152) and Gudeman (Aristoteles Περὶ Ποιητικῆς pp. 166, 171) hold the latter view, while Rostagni (La Poetica di Aristotele, p. 22) supports the former. My own opinion is that $\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ cannot be taken as the equivalent of $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, nor do I believe that Aristotle intended that it should be. But, although he does not in the definition limit the emotions purged by tragedy to pity and fear, in the course of the Poetics he specifically mentions only these two emotions and discusses only these two in detail. I shall therefore treat only these two and for

The essential quality of pity and fear as the ends of tragedy is further confirmed by the words: "For a recognition of this sort, together with a peripety, will cause either pity or fear - and tragedy is supposed to imitate actions of this kind..."¹ Here the recognition is one like that in the Oedipus Tyrannus, a recognition of persons and one accompanied by peripeties. Elsewhere it is reiterated that the proper function of tragedy is the representation of actions fearful and pitiful. This evocation of pity and fear must govern the poet in his formation of plot and character. Further light is thrown on the nature of pity and fear by Aristotle in describing what sort of action will arouse them. For the spectacle of a good man passing from good fortune to disaster will arouse neither pity nor fear, but is revolting; while that of a bad man passing from misfortune to prosperity is the least tragic of scenes, nor can it excite either pity or fear or even the general kindly feeling toward mankind, τὸ φιλόπρωπον. But to see a bad man fall from prosperity into misfortune, while it cannot give rise to pity or fear, will ap-

the sake of convenience I shall refer to them as the tragic emotions affected by the tragic catharsis. In other words, while formally they are not the only emotions concerned, practically they are, and I shall treat them accordingly.

1. 1452a 38.

peal to the kindly feeling toward mankind, τὸ φιλόνθρωπον, and will thus account for the apparent success of a tragedy improperly constructed.¹ This feeling of τὸ φιλόνθρωπον, however, while present in all men to some degree and capable of being affected even by a tragedy wanting incidents properly pitiable and fearful, is to be neither confused nor identified with ἔλεος and φόβος, for a tragedy cannot fulfill its function by appealing to τὸ φιλόνθρωπον, which is not, in short, a substitute for pity and fear. Τὸ φιλόνθρωπον, in fact, is nowhere referred to by Aristotle as a πάθημα, whereas ἔλεος and φόβος are clearly παθήματα. They are further distinguished in the concluding lines of the passage just cited, which say that the sight of a man undeservedly suffering misfortune arouses pity, whereas fear is excited on behalf of a man like ourselves. In another passage Aristotle announces that a good tragedy must be capable of exciting pity and fear by means of its plot, without depending on the spectacle to do this. What is more, any other effect but that of pity and fear, however gained, far from being an advantage to tragedy, is extraneous to it and has no place in it.² Again, it is stated that in the perpetration of a terrible deed upon an enemy there is nothing to arouse pity except the very violence

1. 1452b 32 - 1453a 7.

2. 1453b 1-12.

of the deed itself.¹ Finally, another passage outlines under what circumstances and in what arrangements actions designed to arouse fear and pity will be most effective.² The terms ἔλεος and φόβος, to be sure, do not themselves occur in this passage, but they are clearly referred to and the information given pertains, so to speak, to them. The adjectival forms φοβερῶν and ἐλεεινῶν clearly imply the nouns.

In two other passages³ the word φόβος appears, with ἔλεος in one of them, but they are not used in the sense of the pity and fear which are the ends of tragedy. Rather, they are there used with reference to the emotions of the agents in the tragedy; the author sets forth the means by which one agent will arouse these passions in another within the play. They may, however, even yet be regarded as emotions calculated to evoke similar feelings on the part of the spectator and thus, perhaps, are not so far removed from the objectives of tragedy as a brief first glance might suggest.

No other passage in the Poetics contains either ἔλεος or φόβος. It would, nevertheless, be desirable to know more about these affections, if by chance anything may be learned. Accordingly, although, in the case of words which

1. 1453b 17.

2. 1452a 1-7.

3. 1452a 26, 1456b 1-3.

are specifically and clearly defined in the Poetics or the meaning of which has been adequately outlined, it has been unnecessary to search further through the other works of Aristotle seeking enlightenment, it will be well in the present instance to turn to other Aristotelian writings in order to learn whether there is any additional information to be had concerning what he meant by ἔλκος and φόβος.

There are, in fact, four other passages which deal with φόβος. Two¹ of them define fear as the expectation of evil. The third² describes the conditions necessary for the experiencing of fear: in order to feel fear, a person must think it both possible and probable that something bad of a fairly definite character will happen to him at a specific time in the near future. Those who are in the flood-tide of fortune, be they rich or strong, popular or powerful, fear no evil, for they think it impossible; nor do those who have already suffered much fear anything, for they think that nothing can be worse than their present state. The fourth passage³ announces that fear and pity, like all the affections of the soul, influence the body as well.

There are two other references to ἔλκος. The first⁴

1. EN. 1115a 9, Rh. 1382a 21.

2. Rh. 1382b 28 - 1383a 12.

3. De An. 403a 17.

4. Rh. 1385b 13.

is the definition of pity as a certain pain at seeing a person suffer undeserved evil, either painful or destructive, such as one might expect to befall one's self or one's family or friends. From this point Aristotle goes on to say who is likely to feel pity and under what circumstances, much as he has done in the case of φόβος. Interestingly enough he includes among those who are disposed to experience pity the educated, and among those least disposed to the emotion those who are panic-stricken. The other reference¹ states that pity is at times accorded to those who act under compulsion.

Although the words ἔλεος and φόβος occur in other passages besides the above, these will suffice to illustrate what Aristotle meant by the terms. It now remains to review the occurrences of the words in Greek literature before Aristotle.

I shall treat ἔλεος first. The occurrences are few and the meaning is almost always pity.² There is practically no change or development in the sense from age to age. A few unusual examples may be noted. The adverb ἐλεόν, piteously, is unique in Hesiod,³ who offers no examples of the noun ἔλεος at all. Once in Euripides⁴ ἔλεος signifies the object of compassion,

1. EN. 1109b 32.

2. Hom. Ω44, E. Ph. 1286, Or. 333, 568, IA. 491, Th. III 40.3, Lys. II 39, XII 20, 79, XIV 40, XXVIII 11, Gorg. 82 B11, 8-9 (II 290. 19-22), Pl. Phd. 58e, R. 539a, 606c, Lg. 926e.

3. Op. 205.

4. Or. 832.

the piteous thing. Aristophanes does not employ the noun ἔλεος, but the adjective ἐλεεινός is found three times.¹ In one of these instances² Aristophanes represents Aeschylus as accusing Euripides of arousing pity not through plot, to use Aristotelian terms, but through the spectacle. Once in Thucydides³ οἶκτος is used as a synonym of ἔλεος. Epicharmus uses the verb ἐλεεῖν once,⁴ but the noun ἔλεος is altogether wanting. Only one other of the pre-Socratics uses either: Gorgias uses the verb once⁵ and the noun twice.⁶ Of this last passage more will be said later, for it is notable that here the writer speaks of arousing pity and fear by poetry.

Next follows the investigation of φόβος in Greek literature before Aristotle. In Homer φόβος has the principal meaning of flight.⁷ According to Aristonicus,⁸ indeed, it

1. Ach. 413, Th. 1063, Ra. 1063.

2. Ra. 1063.

3. III 40.3.

4. 23B 34 (I 203.14).

5. 82B 11, 7 (II 290.13).

6. 82B 11, 8-9 (II 290.19-22). See p. 185.

