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be accepted as fulfilling this part of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DUALISM IN MATTHEW ARNOLD

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

1947

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"There is a knowledge of natural things. But wisdom is an excellent gift of God."

-- Book of Job
(At the head of Chapter 28)

"The only creature on earth that has religion is man; the only creature on earth that has a moral will is man; the only creature that has named the name of God is man. Is not this the key to the riddle of the universe?"

-- Peter Bayne

"I wish to decide nothing as of my own authority; the great art of criticism is to get oneself out of the way and to let humanity decide."

-- Matthew Arnold

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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps more than any other thinker in modern times Matthew Arnold cherished the ideal of lucidity and clear-mindedness, the conception of seeing the "object as in itself it really is." At least none championed that conception more earnestly, so that his passionate preference for it often creates the impression of an established fact. His name is indeed a symbol for perspicuity and limpid thought.

This study attempts to prove that such an impression of his clarity and completeness of vision, however firmly rooted in the popular mind -- and in the minds of certain authorities [1] -- is not well-founded: that actually Arnold failed to achieve intellectual and spiritual unity. A vein of consistency in Arnold undoubtedly exists, but there is a real question whether there is not a counter-vein of inconsistency that reveals in him a serious lack of integration and insight.

Regarding this irresolution and self-contradiction, this fundamental intellectual and spiritual indecisiveness despite an exterior serenity, [2] Stuart Pratt Sherman maintains that

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1. One of these authorities is Lionel Trilling who maintains that Arnold <u>was</u> a unified thinker, that his "thought... has a logic and architecture..." Lionel Trilling, <u>Matthew Arnold</u>, New York, 1939, pp. ix-x.
2. Concerning Arnold's reputed poise, T. S. Eliot observes -- but somewhat too harshly -- that it lacks depth: "Perhaps, looking inward and finding how little he had to support him, looking outward on the state of society

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though Arnold had a divided personality, his ideas and themes are unified: "Various as are his themes, his work as a whole is a remarkably harmonious and symmetrical expression of general ideas."[3] The division in his personality, Sherman holds, is doubtless temperamental (as a result of historical conflicts which he could not resolve):

> "The conflict of aristocratic with democratic impulses, of traditional belief and dogma with scientific knowledge, of romantic inclination with classical discipline and conviction, of emotion with intelligence, he not only perceived in the world around him but also felt very sharply within himself. He felt these conflicts and he expressed them poetically. He betrays thus a somewhat unhappily divided personality, yet a personality very resolutely divided."[4]

Thus Arnold, despite certain defenders who, as we shall see, are not always consistent themselves, does not sustain the impression of unity and synthesis. Howard Foster Lowry confirms this view: "He reads the Greeks and gains a classical balance that is almost Stoicism, ...but the romantic in him cannot wholly die. He opens his Goethe, but he

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and its tendencies, he was somewhat disturbed. He had no real serenity, only an impeccable demeanour." T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, Cambridge, Mass., 1933, p. 112.

3. Stuart Pratt Sherman, Matthew Arnold: How to Know Him, Indianapolis, 1917, p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 53. When Arnold is guilty of an inconsistency, Sherman euphemistically employs the term "temporarily forgotten." "The apologist," says Sherman, "has temporarily forgotten his preface of 1853." (Ibid., p. 117.) Sherman is referring to Arnold's own apology for the defects of "Balder Dead" and to the fact that Arnold in the poem did not follow the advice of his 1853 Preface and give the poem significant subject-matter. The fault, I would maintain, is the result of Arnold's failure to achieve a basic unity of outlook rather than the result of a mere lapse of memory.

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forgets to close his Byron."[5] His "heart and his head did not belong to the same individual,"[6] says Irving Babbitt. Saintsbury characterizes Arnold as "imperfectly Romantic, or even anti-Romantic..."[7]

His inconsistency is apparent in the realm of definition, in which he is notably weak. "Arnold had little gift for consistency of definition," says T. S. Eliot. "Nor had he the power of connected reasoning at any length; his flights were either short flights or circular flights. Nothing in his prose work, therefore, will stand very close analysis, and we may well feel that the positive content of many words is very small."[8] With this view a critic, writing

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5. The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough (Howard Foster Lowry, editor), London, 1932, Introduction, p. 32.) In other words, Arnold failed to follow Carlyle's advice: "Close thy Byron; open thy Goethe." Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, (Complete Works, 1901, 20 vols.), p. 145.
   Regarding the intransigence of the "romantic" and "classic" in Arnold, Iris Esther Sells says: "Matthew Arnold was, like Senancour, in youth at heart a romantic, but one of classical training and tradition; and this unfused mixture was the cause of his continual agitation, the rational side of him bringing to birth aspirations to poise and spiritual self-control which his instinctive romantic longings would not allow him to accept without an aching sense of loss." Iris Esther Sells, Matthew Arnold and France, New York, 1935, p. 64.
6. Irving Babbitt, "Matthew Arnold," Nation (August 2, 1917), vol. 105, p. 117.
7. George Saintsbury, History of English Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe, New York, 1906, vol. 3, p. 535. Benn refers to Arnold's inconsistency as "eccentricity" characteristic of "Anglo-Saxon genius..." Alfred W. Benn, The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1906, vol. 2, p. 303.
8. T. S. Eliot, "Arnold and Pater," Bookman (September, 1930), vol. 72, p. 1. "Arnold," Eliot adds, "produced a kind of illusion of precision and clarity." (Ibid., p. 2.) Robertson holds that Arnold's inconsistency is

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many years before Eliot, agrees. Mr. Arnold

> "treats...the most profound and difficult problems of individual and social life with airy dogmatism that ignores their depth and difficulty. And though dogmatic, Mr. Arnold is yet vague; because when he employs indefinite terms he does not attempt to limit their indefiniteness, but rather avails himself of it."[9]

Arnold is celebrated for his effort to see life steadily and whole, but there is a question regarding the success of that effort and of the depth of his thinking and

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due to his intuitive manner of arriving at the truth. "...when we name consistency," he says,"we name the quality which will always be lacking to the men of mere intuition, who begin and end with inward augury." John Mackinnon Robertson, "Arnold," (Modern Humanists), London, 1895, p. 160.

9. Henry Sidgwick, "The Prophet of Culture," Macmillan's Magazine (August, 1867), vol. 16, p. 272. An anonymous contemporary of Sidgwick upholds the view of Arnold's indefiniteness: "We must now hand to our readers a book Essays in Criticism which they will find lively and suggestive, -- a happy stimulant to thought upon various subjects, though seldom a guide to definite conclusions." Review The Athenaeum (May 6, 1865), No. 1958, p. 616.) Edwin Burgum believes that this indefiniteness is a failure both of logic and intention: "When...Arnold's scattered comparisons, which look so sharp and firm in their isolation, are brought together, they can hardly be said to have achieved his intention." Edwin Berry Burgum, "The Humanism of Matthew Arnold," The Symposium (January, 1931), vol. 2, p. 98.

10. According to Chauncey B. Tinker Arnold's desire was early to construct a "vision of the unity of life." (Chauncey B. Tinker, "Arnold's Poetic Plans," Yale Review (June, 1933), vol. 22, p. 783.) He was critical of the poets and writers of the age for not seeing life steadily and whole. Man "has one aim, one business, one desire -- to know and possess his own soul, and at last to know its destiny." (Ibid., p. 793.) In fairness to Arnold, one must indicate that he was no less critical of others than he was of himself -- at least in regard to his poetry. In a letter to his sister, Mrs. Forster, he says: "Fret not yourself to make my poems square in all their parts, but like what you can my darling. The true reason why parts suit you while

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wisdom. Arnold "was not, indeed, a profound thinker. He did not illuminate, like Wordsworth, with a single flash, the abysses of man's nature, and the inmost recesses of the human soul. He was not, as Plato was, a spectator of all time and existence."[11]

Regarding the soundness and wholeness of his vision, the pinnacles as well as the shallows of his thought and philosophy, Louis Cazamian gives a balanced view:

> "The wisdom which Arnold...invokes is elevating and beautiful. He has lived up to it to the utmost of his ability and has given attractive examples of his faith. Still he has not risen at all points to the heights of his own ideal. Prejudices, narrowness of outlook, passive ways of thinking, have limited or warped his mental perspective in certain directions. His social and moral philosophy is at once bold and timorous. He was unconscious of the fact that in many respects he could not and did not want to see clearly."[12]

This study of course does not assume that these animadversions against Arnold prove the case of his inconsistency. It will attempt, however, to prove that much of

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others do not is that my poems are fragments -- i. e. that I am fragments, while you are a whole; the whole effort of my poems is quite vague & indeterminate -- this is their weakness; a person therefore who endeavored to make them accord would only lose his labour; and a person who has any inward completeness can at best only like parts of them...I shall do better some day I hope -- meanwhile change nothing, resign nothing that you have in deference to me or my oracles; do not plague yourself to find a consistent meaning for these last, which in fact they do not possess through my weakness." (Unpublished Letters of Matthew Arnold (Arnold Whitridge, editor), New Haven, 1923, p. 18.) This weakness he never overcame, as Tinker, with kind forbearance, shows.

11. Herbert W. Paul, Matthew Arnold, New York, 1902, p.1.
12. Emile Legouis and Louis Cazamian, History of English Literature, New York, p. 1148.

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the criticism regarding Arnold's disunity is justified. Therefore it will examine a significant segment of his thought, with the object of showing that it lacks synthesis. Accordingly, as a basis of understanding Arnold's own views, it begins with a definition of the doctrine of the "two selves" -- or dualism.[13]

13. "...no Christian," says a contemporary of Arnold, "can complain that Mr. Arnold has brought out with so much emphasis the doctrine of the two lives, of the higher self and the lower self, of the annulment of the fleshy nature required for the well-being of the true man." (J. L. Davis, "Mr. Arnold's New Religion," The Contemporary Review, (May, 1873), vol. 21, p. 862.) Stuart Pratt Sherman confirms this view: "Throughout his work, one will find the persistent presence of the doctrine of the two selves in man." (Sherman, op. cit., p. 291.) Because, it follows, of the prevalence of dualism in Arnold's work, it furnishes an excellent basis to test his consistency and unity.

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II

DEFINITION OF DUALISM

According to the Encyclopedia Brittanica, dualism is[1] "a philosophical term applied to all theories which attempt to explain facts by reference to two existent principles..."[2] The Oxford Dictionary defines it as "a theory or system which recognizes two independent principles.... The doctrine that mind and matter exist as distinct entities.... The doctrine that there are two independent principles, one good and the other evil."

An important aspect of the definition of dualism is the mutual exclusiveness of the two principles, though when these principles manifest themselves in the human personality it is not possible to discern a rigid demarcation between them. On the one hand, the "lower principle" manifests itself as an "inner check" upon our impulses and our desires; but these two forces are opposites. "The inner check," says Paul Elmer More, "is not the mere blocking of one impulse by another which is a quality of the confusion of the flux itself,[3] but a restraint upon the flux exercised by a

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1. "The term dualism appears to have been first used by Thomas Hyde in his De Religione Veterum Persarum (1700)." James Mark Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, New York, 1901, p. 298.
2. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Eleventh Edition, vol. VIII, p. 614.
3. "The sum of desires and impressions we call the great self-moving, incessant flux." (Paul Elmer More, "Definitions of Dualism," (The Drift of Romanticism, Shelburne Essays, 8th Series) Boston, 1913, p. 247.) "There is

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a force contrary to it."[4]

The fact of dualism is universal and our awareness of it is immediate and intimate.[5] We do not have to turn to the

> "great creations of imagination and reason to observe the law of dualism...all of us, looking upon the world at large and upon human activities, have wavered between the conception of endless ungoverned emotion as the only reality and the thought of some invisible power sitting motionless at the centre; and then, turning within ourselves, have perceived that this antinomy is caused by, or corresponds to a like division there ...And piercing still further into consciousness, we resolve that contrast into a warfare between an impetuous personal self-will and that <u>will to refrain</u> which is the submission to a deeper self."[6]

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also," says More, "that within man which displays itself intermittently as an inhibition upon this or that impulse, preventing its prolongation in activity, and making a pause or eddy, so to speak in the stream. This negation of the flux we call the inner check." <u>Loc. cit.</u>

4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 248.
5. "The spiritual positivist will start from a fact of immediate perception -- from the fact namely in the breast of the individual of a principle of vital control (frein vital)..."Irving Babbitt, <u>Rousseau and Romanticism</u>, Boston, 1919, p. 153.
6. Paul Elmer More, "The Forest Philosophy of India" (<u>Studies of Religious Dualism</u>, <u>Shelburne Essays</u>, 6th Series), New York, 1909, p. 25. Although the best evidence that dualism is the fundamental fact of existence is to be found in personal experience, literature and religion offer magnificent illustrations. One of the best, according to Paul Elmer More, is the story of Jesus at Gethsemane: "The story of Gethsemane clothes it [dualism] in its most beautiful and mosttragic garb. It matters little whether we adopt the mythological explanation and say that Jesus actually bore through his divine humiliations the sins of the world or whether, more rationalistically, we say that he was weighed down with sympathy for the universal curse of evil; those prayers beneath the olive trees in the silence and loneliness of night, that agony and bloody sweat, are witnesses to the consciousness in one great soul of the division in man and of the need to attain atonement by sacrificing one half of our nature." Paul Elmer More, "Definitions of Dualism," p. 19.

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In general we may say that the lower self belongs to "nature," and that the "higher self" belongs to God. The lower part is related to the animal kingdom; the higher part to the human or the "ultimately divine."[7] Regarding this difference and demarcation, Robert Shafer says:

> "Man is certainly an animal, linked with the 'animal creation,' and even with the 'vegetable creation,' as the doctrine of evolution teaches us. Thus far man is purely a product of, or a part of, the natural world, and thus far we are all nowadays in agreement with the contention of naturalism. But at the same time, whether it is explicable or not, man is obviously, indubitably, something more and other than an animal, and it is this difference, this otherness, in terms of which he characterizes himself as a human creature, and which to him is the crucially significant fact about himself."[8]

Dualism, then, if it is not to be confused with "monism,"[9] rests upon the assumption that man is everything that the animal is and something else besides and that that additional quality constitutes his essential humanity or "divinity." This statement, however, requires an amendment.

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7. Irving Babbitt refers to the distinguishing quality of man, that is "the will to refrain" as a specifically human quality, but he does not deny the divine relationship of the human and divine: "...what is specifically human in man and ultimately divine is a certain quality of will that is felt in its relation to his ordinary self as a will to refrain." Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, Boston, 1924, p. 6. (Italics mine)
8. Robert Shafer, Christianity and Naturalism, Essays in Criticism, Second Series, New Haven, 1926, p. 290. "There has ever been," says Shafer again, "a war within ourselves; impulses have pulled us in contrary directions, and we have ventured to ascribe a divine origin to some of these, while others we have stigmatised as base, wrong, or winful." Ibid., p. 258.
9. The Oxford Dictionary defines monism as follows: "A metaphysical system based on the assumption of a single

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Reason, the faculty which one would ordinarily associate with the higher self because it is a quality which sets man apart from the animal, the dualist does not include as an element of the higher self. Such exclusion results from the fact that "reason" often acts as an agent of the flux and tends to blur the significant distinction between the higher and lower natures of man. Says Paul Elmer More:

> "We are conscious of our self as both the inner check and the flux, one and the many, the same and different. Reason denies this contradictory dualism, and, starting with an elimination of one element of consciousness, proceeds with the imagination, to build up a theory of life and the world based on the other element of consciousness."[10]

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ultimate principle or kind of being instead of two or more: opposed to Dualism and Pluralism in various applications.
"A general name for those theories which deny the duality (i. e. the existence of two ultimate kinds of substance)...
"The doctrine that there is only one Supreme Being, as opposed to the belief in a God and an Evil Principle as co-ordinate powers." As is evident the words dualism and monism are unbridgeable opposites, as are also the philosophies which they tend to define.

10. More, "Definitions of Dualism," p. 267. Not only is reason an agent of the flux. From a religious point of view it may be considered an agent of the devil, who may be said to have a symbolical kinship to the lower part of dualism. Reason issues in "rationalism" and how rationalism operates to defeat the purposes of God Cardinal Newman clearly states: "Rationalism is a certain abuse of Reason; that is, a use of it for purposes for which it never was intended, and is unfitted. To rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the standard and measure of the doctrines revealed; to stipulate that those doctrines should be such as to carry with them their justification; to reject them, if they come in collision with our existing opinions or habits of thought, or are with difficulty harmonized with our existing stock of knowledge. And thus a rationalistic spirit is the antagonist of Faith; for Faith is, in its very nature, the acceptance of what

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The distinguishing quality of dualism, then, is not reason, an element of the flux, but divinity, which is something other than the flux. Dualism must not deny the essential supernaturalism of the higher self, its divine potentialities, for if it does, whatever else it is, it is not dualism.[11] Dualism is coeternal with the existence of man, and coeternal with the existence of God, for, from a religious point of view there never was a moment in the history of man or nature when man was not conscious of the existence of God. Says Jacques Maritain:

> "We know 'that a state of pure nature,[12] one in which God ex hypothesi had abandoned man to the

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our reason cannot reach, simply and absolutely upon testimony." (John Henry Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, London, 1919, vol. 1, p. 31.) Paul Elmer More further enforces Newman's point of view in regard to reason as the agent of the lower self rather than the higher: "Rationalism is the attempt to erect reason into an independent power within the soul taking the place of the inner check." More, "Definitions of Dualism," p. 270.

11. Leslie Stephen, who, as we shall see, is not a dualist, stresses the relationship between supernaturalism and dualism: "Belief in a supernatural is the belief in a dualistic theory, in an established order liable to spasmodic and inexplicable interferences from without." Leslie Stephen, An Agnostic's Apology, New York, 1903, p. 66.

12. The problem of nature as it affects Arnold's thought will be considered in a later chapter. At present, in fairness, it must be pointed out that the doctrine of dualism is open to critical attack and the conception of a force operating contrary to nature is by many held to be a figment of the imagination. Says Lange: "Nature is a great whole of which man is a part and by which he is a part and by which he is influenced. The beings that we place outside nature have always been creatures of imagination of whose character we can form an idea as little as of their abiding place and modes of action. There does not and cannot exist anything beyond the sphere that includes all creatures.

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> sole resources of the activities of his mind and will, has never existed. From the earliest times God willed to bring to the knowledge of men things far in excess of the requirements of any nature that ever was or ever could be created. He revealed to them the depths of His divine life, the secret of his eternity."[13]

The "depths of the divine life, the secret of His eternity" manifested themselves in man's conscience, the spiritual synonym of the higher self. But the devil is in the heart of the individual too. From these antipodal forces has emerged the doctrine of the two selves -- or dualism.

Man is a psychical being, and his moral existence is only a special aspect of his physical organization." (Frederick Albert Lange, History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance, London, 1892, vol.2, p. 98.) "Man," says Roy Wood Sellars, "is a part of nature, although a self-directive organism adapted more or less adequately to his environment." Roy Wood Sellars, The Next Step in Religion: An Essay Toward the Coming Renaissance, New York, 1918, p. 165.

13. Jacques Maritain, Religion and Culture, London, 1931, p. 8.

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III

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TWO SELVES

I -- HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

-i-

The effort to define the term dualism and the doctrine of the two selves suggests the next step: relating the history of the conception as it is expressed by significant thinkers and elucidating and interpreting further its meanings. Such a prospectus of the possible origins and developments of dualism, as well as an expansion of its meanings in their historical milieu, is essential to an understanding of Arnold's own views. The primary purpose of this section, therefore, is, first, to give the background of Arnold's own doctrine of dualism and, second, to furnish a basis of comparison between it and the traditional conceptions.[1]

-ii-

The conception finds its earliest expression in the Rigveda which, according to R. T. H. Griffith, is probably, "with the exception of the Egyptian monumental records and papyrus rolls, and the recently discovered Assyrian litera-

1. Although this dissertation is not primarily a study in "influences," the manifestations of Arnold's interest in orientalism are nevertheless worth noting. Besides the resemblances between his and oriental views which we will observe in the next section the appendix deals with "external evidence" of that interest. The reader is urged to examine this evidence as a prerequisite to an appreciation of the pages which follow.

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ture...the oldest literary document in existence."[2]

No doubt when man first began to worship he was not

2. The Hymns of the Rigveda (R. T. H. Griffith, translator), Benares, 1920, vol. 2, p. vii. Griffith adds an interesting note: "'The Vedas' are considered to be of divine origin and to have existed from all eternity, the Rishis or sacred poets to whom the hymns are ascribed being merely inspired seers who saw or received them by sight directly from the Supreme Creator." (Ibid.,p. v.) Griffith further indicates that "some of the hymns of the Rig Veda are rather Indo-European than Hindu... representing the condition of the Aryans before their final settlement in India." (Loc. cit.) Lin Yutang states that "the earliest of the Vedas probably went as far back as 1,500 or 1,200 B. C., covering eight centuries of development, during which they grew to their present form." The Wisdom of China and India (Lin Yutang, editor), New York, 1942, p. 11.)

It should be pointed out that there is considerable disagreement whether the Vedantic philosophy is dualistic or monistic. Paul Deussen characterizes the Vedantic philosophy as monistic, since in his opinion the soul and body are indivisible: "Though the gross body and its organs, the eye, ear, hands, feet and so forth, perish with death, the functions of these organs, conceived as self-existent essences, remain bound up with the soul of all time." (Paul Deussen, Vedanta System of Philosophy according to Shankara, Cambridge, Mass., p. 30.)

In explanation of the monistic interpretation of the Vedantic system Deussen says further: "The fundamental idea of the Vedanta system, as most tersely expressed in the words of the Veda, 'That art thou'...and 'I am Brahman' is the identity of Brahman and the soul. This means that Brahman, that is, the eternal principle of all being, the power which creates all worlds, sustains them and again absorbs them, is identical with the Atman, the self, or the soul; namely, with that in us which, when we judge rightly, we acknowledge as our own self, as our inner and true essence. This soul in each one of us is not a part of Brahman nor an emanation from him, but it is, fully and entirely, the eternal indivisible Brahman itself." (Ibid., p. 1.) If the soul and body are identical, then dualism is a fiction and monism is a fact. Paul Elmer More dissents from Deussens's interpretation: "...no word is apt to give a falser impression of the early Indian philosophy than the term 'monism' which is so glibly applied to it." (More, "The Forest Philosophy of India," p. 25.) The error which Deussen makes, it would appear, is the result of the confusion

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fully aware of the higher self as a restraining power though, as Jacques Maritain pointed out, the "Eternal" was not far from him. In his fear half mixed with awe he worshipped and propitiated outer forms with sacrifice and ritual, "but gradually the worship and marvel of the world are subdued to the heart of man."[3] This subdual was "a slow process of absorption...corresponding to the growth of introspection and self-knowledge."[4] At first prayer "was nothing more than the customary plea for worldly honor and success, but with time its meaning or intention changed, and it came to express the hunger of the soul to feel within itself the fulness of the miracle of being."[5]

But before the worshipper could feel the "miracle of being," could satisfy the hunger, he had to transcend the

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in his mind between what exists in the beginning and what is likely to take place in the end. It is true that the follower of the Vedanta philosophy aspires to an ultimate identity or union with God -- or immediate identity, if possible. But the union is a final achievement, in this world or the next, or after a period or several periods of arduous discipline and meditation. Helen White explains this point in regard to mystics. She declares that "All mystics recognize in human nature a dualism analogous to that which we have viewed in the universe at large, a higher and a lower part in man. The lower part they usually attribute to man's body; the higher they attribute to reality." (Helen White, The Mysticism of William Blake, Madison, 1927, p. 64.) That is the basic fact, but there is a second fact to be considered: "...it is from...sustained meditation that the mystic rises into the serene ecstasy of contemplation or union." (Ibid., p. 19.) In other words, the union is ultimate rather than initial. Initially, man is a dual creature.

3. More, "The Forest Philosophy of India," p. 7.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Loc. cit.

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earth, for the earth was a weight fettering the soul and blinding his vision of God, so that dualism has its genesis in the aspiration of man to leave the earth beneath his feet: "Aha! this spacious earth will I deposit here or there..."[6] These words are a simple declaration of hope and determination of the worshipper to overcome the earthly restrictions, and in a sense they are the spiritual antecedent of Jesus' exhortation to the devil to get behind him, for the voice of the worshipper supplicates: "Loose me from sin as from a band that binds me..."[7] "Move far from me what sins I have committed..."[8] Cast all these sins away like loosened fetters..."[9] And with full consciousness of a power higher than himself, though with humility, he implores: "Cast off like cords that hold a calf, my troubles: I am not even mine eyelid's lord without thee."[10]

The desire to smite the earth is more than a poetic conception. It is a religious conception, the thirst to overcome the bondage of the body, the earthly trammels, and to reach God: "In one short moment will I smite the earth in fury here and there..."[11] Obviously, the earth, matter, is a barrier which the spirit must overcome.

The genesis, again, of the conception of dualism is the desire to transcend all that falls within the orbit of one's

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6. The Hymns of the Rigveda, vol. 1, p. 564.
7. Ibid., p. 295.
8. Loc. cit.
9. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 552.
10. Ibid., p. 295.
11. Ibid., vol 2, p. 564.

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comprehension -- even to transcend heaven and earth. The following words are not a boast; they are a statement of appreciation to a higher power which has helped the worshipper to transcend his limitations: "The heavens and the earth themselves have not grown to one half of me..."[12] Devoid of symbolic attire and the heavy dress of emotion, the words would seem to mean that conquest of self, issuing in awe of the creator, has given the worshipper a sense of security and power.

There are two realms of being: one of God, the other the world and all that is in it. The worshipper of the Rigveda expresses this universal, religious conception in the simple phrase: "He of whom all this world is but a copy..."[13] The duality of existence could hardly be better expressed, and what is true between the world and God is also true between God and man, for man is but an image of his creator.

The doctrine of dualism does not mean that life in general is divided into two equal shares. Sometimes -- very infrequently -- a man is all God (in his mystical attainment), when he has achieved a complete mastery over himself and thus in this life or the next effected a union between himself and God. (Other times the union may very well be with the devil.) For the worshipper in the Rigveda man, in his humility, was only a fraction of the celestial

12. Ibid., p. 563.
13. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 273.

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circumference; to complete the circle, a life of strenuous self-direction and discipline lay ahead: the perfection of the divine personality:

> "So mighty is his greatness; yea, greater than this is Purusha.[14]
> "All creatures are one-fourth of him, three-fourths eternal life in heaven.
> "With three-fourths Purusha went up; one fourth of him again was here."[15]

Here we have the difference between the natural and divine in man reduced to a numerical relation; but the moral is nevertheless there: that as Purusha can ascend, so can man.

> "He who fixed fast and firm the earth that staggered, and set at rest the agitated mountains,
> "Who measured out the air's wide middle region and gave heaven support..."[16]
>
> . . . .
>
> "O mighty Varuna now and hereafter, even of old will we speak forth our worship.
> "For in thyself, invincible God, thy statutes ne'er to be moved are fixed on a mountain."[17]

In these words we have evidence that the worshipper in the Rigveda had a mature conception of an almighty God, and in the following verse we have further evidence that he had consciousness of his own spirit and its relation to a power higher than itself: "Ye thoughtful men, inquire within your spirit whereon he stood when he established all

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14. "'Purusha' is the embodied spirit...the personal and life-giving principle in all animated beings..." (Ibid., vol. 2, p. 517.) It may be said to be the "God" in man.
15. Ibid., p. 518.
16. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 273.
17. Ibid., p. 295.

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things."[18]

That consciousness is evidence of dualism.

-iii-

By the time we get to the Upanishads,[19] the conception of God has become the conception of "Self." In the period of the Rigveda, God is first felt as an external, awesome force, but gradually His spirit moves in, or the spirit of man moves out to meet Him, until there is felt a mutual relationship between man and God, always, in Hindu philosophy especially,[20] with the responsibility laid upon man to take the initiative.

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18. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 497. Even as God said to Job: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding." Job,38:4.

19. "The Upanishads are believed to have been written before the time of Buddha, although some...might be as late as 400 B. C. They represented the development of probably three or four centuries..." (Lin Yutang, op. cit., p. 31.) According to Paul Elmer More the central theme of the Upanishads is dualism, which is expressed in them as a commonly felt truth of humanity: "...for the truth of the Upanishads...one might look in the vivid consciousness of a dualism felt in the daily habit of humanity; adding -- with no temerity, no doubt --that the degree of clearness with which this dualism has been perceived marks the depth of any religion or philosophy." More, "The Forest Philosophy of India," pp. 17-18.

20. The Hindu does not rely upon divine grace for coming to his fullest realization of "Self," but relies mostly on his own "will." Paul Elmer More elucidates the similarities and differences between Christian and Hindu in the following statement: "The discipline and preparation for the divine gift were pretty much the same for Brahman and for Christian: to both salvation came in the end as an ineffable transition or transformation in which his natural human faculties took no part. Only there was this profound difference: in the Christian this change was effected by the beneficence of an enthroned Person, who rapt him as it were out of himself; whereas the Hindu, strictly speaking, knew no God, and needed no mythology; emancipation came to him when the illusion of his lower self fell away and left

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In the Upanishads this kinship to God is felt as an inward reality; and even the attempt to explain the beginning and origin of life is in terms of this inwardness:[21]

> "In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person (Purusha). [See footnote 14.] He looking round saw nothing but his Self. He first said, 'This is I'; therefore he became I by name. Therefore even now, if a man is asked, he first says, 'This is I,' and then pronounces the other name which he may have. And because of all this, he burnt down all evils, therefore he was a person."[22]

This passage suggests that the creative principle known as "Self" or "God" identified itself with, or related itself to, the personality of man; but it was in himself that man felt the existence of Self. Therefore the name of Self. The last sentence is significant because it suggests that only because the person had "burned down all evils," had followed the path of righteousness, had he come to know Self

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him to his true Self, alone and that alone." (More, "The Forest Philosophy of India," p. 39.) More of course does not mean that the Hindu did not believe in God or was not conscious of God's power. He evidently means that the Hindu did not believe in God as a detached or anthropomorphic being who descended from his throne to lend a corporeal hand.

21. Regarding the inwardness and subjectivity of the Hindu conception of God, Paul Elmer More says: "It would be very hard to exaggerate the importance of this discovery, made so many years ago in the forest of India, that the eternal and infinite expectation of the soul is not to be sought in submission to an incomprehensible and inhuman force impelling the world, nor yet in obedience to a personal God, but is already within us awaiting revelation, is in fact our very Self of Self." (Ibid., p. 31.) This is a conception, as we shall see, which appealed to Arnold.

22. The Upanishads (Sacred Books of the East, F. Max Muller, translator and editor), Oxford, 1900, vol. 15, p. 85.

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-- or God.[23]

The realization of Self depends upon the "good life," and for the devotee, living an ethical life means the suppression of the senses and the cultivation of the spirit. Such a life of spiritual devotion is the path not only to goodness but also it is the avenue to knowledge. "Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom," says the Hebrew. The Hindu said less inspiringly: "Let men worship him as Self... This Self is the footstep of everything, for through it one knows everything. And as one can find again by footsteps what was lost, thus he who knows this finds glory and praise."[24] The higher element of dualism, then, is not only a power that gives morality; it is also a power that gives knowledge, though not without beatific reward.

The conception of Self as dealt with in the Upanishads is not abstract or metaphysical, though it is spiritual. Although it is a creative force, it is a force which invites the affection, love, and reverence of the worshipper:

"And if one were to say to one who declares

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23. According to Helen White, knowledge of God is the recognition of dualism as a reality -- the achievement of a dualistic operation: "...if the spirit be essentially unknowable to the flesh, how is the soul of man to lay hold upon reality? Certainly not through the senses, for they have nothing of kindred nature whereby they may hold upon the spirit; certainly not by routine operations of the reason, for the best that may be achieved by their agency is a scientific or philosophic generalization or analysis of material derived from the senses. How then is man to know God? By that in which he is like unto God." White, op. cit., p. 62.
24. The Upanishads, vol. 15, p. 87.

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> another than the Self dear, that he will lose what is dear to him, very likely it would be so. Let him worship the Self alone as dear. He who worships the Self alone as dear, the object of his love will never perish."[25]

It would appear, then, that Self is not a cold abstraction but a God of love. Does it follow, since Self is an integral element of the total personality, that when one loves oneself one loves God and when one worships God one worships himself? In a sense, that is true; but it must be remembered that it is the higher and true Self one is invited to love and respect, for "if one were to say to one who declares another than Self dear, that he will lose what is dear to him, very likely it would be so." Indeed, "Thou shalt have none other gods before me" is also an Indian conception.

That one must distinguish the true from the false is evident from the following passage. The burden is on the individual to worship God and to be careful not to be serving his lower self while under the illusion that he is serving his higher Self:

> "Now if a man departs this life without having seen his future life (in the Self), then that Self, not being known, does not receive and bless him, as if the Veda had not been read, or as if no good work had not been done. Nay, even if one who does not know that (Self), should perform here on earth some great holy work, it will perish for him in the end. Let a man worship the Self only as his true state. If a man worships the Self only as his true state, his work does not perish, for whatever he desires that he

25. Ibid., p. 88.

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gets from that Self."[26]

The necessity of knowing and serving the true Self is laid down as a dogma, for "even if one who does not know that (Self), should perform here on earth some great holy work, it will perish for him in the end." This admonition does not have a denominational or canonical meaning, corresponding to what we find in Christian theology, in which varying sects believe that each sect respectively has a monopoly upon truth -- that is, it does not mean that if you do not worship my God you are not likely to be blessed. It means, rather, that one has to make a choice between two loyalties and that if one chooses to serve the wrong master, sooner or later, in this world or the next, he will have to come to terms with his <u>real</u> master:

> "Those who depart from hence without having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is no freedom in all the worlds. But those who depart from hence, after having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all the worlds."[27]

This freedom is achieved through the effort of the will:[28] "Now man is a creature of will. According to what his will is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life."[29]

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26. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 90.
27. <u>Ibid</u>., vol. 1, p. 127.
28. The problem of the will is identical with that of dualism. As Irving Babbitt says: "The whole problem of the will is inextricably bound up with that of dualism. The true dualism I take to be the contrast in man between two wills..." Babbitt, <u>Democracy and Leadership</u>, p. 319.
29. <u>The Upanishads</u>, vol. 1, p. 48.

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Although the human being's ultimate destiny here or hereafter depends upon his will, he is aided toward his salvation and in his quest for immortality by the presence of God in his heart:

> "That God, the maker of all things, the Great Self, always dwelling in the heart of man, is perceived by the heart, the soul, the mind; they who know it become immortal."[30]

Indeed, God is a constant presence[31] in the heart of man. He is the best Self -- the "Great Self"; but man is not all Self, for he is not all God. There is another element in him (corresponding to the phenomenal world at large) which goes by the name of Nature:

> "Some wise men, deluded, speak of Nature, and others of Time as the cause of everything; but it is the greatness of God by which the Brahma-wheel is made to turn."[32]

We may conclude that the Upanishads constitute a definition of dualism between two selves: the natural self on the one hand and the religious self on the other. "Only when men shall roll up the sky like a hide, will there be an end of misery, unless God has first been known."[33] In

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30. Ibid., vol. 15, p. 253.
31. Regarding the constant presence of God in the heart of the individual Paul Elmer More makes an interesting comparison between Christian and Indian thinking: "...whereas in Christianity this present and entire identification of the human soul with God is sporadic and never free of theological colouring, in India it is constant and absolute." More, "The Forest Philosophy of India," p. 32.
32. The Upanishads, vol. 15, p. 260.
33. Ibid., p. 266.

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this magnificent figure the philosopher of the Upanishads stresses the responsibility of the human being to know God, but God, as we have seen, is an inward reality -- a Self that transcends the limitation of man's earthly nature.

-iv-

The Bhagavad-Gita[34] carries forward the dualistic interpretation of life with special emphasis upon the technique of "Self-Realization." "Thus have I declared unto thee the wisdom of Self-Realization,"[35] says the God.

Self-realization depends upon the control of the senses,[36] which are considered dangerous and hazardous. They are considered dangerous because they interfere with clear vision and the apprehension of the higher Self or God. God being spiritual and extra-sensory, the senses cannot be the medium of getting into communication with Him. Moreover, they interfere with the analytical power of man, as well as with his "synthetic" power, upon which

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34. "Originally it [The Bhagavad-Gita] formed a section of Book Six of the great Hindu epic, the Mahabharata. It is the form of a conversation between the warrior Arjuna and his charioteer, who really was the 'Blessed Lord,' the god Krishna...The work was probably written in the second century before the Christian era, although no approximate date can be assigned." (Lin Yutang, op. cit., pp. 54-55.) Lin Yutang quotes Dr. E. J. Thomas who calls the Bhagavad-Gita "one of the greatest of the religious phenomena of the world..." Ibid., p. 55.

35. The Bhagavad-Gita (Swami Paramananda, translator), Boston, 1913, p. 17.

36. The control of the senses (or dualism), according to Paul Elmer More, was the aim of the Vedantic system: "The Vedanta sought the discipline of knowledge and self-restraint to put away these purely individual desires and emotions altogether, and so to distinguish between the two selves." More, "The Forest Philosophy of India," p. 37.

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union with God depends. They interfere with our pursuit of perfection: "O son of Kunti, dangerous are the senses, they even carry away forcibly the mind of a discriminative man who is striving for perfection."[37]

Because the senses are dangerous, one should completely withdraw oneself from them. The reward of such a withdrawal is wisdom: "When he completely withdraws his senses from sense-objects as the tortoise shell withdraws its limbs then his wisdom becomes well-established."[38]

The warning against yielding to the senses is reiterated:[39] "For the mind that yields to the uncontrolled and wandering senses, carries away his wisdom just as a

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37. Ibid., p. 21. When Arnold comes to develop his idea of perfection, he takes issue, as we shall see, with the one which Krishna advocates.
38. Loc. cit. The reward of overcoming the senses is not only wisdom; it is also happiness: "He, whose heart is unattached to external contacts (of the senses), realizes the happiness that is in the Self; being united with Brahman by meditation, he attains to eternal bliss. Ibid., p. 47.
39. One of the characteristics of Eastern literature is the "reiteration" (a quality which may have affected the style of Matthew Arnold), but there are nuances and shades of differences in the reiterated passages which one must heed. The explanation, of course, for this systematic repetition lies in the fact that in the beginning oriental literature was oral. What Irving Babbitt says of Buddhistic literature is equally true of the oriental literature so far examined: "...large portions of the Buddhist books seem to the Western reader to have damnable iteration, to push beyond permissible grounds the sound maxim that repetition is the mother of memory. It is well to remember that most of this repetition is only a mnemonic device that would never have been employed if the canonical material had from the outset been committed to writing. And then, too, in the midst of tracts of wearisome repetition and categorizing one encounters not infrequently passages that are vividly metaphorical and concrete..."

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boat on water is carried away by the wind."[40]

Men therefore gain wisdom not through the medium of the senses, but through the medium of the spirit. The achievement of wisdom is a matter of "spiritual concentration" rather than "emotional expansion." It is associated with approximating the divine rather than with a concession to the emotions of the senses.[41]

The same simple and clear admonition is made in regard to the control of anger and passion, the dark offshoots of the senses. They should be suppressed because they hinder and retard the development of the higher Self. They are like mist and smoke which obscure the way: a barrier between birth and life: "As fire is enveloped by smoke, as a mirror

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Irving Babbitt, "Buddha and the Occident," (The Dhammapada, Irving Babbitt, translator), New York, 1936, p. 73.

40. The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 23.

41. The association of wisdom with the higher part of dualism is interestingly illustrated by Irving Babbitt (though one may not wish to accept his literary deductions): "Goethe defines the devil as the spirit that always says no, and Carlyle celebrates his passage from darkness to light as an escape from the everlasting Nay to the Everlasting Yea. We rarely pause to consider what a reversal of traditional wisdom is implied in such conceptions. In the past the spirit that says no has been associated rather with the divine. Socrates tells us that the counsels of his 'voice' were always negative, never positive. According to the ancient Hindu again the divine is the 'inner check.'" (Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 147.) Babbitt's stricture, especially in regard to Carlyle, may be that he does not accept Carlyle on his own terms. Carlyle's affirmation -- that is, his spiritual acquiescence -- is "associated with the divine." But what Carlyle considers conformity with the divine, on analysis, turns out to be fulfillment and satiety of an emotional thirst -- consequently the very abrogation and negation of the divine, since Carlyle is traveling in an opposite

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by dust, as an embryo by the womb, so is this (Self) covered by that."[42]

The greatest foe that stands in the way of Self-Realization is desire. A distinction of course has to be made between desire that takes man in the direction of the higher Self and desire that takes him in the direction of the senses -- between the downward path and the upward path. Assuredly the downward path is the easier to take, but it is the path where the enemy lurks. He is a foe that must be destroyed; self must be subdued by Self if one is to attain to Him:

> "O mighty-armed, thus knowing Him who is superior to the intellect, and subduing self by the Self, destroy this enemy in the form of desire, difficult to overcome." 43

Again:

> "It is desire, it is anger, born of passion ...of unappeasable craving and great sin; know this as the foe of the world." 44

In other words, desire is not merely a foe that works[45]

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direction from where the divine exists.

42. The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 32.
43. Ibid., p. 33. It should be observed that the "Higher Self" is given priority over the intellect. The intellect as well as reason is the opposite force of the lower self. Such a distinction is doubtless made on the basis of ethical reality, for an undue emphasis upon intellect makes for pride and lack of humility. Says Irving Babbitt: "A consideration of man's ignorance and blindness as they are on a vast scale in the facts of history gives a positive basis to humility. One comes to feel that the great religious teachers may be right after all in their insistence that man needs to subordinate himself to some higher will; above all that it is needful that his intellect should recognize some such control."
44. Ibid., p. 32.
45. The casting out of desire (no less than the control

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havoc in the individual (because it hinders spiritual development), but because society is made up of individuals, it hurts not one, but all. Not the thing, but the desire for the thing is evil.

What are the traits and "character" of the Higher Self to which we can attain by casting out desire? Does it have "personality" or is it an abstract principle? Evidently its qualities and attributes are so manifold and complex (their simplicity is delusive) that definition is difficult. One attribute, however, the devotee of the Bhagavad-Gita defines with passionate conviction. The "God in himself" is indestructible and immortal:

> "Sword cannot pierce It (Self), fire cannot burn It, water cannot wet It, and air cannot dry It.
> "It cannot be pierced, nor burned, nor wet, nor dried. It is eternal, all pervading, unchangeable, immovable, everlasting."[46]

Again the protagonist of the Bhagavad-Gita exclaims:

> "This (Self) is never born, nor does It die, nor after once having been, does it go into non-being. This (Self) is unborn, eternal, changeless, ancient. It is never destroyed even when the body is destroyed."[47]

The nature of the higher Self is not abstract. It is important for us to realise that the higher Self is not

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of the senses) yields a wisdom, which is not fleeting but steady and permanent: "...when a man is satisfied in the Self by Self alone and has completely cast out all desires from the mind, then he is said to be of steady wisdom." The Bhagavad-Gita, p. 20

46. Ibid., p. 14.
47. Ibid., p. 13. We hear again: "The dweller in the body is ever indestructible..." Ibid., p. 15.

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mere reason, not an impulse, a set of emotions, nor a negative "tendency" (as it appears to be with Arnold). Neither is it a nihilistic power of renunciation, though renunciation, as we have seen, is the process of achieving Him. The Great Self is Lord, Ruler, and God: "The great Soul (that dwells) in this body is called the Witness or Looker-on, the Sanctioner, the Sustainer, the Experiencer, the mighty Lord and also the Supreme Self."[48]

And those who have come to know Him in His omnipotence worship Him as God. He is thus more than a rational or metaphysical principle: "O son of Kunti, the great-souled ones, possessing the Divine Nature, knowing Me as Immutable and as the Source of beings, worship Me with single-minded devotion: Ever singing my glory and striving with steadfast vows, bowing down to Me in devotion (they) perpetually worship Me."[49]

The "lower self," contrariwise, is everything which the higher self is not. The lower self is not immortal or enduring. It is destructible because it is transitory and temporal. The lower self traffics with sensations which are by nature evanescent: "O son of Kunti, the feelings of heat, cold, pleasure, pain are produced from the contact of the senses with sense-objects; they are the beginning and end, transitory."[50]

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48. Ibid., p. 107.
49. Ibid., p. 74.
50. Ibid., p. 14.

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The lower self is transitory because it belongs to the realm of nature, to the realm of the senses. A wise man should not delude either himself or others in regard to the unstable qualities of Nature: "A man of perfect wisdom should not unsettle the people of small and imperfect understanding, who are deluded by the qualities born of Nature and are attached to the function of the senses."[51]

It follows that only by liberating oneself from nature, only by perceiving the distinction between the body and the soul (i. e. recognizing dualism as a fact) can one attain to the Supreme Self: "They who thus, by the eyes of wisdom, perceive the distinction between body and Soul, and the liberation of beings from Nature (Prakriti), they attain to the Supreme."[52]

In conclusion, it may be said that the Bhagavad-Gita constitutes a dynamic definition of dualism and the doctrine of the two selves:

> "Let a man raise himself by his Self, let him never lower himself; for he alone is the friend of himself and he alone is the enemy of himself.
>
> "He who has conquered himself by the Self, he is the friend of himself; but he whose self is unconquered, his self acts as his own enemy like an external foe."[53]

The emphasis is upon Self-responsibility -- upon the conquest of the self by the Self. This is dualism as we have

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51. Ibid., p. 29.
52. Ibid., p. 109.
53. Ibid., p. 50.

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defined it.

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"Self is the lord of self, who else could be the lord?"[54] This affirmation and question contain a definition of dualism but with a shade of difference hitherto not encountered in this investigation. The analysis of the nature of the higher Self has so far revealed that the higher Self closely resembled the divine Self -- the conclusion that God was both internal and external and that He became "increasingly internal" as the individual by the right exercise of spiritual powers assimilated Him. The statement from Buddha above, however, gives the impression that the Lord of self is exclusively an internal power, circumscribed by the personality of the human being, and without an external, spiritual concomitant.

The variation between Buddha's conception and the previous conceptions examined, one should hasten to assert, constitutes a difference without a significant distinction (so far as the definition of dualism is concerned). Buddha speaks less of God than do his predecessors[55] but there is no

54. The Dhammapada (Sacred Books of the East, F. Max Müller, translator and editor), Oxford, 1900, vol. 10, p. 45. "The word Dhammapada may perhaps best be rendered Path of Virtue, provided one keep in mind that virtue means practically the Buddhist Law of Norm." (Babbitt, The Dhammapada, p. ix.)

55. Irving Babbitt maintains that "Buddha does not grant any place in his discipline to the idea of God." (Babbitt, "Buddha and the Occident" (The Dhammapada), p. 77.) S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta confirm this view: "When an ordinary man finds himself crushed in life's struggle and fails, in spite of all his natural

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evidence that he obliterates the distinction between the lower self and higher Self or that he conceives of both as varying aspects of phenomenal nature, or that he identifies the higher Self with reason which itself may be construed as part of the flux.[56]

> "He who knows that this body is like froth, and has learnt that it is as unsubstantial as a mirage, will break the flower-pointed arrow of Mara, and never see the king of death."[57]

Here Buddha intimates the vital distinction between sensory and extra-sensory existence and so long as he admits this distinction he is not a monist but a dualist. The body is temporal and insubstantial,[58] but there is in the human being another essence, which is indestructible and which the arrow of death cannot pierce, provided, of course, one has the right knowledge and pursues the

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egoism, to avert misery, his weary spirit craves for some unfailing source of mercy and help. He turns to God. A religion of self-help, such as we find in early Buddhism, is a cold comfort to him." S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Calcutta, 1939, p. 182.

56. Regarding Buddha's maintenance of that distinction Irving Babbitt says: "Buddha eliminates many things that are accounted essential in other faiths, including Christianity, but this opposition between man's higher or ethical will and his natural self or expansive desires he does not eliminate. On the contrary, more than any other religious teacher, he plants himself on the naked psychological fact of the opposition; so that Buddhism, in its original form, is the most critical or, if one prefer, the least mythological of religions." Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 161.

57. Müller, The Dhammapada, p. 17.

58. "Before long, alas! this body will lie on the ground, despised, bereft of consciousness, like a useless log." Babbitt, The Dhammapada, p. 8.

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"path."[59]

Although Buddha does not deal in an affirmative way with God he does not deny the supernatural: "A supernatural person (a Buddha) is not easily found, he is not born everywhere. The family in which a sage is born prospers."[60] Here it is seen that to Buddha man is potentially supernatural, so that one may say that though Buddha does not affirm the existence of God (in a traditional form) he does affirm the existence of the supernatural.

What specifically is the nature of the higher "self" which is the lord of the lower self? Chiefly it is a power that places a curb upon the senses: "For self is the lord of self," Buddha repeats; "self is the refuge of self; therefore curb thyself as the merchant curbs a noble horse."[61] But what, to reiterate, is the nature of the power that curbs?[62] Clearly the power must be supernatural, if it is not natural, and though Buddha may, on experimental grounds,

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59. "He who recognizes the existence of suffering, its cause, its remedy, and its cessation has fathomed the four noble truths. He will walk in the right path." Buddha, "Three Sermons at Benares," Lin Yutang, op. cit., p. 361.
60. Babbitt, The Dhammapada, p. 31.
61. Müller, The Dhammapada, p. 87.
62. One might maintain that between the natural and the supernatural there is another level: human. From a practical point of view there is a distinction to be made between the human and the divine, but when it comes to the quality which distinguishes the human being from all other living creatures and forms of phenomena, the distinction loses force. The element that is human is basically or ultimately divine. (See Chapter II, footnote 7.)

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have refused to adulate the higher Self as a God (in the manner of the protagonist of the Bhagavad-Gita), yet he does set the two selves apart and, at least by implication, put the higher self in the category of the supernatural.

The fact remains that though the ruling self of Buddha does have an ultimate kinship with the supernatural his emphasis is upon self-conquest without divine aid. Either in committing evil or performing good the individual must take responsibility for his actions and work out his own destiny of purification:

> "By one's self the evil is done, by one's self evil is left undone, by one's self one is purified. The pure and the impure stand and fall by themselves, no one can purify another."[63]

A human being, spiritually or physically, must fend for himself. He cannot depend upon the grace of God. Others cannot reform him. He must reform himself. Moreover, he is the product of his own moral thinking:

> "All that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our own thoughts, it is made up of our own thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the wagon."[64]

The implication here is clear that to each human being belongs the total responsibility of molding his

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63. Müller, The Dhammapada, p. 48.
64. Babbitt, The Dhammapada, p. 3. We hear further: "As a fletcher makes straight his arrow, a wise man makes straight his trembling and unsteady thought, which is difficult to guard, difficult to hold back." Müller, The Dhammapada, p. 12.

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own life (unaffected by environmental stimuli) and that the process is mental (if not spiritual), a process that may have its genesis in a period remotely anterior to birth[65] and a process which will continue until such a time after death when one (again by self-effort) has purified himself sufficiently to escape rebirth:

> "The gods even envy him whose senses, like horses well broken in by the driver, have been subdued, who is free from pride, and free from appetities; such a one who does his duty is tolerant like the earth, or like a threshold; he is like a lake without mud; no new births are in store for him.[66]

The process of self-conquest (terminating in Nirvana) is positive,[67] not negative. The approach is energetic to

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65. The belief in life before birth in the orient is almost axiomatic. The characteristic promise of reward for those who have followed the "path" is further illustrated in the following passage: "Make thyself an island, work hard, be wise! When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt enter into the heavenly world of the elect..." Again: "The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place (Nirvana). Ibid., p. 57. (Italics mine.)
66. Ibid., p. 28. (Italics mine.)
67. Helen White has a clarifying note regarding the positive quality of Nirvana: "It is generally assumed that Nirvana means extinction. It is true that the chief aim of the Buddhist, believing as he did that existence was wholly evil, was to escape from existence. Suicide, at first blush the logical weapon, was useless, for the one reality (in a metaphysical sense) that the Buddhist recognized was that of deeds which bound a man to a round of successive existence, a cycle of rebirth, prolonged according to evil of his ways." (White, op. cit., p. 88.) Regarding the strenuous positive approach to Nirvana, Miss White says again: "Whatever happened to the Buddhist after death, it seems pretty clear that the Nirvana to which the Buddhist attained under the Bo tree, the Nirvana in this life...was not nonexistence. It was a state of contemplation, the product of strenuous activity, in its very concentration and self-surrender

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the last degree. Buddha seems to present man in a constant state of warfare. The victory to be achieved is not over the external world, but over himself, and for that reason a thousand-fold more dear: "If one man conquer a thousand times a thousand men, and if another conquer himself, he is the greatest of conquerors."[68]

What, specifically, is the nature of the lower self which one sets out to conquer and to subdue? The answer is that the lower self is an anarchic realm of desire, a forest of underbrush which must be cut down at the roots:

> "Cut down the whole forest of desires, not a tree only! Danger comes out of the forest of desires. When you have cut down both the forest of desires and its undergrowth, then, Bhikshus, you will be rid of the forest and of desires!"[69]

Buddha uses various figures to represent the untamed desires. He conceives of them as a stream which must be "damned up." He suggests the connection which exists between this control of desire and the wisdom which such control gives. Only when desires are controlled can one

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an active state." Loc. cit.

