

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

_____ May 27, 19 35

I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by _____ Charles Thomas Clifton _____
entitled _____ An Examination of the Realist Appeal _____
_____ to Common Sense _____

be accepted as fulfilling this part of the requirements for the degree of _____ Doctor of Philosophy _____

Approved by:

_____ Howard D. Reveloff _____

_____ P. B. Rice _____

AN EXAMINATION OF THE REALIST APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate School
of the University of Cincinnati
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

1935

by

Charles Thomas Clifton

A.B. University of Cincinnati 1930

CINCINNATI
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

UMI Number: DP15695

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform DP15695

Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 E. Eisenhower Parkway
PO Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE.....	1
PART ONE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ORDINARY USE AND THE PHILOSOPHIC USE OF THE TERM COMMON SENSE	
Section 1: Introductory: The Origin of Common Sense and its Conflict with Science and Philosophy.....	1
Section 2: The Ordinary use of the Term Common Sense.....	20
I. Introduction.....	20
II. Common Sense as Natural Intelligence and Acquired Knowledge.....	21
III. The Communal Aspect of Common Sense..	22
IV. The Transition to the Philosophical Concept.....	24
V. Summary.....	28
Section 3: The Philosophic Use of the Term Common Sense.....	32
I. Introduction.....	32
II. Historical Background of the Argu- ment from Common Sense.....	38
III. The School of Common Sense.....	44
IV. Hume's Appeal to Common Sense.....	54
V. Summary and Comparison of the Appeal to Common Sense by Reid and Hume.....	60
VI. How the Modern Appeal Differs from the Old.....	63
VII. Some Modern English Realists: Joad, Moore and Ewing.....	65
VIII. Some Modern English Realists, (Continued): Stout.....	74
IX. The Common Elements in All Appeals to Common Sense.....	80
X. Summary.....	85
PART TWO: THE FUNCTION OF COMMON SENSE WITHIN THE COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHIES	

	Page
Section 1: The General Problem of the Common Sense Philosophies.....	97
I. Introduction.....	97
II. The Clash of Systems and the Common Sense Protest.....	98
III. Analysis of the General Argument from Common Sense.....	103
Section 2: The Common Sense Treatments of Particular Issues.....	108
I. Introduction.....	108
II. Reid's Attempt to Analyze the Knowledge Problem.....	108
III. The Analysis of Professor Moore.....	116
IV. Analysis of the Extension of the General Argument from Common Sense.....	121
V. Summary.....	125
Section 3: Consensus of the General Propositions of Common Sense and the Kinds of Appeals which Emerge from our Study..	130
 PART THREE: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE	
Section 1: The Significance of Public Facts.....	134
I. Introduction.....	134
II. What We Mean by Facts.....	134
III. How Facts Are Known to Be True.....	138
IV. The Significance of Meaning.....	142
V. The Significance of 'Common Sense'.....	148
Section 2: Appearance, Reality and Common Sense.	154
I. Introduction.....	154
II. How Common Sense Regards the Distinction Between Appearance and Reality.....	157
III. In What Sense Appearances May Be Said to Be Saved.....	160
IV. Summary.....	162
Section 3: Analysis of Preceding Arguments.....	164
Section 4: Conclusions.....	172

	Page
PART FOUR: THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY	
Section 1: Philosophy and Common Sense.....	175
I. Introduction.....	175
II. How Philosophy Differs from Common Sense.....	178
Section 2: Common Sense and the Perception of Objects.....	181
I. Introduction.....	181
II. Why Naive Realism and Common Sense Have Been Regarded as Synonymous.....	182
III. The Common Sense Background of Epistemological Dualism.....	187
IV. Immediate vs. Mediate Knowledge.....	191
V. Summary.....	199
Section 3: Further Analysis of the Limitations of Common Sense.....	204
I. Introduction.....	204
II. The Relation of Common Sense to any Analysis.....	205
III. Final Remarks Concerning the Possibility of a Common Sense Philosophy.....	210
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	214

PREFACE

The history of philosophy is a history of man's attempt to answer certain questions. At the present time questions are still being asked, and this would seem to indicate either that all former questions (asked up to the present) have been satisfactorily and adequately answered, the new questions having sprung up under the exigencies of the present, or that some of the questions have been unsatisfactorily and inadequately answered. The evidence of history, if it can be accepted at all, is emphatically in favor of the latter alternative, in spite of those who insist that the progress of time necessarily implies progress in the solution of all problems. It is also a fact that some questions have been adequately answered - contrary to those who consider all thought foredoomed to sterility and to those who believe that the quest for an answer is a participation in a relentless dialectic which admits no stopping place.

The purpose of this essay is to attempt an answer to certain questions, some of which have been asked before, others of which have gone unexpressed. And I can best put these questions by first stating two questions to which my questions are related significantly. Philosophers have tried to answer these questions repeatedly, and their attempt forms most of the literature of recent philosophy. They are, "Do physical objects, which form part of the external physical world, exist independent, logically and causally, of the

knowing subject?" and "Are these physical objects directly and immediately known, i.e. known without some tertium quid, or representative idea, interposing itself as an indirect medium between object and subject?" The first question, when answered in the affirmative, expresses the major tenet of realism; the second question forms the pièce de résistance of the various species of realistic schools.

The questions I wish to ask have to do with each of these generic questions, and my reason for asking them is due partly to the fact that some philosophers have in the past appealed to common sense in an effort to answer these primary questions and partly because I am in agreement with some of these philosophers, yet opposed to others, in so far as the legitimacy of the appeal is concerned. The legitimacy of the argument itself and of any conclusions reared upon it is the ultimate issue to be faced. But before this final problem can even be contemplated, other questions are our concern. How is Common Sense, as a philosophic concept, to be distinguished from the common sense of ordinary usage? is our first question, and this includes two aspects, What is the ordinary use of the term common sense? and, How does the term emerge as a specific name for a philosophic concept? The second question is, What significant role does the concept play in the several philosophies embracing it? Or otherwise put, we could ask, How is the appeal to Common Sense to be distinguished within the philosophies resorting to it? Then we shall ask, What is the ultimate validity and authority of Common Sense? Finally, we tackle the issue already

mentioned, with Is a Common Sense Philosophy possible?

These questions suggest certain specific divisions which will be followed. Part One, at once historical and lexicographical, will concern itself with definitions and distinctions, while Part Two, quasi-historical and logical, will be preoccupied with the attempt to formulate into categories the several kinds of argument. Part Three, patently dealing with the question of validity, necessitates definite analysis from the standpoint of the logic of factuality and truth. Part Four requires, first, an outline of the epistemological issue which serves as the general context for the particular appeal to Common Sense; secondly, a consideration of the extent to which, (a) philosophy can positively be built upon the foundations of Common Sense, and (b) philosophy is limited, negatively, in its pretensions of going beyond Common Sense. Part Four is thus expository and critical, and in its range, together with Part Three, approaches some of the more profound problems of metaphysics.

The first two questions asked limit the scope of this essay to the problem of the perception of physical objects, thus eliminating many interesting - and far more exciting - questions concerning the nature of the good, freedom, God and immortality. It will be evident that this essay does not pretend to give the history of the appeal to Common Sense, of any one Common Sense School, or of the use of the term, perhaps after the fashion of Sir William Hamilton whose tremendous erudition enabled him to summon one hundred and six witnesses authorities, ancient, medieval and modern, from Hesiod and

and Heraclitus to the Abbé de la Mennais, of his own time. Neither can I claim inclusion of all the contemporary philosophers, nor thorough examination of all their ramified arguments. Suffice it to say that this is a "study" of a problem, or if you will, an essai in the spirit of Montaigne, yet claiming the authority and legitimacy of patient thought and research. In short, it is a serious attempt to outline a problem, state the question and essay an answer. After all, as Mr. G.E. Moore has wisely observed in his preface to Principia Ethica, to state what questions are being answered is to preclude and forestall untold controversy and misunderstanding which arise whenever philosophers attempt to answer, without first making clear what they are answering. I trust that I shall have succeeded in at least stating the questions.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE REALIST APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE

Part One. The Contrast Between the Ordinary Use and the Philosophic Use of the Term Common Sense.

Section 1. Introductory: The Origin of Common Sense and its Conflict with Science and Philosophy.

It is a banality to repeat that man is a social animal, living from the very beginning (so far as can be ascertained) in groups, whether it is only the family unit or the larger tribal union of several families. Demands for communication rising out of the needs of practical activities, early required some system of 'signs' whereby a common language could be determined. In Time, there is a consensus of opinion, which regards these signs as standard and conventional. There early develops a tendency to regard them as final, authoritative, and even metaphysical; for words serve their purpose literally and symbolically, the latter use giving them a mysterious quality. Whether the 'sign' is actually a number, or a word, written or spoken (or sung), does not matter, so long as it retains unsullied its legitimate metaphysical role of representing the unseen Reality. The 'sign' of course, acquires its value from its participation in the superior reality beyond and from its unique function of pointing, indicating, designating that which it represents and communicates. The history of the magical uses of 'signs' is well known, running throughout the gamut of Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean history, from Philo of Alexandria to Martianus Capella,^{1*} through whom certain doctrines concerning number were introduced into Christian theology and into modern

mystic cults. When one consults certain esoteric works today in logic and mathematics there is a lingering suspicion that the occult is still very much with us;² at least, the opinion remains that signs and symbols derive their importance from the Great Beyond. Also with some astronomers there is a literal connection between the mathematical formulae and the Mathematical God revealed by the Logos.³

I do not intend to enter into the controversy of Nominalism and Realism and the function of signs in these systems, a fascinating problem indeed. What I am concerned with is the general tendency of mankind to regard signs as somehow fixed and eternal, at once representing and at once creating (for the novitiate) realities, be they things or ideas, terms or propositions. The role of the sign has been emphasized in late years for the purpose of indicating its emotive value and its drive to action, often revolutionary in scope; but it is just as important as a check to action - a reactionary, conservative influence. In education, in particular, thinking in terms of 'patterns' becomes habitual. Hence there is this paradox: without standard words (or propositions), no precise, logical account and agreement, no community of ideas, no understanding; with conventional patterns, no elasticity of thought, no freshness and spontaneity of point-of-view. Bergson would add that the habits of geometry are forever inadequate for the attainment of insight into Reality.⁴ Credulity on the part of the general public is most marked in connection with the written word. For once appearance is made in print, all the reverence and unction accorded an Oriental despot, belongs

to it without the asking. Plato's warning was well taken.⁵ We are always torn between the dead and the living, between the old bottles with their fragrant memories of a once-sparkling content and the new wine, alive and inviting, young and seductive: to taste of the new we must return to the old, and in so doing sometimes we are lost midway between.

Signs also represent what has been directly learned from experience. The ever-lurking dangers of nature, inanimate and animate (if such a distinction is made at first) which make of life a precarious thing indeed, had much to do with the appearance of language in its elementary forms. This primitive collection of ideas and propositions was essential for the successful function of life. Without it life was a continual trial-and-error process, with the penalty of error being death. There was thus an even more original and more necessary incentive to retain in permanent fashion what had been learned from experience. Even though such generalizations often took strange forms, as parts of a primitive theology, as prejudices and superstitions, and as such were regarded as warnings from above they served their purpose. Together with the practical exigencies of communication itself, these derived propositions formed early in the history of the human race a common body of propositions, indispensable, though hardly adequate; authoritative and absolute, though admitting of additions; inviolate, though often opposed and at times even rejected. These propositions we shall tentatively call "common sense propositions."⁶

Common Sense, or what we designate as common sense, arises as (1) a practical necessity, (2) a metaphysical convenience, fixing definite patterns of thought and action,

admitting of a common body of information, rules, practices and revelations, and regulating by means of custom, habit and tradition, the lives of numerous persons. Often codified and immortalized in the sayings of the gods, this body of propositions became the legacy of the past, standing ready for transmission to succeeding generations, yet defiant of time and change - a permanent, substantial something to which man might cling, while reaping the rewards which true devotion secures.

But change is inexorable. It presses centripetally from the periphery of life, tending always to disrupt and disorganize the unmoving center around which we seem to whirl; it can also be initiated centrifugally from within. In the give and take between the inner and outer worlds there is a dual tendency, as capricious as it is unrelenting, to unseat the presiding officer, Common Sense, as quiet reason searches reality for light, - or to give the chief executive more powers, making him dictator, in resistance to the revolutionaries within the body politic. The Left always leads the Right, and as science first emerges as a more definite mode of generalizing 'phenomena' into some semblance of law and enters with philosophy into the joint endeavor of answering the How's and Why's of questions, a terrific uprising occurs. What all along appeared thus-and-so is questioned by those anarchists who seek in the name of Science and Philosophy to overthrow proud Common Sense. Did someone question the divinity of the Moon, or rob the Sun of its eternal motion? Then in the language of Hume "commit him to the flames", for he preaches "nothing

but sophistry and illusion."⁷ Rigid suppression of insurrectionists is usually short-lived, however, and in the end a definite adjustment is made, for there is always a sufficient reason why the agitation has occurred. The lobbies of science and philosophy succeed in pushing a bill here, an amendment there. Eventually, but long after the strife of conflict, there appears a new Common Sense, changed, but as dogmatic and obstinate as before. Again the struggle, again the concessions. It is like the theme of the Stoic metaphysics, an eternal recurrence.