7. A402, M144, N470, E272, N48, A544, E252, ω57. Also B767, E739, Z97, 278, θ108, 139, I2, A37, 71, M39, 432, N362, E522, 0119, 310, 327, 666, H291, 356, 366, 373, 771, P42, 118, 579, 597, 667, Ψ16, Ω216.

8. Friedlander, L., Aristonici Περὶ σημείων Ἰλιάδος reliquiae

always has this meaning, except when used as a personification, although other authorities maintain that it means fear in some instances. Besides the meaning of flight Homer employs it in one other way, to refer to Φόβος as a god, the son of Ares.¹ Hesiod seems to show a change of sense in the direction of fear or panic, but it is not always easy to be sure when the word ceases to mean flight and begins to mean panic or fear. In three passages, however, fear seems to be the meaning.² Hesiod also has the deification of Φόβος already observed in Homer.³ The word is used by four of the lyric poets: once by Tyrtaeus,⁴ once by Archilochus,⁵ four times by Pindar,⁶ and twice by Bacchylides.⁷ In all these instances it means fear. Among the tragic poets Aeschylus, in whom are found many examples, employs Φόβος always with the meaning of fear,⁸ terror,

emendationes, Göttingen, 1853, pp. 195, 208, 221, 110, and 109.

1. N. 299, A. 440.
2. Sc. 144, 155, 237.
3. Th. 934, Sc. 195, 463.
4. 7.16.
5. 56.
6. P. V 61, IX 32, N. III 39, IX 27.
7. V. 23, XII 145.
8. Supp. 379, Pers. 116, Th. 240, Pr. 1090, A. 1243, 1306, Ch. 929, Eu. 88. Also Suppl. 224, 479, 498, 513, 786, Pers. 168, 206, 391, 603, Th. 121, 134, 214, 240, 259, 270, 288, 386, 498, 500, 806, Pr. 181, 696, 881, A. 14, 924, 1135, 1306, 1316, 1434, Ch. 32, 35, 102, 167, 288, 1024, 1052, Eu. 691.

or dread, as does Sophocles¹ also, except that two passages of the latter illustrate further shades of meaning. In one² φόβος indicates the object or cause of fear; in the other³ it is a restraining or salutary fear, such a fear as will result in good and may therefore be regarded as desirable. Euripides uses the word always in the sense of fear or terror.⁴ Among the fragments of Greek tragedy six examples⁵ are found: in all the sense is fear; in one⁶ it is possible to regard it as a salutary or restraining fear. Among the examples of φόβος found in Herodotus, one⁷ seems to signify flight or rout, or

Once, Th. 45, φόβος is described as a god.

1. Aj. 531, El. 783, Ant. 180, OT. 118, Tr. 176, Ph. 1231, OC. 730.
2. OC. 1652.
3. Aj. 1076.
4. Med. 903, Heracl. 996, HF. 816, Or. 1255, Fr. 416.3. Also Med. 184, 263, Hipp. 1204, Hea. 1113, 869, Heracl. 473, 867, Supp. 89, 548, 627, Tr. 157, 895, HF. 871, 971, IT. 1380, 1342, Ion 1300, 1452, 1497, El. 25, 39, 901, Hel. 312, 555, Or. 38, 104, 532, 757, 825, 1324, 1583, Rh. 52, 295, 308, 664, 786, Fr. 68.1, 608.4, 735, 775, 1049.2.
5. Theodectes 8, 5, p. 804, Mimnermus 2, 2, p. 830, adesp. 356, p. 906, Critias 1, 29, p. 771, 1, 37-40, p. 772, and adesp. 547, 1, p. 947.
6. Theodectes 8, 5, p. 804.
7. IX 69.1.

at least the panic accompanying flight. It also, naturally, means fear;¹ elsewhere the significance is panic,² that is, violent fear resulting in flight; and, finally, the object or cause of fear is denoted in two passages.³ Fear, again, is the sense of φόβος where it occurs in Aristophanes.⁴ The many instances of φόβος in Thucydides all have the meaning of fear,⁵ as is the case also in Xenophon⁶ and Lysias,⁷ as

1. VIII 12.2; also IV 115.2, VI 77.3.

2. IV 203.3; also VII 10e, VII 43.2, and VIII 38.

3. VI 112.3; also I 143.1.

4. Pax 642, Fr. 899a.

5. II 87.4; III 54.5, 112.7, IV 88.1, VI 34.9, 34.2, VII 75.3.

The same meaning may be observed in the following passages:

I 9.2, 9.3, 23.6, 33.3, 49.4, 123.1, 140.5, 141.1, II 53.4, 81.6, 89.5, 91.4, III 11.6, 12.1, 42.4, 79.3, IV 10.5, 59.2, 96.5, 106.1, V 11.1, 16.3, 71.1, 97, 111.1, VI 34.9, 36.2, 34.9, 63.2, 70.1, 86.1, VII 44.6, 44.7, 56.2, 61.2, 71.2, 80.3, VIII 1.2, 73.3, 92.1, 105.3.

6. An. I 2.18, VII 4.1, Cyr. IV 2.10, VIII 7.18, HG IV 5.1; also HG VI 5.29, V 4.42, VI 4.26, VII 5.24, Cyr. I 1.5, III 1.24, 1.25, 3.53, V 2.32, VI 3.27, Mem. II 1.25, 4.6, An. I 8.18, II 2.19, 4.3, III 1.18, IV 1.23, VII 2.21, 2.37, Oec. 7.25, Hier. 1.38, 5.2, 6.5, 10.3, 11.11, Eq. Mag. 5.3, 7.7, 8.14, Cyn. 5.28.

7. XX 8, II 39, cited also under ἔλεος, p. 177.

well as among the pre-Socratics¹ and in Isocrates.² In Plato a variety is found in the use of φόβος. To be sure, the usual meaning of fear or dread appears many times.³ In two instances⁴ it has been modified to connote a scruple or doubt. In certain other passages⁵ Plato discusses φόβος more fully, giving his definition of the word as the expectation of evil and discussing the value of the fear of a bad reputation to the lawgiver. Finally, in two passages the word appears as a salutary fear.⁶

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1. Democr. 68B 41 (II 155.9), 68B 268 (II 200.14), 68B 297 (II 207.3), Gorg. 82B 11.8 (II 290.18), 82B 11.16 (II 293.14), 82B 11.17 (II 293.18), 82B 11a.19 (II 298.29), Critias 88B 25.29 (II 388.7), 88B 25.37 (II 388.15).
 2. VII 38, IX 31; also II 5, 23, 26, III 52, V 34, 121, X 25, XI 25, Ep. VI 12.
 3. Smp. 193a, R. 578a, 578e, 579b, Ti. 69d; also Alc. 2 142a, Ion 535c, Chrm. 168a, La. 191d, Mx. 241b, Prt. 360a-b, Smp. 197d, 207e, 221a, R. 360d, 429d, 430b, 497d, 503d, 554d, 616a, Phdr. 254e, Tht. 173a, Plt. 305b, Phlb. 12c, 20b, 36c, 50b, c, Lg. 632a, 635b,c, e, 678c, 727c, 791b, 870c, 906a.
 4. Phd. 101b, Sph. 268a.
 5. Prt. 358d, Lg. 644c, 646e - 647b.
 6. Lg. 671d, 783a.

This completes the survey of the use of ἔλεος and φόβος in pre-Aristotelian Greek literature. It is now necessary to recapitulate.