68. Müller, The Dhammapada, p. 70. Again we hear: "One's own self conquered is better than all other people; not even a god, a Gandharva, not Mara (with Brahman), could change into defeat the victory of a man who has vanquished himself, and always lives under restraint." (Ibid., p. 32.) Buddha is emphatic in giving priority to spiritual values. The "unsung hero" is the one who has mastered not other men, but himself: "The man who is free from credulity, but knows the uncreated, who has cut all ties, removed all temptations, removed all desires, he is the greatest of men." Ibid., p. 33.

69. Müller, The Dhammapada, p. 39.

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understand "what was not made" and evidently this knowledge, unavailable on a sensory level, is the reality which we can apprehend only when the senses are subdued:

> "Stop the stream valiantly, drive away the desires, O Brahmana! When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made."[70]

In conclusion, although Buddha's doctrine teaches self-control, it goes beyond the simple rational admonition that desires should be checked. They should be extirpated. One who has succeeded in this extirpation has secured freedom, freedom in a spiritual sense. He has risen into another realm beyond desire, the cravings, the lusts of the flesh and bodily appetites.[71] Because Buddha advocates such an emancipation (achieved only as a result of the severest discipline) one may justifiably maintain that his gospel defines dualism in a genuine sense: as the conflict between the lower and higher dispositions of man represented by good on one side and evil on the other.

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"With my soul have I desired thee in the night; yea,

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70. Ibid., p. 90. The approach to wisdom is basically moral, not intellectual. Buddha says again: "There is no satisfying lusts, even by a shower of gold pieces; he who knows that lusts have a short taste and cause pain, he is wise; even in heavenly pleasures he finds no satisfaction, the disciple who is fully awakened delights in the destruction of all desires." Ibid., p. 52.

71. "There is no suffering for him who has finished his journey, and abandoned grief, who has freed himself on all sides, and thrown off all fetters." Ibid., p. 27.

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with my spirit within me will I seek thee early..."[72] Clearly the prophet Isaiah teaches that there is that in man which hearkens after God and that such a yearning has its genesis in some region in the personality other than the flesh. "And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes and ye shall keep my judgments and do them..."[73] The spirit of God has taken possession of the personality of man and it is this presence which makes man a dual creature: he is flesh and he is spirit.[74]

There is this difference, however, between the dualism defined in the Bible and the dualism in oriental literature (with the possible exception of the Rigveda); namely, that the eye seems to be turned toward God rather than inward toward the "Self." For the Hebrew and the Christian, one might observe, the gap seems wider and deeper between the Higher Self and God than for the oriental. "Prepare ye the way of the Lord, says Isaiah, "make straight in the desert a highway for our God."[75] The prophet who uttered this ethical injunction was conscious of God in himself, but he doubtless felt His intimacy less than he sensed His existence as an awesome, supernatural personality ruling from afar with a frightening, firm, but solicitous

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72. Isaiah, 26:9.
73. Ezekiel, 36:27.
74. "...the manifestation of the spirit is given to every man to profit withal." I. Corinthians, 12:7.
75. Isaiah, 40:3.

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hand.

That hand of course makes itself felt when man has transgressed the commands of the Father, so that dualism appears to be between man and God rather than between a power in man and his lower self. The following passage from Ezekiel (fulminating in the name of the Lord) makes evident that though God is interested in His children, He keeps His role of the paterfamilias distinct:

> "And they that escape of you shall remember me among the nations whether they shall be carried captives because I am broken with their whorish heart, which hath departed from me, and with their eyes, which go a whoring after their idols; and they shall loathe themselves for the evils which they have committed in all their abominations."[76]

There is here evidently a conflict (or dualism) between two totally detached agents rather than a dualism or conflict in one personality, a conflict of two forces that, though separate, act and react upon each other in a personal and intimate way. And though God may speak to the conscience[77] of man which is an oracle for making himself heard, yet he retains, as I have suggested, his individuality. The law comes from an external authority rather than from the intrinsic but universal selfhood of man. Again we hear:

"I <u>am</u> the Lord your God; walk in my

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76. <u>Ezekiel</u>, 6: 9.
77. "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men; but we are made manifest unto God; and I trust also are made manifest in your consciences." II. <u>Corinthians</u>, 5:11.

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> statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them;
> "And hallow my sabbaths; and they shall be a sign between me and you, that ye may know that I am the Lord your God."[78]

There seems, moreover, to be resentment on the part of the law-giving Father toward the individual who follows his own "spirit." The Father appears somewhat jealous of his own powers: "Thus saith the Lord God. Woe unto the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and have seen nothing!"[79]

Of course the preacher wishes to enjoin upon his people the necessity of distinguishing between true and false prophets, between the spirit of the "Devil" and the spirit of "God," but not very much latitude is given the individual for personal, spiritual evolution. The extrinsic word has preeminence over the inward path, as is evidenced again by the magisterial tone of the following:

> "For I <u>am</u> the Lord: I will speak, and the word that I shall speak shall come to pass; it shall be no more prolonged: for in your days, O rebellious house, will I say the word and will perform it, saith the Lord God."[80]

The fact to be observed is that there is not in Biblical literature as much "synchronization" between the

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78. <u>Ezekiel</u>, 20: 19,20. The following evinces the fact further that to the Hebrew, God was an authority that ruled from a throne afar: "Come ye, and let us go up to the mountains of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." <u>Isaiah</u>, 2:3.
79. <u>Ezekiel</u>, 13:3.
80. <u>Ibid</u>., 13:25.

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higher spirit of man and the spirit of God -- not to the extent certainly that can be found in oriental literature. There is of course the conventional view that Jesus and God are one, but the words which Jesus himself utters in the "ninth hour" would seem to betray that view: "And about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? that is to say, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"[81] With all due allowance that one can make for the strained circumstances under which these words were said, nevertheless the words do not suggest that Jesus felt himself God, or that he felt at one with Him. No human voice, it may be said, either before or after the time of Jesus, ever expressed with such poignancy the distance between man and God -- the sense of separateness and isolation from each other.

The objective form of dualism, then, prevails in the Bible, with the emphasis varying regarding the proximity and closeness of God. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."[82] The two elements of dualism are here boldly opposed. With marked simplicity John defines the nature of God and the method of reaching Him: "God is a Spirit: And they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth."[83] It is the dual nature of life that counts: "It is the

81. St. Matthew, 27:46.
82. St. John, 3:6.
83. Ibid., 4:24.

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spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that speak unto you, they are the spirit, and they are the life."[84]

Although man and God are thus conceived as separate entities, one must strive for His good will and recognition if not for absorption in Him. Achieving this ethical goal depends, as Paul indicates, upon an awareness of the dualism of the body and the soul and the war between the members: "But I keep under my body and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway."[85] The flesh is carnal. If one indulges it, one does not know the spirit which is God: "For ye are not yet carnal; for whereas <u>there</u> is among you envying, and strife, and divisions, are yet not carnal, and walk as men?"[86] "For to be carnally minded," we are told, "is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace."[87] The good that dwells in him is not in the flesh but in the spirit: "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but <u>how</u> to perform that which is good I find not."[88] Knowing how to fulfill the law is difficult, but there is no question of its spirituality as there is none regarding the nature and attributes of the body: "For we know that

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84. <u>Ibid</u>., 7:63.
85. I. <u>Corinthians</u>, 9:27.
86. <u>Ibid</u>., 3:3.
87. <u>Romans</u>, 8:6.
88. <u>Ibid</u>., 7:18.

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the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold unto sin."[89] Finally, the warfare (or dualism) between the flesh and the spirit, their contrary nature, is the one inescapable fact:

> "This I say then, walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh.
> "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would."[90]

Further, Paul envisions dualism as a conflict between "nature" and "supernature" (a conception, especially as it comes from Paul, that burrowed deep in the soul of Arnold). That is, Paul perceives the relation between the body of man and the natural world without, the soul of man and the heavenly kingdom of God. The following may be considered a theological explanation of the genesis and development of dualism:

> "And so it is written. The first man Adam was made a living Soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit.
> "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual.
> "The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven.
> "As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly."[91]

If one is to know God, one is to put away the natural man, for between him and the spirit of God, there is no avenue of understanding: "But the natural man receiveth

89. Ibid., 7:14.
90. Galatians, 5:16,17.
91. I. Corinthians, 15:45-48.

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not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."[92]

This significant fact further to be noted is that the spirit of man, once it has come to terms with God, is an ethical spirit. It is life incarnate, because of righteousness. God in man represents righteousness, and one grows in it as one succeeds in nullifying the senses: "And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness."[93]

In conclusion, limited as this examination of the evidence has been, the fact remains that dualism is a basic doctrine of the Bible. Although this dualism does not have the degree of subjectivity that in general oriental dualism has, it yet conforms to the definition of dualism as a conflict between two antipodal forces: between the things of righteousness because they are eternal and the things of evil because, not having God's sanction, are temporary.

> "And he [an angel came down from heaven] laid hold on the dragon, that old Serpent which is the Devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years,
> "And cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, that he should deceive the nations no more till the thousand years should be fulfilled: and after that he must be loosed a little season."[94]

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92. Ibid., 2:14.
93. Romans, 8:10.
94. Revelation, 20:2,3. (Italics mine).

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The last phrase would indicate that dualism is an imperishable condition of the lot of mankind.

-vii-

The principle of dualism prevails not only in religious literature; it is to be found also in secular literature.

Plato[95] is a dualist, since like the exponents of dualism previously examined, he subscribes, in general, to two incompatible principles to explain life:

> "Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other, conquers."[96]

He is a dualist, further, because he differentiates man from other creatures on the basis of man's kinship to the divine and because of all the creatures man is the only one that worships the gods and raises altars to them:

> "...man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them."[97]

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95. "Plato is at times merely the perplexing metaphysician; oftener he speaks from the depths of unexampled self-knowledge. All that is essential to the dualistic philosophy may be gathered from his dialogues, as hints and fragments of it may be found scattered through innumerable other writers, especially the inspired poets and philosophers of life." More, "Definitions of Dualism," p. 268.
96. "Phaedrus," (The Dialogues of Plato, Benjamin Jowett, translator), New York, 1892, vol. 1, p. 242.
97. "Protagoras," vol. 1, p. 93.

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Although man is different from the animals because he has divine attributes, the fact remains that man is also an animal. That is, the lower self of man is animal and belongs to another nature, but the higher self, the ruling self, is ethical and religious. It is capable of ruling and calming the "lawless beast" in man, of controlling it -- and the passions which belong to it. It is the source of our noble aspirations and the avenue to truth and the unknown. It is also the sentry standing watch against delusion and misconception:

> "...the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless wild-beast nature"; but "when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditations; after having indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle -- which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown....when again he has allayed the passionate element ...he attains the truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions."[98]

Significant is the fact that this "higher part" of man is an ethical self, a self that is contrasted to the

98. "The Republic," vol. 1, pp. 829-830. Dualism is basic in "The Republic." Says Paul Elmer More: "The conclusions of The Republic...are reached by a thoroughgoing dualism." Paul Elmer More, Platonism, Princeton, 1917, p. 79.

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body because it represents the ideal and because it is the summation of all the spiritual values of life. Such is evident from Socrates' balancing (before his death) the values of the body with the values that accrue to him who lives (or dies) by the higher principle:

> "And will life be worth having," he asks Crito, "if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we suppose that principle whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?"[99]

The "higher principle" manifests itself through the soul which is immortal. It is the image of the divine and the seat of the intellect and the mind. It is changeless and stable and permanent, contrasted to the body which is volatile and transitory:

> "...the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable."[100]

The dualism of body and soul, the evanescence of the former, the immortality of the latter, is clearly expressed

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99. "Crito," vol. 1, p. 432. The justification for handling Socrates' ideas and Plato's ideas simultaneously is contained in the following statement by Paul Elmer More: "The Socrates who is still the inspiration of the best and noblest thought of today is not the simple Socrates who died in the jail of Athens, but a very complicated character that has passed through the Alembic of Plato's brain; so that to us 'Socratic' and 'Platonic' mean generally the same thing, and it is a task of the utmost delicacy to separate the original teacher from the creation of the disciple's fancy." More, Studies in Religious Dualism, p. 268.
100. "Phaedo," vol. 1, p. 465.

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in the following passage. Again, the body, partaking of material and static reality, is fugitive and fleeting; the soul, propelled into motion by an internal source of spiritual and dynamic reality, is enduring: "The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul."[101]

The soul is not only destined for future immortality; it has had a previous existence, though the recollections of it may be dim because of our "unrighteousness" or preoccupation with unholy things. The tie with the past is a reality, even though those who have awareness of it cannot explain its mystery or the rapture that accompanies its perception. For Plato, therefore, the higher part of dualism has not only a logical identification with the divine; it also has an intimate and mystical connection with one's immortal past:

> "...every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive."[102]

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101. "Phaedrus," vol. 1, p. 250.
102. Ibid., p. 254. Preexistence, as we have observed

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Plato not only makes a distinction between the body and the soul on the basis of their mortality and immortality, or on the ground that one is flesh and the other spirit; his dualism rests also upon the distimction between the real and the unreal, truth and untruth. The things of this world fade off into unreality and those things which serve the body have less truth in them than those things which serve the soul, for it is filled with the essence of the real that is identical with truth:

> "...in general those things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul...the body itself...has less truth and essence than the soul...for the soul is filled with more real existence and actually has a more real existence than the body."[103]

Not only, moreover, do those things which serve the body have less of truth in them but also what is more significant is that the body itself stands in the way of the apprehension of truth:

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is also an oriental idea. Perhaps the most famous modern re-utterance of the Platonic idea is to be found in Wordsworth:

> "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
> The Soul that rises with us, our life's star,
> Hath had elsewhere its setting,
> And cometh from afar:
> Not in entire forgetfulness,
> And not in utter nakedness,
> But trailing clouds of glory do we come
> From God, who is our home:
> Heaven lies about us in our infancy!"

("Ode. Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Childhood," 59-67.) Like Wordsworth and the oriental, Plato conceived of the other existence as better. He speaks of a day when we were "not yet enshrined in a living tomb." "Phaedrus," vol. 1, p. 254.

103. "The Republic," vol. 1, pp. 845-846.

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> "...the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries and amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth....if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body -- the soul in herself must behold things in themselves...
> "...while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge...."[104]

There is a connection, then, between the control of the senses and the perception of knowledge, so that the most profound experience would be extra-sensory rather than sensory. Also, as we have seen, the control of the senses even to the point of eradication brings one to the gates of wisdom and truth.

It may therefore be said that the force which says "no" to the senses is an ethical or religious force, and nowhere perhaps is this truth better seen than in Socrates when he is being tried for his life:

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104. "Phaedo," vol. 1, p. 450. Plato says again: "...thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her -- neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure, -- when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being..." (Ibid., p. 448.) Plato is as apparently at one with Buddha in his attitude toward desire and pleasure as obstacles of enlightenment. Paul Elmer More explains the ascetic phase of Plato's philosophy as follows: "The very intensity of a pleasure may be a hindrance to the soul in her labour of purgation and her search for the truth, since those things that cause us to feel most strongly are apt to seem clearest to us and truest, and so the keenest emotions may be those that bind us to this earth. Every pleasure and every pain is, as it were a nail that clamps the soul of the body and makes her corporeal, creating the opinion that those things are true which the body affirms, and preventing the soul from passing to the other world in her own purity and power. Paul Elmer More, Platonism, p. 81.

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> "You have heard me speak at sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which comes to me and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to me when I was a child; it always forbids but never commands to do anything which I am going to do."[105]

This voice is not to be gainsaid. It is not the voice of the senses, for if they spoke, would not they say: "Save thy life, Socrates?" What is the origin or genesis of the impulse that impells a human being to endure the agony of the senses in the name of a principle or higher truth? There is no other voice that can be put beside it, for other voices and their claims are inaudible to the ear of the spirit. Says Socrates to Crito:

> "This, dear Crito, is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain."[106]

Concerning the matter of the genesis of the impulse to do right, for Socrates there is no mystery. At least he knew or asserted that he knew that the voice came from God:

> "...if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Antyus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and to speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die; -- if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and

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105. "Apology," vol. 1, p. 44.
106. "The Crito," vol. 1, p. 438.

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love you; but I shall obey God rather than you..."[107]

The evidence by now should be clear that Plato and Socrates reckon existence not as one but as two, that man's destiny is heaven, not a place but a condition of the everlasting soul: that his dual nature impells him to aspire unto God: "Wherefore we ought to fly away from the earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just and wise."[108]

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The dualism of Aristotle does not have the mystical undertones found in Plato or in the other exponents of dualism so far considered.[109] Nevertheless Aristotle believes

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107. "Apology," vol. 1, p. 412. Socrates says further: "For I know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened to the state than my service to God." Ibid., p. 413.

108. "Theaetetus," vol. 2, p. 178.

109. "Like all the great Greeks Aristotle recognizes that man is the creature of two laws: he has an ordinary or natural self of impulse and desire. If man is to become human he must oppose to everything excessive in his ordinary self, whether in thought or deed or emotion, the law of measure." (Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 16. The law of measure or the "golden mean" Aristotle defines as follows: "...by the mean with relation to the thing itself, I mean that which is equidistant from both of the extremes, and this is one and the same in all cases; but by the mean with relation to ourselves, I mean that which is neither too much nor too little for us..." (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (R. W. Browne, translator), London, 1853, p. 43.) Although Aristotle is not an extremist, he is nevertheless a dualist since he believes that the power which controls has a divine origin.

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that man does have a "better part" and that he should be governed by it or by a "ruling principle." The better part emanates from the divine and it falls to each man's lot to cultivate it and aspire to immortality. In man, Aristotle says,

> "there is...something divine...a man ought not to entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is mortal: but as far as it is possible he should make himself immortal, and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle in him; although it be small in size, yet in power and value it is far more excellent than all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's 'self,' if it really is the ruling and better part."[110]

Aristotle, further, distinguishes man from the animal and plant life. Man is to be differentiated from other forms of existence by a peculiar quality of soul or reason: "For life man appears to share in common with plants; but his peculiar work is the object of this inquiry....the work of man is an energy of the soul according to reason, or not without reason..."[111]

Aristotle is not extreme in regard to "desires." He does not believe in their extirpation; he would have them regulated and controlled. Nevertheless his point of view is basically dualistic, since, as we have seen, the reason which controls desire is qualitatively different from emotion or desire itself. What he seeks

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110. Ibid., p. 280.
111. Ibid., p. 16. Reason for Plato or Aristotle, according to Irving Babbitt, does not belong to the flux but to a level above it: "The reason of a Plato or an

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is a disciplined harmony, but the harmony itself is achieved only through obedience and subjection to order:

> "Hence it is necessary that they [desires] should be moderate and few, and not at all opposed to reason: and this state is what we call obedient and disciplined; for as a child ought to live in obedience to the orders of his master, so ought that part of the soul which contains the desires, to be in obedience to reason. It is therefore necessary for that part of the soul of the temperate man which contains the desires, to be in harmony with reason; for the honourable is the mark at which both aim; and the temperate man desires what he ought, and as he ought, and when he ought; and thus reason also enjoins."[112]

The dualism of Aristotle is based on another conception, namely, that of imitation. What, according to Aristotle, puts man in a class by himself -- what, again, distinguishes him from the animals is this power or "instinct":

> "...the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitative. We have evidence of this in the facts of experience."[113]

The dualism, further, of Aristotle is based on the conception of happiness. Happiness is a spiritual condition which only the spiritually capable or spiritually minded can enjoy. First of all it is a condition of the soul:

Aristotle...contains within itself an element of superrational perception." (Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 166.) That is, reason is associated with the divine rather than, as for the rationalists, divorced from it.

112. Nicomachean Ethics, p. 85.

113. Aristotle, Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (S. H. Butcher, translator), London, 1932, p. 15.

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"...by human happiness we mean, not that of the body, but that of the soul; and happiness, too, we define to be an energy of the soul."[114]

Secondly, happiness is typical only of a human being, for only a human being is capable of exercising his spiritual potentialities and thus attaining to happiness. (Even a child cannot be called happy, for a child evidently is spiritually immature.) But such characteristic powers that man has put him in a class apart from all other creatures:

> "It is with reason, then, that we do not call an ox, a horse, or any other beast, happy; for none of them are able to participate in this kind of energy. For this cause, also, a child cannot be called happy; for from this time of life he is not yet able to perform such actions, but those who are so called, are called happy from hope; for, as we have said, there is need of perfect virtue, and of perfect life."[115]

In conclusion, one is justified in maintaining that existence for Aristotle has two orders: that, in general, he subscribes to the dualistic interpretation of life.

-ix-

St. Augustine, who furnishes the final illustration of the master dualists of the past to be treated in this section, exhibits the qualities of dualism with special poignancy.[116] For St. Augustine dualism constitutes an

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114. Nicomachean Ethics, p. 29. Aristotle further defines happiness as "a kind of energy of the soul according to virtue." (Ibid.,p. 22.) The last phrase is significant.
115. Loc. cit.
116. The "constant preoccupation with the dualism of human

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intensive personal search for God, for confirmation of his beliefs -- and mostly, for aid in putting down the devil in his blood. He admits that the sense of dualism came early to him. As a child he was able to make a distinction between the interior voice which communicates with God and the claims of the outer world which deafen one to that voice:

> "...even so early I had an instinct for the care of my own being, a trace in me of that most profound Unity whence my being was derived; in my interior sense I kept guard over the integrity of my outward sense perception, and in my small thoughts upon small matters I had come to delight in the truth."[117]

What we witness in St. Augustine is not simply a subscription to a metaphysical or mystical belief. The door to the heart is opened and we view a dramatic struggle -- a civil war -- between two selves (with the higher self not always winning):

> "It was in vain that I delighted in Thy law according to the inner man, what that other law in my members rebelled against the law of my mind and led me captive in the law of sin that was in my members. For the law of sin is the fierce force of habit, by which the mind is drawn and held against its will, and yet deservedly because it had fallen willfully into the habit. Who then shall deliver me from the body of this death, but Thy Grace only, through Jesus Christ Our Lord?[118]

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experience was the master trait of his [St. Augustine's] mind..." More, "Saint Augustine," (Studies of Religious Dualism), p. 69.

117. The Confessions of St. Augustine (F. J. Sheed, translator), New York, 1943, p. 23.

118. Ibid., p. 166.

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Victory, to be sure, comes to him in the end (as it must to all saints!) but the lines of the opposition are clearly drawn. For the Christian, as we have seen, the conquest of the lower self is not achieved without divine aid, and very often it would appear that the struggle is between man and God rather than between man and the devil, as one may observe from St. Augustine's account of his youthful anxieties and travailings:

> "O God, my hope from my youth, where were You all this time, where had you gone? For was it not You who created me and distinguished me from the beasts of the field and made me wiser than the birds of the air? Yet I walked through dark and slippery places, and I went out of myself in the search for You and did not find the God of my heart. I had come into the depths of the sea and I had lost faith and all hope of discovering the truth."[119]

He failed to find the truth because he had made the wrong assumptions and experienced the inevitable wrath of Nemesis for doing so. To achieve the moral victory which he sought it was necessary for him to discover the true nature of God, not to make the wrong analogies between God and himself regarding their respective natures. It was necessary for him to rid himself of the idea that God was mutable like himself, for such a misconception took him farther from than nearer to the truth of God:

> "But I was once striving towards You and thrust back from You so that I knew the taste of death: for You resist the proud. What could be worse pride than the incredible folly in which I asserted that I was by

119. Ibid., p. 105.

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> nature what You are? Since I was not myself immutable as was clear enough from the fact of my desire to become wise and change from worse to better -- I chose rather to think You mutable than to think I was not as You are. Thus I was thrust back: You resisted my windy pride. So that I went on imagining corporeal forms: and being flesh I accused the flesh, and being a wayfaring spirit I did not return to You but in my drifting was borne on towards imaginings which have no reality either in You or in me or in the body, and were not created for me by Your truth but were invented by my own folly playing upon matter."[120]

It was in such moments as these when he felt his flesh was beguiling him and his soul was not working "efficiently" that he could cry out: "Why, O perverse soul of mine, will you go on following your flesh? Rather turn, and let it follow you."[121]

Such an exclammation is unmistakable evidence of dualism in St. Augustine. Other evidence is his declaration that only God is the crown of his soul or the culmination of it, that only through his own soul can he know God, and conversely, that through the flesh he cannot ascend to Him anymore than the animals can, for are not they kindred in flesh to him, and do they have the "understanding" whereby to "find him"?

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120. Ibid., p. 77.
121. Ibid., p. 72. St. Augustine further defines the "limits" of the flesh as follows: "Our fleshly sense is slow because it is a fleshly sense: and that is the limit of its being. It can do what it was made to do; but it has no power to hold things transient as they run their course from their due beginning to their due end. For in Your word, by which they are created, they hear their law. 'From this point, not beyond that.'" Ibid., p. 71.

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> "I ask again what it is that I love when I love my God? Who is He that is above the topmost point of my soul? By that same soul I shall ascend to Him. I shall mount beyond the power by which I am united to my body, and by which I fill its whole structure and life. Not by that can I find my God: for by that the horse and the mule which have no understanding could equally find Him, for there is in them the same power giving life to their bodies."[122]

Fully conscious as St. Augustine is of the lower order of existence and of the evils of his own body, he raises the inevitable question as to the reasons for the existence of these evils. He cannot, in other words, square the conception of a benevolent God with the existence of evil:

> "What root reason is there for my willing evil and failing to will good, which would make it just for me to be punished? Who was it that set and ingrafted in me this root of bitterness, since I was wholly made by most loving God? If the devil is the author, where does the devil come from? And if by his own perverse will he was turned from a good angel into a devil, what was the origin in him of the perverse will by which he became a devil, since by the all-good Creator he was made wholly angel?"[123]

St. Augustine finds an answer to his difficult query.

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122. The necessity of ascending to God over a path which the animals cannot follow is further indicated in the following passage. God was "sympathetically" near while he was seeking, but the responsibility of finding God was totally his: "You had pity on me when I had not confessed -- in that I sought You not according to the understanding of the mind by which You have set us above the beasts, but according to the sense of the flesh. Yet all the time You were more inward than the most inward place in my heart and loftiest than the highest. Ibid., p. 71

123. Ibid., p. 124.

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The answer is thoughtfully reasoned, though it may not be completely satisfactory. Man is created with two wills (which may be considered the respective agents of the lower and higher selves). They are in conflict; each wills and the stronger will wins. When the higher will loses it does so because it has not willed sufficiently and completely. In his "system of psychology" St. Augustine gives the "mind" the role of "Commander", so that when its will is not carried out it is censured for willing inadequately. In other words, the will should obey the mind as efficiently as the hand obeys it. St. Augustine's exposition constitutes an argument for free will and forms the basis of his conclusion that evil exists because man wills[124] it. The exposition follows:

> "The mind commands the hand to move and there is such readiness that you can hardly distinguish the command from its execution. Yet the mind is mind, whereas the hand is body. The mind commands the mind to will, the mind is itself, but it does not do it. Why this monstrousness? And what is the root of it? The mind I say commands itself to will: it would not give the command unless it willed: yet it does not do what it commands. The trouble is that it does not totally will: therefore it does not totally command. It commands in so far as it wills; and it disobeys the command in so far as it

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124. Paul Elmer More agrees with this interpretation. He says: Augustine's "conception of God as all-responsible creator compelled him to believe that man was originally created a free will perfectly good in the image of God, and that the evil of his nature was to be explained by that monstrum, his voluntary secession from God." More, "Saint Augustine," p. 94. More says again that man had "deliberately elected his own damnation." Ibid., p. 66.

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> wills; and it disobeys the command in so far as it does not will. The will is commanding itself to be a will -- commanding itself, not some other. But it does not in its fullness give the command, so that what it commands is not done. For if the will were so in its fullness, it would not command itself to will, for it would already will. It is therefore no monstrousness, partly to will, partly not to will, but a sickness of the soul to be so weighed down by custom that it cannot wholly rise even with the support of truth. Thus there are two wills in us, because neither of them is entire: and what is lacking to the one is present in the other."[125]

In general, then, for St. Augustine dualism is a conflict between the body and its untutored impulses and a will which must receive its stimulus of truth and strength from God. Although the soul may often find itself "estranged" from God, such an alienation does not alter their basic relationship any more than an estrangement between father and son alters theirs. In St. Augustine we witness the agony of the soul as it strives to put down the flesh. St. Augustine therefore furnishes a good illustration of the doctrine of the two selves in operation.

This brief survey of the manifestations of dualism as

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125. Irving Babbitt explains St. Augustine's conception of the will (and incidentally dualism) as follows: "Saint Augustine's desire...is to know only two things -- God and the soul...God is envisaged primarily, not as mind, but as will. The soul of man is also reduced in its essential aspect to will....The human will is, however, hopelessly alienated from the divine will by the Fall. The gap between the two can be traversed only by a miracle of grace, a miracle that itself depends on the miracle of redemption." Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 176.

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expressed by the spiritual luminaries of mankind confirms the definition of dualism and the doctrine of the two selves. The two selves are organically different. Once that difference is removed, so far as this earthly sphere is concerned, the doctrine of dualism no longer exists but another doctrine prevails which may perhaps best be described as monism.[126] So far this study has been directed toward showing that a large body of data exists for the belief in the former doctrine, without denying the existence of data in support of the other.

II -- ARNOLD'S VIEWS

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"Other creatures submissively follow the law of their nature; man alone has an impulse leading him to set up some other law to control the bent of his nature."[127] These words of Arnold clearly establish the fact that he is a dualist[128]

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126. Monism was defined in Chapter II, footnote 9 and further considered (by implication) in footnote 12 of the same chapter. A full treatment of monism and naturalism takes place in Chapter IV. Suffice it to say now that monism, by the monists, is held to be the doctrine of the future, and dualism, the doctrine of the past. Says Sellars: "I am inclined to prophesy that psychology and physiology will reach an adjustment of their principles before many years have passed, and that consciousness and mind will take their places along with mass and energy in the scientific view of nature. The old dualism of soul and body will pass away and give place to a flexible naturalism. (Sellars, op. cit., p. 149.) That is, dualism is considered as an out-dated or orthodox doctrine. The question of "naturalism" will be treated later.
127. Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 47.
128. A distinction must be made, especially in the case of

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(at least some of the time) and that he is linked with the traditional dualism which we have defined and the history

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Arnold who has sometimes been misunderstood on this issue, between philosophical and religious dualism and the ordinary "duality of nature." A person may be divided against himself, be indecisive and irresolute, in the manner of Hamlet. This is not philosophical or religious dualism. Such a dualism may be dramatic, theatrical, or pathological (for example, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde). When Hugh Kingsmill therefore refers to Arnold's "divided impulses" (Hugh Kingsmill, Matthew Arnold, London, 1928, p. 189), he is referring to Arnold's disunity, but it is not true that he is referring to Arnold's dualism. Genuine dualism is a matter of faith, principle, or religion rather than a divided emotional condition. "I was strong, of unknown strength, a spirit, almost a God," cries Carlyle. (Sartor Resartus, p. 128.) That is the genuine note of dualistic aspiration, although in the last analysis, as will be observable, Carlyle is far from consistent. Carlyle, again, recognizes the dualism of existence (in the correct sense) in the following statement: "Nay, if we consider it, what is Man himself, and his whole terrestrial Life, but an Emblem; a Clothing or visible garment for that divine Me of his, cast hither, like a light-particle, down from Heaven? Thus is he said also to be clothed with a Body?" (Ibid., p. 55.) That is, Carlyle seems to be saying (with his usual circumlocution) that there exists (1) a God; (2) Man created with a body in God's image. Further, in the following statement, Carlyle perceives, in mystical terms, the distinction between the real and the unreal; and so again defines the genuine dualism -- and in a way in which Arnold, on account of his rational bias, fails to attain: "Imperfect as we may be, we are here with our litanies, shaven crowns, bows of poverty, to testify incessantly and indisputably to every heart, That this earthly life and its riches and possession, and good evil hap, are not intrinsically a reality at all, but are a shadow of realities eternal, infinite..." (Carlyle, Past and Present, p. 66.)

Ruskin, also, in his verbosely poetic manner, gives a sound conception of dualism: "Although your days are numbered, and the following darkness sure, is it necessary that you should share the degradation of the brute, because you are condemned to its mortality, or live the life of the moth, and of the worm, because you are to companion them in the dust?

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of which we have, in part, related in the preceding pages. According to G. W. E. Russell Arnold never veered from his doctrine: "From first to last he was true to his own doctrine that we must cultivate our best self in every department of our being and be content with nothing less than our predestined perfection."[129]

Not so; we may have but a few thousand of days to spend, perhaps hundreds only -- perhaps tens; nay, the longest of our time and best, looked back on, will be but for a moment, as the twinkling of an eye; still, we are men, not insects; we are living spirits, not passing clouds." (John Ruskin, Sesame and Lilies, Boston (n. d.) p. 131.)

These "redefinitions" should aid in making clear that when Howard Foster Lowry, following in the wake of Kingsmill, refers to Arnold's "dual nature" because he is gay without and sad within (Lowry, op. cit., p. 32.), or to his irony, as he does in the following passage, he is not referring to Arnold's fundamental dualism. "...one sees," says Lowry, "the familiar dualism that marks the author of Dover Beach and Friendships's Garland. The letters are full of banter and the humour of an amused tolerance of the vain shows and absurdities of men. Arnold always seems established at some solid vantage point from which he smiles, but by no means unkindly, at transitory people and at transitory things." (Ibid.,p. 32.) In other words, the deep, profound dualism to which Sherman does more than justice Lowry barely touches. Neither does Trilling who characterizes Arnold's dualism as "far too simple." (Trilling, op. cit., p. 344.) Trilling is right in maintaining that Arnold's dualism does not result in vigorous and imaginative treatment of new ethical situations (i. e., the dilemma of Antigone), but Trilling does not do justice to the conspicuous place which dualism holds in Arnold's thinking (or in the great systems of ethics and religion). What is a true searching of soul he regards superficially as the mind's "dialogue with itself" (Ibid., p. 113.), essentially the words which Arnold himself uses to describe a morbid intellectual condition -- and not the genuine dualistic conflict. (Incidentally, for an imaginative consideration on the basis of dualism of Antigone's ethical problem Irving Babbitt's Rousseau and Romanticism(p.47f.)should be consulted.

129. G. W. Russell, Matthew Arnold, New York, 1904, p. 262.

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This is an opinion, as we have seen, in which Stuart Pratt Sherman concurs. At this point, it is pertinent to quote Sherman more fully regarding the extent and nature of Arnold's dualism:

> "The primary fact in his religious experience was his consciousness of his own soul. One speaks with a good deal of hesitation about the nature of the soul; and Arnold himself is not too explicit. What he does make clear is his conviction that the true center of one's being is not in the life of the senses, nor in the shifting waves of emotion, nor in the activities of the discursive intellect. Deeper than all these, judging all these, unsatisfied with all these, the spiritual self sits apart, hungering and thirsting for its own felicity in the perfect, the absolute, the divine."[130]

In the course of this discussion I shall try to show that Arnold falls short of Sherman's estimate, that he is dualistic only up to a certain point. First, however, it is necessary to deal with his dualism up to that point.

Arnold's dualism appears in a poignant way in his letters. In writing to his sister, Mrs. Forster, he reveals a dualistic temper:[131] "...I intend not to give

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Russell emphasizes this point again: "...in his true doctrine nothing was more conspicuous that his insistence, early and late, on the supreme importance of character and conduct. The first object of life was to realize one's best self.." Ibid., p. 181.

130. Sherman op. cit., p. 59.

131. Arnold's father, as a good Christian, also displayed that temper. He makes a clear distinction between the "natural" and the "spiritual," the two antipodal aspects of man: "...the natural man receiveth not the things of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. That is, they are discerned only by a faculty which he has not, namely,by the spirit; and therefore, as beings devoid of reason cannot under-

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myself the rein in following my natural tendency, but to make a war against it till it ceases to isolate me from you..."[132]

The "natural tendency" would be to follow his impulses, his desires -- and to accede to the demand of his senses and the flesh. Arnold opposes this tendency, as the following entry in his notebooks reveals:

> "Self-denial has respect to the good estate of the soul, as it hinders her from being carried away to the lower pleasures of sense, that she may relish heavenly pleasures."[133]

This is the traditional dualism of the oriental believer, the Hebrew, the Christian, the Platonist. The gateway to heaven is not through the senses, and the control of them is the way of life. Obedience to the senses means disobedience to God, and freedom means deliverance from the senses, not surrender to them:

"He that will not obey the laws of God must

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stand the truths of science, or of man's wisdom, for they are without the faculty which can discern them, so beings devoid of God's spirit cannot understand the truths of God." (Thomas Arnold, Christian Life, Its Course, Its Hindrances, and Its Helps: Sermons Preached Mostly in the Chapel of Rugby School, London, 1849, p. 177.) The lower nature, he maintains further, must be rendered "powerless," for when the healthy nature has prevailed its victory is health and strength." Ibid., p. 79.

132. Letters, vol. 1, p. 17. This resolution of Arnold's may have been inspired by Goethe who made the following remark to Eckermann: "This natural tendency of yours is indeed not of a social kind; but what would be the use of culture, if we did not try to control our natural tendencies." Goethe, Conversations...with Eckermann and Soret (John Oxenford, translator), London, 1882, p. 82.

133. Notebooks, p. 5.

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> obey his own passions which are the worst tyrants; he must obey the world, and the humours of others. In short, to serve God is perfect freedom; all else is mere slavery, let the world call it what they please."[134]

Whatever Arnold's deflections are from the severities of the dualistic doctrine, he states with sincerity and emphasis his awareness of the existence of two contrary forces and the necessity of overcoming the forces and pushing forward to the light:

> "No one has a stronger and more abiding sense than I have of the 'daemonic' element -- as Goethe called it -- which underlies and encompasses our life; but I think, as Goethe thought, that the right thing is, while conscious of this element, and of all that there is inexplicable round one, to keep pushing on one's posts into the darkness, and to establish no post that is perfectly in light and firm."[135]

Socrates, it has been observed, refers to an "inner voice," to an oracle that brings him light and guidance, which gives him full serenity and self-assurance. Similarly Arnold speaks of an "inward spring" that makes it possible for him to understand and to endure the shocks of life, though it is evident that there has been more throbbing[136] doubt in Arnold and that he has not the full com-

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134. Ibid., p. 26.
135. Letters, vol. 1, p. 289.
136. Although one side of Socrates is definitely sceptical, as his last words well testify ("The hour of departure has arrived and we go our ways -- I to die and you to live. Which is better God only knows." ("Apology," vol. 1, p. 423.), yet it is questionable whether he could have spoken Arnold's famous verses of doubt, verses which perhaps more than any other utterance, sum up an age:
"Wandering between two worlds, one dead,

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prehension of the mystery, for where Socrates could talk about it with full candor and fearlessness Arnold was afraid that it would dissolve at the touch of analysis. Nevertheless the dualism is in the soul of Arnold even as it was in the soul of Socrates:

> "I have ripened, and am ripening so slowly that I should be glad of as much time as possible, yet I can feel, I rejoice to say, an inward spring which more and more seems to gain strength, and to promise to resist outward shocks, if they must come, however rough. But of this inward spring one must not talk for it does not like being talked about, and threatens to depart if one will not leave it in mystery."[137]

That Arnold, at heart, was a dualist is evident from the following passage. Depending on the strength of a man's character, perhaps no hour provides as much opportunity for spiritual insight as an hour of personal tragedy. In such an hour Arnold is clear-sighted enough to make a distinction between the claims of the flesh and the spirit and to associate unmistakably the latter with the will of God:

> "And so this loss [the death of his son] comes to me just after my forty fifth birthday, with so much other suffering in the flesh -- the departure of youth, cares of many kinds, an almost painful anxiety about public matters, to remind me that <u>the time past of our life may</u>

> The other powerless to be born,
> With nowhere yet to rest my head,
> Like these, on earth I wait forlorn.
> Their faith, my tears, this world deride
> I come to shed them at their side." "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse," 84-90.

137. <u>Letters</u>, vol. 1, p. 247.

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> suffice us! --words which have haunted me for the last year or two, and that we 'should no longer live in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God.' However different the interpretation we put on much of the facts and history of Christianity, we may unite in the bond of the call which is true for all of us, and for me above all, how full of meaning and warning."[138]

In deferring to a higher reality that stands opposed to our earthly existence, whatever it claims upon our affections, Arnold is at one with the dualists of the past.

-ii-

The theme of dualism figures often in Arnold's poetry.[139] The poem "Desire" suggests the oriental's preoccupation with that subject and the conviction which the oriental had that desire darkens the vision which one may have of God. Arnold prays that "From the cradle to the grave" he be saved "From the world's temptations," from its "tribulations," from the "fierce anguish" of desire, in which one either languishes or lies asleep "Heavy as death...." Not only uncontrolled desire but its partner in spiritual deterioration, "Pride," keeps man from mounting to God:

> "When the Soul, growing clearer,
> Sees God no nearer,
> When the Soul, mounting higher,
> To God comes no nigher:
> But the arch-fiend Pride
> Mounts at her side,
> Foiling her high emprize,

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138. Ibid., p. 443.
139. This poetry will be more fully treated in the next chapter, where a more complete consideration of the problem of dualism as it relates to nature will be made. Most of Arnold's poems having to do with the theme of dualism also have to do with nature.

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Sealing her eagle eyes,
And, when she fain would soar,
Makes idols to adore;
Changing the pure emotion
Of her high devotion,
To a skin-deep sense
Of her own eloquence:
Strong to deceive, strong to enslave --
Save, oh, save.

"From the ingrain'd fashion
of this earthly nature
That mars thy creature
From grief, that is but passion;
From mirth, that is but feigning;
From tears, that bring no healing;
From wild and weak complaining;
Thine old strength revealing;
Save, oh, save."[140]

In other words, Arnold wants to "detach" himself from the debilitating claims of the flesh, not to escape his moral responsibilities, but the better to fulfill them. Such a yearning is the "core" of dualism.

In the poem "Religious Isolation" Arnold defines the two forces of life: the force which gives man his distinct humanity and the force which gives birth and life to the things of the earth. There are two "lights" which guide creation; but a man must make sure, the poet implies, that the two lights are different and that he follow the light of self control and maturity:

"Do thou, whom light in thine own inmost soul
(Not less thy boast) illuminates, control
Wishes unworthy of a man full-grown.
What though the holy secret which moulds thee
Moulds not the solid Earth? though never Winds
Have whisper'd it to the complaining Sea,
Nature's great law, and law of all men's minds?
To its own impulse every creature stirs:

140. "Desire," 14-28.

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Live by thy light, and Earth will live
by hers."[141]

Dualism, as we have seen, is a conflict between two forces which go by different names. In one form or another Arnold is almost always aware of this conflict, either when he speaks of himself or when he describes others. In the following verses about Byron he recognizes that Byron's own dualism was a conflict between "Passion" and the "Eternal Law":

"When Byron's eyes were shut in death,
We bow'd our head and held our breath.
He taught us little: but our soul
Had felt him like a thunder's roll.
With shivering heart the strife we saw,
Of Passion with Eternal Law."[142]

One aspect of dualism as a principle and a reality of existence is belief in the immortality of the soul. The belief may take different forms but in general the dualist believes that man has a hereafter and that there is a continuity between the higher self or soul of man while it is on this earth and its existence in the next. Arnold, in speaking about his father, reveals that he has that belief:

"O strong soul, by what shore
Tarriest thou now? For that force
Surely, has not been left vain!
Somewhere, surely afar,
In the sounding labour house vast
Of being, is practised that strength,
Zealous, beneficent, firm!"[143]

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141. "Religious Isolation," 6-14.
142. "Memorial Verses," 6-11.
143. "Rugby Chapel," 37-43. Arnold's belief in the immortality of the soul is further evidenced in the following statement: "He would be a narrow reasoner who denied all validity to the idea of im-

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The notion that the senses must be subdued, that "a mark of everlasting light" should be set above them as a goal for the spirit is central among the dualists. The following stanzas testify that Arnold also held this view:

> "O human soul! as long as thou canst so
> Set up a mark of everlasting light,
> Above the howling senses' ebb and flow,
>
> To cheer thee, and to right thee if thou roam,
> Not with lost toil thou labourest through the night!
> Thou mak'st the heaven thou hop'st indeed thy home."[144]

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A consideration of Arnold's criticism will reveal concrete and explicit evidence of Arnold's dualism. The very use of the term "self" or "real self"[145] suggests the oriental conception, which, it should be indicated again, is not basically different from the Christian conception, both of which are based on the opposition within the human being of two forces, one pulling toward the earth, the other toward God. By and large, Arnold champions this view (though his terminology -- the dubious association

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mortality, because this idea rests on presentiment mainly, and does not admit of certain demonstration." (Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma; an Essay towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible, New York, 1883, p. 107). The conception of the immortality of the soul for Arnold, however, is far from central.

144. "East London," 9-14.

145. A critic finds fault with Arnold's use of the word "self" on the ground that consciousness of it is limited to the understanding of the finite personality, so that to associate its origin with an impersonal God would be difficult if not impossible. He says: "A human being, with its intense consciousness of what it means by the word 'self,' can hardly be trained to think of that self as being originated by any power which is not also personal." (Arthur

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of reason with the real self -- gives the first clue to his deflection). Regarding, however, the existence of the two selves he is unequivocal, as the following passage illustrates:

> "It will generally be admitted...that all experience as to conduct brings us at last to the fact of two selves, or instincts, or forces, -- name them how we will, and however we may suppose them to have arisen, -- contending for the mastery in man: one, a movement of first impulse and more involuntary, leading us to gratify any inclination that may solicit us, and called generally a movement of man's ordinary or passing self, of sense, appetite, desire; the other, a movement of reflection and more voluntary, leading us to submit inclination to some rule, and called generally a movement of man's higher or enduring self, of reason, spirit, will. The thing is described in different words by different nations and men relating their experience of it, but as to the thing itself they all, or all the most serious and important among them, agree. This, I think, will be admitted. Nor will it be denied that they all come to the conclusion that for a man to obey the higher self, or reason, or whatever it is to be called, is happiness and life for him: to obey the lower is death and misery. 147

Christopher Benson, "Matthew Arnold" (The Leaves of the Tree), p. 411.) But it is on such a point as this that oriental dualism is profound, for it removes the gap between the personal self of the individual and the impersonal Self of God. Such a liaison between the self of man and God as Self was suitable to the mind and temperament of Arnold, as it apparently was not to his critic who may not have steeped himself in oriental lore.

146. See Chapter II, footnote 10.

147. Matthew Arnold, St. Paul and Protestantism, with an Essay on Puritanism and the Church of England, and Last Essays on Church and Religion, New York, 1883, p. 166. Because Arnold's statement that "all experience...brings us...to the fact of two selves" may be considered too broad, one cannot too often call upon other voices to support him. Such a voice is

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Arnold believed that the life of Jesus not only illustrates the dualism of existence,[148] but that Jesus himself taught that man had two selves. Jesus' method, according to Arnold, was to teach that "self-renouncement" gives happiness. This of course is not only Christianity; it is also orientalism and Platonism and Aristotelianism -- all of which hold that desire tethers the soul and release from it makes for mystical and spiritual insight. Arnold, of course, intimates that Jesus had a method which his predecessors did not have; namely, the combination of sweetness and light. Nevertheless dualism was the principle which Arnold believed Jesus followed and to which Arnold himself gives unqualified approval:

> "Jesus made his followers first look within and examine themselves; he made them feel that they had a best and real self as op-

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that of St. Basil who represents a large segment of human experience and who sustains Arnold's view concerning the spiritual "otherness" of our lives: "We Christians, young men, hold that this human life is a not supremely precious thing, nor do we recognize anything as unconditionally a blessing which benefits us in this life only. Neither pride of ancestry, nor bodily strength, nor beauty, nor, indeed, whatever of human affairs may be called great, do we consider worthy of desire, or the possessors of them as objects of envy; but we place our hopes upon the things which are beyond, and in preparation for the life eternal do all things that we do." (Essays on the Study and Use of Poetry by Plutarch and Basil the Great (Frederick Morgan Padelford, translator), New York, 1902, p. 102.)

148. Arnold shows that this is his position in speaking of Paul's attitude toward the crucifixion: "Paul's foremost notion of this sacrifice is that by it Jesus died to the law of selfish impulse, parted with what to men in general is most precious and dear." St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 93.

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> posed to their ordinary and apparent one, and that their happiness depended on saving this best self from being over-borne. To find his own soul, his true and permanent self, became set up in man's views as his chief concern, as the secret of happiness; and so it really is. 'How is a man advantaged if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of himself?'-- was the searching question which Jesus made men ask themselves. And then by recommending, and still more by exemplifying in his own practice, by the exhibition in himself with the most prepossessing pureness, clearness, and beauty, of the two qualities counteracted, self-renouncement and mildness, he made his followers feel that in these qualities lay the secret of their best self; that to attain them was in the highest degree requisite and natural, and that a man's whole happiness depended upon it." [149]

How did Jesus arrive at the conclusion that man is dualistic? According to Arnold he started experimentally: he based his conclusion on experience and observation. He observed that those who lived by "righteousness" were conscious of a lower and higher self within them. Jesus, Arnold avers, knew that this was a solid fact because those who lived by such a doctrine achieved happiness; those who did

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149. Literature and Dogma, p. 80. In the use of the term "natural" Arnold is somewhat negligent, although he is using the term in the mildest sense -- as a synonym possibly for "plausible." Yet the use of the term leads to confusion, since it could be easily maintained that it is more natural to live by one's senses than to oppose them. Arnold's drift toward naturalism -- his frank avowal of it -- cannot, however, obscure the fact that his definitions of dualism have great felicity and that he is irresistibly drawn toward it in its supernatural form. When Arnold, contradicting himself perhaps, remarks the "conscience whose praise is not of man but of God" (St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 46.), he is not speaking as a naturalist. He is,in fact, talking about the God of his fathers.

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not fell into misery. By his skillful use of the figure of the "two lives" or two selves, Jesus was able to win over the multitude. The whole way of life and salvation Jesus constructed on the basis of this fundamental dualism. So Arnold believed and so he affirms:

> "From his countrymen's errors about righteousness he [Jesus] reverted to the solid, authentic, universal fact of experience about it; the fact of the higher and lower self in man, inheritors the one of them of happiness, the other of misery. He possessed himself of it; he made it the centre of his teaching. He made it so in the well-known formula, his secret: 'He that will save his life shall lose it; he that do lose his life shall save it.' And by his admirable figure of the two lives of man, the real life and the seeming life, he connected this profound fact of experience with that attractive poetry of hopes and imaginings which possessed the minds of his countrymen. Eternal life? Yes, the life in the higher and undying self of man. Judgment? Yes, the trying , in conscience, of the claims and investigations of the two lives, and the decision between them. Resurrection? Yes, the rising from bondage and transience with the lower life to victory and permanence with the higher. The kingdom of God? Yes, the reign amongst mankind of the higher life. The Christ, the son of God? Yes, the bringer-in and founder of this reign of the higher life, this true kingdom of God."[150]

What does Arnold mean by the "kingdom of God"? He means living by the light of the higher Self. Arnold thus is re-interpreting a conventional or orthodox view, but in doing so, he does not depart from basic dualism, anymore than the protagonist of the Bhagavad-Gita or Buddha departs from it when they de-materialize heaven[151]

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150. Ibid., p. 133.
151. "It was the effort of Jesus to place the bliss, the eternal life of popular religion, not where popular religion placed it, in a fantastic paradise to come, but in the joy of self-renouncement." Ibid., p. 174.