This allegory is true. Now, as before, we sense the struggle, often inchoate, yet nevertheless inevitable, between common sense and philosophy, on the one hand, and common sense and science, on the other. The novel, the unconventional, the disconcerting combine to challenge the normal, the customary, the pleasing. Because life is distinctly a practical affair and because man has learned much (often to his intense discomfort) in his dealings with intractable Nature, he early arrived at maxims and proverbs of common sense, which summed up in a more or less generic manner both practical sagacity and synoptic wisdom. This body of propositions was--and is--an expression of the idea of the normal, which emerges, dually, in its regulative function, as an ideal to be striven for, and in its pictorial role, as a description of what has been realized.⁸ There is room left for the miraculous, but not the abnormal; there may be distinctions between the theoretical and the practical, the real and the 'appearances,' but in each case there is some deus ex machina, not always evident, which

overcomes the dualism by a process sometimes called "saving the appearances."⁹ This reconstruction is not always to the advantage of the appearances, ostensibly saved. There is always a parallel readjustment on the side of the ideal structure. Starting with sense, reason generates a new scheme for making intelligible the sensible; but in so functioning, contradictions occur, and the old view, the appearances, must be fit into the new context. Hence a new 'reality' must be created which will save the appearances and harmonize them with the general picture, even make them necessary consequents, but above all make what first appeared strange and abnormal consistent with the idea of the normal.

The Renaissance philosopher-scientists were constantly faced with the necessity of saving the appearances,¹⁰ i.e. restoring common sense to its traditional dignity. This is done by showing how the appearances are necessary in the light of the general conditions which form the structure of nature within which the phenomena appear. If this explanation is acceptable to reason it is admitted into what has been called common sense. The Copernican Revolution illustrates the process. Ordinary common sense perception, supported by certain other considerations, based on religious and moral doctrines, not only was convinced that the sun moved around the earth, but also dogmatically knew that the question was beyond even the slightest doubt. The suggestion that the earth moved around the sun was both insane and heretical, for it is obvious to sense that the reverse is true and that only an iconoclast would dare run counter to authority. Then, as always, the burden rested upon him who

had the temerity to challenge common sense. It was necessary, (1) to show how common sense erred; (2) to indicate why the new scheme was preferable to the old.¹¹ To successfully achieve this salvation of the appearances an entirely new picture of the cosmos had to be drawn, a new set of arguments, backed by evidence drawn from the senses, had to be adduced. Yet it was a couple of centuries before common sense gave up the old and took on the new, so powerful is the testimony of the senses, so final their authority, and so sluggish is the mind to grasp the reasons which lie behind the new interpretation.

So far as the successful function of everyday affairs is concerned, there seems to be little need for man to investigate what Pascal cited as "the infinitely great and the infinitely small."¹² A slight penetration below the surface of things might suffice; man could conduct his life with a minimum of general laws. Two factors, however, drive him on like Faust into contemplation of the universal macrocosm and the microcosms within himself and the atom: the inquisitive yearning for the intelligible and the frank desire to achieve results in the improvement of life. Science is as much the inevitable product of man's demand for understanding as it is the result of the need for its practical fruits. Descartes realized this more than Bacon,¹³ and Meyerson repeatedly calls this dual nature to the attention of the reader in his Identity and Reality.¹⁴ But without the intellectual equipment to weigh evidence and follow arguments--the ability to test the reasons given as explanation for any phenomenon and

to advance new reasons in return-- the demand for rational understanding would be only a vain wish. Ultimately, when practice of everyday life fails to prove a theory (and practice itself can never pursue an argument critically and fruitfully), the validity of any demonstration whatsoever can only be determined by reason, the lumen naturale.¹⁵ And if a body of facts and the 'reasons' in support of them fail to bring assent there is no other court of appeal.¹⁶ Science, therefore, and all its arguments extending far beyond verification by sense or practice rely upon the reason within man for their final acceptance or rejection and, in fact, for their very life.

The body of general facts, ideas and propositions which has been called common sense--a concrete general term¹⁷--accepts a new concept or a unique point-of-view, and in so doing modifies itself by readjustment to the novel in the light of the old,¹⁸ because by its very nature it cannot help doing so. For when experience teaches, the lesson stays learned; and when reason assents, usually after a period of time, during which it has cautiously weighed the questions, it goes the whole distance, lending its vigorous support to the maintenance of the new position. Thus there is a constant process in which common sense finds itself like some immortal snake, constantly shedding an old skin, forever taking on a new, which in turn will be shed. Yet, throughout the identity of the reptile remains the same. Whether or not it itself can be said to move is another problem, but I am inclined to believe that if any moral can be deduced from any movement, which is again highly problematical, that it will be as mysterious

and elusive as the animal whose fate it represents.¹⁹ That there is an identity, in which, perhaps, there are unchanging features, the history of philosophy bears out. Indeed, it is to this hypothetical unchanging body of propositions within the general organism that the appeal to common sense has consisted, not to those ephemerally bits, now sluffed off, now added.²⁰

Quite often it has been thought by philosophers that this organism was so constructed by Nature--possibly in order that it may struggle for its own survival--that it differentiated e.g. between an ego and a not-ego when first it glided over the newly-created terra firma of the Garden of Eden. And since that first day all human creatures share, as in the mystery of original sin, this native distinction so indelibly implanted.

Many hypotheses can be advanced regarding the genesis of common sense. The difficulty exists in trying to verify them. Two thinkers writing on this topic have differed, one holding that it is impossible to ever experiment e.g. with a child, the other sincerely making the attempt to examine the history of the child in the hope of tracing the common sense phenomenon.²¹ It is similarly difficult to essay an answer to such questions as, When did man first differentiate between dreams and real perception, illusions and real things? When did man first experience the clash between the common sense of the tribe--mostly inherited--and primitive philosophy?²² Such questions are forever doomed to die unanswered, though as an ideal example of the kind of questions we should like very much to have answered they linger on to plague us. Really, there is no great advantage

to be obtained from their answers. The real question is, How, accepting the phenomenon of common sense as it recurs in history, are we to evaluate its propositions for philosophy?

The very persistence of some propositions becomes significant when we reflect that in other instances propositions are constantly being revised, even wholly discarded, entirely altered. Some emphasis is added when a vote is taken and these same propositions are returned victorious with a unanimous vote of the electorate. Not only is there evidence in the appeal to numbers, but in addition, the battles of the philosophers present more testimony, for it is seen that these same propositions stand strangely aloof from the combat. It is true that in his study or library a philosopher may advocate what he cannot--even if he would--practice, and that in occasional debate there may even be agreement on some propositions that were they true would make impossible the real existence of more than one knowing subject. But such alternatives to the common sense view must be rejected, not simply on the sole ground that they lead to contradictions between theory and practice, but because they fail to justify themselves when called to account, i.e. they cannot save the appearances of commonsense in the light of their higher revelation of reality, and they have failed positively to show how common sense is in error and how some other body of propositions must be preferable in rerum natura. It is possibly this awareness of responsibility which leads the most avowed opponents of common sense to respect it even when bitterly opposing it.²³ Such opposition is based on the legitimate hope that some positive

irrefutable argument may be adduced. In lieu of this argument they do their best, often attacking some superficial proposition loosely held; but their onslaught is half-hearted since they themselves, being human, are representatives of common sense, first, philosophers, secondarily.

The body of common sense propositions I refer to above as persisting through time, change, numbers, and critical debate, includes one proposition which is alone relevant here. It is, 'There exists a self and a not-self, a knower and what is known, each of which exists independently of the other, just as each differs from the other in its general nature.' But before we can consider this proposition we must attempt to clear the term common sense of the stigma of ambiguity attached to it.

It will be evident that philosophers are like ordinary men in that they use terms mechanically without ever questioning their meaning (that is, in general this is the case; some philosophers prefer to devote their entire energy in making meanings clearer), and if their hostility to so-called common sense is bred of ambiguity, i.e. misunderstanding, how much more so is the opposition of common sense (more precisely, those persons of common sense) to a philosophy whose technical language makes it appear a suspicious foreigner, up to no good and fit only for deportation. Another cause of frequent clashes is the character of the opponents. Science and philosophy are specialties which often become narrowly provincial in their preoccupations; common sense is broadly catholic.

Where the former supply intensive insight, tending to become extreme, the latter affords an extensive outlook, often vague and tenuous, yet always important. Owing to such differences there is bound to be conflict, and if a reconciliation is expected it must come from both sides, during a calm truce, so that each party can adjust itself to the other. The presumption of truth is in favor of the latter and it is up to the former to prove its point--or suffer ignominy. For in the last analysis, if a reconciliation is to be attempted,²⁴ common sense has to be won over by rational demonstration or experience, since before anything else it is the alpha and omega of rational discourse. The nature of this clash will be made clearer in the following examples.

Numerous instances of the opposition between the professional philosopher and the everyday man of common sense or the philosophy termed 'Common Sense' could be advanced. I shall cite just a few. One of the most notorious assaults is that of Kant. In the Prolegomena Kant variously attacks common sense philosophy, first on the ground that its authority depends "merely upon rumor,"²⁵ and, secondly, for the more legitimate reason that it fails to supply a critical, speculative analysis of what can hold beyond experience. It is "normal good sense," and "so far it judges right." But, Kant asks, "What is normal good sense? It is the faculty of the knowledge and use of rules in concreto." In the realm of the abstract it is impotent, hence it is to be condemned when appealed to by men as a substitute for philosophic criticism.²⁶

And in the Introduction he loses patience with Reid, Oswald, and Beattie (this association of names along with Priestley, their bitter critic, proves beyond doubt that Kant had never read their philosophies), first, because they misunderstood Hume, and, secondly, because, not concerned with pure thinking, they found it more convenient to appeal to common sense. I quote at length:

"It is indeed a great gift of God, to possess right, or (as they now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown practically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no sooner-- this is one of the subtle discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own...For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it..."²⁷

Berkeley speaks--as many philosophers--of the "illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed."²⁸ Later Berkeley will show that his philosophy must "bring men back to Common Sense."²⁹ In our own day, Professor R.B.Perry has said, "The very point of philosophy lies in the fallibility of common sense, and in the arbitrariness of vulgar standards of success."³⁰ He proceeds to describe the clash and to "defend" philosophy at the expense of common sense. Again, in the flourishing hey-day of the Scottish Common Sense philosophers there was a general confusion and misunderstanding in regard to the true significance of their appeal to common sense. Mr. Joseph Priestley saw in Reid's work only "an ingenious piece of sophistry," and he was

particularly severe toward Beattie and Oswald.³¹ The poet Burns made some attempts to fathom the metaphysics of the School, but gave it up as a bad job. This is how he speaks of his contemporaries:

I've sent you here, by Johnie Simson,
Twa sage philosophers to glimpse on:-
Smith wi' his sympathetic feeling,
And Reid to common sense appealing.
Philosophers have fought and wrangled,
And mickle Greek and Latin mangled,
Till, wi' their logic-jargon tired,
And in the depth of science mired,
To Common Sense they now appeal,
That wives and wabsters see and feel.³²

SUMMARY

Thus far we have indicated by way of introduction to our essay the general nature of common sense (thus, tentatively defined it--without taking sides) and something in regard to those factors which give it a more or less determinate status, both conservative and conventional, and those which tend to modify it gradually, as science and philosophy influence it. We found that language is a tremendous factor making for rigidity: signs, either as simple terms or as propositions, express facts, principles, ideas--which in turn, may be scientific or philosophic, or simply acquired superstitions, prejudices and intangible intuitions,--and, too, these signs may restrict and control what also they represent, i.e. they may determine definite patterns of action and thought, where their original intention is lost sight of. Certain propositions, in time, are found together. Some of these persist, passing various tests of their intrinsic worth (and as they pass these tests they take on validity of a kind not allowing of direct test); these, when thus organized into a general collection, we have termed 'common sense.'

We saw how common sense regards the 'normal' and how it in turn represents the normal. Also, we considered the conflict between common sense and philosophy and common sense and science, and attempted to show how important the demand for 'saving the appearances' is to common sense. The requirements necessary for a reconciliation of opposites, such as a philosophy which runs counter to common sense and common sense itself, were shown, the presumption being that the latter is true, until the former proves the contradictory. The proposition relevant to our own interest which has persisted is, 'There exists a self and a not-self, a knower and what is known, each of which exists independently of the other, just as each differs from the other in its general nature.'

NOTES

1. His Marriage of Philology and Mercury had a tremendous influence upon Christian doctrine. (Cited in Boas, The Adventures of Human Thought, New York and London, 1929, pp. 101 note, 125.)
2. I am also thinking here of those logical realists whose ontology embraces a formal structure of universals, whether existent or 'subsistent.' Cf. e.g. Montague, The Ways of Knowing, pp. 107-112.
3. See e.g. Sir James Jeans, The Mysterious Universe.
4. Creative Evolution, pp. x, xi: "... our thought in its logical form is incapable of presenting the true nature of life."
5. Phaedrus, pp. 275-276.
6. While this definition is inadequate as it stands it will be seen later to have importance for our discussion. Cf. p. 65 ff.
7. This is taken, of course, from the famous concluding paragraph to his Enquiry, Section XII, part 3.
8. The peculiar nature of this idea is treated later. See p.
9. A favorite phrase with Professor Howard D. Reelofs and used with some freedom by other modern philosophers. Cf. e.g. Bakewell's Introduction to the Scribner's edition of Plato's Republic, p. xxxii. The interpretation of this phrase is mine, however.
10. Cf. E. A. Burtt's The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, New York, 1927, pp. 59-60. The first persons who dared to doubt the authoritative view and who substituted a new interpretation, backed by demonstrable evidence, must have been looked upon as magicians, competent either as professional 'deceivers' or as diabolic suspenders of natural laws.
11. Mr. Stout similarly says, "Even when it ('common sense') is held to be wrong, the situation is not felt to be satisfactory unless the mistake is traced to its source and explained. Hume, for instance, reaches results, which, as he himself recognizes, bid defiance to common sense; but he takes elaborate pains to trace the psychological processes which, as he supposes, account for the common error." Mind and Matter, Cambridge, 1931, p.