For Aristotle ἔλεος and φόβος occupy a central position in tragedy, which is a μίμησις.....δι' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαινουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. This κάθαρσις of ἔλεος and φόβος is thus the τέλος of tragedy, which is to be accomplished δι' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου, which emotions are, it is evident, instrumental in effecting it. The entire effort of constructing a tragedy must therefore be directed toward arousing pity and fear. To this end all the parts contribute, and this end the devices such as ἀναγνώρισις, περικέτεια, πάθος, δέσις, and λύσις also serve. Fear is aroused on behalf of a man like ourselves, neither notably worse nor greatly superior in virtue and excellence, while pity is called forth by misfortunes which are not deserved. Aristotle further defines φόβος as the expectation of evil, as a pain or disturbance arising from the imagination of something painful or destructive about to happen; and ἔλεος he defines as a suffering at the sight of something painful or destructive which is befalling someone who does not deserve such a fate. Both pity and fear are emotions. Although these definitions, to be sure, are found not in the Poetics but elsewhere in Aristotle, nor are they specifically applied to tragedy, they may yet be used as indicating what Aristotle meant by the terms in dramatic criticism also. For while in rhetoric

the means of arousing pity and fear may be different from those of tragedy and the degree of affection may vary as well, the emotions are nevertheless in nature the same. Not only may this argument be urged, but it may be added, too, that nothing in the Poetics stands in the way of the application of these definitions to tragedy, for they are altogether compatible with what is said of the same καθήματα in that work.

The question must next be considered whether Aristotle derived his critical doctrine of the tragic ἔλεος and φόβος from any of his predecessors. The answer is not simple. First, it may be readily asserted that no Greek author before him actually defined ἔλεος, although many had used the word. Whether Aristotle in defining it believed that he was using the term with an altered meaning cannot be decided. The evidence, however, suggests the negative reply, for the sense of the word does not seem to vary, even though the earlier writers employed the word in a different context and did not relate it to tragedy. But in fact two of these earlier authors do write of ἔλεος in connection with tragedy. Aristophanes, in the Frogs 1063, represents Aeschylus as accusing Euripides of exciting ἔλεος by means of showing rulers in rags in his tragedies. The point of this criticism seems to be not the fact that Euripides seeks to arouse pity by his plays, but that he has had recourse to an illegitimate means of doing it. In short, he has done what Aristotle warns against in the Poetics;

he has only excited pity in the audience not by his *μῦθος* but by his *ὄψις*. Thus it is evident that the belief that tragedy should arouse pity was current in the time of Aristophanes. The other author is Gorgias, who, writing, to be sure, not of tragedy alone, but of poetry generally, says: *ἦς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φόβη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολὺδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθήης, ἐκ' ἄλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἰδιδόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχὴ*. Gorgias in these words certainly recognizes the power of poetry to arouse pity and fear, as well as other emotions. It would be transgressing the bounds of evidence, however, to maintain that he believed that poetry or tragedy, should, as its chief purpose, arouse emotion, or pity and fear. Gorgias is here simply stating the fact, which he has observed, of the emotional power of poetry, rather than propounding any theory of its proper aim. This the context makes clear, for he is engaged in demonstrating the power of words to charm and deceive, pursuant to his apology for Helen. Nevertheless, the conjunction of pity and fear in this context, where they are clearly presented as the effects of poetry, is significant and constitutes a definite anticipation of the Aristotelian usage in the Poetics.

In considering the treatment of *φόβος* before Aristotle it is seen that the word is widely used and, for the most part, without any attempt at definition and with little variety. It may be noted, however, that Sophocles, in the Ajax 1076,

uses it to signify a restraining or salutary fear, as does Plato also in a few passages. But, in contrast to what was discovered of *ἐλεος*, it has appeared that Aristotle is not the first to define *φόβος*, for Plato has done so before him. In the *Protagoras*, 358d, he speaks of *φόβος* as the expectation of evil, using precisely the same words as Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1115a 9: *προσδοκίαν κακοῦ*. This constitutes the clearest possible anticipation. It is manifest, therefore, that Aristotle's definition of *φόβος* is not original on his part.

But in the *Laws* Plato elaborates further his views on *φόβος*, stating that besides the *προσδοκία κακοῦ* there is another kind of fear, the concern for one's reputation before friends or *αἰσχύνη*. This second kind of fear, *αἰσχύνη*, is valuable to the legislator and exercises a beneficent and restraining influence against wrong doing among the citizens. This sense of *φόβος* may be regarded as technical with Plato, for no other author before him has developed it and it plays a particular role in the process of law-giving. In this technical sense, however, Aristotle in the *Poetics* has not followed Plato, for *φόβος* therein has the sense of the expectation of evil and nothing to do with the fear of the evil opinion of others.

Now, while it is clear that Aristotle, in his definition of *φόβος*, follows the more general Platonic definition, he has by no means followed Plato in his conception of the rôle

of φόβος in tragedy. For Plato regards it as bad that tragedy should arouse fear and this constitutes one of the grounds on which he condemns tragedy, namely, that its μῦθοι produce effects of fear and horror: Οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ τᾶντα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, κτλ.¹ On this point Aristotle reverses Plato, since he maintains that the proper end of tragedy is, and rightly ought to be, fear and pity.

It may be concluded, then, that as early as Aristophanes it was recognized that tragedy had as one of its purposes the arousing of pity among the audience; that Gorgias recorded the fact that poetry excites pity and fear; that Plato defined φόβος as the expectation of evil, which definition was taken over by Aristotle; that Plato, recognizing that tragedy aroused fear, was opposed to it for this among other reasons; and that Aristotle, following Gorgias in the conjunction of pity with fear, regarded the evocation of these emotions by tragedy as desirable in itself, in disagreement with Plato, by reason of the fact that only by this evocation could tragedy accomplish its end of a μάθαισις of these emotions.

1. R. 387b, ff.

CHAPTER VI

κάθαρσις - μίμησις

Of these two terms, *κάθαρσις* and *μίμησις*, much has already been written, so much, indeed, that even to list it in its entirety would swell this study far beyond any reasonable limits. I shall therefore limit myself to a simple application of the method used in earlier sections to the words *κάθαρσις* and *μίμησις*, in order to see what results may be obtained. To look for anything new or surprising in a realm already so thoroughly searched would be vain. But, on the other hand, an investigation of the technical terms in the *Poetics* can hardly ignore the two most important terms in that work.

Both words appear in the definition of tragedy:¹ "Tragedy, then, is an imitation (*μίμησις*) of a serious and complete action of some magnitude, in pleasing language, with each of the kinds used separately in the parts; an imitation by action, not narrative, accomplishing through pity and fear its catharsis (*κάθαρσις*) of such emotions." From this it can be learned that tragedy is *μίμησις*. In other words, *μίμησις* is a term broader than tragedy and including it. Of *κάθαρσις*, unfortunately, almost nothing can be learned from this context, except that there is such a thing as a *κάθαρσις* of

1. 1449b 24-28.

ἔλεος and φόβος and similar emotions, a κἄθαρσις wrought by pity and fear. In order to discover more about the meaning of these terms, κἄθαρσις and μίμησις, therefore, it will be necessary to examine other instances of their occurrence.

Κἄθαρσις will be examined first. This word occurs only once more in the Poetics,¹ where it refers to the ritual purification of Orestes from blood-guilt.² The word clearly means the religious rite of purifying a person who has committed a crime from the stain of his wrong-doing; but this has nothing to do with tragedy, for the spectators are, presumably, guilty of no crime, nor is the play in itself a religious rite, though forming a part in the observance of a religious festival.

While further instances of κἄθαρσις in the Poetics are lacking, the word is used elsewhere in the works of Aristotle. In the zoölogical treatises it occurs frequently meaning menstruation or kindred discharges.³ Two examples

1. 1455b 15.