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into a spiritual and inward state of the personality, yet dependent upon a transcendent source for its impetus and strength. The kingdom of God is the fulfillment of the law here on earth, but such a realization does not require the sacrifice of the belief of two separate selves. Says Arnold:

> "And what is the kingdom of God or of heaven? It is this: God's will done, as in heaven so on earth. And how was this come to mankind? Because Jesus is come to save his people from their sins. And what is being saved from our sins? This: Entering into the kingdom of heaven by doing the will of our Father which is in heaven. And how does Christ enable us to do this? By teaching us to take his yoke upon us, and learn of him to deny ourselves and take up our cross daily and follow him, and to lose our life for the purpose of saving it. So that St. Paul might say most truly that the seal of the sure foundation of God in Christianity was this: Let every one that nameth him bring forth fruits of the Spirit, -- love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faith, mildness, self-control."[152]

Converting heaven from a material to a spiritual realm and the kingdom of God from an extraneous to an internal condition does not mean the abandonment of faith but the use of it. Without faith, faith in the teaching of Jesus, one would find the ascent from the lower self to the higher self exceedingly difficult:

> "Identifying ourselves with Jesus Christ through faith we become as he was. We live with his thoughts and feelings, and we participate, therefore, in his freedom from the ruinous law in our members, in his obedience to the saving law of the spirit, in his conformity to the eternal order, in the joy and

152. Ibid., p. 133.

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> peace of his life to God. 'The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus,' says Paul, 'freed me from the law of sin and death.' This is what is done for us by faith.'"[153]

In interpreting the nature of the lower self, the "motions of what Paul calls 'the law in our members,"[154] Arnold allows for its complexity. He characterizes these motions as a "hydrabrood"[155] and realizes that the self though single is subject to multifarious faults: "...when we are working against one fault, a dozen others crop up without our expecting it; and this it is which drives the man who deals seriously with himself to difficulty, nay to despair."[156] The "self," moreover, is so constituted that one fault may, like a cancerous growth, consume the whole personality and so far as the conscience is concerned, "whoever offends on one point...is guilty of all."[157] That is, the lower self has to satisfy the conscience on all points, the conscience which is the oracle of God and operates with satisfaction only when it has the "praise" or blessing of God: "...no satisfaction of all the requirements men may make of us, no privileges of any sort, can give peace of conscience; -- of conscience 'whose praise is not of men but of God.'"[158]

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153. Ibid., p. 59.
154. Ibid., p. 45.
155. Loc. cit.
156. Loc. cit.
157. Ibid., p. 47.
158. Ibid., p. 46. On the matter of conscience Arnold is not entirely consistent. No doubt his difficulty arises from his desire to find a golden mean between the Hebraic "strictness of conscience" and the

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The sensuality of the lower self has to be abandoned,

Hellenic "spontaneity of conscience." There are times when Arnold approves of an austere conscience, other times of a resilient one. Hebraism is criticised for "making strictness of the moral conscience...the principal thing..." (Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, New York, 1883, p. 142.) What he wants is a less rigid and more flexible conscience, for as he says at another place: "...what is law in one place is not law in another, what is law here to-day is not law even here tomorrow; and as for conscience, what is binding on one man's conscience is not binding on another's." (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 10.) Conscience thus becomes a "relative power" and not the absolute organ of God. Arnold's views on the conscience must be compared with Cardinal Newman's for one to realise the difference between a "religious" conception of the conscience and one that leans toward a naturalistic interpretation. For Newman the conscience is the organ which perceives the "Supernatural and Divine." (John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, London, 1917, p. 110.) He maintains further that "the phenomena of Conscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive..." (Loc. cit.) "...and this," he adds, "is the creative principle of religions as the Moral Science of ethics." (Loc. cit.) For Newman conscience is not a subjective complex of emotion, which alters with the changing tides of circumstances. It is a voice which asserts itself authoritatively: "...CONSCIENCE does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly DISCERNS A SANCTION HIGHER THAN SELF for its decisions, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them. And hence it is that we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice, a term which we should never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful; and moreover a voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of experience." (Ibid., p. 107.) Finally, conscience teaches us, in absolute form, the nature of God and our duties towards Him: "Conscience, too, teaches us, not only that God is, but what He is, it provides for the mind a real image of Him, as a medium of worship; it gives us a rule of right and wrong, as being His rule, and a code of moral duties. Moreover, it is so constituted, that, if obeyed, it becomes clearer in its injunctions, and wider in their range, and corrects and completes the accidental feebleness

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and so also have "fierce temper and pride," and the way

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of its initial teachings. Conscience, then, considered as our guide, is fully furnished for its office." (Ibid., p. 390.)

Martineau is a "far remove" from the orthodoxy of Cardinal Newman, but he believes that the conscience is the moral interpreter of the divine order: "As the Causal aspect of the Divine nature is opened to us by our own Will and carried out into the sphere of nature, so must we expect the moral aspect to be disclosed to us by our Conscience and applied to the relations of human life." (James Martineau, A Study of Religion: Its Sources and Contents, Oxford, 1889, vol. 2, p. 1.)

Regarding the "relativity" of conscience Arnold's and Mill's positions are close. Mill says: "People are...easily able to flatter themselves that they are acting from the motive of conscience when they are doing in obedience to the inferior motive things which their conscience approves. We continually see how great is the power of opinion in opposition to conscience; how men 'follow a multitude to do evil'; how often opinion induces them to do what their conscience disapproves, and still oftener prevents what it commands." (John Stuart Mill, Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism, London, 1923, p. 84.) This is to say that for Mill conscience is an organ that is extremely sensitive to public opinion; in fact, it is molded by public opinion rather than by God. Conscience is not an inner organ, under the sponsorship of God, but a complex of kinetic responses to social pressures. Even when the conscience of man does function, to the extent of apprising him of an error, it has not the strength to withstand public opinion. Often, too, man deludes himself (flatters himself) into thinking that he is following an inner voice, but in reality, though he lacks the power of self-scrutiny to discover it, it is social pressure (obviously capricious and "relative") to which he is acceding, and not to a conscience under divine supervision. Public opinion, in other words, has more power over man's conscience than an absolute God.

Regarding the conscience, then, one must conclude that it is more "absolute" for the supernaturalist than for the naturalist and that Arnold in acceding to its relative powers somewhat embarrasses his position as a consistent dualist.

159. Literature and Dogma, p. 90.

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to achieve this moral end is to use the "conscience simply and sincerely."[160] Moreover, "our apparent self...has to undergo a profound modification from the law of our higher real self, the law of righeousness; because he, whose ideal is the free development of the senses all round, serves the senses, is a servant."[161] Such servitude leads to degradation. The point is that one should not be the servant of the senses, but of the conscience, which is the servant of the real self synchronized with the will of God.

Significant therefore is the fact that "one side" of Arnold does not deny the divinity of the higher self. "Christ's method," we learn, "directed the disciple's eye inward, and set his consciousness to work; and the first thing his consciousness told him was, that he had two selves pulling him in different ways."[162] But the "higher self," by exercising its "moral powers" can assimilate its divine nature: "...it is our powers of moral action, and through the perfecting of these, that Christ leads us 'to be partakers of the divine nature.'"[163] In so stressing the possibilities of the higher self Arnold places himself

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160. Loc. cit.
161. Ibid., p. 324. So the poet-critic Sir Philip Sidney passes censure upon "our degenerate souls, made worse by their clay lodgings..." (Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie, Oxford, 1829, p. 15.) He adds that the purpose of knowledge is "to lift up the mind from the dungeon of the body to enjoying His, our divine essence." Loc. cit.
162. Literature and Dogma, p. 182.
163. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. xxxii.

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in the ranks of the true dualists.

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A phrase which occurs constantly in Arnold's religious criticism is "dying to our life."[164] This phrase is one of the keystones of Arnold's dualism. The phrase has more than a metaphoric quality, as it represents Arnold's conviction, however intermittent, that life is two-fold and that one comes into the realization of the true or real life as one puts away or dies unto the second or false life. We have seen that the oriental especially strove to extinguish the fires of the senses, and that this attitude in varying degrees was shared by Greek and Christian alike. Arnold felt that Christ, perhaps more than any other figure, was successful in putting the senses -- or the evil impulses which they nurture -- to death. What the ethical rewards and spiritual consequences are of such annihilation the following passage makes clear:

> "All impulses of selfishness conflict with Christ's feeling, he showed it by dying to them all, if you are one with Him by faith and sympathy, you can die to them also. Then, secondly, if you thus die with Him, you become transformed by the renewing of your mind, and rise with Him. The law of the spirit of life which is in Christ becomes the law of your life also, and frees you from the law of sin and death. You rise with Him to

164. "Man sincere, man before conscience, man as Jesus put him, finds laid down for himself no rights; nothing but an endless dying, and in that dying no rights; nothing but an endless dying, and in that dying is life." (Notebooks, p. 68.) Note also that "conscience" as used here suggests a force at once absolute and severe -- even Puritan.

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> that harmonious conformity with the real and eternal order, that sense of pleasing God who trieth the hearts, which is life and peace, and which grows more and more till it become glory. If you suffer with Him, therefore, you shall also be glorified with Him."[165]

One of the remarkable qualities of Jesus, according to Arnold, is that he was able by reason of his character to make this "dying process" agreeable. Under his divine inspiration the "offering up" of our ordinary self becomes a painless sacrifice, so that the world may yet be transformed once it has made itself sensitive to Christ's appeal:

> "The character and discourse of Jesus Christ possess, I have elsewhere often said, two signal powers: mildness and sweet reasonableness. The latter, the power which so puts before our view duty of every kind as to give it the force of an intuition, as to make it seem, -- to make the total sacrifice of our ordinary self seem, -- the most simple, natural winning, necessary thing in the world, has been hitherto applied with but a very limited range, it is destined to an infinitely wider application, and has a fruitfulness which will yet transform the world."[166]

Again Arnold stresses the fact that this "dying to our apparent self" is a process which Jesus has made agreeable because of his secret. Once we have learned it, what we have formerly thought of as life is death and what we have once thought of as death is life, for it is the spirit which gives life, and not the body. ("We die with

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165. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 65.
166. Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 263.

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Christ to the law of the flesh"; we "live with Christ to the law of the mind."[167]) Regarding the efficacy of Jesus' method -- the method of dying to oneself -- Arnold says:

> "The pain and fear and gloom of dying to our apparent self, to 'the wishes of the flesh and the current thoughts' are so great, that only Jesus and his 'secret,' lighting the process up with joy by showing it to be really life not death, could overcome them, and could enable mankind to overcome them."[168]

The injunction to annihilate our senses is not for the purpose of preparing ourselves here on earth for a future life in another sphere. As we saw, Arnold, not unlike the oriental dualists, reduces heaven to an internal condition of the mind, but unlike them he is preoccupied with the problems here on earth, so that he enjoins that the doctrine of "dying to our life" have an immediate application. Reiterating his fond paradox -- 'He that loveth his life shall lose it, and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal" -- he declares:

> "This 'secret of Jesus', as we call it, will be found applicable to all the thousand problems which the exercise of conduct daily offers; it alone can solve them all happily, and may indeed be called 'a fount of water springing up unto everlasting life.'"[169]

Furthermore, there is a connection between "dying unto ourselves" and brotherly love. Spiritual love one experiences after one has subdued the senses. There is

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167. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 64.
168. Literature and Dogma, p. 247.
169. Ibid., p. 193.

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a fraternal bond of interest among men who have conquered their natural selves and "passed from death to life." On the lower level we are tangential and diffusive; on the higher level we are united in the common self:

> "...to live by dying to our life in this world is to transfer the natural love of life from the personal self to the impersonal self, -- the self that we share with all other men; so that to die to oneself is to love the brethern, and by this side is the secret of Jesus always in our Epistle presented. 'Let us love one another! 'We know that we have passed from death to life because we love the brethern.'"[170]

Arnold also gives to the crucifixion an interpretation[171] which may be taken as symbolic and concrete evidence of the universal truth of dualism. Symbolically, Christ's death on the cross may be said to represent the terminus to which the human race must come as a result of its natural limitations, its frailties and iniquities -- its "sins". The resurrection symbolizes the capability that the human race or each individual has of "rising" beyond or surpassing those limitations. Arnold, however, emphasizes the concrete interpretation. "The use by Jesus of the words life and death," he says, "must on no account...be limited to

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170. Ibid., p. 240.

171. The following statement not only illustrates in concrete form Arnold's belief in the personal dualism of Jesus but also Arnold's view regarding the significance of the crucifixion as a spiritual symbol of that truth: "Jesus parted with what, to men in general, is the most precious of things, -- individual self and selfishness; he pleased not himself, obeyed the spirit of God, died to sin and to the law in our members, consummated upon the cross this death...." St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 91.

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this his crucifixion and after-triumph, though in these, no doubt, his dying and living culminated."[172] That is, the dying on the cross is the end of a process which in Christ's life began long before the actual crucifixion. Literally Christ put a "quietus" on the claims of the flesh, "died to them," so that here on earth he anticipated and fulfilled the ethical injunctions which the crucifixion came to represent:

> "Christ throughout his life and in his death presented his body a living sacrifice to God; every self-willed impulse blindly trying to assert itself without respect of the universal order, he died to. You, says Paul to his disciple, are to do the same. Never mind how various and multitudinous the impulses are: impulses to intemperance, concupiscence, covetousness, pride, sloth, envy, malignity, anger, clamour, bitterness, harshness, unmercifulness. Die to them all, and to each as it comes. Christ did." 173

And finally:

> "Long before his signal crucifixion Jesus had died, by taking up daily that cross which his disciples, after his daily example, were to take up also. 'Therefore doth my Father love me,' he says, <u>because I lay down my life that I may take it again</u>.' He had risen to life long before his crowning Resurrection, risen to life in what he calls '<u>my joy</u>,' which he desired to see fulfilled in his disciples also: -- my <u>joy</u>, to have kept my Father's commandment and abide in his love." 174

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The dualism that Arnold discovers in the divine character of Jesus -- the annihilation of the lower or "ordinary self" so that the higher self might reign luminously and clear -- he carries over into his political thinking. As we

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172. <u>Literature and Dogma</u>, p. 221.
173. <u>St. Paul and Protestantism</u>, p. 64.
174. <u>Literature and Dogma</u>, p. 221.

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have seen, Arnold establishes a connection between "dying unto ourselves" and the achievement of a fraternal order among mankind. As people subdue their lower selves, they come together on a higher plane of spiritual endeavor or enlightenment (or they should so come together if they practised a dualistic discipline). Between this sort of religious unison and political unison as a goal there is not much difference for Arnold. He does not prescribe one sort of best self or state for the religious thinker and another best self or state for the political thinker. Society is ill because it lives by its ordinary self, the undisciplined lower self which believes, as far as it may be characterized as a form of "will," in cultivating rather than in disciplining its arrogant desires. "We have found," says Arnold, "that at the bottom of our present unsettled state, so full of the seeds of trouble, lies the notion of its being the prime right and happiness, for each of us, to affirm himself, and his ordinary self; to be doing and to doing freely as he likes."[175] This is anarchy, either on the spiritual or the political plane.

What Arnold wants people to do, then, is to rule their anarchistic emotions, and, from the point of view of this investigation, what is significant is that his idea of the "State" embodies a strong, personal dualism. Arnold says:

> "Well, then, what if we tried to rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole

175. Culture and Anarchy, p. 128.

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> community, the State, and to find our centre of light and authority there? Every one of us has the idea of country, as a sentiment; hardly any one of us has the idea of the State, as a working power. And why? Because we habitually live in our ordinary selves, which do not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to belong." 176

We are not to surmise that we could achieve this "centre of light and authority" beyond ourselves by escaping the fundamental responsibility[177] of ruling our ordinary selves or that those in authority can escape that responsiblity. The temptation to escape it of course is always present. Arnold says:

> "...our statesmen have every temptation, when they must act, to go along as they do with the ordinary self of those on whose favour they depend, to adopt as their own its desires, and to serve them with fidelity, and even, if possible, with ardour. This is the more easy for them, because there are not wanting, -- and there never will be wanting, -- thinkers to call the desires of the ordinary self or any great section of the community edicts of the national mind and laws of human progress, and to give them a general, a philosophic, and imposing expression." 178

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176. Ibid., p. 67.
177. Trilling admits that Arnold's conception of the State ultimately comes to rest upon the responsibility of the individual: "In the end Arnold must turn to the individual, to that possible Socrates in each man's breast..." (Trilling, op. cit., p. 254) The fact is further sustained by a statement from Arnold himself, which proves incontrovertibly that in his conception of the state, Arnold's final emphasis is not upon a class, but upon personal dualism: "...whereas in France, since the Revolution, a man feels that the power which represses him is the State, is himself, here a man feels that the power which represses him is the Tories, the upper class, the aristocracy, and so on." (The italics are Arnold's.)
178. Culture and Anarchy, p. xxxix.

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That is, if one weakly succumbs to his lower self, there is no court of appeal beyond the integrity of the higher or best self or the vested power of the best selves (unless it is to God, from whom the higher self is an emanation). A statesman may very well be seduced by the claims of the ordinary self, either his own or that of others, but sooner or later he will be brought to book by his higher self or the higher selves of others, as a critical alertness comes to be mutually exercised.

Arnold has such faith (no doubt naive and uncritical) in the adequacy of the real self as a corrective organ, especially in its collective power -- "...by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony"[179] -- that he believes it would arrest any deviation from the path of righteousness -- even a revolution: "...our best self, or right reason enjoins us to set our faces against"[180] outbreaks or insurgencies (which may emanate from any of the three classes)[181], for such infractions are a violation "of our

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179. Ibid., p. 68.
180. Ibid., p. 76.
181. Arnold finds different faults in all the three classes, but the faults derive from a common cause; namely, the indulgence of the ordinary self. W. H. Dawson sustains this view. He says: "It is in this propensity to indulge the ordinary self, with its crudeness and imperfections, that all three classes, in spite of the widest external differences, betray a common nature, though from each class emerge at all times exceptional spirits who are conscious of aspiration after perfection and give effect to that aspiration by casting off the characteristics of their fellows." W. H. Dawson, Matthew Arnold and His Relation to the Thought of our Time, New York, 1904, p. 118.

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collective best self, or our national right reason."[182]

As I shall presently show, Arnold, in placing his faith in reason endangers his position as a spiritual dualist. The qualifying adjective "right" placed before reason shows that Arnold is somewhat aware of the dangerous implications of the term, but he uses it frequently enough to weaken the firm foundation of his dualism. For the moment, however, it can be said that in his conception of the State Arnold does insist upon an incisive distinction between the ordinary self and the best or higher self.

To insist that Arnold believes in a personal dualism is not to maintain that Arnold is a "spiritual anarchist" who does not believe in instituted authority above and beyond the individual. From the following passage, it is obvious that his conception of the state goes beyond that of the finite individual:

> "The State is properly just what Burke called it -- 'the nation in its collective and corporate character.' The State is the representative acting-power of the nation; the action of the State is the representative action of the nation. Nominally emanation from the Crown, as the ideal unity in which the nation concentrates itself, this action, by the constitution of our country, really emanates from the ministers of the Crown."[183]

But this passage needs to be set beside another:

> "...the State-power which it [the Nation] employs should be a power which really represents its best self, and whose action its intelligence

182. Culture and Anarchy, p. 70.
183. Matthew Arnold, Mixed Essays, Irish Essays, and Others, New York, 1880, p. 31.

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> and justice can heartily avow and adopt; not a power which reflects its inferior self, and of whose action, as of its own second-rate action, it has perpetually to be ashamed."[184]

Now it is obvious that though Arnold believes -- naturally believes, one should add -- in instituted power, he does so without sacrificing his belief in "personal dualism." "Everything conspires to give us the notion," he complains, "that there is only an ordinary self, and that there is not a best self."[185] Arnold is here not generalizing about inferior and superior people and dividing humanity into two such classes. Rather he is emphasizing the fact that each man, no matter what his station or rank, is composed of two selves and that Barbarian, Philisitine, and populace alike do not escape the responsibility of subordinating to their own best selves their "multitudinous turbulent and blind impulses of [their] ordinary selves."[186][187]

To believe, of course, in the dualism of human nature is not to obliterate the distinction between individuals or to say that when everyone lives by the light of his

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184. Ibid., p. 34.
185. Culture and Anarchy, p. 96.
186. Dawson, again, confirms this view. He says: "... each class and every one of its members must cease to affirm the natural self, with its class prejudices, its unreasoning likes and dislikes, its partial and interested view of things, and in the cultivation of common interests and a common life assert for the individual and for society that true liberty which exist only in the sphere of harmony and law." (Dawson, op. cit., p. 55.) Trilling, too, maintains that Arnold's conception was above class; the State was to be "above all classes, above all sects, synthesizing their diversities, resolving their conflicts." Trilling, op. cit., p. 173.
187. Culture and Anarchy, p. 173.

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own best self all people will be on a democratic footing and all distinctions between classes or individuals will disappear. Arnold does say, as we have just seen, that in our best selves we are most united and harmonized. Nevertheless, the best self of one person is not likely to be the same as the best self of another person, and on this point Arnold is most clear. "Admit," he says, "that for the world, as we hitherto know it, what the philosopher and prophet say is true: that the majority are unsound. Even with communities with exceptional gifts, even in the Jewish State, the Athenian State, the majority are unsound. But there is the remnant."[188] Obviously the best self of

188. Matthew Arnold, Discourses in America, London, 1896, p. 21. Arnold has been severly criticised -- and misunderstood -- regarding his conception of the saving remnant. John M. Robertson stigmatizes it as follows: "A more dismally fantastic doctrine will not readily be found in secular literature." (Robertson, op. cit., p. 179.) In other words, Arnold's idea impresses Robertson as highly impractical. He illustrates: "In Athens, with its three hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, even a remnant of one in ten -- thirty-five thousand -- was insufficient to save the State; and similarly the population of Israel could not yield remnant enough; but in a country like the United States, with its population of fifty millions of the Germanic stock, prepared by the Puritan discipline, even a remnant of one in a hundred would represent five hundred thousand and this would probably be sufficient for saving purposes." (Ibid., p. 178.) Trilling says that Arnold's "half mystical retreat" (Trilling is referring to Arnold's conception of the State but the same criticism is especially applicable to the idea of the "remnant")...exposes him to the charge ...of apologizing for a reactionary if benevolent absolutism." (Trilling, op. cit., p. 277.) These criticisms do not do justice either to the spiritual or practical aspects of Arnold's conception. Irving Babbitt gives the following defense of it: The "doctrine of the saving remnant has been denounced as

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those who do not belong to the remnant is not equal in quality with the best selves of those who do belong to it, but such a view which may not be valid on political grounds is certainly sound on psychological or even religious grounds, for the higher self of a Jesus or a Buddha is to be distinguished from that of an ordinary mortal still living in his sins. Arnold's deference, in other words, to an external authority, whether on spiritual or political grounds, does not, again, impair his belief in a personal dualism.

To conclude, Arnold's notions of the State, a State reflecting the talent, genius, and ability of each best self of the nation is merely the logical consummation of his belief in dualism. To be sure, the State must reflect this dualism; it is, in fact, an embodiment of the personal doctrine, though in its corporate character it rises above individual and class:

> "I conclude that we can as little find in the working class as in the aristocratic or

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priggish. It is the exact opposite. A man to belong to the remnant must be humble, must feel the need of looking to some standard above his ordinary self. Any one who thus looks up, has some chance of being looked up to in return. If a considerable group of individuals thus take on a yoke of a common standard, it will tend by its concerted effort and the force of its example to leaven the whole social lump." (Irving Babbitt, "Matthew Arnold," The Nation (August 2, 1917), vol. 105, p. 120.) The practical aspect of Arnold's conception is that man has always been sensitive to an example, either good or bad, and that in spite of what Robertson says the more good examples a nation has to follow the better are its chances of being "saved." Arnold's conception of the saving remnant is thus in accord with his general idea of the integrity and leadership of the individual.

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> in the middle class our much-wanted source of authority, as culture suggest it to us. Well, then, what if we tried to rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community, the State, and to find our centre of light and authority there?"189

But in the end, this light, this authority, will never be better than the individual consciences which guide them,[190] so that personal dualism, to repeat, remains central in Arnold's ideas of the State.

-vi-

So far I have tried to show that Arnold, despite certain infractions, defines and heartily subscribes to a genuine dualism: a conflict between two sides which do not fuse. (Oneness when it exists is between spirit and spirit, not between matter and spirit.) If Arnold were completely logical and unified he would never veer from the position of clearly demarcating the two sides. He would boldly distinguish between what belongs to one side and what belongs to the other. Unfortunately, Arnold does not always make that distinction. Intimations of his failure have been observable before, but one such failure must now be dealt with more fully.

The genuine dualism is not, we must repeat, between

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189. Culture and Anarchy, p. 67.

190. Plato expresses this basic conception as follows: "...governments vary as to the dispositions of men vary....there must be as many of the one as there are of the other...For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and not of the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things after them..." Plato, "Republic," vol. 1, p. 802.

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the lower self on one hand, that is the emotional self, the senses, the flux, the sum of our desires, and the reason on the other, for as everyone knows one can have a wrong feeling about a matter and reason oneself into believing it right. Reason, that is, can serve the devil as easily as it can serve God. Therefore those who define dualism hesitate to associate reason with the higher part of it. (See p. 9.) The higher part of dualism, in its concentrated, unalloyed form is goodness. If it has any limitations they are not ethical, for dualism, in the final analysis, is a conflict between good and evil.[191] If reason

191. The dualist in rejecting reason because it is not always an ally of "good" finds himself in a difficulty (if not in a contradiction) regarding an aspect of his definition -- specifically that aspect which presupposes that man is dualistic by virtue of the qualities which distinguish him from the animal. Pope eloquently deals with this distinction as follows:

"Far as creation's ample range extends,
The scale of sensual, mental pow'rs ascends:
Mark how it mounts, to man's imperial race,
From the green myriads in the peopled grass:
What modes of sight betwixt each wide extreme,
The mole's dim curtain, and the lynx's beam:
Of smell, the headlong lioness between,
And hound sagacious on the tainted green:
Of hearing, from the life that fills the flood,
To that which warbles through the vernal wood:
The spider's touch, how exquisitely fine!
Feels at each thread, and lives along the line:
In the nice bee, what sense so subtly true
From pois'nous herbs extracts the healing dew?
How instict varies in the grov'ling swine,
Compar'd, half-reas'ning elephant, with thine!
'Twixt that, and reason, what a nice barrier,
For ever sep'rate, yet for ever near!
Remembrance and reflection how ally'd;
What thin partitions sense from thought divide:
And middle natures, how they long to join,
Yet never pass th' insuperable line! (Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, 207-228.)

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serves evil, or is likely to play a hypocritical role, how can it be made synonymous with God, synchronized with his powers or will -- considered a higher part of dualism?

Arnold himself is aware of the limitations or reason when it becomes abstruse, for in reply to his critics, he consoles himself that his "reason" or "reasoning" is not abstruse. He says:

> "...what a consolation to us, who are so perpetually being taunted with our known inaptitude for abstruse reasoning, if we can find that for this great concern of religion, at any rate, abstruse reasoning does not seem to be the appointed help; and that as good or better a help,--for indeed there can hardly, to judge by the present state of things, be

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Plainly, there is a "nice barrier," an "insuperable line" between the "half-reasoning elephant" and man. It is reason, Pope implies, which makes man man; it is the lack of it which makes the animal an animal. Common sense and experience also tend to show that a man degenerates to the level of an animal when he is not under the control of reason so that one should say that it is reason which makes man genuinely dualistic. The answer to such an argument is that it is freedom from "animality," or the possibility of achieving that freedom that makes man a dual creature rather than the blatant fact that he is genus homo. From an oriental point of view, an animal is not denied possibility of achieving that emancipation in the sphere of eternity, just as a person may, if he fails to fulfill his ethical obligations, degenerate into animalhood: in fact, he is reborn as an animal. So far as reason is concerned, it is not an absolute faculty, like a soul. An infant comes into the world with an immortal soul (so the theologians declare), but does it come into the world with "reason"? Reason, therefore, is not acceptable as the distinguishing mark of humanity because it is often diabolical. In conclusion, dualism is the fundamental conflict between good on one side and evil on the other, not between sheer animality on one side and intelligence or reason on the other.

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a worse, -- may be something which is in an ordinary man's power." 192

What is or can be an ordinary man's power is reason that is not abstruse. Elsewhere Arnold speaks of "imaginative reason," 193 though he does not define it as a power synonymous with the real or best self. What he apparently means is that the emotions or the wandering fancy are to

192. Literature and Dogma, p. 6. Arnold says again: In criticism -- in particular Biblical criticism -- the worst combination imaginable is "the junction of a talent for abstruse reasoning with much literary inexperience." Ibid., p. 164.

193. "...there is a century in Greek life," says Arnold, "the century preceding the Pelopennesian war, from about the year 530 to the year 430 B. C., -- in which poetry made, it seems to me, the noblest, the most successful effort she has ever made as the priestess of the imaginative reason, of the element by which the modern spirit, if it would live right, has chiefly to live." (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 221.) Elsewhere Arnold reiterates the same idea: "...whereas the Semitic genius placed its highest spiritual life in the religious sentiment, and made that the basis of its poetry, -- the Indo-European genius places its highest spiritual life on its imaginative reason, and makes that the basis of its poetry..." (On the Study of Celtic Literature, and on Translating Homer, New York, 1906, p. 113.) And still again Arnold says: "...the main element of the modern spirit's life is neither the sense and understanding, nor the heart and imagination; it is the imaginative reason." (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 220.) Obviously Arnold is not merely interpreting literature, but making definitions and establishing literary canons. His definition of the imaginative reason, it should be just as obvious, excludes the supernatural element as it does his conception of the modern spirit. Such definitions do not square with the primary definition of dualism. Neither can it be maintained that since the definitions above are pertinent to the realm of aesthetics, Arnold should not be held accountable for his deflections from ethical criteria. Arnold, it is well known, does not make a distinction between the two spheres, so that he would be the first to admit that a defection in one is a defection in another.

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be subordinated to the reason, but such an interpretation does not relieve him from the dilemma of making reason synonymous with the higher self. Furthermore, by the very use of the term imaginative reason he seems to imply that his faith is in a reason that controls rather than in a reason that is itself subordinate to a higher power. As it seems clear that Arnold, in his advocacy of the imaginative reason does not have in mind a power above the reason which may be best characterized as a supernatural element, it may be said that he is failing to conform to the definition of dualism and to his own conception of it frequently voiced.

Evidence that Arnold juxtaposes reason and the higher self must now be reviewed. The juxtaposition is frequent. For instance, he says: "...indispensable to that human perfection which we seek is...some public recognition and establishment of our best self, or right reason."[194]

In the following quotation Arnold opposes reason to the ordinary self (whereas in genuine dualism they are juxtaposed):

> "This is what, in North Germany, the governors do in the matter of education for the governed; and one may say that they thus give the governed a lesson, and draw out in them the idea of a right reason higher than the suggestions of an ordinary man's ordinary self." 195

It may be maintained of course that Arnold is here merely reporting a historical fact, but it is also true that the

194. Culture and Anarchy, p. 108.
195. Ibid., p. 97.

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statement furnishes an illustration of Arnold's departure from a genuine dualism, to which he often gives allegiance. Again Arnold uses the term "authority of right reason" in apposition with the term "our best self."[196] He proceeds to argue that "much of our disorders and perplexities is due to the disbelief...in right reason, in a paramount best self..."[197] Further, the mainspring of culture is not a supernatural will; it is reason, a very human reason, though a reason, in justice to Arnold, that is right:

> "...culture is the most resolute enemy of anarchy, because of the great hopes and designs for the State which culture teaches us to nourish....believing in right reason, and having faith in the progress of humanity towards perfection, and ever labouring for this end, we grow to have clearer sight of the ideas of right reason."[198]

The search for authority is not in the direction of a transcendent power; it is in the direction of reason which one is almost inclined to believe has merit because it is divorced from the transcendent: "...what we want is to make right reason act on individual reason, the reason of individuals; all our search for authority has that for its end and aim."[199]

The question is, says Arnold again, "whether the nation may not...acquire in the State an ideal of high reason and right feeling, representing its best self, com-

196. Ibid., p. 86.
197. Ibid., p. 195.
198. Ibid., p. 197.
199. Ibid., p. 105.

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manding general respect, and forming a rallying-point for the intelligence and for the worthiest instincts of the community, which will herein find a true bond of union."[200]

Exalted as the ideal here championed is, we must observe that the merger of right reason, right feeling and the best self, since they exclude the supernatural, violates the definition of dualism. The omission of this significant element is conspicuous in this, our final illustration of Arnold's deflection:

> "In modern epochs the part of a high reason, of ideas, acquires constantly increasing importance in the conduct of the world's affairs. A fine culture is the complement of a high reason, and it is in the conjunction of both with character, with energy, that the ideal for men and nations is to be placed." 201

The ideas which Arnold is here expressing appear admirable enough, and surely not much fault can be found with a man who continually espouses right reason -- or so it would seem. The trouble is that "right reason" is a relative and "rationalizing" power and therefore (despite the adjective) intrinsically irreligious and unreliable. Regarding the limitations of reason and Arnold's uncritical use of it, Robert Shafer says: "A man as recent as Matthew Arnold could say that reason, so it be true reason, must be 'always and everywhere the same.' Within a few years after his death, the next generation was deciding that

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200. Mixed Essays, p. 73.
201. Ibid., p. 28.

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philosophical reason was a fraud. Reason could make any view plausible, but could not prove a single one to be absolutely true."[202] As a relative power which can be used to "make any view plausible," reason, as a redeeming power can have little moral, religious, or ethical force; it is a dissolver of faith and of moral moorings which no longer have God as an absolute anchorage. Without belief in a higher will identifiable with the supernatural, Arnold himself has often maintained, anarchy cannot be averted. Unfortunately Arnold does not always make that identity, so that, in sum, he is suspect on two points: (1) inconsistency;[203] (2) failure to perceive the limitations of reason as a redeeming power, either on cultural or spiritual levels.

"Jesus," said Arnold, "was led by the spirit of God; he was dead to sin, he lived to God; and in this life to God he persevered even to the cruel bodily death of the cross."[204] In these words Arnold not only pays tribute to the greatest dualist, undoubtedly, who ever lived but implicitly defines genuine dualism: self-renunciation on the one hand, assimilation of the spirit of God on the other. In a lighter vein, he defines "the idea of two

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202. From Bewowulf to Thomas Hardy (Robert Shafer, editor), New York, vol. 2, p. 486.

203. No one perhaps saw that limitation more clearly than Pascal. His famous aphorism, "The heart has reasons of which the reason knows nothing" convincingly reduces reason to the lower part of dualism. Of course the "heart" for Pascal does not mean our emotions or instincts but a transcendent power of insight. Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 178.

204. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 53.

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lives. One of them life properly so called, full of light, endurance, felicity, in connection with the higher and permanent self; and the other of them life improperly so called, in connection with the lower and transient self."[205] In these statements the things of heaven and earth are not commingled. Because Arnold sometimes mixed them, it may be said that he did not always possess unity.

CONCLUSION

In the ancient time of the Rigveda, dualism, evidently, had its genesis in the longing of the individual to transcend the earth. Soon, very soon, in the history of man, it was discovered that there was some connection between knowing God and controlling one's senses. The "natural tendencies," as Arnold was to name them centuries afterward, the wise and sagacious felt the need to control. Self-renunciation was early recognized as a spiritual law. Arnold's belief in self-denial is thus in accord with that law expressed by the "master dualists." In recognizing that real freedom is release from the senses he was expressing what is a cardinal view in the Bhagavad-Gita and the Dhammapada. Like Buddha he recognizes that desire must be overcome, subdued, and that there is a higher self which, with God, as an ally, is able to subjugate the forest of our emotions.

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205. Literature and Dogma, p. 182.

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Arnold, like all dualists, recognized a distinction between the typical order of man and the characteristic order of things and that the difference between them is one of kind rather than of degree. Like the traditional dualists he was aware of the gulf that divides passion and the Eternal. He accepts immortality of the soul, not however, in the same measure as Plato accepts and espouses it. In Arnold's conception of dualism it figures but lightly. Altogether he believes in a spiritual light that shines beyond the horizon of man's earthly limitations: a light which cannot be seen, however, until the darkness is pushed aside by means of one's own efforts. In this reliance upon the will as a free moral force Arnold is thus at one with the traditional dualists.

Arnold's repeated references to the "two selves" reveals a connection between his own views and the oriental doctrine. In the early Rigveda God does not figure as "Self," but by the time of the Upanishads the conception of God has become the conception of Self, without foregoing its supernatural connotations. God becomes the universal reality of Self. Man can realize this Self only through ethical discipline -- the mastery of the "lower self," which belongs to "nature."

The Bhagavad-Gita symbolizes Self-Realization. The senses are dangerous, just as Arnold recognizes. The divine cannot be approximated through the senses. The

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higher Self is indestructible. It is not an abstraction, but a sovereign, spiritual reality that is at the same time Lord, ruler, and God. The lower self has entirely opposite qualities and is the author of all our vices. The lower self belongs to the phenomenal world, to instability: to nature. To attain the higher Self, the lower nature must be put away. The emphasis is placed upon the conquest of self by the Self. Arnold accepts this view in its entirety.

The Dhammapada has the same emphasis of the conquest of the self by the Self, but less is said about the ultimate nature of the divine, though its existence is not denied. Arnold in his exposition of and allegiance to dualism is essentially Buddhistic -- that is so far as the nature of God is concerned, but Arnold in his use of the term "will of God" indicates a greater reliance upon the supernatural as a help toward self-realization and the achievement of virtue than does Buddha. For Buddha an individual cannot depend upon the grace or will of God. He must depend entirely upon himself. All that we are is the result of our thoughts. Buddha is far more strenouous than Arnold. A man's fate was with him before he was born; it is with him during this life; and it will be with him hereafter. Purification precedes and follows our mortal days. The reward of purification is escape from birth (tantamount to the achievement of eternal bliss), a doctrine which does

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not attract Arnold. The doctrine of the two selves, however, which consistently runs through the Dhammapada Arnold does accept (though not consistently).

For support of the doctrine of the two selves Arnold goes to the Bible. He believes that Jesus taught that there were two selves, although the conception of dualism long precedes in Biblical literature the life of Jesus. It has not, however, for an Isaiah the degree of inwardness that it has for Jesus. Arnold believes that Jesus taught that man has two lives (corresponding of course to the two selves). The first must die to the second. (This is dualism unalloyed.) The lower self is a hydrabrood of sins and faults, which must be arrested in order that the second Self, the real and best Self might achieve fulfillment. One must not serve the senses but the conscience attendant upon the will of God. Christ was a spiritual genius because by his persuasiveness and sweet reasonableness he was able to make the "dying of the lower self" painless and agreeable. For Arnold the crucifixion symbolizes the universal truth of the doctrine of the two selves. By allowing himself to be crucified, Christ testified to the necessity of subordinating our ordinary selves to our higher selves that man might be unified on a spiritual level.

Arnold's conception of the state is based upon an intense personal dualism. If every man rejects his ordinary self and lives by his best Self, collectively all

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men will live on a plane of righteousness. Arnold's political views are thus identical with his ethical views.

Less mystical and oracular than either Plato or Socrates, Aristotle nevertheless maintains that man has a better part which emanates from the divine. Man is differentiated from the animal and the plant. Desires are to be regulated rather than extirpated. Man is differentiated from the animal because of his unique power to imitate and because of his capacity for a typical kind of happiness in which the animal does not share. These views compare essentially to Arnold's views except that when Arnold talks about Jesus he is more extreme regarding the disposition of the senses.

In St. Augustine Arnold has a spiritual progenitor in whom dualism -- the war between God and the devil within the personality -- reaches special depths and poignancy. The difference between St. Augustine and say, a Buddha, is that St. Augustine, in keeping with the Christian tradition, believed in the special intervention of God. There are times when Arnold believes so too, but, on the whole, when he is thinking in dualistic terms, he is nearer the oriental than the Christian tradition. But St. Augustine expresses what Arnold never overtly rejects: that only through the soul, and not through the body, can man know God. St. Augustine is troubled by "origins" in a way that Arnold never is: for instance, the origin of evil. Evil

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does not come from God; evil comes from man's lower will or self. Only by exercising the higher will and making oneself amenable to the grace of God by virtuous living can one extinguish evil. In general, this is Arnold's view, as he indicates when he is dealing with Jesus, that all our vices stem from our lower self.

In dealing with the two selves specifically, Arnold commits one error which makes his doctrine suspect -- or which at least weakens it. Conventional dualists do not juxtapose reason with the higher self but believe that it belongs to the order of the physical cosmos. The fact that Arnold often associates it with the will of God does not entirely free him from culpability, as he reveals lack of insight into its genuine nature. Thus in using the term he displays a partiality toward naturalism: an interest which does much to weaken his doctrine of the two selves.

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IV

THE CONCEPT OF NATURE AS RELATED TO DUALISM

I -- MILIEU AND BACKGROUND

-i-

Monism and dualism are incompatible. In his attitude toward nature Arnold is more often monistic than dualistic. He contradicts himself therefore in two different ways: first, in his twofold attitude toward nature; second, in championing a monistic interpretation of existence when he has subscribed so often, as we have seen, to its opposite, a dualistic view of it.

The reasons for Arnold's self-contradiction Robert Shafer gives as follows: Arnold, he says, was forced

> "to try to translate into naturalistic terms the Christian plan of salvation, and it is unfortunate that he then involved himself in the apparent paradox that self-realization cannot be achieved save through self-renouncement. The paradox is, however, only apparent, as he makes it clear that, as his naturalism demands, what he really means to signify by the traditional term is our resignation of our lower selves in favour of our higher selves. How on a naturalisitc basis he is able to distinguish absolutely between two selves is a question he does not answer..." 1

As is evident, Shafer agrees, as I have shown, that Arnold did subscribe to the doctrine of the two selves. Arnold's deflection apparently was unintentional and unconscious, as Arnold amazingly could subscribe to two

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1. Shafer, op. cit., p. 194.

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divergent philosophies at once without apparent awareness of the contradiction. But unawareness of a contradiction, of course, does not prove its non-existence.

To understand Arnold's attitude toward nature and the contradictions in which he becomes involved as a result of that attitude, it will be helpful to examine the views of the significant figures of his century, as well as those of some of the historical figures of a previous day, from whom Arnold's ideas undoubtedly stem.[2]

-ii-

Our first inquiry is into the meaning of the term "nature" as used by one of Arnold's chief contemporaries: Thomas Henry Huxley. Huxley defines the term with utmost simplicity. "Nature," he says, "means neither more nor less than that which is, the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality of events, past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is, from the nature of the case impossible."[3] Again Huxley states: "For myself, I am bound to say that

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2. Although the intellectual and spiritual roots of a man like Arnold reach almost anywhere, one may aver that when it comes to the question of nature Arnold is essentially the product of his century and when he is a dualist he is the son of all the centuries. Certainly his period may be characterized as naturalistic. For the reason that Arnold's naturalism most likely stems from his age, I am violating chronology -- using the order of the near to the far -- in presenting the background of his ideas on nature.
3. Thomas Henry Huxley, Hume, New York, 1878, p. 129.

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the term 'Nature' covers the totality of that which is."[4] Huxley does not, like the dualist, concede the existence of extra-sensory phenomena or hoist them above the physical cosmos: "The world of psychical phenomena appears to me to be as much part of 'Nature' as the world of physical phenomena; and I am unable to perceive any justification for cutting the universe into two halves, one natural and one supernatural."[5]

Huxley gives a historical analysis from a scientist's point of view of man's groping conceptions of nature and of the origins and development of dualism as related to nature. (His explanation furnishes a contrast to that given in the third chapter of this thesis.)

Primitive men, according to Huxley, conceived of the world in terms of order and permanence; they "gave the name of Nature"[6] to the world of order which they inevitably observed around them: "Experience taught them that the shifting scenes of the world's stage have a per-

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4. Loc. cit. Lange, in his History of Materialism... states the naturalistic point of view in regard to the totality of nature thus: "Nature is the great whole of which man is a part and by which he is a part and by which he is influenced. The beings which we place outside nature have always been creatures of imagination, of whose character we can form an idea as little as of their abiding-place and modes of action. There does not and cannot exist anything beyond the sphere that includes all creatures. Man is a psychical being, and his moral existence is only a special agent of his physical organization." Lange, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 98.
5. Thomas Henry Huxley, Science and Christian Tradition, New York, 1900, p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 3.

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manent background; that there is order amidst the seeming confusion and that many events take place according to unchanging rules. To the region of familiar steadiness and customary regularity they give the name of Nature."[7] But because their reason was "infantile and untutored"[8] and because they had not learned to rule their imagination, they were led "to believe that this tangible, commonplace, orderly world of Nature was surrounded and interpenetrated by another intangible and mysterious world, no more bound by fixed rules than, as they fancied, were the thoughts and passions which coursed through their minds and seemed to exercise an intermittent and conspicuous rule over their bodies."[9] As a consequence, and in order to modify "the course of events of which they themselves possessed a small share,"[10] they attributed to these "entities" an unlimited amount of power and came to regard them as powers "not merely beyond, but above nature."[11] In other words, the God (or gods) were an invention of primitive man's unreasonable imagination and existed only in it.

This explanation of the creation of God or of divine power is also an explanation of the genesis of dualism. Says Huxley: "Hence arose the conception of a 'Supernature' antithetic to 'Nature' -- the primitive

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7. Loc. cit.
8. Loc. cit.
9. Loc. cit.
10. Loc. cit.
11. Ibid., p. 11.

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dualism of a natural world...and a supernatural which has pervaded all later speculation and, for thousands of years has exercised a profound influence on practice."[12] To concentrate on "supernature" and to neglect nature is injurious to the race. Regarding the harm and suffering which adherence to the dualistic theory has caused mankind Huxley expostulates as follows:

> "Indeed, logically developed, the dualistic theory must needs end in almost exclusive attention to Supernature, and in trust that its overruling strength will be exerted in favour of those who stand well with its denizens. On the other hand, the lessons of the great schoolmaster, experience, have hardly seemed to accord with this conclusion. They have taught, with considerable emphasis, that it does not answer to neglect Nature; and that, on the whole, the more attention paid to her dictates the better men fare." 13

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12. Ibid., p. 5.
13. Loc. cit. Huxley is not always consistent in regard to dualism. Robert Shafer in his essay on Huxley shows that when it comes to the question of ethics and moral conduct Huxley is dualistic. "In the Romanes lectures on Evolution and Ethics," says Shafer, "Huxley contends 'that no ethical principle can be learned from the natural universe.'" He quotes Huxley further: "'The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.'" Shafer then raises the question: "What are we to make of this, when we remember that Huxley said the universe is one and the same throughout?" (Shafer, op. cit., pp. 149-150.) The most, however, that one can do is to accuse Huxley of inconsistency. The naturalist does not deny the existence of ethical principles that control our impulses, but he insists that the restrictive power is as natural as the impulses that require control. Shafer, though, might have included more damaging evidence in support of Huxley's inclination toward dualism. "Modern science," Huxley stated, "admits that there are two worlds to be considered, the one physical and the other psychical; and that though there is a most intimate relation and interconnection between the two, the bridge

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To Huxley, then, dualism is a fiction because it violates a law of nature -- nature which is the totality of existence regularized and systemetized. Rationally, it is impossible to admit "the occurrence of any event which was not the logical consequence of the immediately antecedent events, according to...definite, ascertained, or unascertained rules which we call 'laws of nature...'"[14]

In conclusion, dualism, God, and religion are not acceptable in terms of natural law.[15] Arnold, as we shall see, often held otherwise.

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James Martineau has a conception of nature that is less mechanical than Huxley's but a conception that is

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from one to the other has yet to be found; that their phenomena run, not in one series, but along parallel lines." (Huxley, Science and Christian Tradition, p.62.) Parallel lines, in Huxley's day did not meet!

14. Ibid., p. 13.

15. Although Huxley's reputation is established as a rationalist and an agnostic, there is evidence that he had a "personal" point of view which extenuates his rationalism. In a letter to Mrs. Humphrey Ward, he says: "...I think I am not without sympathy for Christian feeling -- or rather for what you mean by it. Beneath the cold logical upper strata of my microcosm there is a fused mass of prophetism and mysticism, and the Lord knows what might happen to me, in case a moral earthquake cracked the superincumbent deposit, and permitted an eruption of the demonic element below...Luckily I am near 70, and not a G. O. M. -- so the danger is slight.

"One must stick to one's trade. It is my business to the best of my ability to fight for scientific clearness -- that is what the world lacks. Feeling Christian or other, is suprabundant..." (Quoted by Mrs. Humphrey Ward, A Writer's Recollections, New York, 1918, vol. 2, p. 174.) So far as this study is concerned, it will continue to consider Huxley a rationalist, as his digressions from his rationalistic faith are too slight to have affected in any degree his incalculable influence as a rationalist.

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monistic nevertheless and that rules out dualism as unmistakably as Huxley's.[16] Martineau is hostile to dualism even though he makes a distinction between "nature" and "supernature," but this is a distinction without a difference because to him the laws of nature are the laws of God and the laws of God are the laws of nature. They have a coherent or interdependent relationship. He says:

> "Nature...can never swallow up the supernatural any more than time can swallow up eternity: they subsist and are intelligible only together, and nothing can be more mistaken than to treat them as mutually exclusive. It is no hindrance to theology if the laws of phenomena pursue their undeviating way; it is no hindrance to science, if the laws of nature are laws of God; the matters of both studies is furnished by the same relation; only taken up at the opposite ends, so as to render explicit in each case the term which is implicit in the other." 17

Martineau, obviously, in keeping with the materialistic impulse of his age, is attempting to eradicate "discontinuities" in nature, an effort to which, as Joseph Wood Krutch says, the nineteenth century was ex-

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16. Benn, in his History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, concurs in my interpretation of Martineau as a naturalist. Benn characterizes him as a "natural theologian" -- refers to his "natural religion" -- and a materialist despite himself: "His strong imagination made him -- not indeed an idolater, but -- a materialist despite himself. His insistence on the objective reality and independence of space led to his making it coeternal with God." (Benn, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 435.) According to Benn, further, "Martineau's own earliest convictions were formed in the school of Bentham and James Mill." (Ibid., p. 67.) Martineau undergoes a "conversion to philosophical spiritualism," but as Benn points out, it is but a refined materialism or pantheism. Loc. cit.
17. Martineau, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 7.

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tremely devoted.[18] If God and nature are not mutually exclusive, there is no dualism; there are no gaps or discontinuities in the "oneness" that is the universe. For Martineau the supernatural is evidently a force which permeates things, but things do not exist without the immanent substance and substance does not exist without things, so that no matter from which end we view the universe we are bound to view it as an indivisible cosmos.

Although nature and God are integrable or constitutionally inseparable, Martineau insists that their roles are different, that although they are not antagonistic they are antithetical. Martineau apparently wishes to establish that God is the cause and that nature is the effect or that God is "positive" and nature is "negative." Conceivably one cannot exist without the other, but if one could imagine the disappearance of God what we would have left would be negation. Theological decorum (not, certainly, the impulsion of fact or logic) demands that we give more preeminence to the role of God (subject) than to that of nature (object or objects), but they are not to be conceived as dual or opposites; rather as complements, though antithetical:

> "...though there is no <u>antagonism</u> between them [nature and God] <u>antithesis</u> there certainly is; and nothing can be more misleading than to say 'God is merely a synonym for nature.' The attributes of

18. Joseph Wood Krutch, <u>The Modern Temper</u>, New York, 1929, p. 247.

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> nature are birth, growth, and death; God can never cease to be: nature is an aggregate of effects; God is the universal cause; nature is an assemblage of objects; God is the infinite Subject of which they are the expression: nature is the organism of intelligibles; God is the eternal intellect itself. Cut these pairs asunder; take away the unchangeable, the causal, the manifesting Subject, the originating Thought; and what is then left is indeed 'Nature,' but thus bereft and alone, is the negation and not the 'synonym' of God." 19

Martineau's effort to harmonize the universe without sacrifice of distinctions, an effort resulting in the exclusion of dualism, extends still in another direction. As we have seen, one of the evidences of dualism, or a man's adherence to it, is belief that basically there is a gulf existing between man and the animal. No doubt the crowning contribution of the nineteenth century was the removal of that gulf,[20] so that man and the animal are considered different in degree but not in kind.[21] Martineau accepts the elimination of that gulf, but insists on a "transcendental" difference between man and the animal. He says:

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19. Martineau, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 8.
20. Regarding the elimination of that gulf T. E. Hulme remarks: "This shrinking from a gap or a jump in nature has developed to a degree which paralyzes any objective perception, and prejudices our seeing things as they really are." T. E. Hulme, Speculations, London, 1924, p. 3.
21. Leuba says in this connection: "The truth of the matter is that the difference between the average human parent and the higher animals in the care of the newborn is not one of kind but of degree. There are instinctive elements in the behaviour of human parents, and there is some degree of the intelligence of animals." James H. Leuba, God or Man: a Study of the Value of God to Man, New York, 1933, p. 288.