12. Pensées, Harvard Classics, v. 48, translation by W. F. Trotter, pp. 25-31 (Section 2, no. 72).
13. For a comparison see Descartes' "Rules for the Direction of our Intelligence", Rule 1 and compare Bacon's "Scientia et potentia humana in idem coincidunt." (Nov. Org., I, 3).
It is really the general spirit and attitude of the philosopher which counts, but Descartes was far more metaphysically minded than Bacon.
14. Identité et Réalité, tr. (as Identity and Reality) by Kate Loewenberg, New York and London, 1930, pp. 20-34, 41-43.
15. The X 'natural light' is a phrase which gives good emphasis to the normal function of the mind, in so far as reason is the final judge of a rational demonstration, Nothing is implied as to the metaphysical source of the 'light' here.
16. Some persons have differed with me here. They hold that there are other avenues leading to judgment -- faith, intuition, and absolute authority, e.g.
17. That is, a general description of a collection of concrete propositions.
18. Meyerson gives a convincing demonstration how our revised scientific concepts alter our perceptions. In the case of our telescopic perceptions of cosmic bodies the knowledge that these bodies are spheres is the prime factor in our seeing them as spheres, not as flat disks, which was the accepted view for ages. Identity and Reality, pp. 378-379..
19. I do not mean to imply that a moral cannot be drawn; but some persons insist dogmatically upon certain absolute views, e.g. that time necessarily brings 'progress'. Recently we celebrated A Century of Progress. (Cf. Bury, The Idea of Progress, London, 1924, pp. 5-6.)
20. Many instances could be cited to demonstrate the changing features of common sense. We have already cited the reversal of the Ptolemaic view (based on common sense; Cf. below, Part three, Section 2, p.) by the Copernican revolution, which, in turn, was adopted by common sense. Another example is the prevalence of an extreme psycho-physical dualism mind set apart from body, since the days of Descartes -- contrary to the Scholastic metaphysics of a composite of two principles, the material and the spiritual. The acceptance of

evolution and its use in everyday language (hence normal thinking) is another example. More specifically, we can cite the entrance into common sense of highly refined terms, such as 'inferiority complex.' At the same time, some terms have become obsolete and have dropped out of the common sense vocabulary: e.g. 'substance', 'phlogiston.'

21. Daniel Cory, with "The Origin in Experience of the Notion of a Physical Object" in Analysis, v. 1, no. 4, May, 1934, concludes that it is impossible to directly account for the evolution of our knowledge of physical objects; and S. S. colvin in "The Common Sense View of Reality," The Philosophical Review, XI, 1902, pp. 139 ff., takes the accepted view of a process in which original chaos is ordered, made a cosmos, and the distinction between self and not-self established.
22. The difficulty has not prevented the appearance of learned studies on primitive society and primitive psychology as those of Tylor, E. B., Primitive Culture, Levy-Bruhl, La Mentalité Primitive, Durkheim, Les Règles de la Methode Sociologique, and Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy.
23. Berkeley, fully aware of the possibilities of solipsism in his system, even appeals to common sense for support. See below, Section 3, pp Recently, in the first number of Analysis, R. B. Braithwaite shows how one type of solipsism (Wittgensteins's) is non-commonsencical, i.e. not incompatible with common sense since it asserts the fact that my analysis of some fact in terms of my experience is not the same as this fact. There is not conflict because the analysis is not put forward on the same level as the common sense beliefs. See "Solipsism and 'The Common Sense View of the World'" in Analysis, v. 1 no. 1, November, 1933. The real difficulty of defending or attacking solipsism in the abstract and intellectually apart from the actual knowing process is that common sense is directly related to the concrete knowledge situation, while the analysis of common sense propositions is divorced from the concrete situation. See below, p. x
24. A reconciliation is not necessary; instead, ~~one~~ can accept an ultimate dualism which divides experience precisely and take his choice philosophically. Practically he has no choice.
25. Prolegomena (Open Court translation, ed. Carus, Chicago, 1902), p. 27. Kant clinches his view with a citation from Horace, Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi "To all that which you thus prove to me, I refuse to believe."
26. Ibid, pp. 144-146.

27. Ibid, pp. 5-6
28. Principles, Introd., 1
29. Hylas and Philonous (3rd Dialogue), concluding sentence. In Alciphron, 7th Dialogue, 18, he appeals to Common Sense on behalf of man's freedom.
30. Lecture on philosophy in the Harvard Classics volume of Lectures, p. 130.
31. An Examination of Dr. Reid's "Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense," Dr. Beattie's "Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth," and Dr. Oswald's "Appeal to Common Sense on Behalf of Religion." by Joseph Priestley, 1774. Quoted by McCosh, Scottish Philosophy, p. 219.
32. Dr. McCosh quotes this on page 271 of his Scottish Philosophy, but does not give the reference. The selection was taken from his Letter, to James Tennant of Glenconner. Burns refers to Common Sense elsewhere, too. See The Twa Herds, The Ordination, The Brigs of Ayr, The Kirk's Alarm.

Section 2: The Ordinary Use of the Term Common Sense

I. Introduction

The term common sense is vague and ambiguous; and yet when we use it in everyday affairs--without pausing to question its clarity and precision--we find it pleasantly articulate and neatly apt. We say, "So-and-so is a man of good common sense," or "Such-and-such an act reflects a total want of common sense," and, again, "The governor promised in his inaugural address a return to the basic principles of sound common sense."¹ Seldom do we question our use of the term, because such an act would be considered bumptious and a betrayal of good taste. Besides, our query would be met with just a trace of hostility. The average man distrusts fine distinctions--and for good reason. It is the vague generality of the term which gives it significance and makes it a convenient instrument for everyday discourse. Were we to carefully make our meaning clearer every time we used the term 'common sense,' and rigorously apply this method of clarification to all the generalities we come upon, I am afraid we should find ourselves in social disrepute. Daily intercourse thrives upon those general terms which in the laboratory and study are frowned at, not because of their generality (for thinking and communication is impossible without them), but because of their wide extension. The normal, hackneyed phrases and catchwords of everyday life admit of easy, effortless conversation, and make possible the communication so necessary for the world's business. But one has only to listen in critically to any passing conversation, or to read a stenographic report of his own words to realize sharply the inadequacy of our language and to wonder at the success it achieves.

The very general term we are considering has survived chiefly because of its utility. It enables us to assert something about one's general mental equipment, or one's ability to cope with practical difficulties, or even about one's judgment. All these things could perhaps be better stated, but there is that aura of the traditional about it, furnished by custom, which makes for its persistence. Why certain words, terms, and phrases continue, a permanent form with changed and ever-changing content, is itself a difficult question barely hinted at above.² It is naturally a source of great confusion in philosophy. Such terms as 'idea,' 'substance,' 'experience,' 'existence,' etc. are fraught with obscurity. How these words, terms, and phrases have been used (and are being used) is a question which enables us to solve some of the problems occasioned by misunderstanding. So our concern, now, is to examine the conventional uses of the term common sense.

II. Common Sense as Natural Intelligence and Acquired Knowledge.

In the previous paragraph, we have already said that common sense may help us say something about the ordinary intelligence of a person. If we turn to the Oxford dictionary,³ we find that the second definition listed there defines the term as, "The endowment of natural intelligence possessed by rational beings; ordinary, normal or average understanding; the plain wisdom which is every man's inheritance. (This is common sense at its minimum, without which a man is foolish or insane.)" There is a close connection between this use

and the obsolete one referring to "an 'internal' sense which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the five senses, in which the various impressions received were reduced to a unity of common consciousness." The source of this psychological usage is of course Aristotle,⁴ whose koine aisthesis (the sensus communis of the Schoolmen⁵) was long thought to be a definite faculty of the mind. Without this faculty, perception (and, hence, knowledge of existence) would be wanting altogether, and it is easy to see how a term applying to an essential faculty of consciousness might easily be applied to the whole of consciousness--or mind--and common sense become a description of those normal individuals competent to handle the problems of everyday life by means of normal intelligence, or better, average knowledge.⁶ A double meaning at once attaches itself to the term: it stands for both the natural gift of intelligence and the knowledge acquired through experience because of this gift, from the standpoint of psychology, logic and metaphysics. The idea of the normal is again evident; for any man deficient in common sense, or even equipped with extraordinary insight, rational or irrational, is termed a moron or idiot, genius or saint.

III. The Communal Aspect of Common Sense.

When we turn from the individual to the group we discover another application of the term, which now refers to "the general sense, feeling, or judgment of mankind, or of a community." Obviously, the longer men live together and the greater the complexity of their society (the complexity of

numbers and geographical extent, in addition to the internal relations), the greater becomes the generality of common objects of reference, while at the same time certain objects of reference will be common to particular localities. Just as all men have a religion (I am not asserting that such is the case in fact; some men may have no religion) and the religion of the Christian differs from the religion of the Mohammedan, so do all men have common sense, though the common sense of the western world differs decidedly from the common sense of the Orient. Likewise, what is termed common sense today is not the common sense of the twelfth century, for example; the American bourgeois common sense of 1928 is not the common sense of the same class in 1935. In every case cited, however, there may be something common to all which defies change, an identity of content underlying the flux as in all metaphysical doctrines of eternal becoming.⁷ At least the term itself persists, even when the content has undergone manifold change. Contradictory meanings may be included under the general term as in the instance cited above of the ordinary man's attitude toward the movement of the sun in comparison with some other 'frame of reference.'⁸

In this last popular meaning of the term common sense, we have the object of the philosopher's scorn and contempt. For the content of "the general sense, feeling, or judgment of mankind" is a social product which excludes nothing save what it cannot understand. It is the widest possible realm of discourse and includes not only what has filtered down as 'facts' from first-hand experience and the various specialties, philosophy, science, history, art, letters and religion, but

also that which presses upward from the dark ages of the past,-- instincts, atavistic propensities (perhaps 'acquired characteristics'); all the superstitions, prejudices and opinions in diverse, heterogeneous accumulation since Adam's day. Here may be found the vague terrors which Lucretius sought to overcome; the "idols" which Bacon warned against; the dogmatic presumptions which Hume banished with searching scepticism; the gloomy superstitions pursued by the Light of the Encyclopédistes; the sickly sentiments denounced by Nietzsche; the bourgeois prejudices which the Marxists of today strive to supplant. The good and the bad, the false and the true, the ugly and the beautiful are as one, swallowed up and reconciled like 'the many' in the Parmenidean One or Hegelian Absolute. Everything inherited, from custom, tradition, habit, language or law is lumped together in a genial democratic family going by the name of "plain common sense."

IV. The Transition to the Philosophic Concept

The conception of the normal appears in connection with the social significance of the term, just as it emerged from a consideration of the average intelligence required for the everyday function of life. Thus when new scientific hypotheses, or new modes of painting or music appear, the authors of these heresies are at first condemned--as we saw in our introductory remarks. In time, we find these new ideas either absorbed or utterly rejected, as understanding wins over the fear of innovation (change), latent in mass conservatism. This seems to indicate that common sense is not without its critical side; that, on the contrary, even though many irrational, instinctive, intuitive 'memories' of the race linger on as

vestiges of previous centuries, there may be not only the judging capacity⁹ for the acceptance or rejection of so-called 'facts,' but also original data, immediately grounded in man by Nature, of such a character that in their absence man would be impotent practically, ignorant intellectually. This data includes propositions of two kinds: self-evident first principles of reason, without which man could not think--such as the principles of identity and contradiction; and self-evident first truths of experience, without which man could not act--such as the belief in the existence of an external material world, the immediate awareness of other selves, etc. In each case these truths seem to be necessary and universal; whether they are a priori (independent of experience) or not is a mooted issue: admittedly they are seen to arise only in experience, and as necessary for experience; as such, they must exist as essential factors from the beginning.

The transition from vulgar common sense to Common Sense Philosophy is thus imminent within common sense in general. For philosophy emerges from common sense in order to attain two chief ends, an all-embracing, comprehensive world-view of "all time and all existence," and a critical analysis of facts and meanings--their source in experience, the methods of verifying them, the possible limitations placed upon them. In short, two kinds of wisdom become objects of love: the meaning of the whole (in which part is related to part, and parts to the whole, historically, morally and metaphysically) and the meaning of a part (in which one aspect of

life, matter or knowledge is dissected, scientifically and logically). These ends are natural to man, and they demand some satisfaction on every level, in themselves, and as a means to practical efficiency. If the common sense philosopher prefers religion to a metaphysics of the Absolute, the Decalogue and the Golden Rule instead of the Imitation of Christ, the multiplication tables and the figures of the stock market rather than Einstein's formulae, the difference is one of degree, not of kind. For if we were not philosophers in potentia, while still men of common sense, every appearance of a new philosopher would be a miracle attesting to the creation of something out of nothing. In this transition, however, there is no guarantee that the emergence of the cocoon from the larva will end the metamorphosis, that the philosopher of common sense will stop at this point. Now and then Nature successfully continues the phenomenon, and a beautiful moth or butterfly emerges from the cocoon: in the world of philosophy a genius is born whose speculative insight carries him far from the humble larva of common sense.