2. E., IT 1163 ff.

3. The list of these passages follows: HA. 573a 2, 7, 23, 574b 4, 578b 18, 582b 1, 7, 16, 30, 583a 30, 584a 7, 587b 2, 19, 30, 33, 588a 1, GA. 727a 14, 727b 14, 20, 22, 24, 728a 29, b 3, 11, 14, 739b 4, 746b 30, 747a 19, 773b 31, 774a 1, 775a 37, 775b 5, 776a 11.

will suffice: the one¹ shows *κάθαρσις* in the sense of expurgation, the other² in its sense of menstrual discharge. It appears to have acquired the latter sense as a result of its basic sense of a cleansing, since the discharges of women were regarded as removing impurities from the system. It is to be noted in both these passages that *κάθαρσις* is followed by a noun in the genitive case, signifying the object or impure matter purged or removed, not the body to be cleansed of the impurity. There are three other examples³ in Aristotle of *κάθαρσις* in the medical sense of a purgation or cleansing. In all of them the meaning of an expurgation or cleansing of impure matter from the body is readily seen.

Two other important passages remain to be considered. In the first⁴ of these, the use of the *αὔλος* in education is prohibited, on the ground that it appeals too strongly to the emotions and will produce a *κάθαρσις*. Of what the *κάθαρσις* is to be, what is to be removed or purged away, is not stated, but it is safe to assume that Aristotle, in speaking here of music, is using the term in the same sense in which he employs it in the *Poetics*, 1449b 24-28.

The remaining passage is found a little further on

1. *GA.* 738a 22-30.

2. *HA.* 572b 29.

3. *Pr.* 864a 33, *Ph.* 194b 36, *Metaph.* 1013b 1.

4. *Pol.* 1341a 17-25.

in the Politics¹. The promise in this passage that *κάθαρσις* will elsewhere be more fully treated is without fulfillment. The common assumption is that the second book of the Poetics, now lost, contained the exposition of Aristotle's theory of *κάθαρσις*. Be that as it may, despite the loss of the promised matter, the present passage contains much of interest and of value. The *μέλη ἐνθουσιαστικά*, the melodies which appeal to the emotions, are those which can effect a *κάθαρσις*. Every soul, moreover, even though normally self-controlled and not subject to strong passion, is nevertheless to some degree liable to emotion, especially to pity and fear. Those who are susceptible to emotion are, under the influence of enthusiastic music, as if possessed, but afterward they are seen to be restored, having experienced healing and *κάθαρσις*. Especially are those who undergo pity and fear and similar affections purged and lightened with pleasure. The *μέλη καθαρτικά* provide men with harmless pleasure.

Now it seems to me that this passage offers the key to the understanding of *κάθαρσις* in the Poetics. While the subject here is music, music and poetry are closely allied, more closely among the Greeks than in our own day. Particularly since Aristotle states that he will discuss *κάθαρσις* at greater length in the Poetics, it seems reasonable to

1. 1341b 32 - 1342a 16.

suppose that he is here using the word with substantially the same meaning that he will give it there. Therefore, if tragedy be substituted for the emotional music of the present passage and the tragic pity and fear for the present emotions (and it is significant that pity and fear are prominent here also), the *κάθαρσις* mentioned in the definition of tragedy can readily be grasped. The term is derived from medicine. The association in the present passage of *κάθαρσις* with *ἰατρεία* and the description of those who undergo the *κάθαρσις* as being lightened (*κουφίζεσθαι*) are of primary significance. The tragic emotions of pity and fear are expurged from those who experience the tragic *κάθαρσις*, and it is here also manifest that everyone to a greater or lesser degree requires this relief.¹ This interpretation of *κάθαρσις* is reinforced by the fact that only once does Aristotle use the word in the sense of purification of a religious ritual, while he very frequently employs it with a medical or biological significance. Nor is any religious or moral significance elsewhere in the *Poetics* attached to the drama.

Since *κάθαρσις* occurs nowhere else in Aristotle,

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1. It may be suggested that the practice of modern psychologists, who extort from their subjects a recital of all their secret fears and shortcomings in order to relieve them of these troubles, is a feeble attempt to accomplish this same *κάθαρσις*.

the account of how he uses it is now complete and we may turn to the investigation of *μῦθος*.

Several pertinent passages occur near the beginning of the *Poetics*. In the first of these¹ it is stated that epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, dithyrambic poetry, and the playing of the flute and lyre are all *μῦθοις*. They are distinguished from one another by the means, manner, or objects of their imitations. I shall tentatively use imitations to render *μῦθος*, although it must remain to be seen whether this is the best word for the purpose or not. The various means, manners, and objects may be variously combined. It is possible to imitate men's characters, what they do, and what they say. The next passage² introduces another example of *μῦθος*, which is without a name of its own but comprises the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues. These are *μῦθοις* by reason of their contents, although they are not composed in meter, and may accordingly be classed as poetry. The works of Empedocles, on the other hand, and similar compositions, although they are written in metric language and are as a result by many called poems, are not imitations at all and have therefore no claim to the name of poetry. Rather they are physical treatises. This makes it

1. 1447a 13-28.

2. 1447a 28 - b 32.

clear that Aristotle regards the essential nature of poetry to be *μίμησις*, rather than the mere linguistic form. Aristotle concludes his discussion of the means of *μίμησις* with the remark:¹ "These differences in the *τέχναι*, then, I call the means by which they accomplish their imitation."

He turns next to the objects of *μίμησις*. There are three passages² from which much may be learned of what Aristotle means by the term. The proper object of *μίμησις* is men in action. These will be either good or bad, for men generally incline in one of these directions and differ from one another in respect of virtue or vice. Accordingly the poet may represent either men wholly better than we ourselves, or about the same as we are, or worse. In accordance with the type of character represented the various kinds of *μίμησις* will be distinguished from one another. The tragic poets should follow the example of the portrait painters, who, while reproducing a recognizable likeness of their subject, yet show him a little better than he really is. For it is the duty of the poet to represent not what actually happened but what might have happened and what could happen in accordance with probability or necessity. Historian and poet, that is, are not distinguished from each other solely by

1. 1447b 29.

2. 1448a 1-9, 1454b 8-13, 1451a 36- b 11.

reason of writing in meter or not, but by virtue of what they write. For the one must tell what did, the other what might happen. Therefore, poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history, since it deals with universals, whereas history is concerned with particulars.

All this brings out the meaning of *μίμησις* more clearly. The word imitation fails to represent the meaning adequately for two reasons: first, it does not convey the suggestion that the objects of *μίμησις* are primarily human beings in action, or the actions, characters, and sufferings of men. Inanimate objects presumably can be and are represented, but their appearance is incidental to the human scene. In short, Aristotle's conception of *μίμησις* is dynamic rather than static. The second reason is that imitation implies a slavish and unimaginative reproduction of a model, a duplication of a prototype without change or originality. This is far from the meaning of *μίμησις* in the Poetics. For the poet may choose the sort of men he wishes to represent and is at liberty to improve them as he will and can. He must not, indeed, depict simply what actually occurred, but must show what can or might happen. He may invent his stories if he will, being guided only by the laws of probability and necessity and the requirement that his *μίμησις* be credible. On the other hand, representation, while it avoids the chief objections to imitation, is, as an equivalent for *μίμησις*,

open to another, for it fails to convey the one valuable suggestion of imitation, that the product of *μίμησις* must bear a recognizable resemblance to the original, in other words, the poet must make his meaning clear. On the whole, however, perhaps representation is preferable to imitation as an English translation of *μίμησις*.