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> "With the naturalist then we can go on in classing man with the animals in virtue of his analogous organism and his sentient and instinctive functions: but we may nevertheless hold with Descartes, his transcendent separation from them in virtue of his proper personality, that is, his self-conscious reason and will." 22

It should be apparent from this statement that transcendentalism -- the way it is used here -- is not synonymous with supernature -- with what lies entirely above nature -- and would not signify a mere difference of degree within the order of nature itself. No doubt man does "transcend" the animal, especially as man has "self conscious reason and will," but if the qualities which make him different from the animal are but aspects of the cosmos, or of natural law, we do not have dualism, but monism, even if the word transcendentalism is used to describe those qualities.

The doctrine, then, which Martineau espouses is one that attempts to harmonize God with nature and nature and man with God without, at the same time, sacrificing the clear character or characteristics of each. He says: "Nature constitutes throughout one intellectual organism: humanity, one moral organism: and as God is the informing thought of the one, so is He the spiritual authority of the other." [23] He maintains also that his doctrine "is in no way committed to the doctrine of a God external to the world," [24] but is committed rather to a consideration

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22. Martineau, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 174.
23. Ibid., p. 48.
24. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 328.

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of "all the cosmical forces as varieties of a method assumed by his [God's] conscious causality, and the whole of nature as the evolution of his thought."[25] In other words, Martineau naturalizes God and supernaturalizes nature. "What," he says conclusively, "in one aspect is a Divine idea in another is a natural force..."[26] His is obviously an effort to define a theology on the basis of the extant naturalism of his age.

-iv-

In the traditional dualism which we have defined -- the only dualism which has meaning, for if we omit the validity of dualism's claim to a supernatural sanction we no longer have dualism but monism -- there is, as we have seen, a warfare between the soul of man and his own nature, or with the seductive or materialistic claims of the naturalistic world without. From the religious point of view, the reasons for such a conflict are grounded on insight into the nature of the divine. Even though the religious thinker does not deny God's responsibility for the creation of the natural world and for the operation[27] of "natural law," yet a St. Paul, a St. Augustine, or

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25. Loc. cit.
26. Ibid., p. 226.
27. What the religious thinker does deny is that God created the world of one substance, namely, out of Himself, and that therefore the difference between Himself and God is one of degree rather than of kind. Says a critic: "The Book of Genesis represents the Creator as working six days, and then resting from His creation. It is not said that He made created things of His own substance, nor even that all things are originally of one substance." (Anon., "Nature-Development and

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a St. Basil, for instance, will declare that only as a man puts his own "nature" outside him, literally suspends the operation of natural law in himself (or believes that it has been and still can be suspended in the external world), can he hope to know God. The path to God, in other words, is not through the medium of nature but through the medium of the spirit which is not natural but supernatural. This view, for many, was reversed in the nineteenth century when man began to look upon nature with tenderness, if not with affection. One of the men who condemns "theology" for misleading man, for encouraging an unwarranted hatred for nature and who praises "science, atheists, infidels, and rationalists" for deliverance is Leslie Stephen who says:

> "Theology of the old stamp, so far from encouraging us to love nature, teaches us that it is under a curse. It teaches us to look upon the animal creation with shuddering disgust; upon the whole race of man, outside our narrow sect, as delivered over to the devil; and upon the laws of nature at large as a temporary mechanism, in which we have been caught, but from which we are to anticipate a joyful deliverance." 28

The "joyful deliverance" to which Stephen has reference is the promise of the heavenly life after death. But now naturalism has emancipated man from his fears so that he has his freedom here on earth; moreover, he can have it

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Theology," The Contemporary Review (May, 1870), vol. 14., p. 175.) In other words, the distinction between nature and God is not to be obliterated.

28. Leslie Stephen, Essays on Freethinking and Plainspeaking, New York, 1908, p. 400.

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without having to pay the price which religion has ever demanded. The blessings of this new naturalistic dispensation have, in fact, aroused a bitter criticism toward the religious ideal of self-denial. Arnold has said a great deal about self-renunciation, dying to oneself, but Stephen raises the question, "What are the limits and the purpose of this self denial?"[29] Arnold has said that the purpose was to deny the flesh in order that one might know life, life which he often designated as synonymous with the spirit, but Stephen implies that such a conflict is futile, and by implication raises the question of its wisdom: "Am I to carry on an indefinite warfare against the body, which you say that God has given me, and to crush the physical for the sake of the spiritual element?"[30] Dualists descant about the spirit which is God and the body which is not God! How can one draw a line between the two, and if there is such a line, what is it, and where is it? "What is the line between the spirit, which is God, and the body, which is hopelessly corrupt?"[31] And why should the body be considered corrupt if God made it, Stephen might have added. In fact, he concludes that "All sound reasoning prescribes a training with the given purpose of bringing the instincts [hitherto considered corrupt] of the individual into harmony with the instincts of the whole organism."[32]

29. Ibid., p. 393.
30. Loc. cit.
31. Loc. cit.
32. Loc. cit.

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"In harmony with the interests of the whole organism"! Here we have the new ethics, a monistic ethics. The instincts are to be controlled, but without reference to an external authority.

But naturalism is a combination of belief and scepticism. One cannot trust the hoary dualism of ages heavy with dust but one must beware of conceding too much to the new unproven theories. Did we hear Stephen disparage theology for its hostility toward the "laws of nature"? He also reaches the position where he condemns those who have a consummate faith in nature. "The attempt," he says, "to transfer to pure being or to the abstraction Nature the failings with which we are taught to regard a person of transcendent wisdom and benevolence is, as theology asserts, hopeless."[33] That is, it is preposterous -- "hopeless" -- to love nature the way men have customarily loved God. The rocks and the rills do not have spiritual content for Stephen. Pantheism, in other words, he evidently considers a sentimental form of naturalism which to him is as objectionable as traditional theology. In fact he says: "Pantheism can give no ground for morality, for nature is as much the cause of vice as the cause of virtue; it can give no ground

33. Stephen, An Agnostic's Apology, p. 17. Although the term "agnostic" was first used by Huxley, according to Benn, the publication of Stephen's essay in 1876 was responsible for "the world-wide celebrity of the name agnostic." (Benn, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 384.) (Stephen was editor of the Cornhill Magazine and "allowed," says Benn, "Matthew Arnold's 'Literature and Dogma' to appear in its pages..." loc. cit.

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for an optimistic view of the universe, for nature causes evil as much as it causes good."[34] We have here the "reverse of the coin." From disparagement of the theologian who taught man to fear and tremble before nature, we have criticism of those who would teach man to revere and love her as the divine source of virtue, the fountain of his hopes and aspirations. Thus naturalism teaches Stephen scepticism and furnishes him a tool of criticism which he uses on his own beliefs as well as upon others; and by the use of this instrument he comes to disdain both those who read into nature virtues which she does not possess and those who believe that nature has no virtues whatsoever -- and all this he does while adhering to his own brand of naturalism -- an "agnostic faith."

Although Stephen has little use for pantheism he is even more critical of those men who are neither pantheists or supernaturalists. Their doctrine, he says, "asks us to believe no miracle. It involves no supernaturalism. Whatever is is natural, and is at the same time divine."[35] He then adds: "These critics, 'after pronouncing nature to be divine,' tacitly assumed there is an indefinite region which is somehow outside nature. Few people have the reasoning tendency sufficiently developed to follow out this view to its logical result in Pantheism."[36]

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34. Stephen, An Agnostic's Apology, loc. cit.
35. Stephen, Essays in Freethinking, p. 397.
36. Loc. cit.

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Apparently he thinks that pantheism at least has some reason and logic on its side but the doctrine (like Arnold's) that is halfway between pantheism and supernaturalism, the doctrine that would take the supernatural out of religion and replace it with something vague and unresolved he has no use for. Stephen, then, is critical of those "who distinguish man in two parts, and give the higher qualities to the soul and the sensual to the body..."[37] He is critical of those who join the two in a sentimental union called pantheism, but he is less critical of the pantheists than he is of those who attempt to naturalise traditional theology. His own type of naturalism is, in the last analysis, a method rather than a belief, a critical and quizzical method, which is the logical correlative of naturalism itself.[38]

-V-

Mill has a sober attitude toward nature. He is neither mystical mor metaphysical. He tries to view nature with total objectivity. His definition reminds us of Huxley's:

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37. Ibid., 381.
38. Stephen no doubt strove to be a "scientific inquirer." The temper and aim of the scientific inquirer of the nineteenth century John Theodore Merz defines as follows: "...the purely scientific inquirer does not know where the path will lead him; it is sufficient that it be clearly marked. Modern science defines the method, not the aim, of its work. John Theodore Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Edinburgh, 1923, vol. 1, p. 30.

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> "Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them; including not only all that happens, but all that is capable of happening; the unused capabilities of causes being as much a part of the idea of Nature as those that take effect." 39

There is very little that is conjectural or hypothetical in this definition. The only degree of speculation, or the only concession to improbability, inheres in the phrase, "unused capabilities of causes," but the positive nature of the words which follow quickly banishes this intimation of uncertainty. Indeed, neither Mill nor anyone knows what these unused capabilities are, but he is convinced that whatever they are, they must be part of nature.[40] This is his naturalistic faith. So inclusive is

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39. John Stuart Mill, Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism, London, 1923, p. 5.
40. Although Mill is a rationalist, he combines sobriety with warmth so that his reputation is assured among contemporary naturalists. Mill's definition suggests, for instance, the compatibility that exists between himself and such a naturalist as Irwin Edman. Edman's definition, further, is useful because it illustrates the trend which the naturalistic ideas of the nineteenth century set in motion: "And what it is, [nature], is the matrix and material of all our ideas and the locus of all possible destinies. It is what we have, it is where we are. For this, too, is the modest recognition of the new naturalist, that the eyes with which he beholds nature are natural eyes, and that the mind with which he observes or condemns or in imagination transfigures nature is itself a movement in and flowering of it. The spirit which others would have contend against the flesh is itself simply the expression, luminous and climactic, of animal life, the flesh become radiant and subtle and consciously alive. Not birth but death is a sleep and a forgetting, yet before that somnolent oblivion there is much that may be done, imagined, and remembered. The memory may be extended, through history, to the beginning of the race and before; the imagination may compass more than generations through doing may translate into

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his definition that it encompasses all that has happened and all that is likely to happen. The definition makes him out a thoroughgoing naturalist and monist.

Inclusive and general, however, as Mill's conception of nature is, it is not so general as to obliterate subtle distinctions, one of which is that nature has two meanings: one having to do with voluntary activity, the other with involuntary activity. He says:

> "...we must recognize at least two principal meanings in the word Nature. In one sense, it means all the powers existing in either the outer or the inner world and everything which takes place by means of those powers. In another sense, it means, not everything that happens, but only what takes place without the agency, or without the voluntary and intentional agency. 41

Mill here is simply belaboring a distinction between voluntary and involuntary activity, but one must not hazard the conjecture that he is abetting a belief in free will that has a superrational source, for the following statement will prove that for him both voluntary activities are equally parts of the whole: Nature. He illustrates their ultimate identity as follows:

> "We move objects, and by doing this, bring some things into contact which were separate, or separate others which were in contact: and by this simple change of place, natural forces previously dormant are called into action, and produce the desired effect. Even the volition which designs, the intelligence which contrives, and the muscular

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existence." Irwin Edman, "The New Naturalism," The Nation, (April 16, 1930), vol. 130, p. 447.

41. Mill, op. cit., p. 8.

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> force which executes these movements, are themselves powers of Nature." 42

In other words, the inevitable activities of nature upon which man intrudes his will are (if we may be pardoned the redundancy) natural, but the voluntary intrusion of man's will is also natural. For Mill, then, there are no gaps in nature. There are differences and distinctions, but in the end, as in the beginning, the universe is one.

Another distinction which Mill makes without "stepping out" out of the naturalistic context is the one having to do with the changeless and changeable. Although Mill is a naturalist he is not a devotee of the flux. Living in an age when the world was viewed as endless mutation, he was yet able to make a distinction between stability and instability, between the "one" and the "many": "There is in Nature a permanent element, and also a changeable: the changes are always the effects of previous changes: the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not effects

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42. Loc. cit. Mill does not, like his younger contemporary, Herbert Spencer, push voluntary action or will back into the feelings. To Mill will is preeminently a rational force. Spencer, however, fuses will and emotion. He says: "We speak of Will as something apart from the feeling or feelings which, for the moment, prevail over others; whereas it is nothing but the general name given to the special feeling that gains supremacy and determines action. Take away all sensations and emotions, and there remains no Will. Excite some of these, and Will, becoming possible, becomes actual only when one of them or a group of them, gains predominance. Until there is a motive (mark the word) there is no Will. That is to say, Will is no more an existence separate from the man occupying the throne." Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, New York, 1895, vol. 2, p. 503.

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at all."[43]

But this statement does not have a metaphysical overtone, nor would it be commensurate with Mill's materialism, refined as it is, that it should mean more than what the words denote: a distinction between organic and the inorganic.[44] He is not like Plato making a distinction between the finite and infinite, between the idealogical permanent which is above the world of matter and the finite which belongs to the transient, "unreal" earthiness, which is nonetheless illusory though it is heavy under one's feet. Mill makes a naturalistic analogy from Plato's metaphysical concept, but his naturalism remains undiminished.

Although Mill is positive and unambiguous regarding what we may find and may not find in nature, he does not always deny the possible existence of a Being who created the complicated arrangements of natural existence. His statement, however, pardoxically denies that nature -- or "matter or force" -- yields evidence that a supreme being created them and yet he gives that author credit for nature's arrangements and order, though he returns to a

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43. Mill, op. cit., p. 142.
44. Plato has Socrates say: "...if I find any man who is able to see a 'One and many' in nature him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.' (Plato, "Phaedrus," vol. 1, p. 269.) But the "one" in nature is not a materialistic element of stability. It is "infinite" and thus transcendent, for we hear again: "...the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the Gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be composed of one and many...have the finite and infinite implanted in them..." "Philebus," vol. 2, p. 347.

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denial of God's powers to alter those purposes. He says:

> "There is in Nature no reason whatever to suppose that either Matter or Force, or any of their properties, were made by the Being who was the author of the collocations by which the world is adapted to what we consider as its purposes; or that he has power to alter any of those properties." 45

Mill evidently is championing a rationalistic or deistic interpretation of existence here; namely, that "God...having created the world and set in motion machinery for its operation" thenceforward withdrew.[46] He is saying, in effect, that nature yields no evidence of God's interference or direct management with its affairs, but nevertheless that "Being...was the author" of its arrangements. As rationalism and deism are not inconsistent with naturalism, it may be said that Mill in paying homage to a remote and "absolute" god, is not violating his own basic doctrine.

Mill's rationalism, however, does not signify acceptance of the eighteenth century doctrine that man "ought to follow nature" because for him the doctrine is meaningless. He says:

> "...the doctrine that man ought to follow nature is unmeaning, since man has no power to do anything else than follow nature; all his actions are done through, and in obedience to some one or many of nature's physical or mental laws." 47

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45. Mill, op. cit., p. 178.
46. William Flint Thrall and Addison Hibbard, A Handbook to Literature, New York, 1936, p. 118.
47. Mill, op. cit., p. 64. Mill no doubt had Pope's famous lines in mind:

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Mill's objection to the doctrine is evidently on two grounds: (1) redundancy of the advice which the doctrine contains; (2) disagreement regarding the meaning of the word nature. The advice to follow nature is superfluous and redundant, for, as Mill plainly indicates, it is meaningless to advise a person to do something which he cannot escape doing, since a person follows nature whether he wills or not. Secondly, while "Nature" meant "reason" to Pope, it meant "natural law" to Mill which he considered often so cruel and inexorable as to offer the poorest criteria for human behavior. Mill of course is not opposed to reason as a scientific means for discovering truth, but his intellectual honesty forbids him to make reason and nature synonymous (since he finds so much in it which is anything but reasonable). Nature for him, then, remains the sum of phenomena; it includes reason as an important factor in that sum, but the two are far from identical.

"First follow Nature, and your judgment frame
By her just standard, which is the same:
Unerring Nature, still divinely bright,
One clear, unchang'd, and universal light."
(An Essay on Criticism, 68-72.)

A critic observes: "In the age of Reason...to act according to Nature meant to act according to reason and, as reason was invariant action according to it was always the same for all people." (Ernest Campbell Mossner, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason: a Study in the History of Thought, New York, 1936, p. 64.) The over-rational attitude of the eighteenth century toward nature was as objectionable to Mill as was, as we shall presently observe, the sub-rational attitude of the early nineteenth century -- a reaction best expressed in Tennyson's famous characterization of nature as "red in tooth and claw." In Memoriam, 56, 16.

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Mill, further, not only rejects nature as the apotheosis of reason; he also rejects it as the source of good feeling and emotion. He criticises those who accept "as a strong argument for its goodness"[48] any "mode of thinking, feeling, or acting"[49] that is in accordance with nature. The ascription of tenderness or goodness to nature is the result of poetic fancy. Attributing such qualities to nature will not stand the test of sobriety. He says:

> "The phrases which ascribe perfection to the course of nature can be considered as the exaggerations of poetic or devotional feeling, not intended to stand the test of a sober examination. No one, either religious or irreligious, believes that the hurtful agencies of nature, considered as a whole, promote good purposes, in any other way than by inciting human rational creatures to rise up and struggle against them." 50

In fact, Mill leans toward a conception of nature as "malevolent" rather than one as either rational or tender:

> "In sober truth, nearly all the things men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are Nature's every day performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives; and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted tortures such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of purposely inflicted on their living fellow-creatures."51

If nature is thus cruel and malevolent and man cannot get his criteria for behavior, either on rational or sentimental grounds, from it, where can he get them?

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48. Mill, op. cit., p. 11.
49. Loc. cit.
50. Loc. cit.
51. Ibid., p. 28.

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"Conformity to nature," he insists, "has no connection whatever with right and wrong."[52] Reviewing the deficiencies and limitations of nature as a moral source, Mill reaches the startling conclusion, which he states with what is for him unwonted passion, that man's hope for restitution and correction lies in no other source than himself -- his second self! The statement follows:

> "There is no evidence whatever in Nature for divine justice, whatever standard of justice our ethical opinions may lead us to recognize. There is no shadow of justice in the general arrangements of Nature; and what imperfect realization it obtains in any human society (a most imperfect realization as yet) is the work of man himself, struggling upwards against immense natural difficulties, into civilization, and making to himself a second nature, far better and more unselfish than he was created with." 53

Admittedly, Mill is expressing a sort of dualism here, but does he sacrifice his naturalism in championing this conception? I have shown that we do not have dualism wherever there is a distinction between one and two, that the genuine dualism is based on a qualitative difference between naturalism and supernaturalism, and therefore, if we are to make a dualist out of Mill we would have to prove that by man's "second nature" he means a self that is at least potentially divine. Logically, such a belief in man's divinity would be predicated upon a belief in the existence of a supreme being. Despite

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52. Ibid., p. 62.
53. Ibid., p. 194. (Italics mine)

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Mill's concession to a deistic conception of God, he reduces belief in God to a wish -- to "wish fulfillment." He says:

> "The whole domain of the supernatural is thus removed from the region of Belief into that of simple Hope, and in that, for anything we can see, it is likely always to remain; for we can hardly anticipate either that any positive evidence will be acquired of the direct agency of Divine Benevolence in human destiny, or that any reason will be discovered for considering the realization of human hopes on that subject as beyond the pale of possibility. 54

If Mill is thus sceptical regarding the objective existence of God, what, to him, is the nature of his "second self" or "second nature" which man must make for himself? Obviously what Mill was trying to do in making a distinction between a first nature and a second nature in man was to show that a real distinction exists between the external world as nature and man's particular nature which operates by its own species of natural law. The difference is as simple as the difference between the physical laws of nature and the biological laws of nature. Man indeed can correct himself on the basis of his experience, but

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54. Ibid., p. 244. The utilitarian Mill dismisses the supernatural not only on philosophical but also on empirical grounds as follows: "Belief...in the supernatural, great as are the services which it rendered in the early stages of human development, cannot be considered to be any longer required, either for enabling us to know what is right and wrong in social morality, or for supplying us with motives to do right and to abstain from wrong. Such belief, therefore, is not necessary for social purposes, at least in the coarse way in which these can be considered apart from the character of the human being." Ibid., p. 100.

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no where does Mill suggest that the experience is not natural. The following statement indicates that while Mill believes that man's hope of self-betterment lies within himself, Mill is essentially empirical, and as such, naturalistic:

> "Why is it," he asks, "that there is a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this preponderance -- which there must be, unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state -- it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience." 55

Plainly, though Mill admits that man is a moral being (which undoubtedly resembles man's "second nature") he does not maintain that that moral nature -- or the revelations issuing from man's moral nature -- has a supernatural origin. In fact, he goes so far as to say that such a belief does mankind an injury. "...there is," he says, "a very real evil consequent on ascribing a supernatural origin to the received maxims of morality." 56 Man's morality, then, for Mill is based on experience, natural experience, not supernatural. Mill, for all his refined distinctions and meanings of nature, remains, in the final analysis, loyal to his naturalistic faith. 57

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55. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Boston, 1863, p. 41.
56. Mill, Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism, p.99.
57. Mill is not extreme in his choice of terminology, so that he often makes distinctions which create the impression that he is less materialistic than he actually is. For instance, it is very doubtful whether Mill's

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Whereas Mill has a rational attitude toward nature, Carlyle has an emotional, and very often, a "mystical" attitude. For Mill nature and reason were far from identical; neither are they for Carlyle, but whereas nature impresses Mill as either, first, impersonal law; second, chaos or disorder as a result of the absence of that law, nature impresses Carlyle in the main as first, the mysterious and mystical garment concealing the soul of God; second, God itself. The following statement is a far cry from Huxley's and Mill's definition of nature as the sum of phenomena:

> "O Nature! -- Or what is Nature? Ha! why do I not name thee God? Art not thou the 'Living Garment of God? O Heavens, is it, in very deed, HE, then, that ever speaks through thee; that lives and loves in thee,

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point of view is fundamentally different from that expressed in the following statement in which moral experience is reduced to a physiological level. This twentieth century statement is significant because it is foreshadowed by the efforts of the nineteenth century naturalists to obliterate dualism: "...biological science in our generation has shown that there is no nicely defined boundary at which physiology ends and moral philosophy begins. Hitherto physiology and academic philosophy have developed independently, because physiologists themselves have accepted the common sense dualism of mind and matter. Moral philosophy can no longer claim that there is any distinctive aspect of the nature of life, which lies beyond the province of physiological inquiry." Lancelot Hogben, The Nature of Living Matter, London, 1930, p. 95.) In a less tender way, this statement is in agreement with Mill's view that our moral reflections do not have a supernatural origin, for it follows that if they do not have a divine origin, they must have a natural origin -- or what amounts to the same thing, a physiological origin.

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that lives and loves in me?" 58

Nature, it is apparent, is almost everything to Carlyle: first, it is, to reiterate, God; second, it is God's garment; third, it is God's mouthpiece; fourth, it is the temple of God's life; fifth, it is the vehicle of God's love. Moreover, God as nature, or nature as God, lives in man, transmits His (or its) love to man, and presumably makes it possible for men to love one another. Carlyle, therefore, in his conception of nature -- it could hardly be called a definition -- makes no distinction between nature and supernature and consequently, so far as his treatment of nature is concerned, is to be classified as a naturalist.

Further evidence that for Carlyle nature and God are not antipodal is to be gathered from the following statement. For the traditional dualist, it has been observed, wisdom was associated with the perception and contempla-

58. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 143. Regarding the inadequacy of the conception of nature held by such idealists as Carlyle and Arnold, Trilling says: "Idealists, like Carlyle, may juggle Nature as they will, make it a garment of God, full of meaning and purpose -- but even Carlyle despairs." (Trilling, op. cit., p. 143.) Trilling adds the following observation regarding the insecurity and unhappiness which both Carlyle and Arnold felt as a result of the fusion of God and nature: "Without a God, fundamentally separated from Nature, there is nothing to bind man to the universe, scarcely anything to bind him to life, strangely enough, little even to bind him to his fellow-man." (Loc. cit.) This statement adds support to my contention that Arnold is inconsistent, for, as we have seen, Arnold often separates, rather than unites, God and nature.

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tion of a God that transcended man's and nature's limitations. The body and the external world of nature were considered barriers which one had to overleap in order to know God. But Carlyle says voluminous knowledge (and no doubt wisdom) comes from nature and he chides man for not knowing even the alphabet of it. He says:

> "We speak of the Volume of Nature: and truly a Volume it is -- whose Author and Writer is God. To read it? Dost thou, does man, so much as well know the Alphabet thereof?" 59

The book of nature, therefore, is the book of God. This is a reversal of the traditional attitude and an abandonment of the dualistic conception that makes the unseen world its source of divine knowledge.[60]

Nature not only gives knowledge and wisdom; it gives purity; it gives truth. Moreover, nature has an all-seeing, penetrating eye,[61] so that what we call "purity" in ourselves she calls chaff. Nature blesses the pure in heart, but she will disdain you if you are impure. He says:

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59. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 195.
60. The traditional view is best represented by the Hebraic generalization: "...the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom..." Needless to say this "Lord" is not nature.
61. It is nature that has the eye of vision, not man. What man must learn to do, apparently, is to trust nature as a child infinitely trusts its parent: "So cunningly does Nature, the mother of all highest Art, which only apes her from afar, 'body forth the Finite from the Infinite,' and guide man safe on his wondrous path, not more by endowing him with vision, than at the right place, with blindness!" (Carlyle, "Characteristics," p. 346.) The point is that the more we trust nature, the more faith we have in her, the more she will lead us.

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> "What we call pure or impure, is not with her [nature] the final question. Not how much chaff is in you but whether you have any wheat. Pure? I might say to many a man: Yes, you are pure; pure enough; but you are chaff, -- insincere hypothesis, hearsay, formality; you were never in contact with great heart of the Universe at all; you are properly neither pure nor impure; you are nothing, Nature has no business with you." 62

Doubtless the idea expressed here is that one must be true to God -- God who is at the heart of the universe. Nonconformity with the laws of nature is hypocrisy towards God who has descended from his orthodox throne and has merged his being with the energetic molecules of the universe. How does one effect an entente with this supreme being at the heart of the universe? Evidently by descending to it via the great unconscious. "The Unconscious is alone complete"[63]; the unconscious alone is the way. Not only, then, is Carlyle championing a naturalistic interpretation of life, but he is upholding a very special brand of naturalism which might be best characterized as primitive or subrational.

Where shall the human being, a castaway from the omniscient unconscious, look for knowledge of himself? We have heard much about the higher self, and the answer to the mystery that lies there -- the higher self that reaches beyond the emotions into a state where the tempest of the

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62. Carlyle, Heroes and Hero Worship, p. 293.
63. Carlyle, Past and Present, p. 114. Carlyle says again: "...in all-vital action her [nature's] manifest purpose and effort is, that we should be unconscious of it..." Carlyle, "Characteristics," p. 346.

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ego no longer rages. But to Carlyle (who seems to welcome the tempest) the insignificant ego cannot find the explanation of itself in itself, nor in a disciplined, concentrated self, but in the dimensionless universe without. The ego which is atom-like when he at first begins to take its size seems suddenly to bulge and to expand as he is mystically warmed by the colors, the motions, and jubilant sounds of the universe. The ego seems to develop a spatial and confident quality as it identifies itself with infinite nature. There in the heart of nature, it finds the answer, the revelation, the apocalyptic vision of "what I am." But this revelation is not given indiscriminately to each of us, but only to the "cunning," to those whose eyes have seen the vision and whose ears have heard the voice -- those, indeed, who vibrate to the throbbing pulse of God in nature. So Carlyle seems to say, and such must the answer be to his final query:

> "Who am I? Who is this Me? A Voice, a Motion, an Appearance, some embodied, visualized Idea in the Eternal mind? Cogito, ergo sum. Alas, poor Cogitator, this takes us but a little way. Save enough, I am; and lately was not; but Whence? How? Whereto? The answer lies around written in all colours and motions, uttered in all tones of jubilee and wail, in thousand-figured, thousand-voiced, harmonious Nature: but where is the cunning eye and ear to whom that God-written apocalypse will yield articulate meaning? 64

Evidence, further, that Carlyle believes that Nature gives light and wisdom, sympathy and love, to those who

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64. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 40.

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will heed her "behests," who will answer her "riddle" will be found in the following passage. But how severe are the reprisals for those who are deaf to her warnings! Indeed, one feels that Carlyle has the same attitude toward "nature" that the Hebrew prophets had toward Jehovah and that for him nature has the same attitude toward her creatures that the Hebrew God had toward his children. Bitter, to repeat, is the life of one who deviates from, or does not accord himself to, the ways of a righteous or a morally indignant nature (for how else are we to interpret the vindictiveness of nature, if not in moral terms?). Says Carlyle:

> "Nature, Universe, Destiny, Existence, howsoever we name this grand unnamable fact in the midst of which we live and struggle, is as a heavenly bride and conquest to the wise and brave, to them who can discern her behests and do them; a destroying fiend to them who cannot. Answer her riddle, it is well with thee. Answer it not, pass on regarding it not, it will answer itself; the solution for thee is a thing of teeth and claws; Nature is a dumb lioness, deaf to thy pleadings, fiercely devouring. Thou are not now her victorious bridegroom; thou art her mangled victim, scattered on the precipices, as a slave found treacherous, recreant, ought to be and must."65

The moral conscience at the heart of nature which metes out justice to those who do not abide by her laws is also responsible for the prophet's vision. Says Carlyle:

> "But the eye that flashes direct into the heart of things, and <u>sees</u> the truth of them; this is to me a highly interesting object. Great Nature's own gift; which she bestows on all; but which only one in a thousand does not cast sorrowfully away: it is what

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65. Carlyle, <u>Past and Present</u>, p. 9.

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> I call sincerity of vision; the test of a sincere heart." 66

This passage is significant because it shows that nature has usurped the role of the ancient God who spoke to his prophets from a vantage point far removed from the physical universe. Admittedly Carlyle's nature has God within it, but the gap between "nature" and "supernature" has been removed (i.e. dualism has been abolished), and with it, it logically follows, the requirement of attaining to God by controlling the "nature" within ourselves. This requirement, it goes without saying, obtained even more for the prophet than for the ordinary individual; but either for prophet or ordinary person, what would be the use of controlling one's nature, when one can find God by expressing or releasing it? The way now is open to attain God through the cultivation of our emotions -- by means, as we have seen, of a descent to the unconscious.

Whatever Carlyle's conception of nature is one fact is certain: Nature is far more to him than mechanical, physical, or biological law.[67] Although the two laws are not mutually exclusive,[68] we find that he considers the

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66. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 298.
67. "As a result of...eighteenth century influences, nature had, according to Carlyle become a mere engine, a system of cogs and pulleys." Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 300.
68. Carlyle himself is specific on this point. (The whole quotation is significant as a straightforward exposition of Carlyle's "supernatural naturalism" -- i.e. the elimination of dualism.) Anthony Froude reports Carlyle as saying: "That the Supernatural differs not from the Natural is a great Truth, which the last cen-

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physical law subordinate to the spiritual law. Carlyle, in other words, succeeds in making a distinction between two kinds of law without desertion of his naturalistic position. The following passage will suggest the distinction which he makes:

> "But is not a real miracle simply a violation of the Laws of Nature? ask several. Whom I answer by this new question: What are the laws of Nature? To me perhaps the rising of one from the dead were no violation of these laws, but a confirmation; were some far deeper Law, now first penetrated into, and by Spiritual Force, even as the rest have all been, brought to bear on us its Material Force." 69

We must note that the miracle of one's "rising... from the dead" is not a violation of "the laws of Nature," that a "Spiritual Force" may be brought to bear on a "Material Force" and so modify it. But the spiritual law only confirms the laws of nature; it does not contradict them. Nature and Supernature are thus not at odds. A spiritual law is in reality a natural law incarnate. Here is more evidence of Carlyle's abolition of dualism and for[70]

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tury (especially in France) has been engaged in demonstrating. The philosophers went far wrong, however, in this, that instead of raising the natural to the supernatural, they strove to sink the supernatural to the natural. The gist of my whole way of thought is to do not the latter but the former. I feel it to be the epitome of much good for this and the following generations in my hands and in those of innumerable stronger ones." (Hill Shine, "Carlyle's Fusion of Poetry, History and Religion by 1834," Studies in Philology by 1834 (July, 1937), vol. 34. p. 450.) Shine quoting Froude who in turn is quoting Carlyle.

69. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 193.

70. Hill Shine reaches a similar conclusion: "The principle" of morality "that he [Carlyle] seemed to favor as one fit for the new era stipulated a tolerant

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that reason, though his conception of nature is far from mechanical, he is essentially a naturalist or a monist.[71]

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No account of Arnold's "naturalistic background and milieu" would be complete without reference to Wordsworth's major ideas. A full treatment of them cannot of course be here attempted, nor can all the vicissitudes of his thought be followed as they occurred over the long years of his life. For the purpose of this study the

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relationship between the dualistic elements in man's life." (Hill Shine, "Carlyle's Views on the Relation between Religion and Poetry up to 1832," Studies in Philology (January, 1936), vol. 33, p. 90.) Such tolerance, of course, in the final analysis means the marriage of "Heaven and Hell."

71. One could characterize Carlyle as a "spiritual monist." But if one accepts the premise that in the fullest sense of the word one becomes spiritual as he puts away his nature and not as he acquiesces in it, the term becomes meaningless. It does, however, have a use in distinguishing such a naturalist as Carlyle from one such as Huxley. Carlyle, again, is most often considered a transcendentalist. Pantheist, however, would be more accurate. Says Beach: "It is certain that he [Carlyle] sometimes incurs the suspicion of ...pantheism...His God is much more like the 'animating principle' of a vast system than like the Living and True God of Christian theology...It is beyond question that Carlyle did much to dissolve in his transcendental solution the theological dogmas of Christianity." (Joseph Warren Beach, The Concept of Nature in Nineteenth Century English Poetry, New York, 1936, p. 310.) Beach adds: "...Carlyle makes Nature's will and God's will synonymous." (Ibid., p. 315.) And further: "In his philosophy of nature unconsciously he was doing his best -- to use a phrase from Arnold -- 'to ease a severe transition,' -- to make possible the passage from a supernatural to a natural reading of the world, and that with a minimum of 'violent shocks' and 'little pain.' (Ibid., p. 317.) All of which is confirmation of my contention that Carlyle is basically a naturalist -- that his so-called transcendentalism does not signify a "break" with Nature.

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"young" Wordsworth is of special significance, the Wordsworth who gave English thought a new direction and particularly attracted Arnold.[72]

Wordsworth anticipates Carlyle in his mystical, non-rational attitude toward nature. He takes the "measure" of nature, not through the mind, the calculating mind that measures objects by rods and inches, but through the feelings, the senses, and through what he regards as the soul. It is Wordsworth's distinctive contribution to fuse the senses with the soul, so that initially it can be asserted that so far as Wordsworth's principal thought is concerned he is not a dualist. Essentially nature remains for him the mother and father of all our being, and if he develops other loyalties, he does so without sacrificing his fundamental, filial affection.

What may impress one at the outset in his study of Wordsworth is that Wordsworth expresses this affection for the mountains and the mists with the same personal

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72. Arnold's estimate is well known: "Wordsworth composed verses during a space of some sixty years; and it is no exaggeration to say that within one single decade of those years, between 1798 and 1808 almost all his really first-rate work was produced." (Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticism, Second Series, London, 1930, p. 136.) It is interesting to observe that Arnold knew Wordsworth personally, as Wordsworth was a frequent visitor at Arnold's boyhood home at Fox How. Mrs. Humphrey Ward quotes from Arnold's mother to the following effect: "Matt has been very much pleased, I think, by what he has seen of dear old Wordsworth since he has been at home, and certainly he manages to draw him out very well." Ward, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 103.

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fervor that before his time was reserved for a personal God -- or for an intimate friend. He expresses his obligations to the elements with reverence and prayerful devotion. They are not cold, unsympathetic -- physically detached. One can see that for Wordsworth they have reciprocal powers and, if anything, in excess of those possessed by ordinary people. He exclaims:

> "Yet were I grossly destitute of all,
> Those human sentiments which make this earth
> So dear, if I should fail, with grateful voice
> To speak of you, Ye Mountains, and Ye Lakes,
> And Sounding Cataracts! Ye Mists and Winds
> That dwell among the hills where I was born." 73

It is this "reciprocal quality" that Wordsworth ascribes to nature that makes his gospel unique and that sets him at odds with traditional dualism[74] (to say nothing of traditional religion). If Wordsworth maintained the integrity of "self" as the oriental maintained it and if he differentiated this self from the elements, then we might justifiably argue that he was establishing a genuine dualism. The evidence, however, seems to be that he wishes to obliterate, rather than to maintain, the demarcation.

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73. Prelude, II, 437-440.
74. Irving Babbitt remarks: "Wordsworth is 'well pleased to recognize in nature and the language of the sense' the 'guide' and 'guardian' of all his 'moral' being.' Saint Bonaventura, though very ready on occasion to interpret religiously natural appearances, yet affirms finally that 'the soul knows God without the support of the outer senses." Irving Babbitt, "The Primitivism of Wordsworth" (On Being Creative and Other Essays), New York, 1932, p. 78.) "Here, if anywhere," adds Babbitt, "is a clash of first principles." loc. cit.

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Traditionally the question of faith was inextricably bound with a belief in a higher self or in a God that furnished the heart with a guarantee that despite our personal disillusionments He would not fail us in the end. Now Wordsworth has the same warm and consoling faith, which he retains despite all adversity, but it is nature-inspired and not God-inspired. He says:

> "If mid indifference and apathy
> And wicked exultation, when good men,
> On every side fall off we know not how,
> To selfishness, disguis'd in gentle names
> Of peace and quiet, and domestic love,
> Yet mingled, now unwillingly, with sneers
> On visionary minds; if we in this time
> Of dereliction and dismay, I yet
> Despair not of our nature; but retain
> A more than Roman confidence, a faith
> That fails not, in all sorrow my support,
> The blessing of my life, the gift is yours,
> Ye Mountains! thine, O Nature! 75

What is further unique in Wordsworth's conception of nature is that she not only gave him faith to endure bitterness and disillusionment when he was physically close to her but also that she functioned as a morally protective spirit wherever he went. As a youth in London "The spirit of Nature was upon" him.[76] Nature kept him on the straight and narrow path and ennobled his thought besides:

> "With deep devotion, Nature, did I feel
> In that great city what I owed to thee,
> High thoughts of God and man, and love of man,
> Triumphant over all those loathsome sights
> Of wickedness and vice.... 77

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75. Prelude, II, 450-62.
76. Ibid., VII, 766.
77. Ibid., 264-269.

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It is evident, further, from this passage that for Wordsworth nature and God are not mutually exclusive. That is, Wordsworth does not worship nature in the place of God. More likely he worships God in nature, for he finds him there. As he says:

> "Listen! the mighty Being is awake,
> And doth with his eternal motion make
> A sound like thunder -- everlastingly. 78

If God can be heard in the motions of the Universe he can also be heard and felt in the motions of the heart, so that it is evident that for Wordsworth the spirit of God and the spirit of nature are identical.

Traditionally, the soul of man, the spirit that makes man man (the soul which, Wordsworth himself will say, "Hath had elsewhere its setting...") [79] had qualities which differentiated it from the elements. This conception of a general soul was related to the conception of personal immortality of the soul. But Wordsworth (at least the "early Wordsworth") believed otherwise: first, immortality was not personal, but cosmological; second, since it is cosmological, it has the same substance as the rocks and trees:

> "No motion has she now, no force;
> She neither hears nor sees;
> Rolled round in earth's diurnal course." 80

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78. "It Is a Beauteous Evening Calm and Free," 6-9.
79. "Ode. Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood," 60.
80. "A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal," 5-8. Joseph Warren Beach labors to establish that Wordsworth is not a pantheist, that the so-called pantheistic poems are poems of a relaxed mood -- not to be taken seriously.

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The spirit of Lucy that lives everlastingly in the rocks lives also in the flower, and the spirit that lives in the flower also lives in man:

> "Methinks that there abides in thee
> Some concord with humanity..." 81

The human soul, then, for Wordsworth has lost its distinctive mark. The gap between nature and man has been removed:

> "To her fair works did Nature link
> The human soul that through me ran..." 82

Consequently, all life is one vast fraternity. Dualism, as an active principle of life, with its emphasis upon the stern control of the senses, the "nature" in man, has ceased to figure.

Since the poet has found God in nature and has fused the soul of man with the substance of the rock, it is natural that he should find morality there too. We have seen that the spirit of nature followed him to London and kept his conscience pure and his thoughts ennobled. But good-intentioned and benevolent nature (against which men like Mill were to react) does not

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The Lucy poem "is simply a description of a dead person." (Joseph Warren Beach, "Expostulation and Reply," PMLA, (June, 1925), vol. 40, p. 359.) Then Beach contradicts himself. Wordsworth would not deny, he states "that the human soul has no kinship with the fair works of nature, no links of common origin and kind with the singing birds and the budding flowers..." (Ibid., p. 360.) Beach is right. Wordsworth would not deny that relationship. Therefore he is a pantheist.

81. "To a Daisy," 6-7.
82. "Lines Written in Early Spring," 5-6.

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make man the exclusive object of her solicitude. Wordsworth spreads a universal blanket of morality over all things, going deep into the germinal beginnings of nature's intentions and discovering that only good is part of her scheme:

> "'Tis Nature's law
> That none, the meanest of the created things
> Or forms created the most vile, and brute,
> The dullest of most noxious, should exist
> Divorced from good -- a spirit and pulse of good
> A life and soul, to every mode of being
> Inseparably linked." 83

How, then, is one to account for the evil that exists? Wordsworth furnishes an explanation in the following confession. His errors, he explains, are the result of his turning "aside from Nature's way":

> "...the errors into which I fell,
> betrayed
> By present objects, and by reasonings false
> From their beginnings, inasmuch as drawn
> Out of heart that had been turned aside
> From Nature's way by outward accidents,
> And which was thus confounded, more and more
> Misguided, and misguiding." 84

Here, then, is a reversal of the customary view. Traditionally when a man erred he felt in his hour of remorse that he had offended by indulging his nature, and he had the same distrust of the external world that he had of nature in himself. He had conformed to nature all too much, not too little. But Wordsworth takes the opposite view. Man's evils are to be accounted for by his

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83. "The Old Cumberland Beggar," 73-79.
84. Prelude, II, 287-93.

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deflection from nature rather than by his deflection from a God transcending nature and its claims, which for him are always benevolent.

If nature gives morality and restitution for our errors, it follows that it also gives knowledge and wisdom. Wordsworth discards the strenuous discipline, the severe self-concentration, that go normally with the mastery of knowledge and the conquest of wisdom. In their stead he substitutes a simple, sensuously enjoyable method which entails the exposure of oneself to the stimuli of the physical world:

> "Come forth into the light of things,
> Let Nature be your Teacher.
>
> "She has a world of ready wealth,
> Our minds and hearts to bless --
> Spontaneous wisdom breathed by health,
> Truth breathed by cheerfulness.
>
> "One impulse from a vernal wood
> May teach you more of man,
> Of moral evil and of good,
> Than all the sages can." 85

Making all possible allowances for poetic hyperbole, the fact remains that Wordsworth, despite his obvious moral intention, is encouraging the indulgence of our lower selves rather than the cultivation of our higher selves. When he refers to "spontaneous wisdom," he is evidently placing a premium upon uninhibited emotion, for, if an emotion were controlled, it would no longer be spontaneous and therefore, we take it, the mind would be shut off from wisdom.

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85. "The Tables Turned," 15-24.

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The following passage further sustains the view that Wordsworth condemned the rational and superrational faculties:

> "Nor less I deem that there are powers
> Which of themselves our minds impress;
> That we can feed this mind of ours
> In a wise passiveness. 86

Even though it is evident that Wordsworth is reacting against the extreme emphasis that the eighteenth century placed upon reason (and the dualist sympathizes with him in this quarrel), yet the weakness of his formula for achieving wisdom is equally evident -- the weakness, namely, of giving preeminence to physical relaxation rather than to spiritual concentration.[87]

Not only is Wordsworth's formula for achieving wisdom questionable; his formula for achieving a mystical union with spiritual reality is equally questionable. Now Wordsworth expresses the achievement of that union with matchless felicity:

> "...that serene and blessed mood,
> In which the affections gently lead us on, --
> Until, the breath of this corporeal frame

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86. "Expostulation and Reply," 21-25.

87. In defense of Wordsworth, it should be indicated that his formula for achieving wisdom is not without deference to "Powers which of <u>themselves</u> our minds impress..." (Italics mine) Wordsworth's belief, apparently, is that the spirit of God in nature will confer wisdom on man if he gives himself to mature. No one of course except possibly a Wordsworth or a Newman can assert positively what God's ways are, but it would be contrary to the spirit of criticism to maintain that God could not use the Wordsworth formula for bestowing wisdom if he so chose. I can merely point out that the Wordsworth view not only runs counter to practical experience but to the way a Buddha, for instance, as an exemplar of the dualistic doctrine, would have advocated.

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> And even the motion of our human blood
> Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
> In body, and become a living soul..." 88

The words, "we are laid asleep In body, and become a living soul," are an excellent description of the consummation which every mystic seeks. As we read further, however, we hear Wordsworth declare:

> "...well pleased to recognize
> In nature and the language of the sense,
> The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
> The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
> of all my moral being." 89

One may very well raise the question how the body can be put to sleep if the senses are allowed to have full sovereignty (as Wordsworth evidently intends that they should have), for one cannot but recall that the traditional mystic anchored his "purest thoughts" not in the "five faculties," but in an "infinite faculty" which lay beyond the "finite five." However felicitous, therefore, the description is of Wordsworth's "mystical mood," we are forced to observe that his approach is altogether different from the approach taken and advocated by the traditional mystics (a St. Paul, for instance) and constitutes a denial of dualism.[90]

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88. "Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey," 41-46.
89. Ibid., 106-111.
90. Basic in that formula is not the denial but the affirmation of dualism. As Helen White has said: "All mystics recognize in human nature a dualism analogous to that which we have viewed in the universe at large, a higher and a lower part in man. The lower part they attribute to man's body, the higher part they attribute to reality." (White, op. cit., p. 64.) Miss White extends her explanation as follows: "...if

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Wordsworth, as I remarked in the beginning, makes amends himself for his extreme emphasis upon the senses.[91] We have seen that he expresses a Platonic conception of immortality (See chapter III, footnote 102) and in so do-

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the spirit be essentially unknowable to the flesh, how is the soul of man to lay hold upon reality? Certainly not through the senses, for they have nothing of kindred nature whereby they may lay hold upon the spirit; certainly not by the routine operations of the reason, for the best that may be achieved by their agency is a scientific or philosophic generalization or analysis of material from the senses. How then is man to know God? By that in which he is like unto God. In that all mystics agree. Man will not come to God in vision or audition or revelation, but within his own soul. In all forms all mystics reiterate St. Paul's 'Know ye not that ye are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?'" (Ibid., p. 62.) Such a description of the mystical way takes us in an opposite direction from that given by Wordsworth.

91. Poems -- to mention just three -- which bear evidence of Wordsworth's return to the eighteenth century are "Ode to Duty," "Character of the Happy Warrior," and "Laodamia." In the "Ode to Duty" we read:

> "Through no disturbance of my soul
> Or strong compunction in me wrought,
> I supplicate for thy control;
> But in the quietness of thought:
> Me this unchartered freedom tires;
> I feel the weight of chance-desires:
> My hopes no more must change their name
> I long for a repose that ever is the same."
> (33-40)

In the "Character of the Happy Warrior," Wordsworth expresses his admiration for him:

> "Where law is reason; who depends
> Upon this law as on the best of friends..."
> (27-28)

Most striking is the poem "Laodamia" (written in 1814). The poem is a paean of praise of self-control. "'And thou," says the spectral lord to his sensual wife,

> though strong in love, art all too weak
> In Reason, in self-government too slow."
> (139-40)

This is a different Wordsworth from the one who glorifies impulse and "dizzy raptures." "Tintern Abbey," 85.

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ing suggests his understanding of genuine dualism, but even in the "Ode" he retains his filial affection for nature. Toward the end of the poem, he exclaims:

> "And O, ye Fountains, Meadows, Hills, and Groves,
> Forebode not any severing of our loves!
> Yet, in my heart of hearts I feel your might..." [92]

Nature, it may be said, never had a more faithful adherent.

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There is a strong resemblance between Goethe and Wordsworth,[93] despite the fact that Arnold expresses his admiration for Goethe in a way which he never does for Wordsworth. For Arnold Wordsworth is at his best when he does not think or philosophize, when nature takes the pen out of his hand and spontaneously[94] expresses the song in his heart. Goethe, however, he considers profound;

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92. "Ode," 187-189. (Italics mine)
93. I wish to maintain this view, though Arnold has an opposite contention. Of the two men Arnold said: "Wordsworth cared little for books, and disparaged Goethe. I admire Wordsworth, as he is, so much that I cannot wish him different; and it is vain, no doubt, to imagine such a man different from what he is, to suppose that he could have been different. But surely the one thing wanting to make Wordsworth an even greater poet than he is, -- his thought richer, and his influence of wider application,-- was that he should have read more books, among them, no doubt, those of that Goethe whom he disparaged without reading him." (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 7.) That Goethe was more profound than Wordsworth is at least open to question. In regard to naturalism, however, there is, as I shall try to show, no essential difference between them.
94. "...Wordsworth's poetry, when he is at his best is inevitable as Nature herself. It might seem that Nature not only gave him the matter for his poem, but wrote his poem for him." Essays in Criticism, Second Series, p. 155.

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his naturalism "imperturbable."[95] But the fact is that when Goethe "thinks" he expresses the same ideas that Wordsworth does when he "emotionalizes" as the following passage illustrates:

> "All is more or less pliant and wavering, is more or less manageable; but nature understands no jesting; she is always true, always serious, always severe; she is always right, and the errors and faults are always those of man. Him, who is incapable of appreciating her, she despises; and only to the apt, the pure, and the true, does she resign herself, and reveal her secrets. 96

Wordsworth too, we have seen, believes that nature is innately right and good and that all men's misfortunes are the result of failure to read her designs correctly or to conform to her laws. The "original sin" for Goethe,

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95. "Goethe's profound, imperturbable naturalism is absolutely fatal to all routine thinking; he puts the standard, once for all, inside every man instead of outside him; when he is told, such a thing must be so, there is immense authority and custom in favour of its being so for a thousand years, he answers with Olympian politeness, 'But is it so? is it so to me?'" (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 161.) Obviously Goethe recommends himself to Arnold on account of his critical method, the scientific or naturalistic method. Goethe would not, like Wordsworth, have condemned the "false secondary power by which we multiply distinctions." But there is one side of Goethe that is as emotional as anything to be found in Wordsworth. The internal standard to which Arnold has reference, constitutes in the final analysis, a plea for subjective and individual authority (a view to which Arnold himself is not consistently friendly). Robert Shafer says: "What Arnold did accept unreservedly from Goethe was his subversive and dissolving individualism, his assertion that man must live from within outwards, his refusal to trust anything on the score of its external recommendations." Shafer, op. cit., p. 167.

96. Goethe, op. cit., p. 367.

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as for Wordsworth, is to have departed from nature's ways. Nature "is always right, and the errors and faults are always those of man." For Goethe nature has "high seriousness." She does not jest; there is no humor in nature. So self-evident a fact, it would seem, barely calls for utterance. No doubt nature or natural law is not funny; but what is the basis of considering it serious? If it is seriousness that we are to cherish as a norm, is it intelligent to suggest that we mimic the dumb solemnity of the rock, the speechless grandeur of the mountain, or even the subtle, though monotonous regularity of a physical or chemical law? Truth may be considered truth wherever it appears; but the truth of nature is one thing; the truth of God is another. Goethe blurs the distinction; in fact, he disposes of it. His position, therefore, as a naturalist and anti-dualist[97] is unmistakable; and Arnold, in praising him, not only exposes himself to the same charge, but also to inconsistency, for Goethe's naturalism is a contrast to Arnold's dualism.

Goethe, like Carlyle, perceives no opposition between divine law and natural law; nor does naturalism for Goethe signify a godless universe. God penetrates every atom of it, and though man no longer occupies an anthropocentric

97. As Joseph Warren Beach says: "He [Goethe] was not led by religious qualms to look askance at nature and to erect a mystical dualism in order to save his spiritual aspirations from the destructive findings of science." Beach, The Concept of Poetry in Nineteenth-Century English Poetry, p. 297.