Anyone--above all a philosopher--who narrowly attacks common sense, meaning that which we have above defined, thus manifests ingratitude, ignorance and intolerance, as well as the impatient arrogance of the proselytizer. He is ungrateful for his common sense heritage, ignorant of its important role in the lives of all persons, including his own, intolerant of the tremendous variety of opinions, and, above all, anxious to reform the world,--even convert it to his own point-of-

view. The philosopher should be contented with his greater insight and keener acumen, or satisfied with the vast learning which natural talents and opportunity threw at his feet: for if he possesses the truth, perhaps patience and restraint will reward him with the satisfaction of seeing his views accepted, if not absorbed, by common sense.

On the other hand, it is the philosopher's profession of the love of wisdom which drives him on and on in persistent criticism and questioning. Systematic doubt in a manner more scrupulous even than Descartes' is the philosopher's first duty. Therefore must he question each and every proposition of common sense, subject them to a disinterested scrutiny in the light of the impartial requirements for truth, and accept only those propositions passing the tests as likely material for his philosophy. Because the philosopher is also a man of common sense this process of 'weeding out' is equally complicated and simplified, for a tremendous effort is required to regard familiar opinions dispassionately; and yet there are some propositions which the philosopher may reject only to have the man of common sense restore. That is, there appears to be a fundamental disparity between philosophical theory and common sense practice of such significance that it cannot be overlooked. The fact that there are ostensibly no ready premises for a significant 'conclusion' does not necessarily obviate our tentative acceptance of this same conclusion; the dismissal of some premises does not thereby invalidate the

conclusion--if P is said to imply Q, the falsity of P does not carry with it the falsity of Q, which may be true--and the possibility exists that we may yet discover further evidence which will satisfactorily clinch our conclusion.

The existence of those propositions, which are accepted, yet unproved, accounts for philosophies resting on common sense propositions. That is to say, there is a preference even among philosophers for basic propositions of common sense, which, so far as they can determine, withstand their criticism. But in the elevation of these unique propositions to a place of pre-eminence, there is no further return to common sense. The philosophy becomes a special type of philosophy known by its insistence upon the fundamental propositions of common sense. Common Sense--as having particular significance for philosophy--will thus be distinguished from the common sense we have outlined above. In its more general--and less philosophic--significance, common sense will refer to, (1) ordinary, average intelligence; (2) the knowledge such intelligence makes possible, and the sagacity which makes for practical success in everyday affairs; and (3) the general opinions, judgments and intuitions of mankind, which include pre-philosophic speculation and pre-critical analysis.

V. Summary

In this section we have tried to show what is meant by the term common sense as we daily employ it, in order to distinguish this commonplace use from the special significance the term has acquired in its association with philosophy. We

found that ordinary communication thrives on vague, general terms and that these same terms often vary in meaning while their form persists unchanged--a phenomenon directly conducive to interminable wrangling. We discovered that we usually mean by common sense one of the three definitions repeated in the above paragraph, and that of the three the last was most attacked by philosophers because it includes unphilosophical and hence dangerous content. Common sense, however, is potentially philosophy--as it is potentially science--and yet differs from philosophy--in the demand for speculative insight and criticism--only in degree. In fact, it may contain some content which persists in spite of critical attack: this is the starting-point for Common Sense philosophies, to which we now turn.

NOTES

1. The Governor of Ohio made this promise in his recent inaugural address.
2. See above, p. 8 and compare Note 7 below.
3. The Oxford Dictionary, v. ii, p. 695. The definitions quoted unless otherwise indicated are taken from this authority.
4. Cf. De Anima, III, 1, 425A.
5. See the reference to Shaftesbury, Note 35, Part One, Section 3, p.89.
6. We could add this subdivision, under the general definition (from the Oxford): "More emphatically: good sound practical sense; combined tact and readiness in dealing with the every-day affairs of life; general sagacity."
7. This holds true for the radical phenomenalist as well as the radical ontologist, the permanent lying objectively, as a necessary substratum which supports the attributes, or subjectively as an identity which logically determines and recognizes difference, by means of comparison. Even granting the contingency of these objective and subjective 'necessities,' the very possibility of logical discourse as Kant recognized rests on certain factors which continue, whether there is a permanent something in the nature of things, or the idea of the permanent is a convenient conceptual or nominal invention is beside the point. For it is a fact that at least two persons in understanding communication are required before philosophy itself can exist; and so long as there is communication terms must possess logical consistency--if the intercourse is to be also rational. To rob these terms of their identity is to rob discourse of its logical significance (even if it have aesthetic value in the absence of identity). But I am far from insisting on their rigidity and immutability. It is also a fact that the meaning of terms varies, though the form persists. (Cf. below, Part Three, Sections 1 and 3) This explains the historic misunderstandings rising from ambiguity. We tend out of habit and demand for the permanent to preserve the form at great cost to ourselves, granting unwarrantedly to words, terms and phrases (whose content changes) the immunity of the Platonic forms which survive all change. In a sense, then, we are torn between the Scylla of temporary persistence of a specific meaning-content (necessary for rational discourse) and the Charybdis of eternal continuity of form; and too often we perish midway--as our ark of understanding flounders.

In this connection, Cf. Dewey, Experience & Nature, (2 ed.), p. 27: "Philosophy, thinking at large, allows itself to be diverted into absurd search for an intellectual philosopher's stone of absolutely wholesale generalizations, thus isolating that which is permanent in a function and for a purpose and converting it into the intrinsically eternal, conceived either (as Aristotle conceived it) as that which is the same at all times, or as that which is indifferent to time, out of time."

8. See above, p. 6 and below, Part Three, Section 2.
9. The lumen naturale of the Scholastics and Descartes referred to above, p. 8.

Section 3: The Philosophic Use of the Term Common Sense.

I. Introduction.

The appeal to common sense, once the proud principle of an imposing school, in recent years has been revived. Yet it has not been generally recognized as either fundamentally important or valid. The 'argument from Common Sense' is enjoying an increasing vogue in England, where philosophers of different sects have turned to the analysis of common sense presuppositions; but in America, if there is a 'return to common sense' movement in the air, it is not making itself felt formally. Informally, there may be some philosophers who argue from common sense, but who prefer to use for their authority a more esoteric, or perhaps less controversial, term. At least, some American thinkers give common sense a prominence which may in time enable it to throw off its present pseudonymity and claim its legal citizenship as a respectable member of the philosophic colony. I am thinking here of the pragmatist exaltation of 'experience,' a term as vague and all-embracing as common sense. It is true that Dewey considers experience the more general and more inclusive, extending from the subterranean depths of human life into the stratosphere beyond.¹ The critical-realists² have repeatedly argued that their philosophy is more in accord with common sense than the analyses of their neo-realist rivals³ who also seek the support of common sense.

What is singularly lacking in these polemics is the direct argument from common sense (often taking the form of

an appeal to common sense), which is our sole concern in this essay. Besides, friendly overtures to common sense may be prompted by the fact that to be recognized, ultimately, one must win the support of this unwieldy, inert common sense audience, which when unconvinced may walk out in the midst of the performance. With these claims of harmonious friendship we are not concerned with directly; indeed, very few philosophers have failed to justify their views on behalf of common sense.⁴ Our interest is primarily in those philosophers who look upon common sense as possessing unique value for philosophy,--a philosophic concept, as valid as the special testimony of the physicist or historian--and who rely upon this concept, or category, as indispensable for the very life of philosophy itself. In short, we are to deal with those thinkers who consider common sense something primary and ultimate, a first principle, in contrast with those who regard it as adventitious and secondary, to be respected as something outside philosophy, something irrelevant to a refined specialty.

Locke, for example, never argues directly from common sense;⁵ yet he is the common sense philosopher par excellence--in the spirit of his inquiries, his preoccupation with 'facts' of human nature, his distrust of formalism in logic and metaphysics, his simple faith and demonstrable morality, his catholicity of interests, his democracy. In the philosophic steeplechase, he certainly starts from scratch, wearing the colors of common sense; but after taking several hazards in stride, he disappears in his own cloud of dust, and when he

returns, he is among the leaders, but on a different horse, with strange colors. For, though he starts from common sense presuppositions, he denies them in the course of his speculations, and, in the end, his knowledge of the external world is reduced to a faith in the veracity of ideas which represent a reality immediately unknowable, yet powerful, capable of causing subjective qualitative ideas.⁶ At best, we have 'signs' of something not present, yet known--a difficulty, indeed, which plagues philosophers to this day and certainly astonishes common sense: we know, but we know only the mysterious M. "X", a "somewhat we know not what,"⁷ by means of special emissaries whose credentials we have no way of establishing, except by faith (so much in disrepute when held elsewhere as the authority for immediate knowledge of something or other).⁸ Accepting at first the traditional categories of his day,⁹ Locke is primarily a critical thinker, willing not only to discard these traditional doctrines, but common sense as well, when he finds them an encumbrance; also, in his independent forages he hews out of the rough timbers of experience new furniture for the pioneer mind, setting the period style which Kant takes up to alter and improve. Locke is really on the "frontiers of common sense," where Santayana locates him.¹⁰

Berkeley repeatedly asserted that his philosophy was thoroughly in harmony with common sense, in fact, the only philosophy which adequately summed up the views of the ordinary man.¹¹ That this idealism still offers a metaphysical justification is true: a thoroughgoing spiritualistic ontology can

be conjured as readily as an absolute materialism for the metaphysical background of common sense, just as modern physics, in contrast to the Newtonian system may adequately provide the scientific background for common sense. But what is required of all these speculations by the philosopher is a logical, non-contradictory account of how common sense comes to believe what it does, e. g. about the apparent impenetrability, weight, and extension of 'matter.' Berkeley, at least, took the pains to make such an analysis, and carefully showed how our everyday ideas of things, i.e. their primary and secondary qualities, were dependent on the mind, how their esse was percipi. At the same time he showed philosophically how the idea of a necessary substratum was false, and how absolute spiritualism was inevitable. But he wisely took no sides. In his Principles he says, "It will be urged that this much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substance. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense--for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind--then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination."¹²

Berkeley indeed thought that he had reconciled common sense and metaphysics. Common sense in the personification of Dr. Johnson, however, thought otherwise.¹³ But, unfortunately,

such a spectacular demonstration fails to convince the philosopher; though readily winning the assent of Everyman, who often is content to argue, 'This stone is hard matter and not a collection of ideas in my mind, because, when I kick it, it remains unchanged and my shoe in no way penetrates it,--in short, it resists my efforts and even causes in me sensations of pain which I have associated with other hard objects." A beautiful petitio, indeed,--it is hard matter because it is hard matter! On the other hand, the swinging foot of the learned doctor at least disclosed, (1) his misunderstanding of Berkeley's argument; and (2) the verification of the philosophy he intended to disprove. For if he had understood Berkeley he never would have attempted a refutation which demonstrates the very argument he attacks, namely, that the alleged hard stone is nothing but a collection of ideas--extension, size, shape, weight, impenetrability, color, etc.

It is very possible, then, for a philosopher to argue matter away and to show how the 'things' of common sense are composed of ideas whose existence depends upon their being perceived by some spirit.¹⁴ The man of common sense may string along with the philosopher, even though he is unconvinced by logical demonstration, until the news is broken to him that his precious possessions exist only through their being perceived. Now he balks; nor will he assent even when he learns that his beloved objects, his home, his wife and children, his savings, are sustained by the Eternal Perceiver, God, introduced in part, after the fashion of Descartes' deity, as

guarantor of man's convictions,¹⁵ i.e. as a concession to man's demand for (a) trustworthy perceptions, and (b) the continued, independent existence of objects apart from man. In spite of philosophic protests of agreement with common sense, Everyman looks upon these constructions with distrust in the act of admitting their logical proof. The man of common sense (and the Common Sense philosopher, too) is in this predicament: he must accept something for which he has no positive proof (the independent existence of real, material things) and reject that for which there exists a careful demonstration (the dependence of things upon the mind). In time, we shall come to a representative Common Sense philosopher of this type, who notes this predicament.¹⁶ But let us keep in mind, meanwhile, these facts, that to start from common sense is no guarantee that one shall return to the same starting-place; that to claim common sense affiliations, even along with logical arguments calculated to support common sense, is no proof that the final view is acceptable to common sense; that common sense has the last word, and may dissent to an apparently foolproof demonstration because it is an inadequate analysis of the view intended by common sense.

II. Historical Background of the Argument from Common Sense.

One always associates Common Sense Philosophy with the Scotch School of the eighteenth century. The names of Hutcheson, Reid, Beattie, Stewart and Oswald, however, are not always mentioned with respect--as we saw above.¹⁷ Yet in their day they had a wide following which extended to France, where Collard, and his pupils, Jouffroy and Cousin, used the Scottish doctrines (and perhaps the common sense philosophy of Father Buffier) in connection with their reaction to Condillac's sensationalism.¹⁸ Sir Wm. Hamilton's 'natural realism' was a substitute for 'common sense realism,' which had fallen into disrepute, following the attacks of Priestley, Kant and Ferrier.¹⁹ In America, James McCosh was the chief representative of the last of the Scotch line, and his natural realism²⁰ was a protest against the spread of a transcendentalism which was to culminate in the philosophy of Josiah Royce. But it was principally the growing popularity of Hegelianism which carried, in the romantic mood of the nineteenth century, far and wide--if not so deep--to the suppression of the realistic trend. Unfortunately for Absolute Idealism, it, too, must succumb to the inexorable processes of dialectic and be aufgehoben, and in the scientific naturalism, aided and abetted by Positivism, there arose a new trend which was to join up with the old realism and culminate in the 'new realism,' on the one hand, and in pragmatism, on the other. In the first years of the twentieth century, therefore, we find a crusade

against the idealistic argument--issuing from Berkeley--for the dependence of objects upon conscious experience. G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism" and William James' "Does Consciousness Exist" were the first momentous blows struck in the Sarajevo of the philosophic world.²¹ Various realist schools sprang up and joined the Allies, and for a while, as Napoleon said, God was "on the side of the heaviest battalions."