Proceeding with the examination of the use of *μίμησις* in the Poetics, we find a passage in which the reasons for the origin of poetry are treated.¹ To represent or imitate is natural to men from childhood, since man differs from the other animals in this respect, and all men enjoy the products of *μίμησις*. It is therefore natural that poetry should come into being. Elsewhere comedy is defined in terms of the objects of representation.² It represents men worse than the average in respect of one particular fault, the ridiculous, which is a species of the ugly. Again, Aristotle speaks of epic poetry.³ One point of difference between it and tragedy is that the former is composed in a single meter and is a report, an *ἀπαγγελία*, whereas the latter is composed in a variety of meters and is dramatic in form. But epic is none the less a form of *μίμησις* for being an *ἀπαγγελία*.

1. 1448b 4-9.

2. 1449a 32.

3. 1449b 10.

Two other passages¹ explain how the constituent parts of tragedy arise from the particular kind of μίμησις which tragedy has been defined to be. They both emphasize the point that tragedy is a μίμησις of πράξεις and it is owing to this fact that it must have μῦθος and ὄψις and the rest. "Ὅψις originates in the manner, μελοποιία and λέξις in the means, and the others in the objects of the imitation. The dynamic quality of μίμησις in tragedy is reiterated² and the fact that a poet is a poet not because he composes verses in meter but by virtue of his μίμησις is stressed again.³ The assertion found here that the poet represents actions is repeated in several other passages,⁴ while three others⁵ speak of the fact that unity of plot depends on unity of μίμησις and that the epic μίμησις has a broader principle of unity than the tragic. Elsewhere the tragic function of μίμησις and its connection with pity and fear are asserted.⁶ This function is to arouse pleasure from pity and fear. This is in agreement with what has been said of κάθαρσις, for pity and fear, being aroused, are purged out of the spectator, and this ex-

1. 1449b 31-34, 1449b 36 - 1450a 4.

2. 1450a 16.

3. 1451b 27-29, already cited under μῦθος, p. 109.

4. 1450a 3-7, 1450a 38 - b 4, 1450b 24, 1450a 12-14.

5. 1451a 30-35, 1462b 3-7, 1462b 11.

6. 1453b 12, cited also under ἔλεος-φόβος, p. 174.

purgation uplifts him with pleasure. There are two other places¹ which reaffirm that the object of *μίμησις* in tragedy is action which induces to pity and fear. In the course of a discussion of the meter appropriate to epic poetry, Aristotle, referring to epic as a *διηγητική μίμησις*, reemphasizes the fact that epic poetry, although it is narrative in form, is nevertheless *μίμησις*.² Finally, Aristotle introduces the question whether epic or tragic *μίμησις* is better.³ The context which follows is important. In it he gives the current criticisms made against tragedy and the arguments in favor of the epic, and the reverse, and concludes at length that tragedy is superior to epic as a form of *μίμησις*. Of this decision I shall say more later, but for the present the examination of the meaning of *μίμησις* in the Poetics is at an end.⁴

Μίμησις occurs twice in the works of Aristotle

1. 1452b 1, 1452b 33.

2. 1459b 31-37.

3. 1461b 26.

4. There are a few other occurrences of the word in the Poetics but they are of no value for learning the meaning of the term. They are 1448a 24, 1448b 3, 35, 1454a 27, 1459a 15, 1462a 14-18.

outside the Poetics. In one instance¹ it is obvious that the word has nothing to do with any theory of poetry or literary criticism, since the discussion is purely metaphysical. The other instance² is of greater interest, for the μῦθος there indicated is the songs of Olympus, which, even when unaccompanied by the music, fill with emotion the souls of those who hear them. Μῦθος is here used as a literary or artistic term, manifestly, and the particular type of μῦθος is shown appealing to the emotions.

Next in the order of investigation after the study of μῦθος in Aristotle comes the examination of the instances of κάθαρσις in earlier Greek literature.

The earliest appearance of κάθαρσις is in Herodotus,³ where it is found in the sense of ritual purification. The next instances are in Hippocrates. Three times the meaning is menstrual discharge or purgation,⁴ already observed in Aristotle in the History of Animals and the Generation of Animals, and once the sense is the medical one of purge or expurgation.⁵ Turning to Plato, we find that three senses can be distinguished.

1. Metaph. 987b 7-14.

2. Pol. 1340a 7-14.

3. I 35.1-2.

4. Aër. 4 (58.31), 7 (60.35), 21 (74.2).

5. Decent. 10 (28.14).

The first is ritual purification;¹ the second is the medical purgation;² and the third is the general sense of purging, purification, or cleansing.³

This completes the review of the occurrences of *κάθαρσις* in Plato and in earlier Greek literature. One might perhaps suppose, from Sophist 227d, that a trace of the *κάθαρσις* of emotion from the soul has been found, but what follows makes it clear that no such conception is in question, for the impurities to be removed from the soul are not emotions at all, but false opinions, and the cathartic agent is neither drama nor any literary form, but the intellectual exercise of dialectical refutation. *Κάθαρσις* before Aristotle either is purely medical in meaning, or has a ritual and religious significance, or it is a very general term for cleansing or purging. Nowhere is the *κάθαρσις* of the emotions mentioned or suggested; nowhere is *κάθαρσις* connected with tragedy or poetry of any sort.

There is, however, one other passage which, although it contains no instance of the word *κάθαρσις*, must be considered.⁴ This passage might be supposed to contain an anti-

1. Lg. 868c, 872e.

2. Cra. 405a, Tl. 52e, 89a, Lg. 628d.

3. Phd. 67c, 69c, Sph. 226e, 227c, 227d, 230d, Lg. 736a.

4. R. 606a-b.

cipation of the idea of *κάθαρσις* in the Poetics, for it speaks very clearly of the appeal of poetry to the emotions and it refers to the natural desire to relax one's self-control and indulge in tears or pity. But, while the actual immediate working of poetry, as here set forth is similar to that described in Aristotle, inasmuch as both Plato and Aristotle agree that tragedy will arouse the emotions of pity, the ultimate result is very different, for Plato, far from conceiving of the *κάθαρσις* of the emotions, believes that they are, once aroused, more potent and more enduring than before and will permanently weaken self-control. In short, he regards the emotional effect of tragedy--and of much other poetry besides--as a bad thing, while Aristotle regards it as a good thing. Therefore I hold that there is in this passage no suggestion of the Aristotelian *κάθαρσις* of the Poetics.

Finally, the question might be raised whether Aristotle may have taken the idea of the tragic catharsis of pity and fear from the Orphic Mysteries or the Pythagorean rituals, even though no examples of Orphic or Pythagorean use of the word *κάθαρσις* can be produced. I think this question must be answered in the negative. First of all, there is not a single piece of positive evidence to show that he did. But beyond this, a strong probability to the contrary can be established. For all the rites and mysteries

which are intended to bring about a purification, whether Orphic, Pythagorean, or something else, are religious in character. They are all supernatural and sacramental: they are intended, that is, through ritual to influence the course of nature by means outside of nature, or to control the will or acts of the gods; and insofar as these rites act upon the souls of the participants, the action is a moral one, that is, the removal of the stain left by wrong doing, the purification of the soul from sin. Thus, the mysteries depend for their effect not upon an emotional response on the part of the initiates, but upon the correct fulfilment of ritual observances and the consequent compulsion exercised upon nature or the gods. In short, their means are supernatural and formal, not natural and esthetic. And their purpose is moral, not sensible, for they aim at purifying the soul from the stain of sin or at accumulating merit for the soul in its future state, rather than at an immediate emotional relief and its sensible pleasure. Therefore, it is unlikely that such rites and mysteries can have suggested to Aristotle his doctrine of catharsis in tragedy, a doctrine which describes just that emotional relief and sensation of pleasure produced by perceptible imitation in those who witness the drama.

The consideration of the use of *κάθαρσις* being now finished, that of *μίμησις* remains.