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position, at least he is subject to the same blessings of divinity as nature's rocks and stones. The two fundamentals of existence, nature and supernature, are thus interrelated. Contrary, further, to the oriental conception which places the responsibility of assimilating divinity upon the will of the individual Goethe believes that man is subject to its blessings, whether he earns them or not.[98] Goethe thus expresses a pantheistic view similar to that of Wordsworth, except that there is a note of divine fatalism in Goethe not to be found in Wordsworth.[99] So Goethe

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98. Apropros of Goethe's pantheism Beach says: "...Goethe does not mean to assert that man's spiritual faculties are something which make him independent of nature, and that his real kinship is with a supernatural world. ....And God, we know, was uniformly regarded by Goethe, from the 1780's onward in the pantheistic fashion, and was to all intents and purposes indistinguishable from universal nature." (Ibid., p. 277.) Dowden also considered Goethe a Pantheist. He refers to "the pantheistic character of his thinking." (Edward Dowden, "The Philosophy of Goethe," The Contemporary Review (December, 1867), vol. 6, p. 451.) Pantheistic ideas, he holds, are "deep at the centre of Goethe's system of thought,..giving it unity." (Ibid. (September, 1867), p. 54.) According to G. S. Brett, to Goethe the "spirit and body were one Living Nature, a Divine Being to be grasped...without confounding the attributes or dividing the substance." (G. S. Brett, "Goethe's Place in the History of Science," The University of Toronto Quarterly (April, 1932), vol. 1, p. 283.) Brett concludes that the early "Goethe was headed for the religion of the Bacchants...the fullness of life which must needs believe the romantic gospel of Pantheism." Ibid., p. 284.

99. What I have called "divine fatalism" H. Walter designates as "fatalistic optimism." Walter refers to Goethe's general conception that to perfect our destinies we need but to trust our lives to nature's hands: "The reformer will look askance at his [Goethe's] 'fatalistic optimism'; the rebel (and we are all rebels nowadays) will spurn his advice to accept our lives as they are given us and patiently wait for the improvements to come about; nor can the denial of

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says:

> "...Nature and we men are all so penetrated by the Divine, that it holds us, that we live, move, and have our being in it; that we suffer and are happy under eternal laws; that we practise these, and they are practiced on us, whether we recognize them or not." 100

What, specifically, is the nature of the divine for Goethe? A permeating force it is, but what kind? The familiar Goethean pronouncement, "Feeling is everything," would suggest that Goethe is even more Wordsworthian than Wordsworth in his emphasis upon the senses, except that Wordsworth's conception of feeling has an elevation which Goethe's in its Mephistophelian context plainly lacks; but there is another side of Goethe which relates him to Spinoza -- a more "severe" side than is to be found in the "early" Wordsworth.[101] Goethe says:

> "...man must be capable of elevating himself to the highest Reason, to come into contact with the Divinity, which manifests itself in the primitive phenomena (Urphenomenen), which dwells behind them, and from which they proceed." 102

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the existence of evil, no matter how true in metaphysics, be accepted as a working faith of everyday life." H. Walter, "Goethe: An Estimate," The University of Toronto Quarterly (April, 1932), vol. 1, p. 278.

100. Goethe, op. cit., p. 525.

101. Regarding Spinoza's influence upon Goethe, Lange says: "...in his later years Goethe took refuge in the Ethic of Spinoza if any unsympathetic theory had affected him unpleasantly, and he calls it his pure, deep, innate, and habitual mode of thinking, which had taught him inevitably to see God in nature, nature in God." (Lange, op. cit., p. 148.) Arnold also maintained that "More than any philosopher who has ever lived, Spinoza satisfied him. [Goethe]" Essays in Criticism, First Series, p.333.

102. Goethe, op. cit., p. 367.

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Reason as well as emotion thus permeates the universe -- divine reason; but this spiritual power, if so we may name it, "dwells" and "manifests" itself "in the primitive phenomena..." Goethe is thus advising man to ascend and descend simultaneously -- to elevate "himself to the highest Reason," but where are we to look for it? In the phenomena below, as he tells us. Now we have met paradoxes before; the ethical implications of dualism are themselves paradoxical. Arnold shows (in interpreting Jesus) that we gain life while losing it, dying to it. But is Goethe's paradox in the same order? Analysis would indicate that it is not, for the reason which he admonishes us to attain is not in Goethe's own terms apart from the natural order. For Goethe, then, the divine essence that permeates phenomena has an element of rationalism in it, but his conception is nonetheless pantheistic.

Goethe's naturalism is further shown in his homage toward "natural science." No doubt science has a good deal that is sound and significant to say about human nature in general; but what can science say about the soul, or about Arnold's "not ourselves that makes for righteousness"? (Of course Arnold agrees with Goethe, and such agreement is tantamount to a contradiction.) Goethe, however, believes that natural science is the proper method to be used in achieving a knowledge of human character. He expresses his obligations to natural science thus:

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> "Without my attempts in natural science I should never have learned to know mankind as it is. In nothing else can we so closely approach pure contemplation and thought, so closely observe the errors of the senses and of the understanding, the weak and strong points of character. 103

Goethe, it is evident, placed a reliance upon science as a means of securing knowledge in a realm whose depths were ordinarily plumbed by religious insight. But Goethe gives first place to science as a means of plumbing those depths. He thus questions the validity, intentionally or not, of dualism both as a method and a philosophy.

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The consideration of two other writers -- Spinoza and Marcus Aurelius[103a] -- will complete our outline of Arnold's naturalistic background. As I have suggested Arnold as a naturalist was especially the son of his period; as a dualist the son of many periods. This is not to infer that the roots of his naturalism do not sink far back into history. As representatives of that history Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza constitute felicitous choices, because of the correspondence that exists between their ideas and the side of Arnold that is anti-dualistic.

Spinoza establishes his anti-dualistic position at once.[104] Neither can he be charged with the inconsistency

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103. Loc. cit.

103a. These two men were close to the heart of Arnold. Evidence of that fact is that he devoted two essays to them: "Spinoza and the Bible" and "Marcus Aurelius," published in Essays in Criticism, First Series.

104. "No thinker," says Benn, "was ever more a cosmist

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that characterizes Arnold. With emphasis, and not without dogmatism, he rules out the possibility of a difference between man and nature:

> "It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be understood through his Nature only as their adequate cause." 105

Such a statement not only dismisses the possibility of dualism between man and nature; it also excludes the possibility of a God as a transcendent power. Man is part of the natural order; and there is only one order: natural. Nature is cause, as are all effects that take place in it. The following statement emphasizes the comprehensiveness and universality of natural law: "I freely admit that all things are predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given, fixed and definite manner." 106

Although the universe is one, and that one is nature, yet nature has two aspects or two principles: active and passive. "...by nature viewed as active," says Spinoza,

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than the author of the 'Ethica,' none ever conceived the universe more completely or more consistently as an ordered whole. His deficiency, if any, is on the side of unity and sameness, not on the side of variety and individuality." Benn, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 97.

105. Benedict de Spinoza, "Ethics," The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza (R. H. M. Elwes, translator), London, 1883, p. 193. Benn elucidates this Spinozaistic view as follows: "For man is not above nature, but a part of it, and all his actions are as rigorously necessitated as the falling of a stone -- which, by the way, were it conscious, would believe that it fell by its own free choice." Benn, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 97.

106. Spinoza, "Theologico-Political Treatise," p. 57.

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"we should understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes or substances, which express eternal and infinite substance...and God in so far as he is considered as a free cause.[107] This is to say that nature as a creative principle expresses God, expresses God himself, insofar as it (nature) is not curtailed by the necessary limits of God's own being. "By nature, viewed as passive," Spinoza continues,

> "I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived." 108

Spinoza is saying here that necessity can be transcended, that the universe is free, that God as God within nature is a causal power, and that when things happen or seem to happen from necessity, as if they could not be diverted from their natural course, the active or creative principle of life, God, the creative substance or creative principle, could and would alter them. Spinoza, therefore, as a monist and as a pantheist, escapes a materialistic fatalism by his subdivision of nature into two complementary principles: active and passive.

Spinoza, though a monist or a pantheist, is not a rationalist. Neither is his pantheism similar to the emotional pantheism of Wordsworth. If anything Spinoza

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107. Spinoza, "Ethics," p. 68.
108. Loc. cit.

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is a superrational monist in so far as he believes in God as substance that transcends reason, though it is immanent in nature. Emphatically, "nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason..."[109] Spinoza's view of reason is almost identical with that of the traditional dualists, like Newman, for instance, who believes that nature puffs up the pride of man and gives him false notions of his importance. It ministers to his self-conceit and disables him from looking to a cause larger than himself. Reason "aims not only at man's true benefit and preservation";[110] what is wider than reason is nature itself: "...her limits are infinitely wider and have reference to the eternal order ...wherein man is but a speck..."[111]

The "whole" has a design of its own, and man is only a speck in that design. Reason, again, which fails in comprehending that design, agitates against man's acceptance of his role in the universe. Men are unwilling to resign themselves (Stoically, one should add)[112] to their role as "specks" in the order of nature. But the fact remains that "by the necessity of this alone,"[113] that is, the acceptance of their roles as parts subordinated to the whole, are all "individuals conditioned for living and acting in a partic-

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109. Ibid., p. 202.
110. Loc. cit.
111. Loc. cit.
112. Arnold refers to Spinoza's "stoicism, a stoicism not passive, but alive." Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 333.
113. Spinoza, "Ethics," p. 202.

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ular way."[114] Reason, in fine, is censured for militating against the acceptance of this severe Stoical fact.

Reason is also held culpable for another "libel" against nature. Both Wordsworth and Goethe, we have observed, attribute the errors of man to his deflection from the laws of nature. Spinoza has a similar explanation for the existence of evil, but the beguiling force, the devil that misleads, is "human reason." He says:

> "If anything...in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we know only in part and are almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil is not evil in respect to the orders and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our reason." 115

It is reason, then, which forces man to read into nature evils which exist not in nature but only in his benighted mind.[116] Man's ignorance is due to his human reason, because he wants nature to conform to it, because he fails to comprehend the true laws of its being.

The laws of nature's being are the laws of God, which

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114. Loc. cit.
115. Spinoza, "Theologico-Political Treatise," p. 202.
116. Spinoza stresses this point in the following. "If all things follow from necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they are serviceable to mankind." Spinoza, "Ethics," p. 81.

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are identical. This fact was indirectly borne out by our analysis of the two aspects of nature. Spinoza deals with their identity even more concretely. He says: "The power of nature is the power of God, which has sovereign right over all things..."[117] Again he adds: "...since the power in nature is identical with the power of God, by which alone all things happen and are determined, it follows that whatsoever man, as a part of nature, provides himself with to aid and preserve his existence, or whatsoever nature affords him without his help, is given to him solely by the divine power, acting either through human nature or through external circumstance."[118] The interrelation of man and nature, of human nature and divine nature could hardly be more emphatically championed, but Spinoza goes so far as not only to identify nature and God, but to conclude that the greater the knowledge of nature the greater is the knowledge of God:

> "...since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception of God so far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena: conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same thing as the knowledge of a particular property of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God (which is the case of all things)." 119

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117. Spinoza, "Theologico-Political Treatise," p. 200.
118. Spinoza, "Ethics," p. 45.
119. Spinoza, "Theologico-Political Treatise," p. 59.

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This is obviously a reversal of traditional dualism and an invitation to the abandonment of supernaturalism as a power above nature. Though sterner and more abstruse than the doctrine of Wordsworth it is nevertheless identical with his doctrine in the emphasis placed upon nature as the source and medium of divine knowledge.

Spinoza, then, is a rigid monist. He permits no latitude for the belief that the universe can be ruled by two antipodal principles. "There cannot," he says, exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute."[120] And though he admits complementary aspects of one principle, he does not admit that ultimately they do not emanate from the same source, since he again says:

> "...as substance is naturally prior to its modifications, -- it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself that is truly, there cannot be conceived one substance different from another, -- that is there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only." 121

The one substance is as natural as it is divine. Spinoza, centuries before Arnold, attempted to naturalise God and religion, and in so doing abolished dualism.[122]

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120. Spinoza, "Ethics," p. 47.
121. Loc. cit.
122. Despite Arnold's criticism of Spinoza because "the great critic" in dealing with Biblical questions "becomes voluntarily as uncritical as Exeter Hall" (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 329), in paralleling him "with St. Augustine (Ibid., p. 342), he is himself uncritical, since he fails to perceive the radical distinction between St. Augustine's dualism and Spinoza's monism.

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A man should not, Marcus Aurelius says,

> "yield to the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the intelligent motion claims superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of them." 123

As one reads this exhortation against the senses, one feels that he has before him an excellent definition of dualism, as indeed he has until he learns that the "self" which controls is for Marcus Aurelius just as an integral a part of nature as the senses which are to be controlled; that, in fine, the controlling element is none other than reason rooted in the mechanical order of nature. Marcus Aurelius' conception, therefore, is not dualistic, but basically monistic, as his interpretation of life proceeds from the assumption that all life can be explained in terms of one principle. His "self control," further, despite a certain pragmatic value, is self control in a spiritual vacuum because it has no external or transcendent power to charge it with ultimate meaning and direction.

Similarly when Marcus Aurelius admits a distinction between the soul and the body his dualism has an im-

123. The Thoughts of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus (George Long, translator), London, 1891, p. 55.

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permanent, an illusory foundation. He says:

> "Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in each of us, things that concern the body and things that concern the soul, and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things which come into existence in that which is the one and all, which we call cosmos, exist in it at the same time." 124

Although the soul and the body are different, they are aspects of the same thing: cosmos. The soul and the body have an inseparable origin and an inseparable destiny; and as the body deteriorates into the dust of the cosmos, so must the soul.

Again the will or the soul that governs the body ends in a void because Marcus Aurelius' reasoning forces him to reduce the will to an involuntary power. He says:

> "With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we should blame nobody." 125

Although, on the whole, Marcus Aurelius emphasizes responsibility and the obligation to fulfill a duty once it has been given to a person to perform, his statement above establishes his conception of the will as a controlled rather than as a controlling power. Self-responsibility becomes a nullity, if one can, either for the gods or himself, claim immunity on the ground of circumstances in nature whose laws he helplessly and in-

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124. Ibid., p. 123.
125. Ibid., p. 200.

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evitably must follow. Further, where there is no blame, there is, as Marcus Aurelius himself admits, no guilt. The will thus becomes an effete and impotent power, and a morality based on it dubious.

Of course Marcus Aurelius bases his conception of morality not wholly upon the will or power of restraint in each person but upon a consideration that the wholeness of nature[126] makes for mutual forbearance and universal good will. Since nature is a whole, and every part in it is related to every other part, it follows that we all should be good to one another, since if we injure a part to which we are related, we injure ourselves. As Marcus Aurelius says:

> "Whether the universe is a concourse of atoms, or nature is a system, let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is injurious to the part, if it is to the advantage of the whole. For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has this common principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that

126. "The Stoics, in particular," says Mossner, "looked with nostalgic longing to a Golden Age when man lived uncorrupt in nature, a state of perfection banished with the appearance of human evil." (Mossner, op. cit., p. 24.) The state of perfection which the Stoics longed for is rational and is therefore of a different order from that which the emotionalists of the nineteenth century imagined to exist.

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> I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself; and I shall turn all my efforts to the common interest, and direct them from the contrary. Now if these things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, and is content with whatever the state may assign to him." 127

The moral conceptions and objectives here outlined are innocuous enough; in fact they are so attractive as immediately to command our affection and admiration for the man who stated them; but they have the deficiency which a naturalistic morality inevitably has; namely, the absence of a supernatural power that gives ultimate meaning to our strivings and increases our spiritual horizons beyond this one, earthly sphere. Mutual consideration and benevolence, moreover, to succeed as ethical ideals must have the impetus of a will that makes an individual answerable for his

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127. Marcus Aurelius, op. cit., p. 172.
128. Arnold himself was attracted by the sweet reasonableness of Marcus Aurelius, but he makes the same point that is being made here -- the point that Marcus Aurelius' gospel does not minister to a God-inspired faith. Arnold says: "...he remains the especial friend and comforter of all clear-headed and scrupulous, yet pure-hearted and upward striving men, in those ages most especially that walk by sight, not by faith..." (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 378.) The same absence of faith of course may often be noted in Arnold's views. But Arnold has another criticism of Marcus Aurelius' social and fraternal ideas: they are unacceptable to "science." (Ibid., p. 377.)

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misdeeds, for how else could one who was by nature anti-social force himself to alter his course -- to pursue "a course of action which is advantageous to his fellow citizens" -- if it is assumed in the first place that he is not to be held responsible for his anti-social attitude?

The similarities between Marcus Aurelius' naturalism and the naturalism of the nineteenth century are not many, but there is one resemblance between them, and that is the analogy which Marcus Aurelius makes between biological life and human life. It is characteristic of the naturalists to base its morality on the life of nature. Says Marcus Aurelius:

> "Dost thou not see the little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to that which is according to thy nature? 129

Although the lesson to be drawn from Marcus Aurelius' illustration appears wholesome and innocent enough, andit may be but a mere fable to point a moral, namely, that if a "plant" or an "animal" does its "assigned" duty uncomplainingly, why shouldn't man? yet there is another meaning, more significant: Man must look to nature for his norms and models for behavior. He is not to imitate a God above the naturalistic level, aspire upward, perform a spiritual task; rather he is to perform his func-

129. Marcus Aurelius, op. cit., p. 106.

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tions with the dumb inevitability with which the animals and plants fulfill their functions. Certainly Stoical acceptance as here set forth suggests the dusty end of our mortal path[130] and gives to "work" a stifled and spiritless meaning. Of course the gap is wide between Marcus Aurelius' admonition that we go to nature in order to learn how to do our work and Wordsworth's suggestion that we go to nature in order to let it work on us, but both conceptions are limited by what they exclude rather than by what they include; namely, deference to a power that is above nature.

Another similarity between Marcus Aurelius' naturalism and nineteenth centruy naturalism (also Spinoza's)is the belief that nature intends no evil. Says Marcus Aurelius, after moralizing on the futile and needless fear of death:

> "But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature." 131

Not only is nature incapable of wrong; she is also incapable of creating anything ugly. The order of nature gives beauty: "...the things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and attractive."[132] To

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130. "...O Nature: from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee are all things, to thee all things return." Ibid., p. 98.
131. Ibid., p. 84.
132. Ibid., p. 126.

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one who "has become truly familiar with nature and her works"[133] practically every object presents itself to the eye as beautiful. He says further:

> "All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are the after-products of the grand and beautiful."[134]

But there was a moment now and then when the Stoic doubted the beauty and symmetry of his moral universe:

> "Either it is a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee and disorder in the All. And this too when all things are so separated and diffused and sympathetic." 135

The doubt is not prevalent. Nature is not chaos; it is rational order: "To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to reason."[136] Nature is a moral cosmos. One's rational obligation is to find one's role in it and perform it or else suffer the consequences which nature has in store for the misfit:

> "Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thy existence is an efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it wilt go and thou wilt go, and it will never return." 137

In the final analysis, the fact that characterizes Marcus Aurelius' philosophy is his insistence that the

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133. Loc. cit.
134. Ibid., p. 125.
135. Ibid., p. 99.
136. Ibid., 132.
137. Ibid., 79.

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universe is one, not two, and his denial of the existence of a power independent of the universe:

> "In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either in nature which externally comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and independent of this." 138

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It is evident that Marcus Aurelius is not a dualist.

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138. Ibid., p. 118.

139. Irving Babbitt makes some comparisons between Stoicism and Buddhism which have bearing upon the point just made in the exposition of Marcus Aurelius' views; namely, that Stoic rationalism and self control do not make for dualism. Babbitt says: "Among the doctrines in which reason has...aspired unduly, with a corresponding tendency to pride to prevail over humility, Stoicism stands preeminent: first, because many important modern philosophies -- for example, those of Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant -- have in their practical bearing on life and conduct much in common with Stoicism; secondly, because misleading comparisons have been made between the Buddhist and the Stoic. The Buddhist reminds one of the Stoic by the severity of the self-control he inculcates, also by his self-reliant spirit. He relies, however, in this discipline not, like the Stoic upon a reason, supposed to coincide with the cosmic order, but upon a will that transcends it. Reliance upon this will gives the psychic equivalent of the Christian submission to a divine will, in other words, of humility. The Stoic is a monist; the Buddhist is like the Christian, an uncompromising dualist. (Babbitt, "Buddha and the Occident," p. 82.) As has been previously observed, a conception of God or "self control" to conform to the definition of dualism must ascribe transcendent attributes to this power, not immanent. Again Babbitt says: "The Stoic attempts to bring all the facts of experience under a single law, the law of 'nature.' The Stoic thus comes to deny dualism in his metaphysical theory at the same time that he asserts it in his ethical practice. In other words, he seeks to base the principle of control on a philosophy of immanence, whereas both Christianity and Buddhism are, though on different postulates, transcendent." Ibid., p. 121.

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II -- ARNOLD'S VIEWS

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The foregoing survey brings into relief the generalization that naturalism, though a complex movement, with manifold branches and tributaries of thought, revolves around one basic idea: life is monistic and not dualistic. Such a fact signifies a common ground between a mechanist and naturalist like Huxley, a theistic monist such as Martineau, an agnostic and sceptic like Stephen, a sensitive rationalist and utilitarian such as Mill, a spiritual monist such as Carlyle (who like Arnold is not always consistent), an emotional pantheist such as Wordsworth, an "intellectual" naturalist like Goethe, a "severe" pantheist such as Spinoza, and a benign Stoic like Marcus Aurelius. In many respects, Arnold is less naturalistic or monistic than any of these men; and that is because, as we have seen, dualism weighs so heavily in his mind and soul.

-ii-

Arnold's treatment of nature, it may be said, falls into a number of attitudes and divisions. First, as I have tried to show, he is often purely dualistic. Second, he has a "neutral" attitude toward nature. Third, he often uses nature for dramatic and didactic purposes. Fourth, his attitude isfrequently all monistic. Fifth, his attitude is a combination of all these -- ambivalent and contradictory.

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In dealing with Arnold's views of nature, I shall, in general, follow the order here outlined and at the same time the convolutions and irregularities of his thought as it falls into this pattern.

If Arnold were strictly and consistently a dualist, he would not veer from the position that nature and supernature are different and that all experience cannot be explained in terms of naturalism. No one, however, is more aware than he of the difficulties inherent in the use of the word nature.[140] Pondering over these difficulties he cannot avoid the conclusion that as we turn in the direction of nature we may possibly turn away from the "secret of Jesus." The following statement makes clear that in his consideration of the place of "nature" in human life Arnold often was dualistic:

> "'Let us return to Nature!' And all the world salutes with pride and joy the Renascence, and prays to Heaven: 'Oh that Ishmael might live before thee!' Surely the future belongs to this brilliant newcomer, with his animating maxim: Let us return to nature! Ah, what pitfalls are in that word Nature. Let us return to

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140. No one with perhaps the possible exception of Arthur O. Lovejoy who says: "...there have been few, and so far as I know, no adequate attempts to exhibit completely and connectedly the manifold historic roles played by this verbal jack-of-all-trades. Nothing, however, is more needful...than a thorough understanding of the diversity of meanings of the word, at once the most sacred and most protean..." (Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Nature as Aesthetic Norm," Modern Language Notes (November, 1927), vol. 42, p. 444.) Of course Arnold was as aware as Lovejoy that the word offered difficulties, but he himself does not avoid diverse uses. His contradictory use of the term is considered later.

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> art and science, which are a part of Nature; yes. Let us return to a proper conception of righteousness, to a true sense and secret of Jesus, which have been denaturalised; yes. But 'Let us return to Nature'; -- do you mean that we are to give full swing to our inclinations, to throw the reins on the neck of our senses, of those sirens whom Paul the Israelite called 'the deceitful lusts,' and of following whom he said 'Let no man beguile you with vain words, for because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience?' Do you mean that conduct is not three-fourths of life, and that the secret of Jesus had no use? 141

Although there is an awareness shown here of the division that separates our inclination and a power that controls them, an awareness that shows Arnold's own dualistic inclinations, yet the statement reveals another note, a contradictory note, for though Arnold does not want man to be naturalistic so far as his inclinations are concerned, he is critical of those who have "denaturalized" the method of Jesus. Now when a man is dualistic in one direction and monistic in another, it cannot be said that basically he has a consistent or unified point of view, for a man cannot be a dualist and a monist at the same time. It is especially illogical that a man should be a dualist so far as our biological instincts are concerned and a naturalist[142]

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141. Literature and Dogma, p. 321.

142. It may be argued that Arnold like Marcus Aurelius and other ethical monists advocates self-control on naturalistic grounds. But evidence in a previous chapter has shown that renunciation of the senses for Arnold signifies an anti-naturalistic source of impetus and direction, so that if he is naturalistic in his conception of self-control just quoted and anti-naturalistic elsewhere, he still would be contradicting himself.

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so far as our religion or conception of God is concerned, for if there is any claim upon our attention which should demand our fealty to a supernatural interpretation it would appear that that claim would be religious. Yet it is in this particular field that Arnold's naturalism especially comes to the fore, despite his emphatic dualistic pronouncements which, as we have seen, abound in his works.

Contradicting the spirit of dualism, Arnold sets about, then, to naturalise religion. He believes, for instance, that Israel's acceptance of Jahveh was in fulfillment of natural law, not in fulfillment of a divine law. Religion comes from nature, not from supernature. He says:

> "Israel adhered to Jahveh for the same reason which had at first made him take to the worship of Jahveh: -- that Jahveh was the Eternal Power that makes for righteousness, was the centre and source of those ideas of moral order and of conduct which are, we repeat, in human nature, but which pressed on Israel's spirit with extraordinary power. This alone gives us a natural, intelligible clue to the development of the religion of the Bible." 143

Whatever the soundness of Arnold's ideas of God (which will be examined elsewhere), it is evident that Arnold tries to validate religious experience on naturalistic grounds -- that intentionally or otherwise -- he is endeavoring to remove the gap that exists between

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143. Matthew Arnold, God and the Bible: a Review of Objections to Literature and Dogma, New York, 1913, p. 123.

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the natural and the divine: to eliminate dualism.[144]

Arnold goes so far as not only to explain away the supernatural genesis of religious experience but to maintain that such an explanation is greater and grander than the traditional one. He says:

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144. Robert Shafer maintains that Arnold's naturalism was more a method than a conclusion. He says: "Arnold rejected traditional Christianity because he considered its supernatural claims hollow and its metaphysical supports rotten. But the naturalism which took him this far was on its face, as I have said, a method rather than a conclusion. It was primarily an instrument of criticism." (Shafer, op. cit., p. 172.) No doubt Arnold tried to adapt scientific methods to his uses, but the conclusions to which these methods led him were nevertheless often weighty in their significance, such as obscuring the difference between the natural and the supernatural.

Regarding, further, Arnold's naturalistic method, E. B. Burgum maintains that Arnold got it from the Greeks: "Arnold went to the Greeks. He admired and, to a greater extent than any other Victorian man of letters absorbed their candid naturalism. Putting aside the slow detailed methods of scientific experiment that we have come to believe the only road to Truth, he accepted the method of the ancient Epicurean, and insisted that all we can know of Truth will be revealed to him who examines with natural insight, unprejudiced by any theories or methods, the evidence that makes up the complex synthetic life of man." (E. B. Burgum, "Victorianism," Sewanee Review (July, 1928), vol. 36, p. 278.)

To Fred A. Dudley the "scientific approach" for Arnold meant "impartiality." "When Arnold called himself 'scientific,' Dudley says, "he meant 'impartial.'" (Fred A. Dudley, "Matthew Arnold and Science," PMLA (March, 1942), vol. 57, p. 280.) But he also says: "In spite of a certain distrust of or distaste for science and a fairly comprehensive ignorance of its details, he believed he was following in important ways the lead of its scientific spirit." (Ibid.,p.276.)

My own position, as I have indicated before, is that Arnold is naturalistic both in method and in conclusion (intermittently so), that his naturalism is essentially the product of his age, though he was undoubtedly attracted by the naturalism of the past.

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> "And this native, continuous, and increasing pressure upon Israel's spirit of the ideas of conduct and of its sanctions, we call his intuition of the Eternal that makes for righteousness, the revelation to him of the religion of this Eternal. Really, we do not know how else to account for the evident fact of the pressure, than by supposing that Israel had an intuitive faculty, a natural bent for these ideas; that their truth was borne in upon him, revealed to him. How else are we to explain their pressure on him? We put aside all the preternatural; -- a magnified and non-natural man, walking in gardens, speaking from clouds, sending dreams, commissioning angels. We give an explanation which is natural. But we say that this natural explanation is yet grander than the preternatural one." 145

One may very well maintain, of course, that what Arnold is endeavoring to do is to eliminate the superstitious explanations for religious experience rather than the dualistic and religious disciplines that are associated with it. That he tried to rid religion of superstition and gross explanations is undeniable -- to dissolve the conception of "a magnified and non-natural man, walking in gardens, speaking from clouds, sending dreams, commissioning angels." It should be stated that such rejection of legendary beliefs, of "miracles," does not necessarily make a monist out of Arnold -- if he had only stopped with that rejection. But in disposing of the clumsy mythology that clothed the traditional beliefs did he retain -- consistently retain -- the basic idea of dualism which may be considered valid and central

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145. God and the Bible, p. 121.

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despite the fact that it is often beclouded by local discolorations? Or did his mind take the next logical step and reason that if the natural explanation can account for the fairy-tale aspect of religion, can it not also account for real religion, the supernatural, the higher and real Self which we have seen the religious thinkers (including Arnold) champion? Unwinding the coils of Arnold's thought, we discover that is exactly what happens: that in his attempt to dispose of "extra belief" which does not square with natural law, he also disposes (intermittently disposes, that is) of real belief -- a belief in a supernatural God and a supernaturally inspired religion which the laws of nature cannot in any wise comprehend.

The situation in which Arnold finds himself, then, is one in which he is willing enough to accept the blessings of a dualistic and supernaturalistic dispensation, but at the same time he must needs account for these blessings in terms of naturalism.[146] After defining dualism, for instance, and its qualities as unequivocally as possible, after making a distinction between the "lower self of sense" and the higher life" or the "law of God," he reaches the conclusion that this dualistic phenomenon can be acclaimed by the natural faculties and accounted for by natural experience.[147]

146. T. S. Eliot is critical of this form of presumption, for arrogating "from religion" what belongs to it and crediting it to another gospel." T. S. Eliot, "Arnold and Pater," Bookman (September, 1930), vol. 72, p. 2.

147. Fred A. Dudley says: "In religion he sought and believed he had found an experimentally verifiable

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He says:

> "Observers say, with much appearance of truth, that all our passions may be run up into two elementary instincts: the reproductive instinct and the instinct of self-preservation. It is evident to what these instincts will in themselves carry the man who follows the lower self of sense, and appetite, and first impulse. It is evident, also, that they are directly controlled by two forces which Christianity, following that law of the higher life which St. Paul names indifferently the law of God, the law of our mind, the line of thought of the spirit -- has set up as its two grand virtues: kindness and pureness, charity and chastity. If any virtues could stand for the whole of Christianity, these might. Let us have them from the mouth of Jesus Christ himself. 'He that loveth his life shall lose it; a new commandment give I unto you that ye love one another.' There is charity. 'Blest are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.' There is purity.
>
> "We go here simply on experience, having to establish the natural truth of Christianity."148

What is observable here, to repeat, is that he defines dualism and its qualities -- the fruits which the higher spirit yields -- but the conclusion which he reaches, the explanation, that is, for the existence of the fruits of the higher law, is startlingly monistic: "We go here simply on experience, having to establish the natural truth of Christianity." This is unmistakable evidence of the monism of Arnold, since it is obvious that he is willing, at least in the mood in which he writes this passage, to limit all

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position." (Dudley, op. cit., p. 276.) The central problem of Arnold's conception of religion -- the tenability of his definition -- will be considered in a later chapter.

148. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 169.

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experience, human as well as divine, to one framework: the natural.

Both in our survey of the historical background of dualism and in our exposition of Arnold's doctrine of it we have observed that St. Paul is a consistent champion of it. Arnold relies upon him to support his own position regarding the difference between the lower self and the higher self, and the association of the latter with the will of God, but beneath his protestations there is the disposition toward naturalism, the evident desire to naturalise the will of God, so that he gives us the statement that St. Paul's supernaturalism is but "a product of nature":

> "...of our rendering of St. Paul's thought we conceive rather as of a product of nature, which has grown to be what it is and which will grow more; which will not stand just as we now exhibit it, but which will gain some aspects which we now fail to show in it, and will drop some which we now give it; which will be developed, in short, farther, just in like manner as it has reached its present stage by development." 149

In accord with the naturalistic spirit of his time, Arnold is not only endeavoring to naturalise the religious or supernatural insight of a man like St. Paul, but he is also attempting to put it upon an "evolutionary" basis. Now St. Paul's dualism does not rest upon the peripheral pressure of the moment, or even upon the fundamental discovery of an age, such as evolution. It rests

149. Ibid., p. xiii.

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upon insight into the universal, a central and ageless truth, which local interpretations or inventions (such as miracles to explain spiritual phenomena) cannot disfigure. That is, St. Paul's dualism, the higher and the real self, the spirit warring against the members, so acceptable to Arnold in a certain mood, is revealed to us as a constant, unaffected by the intellectual temperature of today or tomorrow. Arnold in thus "rendering...St. Paul's thought... as a product of nature," subject to evolution, is declaring that religious thought itself is "relative,"[150] that there are no certainties or constants. Such a belief throws into con-

150. Regarding Arnold's "relativism," he himself offers conflicting evidence. First he will maintain that there is an absolute order of ideas. The French Revolution appeals "to an order of ideas which are universal, certain, permanent." (Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 10.) On the other hand, what is law and conscience is not absolute: "...what is law here today is not law even here tomorrow; and as for conscience, what is binding on one man's conscience is not binding on another's." (Loc. cit.) Arnold is a relativist, evidently, in regard to law and conscience but an absolutist in regard to reason (See also pp. 105-106.): "But the prescriptions of reason are absolute, unchanging, of universal validity..." (Loc. cit.) Further, when it comes to criticism he is not always relative; especially when he is championing the "cause of perfection" is he opposed to "relative conceptions": "By eluding sterile conflict, by refusing to remain in the sphere where along narrow and relative conceptions have any worth and validity, criticism may diminish its momentary importance, but only in this way has it a chance of gaining admittance for those wider and more perfect conceptions to which all its duty is really owed." (Ibid., p. 24) At another time he will reverse this "absolute" approach and favor a critical approach which is relative: "All tendencies of human nature are in themselves vital and profitable; when they are blamed, they are only to be blamed relatively, not absolutely." (Celtic Literature, p. 83.) In regard to religious matters he will main-

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fusion the psychological and spiritual doctrine of dualism which rests on an immutable truth; namely, that of a higher Self or God which is not subject to the vicissitudes of either evolution or dissolution.

To conclude, Arnold, in undertaking to explain away the gross excrescences of religion naturalistically, proceeds to interpret genuine religious phenomena in the same terms. He thus convicts himself of self-contradiction, since elsewhere he champions a higher and real Self organically different from the world of nature.

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Arnold's naturalism is perhaps most in evidence in his religious ideas (and for that reason they were considered before his poetry), but his poetry also reveals naturalistic tendencies. In his religious writings his object is evident enough: to reconcile an orthodox faith

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tain that the only defensible approach is relative: "Our truth on these matters [religious], and likewise the errors of others is something so relative that the good or harm likely to be done by speaking ought always to be taken into account." (Literature and Dogma, p. v.) But at another time his attitude is anything but relative: "The question is not, whether you or I may feel the truth of a thing of this kind; the question is, whether the thing is really so." (Mixed Essays, p. 364.)

Robert Morss Lovett maintains that Arnold indeed had "a bias toward relativity, a sense of emphasis according to the needs of the age." (Robert Morss Lovett, "The Mind of Matthew Arnold," Nation March 11, 1939), vol. 148, p. 297.) That he leaned in the direction of relativism is undeniable, but it is also true that he yearned for the absolute. Both of these positions find expression in him without reconciliation.

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which rests upon dualism with an ethical system or program based on the "One." In his poetry, as we have seen, he is often dualistic. The fact that he is not always dualistic would tend to show that Arnold was not unified in his philosophy, unless one wished to argue that as a poet Arnold had a right to write as he felt and should not be held accountable for not pursuing a rigid and logical course. But Arnold was a poet of ideas as well as of feelings and if a poet sets out to express ideas as well as feelings he cannot escape the intellectual responsibility of being logical and consistent.[151] Arnold, however, does not betray his faith to dualism every time he manifests an interest in or love for nature. A monist is not one who merely loves nature; he is a monist only if he makes man subordinate to nature or if he blurs the distinction between the natural, on one hand, and on the other, the human and the

151. That is, with Arnold poetry was not mere exercises in technique. According to Alan Harris, Arnold "prided himself on the 'literalness and sincerity of his poems..." (Alan Harris, "Matthew Arnold: the Unknown Years," The Nineteenth Century (April, 1933), vol. 113, p. 506.) Regarding the problem of how much of the real Arnold went into his poetry, Lionel Trilling says: "Arnold is a very intimate poet; he is an occasional poet who writes of the hour as it passes; he is a literal poet who tries to say what he means at the moment even if what he says contradicts what he said the moment before. (Trilling, op. cit., p. 122.) (Of significance is Trilling's statement that Arnold contradicts himself. At another place Trilling refers to Arnold's "complex unity of thought." One must conclude that either Trilling himself is guilty of self-contradiction or that if a system of thought is sufficiently complex contradictions regarding a large body of poetry do not count.)

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divine. In his poetry Arnold does not always blur that distinction.

He often succeeds, in other words, in maintaining a neutral, an impersonal, or objective attitude toward nature. Such an attitude, as I have said, does not violate the integrity of his dualistic position. The following is an illustration of Arnold's ability to conform to his own point of view; namely, to see the object as in itself it really is (not "to interpose a play of thought between his object and its expression"[152]), or not to make a monistic hodge podge between the poet's own ego and feelings and the external world:

> "Runs it not here, the track by Childsworth Farm,
> Up past the wood, to where the elm-tree crowns
> The hill behind whose ridge the sunset flames?
> The signal-elm that looks on Ilsley Downs,
> The Vale, the three lone weirs, the youthful Thames? --
> This winter-eve is warm,
> Humid the air; lifeless, yet soft as spring,
> The tender purple spray on copse and briers;
> And that sunset City with her dreaming spires,
> She needs not June for beauty's heightening." [153]

A second illustratiom will suffice to show that Arnold can write about nature without merging or fusing the distinctly human qualities of man with the distinctly natural qualities of the universe:[154]

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152. On Translating Homer, p. 167.
153. "Thyrsis," 11-20.
154. Stuart Pratt Sherman sustains this view, although his first illustration is not entirely fortunate at all points (as I shall try to illustrate later). Sherman says: "His 'Scholar-Gypsy' and his 'Thyrsis' show him keenly sensitive to pastoral poetry; but his

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"...a country path
Creeps over it from the till'd fields behind.
The hollow's grassy banks are soft inclin'd,
And to one standing on them far and near
The lone unbroken view spreads bright and clear
Over the waste: -- This cirque of open ground
Is light and green; the heather, which all round
Creeps thickly, grows not here; but the pale grass
Is strewn with rocks, and many a shivered mass
Of vein'd white gleaming quartz, and here and there
Dotted with holly trees and juniper." 155

These illustrations are given purposely to show that Arnold can treat nature as background upon which man moves and has his being.[156] Nature does not reach out and clasp

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feeling for nature's more winsome aspects is nearer to Keats in the odes and to that of the Greek idyllists than to that of Wordsworth. He is deeply penetrated with the sentiment of the Cumner Hills near Oxford; and he renders with charming delicacy and suggestiveness the impressions which he has received from woods and rivers and flowering fields. The emotion which pervades these pieces is, however, a relatively simple and sensuous delight in the consoling loveliness of the eternal features of eternal life -- a loveliness sufficient for an hour to make the scholar forget his books, and to free the thinker from the pain of thought. The emotion is modified in each case not by the heightened mystical communion but by a return to Arnold's habitual mood of thought and morality." (Sherman, op. cit., p. 92.)

155. Tristam and Iseult, 8-18.

156. In his treatment of nature Arnold's Hellenism no doubt comes to the fore. Says Butcher, interpreting the Greek view toward nature: "Aristotle's theory is in agreement with the practice of the Greek poets and artists of the classical period who introduce the external world only so far as it forms a background of action, and enters as an emotional element into man's life and heightens the human interest." (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (S. H. Butcher, translator), London, 1932, p. 124.) Irving Babbitt further elucidates the Greek's attitude toward nature as follows: "Nature interests them [the Greeks] as a rule less for its own sake than as a background for human action; and when they are concerned primarily with nature, it is a nature that has been acted upon by man." Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 270.

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man to his bosom, or absorb him, so that one can no longer tell where the humanity or divinity of man begins and where it ends. Nature remains nature, and man remains man. This attitude, further, toward nature as neutral is seen in his poem Empedocles. Although the poem in its entirety may be considered as pantheistic, as an effort on the part of Empedocles to patch together his torn emotions in the cosmic crucible, yet the poet's own predisposition toward the view that nature is a great indifferent force is an element of the poem worthy of note:

> "Nature, with equal mind,
> Sees all her sons at play;
> Sees man control the wind,
> The wind sweep man away;
> Allows the proudly-riding and the founder'd bark.
>
> "And,lastly, though of ours
> No weakness spoil our lot,
> Though the non-human powers
> Of Nature harm us not,
> The ill-deeds of other men make often our life dark." 157

The fact that the poet here concludes that man himself, not nature, is the cause of his misdeeds, helps to bring into clear relief the fact of nature's neutrality.

Arnold uses nature in still another way which shows that he does not always depart from his dualistic position. He uses nature to dramatize and to illustrate a thought. It is one thing to employ nature metaphorically, to say

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157. Empedocles on Etna, 257-266.

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that, to use a simple illustration, this apple is as hard as a rock; it is quite another thing to say that because both the apple and the rock are hard they are alike in substance, to eliminate the gulf of differentiation that exists regarding their respective qualities. In the following poem Arnold uses nature to symbolize the difference between nature's physical horizons and man's spiritual horizons. The horizons of nature are vast and measureless. The dimensions of man's soul are not vast and measureless. Therefore man's soul should match the spaciousness and magnitude of the heavens. The poem is not naturalistic because it does not, in the main, preach the absorption of man by nature. Says Arnold:

> "Ye Heavens, whose pure dark regions have no sign
> Of languor, though so calm, and though so great
> Are yet untroubled and unpassionate:
> Who though so noble share in the world's toil,
> And though so task'd keep free from dust and soil:
> I will not say that your mild deeps retain
> A tinge, it may be, of their silent pain
> Who have long'd deeply once, and long'd in vain;
> But I will rather say that you remain
> A world above man's head, to let him see
> How boundless might his soul's horizons be,
> How vast, yet of what clear transparency.
> How it were good to sink there, and breathe free.
> How fair a lot to fill
> Is left to each man still." 158

I have said that the poem is not essentially naturalistic, but there is a verse which nevertheless suggests that Arnold did not have perfect control of his ideas and that in his poem his attitude toward nature is a trifle

158. "A Summer's Night," 78-92.

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unsteady. The words "How it were good to sink there" are at variance with the preceding suggestion that our souls' horizons should match the immensity of the heavens, for they suggest that desire to be absorbed into nature which I have designated as evidence of naturalism and veering from dualism. The words, however, are evidence of Arnold's divided attitude rather than of his pantheism which Arnold, no doubt on account of his dualistic bias, by and large successfully escapes.[159]

In Sohrab and Rustum Arnold again uses nature in a non-Wordsworthian sense. Far from finding a lesson in the soul of nature, he draws an analogy between external nature and the destiny of man. If Arnold suggested in this poem (as he suggests in Empedocles) that man's destiny must become identified with the fiery mutations of nature, the poem would bear evidence of his monism or naturalism, but nature is used quite allegorically, as a dramatic device, to illustrate how man's life, if heroic, may flow as a river past obstacles until it reaches an open and luminous end:

> "But the majestic River flowed on,
> Out of the mist and hum of that low land,
> Into the frosty starlight, and then mov'd,
> Rejoicing, through the hush'd Chorasmian waste,

159. Herbert Paul, however, believed that "only Wordsworth has more beautifully expressed the spirit of Pantheism" than Arnold. (Herbert W. Paul, Matthew Arnold, New York, 1902, p. 40.) But G. W. E. Russell held that Arnold "taught us...never to endow 'nature' with fanciful attributes of our own or other people's imagining..." Russell, op. cit., p. 46.

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Under the solitary moon: he flowed
Right for the Polar Star, past Orgunje,
Brimming, and bright, and large: then sands
begin
To hem his watery march, and dam his streams,
And split his currents; that for many a league
The shorn and parcelled Oxus strains along
Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles --
Oxus, forgetting the bright speed he had
In his high mountain cradle in Pamere,
A foil'd circuitous wanderer: -- till at last
The long'd-for dash of waves is heard, and
wide
His luminous home of waters opens, bright
And tranquil, from whose floor the new bath'd
stars
Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea." 160

The Poem "Quiet Work" is used similarly to represent a moral idea. Though the poet goes to nature to learn a lesson, he does not identify his spirit with that of nature; he does not commune with nature. Says Arnold:

"One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee,
One lesson which in every wind is blown,
One lesson of two duties kept at one.
Though the loud world proclaim their enmity --
Of toil unsevered from tranquillity;
Of labors, that in lasting fruit outgrows
Far noisier schemes, accomplishes in repose,
Too great for haste, too high for revelry.
Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring,
Man's fitful uproar mingling with his toil,
Still do thy sleepless ministers move on,

Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting;
Still working, blaming still our vain turmoil,
Labourers that shall not fail, when man is gone."

There is no doubt that the poet admires nature, that he does not have the medieval fear of it. But a man is not monistic because he does not fear nature. He is monistic, as we have observed before, only when his

160. Sohrab and Rustum, 875-892.

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esteem for the physical universe is so uncritical that he either worships it or resorts to it as a complete source for the explanation of all phenomena, supernatural as well as natural. In the poem above Arnold is merely championing heroic modesty as a human ideal, and he uses the poetic machinery to express the idea. The poet makes use of the symbol to convey the idea. He does not imply that the human ideal is a reality of nature itself and that man must fuse his soul with that reality in order to know it. As long as the poet uses nature for purposes of illustration and does not regard it as a total entity containing the truths of all existence he cannot be considered a monist.

One aspect of nature which especially attracts Arnold, at least when he is writing poetry, is nature as a symbol[161] of endurance. To say that nature is a symbol of endurance is not to say that nature endures. The poem "Resignation" teaches what the title suggests, but Arnold does not ascribe an emotional and conscious power to nature. Nature itself is not dualistic; it does not have

161. Regarding the symbolical and metaphorical use which Arnold makes of nature, as well as his dualistic attitude toward it, Stuart Pratt Sherman is worth quoting again: "If the stars have any voice, it says 'Endure, and go about your business quietly and diligently.' In general, however, Arnold feels that man needs not, and had better not look to nature for moral guidance. There is one law for things and another law for man. 'Man must begin, know this, where nature ends.' The stars perform their appointed tasks tranquilly and effortlessly indeed; but, after all, the effort and the earnestness of man are his special human distinctions, the signs of his morality, the marks which show his alliance with God." Sherman, op. cit., p. 84.

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two selves, a lower and a higher which engage as demon and angel in a dualistic moral struggle. Nature simply is, and nature ever will be; in fact, it will outlast death. To the poet, it seems that nature bears rather than rejoices, but he qualifies the assertion by the words: "If I might lend their life a voice..." He does not say that they -- the rocks -- have that voice, or that a voice comes from a soul penetrating them, as Wordsworth might have done. Significant parts of the poem which illustrate Arnold's use of nature without blurring the distinction between the human and the natural follow:

> "The World in which we live and move
> Outlasts aversion, outlasts love:
> Outlasts each effort, interest, hope,
> Remorse, grief, joy: -- and were the scope
> Of these affections wider made,
> Man still would see, and see dismay'd,
> Beyond his passions's widest range
> Far regions of eternal change.
>
> "Nay, and since death, which wipes out man,
> Finds him with many an unsolv'd plan,
> With much unknown, and much untried,
> Wonder not dead, and thirst not dried,
> Still gazing on the ever full
> Eternal mundane spectacle;
> This world in which we draw our breath;
> In some sense, Fausta, outlasts death.
>
> . . .
>
> "Enough, we live:-- and if a life,
> With large results so little rife,
> Though bearable, seems hardly worth
> This pomp of worlds, this pain of Birth;
> Yet, Fausta, the mute turf we tread,
> The solemn hills around us spread,
> This stream that falls incessantly,
> The strange-scrawled rocks, the lonely sky,
> If I might lend their life a voice,
> Seem to bear rather than rejoice." 162

162. "Resignation," 213-228; 259-268. In contrast to the

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Arnold seems to say, then, that we must teach ourselves eternity and achieve a timeless spiritual perspective. The implied emphasis is on the effort of the soul and not upon effortless nature to accomplish our spiritual ends for us.

What we have been trying to do so far is to follow the maze of Arnold's thought, which oscillates between dualism and monism. Arnold's neutrality, however, is not evidence of that oscillation. Rather it is proof of his ability to use nature legitimately, as the cyclorama for human action and speculation or for purposes of allegory and illustration. But Arnold's deflections are sudden and preemptory. Doubt enters in when we least expect it, and when we think that he is vigilantly endeavoring to keep on the beaten tracks of dualism we find him veering. The following verses show a digression into monism:

> "Say, what shall calm us, when such guests [affliction and grief] intrude,
> Like comets on the heavenly solitude?
> Shall breathless glades, cheer'd by shy Dian's horn,

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interpretation which I have just given and which Stuart Sherman in general makes of Arnold's poetry, Mrs. Iris Esther Sells gives "Resignation" a Wordsworthian and pantheistic interpretation. She says: "Arnold in "Resignation" seems almost to approach the 'poet's rapt security' which he desires, and seeks to draw from the moderate one, that he may some day find a place among these silent companions, and be merged and lost in their life, in the life of the world, 'of plants and stones and rain' that will survive him." (Sells, op. cit., p. 72.) Such an interpretation suggests an abandonment to emotion not central in the poem, a view which is sustained by Trilling who finds in the poem a breaking away from the "bondage...of the emotions..." (Trilling, op. cit., p. 100.)

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> Cold-bubbling springs, or caves? Not so! The Soul
> Breasts her own griefs; and, urged too fiercely, says:
> "Why tremble? True, the nobleness of man
> May be by man effaced; man can control
> To pain, to death, the bent of his own days,
> Know thou the worst.' So much, not more, he can!'" 163

Now the first four verses here quoted show that Arnold repudiates nature as a means of consolation, and in these verses, therefore, he is genuinely dualistic. But a question immediately arises: What kind of soul does Arnold subsequently direct the grief-stricken for consolation? There is some suspicion (though one must proceed cautiously here) that Arnold has in mind the soul and the will of the Stoic and if this is so he is veering from dualism to monism. When Arnold says, "So much, not more he can!" he is delimiting the spiritual expectations and perspective of the individual and incarcerating his soul in a monistic universe. (This note of helpless surrender to finiteness is implied in the original title of the poem "Human Limits.") [163a] Empirically, there does not seem to be any difference between the "will" of the Stoic and the "will" of the orthodox Christian, but I have tried to show that from the standpoint of religious reality, there is a difference. The will of the Stoic is enclosed within the materialistic shell of the cosmos. It may, in fine, be considered a degenerate form of the divine

163. "To George Cruikshank on Seeing in the Country, His Picture of 'The Bottle,'" 6-14.

163a. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry, The Poetry of Matthew Arnold, London, 1940, p. 32.

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will, against which, like Satan, it has rebelled. To the individual it can only hold forth the promise of cosmological immortality, not personal and individual immortality. Further, when Arnold, as a good Stoic, exhorts the soul "to breast her own griefs," he is at the same time inferring that the soul may not look to a supernatural source for divine aid and succour. He is, to repeat, limiting the soul's expectations to the boundaries of the finite, materialistic universe. The Christian and oriental dualist confine the soul and its possibilities for salvation to infinity. The difference is considerable. Arnold has thus once more turned from a dualistic to a monistic position.