Today the realists claim complete victory and point with pride to their wide conquests, as well as their acquisitions of a refined scientific technique and the new logic, which they consider impregnable instruments of warfare. But, alas, once more the affairs of state are uncertain, and there is evidence of a reactionary idealist coup. There is a growing ennui, a dissatisfaction with critical analysis; a plea is heard for a constructive, systematic world-view, embracing the ends and values of mundane existence and reconciling the new physics and mushroom cosmologies with the vulgar demands of the 'insignificant,' atomic individual. Common sense has grown impatient; having willingly lent its prestige to the realist campaign on behalf of the external world, it is now yawning at the long drawn contest and wondering whether the salvation of alien territory is worth the poverty at home.²²

Our immediate interest, here, lies not in a historical sketch but in the examination of the problem of the appeal to common sense which has more recently sprung up among the British neo-realists. We shall try first to relate the traditional views of common sense to the more modern in an effort to

obtain a clear idea of how the term is used as a philosophic concept. We shall also indicate the function of the concept within the philosophies of representative exponents, examine the general legitimacy of the concept, then attempt to decide whether a Common Sense Philosophy is justified. For the present we can briefly review the three important vulgar uses of the term, indicating (1) normal intelligence; (2) the knowledge acquired in experience by means of this endowment; and (3) the general judgment, feeling or instinct of mankind, to which may be appended the pre-critical, pre-philosophic 'philosophy' latent in common sense.

It is no coincidence that the appeal to common sense reaches a climax in the eighteenth century; for it was the very spirit of the times to regard Nature with veneration, and Common Sense, like Reason,²³ was looked upon as the gift of the gods. The Renaissance return to Nature, embraced two distinct tendencies, the revived aesthetic and scientific interest in the world of sense experience (which, after the manner of the Epicureans, was to be trusted), and the rediscovery of man's reason as the sole authority in matters scientific and metaphysical. Eventually, Nature replaced the authority of the Church, of the Schoolmen and Aristotle. And it is not at all surprising to find this new authority as final, dogmatic, and unrelenting as the old authority, so vehemently attacked by Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and the entire coterie of "enlightened" philosophes. For it is one of the ironical twists of history that in destroying the idols of

the past, new ones are set up, in essence the same as the old. Man requires some authority, some ultimate logical ground or basis, if only while attacking another authority. He is not satisfied with a meaningless Caprice which produces a chaos, an absolute disorder,--a metaphysical nightmare. For aside from the fact that such a picture itself presents an ultimate, authoritarian Chaos, the practical exigencies of life demand at least a tentative ordering and control of affairs. Even the road to self-extinction is a hard one, requiring discipline and ordered practice, as the Eastern sages well know.

To live or to will oneself into non-existence require equally, then, a minimum of beliefs about existence. Whence these beliefs come is a mystery which man has attempted to solve, usually, by a rhetorical appeal to God or to Nature. Even in the recent attempts of modern behaviorists there is the traditional irreducible ultimate, the nature of the physiological organism--at the least, electrons buzzing about--which makes possible response to a stimulus. This ultimate is something which stands as a fact or principle not derivable from some other facts or principles; or expressed logically, it is the distinction which Aristotle made between self-evident necessary and universal first principles and those principles which are secondary, or derived from these primary principles.²⁴ It is, in other words, the phenomenon of a set of beliefs, original stock-on hand, without which we do not begin the business of life. This stock may be 'instincts,' 'tendencies,' logical a priori 'principles,' metaphysical 'categories,'

'common sense axioms,' or 'fundamental beliefs.'

When the Age of Enlightenment reached its climax with the proud exhibition of man's encyclopedic knowledge and the pronouncement of a platform of reform, the great emphasis was laid upon the individual's reasoning power; and confidence in the ability of Reason to unlock the dank dungeons of superstition and let in the Light was unbounded. The paradoxes of the thought of the Age have been summed up delightfully by Professor Carl Becker in his recent Storrs lecture. The philosophes owe much to medieval thought, yet

"They denounced Christian philosophy, but rather too much, after the manner of those who are but half emancipated from the 'superstitions' they scorn. They had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude toward the Deity. They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind. The Garden of Eden was for them a myth, no doubt, but they looked enviously back to the golden age of Roman virtue, or across the waters to the unspoiled innocence of an Arcadian civilization that flourished in Pennsylvania. They renounced the authority of church and Bible, but exhibited naive faith in the authority of nature and reason. They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be called philosophers. They dismantled heaven, somewhat prematurely it seems, since they retained their faith in the immateriality of the soul. They courageously discussed atheism, but not before the servants. They defended toleration valiantly, but could with difficulty tolerate priests. They denied that miracles ever happened, but believed in the perfectibility of the human race."²⁵

Nature and natural law--these were the magic words of the century. In man Nature had implanted flawless faculties of reason and intuition, which, if used faithfully, could arrive at the understanding of all things, and which at some time in the near

future could realize the progressive perfection of things. This was the ambition of a Descartes or Bacon given new enthusiasm. And in Rousseau this 'return to Nature' is rhapsodized. Just what this Nature one was to revert to really was no one made clear. As for natural law, the Newtonian physics had presented a triumphant picture of the world-machine, and man--at least the body of man--was definitely a part of this world-process.

Enlightenment, reform, progress--in the world of things as well as in the world of art, letters and philosophy-- was a big order. The trouble began with the complete faith in the realization of all ideals by means of man, the agent and benefactor. And when disillusionment came it arrived covertly in the cloak of skepticism, or jauntily in the costume of some new enthusiasm, perhaps the 'new history.'²⁶ Hume's skepticism is thus typical. But skepticism was never allowed to become an obstacle to action or faith; so we find Hume apologizing--and rationalizing--for the failures of Reason by indicating the value of academic or 'mitigated' skepticism for philosophy and philosophers, in one place,²⁷ and by stipulating that only by becoming a philosophic skeptic can one be truly a Christian, in another connection.²⁸ The impasse occasioned by Reason thus prepared the way for custom or habit, instinct or faith. And Hume is ready to turn to Nature, or to Common Sense, for the authority of those beliefs he retained as a practical man of the world, happily busy in court, or divertingly entertained by the Comtesse de Boufflers (for

whom he was the "maitre de philosophie et de morale") in the salons of Paris. Meanwhile, in the provinces, far removed from the capital of the civilized world and little impressed by the uncreative works of most of the philosophes (though it should be said, strongly moved by the democratic ideal), the Königsberger, Kant, and the fellow-countryman, Reid, were preparing polemics which would destroy the skeptical philosophy and secure God, freedom, and immortality.

III. The School of Common Sense

Hume, then, is really the precursor of Reid's Common Sense philosophy, though unconsciously so. Reid, however, began with the principles of Common Sense and set out to correct the "ideal theory," the premises of which lead to skepticism; Hume, on the contrary, started with the traditional categories of his predecessors, and in particular with the Lockean 'ideas,' only to revert to Common Sense in order to save the external world in his hour of need. Strangely enough, Reid, as we shall discover, returns to a philosophic position similar to that of Locke--a position he thought his principles of Common Sense obviated. Thus Hume ends where Reid begins; while Reid ends where Hume begins. Each, as representative of the spirit of the times, is a Common Sense philosopher, just as Kant thought he was,²⁹ and as Hamilton, sharing the views of both Reid and Kant, in turn claimed to be.

The Cartesian emphasis upon consciousness as the starting point for all reflection is, by Reid's time, approaching its later consummation at the hands of the post-Kantians, who, spider-like, will spin the world out of the transcendental ego.

Both the logical and psychological aspects of the ego have received thorough attention from the 'rationalists' and 'empiricists.' In Reid both sides meet, but he is, above all, partial to the English tradition. We are to begin with an inductive analysis of consciousness after the best manner of Bacon.³⁰ Moreover, we are to abide by the fundamental principles of the understanding, once we have discovered them, and thereafter deduce the consequences. Reid was a close student of Berkeley³¹ and tended to see other philosophies through the eyes of the good bishop. In his own theories he invokes Berkeleyan terms.³² And his teacher at Marischall College, George Turnbull, was a Berkeleyan, and, according to Fraser, fond of appealing to Common Sense as the final arbiter in philosophic matters.³³ McCosh notes that in Turnbull's, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning the Connection between the Doctrine's and Miracles of Jesus Christ (1726) there are repeated references to Common Sense as the judge in settling moral questions.³⁴ Earlier in his volume on the Scotch realists, Dr. McCosh has observed also that "it was owing... to the influence direct, or indirect, of Shaftesbury that the phrase 'common sense' came to be so much used by the Scottish School."³⁵

In 1717, a little after Shaftesbury had published his Characteristicks, there appeared under the pen of Father Buffier, S.J., a treatise on first truths, Traité des Premières Vérités.³⁶ This was an attack upon the Cartesian confinement to consciousness of those initial truths from which his entire

system proceeds. Buffier shows that skepticism is inevitable; or as Brehier puts it, "to say in effect that, primitively, we know only the actual modification of our soul, given by the inner sense, is to say that we could legitimately doubt exterior things, events of our own past history, and the existence of other men, since none of these things could be the object of the inner sense; and it is an illusion to believe that, in proceeding from these modifications, one could prove rationally the existence of these things."³⁷ To start with methodical doubt is to commit an initial faux pas: "There are some truths concerning existence outside the self (called 'external verities') which are 'primitive'--or 'primary' in the same respect as the inner sense, for example, the reality of the external world, or of other men." "The faculty which perceives these verities is 'common sense'...the same thing as nature, since 'it is nature and the sentiment of nature which we must know again for the source and origin of all original verities.'"³⁸ Buffier, like Reid, looks upon Common Sense in the end as the guarantor of the truths of religion: Common Sense "suffices to lead one to the most solid principles of religion."

This doctrine is very much like Reid's. It is significant that on the title pages of both the An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense and the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid quotes from Job. On the former is inscribed, "The Inspiration of the Almighty Giveth Them Understanding;" on the latter, "Who Hath Put Wisdom in the Inward Parts?" For Reid, not unlike Descartes, looks upon the

truth of the self-evident facts and principles as assured by God, who put them into the understanding.³⁹ In a passage in the Essays where Reid speaks of the "offices" of reason⁴⁰ he distinguishes between that which judges of things self-evident, and that which draws conclusions from these self-evident things. "The first of these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent...It is the degree that entitles them (mankind) to the denomination of reasonable creatures..(This first) is purely the gift of Heaven. And where Heaven has not given it, no education can supply the want." This same theme is brought out in his Inquiry. "If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them--these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd."⁴¹

But just what are these principles of common sense so necessary for the function of life and of philosophy? "The man who first discovered that cold freezes water, and that heat turns it into vapour, proceeded on the same general principles and in the same method by which Newton discovered the law of gravitation and the properties of light. His regulae philosophandi are maxims of common sense, and are practiced every day in common life; and he who philosophizes by other rules, either concerning the material system or concerning the mind, mistakes his aim."⁴² In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Reid

discusses these first principles in detail. There are those which relate to contingent truth and those which have to do with necessary and immutable truths, whose contrary is impossible. I shall list the former first--in the order in which Reid presents them. Contingent truths have as principles:⁴³

1. "The existence of everything of which I am conscious."
("This is the only principle of common sense that has never directly been called in question.")
2. "That the thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person."
(Reid shows that a permanent self continues while thoughts and feelings continually change.)⁴⁴
3. "That those things did really happen which I distinctly remember."
4. "Our own personal identity and continued existence, as far back as we remember anything distinctly."
5. "That those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our sense, and are what we perceive them to be."
6. "That we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determination of our will."
7. "That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious."
8. "That there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse."
9. "That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind."
10. "That there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion."
("If children were so framed as to pay no regard to testimony or to authority, they must, in the literal sense, perish for lack of knowledge.")
11. "That there are many events depending upon the will of man, in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances."
("...as to men who have a sound mind, we depend upon a certain degree of regularity in their conduct...")

12. "That, in the phaenomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances."⁴⁵

Reid divides the principles of necessary truths⁴⁶ into six classes, grammatical, logical, mathematical, matters-of-taste, moral, and metaphysical. "That every complete sentence must have a verb" is an example of a necessary grammatical principle; "That no proposition can be both true and false at the same time" is cited among the logical principles. Under taste we find Reid avowing that "notwithstanding the variety found among men," there are, "some common principles, even in matters of this kind." Some of the moral maxims are: "That an unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one; That a generous action has more merit than a merely just one," etc. etc. Much more attention is given to the metaphysical principles, which are here listed:

1. "That the qualities which we perceive by our sense must have a subject, which we call body, and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind."
2. "That whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it."⁴⁷
3. "That design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred, with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect."