There is one occurrence¹ of *μιμεῖσθαι* in the Homeric

1. H. Ap. 163.

Hymns, where it means to imitate. The noun is found neither in Homer nor in the Hymns nor in Hesiod. The verb, again, but not the noun, is found in two of the lyric poets,¹ again meaning to imitate. Aeschylus, too, has one example of the verb,² none of the noun. The noun μίμησις is found first in Herodotus, where it occurs once.³ Here it is used as imitation, and in connection with a statue. The germ of the idea that works of art are μίμησις may be detected here. The verb occurs frequently.⁴ The sense always is imitating, or being made to imitate. It is worth noting that the idea of imitation is regularly connected with the representation of objects in art. Aristophanes uses μίμησις twice.⁵ The meaning in both examples is imitation, but without reference to literature or art. Thucydides likewise uses μίμησις twice,⁶ but without reference to any concept of creative artistic activity. Lysias, although he uses the verb μιμῆσθαι four times, has no example of the noun. In the Hippocratic Corpus, the work περὶ διαίτης has several

1. Thgn. 367-370, Pi. P. XII 21.

2. Ch. 564.

3. III 37.2.

4. II 78, 86.2, 132.1, 169.5; also I 176.3, II 104.4, III 32.4, IV 166.1, 170, V 67.1, 69.1, IX 34.1.

5. Th. 156, Ra. 109.

6. I 95.3, VII 63.3.

instances of μιμεῖσθαι¹ and one of μίμησις.² Two of these³ are important, for they show that sculpture is regarded as a μίμησις and that those who imitate do not know what they are doing. These are significant ideas, to which further reference will be made later. Among the pre-Socratics, only Democritus uses μίμησις, which he has once,⁴ and μιμεῖσθαι, which he has twice.⁵ The meanings are respectively imitation and to imitate, but nowhere is the view of art as μίμησις introduced.

Μίμησις is not found in Isocrates and, accordingly, we come next to Plato. In the Sophist he shows that μίμησις ^{it} makes things, to be sure, but/makes images and not real objects.⁶ Those who imitate may be subdivided into those who imitate with understanding of what they are doing and those who do not.⁷ Now throughout this elaborate classification and subdivision of imitation there is nothing that seriously concerns poetry,

1. I 11 (VI 486 L), I 12 (VI 488 L), I 16 (VI 490 L), I 17 (VI 492 L), I 18 (VI 492 L). References in περὶ διαίτης are to E. Littré, Oeuvres Complètes d' Hippocrate, 10 vols., Paris, 1839-61.
2. I 21 (VI 494 L).
3. I 21 and I 11.
4. 68B 154 (II 173.15).
5. 68B 39 (II 155.5), 68B 79 (II 160.5).
6. 265b.
7. 267a.

but that is not surprising, since Plato in this dialogue is not dealing with literature, but is trying by dialectic to ensnare the Sophist. In the Critias¹ the fact is put forward that the imitator must produce a precise copy of a model, at least in imitating men and men's actions.

Next we shall examine the treatment of μίμησις in the third book of the Republic, where Plato is certainly concerned with poetry and with tragedy in particular. Here μίμησις is first of all contrasted with διήγησις.² Then it appears to be imitation pure and simple, to the point of mimicry. The contrast, too, between μίμησις and διήγησις is further pointed.³ The kinds of poetry are then classified with reference to μίμησις and διήγησις.⁴ The habit of imitation will gradually enter into the character, if it be indulged, until it will at length predominate, both in body and voice and in thought.⁵ Finally, the attitude of the good and well balanced man toward imitation is described.⁶ It is now clear that μίμησις in this section of the Republic means imitation,

1. 107b-c.

2. 392d.

3. 393c.

4. 394b.

5. 395d.

6. 396c-e. One other passage, 397b, has already been cited under λέξις and adds no further information on the present matter.

almost in the sense of mimicry. It refers to what Aristotle would call the manner of the imitation, but what Plato terms the *λῆξις*. *Μίμησις* here is dramatic as opposed to epic and other narrative poetry. This is quite different from its meaning in Aristotle.

But let us consider the treatment of *μίμησις* in the tenth book of the Republic. Here it is stated that *μίμησις* imitates not reality but appearances.¹ Epic poetry is now seen classed with tragedy as mimetic, a marked change from its classification as *διήγησις* in the third book. And all *μίμησις* is declared to be mere play and not to be taken seriously.² Imitation takes for its object the worst part of man's soul and shuns the better.³ Comic imitation has the same sort of effect as tragic.⁴ Poetic *μίμησις* arouses the emotions which ought rather to be suppressed and held under control, and thus makes us worse, not better men.⁵

It is now clear that the meaning which Plato gives to *μίμησις* in the tenth book of the Republic is quite different from that of the third. The earlier meaning is narrow; the newer is wide, for it has embraced epic poetry and, indeed,

1. 598b.

2. 602b.

3. 604e.

4. 606c.

5. 606d.

all poetry except hymns and encomia of virtuous men. Thus the newer meaning is similar in one respect to Aristotle's: both comprise almost the same groups of poetry. But the resemblance ends here. For the effects of *μίμησις* are quite different in the two philosophers. Plato's widening of the term in the tenth book enables him to include epic poetry with dramatic in the condemnation of the third book, while his theory of Ideas provides him with the means of intensifying the condemnation in the tenth book through the discovery that imitation is at the third remove from reality. Aristotle, who does not share the Platonic theory of Ideas, can use the concept of poetry as *μίμησις* without thereby degrading poetry. Even if Plato had, for instance, thought of the *καταρσις* of pity and fear, his belief in the theory of Ideas and his opinion of the nature of emotions would have prevented him from using it. A final difference between the views of the two men about *μίμησις* is this, that for Aristotle *μίμησις* leaves the poet much freedom and *μίμησις*, since it can express universals, can be truer than any particular fact, whereas for Plato *μίμησις* compels the imitator to adhere rigidly to the reproduction of a particular model.

It is now necessary to turn to the Laws in order to find out what Plato's concept of *μίμησις* is in that work. Imitation, we find, is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure.¹ This is directly the opposite of what Aristotle

1. 667e.

believes, for he regards pleasure as the legitimate product of imitation; and this refusal of Plato's to judge imitation by the pleasure it gives also condemns imitation from the very beginning. Again, Plato emphasizes the strict correctness and rigid accuracy expected of μίμησις.¹ Imitation is said to account for the origin of dancing.² Finally, the whole ideal state is said to be a μίμησις of the fairest and best life, in reality the truest tragedy of all.³ In the Laws, then, imitation has not altered its meaning. Plato continues to the condemnation and rejection of poetry. One final passage⁴ may be noted, in which the poet and the imitator are in the sixth place.

A few other instances of μίμησις in Plato remain,⁵ but they bear no relation to poetry or to literature and shed no light on the meaning of the word.

In retrospect it is reasonable to state that the habit of looking upon works of art as μιμήσεις at least as old as Herodotus and the writer of περὶ διαίτης. In including poetry among the works of art classed as μιμήσεις Plato, al-

1. 668b.

2. 816a.

3. 817b.

4. Phdr. 248e.

5. Cra. 423c-d, 427b, Grp. 511a, Ti. 80b, Lg. 705c, 706b.

though he follows a natural progression in the use of language, may have been the leader or originator. Aristotle in his turn follows Herodotus and Plato in using *μῦθος* as a term for painting, sculpture, most music, and poetry, as well as for certain works in prose. But Plato and Aristotle, while including almost the same arts under a common term, regard the term as connoting altogether different things and regard the arts it comprises in a very different light. The term Aristotle found ready made and has taken for his own use, but in using it he has developed an entirely new significance for it and placed poetry in a wholly new position, and the view of poetry which *μῦθος* connotes in the Poetics is altogether Aristotle's own.