Arnold's basic inconsistency is further shown in the doubt which he expresses regarding the ultimate freedom of the will.[163b] Apparently he cannot make up his mind whether the will is free or not. In his attitude toward the will his mind therefore seems to go through three stages, though they may not be in the logical order in which I shall name them: first, the will is free; second, it cannot transcend the limitations which nature has imposed

163b. A question may arise at this point whether the Calvinist tradition in Christianity is dualistic. Dean Inge answers that question as follows (with some additional observations pertinent to our subject): "Calvinism is simply baptised Stoicism; it is logically pantheistic since it acknowledges only one effective will in the universe. The creed of nineteenth century science is very similar. Puritanism was not at all like Judaism in spite of its fondness for the Old Testament; it was very like Stoicism." William Ralph Inge, The Church in the World, New York, 1928, p. 117.

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upon it; third, it may not be free at all. Says Arnold again:

> "...the will is free;
> Strong is the soul, and wise, and beautiful;
> The seas of godlike power are in us still;
> Gods are we, bards, saints, heroes, if we will!--
> Dumb judges, answer, truth or mockery? 164

Now the question which Arnold asks at the end proves that he is not certain: not certain regarding the sum of qualities that constitute man's distinctive humanity, especially that quality called the will. An element of faith seems to be here lacking, faith which is the spiritual premise of dualism. The faith of religious minded men, to be sure, seems often to waver, as we have seen in St. Augustine and even in Jesus in his last moments, but a distinction must be made between religious scepticism and intellectual, rational, or naturalistic scepticism. The religious sceptic never for an instant seriously doubts the existence of God. Cynicism is not in his heart; neither is the smile of "mockery" upon his countenance. Like Job or Jesus he may with bleeding heart and body wonder and marvel at the mystery and injustice of his suffering, but his faith transcends his doubt which becomes, paradoxically, the stepping stone to his spiritual resurrection and ultimate peace and serenity. On the other hand, the rational doubter, like Empedocles, flounders in his faithlessness and scepticism. It is a disease that

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164. "Written in Emerson's Essays," 10-14.

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leads to morbidity and spiritual disintegration -- not resurrection. Although Arnold was of a religious temper and mind, the doubt in the verses above appear rational and intellectual, perhaps inspired by the demon in our nature, rather than by God who may possibly play a hand (as, again, in the case of Job or as, if we turn to the Bhagavad-Gita, in the example of Arjuna) in putting to the test our spiritual mettle. Although one cannot afford to be too positive at this point, one may aver that the scepticism expressed in the verses above is naturalistic rather than religious, and as Arnold elsewhere will champion a religious will with complete faith, and without scepticism, it cannot be said that he has a unified view in regard to it.

Further, there are times when Arnold, contradicting a view which often seems an organic part of him, expresses his scepticism whether there is any use in exercising our wills at all -- either on a Stoic or a more religious level. "Look," Arnold seems to say, "how effortless nature's ways are." "There is no effort" on "nature's brow." Nature apparently "arrives" without toil and travail. The poet, speaking for nature, says:

> 'There is no effort on my brow --
> I do not strive, I do not weep.
> I rush with the swift spheres and glow
> In joy, and, when I will, I sleep.'" 165

Again the poet shows man coveting nature its freedom from care:

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165. "Morality," 25-28.

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"Nature, whose free, light, cheerful air,
Oft made thee, in thy gloom despair." 165a

But this is only one aspect of the poem: nature as effortless and enviably relaxed. The poem has another mood and another idea, a dualistic conception: an admission from nature that man has an "earnest air," a distinction and quality which nature lacks and the loss of which nature mourns:

"...that earnest air,
I saw, I felt it once -- but where?

"I knew not yet the gauge of Time,
Nor wore the manacles of Space;
I felt it in some other place;
'Twas when the heavenly house I trod,
And lay upon the breast of God." 165b

And still further:

"'Ah Child!' she cries, "'that strife divine,
Whence was it, for it was not mine.'" 165c

Even the kind of strife a man endures distinguishes him from nature. Presumably the strife is not dumb or purposeless, since it has the seal of divinity upon it. This is a dualistic conception. The poem, then, is both monistic and dualistic and shows Arnold vacillating between two poles of thought.

But Arnold is not so openly monistic in all his poetry as he is in parts of the poem of "Morality," in which the effortlessness of nature attracts him (even the while it repells him). As we have seen, his attitude is often

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165a. Ibid., 17-18.
165b. Ibid., 29-36.
165c. Ibid., 23-24.

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neutral, or else he uses nature for purposes of illustration, and the purposes are usually ethical, being couched in an undogmatic tone and spirit. While he is not overtly dualistic in these poems at least he is not openly monistic. Here and there a note creeps in that shows that his mind wavers. In the poem "Self Dependence" we feel that nature is more than firmament or earth representing endurance and self-reliance. It is all that, but it is something else besides. Nature has a healing power that is more than physical; nature has given the poet spiritual composure. To be sure, on empirical grounds the difference between spiritual and physical are difficult to determine, but when a man looks to nature for what he has customarily expected from God, that in itself constitutes heresy to his supernatural belief. The poem which follows suggests that Arnold has committed such a heresy:

> "Weary of myself, and sick of asking
> What I am, and what I ought to be,
> At this vessel's prow I stand, which bears me
> Forward, forward, o'er the starlit-sea.
>
> And a look of passionate desire
> O'er the sea and to the stars I send:
> 'Ye who from my childhood up have calm'd me,
> Calm me, ah, compose me to the end!.
>
> 'Ah, once more,' I cried, 'ye Stars, ye Waters,
> On my heart your mighty charm renew;
> Still let me, as I gaze upon you,
> Feel my soul becoming vast like you!'
>
> From the intense, clear, star-sown vault of heaven,
> Over the lit sea's unquiet way,
> In the rustling night-air came the answer --
> 'Wouldst thou <u>be</u> as these are? <u>Live</u> as they.

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'Unaffrighted by the silence round them,
Undistracted by the sights they see,
These demand not that the things without them
Yield them love, amusement, sympathy.

'And with joy the stars perform their shining.
And the sea its long moon-silvered roll;
For self-poise they live, nor pine with noting
All the fever of some differing soul.

'Bounded by themselves, and unregardful
In what state God's other works may be,
In their own tasks all their powers pouring,
These attain the mighty life you see.'

O air-born Voice! long since, severely clear,
A cry like thine in my own heart I hear.
Resolve to be thyself: and know, that he
Who finds himself, loses his misery."

Despite the fact that this poem is almost wholly occupied with nature, it is not predominantly naturalistic in the sense that the term represents a philosophy of life that refuses the soul a separate existence. When the poet says, "...as I gaze upon you, let me feel my soul becoming vast like you," he is not, I submit, Empedocles fashion, seeking a merger with the mute forces of nature. What he wants is spiritual amplitude and he is using the sea and the stars as symbols to express that spiritual ideal. The preceding lines, however, which call upon the elements to compose him have almost a pagan trace in them and suggest, as I have said above, that he is looking to nature to do for him what he should endeavor to achieve by dualistic self-discipline. Furthermore, when he considers that "with joy the stars perform their shining" the figure seems to have more than poetic meaning; the poet is ascribing human and spiritual faculties to

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nature; and this is naturalism. Finally, the poem in its totality shows the philosophically divided Arnold, though the divisions are far from equal and the submission to naturalism far from complete.

When Arnold departs from his neutral position, the degree in which he submits to naturalism, it may be said, varies from poem to poem, just as in his prose he is dualistic some times and monistic other times. Arnold, though critical of Wordsworth's formal philosophy, both in his prose and his poetry about Wordsworth, felt that Wordsworth was at his best in dealing with nature. Did Wordsworth appeal to Arnold merely as a "recreational" poet? Was the healing power" of Wordsworth only physical or was it spiritual? To answer this question the following verses need to be examined:

> "He laid us as we lay at birth
> On the cold flowery lap of earth;
> Smiles broke from us and we had ease.
> The hills were round us, and the breeze
> Went o'er the sunlit fields again.
> Our foreheads felt the wind and rain.
> Our youth return'd; for there was shed
> On spirits that had long been dead,
> Spirits dried up and closely furl'd
> The freshness of the early world.
>
> . . .
>
> "But where will Europe's latter hour
> Again find Wordsworth's healing power?
> Others will teach us how to dare,
> And against fear our breasts to steel:
> Others will strengthen us to bear --
> But who, ah who, will make us feel?
> The cloud of mortal destiny?
> Others will front it fearlessly --
> But who, like him, will put it by?"

166. "Memorial Verses," 48-58; 62-70.

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Of course there is a good deal of Wordsworth's poetry which on rational and superrational grounds may perform for one the essentially spiritual function which Arnold outlines in the verses above, but now that these lines are before us it should be evident that Wordsworth's appeal to Arnold goes beyond the flesh to the spirit.[167] There is a real question, however,[168] which Coleridge himself raised and which Arnold himself by his subscription to dualism often raised regarding the capacity of man to do the work which falls upon a transcendental power to perform. One must of course make a distinction between aesthetic and spiritual enjoyment and though Wordsworth performed a remarkable service in teaching Arnold to appreciate the breezes, the fields, and the rain, did he also feed the ethical "otherness" in him, for so Arnold himself will characterize that God-like quality? There is a strong likelihood that Arnold, in the footsteps of his inspiring predecessor, has made a confusion between the aesthetic and the ethical or spiritual, and in so doing has again slid into the

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167. Mrs. Iris Esther Sells intimates that Arnold contradicts himself (1) in conceiving of nature as indifferent to the lot of man; (2) in conceiving of nature as having a spiritual interest in his health. She states: "Arnold, in spite of the indifference he in general ascribes to nature also sees in her this same 'healing balm!" (Sells, op. cit., p. 87.) The healing balm, as apparently Mrs. Sells conceives it, is the result of nature's conscious interest in man.

168. "O Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does Nature live..."(Italics mine) "Dejection: An Ode," 47-48.

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naturalistic fold.[169]

Characteristic of Arnold, as we have observed, is that he is no sooner inside the boundaries of naturalism than his critical intelligence or ethical sensitiveness (one can only speculate as to the reason for his shift)

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169. Further evidence of Arnold's confusion and contradiction is to be found in his essay on Wordsworth. Arnold says, for instance, that Wordsworth's "superiority arises from his powerful use, in his best pieces, his powerful application to his subject, of ideas 'on man, on nature, and on human life.'" (Essays in Criticism, Second Series, p. 100.) He says further: "Wherever we meet with the successful balance, in Wordsworth, of profound truth of subject with profound truth of execution, he is unique." (Ibid., p. 112.) And finally Arnold asks: "Where, then, is Wordsworth's superiority? It is here; he deals with more of life than they [other poets] do; he deals with life, as a whole, more powerfully." (Ibid., p. 105.) What, precisely, does Wordsworth deal with when he deals with life powerfully? The answer, in Arnold's own word, is "Nature." "It might seem," he says, "that Nature not only gave him the matter for his poem, but wrote it for him." (Ibid., p. 110.) Further, it is not to Wordsworth's systematic philosophy which Arnold directs us in search of Wordsworth's profundity, for Arnold says: "His poetry is the reality, his philosophy, -- so far, at least as it may put on the form and habit of a scientific system of thought, and the more that it puts it on, -- is the illusion..." "...in Wordsworth's case," he concludes, "we cannot do him justice until we dismiss his philosophy." (Ibid., p. 105.) It follows from all this that Wordsworth is profound when he is most natural, for then he deals with life more powerfully, but this life turns out to be the very nature from which Arnold has sometimes asked us to turn away. The confusion and inconsistency of Arnold are therefore once more in evidence. (Incidentally, this "spiral" reasoning of Arnold leads John Dover Wilson to the conclusion that Arnold, in his essay on Wordsworth, has perpetrated "the most audacious non sequitur in the annals of English criticism." John Dover Wilson, Leslie Stephen and Matthew Arnold as Critics of Wordsworth, Cambridge, 1939, p. 36.)

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impells him out of it. In lyricising the effects which Wordsworth had upon him, Arnold reveals, one senses, a perfect devotion to an aesthetic morality. Now what one says in poetry must, as I have indicated before, be interpreted with extreme caution and judiciousness, for poetry is the language of mood and emotion, of fleeting impressions and ethereal passions -- and not of ideas pure and simple, but in following the convolutions of Arnold's thoughts, one cannot always isolate them from the moods which produce them. Thus the following stanza, while obviously the expression of a mood, contains in it a kernel of an idea which this study cannot ignore:

> "The thoughts that rain their steady glow
> Like stars on life's sea,
> Which others know, or say they know --
> They never shone for me." 170

With a measure of remorse and self-pity Arnold is no doubt lamenting that nature does not perform the offices for him that it has performed for others, but there is another interpretation which does not appear far-fetched; namely, that what nature cannot do for him it cannot do for others. If this interpretation is correct, Arnold is turning his back on the exaggerated claims of naturalism, and this scepticism is no better evidenced than in that most remarkable of Arnold's poems: "To an Independent Preacher."

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170. "Despondency," 1-4.

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This poem is remarkable for two reasons: it contains the strongest evidence that one might wish that Arnold was a dualist; it contains significant evidence that Arnold had an ambivalent attitude toward nature and that therefore he was not unified in his thinking. For these reasons the poem deserves careful consideration:

> "In harmony with Nature? Restless fool,
> Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee,
> When true, the last impossibility;
> To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool: --
> Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more.
> And in that more lie all his hopes of good.
> Nature is cruel; man is sick of blood;
> Nature is stubborn; man would fain adore;
> Nature is fickle; man hath need of rest;
> Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave;
> Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.
> Man must begin, know this where Nature ends;
> Nature and man can never be fast friends.
> Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!"

The two verses

> "Man must begin, know this where Nature ends;
> Nature and man can never be fast friends"

constitute perhaps the best definition of dualism that can be found in literature.[171] If one took those two lines only and set them against all that Arnold says in favor

171. Joseph Warren Beach does not like Arnold's separation of man and nature. He says: "...the naturist will at once be moved to ask whence man derives his humanity if not from nature." (Beach, The Concept of Nature in ~~the~~ Nineteenth-Century English Poetry, p. 399.) From the point of view of a dualist, the answer is obvious. "His animality" he derives from nature; his "humanity" he derives from a far other source; namely, God or supernature. Beach, however, is on firmer ground in criticising Arnold because, in general, "his references [to nature] in the abstract show a certain confusion of attitude." Ibid., p. 397.

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of naturalism, he would not have to go farther to prove Arnold's inconsistency and that Arnold did not achieve a synthesis or unity in his thought. Moreover, the poem contains further confusions and contradictions. In the first four lines of the poem Arnold holds up nature as an ideal; he is chiding the "preacher" because he is presumptuous enough to think that he can achieve a harmony with nature. "Fool," it is the "last impossibility" to try to match nature's strength and coolness. After Arnold has thus set up nature as an unattainable ideal, he informs us in the next two verses that there is another ideal and that all our "hopes" of good depend upon our exploiting our dualistic difference from nature. He has of course just told us that we cannot match nature;[172] now he is informing us that we must surpass her! Then he goes on as a devout dualist to describe the cruelty of nature, her sanguinity, her stubbornness, her organic inability to give love, her unreliability and fickleness, her eternal surge and restlessness, her lack of compassion and pity and incapacity for fear -- all deficiencies in the eyes of Arnold. The next two lines, as I have expressed, are a strong plea for dualism; they are the climax and conclusion to Arnold's argument against naturalism as an interpretation of life. But Arnold is not through con-

172. Swinburne believed that Arnold taught that we "are the sons, not the lords of nature..." Algernon C. Swinburne, "Mr. Arnold's New Poems," Fortnightly Review (October, 1867), vol. 8, p. 417.

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tradicting himself, for in the last line he reverses the conclusion stated in the previous two lines and returns to the ideal and to the mood expressed in the first four lines; namely, nature as a master,[173] though there is also the implication that he who is unable to surpass nature deserves to be her slave. Admiration for nature as an ideal worthy of emulation, however, is as much a part of the poem as the opposite ideal, departure from nature, the realization of man's complete selfhood as he breaks off relations with nature -- the ideal which is so eloquently expressed in the two verses which I have quoted (twelfth and thirteenth lines)[174] and which Arnold elsewhere espouses.

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173. Arnold's verse "Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave!" reminds us of Goethe's observation regarding the artist's relationship to nature: "The artist has a twofold relation to nature; he is at once her master and her slave." Goethe, op. cit., p. 248.

174. Regarding the sonnet just analyzed, I am confirmed by a number of critics in the view regarding its contradictory nature, one of whom, William M. Rossetti, in probably one of the earliest printed criticisms of Arnold's poetry, wrote: "...we cannot but think that, by attributing to nature a certain human degree of qualities, which will not suffice for man, he loses sight of the point really raised: for is not man's nature only a part of nature? and, if a part, necessary to the completeness of the whole? And should not the individual, avoiding a fictitious life, order himself in conformity with his own rule of being?" (William M. Rossetti, "Reviews: The Strayed Reveller; and Other Poems, by A.--," The Germ (February, 1850), No. 2, p. 95.) The contradiction for Rosetti is inherent in Arnold's indecisive attitude toward nature. Arnold is for and against nature at once, and from Rossetti's standpoint, he is not sufficiently for nature. This view is further confirmed by a more recent critic: "In one of his sonnets Arnold draws a curious distinction between man and nature, which

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Whatever the inconsistency of the poem, Arnold's awareness of a dualism between man and nature is evident. We are somewhat startled, therefore, to find Arnold deliberately turn against those who divide man's nature -- turn against them for doing what he himself has done: champion dualism. It is ridiculous, says Arnold, to divide the mind and soul into impulse and reason, freedom and control. Life is one -- one harmonious whole:

> "Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers,
> Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control --
> So men, unravelling God's harmonious whole,
> Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours.
>
> Vain labour! Deep and broad, where none may see,
> Spring the foundations of that shadowy throne
> Where man's one nature, queen like, sits alone,
> Centered in a majestic unity...." 175

I have difficulty in accepting. He suggests that man is one thing, nature another. I believe that man is as much a part of the order of nature as is any other phenomenon, that man is, if I may so express it, the highest manifestation of nature. When Arnold says, therefore,

> 'Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more
> And in that more lie all his hopes of good,'

I find it hard to follow him. I should be inclined to say that what Arnold refers to as the more is the summit of nature's attainment. It is true that he seems to contradict himself occasionally at this very point." (Waldo Hilary Dunn, "Matthew Arnold" (Lectures on Three Eminent Victorians), Claremont, California, 1932, p. 63. Italics mine) Mrs. Iris Esther Sells also implies that there is a contradiction between Arnold's "treating with some disdain the idea that man can ever emulate Nature's coolness and strength" and his assertion that nature is superior to her in the first place. (Sells, op. cit., p. 202.) Hugh Kingsmill asserts that the poem contains a "direct contradiction," for it implies at the same time "surrender to an eternal phenomenon" and mastery of it. Kingsmill, op. cit., p. 93.

175. "Written in Butler's Sermons," 1-8.

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If man has "one nature" what becomes of the conception that man has "two natures": that "Man must begin...where nature ends"? It is evident that Arnold sometimes champions the doctrine of the "two selves"; other times the doctrine of the "one self." As they are two diametrically opposed doctrines, Arnold, in championing both, contradicts himself -- and proves that he is not unified.

When Arnold, however, does give vent to monism, it is more in the spirit of Spinoza or Marcus Aurelius than in the spirit of Wordsworth, though, as we have seen, Wordsworth engaged his fancy and colored his ideas, especially those which he expressed through the medium of his poetry. Arnold's monism, in other words, is severe rather than tender, rationalistic rather than emotional. In the "Scholar Gypsy," however, this temper is modified. The poet makes a concession to impulse:[176]

176. Stuart Pratt Sherman more than confirms my interpretation. He says: "In the 'Scholar Gipsy' Arnold plays much of the same pastoral music which he evokes in 'Thyrsis'; but the poem has this additional interest that it betrays his poetical sympathy with an impulse which in his own conduct he severely checked -- the impulse to drift and wander irresponsibly." (Sherman, op. cit., p. 79.) Arnold would have agreed with Sherman's criticism in its essentials. In a letter to Clough, he wrote: "I am glad you like the Gipsy Scholar -- but what does it do for you? Homer animates -- Shakespeare animates -- in its poor way I think Sohrab and Rustum animates -- the Gipsy Scholar at best awakens a pleasing melancholy. But this is not what we want. The complaining millions of men...what they want is something to animate and ennoble them -- not merely to add zest to their melancholy or grace to their dreams." Lowry, op. cit., p. 146.

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"Still nursing the unconquerable hope,
Still clutching the inviolable shade,
With a free onward impulse brushing through,
By night, the silver'd branches of the glade --
Far on the forest skirts, where none pursue,
On some mild pastoral slope
Emerge, and resting on the moonlit pales
Freshen thy flowers, as in former years,
With dew, or listen with enchanted ears,
From the dark dangles, to the nightingales." 177

On the whole, however, the poem expresses an idyllic and pastoral mood rather than one that is utterly relaxed and unfettered. Arnold's monism is "hard" rather than "soft." The following four lines, which complete our treatment of Arnold's poetry, illustrate the severe aspect of Arnold's naturalism:

"True, we must tame our rebel will;
True, we must bow to Nature's law;
Must bear in silence many an ill;
Must learn to wait, renounce, withdraw." 178

We must note that the law which controls is natural. Such a view is in accord with the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius and the severe pantheism of Spinoza. But it is not in accord with the dualism that Arnold frequently champions in which he associates the law of self control with the will of God -- with a supernatural rather than a natural power. The inconsistency of Arnold, therefore, is again evident. His attitude toward nature is ambivalent and unresolved. He served two masters at once -- neither faithfully, though his motives, one must add in justice, were above reproach.

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177. "The Scholar Gypsy," 211-220.
178. "Courage," 1-4.

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Another form of Arnold's inconsistency, which gives much ground for confusion, arises from his uncritical acceptance and use of terms. To illustrate, one may take his very use of the term nature. Arnold himself has said: "Ah, what pitfalls are in the word Nature!" Yet he himself has not avoided those pitfalls, for he will quote with approval, without warning to the reader of the pitfalls, such a passage as this: "'It is much more according to nature to work virtue than vice; for virtue places nature firmly and supports it, while vice displaces it. A thoroughly natural man is a pure man. That which maketh nature impure is a faulty accident of nature and is not the essence of nature.'"[179] Arnold then adds the following commentary: "...to follow him [Christ] and his life is really to follow nature, to be happy. And to enter into the kingdom of heaven is really nothing else than the following nature, this being happy."[180] It is obvious that such a statement is a contradiction of dualism as Arnold himself has expressed it. How does Arnold square this notion with the conception we have seen him frequently voice that Jesus died to his natural self and taught us to do likewise, so that we could achieve the grace of God here on earth? The fact that Tauler, a medievalist, had a different con-

179. Essays in Criticism, Third Series, Boston, 1919, p. 228. Arnold quoting John Tauler.
180. Ibid., p. 240.

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ception of nature from that of a nineteenth century expansionist, does not alter the fact that Arnold, in interpreting Tauler, bandies the term about uncritically -- and so gives advice which appears entirely opposite to what he has exhorted us to follow.

Another instance of the same kind of confusion the following passage illustrates. Emphatically Arnold has shown that man's spiritual and cultural development depend upon his departure from the ways that nature has imposed upon us, that our instincts and impulses must be controlled. Yet we hear him say:

> "The love of liberty is simply the instinct in man for expansion. Not only to find oneself tyrannised over and outraged is a defeat to this instinct, but in general, to feel oneself over-tutored, over-governed, sate upon (as the popular phrase is) by authority, is a defeat to it. Prince Bismarck says: 'After all, a benevolent rational absolutism is the best form of government.' Plenty of arguments may be adduced in support of such a thesis. The one fatal objection to it is it is against nature, that it contradicts a vital instinct in man -- the instinct of expansion. And man is not to be civilized or humanised, call it which you will, by thwarting his vital instincts. In fact, the benevolent rational absolutism always breaks down. It is found that the ruled deterriorate. Why? Because the proceeding is against Nature." 181

The sanity and soundness of his political view are beside the point. That he uses the term carelessly is to the point. Are all proceedings which are "against

181. Mixed Essays, p. ix.

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nature" fatal? And is man not to be civilised and humanized by the process of spiritual concentration rather than by that of emotional expansion? With all the allowances that can be made for Arnold's "larger meanings" the fact remains that he uses his terms in a misleading and contradictory fashion.

Did Arnold once gravely pronounce

> "Man must begin, know this where Nature ends;
> Nature and man can never be fast friends"?

Here is quite a different pronouncement:

> "...it is a grave thing, this indifference to the real and natural and rational rule of things, because it renders us very liable to be found fighting against nature, and that is always calamitous...There is a point, in which our action, as a community, seems to me quite at variance with what the rational rule of things would prescribe, and where we all suffer by its being thus at variance." 182

This passage signifies a complete reversal of position. Conformity with nature is the ideal, and not noncomformity. Arnold is now saying: Man must begin, know this, where nature <u>begins</u>; nature and man <u>are</u>, or should be, fast friends. Does Arnold in the passage above have a different conception in mind from the one expressed in the famous sonnet? Indeed, he expresses a more rational view in the passage above; even so, he does not escape a monistic or naturalistic interpretation, or the charge that he uses his terms uncritically.

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182. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 360.

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Arnold's attitude toward nature is logically related to his attitude toward science.[183] Even though Arnold quarrels with science, he does so only because he fears that science will replace humane letters, not because science stands for a view of life which to him is philosophically untenable. "The great results of the scientific investigation of nature we are agreed upon knowing,"[184] he says. What he objects to is the proposal "to make training in science the main part of education...."[185] Such knowledge is incomplete. For complete knowledge "men will always require humane letters," but they will also have to acquaint themselves "with the great results reached by modern science."[186] This view he expresses again in a letter:

> "Indeed, I am convinced that as Science, in the widest sense of the word, meaning a true knowledge of things as the basis of our operations, becomes as it does become, more of a power in the world the weight of the nations and the men who have carried the

183. Robert Shafer defines the relation between naturalism and science as follows: "Naturalism is simply the statement in philosophic form of the assumptions on which science is based and of the meaning of its revelations. So far as science is incomplete, naturalism is the more inclusive term, but science cannot dissociate itself from naturalism without ceasing to be science..." (Shafer, op. cit., p. 6.) Bertrand Russell in turn defines science "as the power of manipulating nature." (Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook, London, 1931, p. 10.) The terms are thus related to each other, though not identical.
184. Discourses in America, p. 95.
185. Ibid., p. 99.
186. Ibid., p. 137.

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> intellectual life farthest will be more and more felt..." 187

Basically, Arnold is interested in the method of science -- its emphasis upon experimentation or experience. He transfers the method and the approach which science takes to his own treatment of religion, as the following statement makes clear:

> "Paul does not begin outside the sphere of science; he begins with an appeal to reality and experience. And the appeal here with which he commences has, for science, undoubted force and importance; for he appeals to a rational conception which is a part, and perhaps the chief part, of our experience; the conception of the law of righteousness, the very law and ground of human nature so far as this nature is moral. Things as they truly are, -- facts, -- are the object-matter of science; and the moral law in human nature, however this law may have originated, is in our actual experience among the greatest of facts." 188

Another aspect of science which appealed to Arnold is its unifying powers. In this connection, he says:

> "...science, -- true science, -- recognizes in the bottom of her soul the law of ultimate fusion, of conciliation. To reach this, but to reach it legitimately, she tends. She draws, for instance, towards the same

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187. Letters, vol. 1, p. 285.

188. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 37. What Arnold of course is trying to do, as we shall see in the chapter on religion, is to put religion upon a naturalistic basis. Both scientist and religionist go to the facts which, even if they are of a different order (though Arnold in the passage above does not trouble to make that distinction), can be verified without reference to a supernatural authority or without concern regarding their genesis. This is Arnold's naturalism, and as such it is a contradiction of his dualism which does include the supernatural in its frame of reference.

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> idea which fills her elder and diviner sister, poetry, -- the idea of the substantial unity of man; though she draws towards it by roads of her own. But continually she is showing us affinity where we imagined there was isolation. 189

These passages not only establish that Arnold is a naturalist; they also establish his failure to reconcile diverse points of view. First of all, Arnold's analogy between the method pursued by religion and the method pursued by science is questionable. St. Paul relied upon insight of a special sort, insight which relied upon the abatement of the senses, self-renunciation: a method which, as we have seen, Arnold approved. St. Paul's method relied upon an infinite faculty, beyond the five; science, on the other hand, restricts itself to the phenomena of the five senses.[190] The experience or the facts, further, that we may know on the natural plane are substantially different from those we may hope to know on a supernatural plane. As a dualist (though intermittent) Arnold should be the first to recognize the distinction between the two kinds of fact, to say nothing of the two kinds of reality.

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189. Celtic Literature, p. 58.

190. Cardinal Newman defines the difference between the religious and the scientific approach -- between the finite and the infinite -- as follows: "Theology begins as its name denotes, not with any sensible facts, phenomena, or results, not with nature at all, but with the Author of nature, -- with the one invisible, unapproachable cause and source of all things. It begins at the other end of knowledge, and is occupied, not with the finite, but the Infinite. It unfolds and systematizes what He himself has told us of Himself." (John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, London, 1898, p. 434.)

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Also, as a dualist he should question his own statement regarding the "substantial unity of man" -- at least on the natural or human plane, for such unity as man may hope to achieve can only be obtained on the supernatural level, when the soul in mystical union with God,[191] has dissolved the conflict which keeps him apart.

Arnold's attitude toward science, therefore, no less than his attitude toward nature, indicates a failure to achieve a synthesis of thought.

CONCLUSION

Arnold's ambivalentattitude toward nature can best be understood in terms of the naturalistic milieu of his age and his spiritual background represented by such thinkers as Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza. Such a figure as Thomas Huxley provides a severely rationalistic and mechanical view of nature which Arnold never shared. Huxley

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191. "The goal of the great mystics," says Helen White once more, "...is a peculiarly intimate and profound union with God, or the supreme Reality, in the soul of the mystic." (White, op. cit., p. 211.) Although the experience takes place in the soul of the mystic, the experience is nevertheless of a transcendent or supernatural kind. Regarding the mystical state, Paul Elmer More says: "Certain men have reported that with the attainment of perfect peace the soul can rise into a state wherin the desires cease altogether, and the other element of consciousness, as the higher self or infinite spirit, abides in blissful liberation. This is the region of mysticism, towards which all philosophy and all religion point." More, "Definitions of Dualism," p. 289.

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was frankly anti-dualistic, and there is no ambiguity in his stand, as there is in that of Arnold. All phenomena, mental as well as physical, are naturalistic. Huxley believed that dualism was a sign of primitivism and untenable in a sophisticated and scientific age. The division between "supernature" and "nature" was born from fear and superstition. God and religion cannot be explained in terms of natural law. This is a view which Arnold accepts.

Martineau, too, is hostile to dualism, even though he makes a distinction between the natural and the supernatural, but to him they are different aspects of the same universe. Martineau seeks to eradicate discontinuities in nature. He does so by conceiving of God as cause and nature as effect, or God as infinite subject and nature as infinite object, but both antitheses are within the same unit of existence. Martineau tried to create a theology out of naturalism. This sort of half-mysticism Arnold eschews.

Leslie Stephen is as critical of traditional theology as Arnold, but Arnold -- or one side of him -- tried to salvage the doctrine of the two selves from it. For this doctrine -- the doctrine of "self denial" -- Stephen had a frank contempt. The demarcation between soul and body is fictitious and impossible and the conception of the body as corrupt a form of evil itself. But Stephen, as a sceptic, is equally critical of those who have perfect faith

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in nature. Pantheism to him offers no ground for morality. Stephen is also critical of those who, like Arnold, would deprive religion of the supernatural. Stephen's faith is the faith of the sceptic -- a faith which derives its consolation from "means" rather than from "ends." For Arnold naturalism also provides a critical method -- a means with which he was able to revaluate the ancient traditions and so reach what he considered constructive conclusions.

Mill's attitude toward nature, like Huxley's, is rationalistic. His approach to nature is through reason, not through feeling. Arnold may be said to approach nature through both. Mill cannot conceive of nature as either all flux or all order. Nature gives both. At times he seems to voice a deistic doctrine, the conception of a remote God who set the universe in motion and then withdrew. Mill conceives of nature as red in tooth and claw; the doctrine of following nature he considers fallacious advice. Arnold, however, is both attracted and repelled by nature. Mill sometimes speaks of a second nature, but he is not a dualist, since his "second nature" is no more than a "refined" first nature. There is no supernaturalism in it, as there is in Arnold's conception when he speaks of the "will of God." Mill, in fact, believes it is evil to ascribe a supernatural origin to the moral inclinations of man. Improvement of man is on the basis of experience -- natural experience -- a view which

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Arnold shares, except that religious dualism is conspicuous in Arnold and absent in Mill.

Carlyle does not have a rationalistic or mechanical conception of nature. He approaches nature through the feelings and the heart rather than through the mind or reason. Arnold will often take every avenue except that of extreme emotion; in this respect he is unlike Carlyle, but despite his unemotional approach he pursues conflicting byways of thought and so creates the impression of self-contradiction on intellectual grounds, if not upon emotional. Carlyle fuses God and nature: the book of nature contains the wisdom of God; nature blesses the pure of heart. He thus makes nature a moral judge. Also, the farther one descends into the unconscious the nearer one comes to God. Arnold seldom directs one down this path (though his emphasis upon the emotional element in religion, as we shall see, relates him to Carlyle). For Carlyle, the moral conscience is in the heart of nature. Nature has usurped the throne of the Hebrew God, but the way to reach that throne and to avail oneself of its gifts is not by overpowering the emotions but by intensifying and vitalizing them. Carlyle, it may be said, more completely than Arnold rubs out the distinction between nature and supernature.

Wordsworth anticipates Carlyle in his approach to nature through the heart and the feelings rather than through the calculating mind. Wordsworth has a caress-

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ing fondness for nature which repelled a man like Mill (at least in his essay on "Nature") and which Arnold, admirer though he was of nature, never indulged. Nature to Wordsworth was warm and affectionate and tender, whereas to Arnold she was often neutral and indifferent, though Arnold wished he could emulate her austere ways. The mystical assumptions which Wordsworth makes in regard to nature Arnold does not share. Nature and God are not mutually exclusive for Wordsworth, as they sometimes are, and other times are not, for Arnold. Arnold did not mix up the soul of man with rocks and stones and trees. Arnold did not ascribe noble intentions to nature. His attitude toward nature was more nearly scientific -- or what he thought was scientific. Man's original sin for Wordsworth was his departure from nature's ways; man's errors for Arnold were traceable to his ordinary self. It is true that Arnold often contradicted himself on this point, but when he dealt with it, he did so with penetration and deference to a rich religious tradition not observable in Wordsworth's consideration of nature as a moral source. Arnold did not scorn the traditional and hardly acquired methods of achieving knowledge and wisdom; nature for him was not the teacher who bestowed wisdom spontaneously as she was for Wordsworth. Arnold appreciated Wordsworth's love of nature, and he was affected and swayed by Wordsworth's devotion to her; but he was not as constantly

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loyal to her as Wordsworth was, nor did he share Wordsworth's undiluted faith in her human and God-like powers of solicitude and benevolence.

Goethe, despite his strenuous cerebrations, reaches practically the same conclusions about nature that Wordsworth does through the heart and the emotions. Nature is to be copied for her truth. Goethe, naturalist that he was, fails to distinguish between the truth of nature and the truth of supernature, a distinction which Arnold, lacking consistency, does not himself always make. Goethe naturalizes the supernatural as does Carlyle, as does Arnold, especially in his religious works. The divine exists for Goethe, but it is a naturalized divinity, which expresses itself either through the feelings or the reason -- but dualism as a force which divides the senses from a power which exists above them does not obtain for Goethe. The "imperturbable naturalism" of Goethe is not serenity in a spiritual sense, the serenity which a Buddha achieves by the conquest of the senses; rather it is analogous to the neutrality and lifelessness of the stars. Regarding the means that one may use to achieve that serenity, the naturalistic method of a Goethe is utterly at variance with that which Arnold himself often advocates.

Spinoza and Marcus Aurelius were chosen to represent the naturalistic stream of influence before the nineteenth century. Spinoza is a monist; he considered that it was

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impossible that man should not be in his entirety a component of nature. Arnold's view that man begins where nature ends is extraneous and alien to the spirit of Spinoza. All things for Spinoza are predetermined by natural law and this is an interpretation and point of view which Arnold employs in his religious criticism. Spinoza was distrustful of reason in a way that Arnold seldom was and in a way that reminds one of a conventional dualist like Newman. The power above reason was God, substance; yet it is a power that permeates the universe. Spinoza recognizes complementary aspects of nature, but they are not dualistic opposites. The world is a divine unit. Arnold accepts Spinoza's naturalism without, however, accepting his pantheism consistently.

Marcus Aurelius is not a dualist, though he exhorts against the senses. His "reason" which would control the senses is a self-regarding power; it is rooted in nature, not in supernature. Although he makes a distinction between soul and body, they are aspects of the same cosmos. The emphasis which Marcus Aurelius places upon self-control doubtless appealed to Arnold's sense of dualism, but Arnold himself placed so much reliance upon reason as to endanger his own position as a dualist in the genuine sense. Marcus Aurelius felt that the totality and cohesiveness of nature made for universal good will and benevolent forbearance. The view of nature as a cosmic fraternity did

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not appeal to Arnold, nor did the notion that "nothing is evil according to nature." Yet the idea that all moral experience can be explained in terms of nature did possess the mind of Arnold, for he himself undertook a similar endeavor.

Although Arnold's views of nature have much in common with those of the figures examined in this study, he evolves an interpretation which, even if it does not command his undivided loyalty, goes beyond the views held by any of them: nature for him is not the source of man's distinctly human qualities. Yet he is at one, as we have observed, with Spinoza in his desire to give religious experience a natural basis, and he was no doubt inspired in this direction by the temper of his age. In his poetry Arnold often assumes a neutral attitude toward nature. She is just "there" as background on which man moves and plays his part. Arnold also uses nature somewhat allegorically -- to illustrate a point, without ascribing virtues to it that inhere in man. He draws analogies between nature and man without fusing, as Wordsworth does, man and nature; but he does not have a unified point of view: he creates the impression often of gravitating toward two opposite poles at once.

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-V-

THE CONCEPT OF GOD

Arnold's ideas about God are the logical corollary of his ideas about nature, the background of which has already been given and which will therefore not require reconsideration. If Arnold had not felt about nature as he did, he would not have evolved his particular conception of God -- a conception essentially naturalistic and commensurate with the naturalistic tendency of his age,[1] even though that tendency was variously expressed.[2]

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1. What that tendency in general was, or what the attitude toward the "Godhead" was during that age, Louis Cazamian, literary historian, expresses: "The conception of the Godhead divests itself, as it were, of personality, and tends towards an ethical pantheism. We perceive God as a diffused current of volition and desire which, within us and without, is directed toward the moral ends of the universe. The enemies of true zeal are on the one hand, indifference and, on the other, fanaticism; the most desirable form of faith is that which is regulated by a discriminating and cultured intelligence." Legouis and Cazamian, op. cit., p. 1150.
2. That Arnold expressed a view in keeping with the naturalistic and scientific temper of his time the following statement makes clear: "...the scientific sense in us does not refuse to admit willingly and reverently the name of God, as a point in which the religious and the scientific sense may meet, as the least inadequate name for that universal order which the intellect feels after as a law, and the heart feels after as a benefit. 'We, too,' might men of science with truth say to the men of religion -- 'we, too, would gladly say God, if only, the moment one says God, you would not pester one with your pretension of knowing all about him.' That stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfill the law of their being, and which, inasmuch as our idea of real welfare resolves itself into this fulfillment

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There is one figure, however, Cardinal Newman, whose ideas are not naturalistic and for that reason were not fully treated in the last chapter. His ideas will now be considered (although not without treatment of the ideas of other pertinent figures) because Newman's ideas serve as a contrast to Arnold's ideas and because they represent the dualistic tradition at its best, from which Arnold's naturalism is a departure. Arnold's deflection from dualism, in other words, will stand out best against the background of Newman's intense loyalty to it. An analysis of Newman's ideas of God therefore follows.

Despite the fact that Newman champions an orthodox

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of the law of one's being, man rightly deems the fountain of all goodness, and calls by the worthiest and most solemn name he can, which is God, science also might willingly own for the fountain of all goodness, and call God." (St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 8.) This statement tends to prove that Arnold was more than anxious to make his idea of God scientifically acceptable and he was motivated in this intention by the scientific temper of his time. As a critic says: "He belongs to the age which set such store on verification, and rightly or wrongly, he believed it possible to verify by experience that the pursuit of righteousness, the knowledge of the secret of Jesus brings with it satisfaction, happiness, the sense of 'hitting the mark.'" (Janet E. Courtney, "Matthew Arnold" (Freethinkers of the Nineteenth Century), 1920, p. 90.) The kind of intuitive thinking, however, in which Arnold engaged under the illusion that it was scientific such a rationalist as Mill condemned: "The mode of reasoning which I call unscientific, though in the opinion of some thinkers it is also a legitimate mode of scientific procedure, is that which infers external objective facts from ideas or convictions of our minds." Mill, Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism, p. 139.

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creed, his conception of God is not anthropomorphic. Part of Arnold's effort, as we shall see, was to rid mankind of this conception;[3] he wanted to de-materialize the current notions of God, but he only succeeded in naturalizing them and thus, ironically, engulfed himself in the same kind of abyss from which he tried to escape. Newman, on the other hand, stayed within the conventional pattern -- one might characterize it as a universal pattern -- and defined, in philosophical and essentially non-theological terms, a God who is wholly spiritual and supernatural, without being in the least degree corporeal or natural. Newman's definition, in other words, does not constitute an abatement of dualism. In fact, for him the "gulf" between man and God is infinite (and in this respect he differs from the oriental dualist[4]). "God," he says, "is an Individual, Self-dependent, all-perfect, Unchangeable Being; intelligent, living, personal and present; almighty, all-seeing, all remembering; between whom and His creatures there is an infinite gulf..."[5]

Although the gulf is wide between man and God, New-

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3. Fred A. Dudley does not consider that Arnold was entirely successful in his effort. He considers Arnold's conception "teleological anthropomorphism." Dudley, op. cit., p. 286.
4. Speaking specifically of the Brahman, Helen White says: "The Brahman conceived of the individual soul as a portion of the Over-Soul, segregated in the body." (White, op. cit., p. 83.) Since the individual soul is a portion of the Over-Soul (God), it follows that the distance between it and God is one of relative immediacy rather than of infinity.
5. Newman, The Idea of a University, p. 36.

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man of course does not withhold from man the conventional means of salvation and heavenly attainment. What is significant for our purpose is that he does not fuse the disparate orders of life. Moreover, we notice that Newman does not reduce God to a substance or a tendency,[6] that for him God retains his self-sufficiency and perfectibility. What is most significant, God is an unchangeable being. He does not alter with man's whims, caprice, or pressure of the times, however enlightened that pressure for the moment appears to be. Neither is He an impersonal power, an objective force that operates with the hard and fast indifference of a natural law. Newman continues his definition. God is one

> "who has no origin, who is all-sufficient for Himself; who will judge every one of us, sooner or later, according to that Law of right or wrong which He has written on our hearts. He is One who is sovereign over, operative amidst, independent of, the appointment which He has made; One in whose hands are all things, who has a purpose in every event, and a standard for every deed, and thus has relations of His own towards the subject-matter of each particular science which the book of knowledge unfolds; who has with an adorable never-ceasing energy implicated Himself in all the history of creation, the constitution of nature, the course of the world, the origin of society, the fortunes of nations, the actions of the human mind." 7

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6. Newman condemns the pantheistic idea of God which Stephen in the spirit of exposition rather than of belief expounds as follows: "God is not an external ruler, a part of the series of phenomena, but in some mysterious way an all-pervading belief." Stephen, Essays on Freethinking, p. 115.
7. Newman, Idea of a University, loc. cit. These perfervid affirmations of Newman were of course questioned. One of the doubters was Anthony Froude who questioned

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The genesis of God is perhaps the most perplexing and troublesome question of all. But Newman is not sceptical concerning the answer to that question; he is dogmatic and speaks with sovereign assurance. When Newman says, "God is an individual...who has no origin," the negative statement has all the force of an affirmation. There is no doubt in Newman's mind that God always was. The question is difficult, but there is no connection between difficulty and doubt for Newman. As he says: "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt, as I understand the subject; difficulty and doubt are incommensurate."[8] Newman, then, represents an anti-naturalistic

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the large claims which Newman made for his God. "I will not," says Froude, "I must not, believe that the all-just, all merciful, all good God can be such a Being as I find him there described. He! He! to have created mankind liable to fall -- to have laid them in the way of a temptation under which he knew they would fall and then curse them and all who were to come of them, and all the world, for their sakes; jealous, passionate, capricious, revengeful, punishing children for their father's sins; tempting men, or at least permitting them to be tempted into blindness and folly, and then destroying them." (James Anthony Froude, The Nemesis of Faith, London, 1849, p. 11.) Froude's heretical book made a sensation. Clough remarked regarding its publication: "Froude ...has published a new book of religious biography, auto or otherwise (The Nemesis of Faith), and therewith resigns his Fellowship. But the Rector (of Exeter) talks of not accepting the resignation, but of having an expulsion -- fire and fagot fashion." (Ward, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 115.) Ward quoting Arthur Hugh Clough, from his letter to Mr. Thomas Arnold, Arnold's brother in New Zealand.

8. John Henry Newman, History of My Religious Opinions, London, 1865, p. 139.

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approach, for naturalism makes no dogmatic conclusions when there is the least evidence of doubt. Even if Newman's consummate faith gave way to a single doubt, he would still hold to his conclusions, simply because the naturalistic method,[9] to which doubt belongs, is to him untenable in matters that lie beyond the realm of nature. The process of knowing God is not for Newman, as it is for Arnold, a natural operation. To this operation, which analyzes and dissects, doubt is essential; but it is unessential in the supernatural process of knowing God, the operation which goes beyond analysis and depends upon the direct voice of authority.[10]

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9. The use which a naturalist makes of doubt is strikingly illustrated in the following passage from Freud who though at opposite poles from Newman on spiritual matters, and from Arnold on most of them, yet bears a logical relation to him because of their respective efforts to find a human and natural explanation for supernatural belief: "As it is a delicate task to decide what God has himself ordained and what derives rather from the authority of an all-powerful parliament or a supreme judicial decision, it would be an indubitable advantage to leave God out of the question altogether, and to admit honestly the purely human origin of all cultural laws and institutions." Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, London, 1928, p. 73.

10. While God speaks to Newman through the conscience, He nevertheless speaks to Him as an objective, an external voice. He is not metamorphosed into supernatural ether. Carlyle, for instance, expands the conception of God until he is everywhere and nowhere at once. He is like the ether around us, and yet we view him subjectively: "...has not a deeper meditation taught certain of every climate and age that the WHERE and WHEN, so mysteriously inseparable from all our thoughts; are but superficial terrestrial adhesions to thought; that the seer may discern them where they mount up out of the celestial EVERYWHERE

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God, for Newman, as we see, is a moral judge, omnipotent in his process; He weighs and considers our actions in the light of standards. He is thus not a law but an interpreter, as well as the maker of the law. As a sovereign judge, He is not without love and benevolence. He is not at once the "maker" and the "made," cause and effect,[11] as he is with the pantheists. He is the maker

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and FOREVER; have not all nations conceived their God as Omnipresent and Eternal; as existing in a universal HERE, an everlasting NOW? Think well, thou too will find that Space is but a mode of our human Sense, so likewise Time; there is no Space and no Time: We are -- we know not what; -- light sparkles floating in the ether of DEITY!" (Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, p. 42.)

What Carlyle is evidently trying to do is to interpret the outer world in terms of his intense, subjective emotions (and so to arrive at a conception of God). He makes both the world and God conform to his own impressions and intuitions rather than subordinate those emotional impressions to a law above himself. Even time and space are subjective modes of human sense. Such is Carlyle's mysticism. Arnold does not fall into the emotional extreme that Carlyle does. He avoids all sorts of mystical ebullitions. As Lowry says: "For what commonly passes as mysticism he had no quarter; he seeks only those outposts that are 'perfectly in light and form.'" Lowry, op. cit., p. 1.

11. This is a traditional, dualistic distinction very well expressed by Plato: "...was the world...always in existence and without beginning? or created, and had it beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body and therefore sensible things are apprehended by opinion and senses and are in a process of creation and created. Now that which is created...must of necessity be created by a cause. But the father and maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible." (Plato, "Timaeus," vol. 2, p. 13.) The cause of religion is not served, Plato seems to say, by diminishing the mystery -- by reducing God, the Primary Cause, into an anonymous link in the endless chain of cause and effect.

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and the things which he makes are different from Him, though to man, his favorite, he has given a soul. What, then, is the relation between Him and nature? He has, says Newman, implicated himself in all creation, but so has an artist implicated himself in the painting which he has created; but is there no difference between the creator and the thing he has created? Obviously, the fusion, if any, is imaginative, not actual and real in the sense that the distinction has been obliterated between the maker and the thing he has made. The spirit of God is in his handiwork, but Newman does not eliminate God, an independent being, and say, he is in his handiwork, and nowhere else.

Regarding the matter of God's permeability, Newman is as explicit as can be. Dualism is fundamental. God is not the soul of the world. He is absolutely distinct from it. Newman draws an analogy between the living principle acting freely in the individual and the invisible intelligent Being acting behind the invisible universe, but he does not say that the intelligent Being pervades the natural universe:

> "As in the human frame there is a living principle, acting upon it and through it by means of volition, so, behind the veil of the visible universe there is an invisible, intelligent Being, acting on and through it, as and when He will. Further, I mean that this invisible Agent is in no sense a soul of the world, after the analogy of human nature, but, on the contrary is absolutely distinct from the world as Being, Creator, Upholder, Governor, and

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Sovereign Lord." [12]

This Sovereign Lord is eternal and, consequently, "He has lived a whole eternity by Himself..." [13] His goodness is also eternal. Newman ascribes no evil to his Sovereign Lord. He is "the Supreme Good or has all the attributes of Good in infinite intenseness." [14] The existence of evil, [15] we are left to infer, is the result of our deflection from the sovereign will. God is also the source of beauty and wisdom and kindred attributes. He is "all wisdom, all truth, all justice, all love, all holi-

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12. John Henry Newman, "Idea of a University" (A Newman Treasury), New York, 1943, p. 235.
13. Loc. cit.
14. Loc. cit.
15. The origin of evil is perhaps the most heart-breaking of theological problems. No doubt the genesis of a dualistic interpretation of existence is related to the effort to solve this problem. St. Augustine endeavors to solve it by putting God on a pedestal beyond evil and by reducing all things that are not good to a "lower" category. This is his dualism. The following passage is an illustration of the point in question: "I sat myself to think of You as the supreme and sole and true God; and with all my heart I believed You incorruptible and inviolable and immutable, for though I did not see whence or how, yet I saw with utter certainty that what can be corrupted is lower than what cannot be corrupted, that inviolable is beyond question better than the violable, and that what can suffer no change is better than what can be changed." (The Confessions of St. Augustine, p. 131.) In other words, the things which are excellent and pure derive from God, and the things which are incorruptible and not good derive from another source (since God being good cannot produce evil). Scientifically, of course, this explanation is untenable and naive. From the standpoint of science and naturalism, what is more desirable or "better" is not necessarily true. Religion, presumptuously perhaps from the standpoint of science, cuts through what is rational and logical and obtains its information first hand at a supersensuous source; namely, from God.

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ness, all beautifulness..."[16] Further, he "is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent; ineffably one, absolutely perfect; and such, that what we do not know and cannot imagine of Him, is far more wonderful than what we do and can."[17] Although God is incomprehensible, for that reason we are not to be sceptical regarding the manifoldness and magnitude of his powers, for Newman, disregarding the barriers of logic, unswervingly asserts: "I mean that He...created all things out of nothing..."[18] "He made them," he concludes, "and...in consequence, He is separated from them by an abyss, and is incommunicable in all his attributes."[19] Here, then, finally, is evidence once more of Newman's dualism.

What Newman of course is trying to combat is the idea that God is a mere generalization, a principle, or a law. As he says: "The Almighty is something infinitely different from a principle, or a course of action, or a quality, or a generalization of phenomena."[20]

Newman, it is evident again, does not have a life-

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16. Newman, loc. cit.
17. Loc. cit.
18. Loc. cit.
19. Ibid., p. 236. The paradox of the "separateness" and "inseparateness" of God (for Newman does not mean that God has no relation to man's soul) is well expressed, again, by St. Augustine: "You see not even the soul, which is the life of bodies -- and therefore obviously better and more certain than the bodies it vivifies: but You are the life of souls, the Life of lives, Livingness itself, and you shall not change, O Life of my soul." The Confessions of St. Augustine, p. 48.
20. Newman, Idea of a University, p. 37.