Reid proceeds in the next chapter to discuss "Opinions, Ancient and Modern, About First Principles." His list includes those of Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Newton and Buffier,--a poor showing, indeed, along side Hamilton's prodigious summons of one hundred and six witnesses.⁴⁸

I have cited the above principles at length because they enable us to grasp concretely just what Reid understood

by "principles of common sense," "common notion," "self-evident truths," or simply "first principles,"⁴⁹--terms that he uses synonymously in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, which presents his mature views. His chapter treating of judgment in the collection of essays just named is revelatory of Reid's similarity to Kant. For both philosophers make judgment primary: we start with beliefs which can be shown to bear directly on certain logical propositions without which experience would be meaningless (in Reid's point of view) and impossible (from the standpoint of Kant). But for our purposes it shows just where Reid stands as a common sense philosopher. Certainly with him there is no easy-going appeal to a general, all-inclusive term, as a philosophic argumentum ad sensum communem. In his Inquiry, he has gone at great length--and patience--to criticize the dangerous implications in the hypothesis of representative perception.⁵⁰ Then he has attempted to present his own counter-argument, again by a careful, deliberate procedure, in order to arrive at a theory of perception which harmonizes with the first principles of common sense, possessed democratically by all men.⁵¹ And in the present work (the Essays) he endeavors to clarify his position and justify it on philosophical grounds, perhaps, to even win back some of the prestige which succumbed to Dr. Priestley's bitter invective.

Common sense is the term we apply ordinarily to common judgment.⁵² "Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business."⁵³ And again, "All knowledge, and all science, must be

built upon principles that are self-evident; and of such principles every man who has common sense is a competent judge, when he conceives them distinctly. Hence it is, that disputes very often terminate in an appeal to common sense."⁵⁴ Furthermore, in the passage cited above,⁵⁵ confining common sense to the judging of things self-evident, rather than applying it to the active reasoning faculty which proceeds to draw conclusions from these first principles, Reid limits the extension of his term. He has proceeded to analyze what persists after many propositions have perished or undergone change,--what, in fact, is at the bottom of all our reasonings, concerning both matters-of-fact and necessary truths. It is not the concretely worded conclusions which describe past experience or prophesy future experience, nor those random conclusions which come from we know not where, but the logical principles behind all these, which, in Kantian language "make experience possible."⁵⁶ Reid distinguishes, as was customary and traditional between the necessary truths of mathematics, demonstrable a priori and with certainty, and the truths which we know "concerning the real existence of things--the truth of our own existence--of the existence of other things, inanimate, animal and rational, and of their various attributes and relations."⁵⁷ But all our knowledge, whether of abstract relations or of matters-of-fact, is got by reasoning built on first principles,⁵⁸ and our conclusions are either certain or probable, in various degrees.⁵⁹ Also, it is highly desirable that to afford stability to human knowledge the first principles on which it is ground be pointed

out.⁶⁰ Finally, "Nature hath not left us destitute of means whereby the candid and honest part of mankind may be brought to unanimity when they happen to differ about first principles."⁶¹ Reid then lists the first principles we have presented above. No matter what we think of Reid's principles whereby knowledge is made possible,⁶² we must admire his inductive efforts to arrive at them. He can never be accused of shirking his philosophic responsibilities.

Common sense, then, is that term which we apply to self-evident, first truths, principles, or propositions of the understanding, given or intuited immediately, and necessary for all our knowledge and action, in matters of abstract, certain demonstration and in things of concrete existence, where probable knowledge alone results. Dugald Stewart preferred to denominate them, "fundamental laws of human belief,"⁶³ because of the misunderstandings occasioned by the term common sense. And Hamilton, in an extensive Note, appended to his collection of Reid's works, "On the Philosophy of Common Sense or Our Primary Beliefs Considered as the Ultimate Criterion of Truth," discusses the term at great length,⁶⁴ agreeing with Reid, but pointing out that these primary facts are assured to consciousness by feeling or belief. He sums up the argument from common sense this way, "To argue from common sense, is simply to show, that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial of some original datum of consciousness; but as every original datum of consciousness is to be presumed true, that the proposition in question, as dependent on such a principle, must be

admitted."⁶⁵ So far as sensible perception is concerned, it is a fact of common sense that I am immediately aware of both myself, as knowing subject, and of a not-self, as object known; never do I know only a representation of some object.⁶⁶

Reid, Stewart and Hamilton thus concur in their definitions.⁶⁷ Common sense has taken on a technical significance for philosophy, and it is no wonder that the poet Burns was unable to understand this special use of the term,⁶⁸ or that those who did not first take the trouble of reading the Scottish thinkers condemned off-hand, as superficial and anti-philosophical, their much labored treatises.⁶⁹

The above definition has much in common with our first definition of the ordinary usage of the term common sense and a direct bearing on the other two. It is a philosophic analysis of the ordinary concept. This gives the philosophic concept particular significance, in that it shows a very positive relationship existing between our ordinary beliefs (and practices) and philosophy.⁷⁰ It shows that ordinary common sense beliefs and philosophic beliefs are basically compatible, perhaps mutually implying each other logically. And I believe that this is what Reid meant to assert. His recourse to an argumentum ad absurdum or ad risum is taken in a mood of the ordinary man. Of course, this is bad practice for a philosopher who has resorted to a dangerous term like common sense, because it plays into the hands of those enemies to whom common sense is anathema, representing as it does all that is

objectionable in the ordinary man's argument from prejudice, superstition or passion.⁷¹ In his best philosophic manner Reid never thought of winning his point only by such 'arguments.' It is true that he regarded them as having some validity,⁷² but they are secondary to his main point that the principles of common sense are those "which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life."⁷³

Essentially, he starts from life and ordinary beliefs and looks upon them as more fundamental than reason, logic or history.⁷⁴ As we have noted above, beliefs--or judgments--are original; logical analysis appears much later on the scene. What Reid is also asserting, in addition to the fact of harmony and generic relationship between common sense and philosophy,⁷⁵ between practice and theory, is that even in philosophic analysis (a reflective refinement upon common sense) there is no disparity between reason and feeling or instinct. Or better put, there is a concordant, compatible, non-contradictory relationship between all the elements making up conscious life. We may not be able by reason to explain our instinctive beliefs, but the possibility of such remains; we may not affectively assent to a rational construction or critical analysis, yet the possibility of finding such intellectual objects to be really objects of interest cannot be closed.

IV. Hume's Appeal to Common Sense

I believe Hume would admit this last statement, though in his philosophy he differentiates sharply between those beliefs of custom or habit⁷⁶ and the conclusions of reason. In

a way he contradicts himself; for he first attempts, like Leibniz, to apply the mathematical ideal to matters of fact, that is, by use of the traditional categories arrive at conclusions analytically. At the same time he held out the hope that certain relations between phenomena could be grasped in their immediacy, that e. g. the causal tie could be intuited or immediately perceived. The upshot of his thinking, however, led him to the conclusion that while we can arrive at analytic a priori judgments in mathematics or geometry, in science, where matters-of-fact (existences) are concerned, we arrive at synthetic proposition a posteriori only through experience, that is, by custom or habit (not by reason). Thus, pure reason has failed to justify what we all, as persons of common sense, take for granted; yet the facts exist, therefore they must be due to psychological association--ordinarily termed custom or habit. But in making this analysis, Hume was still the philosopher. In short, he didn't throw up his hands in despair,⁷⁷ nor remain "suspended," as not even the skeptic he presents⁷⁸ could have done. He went right ahead to explain, as best he could, how our ordinary beliefs⁷⁹ are formed by psychological principles.⁸⁰ From the standpoint of the rationalist, these beliefs may be 'illusions of common sense,' but from the viewpoint of the ordinary many they are facts. And Hume was frank enough to admit that these facts have a presumption of truth in their favor, even though some rational demonstrations have failed to account for them.

We must never forget that Hume's first work was a Treatise of Human Nature and that in the course of his metaphysical discussions, after having been plunged into skepticism, he returns to human nature wherein may be found, apart from our reasoned constructions, the key to our beliefs about nature. In a sense, his return to common sense is an avowal, (1) that his job of showing the impotency of reason--once held so high--is done; (2) that the critical skepticism, finished, may carry on to clear out the cobwebs of the mind (as Locke's essay had been contrived to "clear the ground" and "remove some of the rubbish"); and (3) that we may now return to a new analysis of experience based upon experience itself, and especially upon the sensitive phase of life. "My intention, then, in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect (the skeptics), is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects, are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures."⁸¹ In the preceding passage he has stressed the natural source of our judgments. "Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connection with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking, as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine."

Indeed, this is the language of the Common Sense philosophers, and one would have a difficult time of placing it elsewhere. And in the next sentence he anticipates the cry of Reid, shrill with alarm,

"If this is the philosophy of human nature, my soul, enter thou not into her secrets! It is surely the forbidden tree of knowledge; I no sooner taste of it, than I perceive myself naked, and stript of all things--yea, even of my very self. I see myself, and the whole frame of nature, shrink into fleeting ideas, which, like Epicurus's atoms, dance about in emptiness."⁸²

and admits that no philosopher can set up what has existed within him all along (thus anticipating Reid's answer):

"Whosoever," says Hume, "Has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered unavoidable."

But this skepticism is even more pronounced when Hume's phenomenalism discards, first, the external world, then the internal world. And again, it is impossible for one, by philosophical argument alone to judge of the veracity of those prior arguments which have so easily removed the "existence of body." For "Nature has not left this to (the skeptical philosopher's) choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance, to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but it is vain to ask, Whether there be body or not?"⁸³ He repeatedly speaks

of the 'fiction' and 'illusion' of 'continued existence,' but takes great pains to show by a philosophical analysis how, owing to man's nature, these illusions naturally occur, i. e. how common sense realism comes about. As a philosopher, he is a phenomenalist, rejecting both Berkeleyan subjectivism and Lockean representative dualism on the grounds that we have neither a substantial self, nor any basis for an external cause, much less a Deity, in the first instance; and that we have no right (1) to invent "the double existence of perceptions and objects," (2) because this depends upon our illusory creation of continued existence in the common sense view, and (3) we cannot ever arrive at a causal tie between the existent, continuous 'object' and the fleeting perception,⁸⁴ in the second case. We have, indeed, only the terpsichorean antics of atomic impressions and ideas, as Reid pointed out.

Hume, then, returns to common sense because he has to; we are so made that we cannot be anything but common sense persons in practice, and only by a great effort of concentration, be more than a common sense philosopher in theory. But Hume has not sold out to common sense; on the contrary, he is all the more a philosopher in demonstrating how the appearances of common sense are 'saved.'⁸⁵ He seems to reason like this:

The philosopher alone is competent to tear off the veil of appearances and see things as they really are. His fate--a hollow reward for the exertion of his rational faculties--is to end in the Black Hole of Skepticism. Fortunately, Nature has prearranged his rescue from mental suffocation. Common Sense offers ready escape with its illusions of Gnosticism,--its 'Animal Faith.' Important and indispensable as they are, these ordinary, vulgar beliefs

are not beyond analysis. And the genesis of these Common Sense fictions can be shown by the philosopher to rest necessarily upon the demands for a safe and sound conduct of life.

In a sense, then, we are torn between philosophy and Common Sense, reality and appearance. Our visit to the former realm has enabled us to see through our vulgar frailties and understand them. Had we never gone abroad, we would cling still to our homely beliefs as the 'real;' had we stayed abroad, we would have embraced the truth at the expense of our life. By going and returning--like the Platonic dweller-in-the-cave--we live, yet live understandingly.

If we are to live a life of reason, we cannot choose between the alternatives.

The great mass of mankind has little appetite for the philosophic fare. The philosopher leaves his skepticism--with his books and papers--within his study's walls. And while the beliefs of Common Sense have an initial presumption of truth and finality for all men, the truth is the special province of the philosopher. For he is truly a philosopher who first questions the common sense beliefs with which he is originally equipped. This does not mean that he can go beyond Common Sense. Yet he may go beyond, and finally discover, without compromising himself, that he can reconcile his common sense youth and philosophic manhood without slighting either.

From Common Sense to philosophy; from philosophy, back to Common Sense. The two are never one, but then neither are they exclusively two. The philosopher, though always a man of Common Sense, is yet a philosopher, quite unable to forget his vision of the real.

Thus we can understand his preference for the 'profound philosopher,' rather than the popular philosopher, who superficially builds on the opinions of common sense. "It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtle reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its

contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no further; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions."⁸⁶

V. Summary and Comparison of the Appeal to Common Sense by Reid and Hume

So far, then, we have considered two appeals to common sense. The first proceeds on the grounds that 'experience' and philosophy are one, and that common sense is the first source of all our truths concerning matters-of-fact and metaphysics; the indispensable, because universal and necessary, basis for all reasoning; the primary and elemental body of self-evident propositions; or, as we should term them today, the 'postulates,' 'primitive propositions,' 'axioms,' which cannot be demonstrated, but which are necessary for demonstration. The second type of appeal begins with the admission that philosophy (by which is meant rational demonstration) is impotent to overcome the illusions of common sense, which are necessary for practical action, in the first place, and so native and 'natural' to man, metaphysically, or better, perhaps, physiologically, in the second place. While philosophy sees through the hypocrisy of common sense, which pretends to be something

it isn't, common sense exists in its own right, not as a pragmatic concept (though it is pragmatic), but as a necessary concept, representing wise Nature who has endowed man with the necessary instincts and 'imagination' that he might live with security and efficiency, and survive any skepticism which philosophy, the evil spirit within, might engender, in showing that, after all, the 'apparent world' is a mind-organized collection of 'phenomena.'