CONCLUSION

It is now possible to state the conclusions of this study.

In the introduction two questions were raised concerning the technical vocabulary of the Poetics: Does Aristotle employ for his technical terms words already used in the Greek language or does he devise new words to express his ideas? If the former, does he use these words in a sense already familiar or does he endow them with a new meaning?

Of the fifteen terms studied, fourteen were certainly used by writers before Aristotle. They are μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, ὄψις, δέσις, λύσις, ἀναγνώρισις, πάθος, ἔλεος, φόβος, κάθαρσις and μίμησις. The fifteenth, περιπέτεια, alone of all the terms studied, is not found before Aristotle and may perhaps have been coined by him, although the evidence is purely negative. The weight of the findings concerning the other terms, moreover, makes it unlikely that he coined the word outright. And if he did, it is clear that such a procedure is the exception rather than his practice. It is, therefore, now possible to answer the first of the questions raised in the introduction. The answer is that he does not devise new words, but employs words already in existence.

Given this answer to the first question, the second now asks whether Aristotle uses these words in a sense known before him or whether he endows them with a new meaning. Be-

fore I answer this question it will be well to recall briefly what has been discovered concerning each word studied.

Muthos is found frequently in Greek literature before Aristotle, having been employed by Homer and many other authors. Aristotle's immediate predecessors, Isocrates and Plato, as well as others, give it the sense of story or fable. Often the context indicates that the story is false, or, at least, that belief in its truth is reserved. In particular, *muthos* is used of a certain type of story--the tales connected with the legendary heroic families of Hellas, just such tales, indeed, as the tragedians took for their plots. From the use of *muthos* to denote these stories to the meaning of the plot of a play is an easy and natural step and Aristotle took it. The point of moment here, however, is that it was Aristotle who took the step. No Greek writer before him uses *muthos* in connection with the drama to mean the plot of a play. Accordingly, in the case of *muthos* we find Aristotle taking a word already in use in Greek and endowing it with a meaning which is new with him and therefore his own.

Thos, too, is widely used before Aristotle, but nowhere is it applied to persons in a drama and nowhere does it denote the moral purpose, the *apoteleia* of a person. Aristotle is original, therefore, in his adaptation of this word to the needs of literary criticism and his employment of it as a technical term in his analysis of tragedy.

Many writers before Aristotle use διάνοια; sometimes it approaches the meaning which it has in the Poetics, but it is never actually equivalent to the sense in which it is there employed. The usage of Isocrates in particular is not far from Aristotle's. But only the latter employs the word to mean the thoughts and ideas of the agents in a drama; and no one has foreshadowed the most characteristic turn of the Aristotelian meaning, the process of making the condition of the mind manifest through speech and action. Διάνοια, therefore, as used in the Poetics, is original with Aristotle.

Only Isocrates and Plato use λέξις before Aristotle, but their usage in general foreshadows his, for it is clear that what chiefly interests Aristotle is not metrics or anything else peculiar to poetry, but style and the choice of appropriate words. Aristotle, therefore, accepted λέξις from his predecessors and inserted it into the Poetics without any appreciable additions of his own.

The Aristotelian sense of μελοποιία differs in no respect from Plato's. Moreover, Aristotle expressly states that the meaning of the term is already too well known to require him to define it. In the case of ὄψις, too, Aristotle uses the term in the Poetics in the special sense of a theatrical production or spectacle, a sense which had already been developed by Plato in the Laws.

Δέσις, λύσις, and ἀναγνώρισις all appear in Greek

literature before Aristotle, but none of them has any connection with the drama or with literary criticism. It is therefore clear that their use as technical terms in the Poetics is altogether new.

Περικέτεια, on the other hand, does not occur before Aristotle. Cognate words are so used by earlier writers as to suggest its meaning in a general sense, but nowhere are they applied to the drama. Aristotle, therefore, is original in his use of περικέτεια.

Although no earlier writer uses πάθος in the technical sense in which it appears in the Poetics, it already possessed a well-established meaning akin to its sense in that treatise, and the step by which Aristotle transformed it from a word meaning suffering or disaster into a term of literary criticism denoting the representation in a tragedy of painful or destructive actions is easy. Nevertheless, Aristotle is the first to apply the word to tragedy as a critical term.

"Ελεος and φόβος were familiar words in Greek literature before Aristotle wrote the Poetics and in using them in his discussion of tragedy he leaves their meaning unchanged.

Aristotle uses κἄθαρσις as a term of literary criticism in a sense quite new, though developed from the medical meaning; the Aristotelian theory of a κἄθαρσις of pity and fear and such emotions as a result of the working of tragedy, is anticipated by none of his predecessors.

In the case of *μίμησις*, also, Aristotle adapts to his needs a word already in use. In employing *μίμησις* to mean all painting and sculpture and most music and poetry, as well as certain classes of prose works, Aristotle follows the lead of Plato and others. In the significance which he attaches to *μίμησις*, however, he stands alone. For Plato regards imitation as degrading and deceptive. It is three degrees removed from reality and therefore from the truth; it is by nature unreliable and full of error, nor would anyone imitate who could do something better. But Aristotle believes that it is capable of truth more elevated than that of facts and is therefore more philosophical than history, and that it offers wide scope to the knowledge, reason, and creative impulses of the imitator. Above all, successful *μίμησις* demands imagination. Aristotle has, therefore, endowed the term with a significance which it had not possessed in any earlier writer.

In this review I have stated that many of the terms discussed were used by Aristotle in the Poetics with a meaning which they had not had before him. This assertion may at first appear unjustified. For, one may ask, if the idea itself is older than Aristotle, how can it be assumed that the use of a particular term to express this idea originates with him? And such ideas as those expressed by *μῦθος*, *δέξις*, *ἀνταγώνισις*, and the like, must be as old as tragedy itself. The answer to this is that in a sense these ideas are not as old as tragedy

itself. The things for which these ideas stand, of course, are obviously coexistent with tragedy. There actually were plots and complications, as soon as there were tragedies. But the ideas of these things were not so early separated from the individual plays and identified as concepts. Aeschylus and Sophocles wrote tragedies and used plots and recognitions, but there is no evidence that they broke their tragedies down into their component elements or thought of a play as being built up of distinct parts like $\mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$, $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$, $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$, and the rest. In short, the practice preceded the theory. There is nothing surprising in this. It was a long time after Homer had written the Iliad before there was a theory of the epic. More recently, authors had been writing novels for some time before a theory of the novel appeared. In philosophy itself, Thales and Heraclitus and others had been thinking and producing philosophy long before a formal theory of how to go about thinking correctly was developed. So too, then, tragedy was older than Aristotle, and with it the elements which he pointed out in his analysis of it. But the analysis itself was necessarily later. Neither do I wish to imply that Aristotle was the first man who attempted to analyse tragedy. I am simply trying to show that he was the first to make this particular analysis which we find in the Poetics. When I say, therefore, that $\mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ and $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$, $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\omega\pi\iota\varsigma$ are used in the Poetics in a new sense, I mean that they are there for the first

time used to express ideas which make up the analysis of tragedy therein presented. The words are old, the context is new.

To resume, then, of the fifteen terms studied, five, λέξις, μελοποιία, ὄψις, ἔλεος, and φόβος, are clearly employed in a sense already known. To their actual meaning he adds nothing. The remaining ten terms, μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια, δέσις, λύσις, ἀναγνώρισις, πάθος, κάθαρσις, and μίμησις, have, in the Poetics, meanings which they have not had before, but which Aristotle has given to them for the purposes of literary criticism.