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less, negative conception of God. The following statement which Newman made after his conversion vividly expresses the affirmative qualities of his God. One feels that God is far more than natural law, an essence, a cause, or a tendency. In a letter to Mrs. William Froude Newman says:

> "You will have the blessedness of finding, when you enter a Church, a Treasure Unutterable, the Presence of the Eternal Word Incarnate, the Wisdom of the Father who, even when he had done His work, would not leave us, but rejoices still to humble Himself by abiding in places on earth, for our sakes, while He reigns not the less on the right hand of God. To know too that you are in the Communion of Saints, to know that you have cast your lot among all those Blessed Servants of God who are the choice fruits of His Passion, that you have their intercessions on high, that you may address them, and above all the Glorious Mother of God, what thoughts can be greater than these? 21

While the conception of God revealed in this passage is far from simple and includes much which is theological rather than philosophical, it succeeds in establishing one fundamental fact; namely, that God is supernatural. Also, the statement reveals that though Newman does not have an anthropomorphic conception of God, for him God has superhuman qualities which resemble the human though they transcend it. But, principally, one feels that despite the possibilities that Newman holds out for

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21. John Henry Newman, Cardinal Newman and William Froude: A Correspondence (Gordon Huntington, editor), Baltimore, p. 73.

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intimacy between God and man, the difference between His order and the order below has not been eliminated. Naturalism cannot account for Newman's conception of God.

While Newman strove to justify the accepted dogmas of religion and God, to square those dogmas with a supernatural standard of truth, Arnold had an opposite objective, namely, to question the validity of revelation by means of which man had received these truths -- to remove religion and God from the excrescences of fairy tale and legend and so to place God and religion on a naturalistic footing. The God of "popular religion" he considered fancy. The tales and legends in which He figured were to be respected and treated with literary indulgence, but as "religion" they were to be dismissed. As Arnold says:

> "For us, the God of popular religion is a legend, a fairy-tale; learned theology has simply taken this fairy-tale and dressed it metaphysically. Clearly it is impossible for us to treat this fairy-tale with solemnity, as a real and august object, in the manner which might be most acceptable to its believers. But for the sake of the happiness it has given, of its beauty and pathos, and of the portions of truth mixed up with it, it deserves, we have said, and from us it has received and always will receive, a nearly inexhaustible indulgence." 22

22. God and the Bible, p. 17. Arnold's effort to naturalize the conception of God and religion took the form of an attack upon metaphysics for the evident reason that it casts a mystery over natural experience which he wanted to reclaim, paradoxically, not for science but for religion itself. He says: "At the mention of that name metaphysics, lo, essence, existence,

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Although Arnold, as is evident, desires to naturalize God, he scorns the use of a so-called scientific method employed by the theologians.[22a] His own naturalism is literary and critical rather than mechanically scientific. Such a method leads him to the conclusion that the term God cannot be used with any degree of absolutism -- that it is, in fine, a relative term. Whereas to Newman the term God had definite meanings, to Arnold the term cannot be used with any degree of finality. Arnold is thus close in spirit to such a sceptic as Stephen -- and at opposite poles to such a dogmatist as Newman. Arnold says:

"...terms, in short, which with St. Paul

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substance, finite and infinite, cause and succession, something and nothing, begin to weave eternal dance before us! with the confused murmur of their combinations filling all the region governed by her, who, far more indisputably than her late-born rival, political economy, has earned the title of the Dismal Science." (Ibid., p. 50.) In reclaiming natural experience for religion Arnold goes to Jesus as an authority: "The moment Jesus speaks, the metaphysical apparatus falls away, the simple intuition takes its place; and whereever in the discourse of Jesus the metaphysical apparatus is intruded, it jars with the context, breaks the unity of the discourse, impairs the thought, and comes evidently from the writer, not Jesus." (Literature and Dogma, p. 155.) Arnold's effort, however, to rid religion of metaphysics and Jesus of his divinity reduces the status of Jesus to one of uncertainty, and as one critic says, Arnold's own point of view to weakness: "... the weak point, in Arnold's reformed Christianity is its evasion of the question as to whether Jesus differed in kind, or only in degree, from other great teachers. Arnold never answers that question; he does not even raise it, except by implication..." Courtney, op. cit., p. 91.

22a. Arnold is scolding, in particular, "The Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester." Literature and Dogma, p. 11f.

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> are literary terms, theologians have employed as if they were scientific terms.
>
> "But if one desires to deal with this mistake thoroughly, one must observe it in that supreme term with which religion is filled, -- the term God. The seemingly incurable ambiguity in the mode of employing this word is at the root of all our religious differences and difficulties. People use it as if it stood for a perfectly definite and ascertained idea, from which we might, without more ado, extract propositions and draw inference, just as we should from any other definite and ascertained idea." 23

The term God, in other words, can only be used approximately; and when we use it we must make our conceptions conform to actual experience. Arnold thus reduces experience to a monistic level. In his desire to dispose of God as a "person," he eliminates the transcendent truth which that notion once represented. His scepticism is in keeping with the naturalism of the nineteenth century, but it constitutes a contradiction of his own dualistic views. His insistence that the term God be used relativistically and upon a basis of actual experience is borne out by the following statement:

> "...we must not attempt to define God adequately, or in a way that goes beyond our experience, -- to say, like our theologians: God is a person! -- but we define God approximately, according to our actual experience of him." 24

Thus Arnold's naturalism leads him to the dismissal of two conceptions: first, an absolute conception of God; second, an anthropomorphic conception of God. These two

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23. Ibid., p. 9.
24. Ibid., p. 241.

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ideas are not necessarily related, for, as we have seen, the orientals do not possess an anthropomorphic conception of God; yet their ideas concerning the nature of God are, for the most part, absolute and certain, not relative. Although Arnold, as we observed further, was doubtless subject to the oriental tradition, its effect upon him apparently did not extend beyond giving him a basis for his doctrine of his two selves. His naturalism, contradicting that doctrine, most likely stems from a more immediate source which evidently inspired him to make the following anthropological explanation regarding the genesis of the "magnified man." He says:

> "They [the primitives] were supposed to give us for conscious intelligence, for thinking and loving, a basis or subject independent of bodily constitution. They do in fact give us nothing beyond bodily phenomena; but they transfer by a figure the phenomena of our own bodily life to all law and operation. On a fine and subtle scale they still carry on that personifying anthropomorphic process, native in man and ineradicable, which in all the early religions of the world we can see going forward on a scale gross and palpable." 25

Such a process results in the creation of God in man's own image. One error, among others, is that man has created as his God a "non-natural" man. In other words, Arnold criticises primitive man not only for a deficient supernaturalism, such as anthropomorphism, but for going beyond nature in order to explain or satisfy his religious yearnings. Primitive man should have stayed

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25. God and the Bible, p. 81.

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inside the naturalistic pattern. Arnold continues his explanation of the existence of an anthropomorphic conception of God as follows:

> "In general, as God is said to have made man in his own image, the image of God, man has returned the compliment and has made God as being, outwardly or inwardly, in the image of man. What we in general do is to take the best thinking and loving of the best man, to better this best, to call it perfect, and to say that this is God. So we construct a magnified and non-natural man, by dropping out all that in man seems a source of weakness and inserting its contrary, and by heightening to the very utmost all that in man seems a source of strength, such as his thought and his love." 26

After thus disposing of the superstitious and non-natural idea of God, Arnold sets about, on the basis of "experience" to construct his conception of God. Arnold discovers, first of all, that we have an element in us "in which we live and move and have our being..." [27] This element "stretches around and beyond the strictly moral element in us, around and beyond the finite sphere of what is originated, measured and controlled by our own understanding and will..." [28] For a moment one thinks that Arnold is championing the doctrine of the two selves, that, like Newman, he is making a point of the fact that there is a gulf that divides creation, but as he continues, one finds that he mingles the pleasures of the senses and the pleas-

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26. Ibid., p. 34.
27. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 49.
28. Loc. cit.

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ures of the approving conscience -- that he is working inside a monistic pattern. He says:

> "By this element we are receptive and influenced, not originative and influencing; now, we all of us receive far more than we originate. Our pleasure from a spring day we do not make; our pleasure, even, from an approving conscience we do not make. And yet we feel that both the one pleasure and the other can, and often do, work with us in a wonderful way for our good." 29

The element which stretches around and about us, one may reasonably conjecture, is similar to Spinoza's permeating substance,[30] with a strong tincture of Wordsworth in it. Arnold is not deserting the naturalistic process in evolving his conception of God.

Arnold is anxious, further, that God be considered as a concrete power, not as an abstraction. In fact, he objects to the use of the word "Being" because he thinks it

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29. Loc. cit.

30. Arnold, of course, would deny the similarity. He says: "...this alleged clear and distinct idea of an infinite substance, all-knowing and all-powerful, is one of those cases where an idea is fancied to be clear and distinct when it is not." (God and the Bible, p. 86.) But Arnold does not, in spite of himself, avoid the metaphysical. Says Dawson, speaking in general about Arnold's conception of God: "...the assumption that behind right conduct there is a Power 'making for' it, is as purely metaphysical as the assumption that the universe is governed by a 'Personal First Cause, the moral and intelligent governor of the universe, who thinks and loves.' Some Intelligence, however conceived and named, must be at work, even to produce Arnold's scheme of life, since righteousness cannot exist apart from conscious being." (Dawson, op. cit., p. 247.) Dawson's point is that Arnold begins experimentally with right and wrong and proceeds to evolve his definition of God: a motivating power that turns us in the direction of right. This force, in spite of Arnold's protestations, is metaphysical.

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is a figure of speech. "Power" to him is nearer to experience -- concrete experience. As he says:

> "We advise people to eschew as much as possible, in speaking about God, the use of the word Being, which even strict thinkers are so apt to use continually without asking themselves what it really means. The word is bad, because it has a false air of conveying some real abstruse knowledge about God's nature, while it does not, but is merely a figure. Power is a better word, because it pretends to assert of God nothing more than effect on us, operation." 31

God, therefore, is a process, and what keeps the process in operation is power.

Arnold reiterates the view that God is an "operation," (but one must note that he is not consistent in his opposition to the use of the word Being to designate God). Further, he is sceptical regarding the ultimate nature of this "power"; to him it is a psychological force -- a psychological operation:

> "...we...mean, when we pronounce that God has being, that God is, simply that God operates, that the Eternal which makes for righteousness has operation. And then we assert nothing about God's constitution whatever, we neither affirm God to be a person nor to be a thing. And, indeed, we are not at all in a position to affirm God to be either the one or the other." 32

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31. God and the Bible, p. 93.
32. Ibid., p. 84. A contemporary of Arnold shows how lacking in logic is Arnold's conception of the Eternal: "...he really means by 'eternal' nothing more than 'enduring' and by 'enduring,' enduring in the history of man; so that the verifiable proposition which he takes as the foundation of a new religion is after all nothing more than this, that so far as history gives evidence at all, there has always been hitherto, since man appeared upon the earth, a stream of

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To Newman God was holy, a divine, august Being. Newman made no analogies between God, the father, and the law of gravitation. But Arnold makes such an analogy, because to him God is natural. He says:

> "We no more pretend to know the origin and composition of the power that makes for righteousness than of the power that makes for gravitation. All we profess to have ascertained about it is, that it has effect on us, that it operates." 33

The very fact that Arnold refers to his God as "it" is evidence of the vast gulf that separates him from Newman; it also shows the gap that exists between Arnold's own views: his dualism, on one hand, his naturalism, 33a on the other.

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tendency which made for righteousness. Nevertheless, if the earth came to an end, and there be, as Mr. Arnold apparently inclines to believe no life for man beyond his life on earth, then the enduring stream of tendency would endure no longer, and the 'eternal' would, so far as it was verifiable, sink back into a transitory and extinct phenomenon of the terrestrial past." (Richard Holt Hutton, "Matthew Arnold" (Essays on Some of the Modern Guides to English Thought in Matters of Faith), London, 1888, p. 2.) This is perhaps the most unanswerable criticism that can be made of Arnold's conception of God, the Eternal. It eventuates that Arnold's "Eternal" is not eternal at all, since His period of existence is limited to the temporal life of man -- or of mankind. A conception of God whose being is made dependent upon the life of man is logically (and religiously) a weak conception. Logically, again, God not only coexists with the life of man; he is anterior and posterior to it. The final phrase of Hutton's statement is significant. Arnold's God is indeed terrestial. Consequently Benn can maintain that Arnold's definition of God is "quite compatible with atheism or pantheism..." Benn, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 310.

33. God and the Bible, p. 78.

33a. Arnold does not violate his dualism because he does not accept Newman's conception of God. He violates his

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But this power, this force, one may argue, is a moral power -- a restraining power. The very use of the words "not ourselves" would so indicate. Arnold concretely defines God as follows: "God is the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness..."[34] He says again: "Men cared about God for the sake of what they knew about him, not of what they did not. And they knew about him that he was the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness, and as such they gave him that name for what gives light and warmth, God."[35]

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dualism because he conceives of God as natural law. The main difference, that is, between Newman and Arnold is not that Newman accepts a personal God and that Arnold accepts an impersonal one, but that Newman, to repeat, believes in a supernatural God, and Arnold (intermittently) does not.

In no wise is the oriental conception of God similar to Arnold's conception (as defined in this chapter), if for no other reason than that the oriental's God exists independent of consciousness, the conscience, and the whole personality of man. The fact that He manifests himself through the consciousness of man does not mean that He does not exist outside that consciousness. Further, it is an erroneous assumption that, to the oriental, God is "impersonal," a "tendency," or a "law." In the Bhagavad-Gita Krishna is as warm and close and intimate in the heart of Arjuna as Jesus is in the heart of Newman. Also, in oriental literature man does not create God. God creates man. Even though Arnold is critical of primitive man for creating God in his own image, Arnold has done some "creating" himself. He has created a conception of God that makes Him dependent upon the consciousness of man (See footnote 32.), which, we are left to suppose, is conterminous with the life of nature. Arnold's conception of God, in other words, is naturalistic, and as such, contradicts his dualism which rests upon the recognition of a higher self which has, as he has so eloquently indicated himself, an independent and non-natural operation and sphere of being.

34. Ibid., p. xxxvii.
35. Loc. cit.

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Have we not here a definition of the higher part of dualism -- an ethical, divine power that rules and governs our being inwardly and outwardly?[36] The answer is that

36. Irving Babbitt who is usually penetrating (and strict) when it comes to distinctions accepts Arnold's definition of God because he conceives of it as a genuine definition of dualism: "What one is able to affirm without going beyond immediate experience and falling into dogma is, in Arnold's phrase, a great power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, a phrase that reminds one of Buddha's conception of the dhamma, or human law, as one may render it, in contradiction to the law of physical nature." (Babbitt, "Buddha and the Occident," p. 80.) But Arnold amply shows that so far as his conception of God is concerned, he does not want to set up a law that contradicts the laws of nature. T. S. Eliot, who is a dualist himself, characterizes Arnold's definition as "clap trap." (T. S. Eliot, "Francis Herbert Bradley" (Essays Ancient and Modern), 1936, p. 97.) "Most of us," he adds, "certainly the public which Mr. Arnold addresses, want something they can worship; and they will not find that in any hypostasized copybook heading, which is not much more adorable than "Honesty is the best policy,' or 'Handsome is what handsome does,' or various other edifying maxims, which have not yet come to an apotheosis." (Ibid., p. 56.) Elsewhere Eliot says again: "He [Arnold] girds at (apparently) Herbert Spencer for substituting the Unknowable for God; quite unaware that his own Eternal-not-ourselves comes to exactly the same thing as the Unknowable." (T. S. Eliot, "Arnold and Pater," Bookman (September, 1930), vol. 72, p. 3.)

Anticipating Eliot by almost a generation, G. W. E. Russell makes the following criticism, which takes the same line as Eliot's: "'A Stream of Tendency' can never satisfy the idea of God, as ordinary humanity conceives it. It is not in human nature to love a stream of tendency, or worship it, or ask boons of it; or to credit it with powers of design, volition or creation." (G. W. E. Russell, op. cit., p. 257.) John Burroughs also criticises Arnold's definition for its undue naturalism: "Can we worship an impersonal law or tendency? If public worship is to be continued, if church organization is still to go on, as Mr. Arnold advocates, it is impossible to see how the natural truth of Christianity will alone suffice." (John Burroughs, "Matthew Arnold's Criticism" (Indoor Studies), Boston, 1889, p. 104.)

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ethical control and naturalism, on empirical grounds are not incompatible, but monism and dualism are incompatible. Arnold does not conceive of "the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness" outside a naturalistic context, for he says: "We do not mean that this people [the Hebrews] had a clear and adequate idea of righteousness in conduct as a law of nature..."[37] If anything the Hebrews were not

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The sum of these voices, following Babbitt's commentary, shows that Arnold created the impression that he had a naturalistic and negative conception of God, a conception which runs counter not only to Babbitt's definition of dualism, but what is more pertinent to our purpose, to Arnold's. Central in these criticisms of Arnold, it should be further observed, is not that he is anti-Christian but that he is anti-supernatural and pro-natural -- that his "Eternal-Not-Ourselves" is natural.

37. God and the Bible, p. 115. Arnold's historical accuracy in ascribing ethical preeminence to the Hebrews is often disputed. Arnold is concerned because the Hebrews did not conceive of the law of righteousness adequately in naturalistic terms, but a critic like Robertson disputes the general interpretation which Arnold in the first place makes regarding the Hebrews' ethical superiority: "...the Jews had no more genius for righteousness, for justice, than any other ancient people, no more than the Persians and the Egyptians, decidedly less than the Greeks and Romans. The very fact that righteousness for them came to mean obeying a sacerdotal law is the proof of their inferiority; the occasional passionate cry of their prophets for social rectitude is the measure of their lack of it as a community." (Robertson, op. cit., p. 152.) Kelman, further, questions the soundness and accuracy of Arnold's substitution of his own defnition of God for the Hebrew's conception. He says: "In regard to the personality of God, his substitution of 'the Eternal' for the Hebrew word 'Jehovah' is not admissible. Israel's sense of her God was rather the actual than the eternal, and conveyed the meaning of an intensely vital belief in His thought and speculation of man, but also commanding, loving and revealing." (John Kelman, "Matthew Arnold" (Prophets of Yesterday and Their Message To-Day), Cambridge, Mass., 1924, p. 113.) No doubt Arnold made

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naturalistic enough to suit him. But because they were not adequately naturalistic, or consciously naturalistic, does not alter the fact, says Arnold, that God to them was a natural law. Arnold elaborates this conception as follows:

> "...certainly we do not opine...that Israel's God was the conscious deification of a natural law. To attack, therefore, the improbability of this, is merely to tilt against a phantom of one's own creating. Unquestionably, that Israel, as we see him in the earliest documents of the Old Testament, should have been likely to sit down and say to himself: 'I perceive a great natural law, the law of righteousness, ruling the world; I will personify this law as a God, -- the one and only God; I will call it Jehovah, build a sanctuary for it, and invent a worship for it;' -- that this should have happened is utterly improbable. One can almost as well conceive Israel saying that he was aware of the law of gravitation, and felt disposed to deify it and to erect a temple to it." 38

But Arnold is even more specific. He goes so far as to say that God -- "the eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness" -- is as much a natural law as the law of gravitation. He says: Men

> "become aware of a law of nature which concerns their own life and conduct in the highest degree, -- of an eternal not ourselves

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generalizations which will not stand the test of historical accuracy. "...glib statements," says Burgum, "are the very basis of Arnold's theology." (Burgum, op. cit., p. 96.) But in the main Arnold's central contention that the Hebrews had a passion for righteousness cannot be denied: "Hearken unto me, ye that know righteousness, the people in whose heart is my law; fear ye not the reproach of men, neither be ye afraid of their revilings." (Isaiah, 51:7.) His error, if anything, is not that he ascribed righteousness to the Hebrews, but that he forced them into a naturalistic mold in conformity with his own preconceptions.

38. God and the Bible, p. 101.

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> that makes for righteousness. For this is really a law of nature, collected from experience, just as much as the law of gravitation is; only it is a law of nature which is conceived, however confusedly, by very many more of mankind as affecting them, and much more nearly. But it has its origin in experience, it appeals to experience, and by experience it is, as we believe, verified." 39

Finally, Arnold maintains that there is more evidence on naturalistic or monistic grounds to support the "law of righteousness, the Eternal that makes for righteousness," as natural law than there is to support other naturalistic or scientific hypotheses. He says:

> "...a great many people have believed this or that hypothesis about the system of nature. But the question is, whether they had any such good grounds from experience for accepting these things as true, as there are for accepting as true the law of gravitation and the law of righteousness, the Eternal that makes for righteousness." 40

Arnold, then, reduces God to a natural power, an impersonal tendency which, though it operates with warmth, does not have the personal, fatherly attributes that the supernatural God of Newman has (nor for that matter, as I have indicated before, the paternal, affectionate characteristics which, in general, the oriental God has).[40a] God is

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39. Ibid., p. 77.
40. Ibid., p. 79.
40a. The Upanishads are recognized as perhaps the most abstract of oriental religious writings. But even in them we find, along with philosophical principles, the delineation of a God who matches Newman's God for warmth and personal attraction:
"He [God] is beyond all the forms of the world and of time, he is the other, from whom this world moves round, when one has known him who brings good and removes evil, the lord of bliss, as dwelling with-

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"the stream of tendency by which all things fulfill the law of their being,"[41] says Arnold again. He himself has questioned the ambiguous meanings of the word "being" as it applies to God. What can it mean to him when it applies to a human being? Here doubtless Arnold could fall back on his doctrine of the two selves and say that a man's true being is his best self and that he fulfills the law of his being when he lives not by his ordinary self but by his best self. But the best self to him is often, apparently, a natural self, and so must the lower self be -- or the self which he calls "ordinary." Are both selves then natural? If so, then Arnold's dualism dissolves, in the light of his contradictions, into nothingness. He would be more clear and less confusing if he would say in the first place: All life is one; there is nothing but nature and the two selves are different aspects of the "One." At least one would know where he stands. But Arnold does not say that. He says man begins where nature ends; he says one only begins to know "life" as the first self dies to the second. He talks about the "will of God" -- a God who sits far above the earth and whose essence is not of nature. He thus espouses two antipodal doctrines, consciously or otherwise, at once. The lack of synthesis in Arnold's

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in the self, the immortal, the support of all.
"Let us know that highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities, the master of masters, the highest above, as God, the lord of the world, the adorable." The Upanishads, vol. 15, p. 261.

41. Ibid., p. 94.

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thought is therefore an evident fact.

"I the lord," says Isaiah, "have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles."[42] Arnold himself has adequately proved that there is Biblical authority for his conviction that God is a force of righteousness. Also, he might have gone to Plato for support of that conviction. "Whereas the truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous -- he is perfect righteousness; and he of us is the most righteous is most like him."[43] To Plato, therefore, God stands for righteousness. Arnold, however, when he reduces God to a natural law must, of necessity, reduce evil to a natural law. Whereas there may be different natural laws, there is only, from a naturalistic point of view, one nature, so that for Arnold both good and evil (when he is being naturalistic) derive from the same source. Not so for Plato, because he says:

> "...God, if he be good, is not the author of <u>all</u> things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him." 44

Plato thus avoids the dilemma which Arnold leaves

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42. <u>Isaiah</u>, 42: 6.
43. Plato, "Theatetus," p. 178.
44. Plato, "Republic," p. 643.

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unresolved when he reduces God to the same ultimate source from which evil flows. The question here is not so much as to who is right, Plato or Arnold, but as to consistency. Plato is a consistent dualist; Arnold is not. Neither could it be said that Isaiah, for all of Arnold's effort to prove otherwise, would follow Arnold in his effort to naturalize the supernal personality of God -- to transmute him into a stream or tendency.

With Spinoza's conception of God, as I have intimated, Arnold has much in common -- at least with Spinoza's aim to naturalize God.[45] Arnold, in interpreting Spinoza, says: "...the laws of nature are the laws of God, and to say that God violates the laws of nature is to say that he violates his own nature."[46] Arnold, as we have seen, objects to the fictitious and the improbable in the Bible. Spinoza's undertaking therefore to reject the supernatural and fabulous and to espouse a conception of God in

45. The reason, according to Burgum, that Arnold admired Spinoza (and pantheists in general) is that they found "nothing in the world more definite to worship than a power not themselves that makes for righteousness." (Burgum, op. cit., p. 101.) Peter Bayne maintained that Arnold's conception of God was thoroughly pantheistic: "With the heavens Mr. Arnold has abjured communion. There is for him no God but the blind impartial force which lives in stones and trees and oceans. Nor can earth lend him assistance, for the great enthusiasms which have arisen among men in the past were delusions, and the secret of these delusions, the trick of the old religious mystery has been discovered." Peter Bayne, "Mr. Arnold and Mr. Swinburne," The Contemporary Review (November, 1867), vol. 6, p. 351.

46. Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 321.

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conformity with the laws of nature has Arnold's favor. Arnold says:

> "The doctrine that 'God directs nature, not according as the particular laws of human nature, but according as the universal laws of nature require,' is at utter variance with that Hebrew mode of representing God's dealings, which makes the locusts visit Egypt to punish Pharoah's hardness of heart, and the falling dew avert itself from the fleece of Gideon." 47

Further, Spinoza himself, in rejecting an anthropomorphic conception of God, rejects dualism along with it (as we observed in considering his ideas on nature).[48] Regarding his conception of God, he says specifically:

> "Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident..." 49

This dualistic view is wrong because "no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself," because "besides God no substance can be granted or conceived."[50]

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47. Ibid., p. 335.
48. Leslie Stephen confirms this view: "It is often said, and I believe truly, that if you persist in following theological argument to its legitimate conclusion, and refuse to blind your eyes by using the word 'mystery' where you ought to say 'nonsense,' you cannot stop short of Spinozism, or, in other words, of identifying God with the universe." And such identification spells monism.
49. Spinoza, "Ethics," p. 56.
50. Loc. cit. Says Mossner, in explanation of Spinoza's conception of God and the effect which that conception had upon English thought: "With him God is known intuitively as the forming substance of the world, matter under the attribute of extension, soul under the

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Arnold's accord with Spinoza, it may be said, lies in the direction of Spinoza's effort to naturalize God and religion. For Spinoza, however, God is abstract and metaphysical, whereas for Arnold, He is vital and psychological.

Returning to Newman, who represents in his own century, as I have said before, the staid dualistic view, we hear him say: "I do not see much difference between avowing that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can for certain be known about Him."[51]

If Newman is right in this statement, it constitutes a severe criticism of Arnold, since Arnold definitely says that our ideas concerning the nature of God are approximations. The statement of Newman, of course, is extreme, but it does suggest that Arnold's course veered in an opposite direction from that of Newman -- and so away from the basic dualism to which Arnold often renders homage. To Newman God is supernatural; to Arnold God is natural. Arnold, of course, not only differs with Newman; he differs with himself, as he is often, as I have tried to show, supernaturalistic. Of Arnold it may therefore once more

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attribute of thought. In reducing God to pure Being Spinoza renders superfluous the old theology and the old revelation; his doctrine portends 'the natural euthanasia of theology.' Though little known in England through his posthumous Ethica (1677) Spinoza became notorious through Bayle's account of him as 'the first who reduced atheism to a system.'" Mossner, op. cit.,40.

51. Newman, Idea of a University, p. 40.

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be said that he failed to achieve a synthesis of thought.

CONCLUSION

Arnold's conception of God can best be understood in terms of his conception of nature. He shared, in the main, the naturalistic convictions of his age, but there is one outstanding figure in that age who remains a consistent dualist: Cardinal Newman. For Newman God retains His independent individuality. He is a genuine supernatural personality, complete and perfect in ways beyond the capacity of finite mind to grasp. God is unalterable; He is not to be fashioned in man's mind according to new and shifting pressures of thought -- new expectations and aspirations born of the moment. He is eternal, but eternal in a different sense from the way Arnold uses the word: eternal inasmuch as His being in no wise depends upon the subjective recognition that man may make of Him. Arnold's sense of the eternal is limited -- restricted to the temporal life of society. For Arnold God, despite the impression that his definition creates that He is an objective power, is a subjective being, a psychological experience confined to the finite personality of the individual -- even an emotion. For Newman God speaks to the conscience, but He is far more than a subjective or psychological element of negation. He is an independent and complete personality existing beyond the totality of man's limited personality.

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For Arnold God exists in the pattern of nature as a stream or tendency -- exists in it as a law of gravity. Under his hand, God endures a monistic incarceration, as he does for his spiritual forbear, Spinoza, and as he does not for Plato, a consistent dualist who is careful not to attribute the antipodes of good and evil to the same origin. In delimiting the supernatural, Arnold's higher self or best self ceases to have meaning, as it has nothing beyond and above itself to move or to motivate it. Arnold's conception of God is thus inconsistent with his conception of dualism.

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VI

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION

"When the secret of inner lives is unrolled, many will be found who acknowledge Matthew Arnold," says a critic,

> "as their spiritual father. He it was who in the dissolution of supernatural religion enabled them to keep steadily by faith and hope and love. The pure beauty of his poetry and the revealing light of his criticism are nothing compared with the personal and intimate service which he rendered to the youth of a generation, whose faith was almost quenched in scepticism." 1

The phrase of significance in this passage is the one which refers to the dissolution of supernatural religion. The point is that Arnold had a hand in its dissolution,[2] though it is very true that he tried to provide

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1. Charles H. Harvey, "Matthew Arnold and His Recent Critics," The Westminster Review (April 19, 1903), vol. 159, p. 421. Another critic, sustaining Harvey, maintains that Arnold rendered Christianity a service by making it palatable for a world whose faith had gone to seed on account of science: "Arnold felt to the full the immense loss which the world sustained as it gave itself into the power of material science, but his eminently reasonable nature set to work in an effort to save the essentials of Christianity which after all remained the only light for the wandering feet of men as they trudged through the night of naturalism." (Percy Houston, "The Modernism of Arnold," Sewanee Review (April, 1927), vol. 35, p. 195.) The central question, however, is whether Christianity can retain its vitality when the supernatural has been extracted from it.
2. As Hutton says: "We must remember, then, that though Mr. Arnold proposes to demonstrate for us the truthfulness and power of the Bible, he commences by giving up absolutely the assumption that there is any Divine Being who thinks and loves, revealed in the

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a substitute. Whether his substitute for supernatural religion was constructive or not is less pertinent to the purpose of this study than the fact that his conception of religion is naturalistic and that such a fact runs contrary to his religious dualism elsewhere maintained. Mr. Arnold combines, W. E. Gladstone maintained,

> "a fervent zeal for the Christian religion with a not less boldly avowed determination to transform it beyond the possibility of recognition by friend or foe." 3

The transformation was not so unrecognizable as Mr. Gladstone held. What that transformation was another critic, in agreement with Mr. Harvey, maintains in the following statement:

Bible -- a proposition for which he does not consider that there is even 'a low degree of probability.'" (Hutton, op. cit., p. 109.) Hutton adds: "He eviscerates the Bible, and restores its meaning with the supernatural personality excluded." (Ibid., p. 112.) With the supernatural excluded what we have, according to Frederic Harrison is an admixture of "Anglicanism plus Pantheism." (Frederic Harrison, "Matthew Arnold" (Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill and other Literary Estimates), London, 1899, p. 134.) Benson expresses a similar view: "His religion was a literary Pantheism with a strong tinge of Christian Idealism. He could not accept as proved the doctrine of a Personal Divinity." (Arthur Christopher Benson, "Matthew Arnold" (Leaves of the Tree), New York, p. 409.)

Significantly, although Arnold and Huxley were often rivals, they agreed regarding the supernatural. Huxley says: "Men are growing to be seriously alive to the fact that the historical evolution of humanity, which is generally, and I think not unreasonably, regarded as progress, has been, and is being, accompanied by a co-ordinate elimination of the supernatural from its originally large occupation of men's thoughts." Huxley, Science and Christian Tradition, p. 32.

3. W. E. Gladstone, "Bishop Butler and His Censors," The Nineteenth Century (December, 1895), vol. 38, p. 1056.

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> "...Arnold remains an important witness to the secularization of Protestantism, to its gradual shift of emphasis from Christianity as a revealed religion requiring a theology, to a natural religion planted in human instinct, from viewing Christ as a theologian to viewing him as a great literary figure of elusive but invaluable personality whose aphorisms teach by delighting." 4

The consensus appears to be that for Arnold, as Burgum says again, "Christianity was the true religion of nature."[5] If this is so then Arnold's attitude toward religion is monistic and his self-contradiction and failure to reconcile opposite points of view again evident.

"True religion," says Jacques Maritain, "...is supernatural, come down from Heaven with Him who is the author of Grace and Truth. It is not of man or of the world or a civilisation or a culture or of civilisation or

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4. Burgum, op. cit., p. 95. Arnold of course represented a movement in his effort to reduce the "supernatural to a minimum" (Legouis and Cazamian, op. cit., p. 1147.) and in disposing of the supernatural elements of Christ's personality. One of the men who spoke in Arnold's vein was John Robert Seeley who humanizes Christ's personality as follows: "He [Jesus] scrutinized fearlessly the mass of traditions which then went by the name of the Law, and unhesitatingly pronounced a great deal of them wanting authority. Some of these time-honoured usages he stigmatized as immoral and mischievous, others which were in themselves indifferent, he treated with contemptuous neglect. We may imagine that by this conduct he gave grievous offense to some honest, 'cautious' conservative spirits." (John Robert Seeley, Ecce Homo: a Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ, Boston, 1866, p. 196.) In other words, Jesus did what Seeley and Arnold were trying to do, put religion upon a rational and natural basis.
5. Burgum, op. cit., p. 92.

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culture: it is of God. It transcends every civilisation and every culture."[6] That religion comes "down from heaven," that it has a supernatural genesis, is a view which Arnold opposes; and it is a view that one of Arnold's spiritual ancestors, Cardinal Newman, upholds. Newman's ideas of religiom are, as may be expected, in complete harmony with his ideas of God; consequently when he says, "By Religion, I mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties towards Him,"[7] we know that to Newman, religion is inconceivable without a supernatural being at its center -- a supernatural being that the laws of nature cannot explain.

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6. Maritain, op. cit., p. 12. It is this view of religion which, on the whole, the "modern temper" (like Arnold's) rejects. Arnold, however, in rejecting the supernatural, wanted to retain, as we shall see, religious values under the category of culture: an aspiration, which in the name of science, is still being championed today. "...we want a religion," says Sellars, "of present use, a religion not concerned with mythological objects and hypothetical statutes of existence but with the tasks and needs of human beings in society. Will not the next step in religion be the relinquishment of the supernatural and the active appreciation of virtues and values." (Sellars, op. cit., p. 11.) On the other hand, the scientific temper has often meant the entire rejection of religion and the prediction of its disappearance. Freud considered religion "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity." (Freud, op. cit., p. 76.) "According to this conception," he adds, "one might prophesy that abandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth, and that we are just now in the middle of this phase of development. (Loc. cit.) Arnold, as a prophet, predicted on the side of Sellars rather than on the side of such extremists as Maritain and Freud. But in so doing, he compromised, from the point of view of a Maritain, the very principles of religion which he wished to preserve.
7. Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 389.

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Further, the source or fountain from which the religious experience springs or receives its impetus is not for Newman "feeling" or "sentiment." He criticises those who maintain that religion is not "objective," that it is "subjective, in doctrine."[8] "The religious world," he adds censoriously, "as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that Religion consists, not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment."[9] What is important is that our lives be in conformity with the principles superadded to our nature."[10] The folly of resting our conduct or religion upon nature is that nature cannot rise above itself, and what is true of nature would also be true of man, if he is conceived as exclusively the product of nature and of nothing else. Therefore Newman maintains: "Man cannot lift himself up; he must look above for help."[11]

In his conception of religion, as in his conception of God, Newman seeks to strengthen the justification for the ancient principles. He endeavors to withstand the pressure of the times, for his God represents changeless truth, discovered and revealed once and for all time. Newman remains loyal not only to the ancient principles but also to the traditional forms in which the principles are clothed. On the other hand, Carlyle who, as we have seen,

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8. Newman, Idea of a University, p. 28.
9. Ibid., p. 27.
10. Newman, "Sermons, Nature and Grace" (Newman Treasury), p. 166.
11. Ibid., p. 168.

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endeavored to naturalize the supernatural, scorns the outward forms of religion. He is thus in harmony with the critical and sceptical impulse of his age. He says:

> "...first must the dead Letter of Religion own itself dead, and drop piecemeal into dust if the living Spirit of Religion freed from this its charnel-house, is to arise on us, new-born of Heaven, and with new healing under its wings." 12

Carlyle, it is evident, wants to dispose of the "Church-Clothes" so that the "Religious Principle" could operate unencumbered.[13] At another place he will express his scorn at those who seek a "New Religion,"[14] but in the main his Religious Principle is not supernatural, but natural.

Carlyle, however, would agree with Newman that religion is not made up of doubts: "...our religion," he says, "is not yet a horrible restless doubt, still less a far horribler composed cant; but a great heaven-high Unquestionability, encompassing, interpenetrating the whole of life."[15] Carlyle insists again that the essence of religion is its affirmative, unquestioning note:

> "A man's 'religion' consists not of the many things he is in doubt of and tries to believe, but of the few he is assured of, and has no need of effort for believing. HIS RELIGION, whatever it may be, is a discerned fact, and coherent system of discerned facts to him; he stands fronting the worlds and the eternities upon it: to <u>doubt</u> of it is not permissible at all! He must verify or expel his

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12. Carlyle, <u>Sartor Resartus</u>, p. 89.
13. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 162.
14. Carlyle, "Jesuitism," p. 397.
15. Carlyle, <u>Past and Present</u>, p. 66.

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> doubts, convert them into certainty of Yes or No; or they will be the death of his religion." 16

Carlyle, it appears, would substitute his own set of dogmas for those of Newman. Carlyle is not always specific what these dogmas are -- what this "New Religion" is. One knows that whatever it is one should not have any doubts about its nature. But if one accedes to the critical impulse, which Carlyle sometimes champions and sometimes disdains, and inquires into its nature, what he encounters does not even have the concreteness of a dogma. Carlyle's definition of religion, in other words, is practically no more than an ebullition. He says:

> "Religion is not a diseased self-introspection, an agonizing inquiry...Religion lies over them [the genuinely religious] like an all embracing heavenly canopy, like an atmosphere and life-element, which is not spoken of, which in all things is presupposed without speech. Is not serene or complete Religion the highest aspect of human nature; as serene Cant or complete No-religion, is the lowest and miserablest?" 17

One gathers that religion, for Carlyle, is charged with elemental emotion, though he does characterize it as the "highest aspect of human nature"; but in general he creates the impression that religion is a rudimentary, protean force, and not a supernatural, restrictive force as it is for Newman.

Even when Carlyle speaks of religion in terms of duty, he does not escape mystification. When, for instance,

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16. Carlyle, "Jesuitism," p. 397.
17. Carlyle, Past and Present, p. 60.

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he says that religion is "the thing a man does practically lay to heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to the mysterious universe, and his duty and destiny there,"[18] one is left in the dark regarding two important questions: first, what one's vital relations to the universe are; second, what one's duty toward the universe is (to say nothing of his destiny there). Obviously, there is a difference between the moral and spiritual force that a systematic religion like Newman's can exercise upon one's emotions and the moral force that supposedly the "mysterious universe" can exercise upon one. Carlyle continues to inform us that religion is "the manner ...in which" one feels oneself "to be spiritually related to the Unseen World or to the World."[19] But again he speaks in terms of intangibles, compared to the concreteness of a Newman, for while a spiritual force is a definite manifestation of a well-delineated God for Newman, for Carlyle it is God. Again, the supernatural, in the sense of a power above nature, Carlyle eliminates and substitutes for it a subjective urge or spiritual thirst.

Carlyle's treatment of religion, however, may be said to waver between a dreamy emotional mysticism and a hard, empirical Stoicism. Religion is not only aspiration, aching and thirst for the infinite; it is also

18. Carlyle, Heroes and Hero Worship, p. 236.
19. Loc. cit.

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work, resignation, Stoic acquiescence in the task at hand. From such acquiescence, presumably, one is to secure the elevated satisfactions customarily derived from religion:

> "'Religion,' I said; 'for properly speaking, all true Work is Religion: and whatsoever Religion is not Work may go and dwell among the Brahmins, Antinomians, Spinning Dervishes, or where it will; with me it shall have no harbor. Admirable was that of the old Monks, 'Laborare est Orare,' Work is Worship.'" 20

Carlyle's doctrine thus expressed has two weaknesses: first, it makes spiritual what is by nature physical; second, it provides a physical substitute for spiritual effort. Although pushed to its logical conclusion, this doctrine, it may be said, signifies that the spiritual quality inheres in the attitude that one may have toward one's work rather than in the work itself, Carlyle evidently intends that both should be considered spiritual.[20a] In making physical work spiritual, Carlyle is not only dissolving dualism as a fact of existence, but also he is suggesting that one's spiritual goals may be achieved by material means rather than by spiritual means. The second deficiency

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20. Carlyle, Past and Present, p. 194.

20a. I note that Trilling agrees essentially with my interpretation. He considers that Carlyle's attitude toward work is Calvinistic, and he defines this attitude in the following terms: "A man's work is his vocation, his 'calling,' in exactly the same sense that a man is 'called' to a priesthood. Work is a holy thing, a spiritual effort in itself; if a man is successful in his calling it is because of his virtue and as a sign of his grace," Trilling, op. cit., p. 228.

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of his doctrine is that it would tend to make physical sublimation of emotional excess a substitute for restraint and for rectification of the emotions on purely moral grounds. There is a difference surely between working on one's emotions and "working off" one's emotions. The implication of Carlyle's doctrine is that it offers a naturalistic and non-religious solution for innately spiritual and religious problems.

Carlyle's intentions, like Arnold's, are far more innocent than the unsound and often dangerous implications of his words; and it is characteristic of both these men, caught between two conflicting zones of thought, that they committed errors on the side of intellect in which their hearts, accustomed to the ancient traditions, did not share. The following passage illustrates that Carlyle could define the functions of religion in terms that even a Newman might accept:

> "All religion was here to remind us, better or worse, of what we already know better or worse, of the quite infinite difference there is between a good man and a Bad; it bid us love infinitely the one, abhor and avoid infinitely the other, -- strive infinitely to <u>be</u> the one, and not to be the other." 21

Of course, this statement, it should be pointed out, would be acceptable not only to a Newman; it would be acceptable to a Marcus Aurelius and to such a naturalist as Thomas Huxley. The object of this thesis is not to

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21. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 219.

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prove that dualists have a monopoly upon moralistic conceptions. The important question is whether Carlyle's distinction has the merit of comprehending in it the supernatural genesis of the desire to overcome evil. Carlyle's definition, in fact, on analysis, is unsatisfactory for the very reason that it is acceptable either on naturalistic or dualistic grounds. A definition of the functions of religion, to be both complete and incisive, would have to take cognizance of the relation between the worshipper and the supernatural. What that relation is for Carlyle I have already tried to make clear: in the main, it is naturalistic.

Mill, despite his reputation as a rationalist, has an aesthetic attitude toward religion. His tolerant attitude permits him to accept it as poetry -- as the vehicle of "grand conceptions," but it has no supernatural sanctions. He says:

> "Religion and poetry address themselves, at least in one of their aspects, to the same part of the human constitution: they both supply the same want, that of ideal conceptions grander and more beautiful than we see realized in the prose of human life." 22

But beyond this concession on aesthetic or utilitarian grounds Mill does not go. Whereas Arnold defines God as the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, Mill says it is public opinion that makes men act

22. Mill, Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism, p. 103.

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rightly:

> "The effect of religion has been immense in giving a direction to public opinion which has, in many important respects, been wholly determined by it. But without the sanctions superadded by public opinion, its own proper sanctions have never, save in exceptional characters, or in peculiar moods of mind, exercised a very potent influence..." 23

The source of religion is not divine or supernatural; it has its genesis in social pressure or public opinion. Mill makes a distinction, furthermore, between religion as a social force and public opinion as a social force, but evidently religion as a force is subordinate to public opinion. Yet, in the final analysis, he is forced to admit that religion as an influence will survive effects of rational criticism (or naturalism) to discredit it. "...we may well conclude," he says, "that the influences of religion on the character...will remain after rational criticism has done its utmost against the evidences of religion."[24]

"To fix a certain aspect of things by an appropriate phrase," says Leslie Stephen of Arnold, "is the process which corresponds with him to a scientific analysis. But may not this method merely lead to the substitution of one set of prejudices for another; the prejudices say, of the fastidious don for the prejudices of the coarser tradesman?"[25]

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23. Ibid., p. 87.
24. Ibid., p. 255.
25. Leslie Stephen, "Matthew Arnold" (Studies of a Biographer)

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Although Stephen makes this adverse criticism of Arnold, Stephen's views of religion, ironically, are similar in an important respect to those of Arnold; namely, the emphasis of emotion in religion. He does not, however, always side with Arnold. No doubt he had Arnold specifically in mind when he wrote:

> "The logical conclusion to which these thinkers are tending would be, that the emotion, and not the opinion, is of vital consequence; but frankly to accept that conclusion would be to part company with Christianity of the historical kind." 26

No more incisive criticism of Arnold's consideration of religion could be made than this, for as I wish to maintain, a conception of religion based upon emotion is a conception of religion rooted in the flux. Religion so conceived will inevitably give impetus to a set of values that are as volatile as emotion itself. It is for this reason that Stephen can very well say that such a conception runs counter to historical Christianity.

Although Stephen is thus aware that religion must be lodged in something firmer than emotion, yet without conscious contradiction, he maintains that the only salvation of religion is its elevation to an "aesthetic basis." The "modern conception" of religion, he states, is

> "that of a religion raised on a purely

New York, 1898, vol. 2, p. 95.

26. Stephen, Essays on Freethinking, p. 63. Stephen's view, of course, would be just as sound if he had substituted the word "religion" for Christianity.

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> aesthetic basis; accepted, not because it is true, but because it is beautiful. Certain old-fashioned prejudices may oppose its adoption, and yet it would seem that by this path alone we can arrive at that truly Catholic religion, so ardently desired by so many sects." 27

Ordinarily an aesthetic attitude toward religion is the logical outcome of belief in emotion as the basis of values rather than in ideas or intellectual conceptions as their basis. Critically Stephen perceives that religion has an unsure foundation if it rests on emotion, but his naturalism, as we have seen, forces him into an agnostic position. Unable to reject religion entirely, he accepts it -- or favors its acceptance -- on aesthetic grounds, not perceiving that such acceptance discredits his view that religion must have more than an emotional basis, even when that basis, one must add, is aesthetic.

The aesthetics of Stephen is further evident in his advocacy that religion become a branch of poetry. He says:

> "Whatever the differences in dogmas and creeds are, you avoid conflicts of opinion by placing them in the sphere of poetry instead of history. This view once boldly accepted, controversies may disappear as simply inapplicable, and we

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27. Ibid., p. 64. The weakness and deficiency of an aesthetic religion are inherent in the very denotation of the word: "The word 'aesthetic'...came from a matrix of general ideas, ancient Greece: in its original form it made a sharp distinction between thought and feeling..."; between "things perceptible by the senses, things material as opposed to things thinkable and immaterial." William Gaunt, The Aesthetic Adventure, London, 1945, p. 13.

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> are on the road to the eclectic faith, combining all that is lovely in the creeds of all persuasions." 28

One must observe that "truth" is not, for Stephen, an important element in religion -- not that poetry in its highest reaches does not express the truth; but Stephen has in mind the aesthetic aspects of poetry rather than the ethical. As he says: "Religion, to retain its vitality, must sanctify the ordinary passions of men, and not fruitlessly aim at their extirpation." [29] "Extirpation" of the passions, as we have observed, is the ultimate objective of the dualistic process, so that it follows that Stephen's eclectic conception of religion is naturalistic, since it rules out dualistic self-control having a supernatural sanction.

A man who dissented from traditional faiths and interpretations and yet did not accept aestheticism or emotionalism as a substitute is Anthony Froude. [30] His point of view serves not only as a rebuttal to Stephen's views (which are not wholly consistent, as he himself, as we

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28. Stephen, Essays in Freethinking, p. 67.
29. Ibid., p. 166.
30. Froude's antinomianism in regard to traditional interpretations of religion is seen in the following passage: "I believe that we may find in the Bible the highest and purest religion...most of all in the history of Him in whose name we are called. His religion -- not the Christian religion but the religion of Christ -- the poor man's gospel; the message of forgiveness, of reconciliation, of love; and oh, how gladly would I spend my life, in season and out of season, in preaching this!" Froude, op. cit., p. 18.

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have seen, is aware of the impotence of religion once it has made emotion its base) but also as an answer to Arnold who, like Stephen, defines religion in terms of emotion. Referring to himself, Froude says:

> "His conscience was satisfied with what he had done. Unsteady as it was, and without the support which a strongly believed religious faith had once provided for it, he experienced at last what so long he had denied, that to attempt to separate morality from religion is madness; that religion reduced to a sentiment resting on internal emotion, is like a dissolving view, which will change its image as the passions shift their focal distances; that unrealized in some constant external form, obeying inclination, not controlling it, it is but a dreamy fanthom of painted shadow, and vanishes before temptation as the bright colours fade from the earth when a storm covers the sun." 31

It is true that Arnold, as we shall see, does not divorce morality from religion, but he does reduce religion "to a sentiment resting only on internal emotion." Froude intimates, further, the danger of such an emphasis in the following passage:

> "...there is no conduct to which these vague emotions will not descend to adapt themselves, and which they will not varnish unto loveliness. If there be one prayer which, morning, noon and night, one and all of us should send up to God, it is, 'Save us from our hearts!'" 32

A religion that thus seeks propulsion from the heart and the emotions will evolve relativistic standards of conduct. Morality, issuing from religion, is subject to the same instability. It is at this point that Arnold's

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31. Ibid., p. 180.
32. Ibid., p. 181.

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views of religion may be best brought into focus:

> "The sea of faith
> Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
> Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd;
> But now I only hear
> Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
> Retreating to the breath
> Of the night-wind down the vast edges drear
> And naked shingles of the world." 33

The dissolution of faith impelled Arnold to evolve a new conception of religion, though not a new creed, for he says again:

> "The force which is shaping the future is... neither...with any of the neo-religious developments...They give to what they call religion, and to religious ideas and discussions too large and absorbing a place in human life; man feels himself to be a more various and richly endowed animal than the old religious theory of human life allowed, and he is endeavouring to give satisfaction to the long suppressed and still imperfectly-understood instincts of this varied nature." 34

Arnold felt that both the old and new religions were "crabbed"; they hindered rather than helped the all around development of man. The set of ideas which Arnold evolves as a substitute for religion goes by the name of "culture," but nevertheless he has much of significance to say about religion -- and what he says is pertinent to our purpose because it brings to light Arnold's inconsistency in favoring a point of view which runs counter to the dualism which he frequently expresses.

In evolving a conception both of God and religion

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33. "Dover Beach," 21-28.
34. Letters, vol. 2, p. 220.

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in terms of naturalism, Arnold, as I have suggested, was sensitive to the pressure of his times. He felt that the supernatural was going and he was critical of those who did not have the foresight, who were too sluggish and provincial to perceive that it was going. As he said:

> "Events and personages succeed one another, but the central fact of the situation always remains for me this: that whereas the basis of things amidst all chance and change has ever in Europe generally been for ever so long supernatural Christianity, and far more so in England than in Europe generally, this basis is certainly going -- going amidst the full consciousness of the continentals that it is going, and amidst the provincial unconsciousness of the English that it is going." 35

So Arnold set about to naturalise religion because he felt that the supernatural on which it was based could not be verified by experience -- because belief in the supernatural was no longer tenable in the light of a new age. This effort he undertook, evidently oblivious of his oft repeated animadversions against the natural and his, as I have shown, support of the doctrine of the two selves.