The similarity of these positions is evident. Common sense, in each instance, is a natural body of necessary and universal beliefs, which express man's original, primary views about the world in which he lives, that is, acts; for the emphasis is upon the exigencies of practice, upon the question, As an active organism, what features of the environment I live in strike me as significant, and as such, as real? The difference enters with the word 'real.' Reid and his followers could see no dualism between what we find real, as practical men, and what we discover upon philosophical analysis. The difference between common sense, in the ordinary sense, and philosophy is that the latter seeks by a careful analysis and criticism to understand the meaning of those things merely taken for granted by the former. And we find that there is no essential difference between the two. Hume, however, returns to the Platonic distinctions between philosophic subject-matter and philosophic faculties, the hierarchy of relative truth and immutable Truth. His ideal is that of mathematics, the discovery of those primary truths from which can be deduced, necessarily and a priori,

all truths. His goal is 'reality'--open only to the philosopher. His obstacle is opinion (or common sense) which flourishes by custom or habit. His conclusion is that whereas all men require common sense in order to live, the philosophically 'real' is open to a few.

Both Reid and Hume would accept the utility of the proposition, There is an external, continuous and independent world which I know immediately. Each would admit, also, that this is a practical dictum without which the normal business of the world could not function. Philosophically, however, a wide divergence occurs. Reid argues that the proposition has prima facie truth inasmuch as it grows out of the body of self-evident first truths. Hume claims that it must be called before the Inquisitor, Philosophy; for what has practical value may not be really true, and what has initial validity as a 'truth' of common sense may be false in metaphysics. For Hume the first truths of metaphysics are the traditional categories and certain unchallenged dogmas concerning the stuff of knowledge. These have greater validity in the philosophic world than any claims which common sense might make. When Hume concludes, then that phenomenalism is elected by philosophy, it is imperative that he show how the realism of common sense offers so much opposition. This is done by summing up the function of the natural tendencies of the imagination, etc. which construct the illusory world of experience out of impressions and ideas, thus setting the precedent for Kant.⁸⁷ Had Hume failed to show how the illusions of common sense come about

he would have failed to convince even his most credulous followers, so persuasive and presumptuous is common sense.

VI. How the Modern Appeal Differs from the Old.

The old and the new schools of common sense have this in common: they react against a theory of ideas which they feel is incompatible with realism. In the eighteenth century it was the inevitable skepticism of Hume which stimulated the Scotch School into fervid effort to retain all the cherished beliefs of common sense. In the twentieth century it is against a particular type of realistic analysis, as well as contrary to the prevailing idealism, that action is taken. The position of Russell, for example, was found obnoxious. Material things, it was felt, were not simply collections of "appearances," and our belief in the reality of the external world was more than a mere "prejudice"--as Russell himself admitted.⁸⁸ In short, the appeal to common sense takes the form of saving the real world from the steady inroads phenomenologists (or hang-over "radical empiricists") were making. Material things, according to common sense, are more than sensibilia or collections of sense data.

At the same time, many of the advocates of common sense are wanting in the temerity to speculate; they are satisfied with a positivistic position. Common sense is not regarded as the genetic source of knowledge, that is, as that which supplies the first premises for facts known through experience, or deduced in demonstration, and which furnishes the impetus behind

our judgments or beliefs,--excepting one or two debatable instances where philosophers have merely appealed in a general way to the authority of common sense to sanction their argument--a phenomenon not uncommon, as we have seen above. No effort is made to justify common sense by placing it in a metaphysical background. It is felt that it needs no justification. It is a natural fact: a body of propositions is accepted as true by all persons. In regard to the knowledge problem, common sense supplies testimony with a realist flavor, for it asserts that we know objects to have an independent existence, and in knowing them, we know them approximately as they really are. Thus, there is an internal harmony between the realist philosopher and the ordinary man of common sense; they agree in general. They differ in their interests. The plain man is content to accept the situation as it stands; the philosopher is restless until he explains the meaning of the general propositions. This entails rigorous analysis--the role, in short, of the specialist. In looking upon common sense as the spring from which the data of philosophy bubbles, these primitive propositions are logical premises for further analysis, so that we have really reintroduced the concept of the Scotch School, and we have again a body of self-evident, first truths. The gap, however, between the old and the new is more than an expanse of years.

Contemporary realists are positivists, so far as common sense is involved, while the Scotch realists were psychological metaphysicians. And where the eighteenth century was vitally

concerned with the furniture of the understanding,--the logical categories, out of which our body of propositions sprang,--the twentieth century is preoccupied with a positive acceptance of the propositions themselves and the ambition to make their meaning clearer. Otherwise put, the old common sense realists were curious to discover the machinery of the human mind which, in the manner of a printing press, 'made' the newspaper of knowledge out of the raw materials that went into the complicated process. The moderns are content, for the present at least, to take the process for granted, or as more or less adequately 'explained,' and accept positivistically the printed sheet. Their job is to make clear what is not quite clear, and thus define general 'facts' in such a way that their meaning is understood from the specific angles which analysis suggests. In the knowledge situation they hope to make clear the factors involved in my simple statement, "I see my desk," without jeopardizing the common sense demand for an analysis which meets the requirements of its general position. If the drift of the analysis leads to conclusions incompatible with the premises, we must reexamine our analysis, rather than revise our premises; for, in the first place, we can hardly alter what is necessary, and secondly, in the nature of things, common sense is the final arbiter. We shall have more to say on this question later.⁸⁹

VII. Some Modern English Realists: Joad, Moore and Ewing.

C. E. M. Joad has written a popular volume of

philosophic essays which purport to be aspects of a common sense philosophy, and he has, in fact, designated the title, Essays in Common Sense Philosophy.⁹⁰ In the essay, "Our knowledge of Sensible Objects," he joins with Professor Dawes Hicks against the idealists, traditional representationalists and those New Realists (Messrs. Russell and Moore, in particular) who fall back into the representationalist error of having as factors in the knowledge situation, the knowing mind (A), the idea or image known (B) (though the term used may be 'sensible quality,' 'sense datum,' 'presented sensation'), and the physical object which is regarded as being the cause of the idea or image (C). Mr. Joad believes that factors (A) and (B) suffice, and that these are in fact the only factors involved. In the name of common sense, then, "we are in perception in contact with Reality itself," and "the divergent perceptions of the same object which are experienced by different people and by one person at different times, are due to the varying contents of the same whole to which we direct our attention."⁹¹ The mind is active and selects discriminately content which is part of a whole, and while the content of the whole exists independently of being perceived, the separate contents are called into existence by the percipient and exist "simply by our act of perceiving them." That this is a very unsatisfactory account, taking no cognizance of the significance of memory and error, may be due to the author's view that "it is the peculiar function of mind

to know in this way things other than itself, a function which is unanalysable and, if you like, inexplicable."⁹²

Common sense, then, is an authority which enables us to criticize as inadequate any theory that holds up some tertium quid coming between the knower and the known, because of the positive demand for a knowledge directly of the object known, which is known as it is in reality, and which exists in its own right apart from the knower and independently of being known. Among the numerous propositions meant by common sense, then, are those which express a naive realism, immediate knowledge of things just as they are.

Mr. Moore, in contrast to Joad, agrees that we start with common sense, for it embraces apparently the subject-matter of philosophy. He does not agree, however, that the analysis of what we mean by our common sense views requires any one analysis. In other words, the ultimate, detailed phases of the knowledge situation in no way seriously affect our meaning when we assert, "I see a chair." There are certain requirements, indeed, but once these are satisfied, philosophic refinements may enter to explain what must be involved in detail, the sole proviso being, that the final conclusions do not contradict our general premises, that is, common sense. Moore has stated this point in his essay, "A Defence of Common Sense."⁹³ In order to make clear what he means by 'Common Sense' he gives a list of 'primary' propositions,--a 'credo' which ordinary persons and some philosophers readily assent to, thus differing from many other philosophers who have dissented. So far as

Moore is concerned, the propositions of common sense which he lists are true,⁹⁴ and philosophy must begin its analysis with them. For understanding the meaning of a general proposition is one thing; knowing what it means "in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning" is another question. This is, of course, a general tenet of the Cambridge analysts. The point he is making, however, established for us the place of common sense in philosophy and their generic difference. Common sense is a body of beliefs (propositions) whose meaning is understood clearly and unambiguously by all men, and some of these beliefs are truths, and recognized as certainties. The correct analysis of these meanings is the business of the philosopher and the fruits of his labors are propositions which may or may not have a probability of truth.

The list which Moore presents as comprising some of the propositions or 'truisms' included in our 'common sense beliefs' is divided into two groups, one having to do with his private beliefs, the other with beliefs held in common by all men:⁹⁵

I

A.

1. I have a living human body, which was born, has grown, and has been in contact with or close proximity to the earth's surface.
2. At every moment since the birth of my body, many other things of three dimensions have existed; and my body has been at various distances from and in various contacts with these things.
3. Among these 'other things' are other living human bodies which have had relations with things. Some of these bodies have died and ceased to exist.

4. The earth had existed many years before my body was born, and upon it lived many human bodies at every moment. Many of these bodies had died and ceased to exist before I was born.

B.

1. I am a human being and I have had at different times many different experiences, of many different kinds:
- a. I have perceived my body and other things forming its environment, among them other human bodies.
 - b. I have observed facts about them, e. g. the spatial relation of 'nearness.'
 - c. I have remembered certain facts.
 - d. I have anticipated the future, and have held many other beliefs, true and false.
 - e. I have imagined things.
 - f. I have had dreams.
 - g. I have had feelings of many different kinds.

C.

Just as I have a body and have had such experiences (of the above and of other kinds); so have there been other bodies which have during their lifetime had many similar experiences.

II

I have knowledge of other selves and of the correspondence of their experience and knowledge, in general, with my experience and knowledge.⁹⁶

Moore holds that all these propositions are wholly true, and points out that II includes the fact that other persons agree with him in believing these propositions to be certain and free from error. Besides, the meaning of these propositions is perfectly clear. What the correct analysis is on any occasion is another matter and a difficult question. "It is obvious that we cannot even raise the question how what we do understand by it is to be analyzed, unless we do understand it."⁹⁷

The above propositions imply the reality of material things, of space and time, and of at least one self, and anyone admitting the truth of these propositions, and yet denying any of their implications is in an ambiguous position. Moore then shows the contradictions which occur when philosophers deny any of these propositions, e. g. in denying the knowledge of the existence of other selves they have yet referred to the existence of other philosophers. Elsewhere, some philosophers have held other views which they have known to be inconsistent with what they have known to be true. And some philosophers have admitted only the possibility of the truth of these propositions which they term 'Common Sense beliefs,' that is, these propositions are believed, never known for certain. These latter thinkers, however, in asserting that they are beliefs of common sense, generally held, forget that if there are such beliefs, they must be true; for they entail those propositions asserting the existence of many human beings beside the philosopher, the fact that they have had human bodies, which lived upon the earth, and have had various experiences, including beliefs of common sense.⁹⁸ Beliefs of common sense, then, must be accepted by philosophers, themselves, not merely as beliefs, but as truths. It should also be noted that we entertain some propositions which we know indirectly and yet know them to be true, that is, we know propositions for which the evidence has escaped us: we know them, but do not know how we know them.

Moore concludes by showing that we must accept the body of 'Common Sense beliefs' as wholly true. All philosophers have agreed to this view of the world while holding views inconsistent with the features of the common sense view. To know anything as a feature of the common sense view is ipso facto to know it as true, for to say we know it is to admit the truth of the general proposition II. The beliefs of common sense are "extraordinarily vague," and many views called 'Common Sense views' may be false and "deserving of the contempt with which some philosophers speak of them." "But to speak with contempt of those 'Common Sense beliefs' which I have mentioned," Moore concludes, "is quite certainly the height of absurdity."⁹⁹ Finally, if the above propositions are true, others are true, too, e. g. "That there have lived upon the surface of the earth not only human beings, but also many different species of plants and animals, etc. etc."¹⁰⁰

In his recent volume, Idealism: A Critical Survey,¹⁰¹ A. C. Ewing likewise devotes space to the argument from Common Sense. Phenomenalism is absurd, not only to the ordinary person, who has never looked into a formal philosophic treatise, but also to those philosophers like Hume who after study and long familiarity with philosophy agree with the ordinary man. Each appeals to common sense, "a non-inferential but not therefore necessarily irrational conviction which survives the acid test of philosophic study and criticism."¹⁰² And Ewing rightly asks, if solipsism seems absurd and we instinctively

believe in the existence of other persons (in the full sense of 'persons'--physically embodied 'souls'¹⁰³), why there is not the same evidence for the independent existence of physical objects? Common sense, in fact, agrees that the denial of independent existence in each case is contradictory (to common sense). Furthermore, if we cannot know physical objects, but can know only their phenomenal effects, this state of affairs is just as unsatisfactory as the non-existence of objects, yet science has proceeded on the assumption that we cannot know matter in itself but only what it is in external relations. No one can be said to believe in physical objects when these are regarded as an unknown something causing our experiences, for the unknown may (for all we know) be Berkeley's Divine Spirit, Democritus's atoms, or Beelzebub.

On the contrary, the person of common sense knows at least the size, shape, and relative position in space and time of physical objects. Ewing also notes that phenomenalism not only suffers within philosophy from the charges of common sense, but above all in practical affairs, where the philosopher is "no more qualified to speak than the plain man," we give credence to our normal views flatly contradicted by phenomenalism. What are these views--in detail which phenomenalism contradicts? Analysis of our ordinary views reveals eight conditions,¹⁰⁴ which we know to be true and which phenomenalism in every instance rejects:

1. "When we ascribe shape or position to a physical object as existing unperceived...we are asserting to a categorical proposition." (Not a merely hypothetical proposition with the phenomenalist.)
2. By a cause (of our perceptions) we refer to something actual. (Not to something hypothetical.)
3. Ascription of spatial characteristics to independently existing objects is an "essential part of the normal perceptual experience."
4. A categorical proposition, e. g. "This is elliptical," not only expresses the present, but "forecasts the future and implies the past..." (It is not mere appearance that we have to do with.) And 'is' is the existential 'is.'
5. "Terms such as 'this table,' 'a stone,' 'his hand,' etc. as usually employed each stand for a particular continuant."
6. Propositions about physical things are not propositions about human experiences of fleeting images.
7. Different persons perceive (e. g. see) the same thing (Even when some types of representative perception is held; but in phenomenism there could be no identical particular thing of which two or more persons can have sensa.)
8. Propositions about a human being imply his independence of other observers and are not propositions about sensa of these observers.