These fifteen terms fall naturally into two groups. The first contains the terms concerned with the analysis of the structure of tragedy; these words, which deal with the mechanics of building a play, are μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια, λέξις, μελοποιία, ὄψις, δέσις, λύσις, ἀναγνώρισις, περιπέτεια, and πάθος. The second group comprises the terms which embody Aristotle's conception of the nature and function of tragedy as a whole: ἔλεος, φόβος, κάθαρσις, and μίμησις.

Let us first consider the former group. Eight words of this group are used in a new sense in the Poetics; the other three have undergone no change. These three, however, λέξις, μελοποιία, and ὄψις, designate elements which are not peculiar to the drama, or even to metrical composition at large, but which belong also to prose, to the dance, and to religious rites. They are elements which poetry does not possess ex-

clusively, but shares with other τέχνηαι. The remaining eight terms, on the contrary, belong to poetry alone and most of them are confined to dramatic and epic poetry. It is upon these terms that the burden of Aristotle's analysis of tragedy rests, and these terms are original, in their technical sense, with him. The reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that Aristotle's analysis of the structure of tragedy in the Poetics is altogether his own, nor has he borrowed it from any other writer.

Two words of the latter group, ἔλεος and φόβος, have suffered no change of meaning in the Poetics. But the important point in which Aristotle differs from his predecessors is in the rôle played by ἔλεος and φόβος in the function of tragedy. Although Gorgias, as has been noted, wrote that poetry aroused pity and fear in its audience and Aristophanes spoke of the intention of the tragic poet to excite pity and fear among those who watched his plays, both were simply stating facts observed; neither attempted to explain why the result of tragedy was or should be what it was. While, therefore, the germs of the idea that the excitation of pity and fear is the end of tragedy may be detected in these two earlier writers, it remained for Aristotle to develop a clear doctrine of the proper relationship between pity and fear and tragedy. In other words, the essential step in the development of a theory of tragedy, although perhaps indicated by Gorgias and Aristophanes, was actually taken by Aristotle.

In his theory of the rôle of pity and fear in tragedy, Aristotle definitely opposed the view of Plato. It has been observed, to be sure, that Aristotle follows Plato in his definition of φόβος and in the meaning which he everywhere assigns to ἔλεος and φόβος. But here the resemblance ceases. Plato, though recognizing that tragedy does in fact excite pity and fear, regards this as a bad thing and it is one of his strongest reasons for condemning tragedy. Aristotle, on the other hand, holds it the purpose of tragedy to accomplish an expurgation of pity and fear, an end which can only be achieved by first arousing these emotions in those to be purged. The part played by pity and fear, therefore, in the Aristotelian conception of tragedy is of vital importance. Without assigning such a part to pity and fear Aristotle cannot complete his theory of tragedy. To him these emotions are an essential end of tragedy; to Plato they are an undesirable result and an evil to those who experience them. For whatever the latter may believe the end of tragedy to be, he certainly does not believe that it is the production of pity and fear. He may agree that a catharsis of pity and fear is desirable if it can be had, but he does not admit that it can be brought about by arousing these emotions. It is evident, therefore, that the rôle of pity and fear in the Poetics is altogether different from any literary doctrine of Plato's; in short, it is original with Aristotle.

When we consider Aristotle's criticism as a whole, it is at once evident that he derived certain of the ideas in-

cluded in it from others. The fact that tragedy aroused pity and fear is found in Gorgias, Aristophanes, and Plato. The idea of κάθαρσις as a cleansing is seen in Hippocrates. The definition of fear is taken straight from Plato. The notion that poetry can represent things as other than they actually are is suggested by Gorgias. The view of poetry, painting, sculpture, and certain kinds of music as μίμησις is part of the general current of Greek thought and can be traced at least as far back as Herodotus.¹ And the plays themselves furnished matter for the analysis of their parts. But neither these ideas separately nor their simple combination can produce the criticism of tragedy found in the Poetics. All these ideas are included in that criticism, but the whole is far more than just the sum of these parts. There had, moreover, been critical theories of the drama before Aristotle, notably the Platonic criticism in the Republic. It is more than likely that the inspiration for many of Aristotle's doctrines came from his opposition to this Platonic criticism and the necessity of working out an adequate answer to it. But basically the views of the two philosophers are quite different.

The most important element in the Aristotelian critical theory is μίμησις and the source of the originality of the theory is the change which he made in the meaning of μίμησις. This establishes the whole nature and the dignity of art—that

1. Cf. T. B. L. Webster, "Greek Theories of Art and Literature down to 400 B. C.," Classical Quarterly, v. 33, 1939, p. 166.

is, of creative poetry, of painting, sculpture, and music. The place of μίμησις is fundamental in the Poetics. Upon it is based the classification of the individual arts and of the kinds of poetry, according to the objects of the μίμησις, the means, and the manner; and the same principle is followed in the analysis of the six elements of tragedy. The other major critical terms assume their significance from their relation to μίμησις: κάθαρσις defines the τέλος of the particular type of μίμησις which is tragedy; ἔλεος and φόβος are in turn at once the objects of κάθαρσις and the means of its consummation; μῦθος, ἦθος, and διάνοια are the objects of the tragic μίμησις, λέξις and μελοποιία its means, and ὄψις its manner. Μίμησις is the unifying member of the Aristotelian critical system.

It is therefore clear that, taken as a whole, the Aristotelian theory of dramatic criticism in the Poetics originated with Aristotle and is substantially independent of any earlier theory.

As recently as 1927, Rostagni¹ maintained that Aristotle never viewed poetry as detached from morals, and that his theory in the Poetics results from this essentially moral point of view. Now this moral preconception certainly characterizes Plato's view of the drama, as well as of other arts, and is at the bottom of his condemnation of it. But it seems to me that

1. La Poetica di Aristotele, Turin, 1927.

with regard to Aristotle Rostagni's position is untenable. For Aristotle nowhere states that tragedy will make men better. True, in contradistinction to Plato, he maintains that it will effect a *καθάρσις* of the pity and fear which both philosophers agreed it excited. But, while this is, to be sure, a reply to Plato's charge that pity and fear, being aggravated, will make men worse, it is really intended to have no immediate moral significance. The *καθάρσις* of pity and fear is introduced not because it will make men better, but because it is in itself the end of tragedy. And if it be asked what effect this *καθάρσις* will have upon those who experience it, Aristotle's answer is that, relieved and lightened, they will experience pleasure. The *καθάρσις* of pity and fear, in short, results in the tragic pleasure. There is not a word in the Poetics of moral improvement or of instruction. As a matter of fact, Aristotle specifically denies that didactic verse is poetry.

The question may be raised why Aristotle held that the tragic pleasure resulted from the *καθάρσις* of *ἔλεος* and *φόβος*. The finding of the first chapter of this study concerning the Aristotelian significance of *τέχνη* provides the key to the solution of this question. For a *τέχνη* is a *ἐξ ἑστῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιετική* and is the result of scientific observation and inductive reasoning. According to this concept of *τέχνη*, then, the study of tragedy in the Poetics, since this work sets forth the *τέχνη* of tragedy, is an exposition of facts and principles derived from the observation of actual tragedies and their effects. It thus becomes evident that Aristotle, in watching

the working of tragedy upon his contemporaries, believed that he had actually observed them experiencing pleasure as a result of the *πάθος* of pity and fear which he saw them undergo, and, since he had observed this, he concluded that the tragic pleasure is the result of the *πάθος* of pity and fear.

One final reflexion will terminate this study. In the first chapter I suggested that art is inappropriate as a translation of *τέχνη*, which is more accurately rendered as applied science or creative science. There is another Aristotelian term, however, which the English word art, in its sense of creative endeavor for the sake of pleasure, would reproduce very well. That term is *μίμησις*.

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