The experience, it must be emphasized, to which Arnold goes for verification of his views and interpretations is something quite different from what it was for Newman. Experience for Newman could be metaphysical; it could be supernatural; it could be with God who sits above

35. Ibid., p. 234.

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nature and rules and governs the universe. Arnold, borrowing from naturalistic methodology, demanded "experimental proof" for religious conclusions. He says:

> "...the grandeur of Christianity and the imposing and impressive attestation of it, if we could but worthily bring the thing out, is here: in that immense experimental proof of the necessity of it, which the whole course of the world has steadily accumulated, and indicates to us as still continuing and extending. Men will not admit assumptions, the popular legend they call a fairy-tale, the metaphysical demonstrations do not demonstrate, nothing but experimental proof will go down; and here is an experimental proof which never fails, and which at the same time is infinitely grander, by the vastness of its scale, the scope of its duration, the gravity of its results, than the machinery of the popular fairy-tale." 36

The proof, it is evident, which Arnold required was not of the "test tube" variety, but neither was it of a mystical or extra-sensory sort. He was critical of the fabulous and fairy-tale aspects of Christianity; what he wanted was a fool-proof Christianity which could be attested to by the common and rational desires of life. To him, evidently, the necessity for a thing was evidence of its truthfulness: a form of arriving at a conclusion which is especially dubious from the standpoint of naturalism. Nevertheless Arnold emphasizes experience[37] -- non-metaphysical experience -- as a means of arriving at the truth

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36. Literature and Dogma, p. 335.
37. "I believe," he says, "that the power of religion does of nature belong, in a unique way, to the Bible and to Christianity, and that it is no pedantry of sect which affirms this, but experience." St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 216.

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of Christianity and religion.

The fact that Arnold could furnish a corrective to this emphasis upon provable experience by the addition of the word "moral" does not alter the fact that his conception of experience is steeped in naturalism. When, for instance, he maintains that Israel's "religious greatness is just this, that he does not found religion on metaphysics, but on moral experience,"[38] he is taking a naturalistic stand, since, logically, in opposing metaphysics he is opposing supernaturalism and favoring naturalism. The moral experience, therefore, which he favors falls within a monistic pattern, though the vestiges of the supernatural cling to it.

Genuine dualism, as we have seen, is a conflict between the emotions on one hand and a contrary force on the other. The force that encounters the emotions in a spiritual struggle is a will that emanates from God; if it is not the supernatural will itself, it is a power that receives its force and strength from God. In the final analysis this force is objective and is not to be identified with a subjective element of the individual personality. This is to say that a soul which a human being has is not emotional but something else besides and cannot be defined or described in terms of our own senses. Now if God is supernatural a religious experience in its consummate

38. Literature and Dogma, p. 109.

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state would also be supernatural, for it is given to a human being, dualistically constituted, to engage the affection and attention of God by rising to a supernatural plane. A religious experience, it follows further, could begin in the senses or the emotions but if it ended with them, if it did not transcend them, it would not be a religious experience of the highest order.[39] It follows,

39. Regarding Arnold's definition of religion and his undue emphasis upon the role of emotion in religion, Irving Babbitt says: "If we wish to define religion adequately, we need to ascertain what is central in it. This central virtue seems to have been overlooked by Matthew Arnold in a definition of religion that has at least the merit of being experimental: 'Religion is,' he says, 'morality touched by emotion.' Though religion normally leads through morality and, at least in its earliest stages, is very much mixed up with emotion, the final emphasis, if we are to believe the great religious leaders themselves, is elsewhere." (Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 160.)

Defining the role of emotion for the Buddhist, Babbitt again shows that emotion may be at the beginning of religious experience, but not at the end: "For the Buddhist, emotion, like morality, lies in the way to religion; but as one approaches the goal one enters, as I have said, into a different element -- an element of unalloyed calm." Babbitt, "Buddha and the Occident," p. 101.)

Comparing the role of emotion in both Christianity and Buddhism, Babbitt further shows that what we have in both religions at the end is a state devoid of emotion and that for that reason Arnold's definition of religion is "infelicitous": "The truth is, that though Christianity from the start was more emotional in its temper than Buddhism, and though an element of nostalgia entered into it from an early period, it is at one in its final emphasis with the older religion. In both faiths this emphasis is on the peace that passeth understanding.

"Matthew Arnold is therefore infelicitous from both a Christian and a Buddhist point of view in defining religion merely as morality touched with emotion." (Ibid., p. 99.)

Barry Cerf sustains Babbitt regarding the relation of emotion to religion: "...religion in its final

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again, that when Arnold says, "Religion, we know, arises when moral ideas are touched with emotion,"[40] he is ignoring, or wilfully excluding, the supernatural origin and goal of religion, that he is reducing religion to a naturalistic experience from which God, as a supernatural power is omitted.

When he is thinking in naturalistic terms, it might be said in defense of Arnold, he is not centrally interested in the genesis of the religious experience, in its initial stimulus -- or in how a person becomes religious. Of primary importance is whether a person is religious. The test, Arnold says, is in the amount of emotion a person has:

> "...for us now, religion is, we say, morality touched with emotion, lit up and enkindled and made much more powerful by emotion. And when morality is thus touched with emotion, it is equally religion, whether it have proceeded from

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analysis...is a state of mind which enables man by the exercise of supersensuous faculties to arrive at the spiritual peace by virtue of which he may escape the oppressive sensation of the transitoriness of human things and perceive the unchanging, the eternal." (Barry Cerf, "Wordsworth's Gospel of Nature," PMLA (December, 1922), vol. 37, p. 618.)

Finally, R. H. Hutton criticises Arnold "for translating "St. Paul's motive power into 'the elemental power of sympathy and emotion in us.'" Hutton adds: "I can find no trace at all in St. Paul's writings that he ascribed the great change of spirit he demanded to 'the elemental power of sympathy and emotion...St. Paul's language is, as far as I know, always the same, always cast in the mystical, never in the emotional form..." R. H. Hutton,"Mr. Arnold on St. Paul and His Creed," Contemporary Review (June, 1870), vol. 14, pp. 336-337.

40. God and the Bible, p. 131.

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> a magnified and non-natural man in the clouds, or arisen in the way we supposed. And those in whom it appears thus touched with emotion most, are those whom we call endued with most bent for religion, most feeling, most apprehension..." 41

Thus Arnold deals with religion quantitatively, in terms of its empirical effects. If anyone deludes himself with thinking that religion derives from a "magnified non-natural man in the clouds," no matter, so long as he has the right quantity of emotion. This is indeed a tolerant view; but it makes more of a naturalist out of Arnold, and not less. It enforces Arnold's naturalism because it confines religion more than ever to the sphere of the incessant flux, or phenomenal nature, because, as we observed both in Stephen and Anthony Froude, to rest religion on "internal emotion" is to give it a volatile and unstable base.

Significant, too, is that for Arnold religion is not an independent system of ethics informed by the spirit of God, but that it is a moral appendage: that it serves a secondary role, if not a subordinate role, to morality.[42] Morality,

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41. Loc. cit.
42. For Thomas Arnold religion was morality, but it was a sovereign system motivated by God, and not by an emotion: "...meaning by Religion what the Gospel teaches one to mean by it, it is nothing more or less than a system directing and influencing our conduct, principles and feelings, and professing to do this work with sovereign authority, and most efficaious influence." (The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, vol. 2, p. 77.) H. W. Garrod maintains (as I do) that Arnold in his definition of religion as morality touched by emotion contradicts himself and also gives a wrong conception of Christianity: "That definition brings Matthew Arnold again into conflict not only with the Christianity of Christ, but also with his own conception of Christianity. The Christ who sat

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apparently, has an anterior existence to religion, religion which has come into being to serve as a light to morality. "...morality," says Arnold, "represents for everybody a thoroughly definite and ascertained idea: the idea of human conduct, regulated in a certain manner."[43] But moral rules by themselves are inadequate. They lack warmth; they lack emotion -- especially for ordinary people. They may do for the sage who can live by impersonal law, but for the common man they must be given an emotional glow. As Arnold says:

> "...moral rules, apprehended as ideas first, and then rigorously followed as laws, are and must be, for the sage only. The mass of mankind have neither force of intellect enough to apprehend them clearly as ideas, nor force of character enough to follow them strictly as laws. The mass of mankind can be carried along a course full of hardship for the natural man, can be borne over a thousand impediments of the narrow way, only by the tide of a joyful and boundless emotion." 44

It is at this stage, when light and warmth are needed, that religion, according to Arnold, steps in to play its principal role. He says:

> "The paramount virtue of religion is, that it has lighted up morality; that it has supplied the emotion and inspiration needful for carry-

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down to eat with the sinners knew very well that religion only begins where morality ends: that the essence of religion is just this, that it lifts us above morality, out of the moral judgment both of ourselves and others." H. W. Garrod, "Theology of Matthew Arnold," Living Age (February 5, 1910), vol. 264. p. 355.

43. Literature and Dogma, p. 10.
44. Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 346.

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> ing the sage along the narrow way perfectly, for carrying the ordinary man along it at all. Even the religions with most dross in them have had something of this virtue..." 45

And still, at another place, Arnold says:

> "The very power of religion, as we have seen, lies in its bringing emotion to bear on our rules of conduct, and thus making us care for them so much, consider them so reverentially, that we surmount the great practical difficulty of acting in obedience to them, and follow them heartily and easily." 46

It is thus seen that religion, far from being an awareness of the supreme greatness of God, a constant devotion to and adoration of Him which find expression in a system of righteousness that has its mainspring in supernatural dualism,is at best an emotional stimulant for a rational ethics.

To Arnold, further, there is no distinction between ethics and religion. He himself raises the question of their relation and answers it in the following way:

> "But is there, therefore, no difference between what is ethical, or morality, and religion? There is a difference; a difference of degree. Religion, if we follow the intention of human thought and human language in the use of the word, is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling; the passage from morality to religion is made when to morality is applied emotion. And the true meaning of religion is thus not simply morality but morality touched by emotion. And this new elevation and inspiration of morality is well marked by the word 'righteousness." Conduct is the word of common life, morality is

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45. Loc. cit.
46. Literature and Dogma, p. 74.

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> the word of philosophical disquisition, righteousness the word of religion." 47

Ordinarily the difference between the ethical and religious is that the religious is indistinct from the supernatural, whereas the ethical -- at least in one significant respect -- may be used to describe a sphere of practical conduct that is not immediately identical with the supernatural. But to Arnold both the religious and the ethical are practical and empirical, the difference between them being only one of degree. Arnold thus succeeds in bringing religion "down to earth," but his success is not without sacrifice of the supernatural. He says:

> "Religion...means simply either a binding to righteousness, or else a serious attending to righteousness and dwelling upon it. Which of these two it most nearly means, depends upon the view we take of the word's derivation; but it means one of them, and they are really much the same. And the antithesis between ethical and religious is quite a false one. Ethical means practical, it relates to practice or conduct passing into habit or disposition. Religious also means practical, but practical in a still higher degree; and the right antithesis to both ethical and religious, is the same as the right antithesis to practical; namely, theoretical. 48

This line of reasoning results not only in the removal of the vital connotations of the word religious, but also in the disappearance of God as the author and self-sufficient source of religion. What Arnold gives

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47. Ibid., p. 18.
48. Ibid., p. 17.

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us, then, is a monistic theory of ethics, to the total exclusion, at least for the time being, of dualism as a consideration.

Not only does Arnold remove the ultimate distinction between ethical and religious, but he also removes it between "natural" and "revealed." Revealed religion is natural religion. The difference between revealed and natural is, again, only one of degree, not of kind. This is tantamount to eliminating the difference between the supernatural or the natural -- or of erasing dualism as a fact of life. Arnold says:

> "...let us anticipate the objection that the religion here spoken of is but natural religion, by pointing out the falseness of the common antithesis, also, between natural and revealed. We awake to the consciousness of it, we are aware of it coming forth in our mind; but we feel that we did not make it, that it is discovered to us, that it is what it is whether we will or no. If we are too little concerned about it, we say it is natural; if much, we say it is revealed. But the difference between the two is not one of kind, only of degree. The real antithesis, to natural and revealed alike is invented, artificial." 49

Arnold's avowal, then, is to naturalize religion -- and with it goes a confession of faith -- faith that Christianity can only survive on the basis of naturalism: "I believe that Christianity will survive because of its natural truth." 50 If Christianity is to survive because of its naturalism, then dualism will perish because of its

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49. Ibid., p. 49.
50. St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 177.

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supernaturalism. Arnold is thus undermining his own favorite doctrine, the doctrine which, as Stuart Pratt Sherman has stated, permeates Arnold's entire philosophy -- and a doctrine which Arnold perhaps as much as any figure in history has lent his eloquent voice to support.

Although Arnold asserts that Christianity has natural truth, when he is laboring to establish the tenability of dualism, he maintains the opposite. For instance, he will say: "No doubt it [the indulgence of our natural selves] is natural; to indulge our ordinary self is the most natural thing in the world. But Christianity is not natural..."[51] Between saying that a thing is "natural" and that a thing has "natural truth" there is no basic difference, for, logically, what is not natural could not have natural truth. Yet Arnold says at one time that Christianity is not natural and at another time that it is natural -- or what amounts to the same thing -- that Christianity has natural truth. This is another instance of Arnold's looseness of terminology -- or of his inconsistency.

In examining the ideas of Stephen we have seen that there is a connection between a belief in emotion as the basis of religion and in the aesthetic value of religion. Stephen commits the inconsistency of criticising men like Arnold who would base religion on emotion and himself serving as an apologist for religion on the basis

59. Ibid., p. xxix.

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of its aesthetic value. Whatever inconsistencies Arnold commits this is one of which he is innocent, for in keeping with his emphasis of emotion as the basis of religion, he expresses the theory that the origin of religion is aesthetic. He says:

> "From the older religions were handed on ceremonial and rite, which have, in truth, their proper origin, not in the moral stirrings of man's nature at all, but in the stirrings which we call aesthetic." 52

Moreover, when Arnold does have words of praise for traditional religion, for the frozen and rigid dogmas, it is the aesthetic aspect which appeals to him, for rigid as they are, at least they give warmth and beauty. In a letter to Clough he says:

> "If one loved what was beautiful and interesting in itself passionately enough, one would produce what was excellent without troubling oneself with religious dogmas at all. As it is, we are warm only when dealing with these last -- and what is frigid is always bad. I would have others -- most others stick to the old religious dogmas because I sincerely feel that this warmth is the great blessing, and this frigidity the great curse -- and on the old religious road they have still the best chance of getting the one and avoiding the other." 53

The aesthetic values of life thus, for Arnold (despite his famous three-fourths one-fourth ratio), often take precedence over the ethical or the religious. When it comes to the matter of poetry and religion, Arnold is unambiguous in giving first place to poetry. He says:

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52. God and the Bible, p. 118.
53. Lowry, op. cit., p. 143.

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> "...Wordsworth finely and truly calls poetry 'the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge'; our religion, parading evidences such as those in which the popular mind relies now; our philosophy, pluming itself on its reasonings about causation and finite and infinite being; what are they but the shadows and dreams and false shows of knowledge? The day will come when we shall wonder at ourselves for having trusted to them, for having taken them seriously; and the more we perceive their hollowness, the more we shall prize 'the breath and finer spirit of knowledge' offered to us by poetry." 54

At another place Arnold is still more emphatic in subordinating poetry to religion. He says:

> "The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry where it is worthy of its highest destinies, our race as time goes on, will find an ever surer stay: There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialized itself in the fact, in the supposed fact, and the fact is failing it. But for poetry the idea is everything; the rest is a world of illusion. Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact. The strongest part of our religion is its unconscious poetry." 55

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54. Essays in Criticism, Second Series, p. 3.

55. Ibid., First Series, p. 1. The problem of the relation of poetry to religion has arrested the attention of critics from the time of Plato. Few of these critics, however, give the palm to poetry. The consensus is that poetry delights while teaching, or teaches while delighting.

> "To teach -- to please -- comprise the poet's views,
> Or else at once to profit and amuse,"

said Horace, and his voice was echoed by many a critic. The divorce of poetry from religion, the attempt to make poetry self-sufficient from an ethical point of view, is essentially a nineteenth century enterprize, regarding which Jacques Maritain observes: "The attempt of the nineteenth century to prescribe spiritual ideals in literature and ethics, while refusing to admit the objective existence of a spiritual order has ended in failure, and today we have to choose between the complete expulsion of the spiritual ele-

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It should be observed that although Arnold characteristically emphasizes idea or subject-matter as basic in poetry, yet he does not fail to attach "emotion to the idea." Such cohesion between the two is tenable enough for poetry and perhaps for religion, if one does not reduce religion itself to the role of handmaiden to poetry. The significant disciplinary connotations of religion are thus banished -- and the higher element of dualism dis-

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ment from human life or its recognition as the very foundation of reality." (Maritain, op. cit., p. xxv.)

In connection, specifically, with Arnold's giving to poetry a preeminence over religion, Irving Babbitt says: "Inasmuch as high seriousness of substance and the grand style coexist only in the best poets, Arnold is led to set up the best poetry as a substitute for philosophy and religion; to proclaim that what is best in philosophy and religion is their unconscious poetry. Various correctives to statements of this kind may be supplied from Arnold himself, yet even so, this remains his most dubious side. One may affirm that the man of today will be more aided in his struggle towards standards by the study of Aristotle (perhaps the most modern of the Ancients) especially of the 'Ethics' and 'Politics,' than by reading Homer, the chief of poets; and one may at the same time refuse to go to the opposite extreme with Plato and indict Homer for his lack of religious seriousness. Yet Aristotle's excellence of substance, so far from being associated with the grand style, is associated with something that attimes comes perilously near jargon." (Irving Babbitt, "Matthew Arnold," The Nation (August 2, 1917), vol. 105, p. 118.) In a way, Babbitt's position, on analysis, is not too far removed from Arnold's which he criticises, and is quite some distance from Maritain's. Babbitt, like Arnold, is failing to make a distinction between ethics and religion, a failure of which Maritain is not guilty. Even philosophy does not perform the office of religion, for in the final analysis, religion has behind it what neither poetry nor philosophy has, a supernatural authority. What poetry and philosophy have to offer, consequently, in lieu of it, in terms of ethics and morality, is futile and negligible.

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solved into an aesthetic mist.

Arnold continues to degrade religion to a subordinate role in his treatment of culture. First he will favorably observe that "the culture of which" he has been talking is "an endeavour to come at the reason and the will of God by means of reading, observing, and thinking..." [56] Then he will again make a favorable comparison between religion and culture as follows:

> "And religion, the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself, -- religion, that voice of the deepest human experience, -- does not only enjoin and sanction the aim which is the great aim of culture, the aim of setting ourselves to ascertain what perfection is and to make it prevail; but also, in determining generally in what human perfection consists, religion comes to a conclusion identical with that which culture, -- culture seeking the determination of this question through all the voices of human experience which have been heard upon it, of art, science, poetry, philosophy history, as well as religion, in order to give a greater fulness and certainty to its solution, -- likewise reaches. Religion says: The kingdom of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition; in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality. It places it in the ever-increasing efficacy and in the general harmonious expansion of those gifts of thought and feeling, which make the peculiar dignity, wealth, and happiness of human nature. As I have said on a former occasion: 'It is in making endless expansions of its powers, in endless growth in wisdom and beauty, that the spirit of the human race finds its ideal. To reach this ideal culture is an indispensable aid, and that is the true value of culture.' Not a having and a resting, but a growing and

56. Culture and Anarchy, p. 60.

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> a becoming, is the character of perfection as culture conceives it; and here, too, it coincides with religion." 57

There are two points in the passage just quoted which deserve special consideration: first, Arnold's belief in the supernatural is manifest; second, culture is an aid to religion and thus subordinate to it. That Arnold defers to a supernatural God and so subscribes to a genuine dualism[58] is one of the major contentions of this thesis. It is also a contention of this thesis that his devotion to a supernatural God is not consistent and that he often defines a God rooted in phenomenal nature. The second point, namely, the subordination of culture to religion, if not their identification, Arnold indubitably makes, but again he is not always consistent as the following passage illustrates:

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57. Ibid., p. 10.

58. T. S. Eliot observes: "In Culture and Anarchy, which is probably his greatest book, we hear something said about 'the will of God,' but the 'will of God' seems to become superseded in importance by 'our best self, or right reason, to which we want to give authority'; and this best self looks very much like Matthew Arnold slightly disguised." (Eliot, "Francis Herbert Bradley," p. 56.) This is a cruel criticism which Arnold hardly merits. I have tried to show that Arnold is inconsistent and spiritually unresolved, but I would not go the length that T. S. Eliot goes in accusing Arnold of setting up an egotistical self-regarding self as a substitute for what lies above our lower natures. The fact is that Arnold had a genuine religious disposition whatever his failings were on the side of logic, depth, and consistency. As Helen White remarks: Arnold "was one of the most spiritual-tempered men of the nineteenth century; there have been few men in any age to whom the spiritual experiences of the race was a greater reality..." (White, op. cit., p. 59.) It was this religious temper which was responsible for his professing, as T. S. Eliot indicates, a belief in a "will of God," but it was not

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> "...perfection, -- as culture from a thorough disinterested study of human nature and human experience learns to conceive it, -- is a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest. Here culture goes beyond religion, as religion is generally conceived by us." 59

In other words, for Arnold culture and religion coincide up to a certain point. Up to that certain point culture is even subordinate to religion, but beyond that point culture will not go. That point is "perfection" or completeness. As Arnold says: "...to the worth and grandeur of the religious side in man, culture is rejoiced and willing to pay any tribute, except the tribute of man's totality."[60] This is to affirm that culture is more complete than religion and so to place religion in a subordinate position.[61] The deficiency of Arnold's view is that

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strong enough apparently to enable him to withstand the naturalistic pressure of his time.

59. Culture and Anarchy, p. 12.
60. Ibid., p. xxxvii.
61. T. S. Eliot's remark is here germane: "The total effect of Arnold's philosophy is to set up Culture in the place of Religion, and to leave Religion to be laid waste by the anarchy of feeling. And Culture is a term which each man not only may interpret as he pleases, but must interpret as he can." (T. S. Eliot, "Arnold and Pater," Bookman (September, 1930), vol. 72, p. 4.) The deficiency of Arnold's point of view is further indicated by Maritain who is in essential agreement with Eliot. "It is important...to realize fully," Maritain says, "that culture or civilization by its very nature belongs to the temporal sphere, in other words has a specifying object -- the terrestial and perishable good of our life on this earth -- the subject matter of which is of the natural order. It must doubtless be subordinated to eternal life as an intermediate end is subordinated to the ultimate end." (Maritain, op. cit., p. 7.) For Henry Sidgwick

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he here offers a questionable interpretation of life, for if religion is subordinate to culture so must God be, and what is presented is a formula for life completely separated from a genuine supernatural authority. The second deficiency, related to the first, is that Arnold's conception of dualism -- the "doctrine of the two selves" -- is not wholly compatible with the conception of culture. Dualism deliberately calls for "one-sidedness," the one-sidedness that Arnold frequently describes as the "best self." Religion is one-sided inasmuch as it is wholly on the side of good and wholly and consistently not on the side of evil. Arnold has not resolved the differences between the conception of dualism on the one hand, and the conception of culture on the other. When Arnold expresses his opposition to the "sacrifice" of "all other sides of our being to the religious side,"[62] whether he is aware of it or not, he is contradicting the dualistic position which he perhaps more than any other figure of the nineteenth century champions.

Arnold's culture was but a "refined eudaemonism." (Sidgwick, op. cit., p. 273.) Sidgwick sums up Arnold's limitations as follows: "He does not deal adequately with ultimate questions; he says nothing of the indefinite but inevitable questions about the world and human destiny, nor admit the eternal metaphysical problems..." (Ibid., p. 275.) All of which signifies that Arnold was most indecisive and unsatisfying at those moments of intellectual and spiritual experience when vision and insight are most needed.

62. Culture and Anarchy, p. xviii.

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CONCLUSION

Arnold has been criticised, as we observed in the beginning of this chapter, for dissolving supernatural religion. Evidence has been presented to support that statement. He conceived of religion as the true product of nature, but he was not always consistent on that point. For Newman God is central in a definition of religion; he is critical of a definition of religion, such as Arnold's, in which feeling or emotion are basic. Newman considers that resting our conduct or religion upon nature is fallacious and foolish. Carlyle is anti-traditional in his conception of religion. His "religious principle" is naturalistic, though anti-mechanical. Religion for Carlyle is variously a canopy, a spiritual thirst, a dreamy mysticism; it is also resignation -- "work." Carlyle makes physical endeavor a substitute for spiritual endeavor. For Carlyle, emotion conceived in terms of religion, is like a tide sweeping over the land; for Arnold, delicate of touch, religion is morality touched with emotion. The word "touched" is significant in defining the difference between Carlyle and Arnold. Mill, rationalist though he was, had a poetic and aesthetic attitude toward religion, a view not incompatible with the more fully developed one of Arnold. Stephen could criticise a man like Arnold for basing religion on emotion and then circle around and serve as an apologist for religion on account of its poetic

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and emotional qualities. Stephen and Arnold are at one in stressing the aesthetic aspect of religion. Anthony Froude felt the dangers of religion that divorced itself from external authority -- that pivoted on emotion or sentiment. His view constitutes a criticism of Arnold's position.

The dissolution of his faith forced Arnold into a new conception of dualism unlike Newman's. Arnold felt that old and new religions were stiff and rigid -- unaesthetic, though with his usual inconsistency he could champion the old dogmas on the basis of their aestheticism. In keeping with the naturalistic temper of his age, Arnold tried to evolve a verifiable religion. The naturalist stressed the experimental method; Arnold adapts it to his own use in evolving a new conception of religion. On the basis of natural experience he disposes of the fabulous and fairy-tale elements of Christianity. Non-metaphysical or natural experience teaches him that religion is an emotional stimulant for morality. Such a view paralyzes his conception of dualism in which the will of God figures as the higher part. A view of religion ultimately resting on emotion is inconsistent with a view of God having a will. Will and emotion are not the same thing. Arnold removes the distinction between "ethical" and "religious," "revealed" and "natural" -- he makes them all empirical -- and so blurs his definition of dualism. For

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Arnold religion is not a system independent of morality but serves as a sort of emotional supplement to religion. The source of religion is not ethical for Arnold, but aesthetic. Such a view results in his giving both poetry and culture a place above religion. In so doing he does not resolve the difference between a culture which stresses "well-roundedness" and a religious dualism that champions self-renunciation, the development of the higher self at the expense of the lower -- a view that Arnold often favors. Arnold's conception of religion is thus at variance with his conception of dualism.

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VII

CONCLUSION

This study was an effort to prove that though Matthew Arnold has an obvious vein of consistency in him he is nevertheless inconsistent in several important respects and that as a consequence of these inconsistencies he failed to achieve a unity and a synthesis of thought.

To prove this contention, this study has taken as a basis for reaching and testing its conclusion the concept and principle of dualism. A man, it argued, could not be at the same time both a dualist and a monist because dualism and monism represent intransigent and diametrically opposed points of view.

Dualism it defined as the philosophy which holds that life is both physical and spiritual and that, on this earthly plane, life is inexplicable wholly in terms of one or the other. A man grows in spiritual stature in proportion to his ability to subdue and overcome his physical self. Conversely, a man sinks to the naturalistic and animal level in proportion to his inability to overcome the daemonic element in him which is as certainly an organic part of him as is his other nature, which, in varying degrees, approximates the divinity of God. True dualism is not a division within nature itself or a conflict between emotions in the

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personality of the individual; in the final analysis it is the conflict between the natural and the supernatural in the heart of the individual. To every individual, it is given as Hamlet clearly implies to be "how like a god!" But it is also given to him to be how like a daemon or a devil. God and the devil are not the same. They are sworn enemies, and on ethical and religious grounds to lessen this fact is dangerous. It follows that, if a man does, intentionally or otherwise, dwarf the distinction which he himself may have urged, he is certainly, to put it mildly, not a consistent and logical thinker.

Just as dualism is a doctrine which would interpret life on the basis of two principles, monism is a doctrine which would do the opposite: explain and interpret it on the basis of one principle. In general there are two classes of monists: those who maintain that all life is explicable in terms of one law -- physical; and those who maintain that all life is explicable in terms of one law -- spiritual. Such "spirituality," however, as the monist knows turns out to be on analysis a mere refinement of the physical. Either class of monist -- and this is the significant fact -- eliminates the vital difference between the natural and the supernatural, an elimination which results in the naturalization of God.

The two "sides" of dualism are represented by various names. In Arnold himself, as Stuart Pratt Sherman aptly

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points out, it goes by the name of the "doctrine of the two selves."

Now this doctrine, or the principle which it embodies, has a long and honored history, since the conflict of good and evil (for in the last analysis that is what dualism is) parallels infinity. It is inconceivable, so holds the man of faith, that there ever was in boundless time a fraction of a second when God did not exist as sovereign, lord, and ruler; and if he always existed in these capacities, there must always have been for Him something or somebody to rule. As Jacques Maritain points out, God always existed independent of nature and there never was a time when man was not subject to His dominion. This is another way of saying that dualism as a fact of history is as eternal as God Himself.

Historically, the doctrine finds expression in the orient, where there has always existed, apparently, the passion to discover and know God. About 1500 B. C. the singers of the Rigveda discovered that there was some connection between overcoming the limitations of matter and knowing God, that somehow the earth itself was a barrier between themselves and heaven. The next step was the discovery that their own senses had to be subjugated if they were to know God within themselves. In fact, they reached the rather advanced conclusion that this world is but a copy of the next, the real world. Early, therefore,

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they made the fundamental distinction between the physical and transient on one side and the spiritual and eternal on the other.

By the time of the Upanishads (approximately a dozen centuries later) God has been translated into the Self; he is not conceived entirely as an external being but rather as a power that lives both without and within. The urge to know this Self was a strong spiritual appetite (practically the only appetite which the oriental permitted himself); and the way to satisfy this appetite was to eliminate all other cravings and desires which stood in the way of Self-Realization. The inducements for such realization were tremendous, for the oriental always had a passion for freedom, and freedom for him meant not the fulfillment of desire but the liberation from it -- and also the promise that as he perfects himself in this world or the next, he would escape what he considered the maximum ordeal: rebirth into this world. Such excessive supernaturalism never appealed to Arnold.

The Bhagavad-Gita (written about two centuries before Christ) expounds further the dualistic theme regarding the difference between the lower self and the higher self, with emphatic protests against the senses for standing in the way of wisdom and spiritual enlightenment and perfection. Men gain knowledge and wisdom by giving themselves over wholly and exclusively to the life

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of the spirit (though these ends cannot be achieved by escaping one's earthly responsibilities which should be met with spiritual detachment). Only by subduing self by the Self can one fulfill oneself, and the technique of such realization is to destroy the "enemy in the form of desire." But this Self exists not only in the consciousness of the individual. It is both a subjective and an objective reality, so that if man were to perish from the earth it would not cease to exist. The lower self, conversely, is all that the higher self is not. It is transitory and temporal; it belongs to the world of nature in which all things either change form or perish. But the higher Self, or God, is immutable. Thus the Bhagavad-Gita constitutes a definition of true dualism.

In the Dhammapada the same emphasis of the conquest of the self by the Self remains, but the Dhammapada does not concern itself so much with the ultimate nature of Self as do the other documents. Desire is considered the source of evil, and all the evils that man suffers he himself has caused by failing to cope with -- or to root out -- his desires. The Dhammapada places supreme emphasis upon thought as a creative power: all that we are is the result of what we have thought. This is not to say that the higher self is purely an intellectual power. It is a moral and religious power -- substantial and eternal and therefore, supernatural. True dualism,

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to reiterate, is the quintessence of Buddhism.

The Bible is patently dualistic, since a belief in the existence of the supernatural is tantamount itself to a definition of dualism. Although the terminology of the "two selves" is not used in the Bible (Arnold nevertheless uses the terms in interpreting the Bible), the conception that man is dual by nature, that he is flesh and that he is spirit, that he is soul and that he is body runs through it. In the Bible the power that is God is more of a personality and less of a principle, however divine, than he is in the oriental specimens of literature examined in this study, but He nevertheless makes himself felt in the conscience of the individual with the same moral and ethical force as he does in oriental literature, though there seems to be, on the whole, a deeper and wider gulf between the lower nature of man and God himself in Biblical literature than in oriental literature. The fact remains that though God retains more of his Selfhood in Biblical literature, such a circumstance does not obviate the basic dualism which exists for the Christian between his lower nature and his higher nature ultimately affiliated with God.

The theme of dualism is prevalent in both Plato and Aristotle, though Plato's conception is far more mystical than is Aristotle's. Socrates too gives ear to a voice that is far from natural. Plato speaks of the "lawless

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beast" in man that must be ruled by a higher principle which manifests itself through the immortal soul. Plato, like the oriental, believes that the soul has had a previous existence, and like the oriental again, he believes that the body is a barrier to truth and wisdom. Aristotle believes that man has a "better part" (corresponding certainly to Arnold's "best self") and that he must be ruled by it.

St. Augustine provides a perfect illustration of a dualist who felt the lines boldly drawn between the daemonic and the divine, though the daemonic presented itself in various disguises, and he recognized that in the hierarchy of moral choices none took precedence over the necessity of discerning the difference between masters and of serving the right master faithfully. For St. Augustine, as for the Christian in general, making this discovery and effecting the subjugation of the daemonic element was not without the charitable aid of God. "Self is the lord of self," said Buddha; so it is for St. Augustine, but St. Augustine will appeal nevertheless to a well-delineated God that sits aloof from the higher self though the divine relationship between God and the soul of man is not to be denied. First and last, however, dualism for St. Augustine is an intensely personal struggle between the flesh and the spirit, between the side in himself that takes him away from God and the side that

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takes him toward God. Such a conflict is the common denominator in the beliefs of all dualists, however variously they have designated the opposing sides -- although the designation of the "two selves" had a particular fascination for Matthew Arnold.

Arnold's dualism begins with the recognition of the two antipodal laws in man -- and so he is in agreement with the master dualists, whether oriental, Greek, or Christian. As Stuart Pratt Sherman ably points out, Arnold believed that the true life of man was not in the senses, that the "spiritual self sits apart, hungering and thirsting for its own felicity, in the perfect absolute, the divine." Unquestionably this constitutes a correct definition of Arnold's dualism -- and sustains the view of Arnold's accord with his spiritual predecessors -- especially the orientals.

Arnold's dualism is not merely a cold abstraction, composed by a rational intelligence, as it may have been with Aristotle. As with St. Augustine, or the anonymous lyricists of the Rigveda, dualism is an experience of his own soul which issues finally in a doctrine (though he does not adhere to this doctrine steadily). He feels the necessity of erecting a barrier against the down-pulling stream of nature -- his own impulses and desires. He sets up self-denial as an ideal, and he warns himself not to be carried away by the lower pleasures of the senses;

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and he makes the statement, almost oriental in its content, that to serve God is freedom and that all else is slavery. He expresses his awareness of the daemonic element that forces one into the darkness and of the necessity of resisting it, of drawing upon an "inward spring" for sustenance and light. And in an hour of pain and irretrievable loss, when "his suffering in the flesh" is most acute, the solution which he offers himself is dualistic: One must not accede to the flesh but rather submit to, and find life in, the will of God.

So Arnold has an agonizing awareness of the debilitating claims of the flesh and the hazards of desire. He perceives that the law which molds the solid earth is one, but that there is another law which guides man in the darkness and that as long as man can set up a light "above the howling senses," heaven is no longer beyond his reach. He perceives, further, that there is a perpetual conflict between passion and the Eternal -- and this again is his dualism.

In his religious criticism Arnold's great premise is that of the "two selves" which he redefines for the nineteenth century, but his declarations are not essentially different from those of Krishna, the hero God of the Bhagavad-Gita, or, for that matter, from Paul Elmer More, a dualist of the twentieth century. Arnold's analysis of the character and soul of Jesus brings him to the conclu-

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sion that Jesus made a distinction between the two selves -- between a "higher and lower self in man." According to Arnold Jesus taught that living by the one brings happiness and that living by the other brings misery. Also, while Arnold converts heaven from a physical kingdom in the empyrean to a psychological or spiritual condition of the soul, he does not do so without deference to God's will -- to a God who has genuine, supersensuous powers.

No where is Arnold's conception of true dualism more in evidence than when he speaks of the prime responsibility laid upon man to "die to himself." The real life for Arnold, as it was for the protagonist of the Bhagavad-Gita, and as Arnold held it to be true of Jesus, was that other life, which began when the senses were subdued. Arnold uses Jesus as an exemplar of this doctrine, Jesus who fulfilled it with perfect success, and enjoins it upon mankind as a corrective for "all the thorns and problems which the exercise of conduct daily offers..." Such a method of self-renunciation (which Arnold calls the "secret of Jesus"), faithfully followed, gives promise of everlasting life.

Arnold has a dualistic conception of brotherly love. One's love for humanity is in proportion to his ability "to transfer the natural love of life from the personal self, -- the self that we share with all other men..." Not as we indulge or "expand" our emotions do we love

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one another, but as we restrain and temper them. The "purging" of the lower self brings men together upon a selfless plane of impersonal love. On a spiritual plane men are united; on a natural plane they are dis-united. In elucidating his conception of universal brotherhood, Arnold is not naturalistic; he is dualistic and religious.

Arnold's idea of the state involves a personal dualism. Arnold does not say that people become better as the state becomes better; his emphasis is upon the reverse of this statement, that the state becomes better as people themselves become better. There is no essential difference, it follows, between Arnold's political views and his religious views. The state, to succeed, must dissuade the individual of all classes from exploiting the lower self and, as an alternative, inspire him toward the strenuous ideal of cultivating his higher or "best self." Arnold's formula, therefore, for a felicitous society involves a strong, personal dualism.

In making a distinction between the higher and lower self, Arnold is vivid and clear; but very often -- and his weakness and inconsistency begin to be apparent -- he falls into the error of the rationalists and naturalists by according to reason a higher place than the master dualists are willing to give it. Reason, they regard as a daemonic, though often vital, element of the flux rather than as an angelic aid to the purposes of God. It is "reason"

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which strikes up rebellions against the Eternal Law, the mysterious and seemingly irrational ways of the supernatural. It is reason which dissolves faith, for faith demands a large measure of credulity, to which reason by nature stands opposed. To associate, therefore, reason with the will of God is to becloud the distinction between what belongs to nature and what belongs to supernature -- and thus to fall into confusion.

The concept of dualism is related to the concept of nature, since dualism is a conflict between nature and supernature or, if one speaks in terms of the individual, between the lower or natural self and higher self which is potentially divine. Arnold's inconsistencies and disunity of thought are most in evidence in his treatment of nature.

Arnold's naturalism, unlike his dualism, is most likely the product of his century, though like his dualism it is not without time-honored and ancient precedent. In Arnold's period, Huxley spoke out unequivocally against dualism and endeavored to dissolve the concept with the acid of scientific criticism. He eliminated dualism by declaring that nature comprehended the totality of experience and all that is. Such an assertion leaves no space in the mind or the conscience for the supernatural -- for what is above nature. Dualism he considered a myth, invented by the uncritical and irrational minds of primitive people

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and savoured and nursed by a sentimental populace not yet trained in the austerities of scientific thinking. He stressed experience as a guide to truth -- an idea which also figures in the mind of Arnold.

Not all naturalists are as mechanical and rational as Huxley, but whether rational, emotional, or "spiritual," they all agree that there are no discontinuities in nature -- a view which is basal in such a thinker as James Martineau. Leslie Stephen, a skeptic, is harshly critical of such religious ideas as self-denial and self-renunciation which flaunt the laws of nature. Mill has a "realistic" attitude toward nature. If anything, he inclines toward the view that nature is malevolent -- and that man's hope lies in the direction of subduing nature, but such efforts as are involved in subduing her are wholly inside the natural pattern.

Carlyle is anti-mechanical and anti-rational; yet he is a naturalist who has eliminated dualism as surely as Huxley and as surely as Mill (although there are occasional passages in Carlyle which divulge his orthodox Christian heritage: passages genuinely dualistic). Essentially, however, the universe exhales the spirit of God for Carlyle. One feels, too, that for him the supernatural is a penetrating power and the universe is so replete with it, all gaps between matter and spirit have been eliminated.

The crowning naturalist of the nineteenth century

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who did so much to create the milieu in which a man like Arnold throve is Wordsworth. To both Wordsworth and Huxley, dissimilar as they are, nature represents totality of existence and unity: all gaps have disappeared -- dualism in particular. But whereas Huxley arrives at his conclusions through reason and analysis Wordsworth reaches his conclusion through feeling and synthesis. Feeling leads Wordsworth into reverence and worship of nature -- to the deification of nature. Similarly, Goethe naturalizes the supernatural (without benefit of mysticism, however) and so eliminates dualism. For Goethe, too, nature is the source of depth and profundity -- the fount from which calm and serenity flow.

Consideration of two figures, Spinoza and Marcus Aurelius, representing the past, completes for the purpose of this study the background of Arnold's naturalism. Both are monists, but whereas Spinoza is critical of reason Marcus Aurelius appreciates it fulsomely -- to such an extent that one may be beguiled (as possibly Arnold was) into considering reason as a sovereign and infallible power synonymous with the divine self or will of God. On analysis, reason turns out to be for Marcus Aurelius an element of the flux, not an affiliate of the divine. The importance which Marcus Aurelius gives to reason Spinoza gives to God, a substance that permeates the universe and rules it with moral force, though wholly on a naturalistic or monistic

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basis.

Arnold's naturalism has much in common with the naturalism of his age and century and with that of such figures as Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza, but the doctrine of the two selves modifies his naturalism -- often to such a degree as to convict him of ambivalence and self-contradiction. He counsels that the term nature is full of pitfalls, but he himself falls into them and gives the term divergent uses contrary to his own warnings. Although he defines a dualism, the upper element of which is associated with the will of God -- with the God of his fathers -- he nevertheless tries to reduce God and religion to a naturalistic level and thus, unwittingly we suppose, to remove the gap between nature and supernature which he himself recognizes as existing. No doubt his effort was to refine the conceptions of both God and religion, to remove the gross accretions of superstition and irrational dogma which adulterated God and religion in their pure forms, but in endeavoring to effect his objective he casts out the very distinction that gives integrity to the conception of God and religion (namely, their supernaturalism) and precipitates himself into a naturalistic bog against which his own definitions of dualism often warn us.

Arnold, that is to say, does not hew to a straight line either in his naturalism or his dualism. In his poetry he is sometimes dualistic and other times monistic

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-- and often, when he treats nature with dramatic objectivity, neutral. In such poetry he is loyal rather than disloyal to his dualistic position in which nature properly recedes as background as man advances toward the ever-beckoning light that is above nature. But his attitude toward nature is not consistently neutral. On the one hand, nature, Wordsworth-fashion, provides a model and a way -- a standard for human conduct and behavior; on the other hand, nature is to be eschewed:

> "Man must begin, know this where nature ends;
> Nature and man can never be fast friends.

These verses constitute an explicit exposition of dualism and a warning against the "pitfalls of nature," but such a forceful admonition does not keep Arnold himself from subscribing to a contrary admonition that it is much more according to nature to work virtue than vice, or, almost in the manner of a modern Freud, to warn man that his instincts must not be contradicted or thwarted: "...man is not to be civilized or humanised, call it which you will, by thwarting his vital instincts."

Although Arnold's definition of God as a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness suggests a genuine veto power identifiable as the higher element of dualism, subjected to analysis this conception turns out to be of a God who is an effusion of the flux. Whereas such representative dualists as Cardinal Newman or Isaiah or Plato conceive of God foremost and last as supernatural,

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Arnold, in contradiction of his oft sincere references to a genuine supernatural God, defines a God with temporal and monistic attributes. His "Eternal" is a misnomer, for it does not have an existence independent of the cumulative life of man. (That is, were man's existence to cease tomorrow, so would God's.) The concept of the eternal, in fine, is one that has evolved from experience in order to fulfill a need, the same as any other social phenomenon, and thus is subject to the same natural law of change. His stream or tendency is a natural stream or tendency and the "not ourselves" is only different from the "ourselves" in degree, and not in kind. His definition of God, therefore, which has a superficial resemblance to the higher self in his "doctrine of the two selves" is a contradiction of that doctrine, which, in its pure form, as Arnold often gives voice to it, represents a conflict between two sides: one natural, the other divine.

Arnold's definition of religion constitutes another departure from his conception of dualism. In resting religion finally on emotion, he gives it a volatile and shifting base. A measureless gulf divides Arnold's and Newman's conceptions of religion, since for Newman at the center of religion is a supernatural God, not merely the rules of morality slightly emotionalized. Arnold, however, is not far different from his contemporaries, whatever shades of difference exist among them, in his effort to

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redefine traditional religion in terms of naturalism.

When Arnold does this, however, he falls into a contradiction; for he has defined man's humanity in terms of dualism, the higher part of which is at variance with nature. To be logical, Arnold should define religion in terms of the side of man that is ultimately divine, not in terms of the side of him which is basically natural. In other words, Arnold's conception of religion, based on emotion, is a contradiction of his doctrine of the two selves, since, logically he does not relate, at least so far as his definition is concerned, religion to the higher self of man, the soul, which is something other than emotion however refined.

In relegating religion to a secondary role and elevating culture to a primary role, Arnold involves himself in the difficulty of intransigence between his conception of dualism on the one hand and culture on the other. In his exposition of the doctrine of the two selves Arnold, unconsciously perhaps, defined a genuine religion, a religion which a man has when the life of the senses give way to the life of the spirit -- when the ordinary and apparent self dies to the real and best self. This is dualism, and dualism is decidedly a doctrine of "one-sidedness," not of "well-roundedness." How a man can be one-sided and well-rounded at the same time Arnold leaves unresolved.

A man cannot, in fine, be a monist and a dualist at

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once without exposing himself to the charge of inconsistency. A large vein of consistency underlies the thought of Matthew Arnold; the purity of his intentions, his hopes, his priest-like solicitude for the future of the race, these are the bedrock of his views however divergent. His errors are on the side of intellect and logic; and when his spirit appears culpable the cause may be traced to the mind rather than to the heart, for one cannot impugn the vision which it engendered. Matthew Arnold represented the best that was thought and said in the nineteenth century, but he nevertheless failed to effect a unity and a synthesis of thought; to resolve and to eliminate the inconsistencies in his attitude toward the doctrine of the two selves.

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APPENDIX

ARNOLD'S KNOWLEDGE OF ORIENTAL LITERATURE

The study of Matthew Arnold's dualism brings to the fore the question of his actual knowledge and interest in oriental literature. This interest is observable in a variety of places and is attested to by a number of authorities. His Notebooks contains the following significant entry: "My earliest purpose in life -- to bring over into my own knowledge and into my own fatherland the language and the spirit of the solemn and distant east. B."[1] The "B" may stand for Eugene Burnouf. Concerning his influence upon Arnold Iris Esther Sells says:

> "Among the group that was associated with the short-lived Institut historique...was Eugene Burnouf, the great orientalist to whom much of the responsibility for the revived interest in orientalism of the mid-nineteenth century must be attributed. It seems that Arnold himself had a copy of Burnouf's Introduction a l Histoire du Buddhisme indien, published in 1844, for a book referred to as 'my Buddhisme' is mentioned by him (as being unprocurable) in a letter dated 1858. The almost certain probability is that this Buddhisme is Burnouf's Buddhisme, since Arnold, we know, was familiar with the orientalist's writings. It is possible that this book, too, was instrumental in turning Arnold's interest in the direction of Hindu thought." 2

The letter to which Mrs. Sells has reference was to Arnold's sister. In the letter Arnold wrote as follows:

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1. Notebooks, p. 43.
2. Sells, op. cit., p. 67.

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"I must ask you to send me back some day my Buddhisme to make a reference for my next lecture -- the book is now unprocurable -- you shall have it again."[3]

The following passage, further, from Arnold's Notebooks contains unmistakable evidence that Arnold was absorbed in oriental thought:

> "Let him reflect the transmigrations of men caused by their sinful deeds, on their downfall into a region of darkness, and their torments in the mansion of Yama;
> "On their separation from those whom they love, and their union with those whom they hate, on their strength overpowered by old age and their bodies racked by disease;
> "On their agonising departure from this corporeal frame, their formation again in the womb, and the glidings of this vital spirit through the thousand millions of passages;
> "On the misery attached to embodied spirits from a violation of their duties, and the imperishable attached to them from their abundant performance of all duties." 4

Again Arnold's interest in the East is shown in the following laudatory reference to it: "...that wonderful East, from which, whatever airs of superiority Europe may justly give itself, all our religion has come, and where religion, of some sort or other, has still an empire over men's feelings such as it had nowhere else."[5]

Arnold, further, read the Bhagavad-Gita with obvious enjoyment. In a letter to Clough he expresses his regret that Clough did not share his appreciation: "I am disappointed the Oriental wisdom, God grant it were mine,

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3. Whitridge, op. cit., p. 43.
4. Notebooks, pp. 11-12.
5. Essays in Criticism, First Series, p. 225.

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pleased you not."[6]

It is well known that Arnold was interested in the enduring qualities of literature. As is evident from the following extract from a letter to his sister, Mrs. Forster, his quest for permanence must have received a stimulus from Buddhism: "I must read Merope to you. I think and hope it will have what Buddha called the 'character of Fixity, that true sign of the law.'"[7]

Further evidence of Arnold's interest in oriental learning is to be found in the friendship between Arnold and Max Müller, the eminent Sanskrit scholar. Besides the number of references in Arnold's letters to Müller,[8] the following anecdote related by Müller links the mind of Arnold with the oriental tradition:

> "When signing my name in the album of Mr. Elliot, after having sat for my photograph in their studio (Messrs. Elliot and Fry), I saw four lines signed by Matthew Arnold. When I had read them, I felt convinced that they also were a translation from Sanskrit, though it was not said so. They were dated 1868.
>
> 'Like driftwood spars, which meet and pass
> Upon the boundless ocean plain,
> So on the sea of life, alas!
> Man nears man, meets, and leaves again![9]
>
> I at once wrote under it the lines in Sanskrit which I felt sure must have been the original of Arnold's verses. They are:--

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6. Lowry, op. cit., p. 69. For Arnold's debt to the Bhagavad-Gita, see Trilling, op. cit., pp. 25, 30, 88, 89, 104, 158.
7. Letters, vol. 1, p. 66.
8. See Letters, vol. 2, pp. 346-347; Lowry, op. cit., pp. 24 and 153.
9. Müller apparently was not aware that Arnold was merely

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Yatha kashtham ka kashtham ka
As spar and spar also
Sameyatam mahodadham
Come together on the great ocean
Sametya ka vyapeyatam
And having met go apart,
Tadvad bhutasamagamah,
Thus of beings is the meeting!

"This verse must have been a great favorite, for it occurs not only in the Mahabarata, Ramayana, Hitopadesa, and other popular collections, but in a very similar form in a Buddhist work, the Mahavastu..., where it reads as:-- [Sanskrit omitted]

As a spar is carried off on the great water-ocean
Struck together, vanishes, thus is of friends the meeting!

"Arnold was not a Sanskrit scholar, and I am not aware that he ever studied Sanskrit literature. Of course the same thought might have occurred to two poets, but one's sense of probabilities seems to rebel against so easy a supposition..." 10

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quoting from one of his own poems, "The Terrace at Berne," first published in 1867. Of course this does not invalidate the presumption of an oriental source for the verses.

10. F. Max Müller, "Coincidences," Fortnightly Review (July, 1989), vol. 64, p. 16. Another interesting "coincidence" is that the title of W. Somerset Maugham's book The Razor's Edge, taken from the Katha-Upanishad, was once used by Arnold in a commentary on his sonnet on "Shakespeare." "The easy tone of a Shakespeare," Arnold says,"suits the immortal-vulgar: the moralist conscious of his own imperfection & strain, admires it: but what does the poet's own conscience say to it -- what would he say at seeing his easy morality erected by Germans & others into a system of life & a thing to be held in view as an object for inward disciplining of oneself towards. He would say -- You fools -- I have walked thro...God knows how -- if you mistake my razor edge, you damned pedants, for a bridge, a nice mess you will make of your own & others' walk & conversation." (Tinker and Lowry, op. cit., p. 25. Quoted from a "pencilled note...in the Yale MS.) The quotation from the Katha-Upanishad in Maugham's book is as follows: "The sharp edge of a razor is difficult to pass over; thus the wise say the path to Salvation is hard." One may conjecture that Arnold had some familiarity with the Upanishads as well as

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It remains to be mentioned that Arnold may have been guided toward his interest in oriental thought by his father who himself was interested in it. To a former student, Reverend H. Fox who had gone out to India as a missionary, Thomas Arnold wrote: "I should earnestly, I think, look out in a Hindoo's mind for those points which he had in common with us, and see if the enormous differences might not be explained and their existence accounted for." His son, one might add, went much farther than his father in diminishing the distance between his own mind and that of the East.

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other oriental writings.

11. Thomas Arnold, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 305.

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