These eight conditions are imposed upon our philosophic analysis by our common sense realism which makes itself evident when we ask ourselves what we mean by our ordinary statements.

As with Moore, then, Ewing believes that common sense is the starting point for philosophic analysis. As a collection of propositions whose meaning is clear to the ordinary man, common sense is the inevitable starting place for the philosopher, who draws out the full meaning. We start with common

sense because we cannot start elsewhere--it is first in the order of subject-matter and has a presumption of truth chiefly because the beliefs of common sense and our variety of practices and actions are harmoniously consistent. Ignoring the meta-physical implications (perhaps we should add, physiological or biological implications), and taking a positivistic attitude, common sense presents the material for philosophy. This--in substance--is the view as I see it of the Cambridge analysts (represented by Moore and Ewing). In an age where the dominant reaction was in favor of idealism against realism, the appeal to common sense would be minimized or would take a different form--possibly on behalf of 'values,' or of a 'comprehensive world-view,' etc.

VIII. Some Modern English Realists (Cont'd): Stout

Strangely enough, Mr. Stout makes this last appeal as a basis for his metaphysics.¹⁰⁵ He does not confine his treatment to epistemological issues, as do Moore and Ewing in their respective appeals to common sense, but includes the psycho-physical problem, certain aspects of the ontological problem, and then prepares an introductory prolegomena to the more ultimate problem of the relationship of God and Nature. The scope of his work thus demands a view of common sense, as synoptic and all-inclusive. I propose to outline what he presents as significant for the knowledge problem.

Philosophers in general regard common sense not as a final authority but as "a witness whose testimony must be

carefully considered before it is rejected," and when they achieve results contrary to it and regard the common sense view as false, they take pains to show how we come to have such a view. We have pointed this out above in considering Hume's 'apology.'¹⁰⁶ Stout indicates that the common sense of the ordinary man is opposed to the special sense of the specialist, and that in the conflict the ordinary man does not feel disposed to side with the specialist. On the contrary, the ordinary man feels that there is something wrong with a view which is warped, one-sided, or biased, and lacking in the broad, but unscientific, view of the common sense individual. The specialist by means of popular books may win over the ordinary man and also show him the fruits of his speciality, e. g. the radio, which applied science made possible. But in spite of this alteration in the original body of common sense beliefs a man starts out with, there is, says Stout, "A class of questions in which neither the positive explanations nor the acquired prestige of the expert are felt to be adequate. . . .When, in the name of science, the man in the street is told that grass is not really green, as it is really extended, he may bow to authority: he may even endeavour to understand, and think that he does understand, the process by which this result is reached, and he may be unable to detect any fallacy in it. None the less, he covertly retains his misgivings, and, when he is not expressly referring to 'what science teaches' his position is, in substance, unaffected by it. When he looks

at grass, he still takes it to be green as he takes it to be extended."¹⁰⁷ The same attitude is reflected in the ordinary man's respect for the philosophic doctrine of determinism: the average man holds two incompatible views, the one of theory over against the one of practice, for in daily life he still acts as if he possessed freedom of choice.

Since the distinctive aim of the philosopher is to give "a coherent account of the nature of the universe as a whole,"¹⁰⁸ common sense and philosophy function similarly. We have pointed out above that this comprehensive view is early in the history of man a desideratum, and that from this angle, common sense is, with Stout, that which may be taken to signify, "the whole in which the partial views due to one-sided interest and experience are so combined and harmonised that they converge again in a focus."¹⁰⁹ In primitive life there was more agreement between the 'medicine man' and the ordinary person because life was not so highly specialized. Today, however, we are beginning to pay the penalty of over-specialization and men are failing to see the forest because of the trees, to use a trite, but true, expression.¹¹⁰ How is the philosopher to regard the mass of concrete beliefs and experiences which form common sense? First he must get behind the data and by means of critical interpretation "discriminate what assumptions are really essential to primitive practical efficiency from prejudice due to narrowness and ignorance."¹¹¹ In attempting this determination, he may appeal to the

'educated.' This is always done, anyway, in testing the value, if not the truth, of our thoughts, or arguments: their acceptance, in the long run, depends upon those qualified to pass judgment upon them. But philosophically we cannot count on a consensus (which may be very misleading, even if it were possible always to secure such testimony), nor on the so-called educated (because education is always imperfect, and one-sided, according to some dominant interest of the period). The philosopher must always criticize and correlate one-sided views (and always be on the lookout for the one-sided) by means of critical methods, employing specialists where he finds them helpful, yet allowing for their peculiar bias.

At the same time, the philosopher must keep in mind the possibility of discovering any fallacy inherent in human nature, any original tendency, which can account for common sense beliefs,--that is, explain them away, as Hume attempted to do. If some beliefs persist, in spite of past errors and inadequacies, these are strengthened rather than weakened in their prima facie evidence. Assuming that beliefs persist and no original fallacy has been found the philosopher must still consider the objections advanced. "The mere failure of this or that specialist to find reason for it, within the limits of his own domain and characteristic methods, ought to count for nothing."¹¹² If no original fallacies are discoverable, then, in spite of objections launched against common sense,

it should be regarded as having a presumptive claim for recognition and acceptance. If science, a special development of one of the original partial interests of common sense, ignores certain aspects of experience in order to achieve its own goal, or attempts to interpret the whole in terms of its partial specialty, then common sense is obligated to step in and assert its forceful objection on the ground that a one-sided view is a distortion of reality. The presuppositions of science cannot be accounted for by science itself, and the question of what ends should be attained is an important question forever beyond the reach of a specialty which is concerned with explaining 'the How' rather than 'the What.'¹¹³ Disturbed by the dogmatic one-sidedness of science we have but to turn to common sense for other views and for the synoptic "focus."

As a body of beliefs, common sense is an expression of what we know, as well as feel, and otherwise experience. In practical affairs true knowledge is indispensable. Generally, from the point-of-view of its success in describing situations and predicting consequences, as well as verifying them, it is not unlike science. Now so far as common sense is concerned any philosophical criticism of a special philosophical topic, especially theory of knowledge, must recognize this primary fact of adequate knowledge at the common sense level. In fact, "The ultimate test of any theory of knowledge is its success in answering the question which falls within its province. It

sets out to explain how we know what we admittedly do know. It breaks down if instead of this it reaches the result that we cannot know what admittedly we do know. In that case what it has achieved is only to show that the principles on which it has proceeded must be false."¹¹⁴ The demands of common sense which must be met by any theory of knowledge are summed up by Stout as follows:

- 1 - An initial datum is the "distinction and correlation of embodied self and external object."¹¹⁵
- 2 - Any theory of knowledge "is bound either to reaffirm or to find a really workable substitute for the view of the physical world as a world of things existing independently of individual experience, locally separate from each other, interacting with each other, and possessing in themselves the primary and secondary qualities of matter."
- 3 - The distinction which common sense makes practically "between the appearance of a thing to the senses, and its own intrinsic nature which persist and changes independently of variation in its sensible appearance," must be preserved.
- 4 - Justice must be done to the causal view of perception according to which, "sense-experience, and indeed individual experience in general, is in some way determined in the phenomenal order of nature by physical conditions: more especially by processes in living bodies and by the interaction of living bodies with their environment."

Finally, there should be no real conflict between science and common sense, out of which science itself develops, and in which it exists in a rudimentary way from the very beginning. However, when science denies what it has found irrelevant for its peculiar purpose there results "apparent conflict between it and the whole concrete view of reality which constitutes Common Sense." Such wholesale denials are unwarranted to

begin with and only end in hopeless confusion and misunderstanding.

It is apparent by now that Stout has taken great pains to make explicit what Moore and Ewing have likewise implicitly agreed upon in regard to the function of common sense as a philosophic concept. Stout has summarised his definition succinctly: Common sense is "a social product maintained and transmitted from generation to generation through the co-operation and conflict of many minds in thinking and willing."¹¹⁶ It is the starting point for philosophic research because it is the concrete body of knowledge (taken in its broadest sense) from which the various specialties, science, philosophy, religion, art, etc. branch out--the Mother, the logical and material parent of specific 'realms of discourse,' ever-changing, yet maintaining some propositions which seem to resist change. And whether we approach it positivistically in seeking the correct analysis of its meaning, or in addition tackle it metaphysically, to determine its underlying conditions and its consequences for philosophy--in general, or in some particular problem--it is both the beginning and the end (as a philosophically enlightened Common Sense) of our progress, guiding us positively, correcting us negatively, and yet always regulating and determining our ultimate destination.

IX. The Common Elements in All Appeals to Common Sense

It is a long jump from Locke to the present, yet there is internal evidence that the 'return to nature' begun during

the Renaissance and climaxed by its deification in the century following the father of epistemology is still making itself felt philosophically, if nowhere else, at least in the high esteem with which common sense is still regarded. The philosophies of experience today are the logical consequents of the movement begun in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the appeal to, or the argument from, common sense is perfectly consistent with the eternal demand for the concrete, immediately known truths, inherited in the fixed forms of language and custom, and corroborated by everyday events and personal history. The positive appeal to common sense involves the positive reaction against any extreme doctrine which is felt to run counter to the simple, homely truths. The cry of "Back to Common Sense!" may be the indignant demand of a people frightened by skepticism, or the restrained plea of a philosophic sect outraged by an equally extreme doctrine denying the reality of space, time and deity. Opposite extremes appeal to it with equal facility, for common sense is in fact the meeting place of extremes.

In each of the philosophic doctrines we examined we found essentially the same elements, with different emphasis being placed upon common sense in keeping with the particular interest of the philosopher. Every instance found common sense a body of first principles or first truths,¹¹⁷ with the emphasis upon belief, i. e. judgment, thus indicating the conviction with which they were held. We found that these beliefs

--or propositions--were held universally, were immediately known (though in some cases, the conclusions were reached first by others, mediately), and that some of the beliefs were regarded as necessary. So far as the main doctrine of realism is concerned, we found unanimity. Reid preferred to regard Common Sense principles as a priori, self-evident truths of the understanding, which, if not innate, are brought to light through experience. Earlier, Hume had likewise made much of common sense beliefs which come of necessity, owing to our physiological nature, and which save man from the bitter truth of philosophy by clothing him in a protective mantle of illusion. Hence, where Hume was sure of their irrationality, Reid was convinced of their inherent rationality; though Hume, too, might have admitted some rationality in the wise foresight of Nature (in providing man with such important facilities as reason) and in man's efficient manipulation of everyday affairs. All our philosophers recognize the strong argument from the 'practical,' and this prime factor receives due attention from the moderns under the influence, no doubt, of pragmatism. At the same time, the modern Common Sense philosophers are loath to leap into metaphysical speculations regarding the furniture of the understanding; they are satisfied, rather, to attend to the content, the concrete beliefs, themselves, and to unravel the implications important for philosophy. Stout carries his analysis further, for he is building a metaphysics,-- a speculative system. In a sense, he revives the spirit of Reid

who tried to solve numerous problems while ensconced in the solid fortress of common sense.

For all the philosophers we have studied, Common Sense is a significant concept for philosophy. In a sense it is necessary, i. e. philosophers cannot dismiss it whether they agree that it is important or unimportant; besides, as men they must rely upon it in their practical moments. Furthermore, all philosophers admit that as a body of concrete propositions, guiding man in his daily intercourse, common sense is indispensable; and as such--some add, "but no further"--a place may be found for it in philosophy. The Common Sense philosophers hold, on the contrary, that practice and philosophy are mutually related, that the natural beliefs about the universe, rising as a product of man's intercourse with Nature, have a presumption of truth in their favor; hence, they are the stuff out of which philosophies are made. Contradictions, they agree, are often the direct result of ignoring Common Sense, as, in a far more serious manner, absurd theories of the world and skeptical conclusions are also the consequences of denying the 'first truths' of the understanding. The Common Sense philosophers, then, are in agreement on the following points: They admit that Common Sense is a valuable, indispensable working concept in philosophy; that it is significant, valid and authoritative--facts which 'experience-in-general' reveals; that it broadly outlines the scope of a general philosophy, while, at the same time, it limits and regulates the analyses

which attempt to solve special issues within a general philosophy--that is, its propositions are general truths, known with certainty, setting a point which cannot be contradicted without sacrificing the entire position, known from the first to be true; that it is unfortunately vague and ambiguous, yet at the same time full of definite meaning, so that as a philosophic term its good points outweigh the bad.¹¹⁸

If we stop to compare the philosophic concepts of common sense with the ordinary usage, we find that the former is but a careful, critical refinement upon the latter, and that at bottom they are possibly of the same genus. By straining a bit, we can even detect an analogy running through the various definitions. Ordinary common sense as 'normal intelligence' is similar to the necessary truths of the understanding advertised by Hume and the Scotch School. The truths, beliefs, etc. learned from experience are analogous to the 'contingent truths' of Reid, the 'customary' beliefs of Hume, and, in part, are directly involved in the body of propositions which Stout and the Cambridge positivists begin with. Finally, the emphasis upon the general body of beliefs entertained by all mankind marks out the close kinship the vulgar view has with Stout's insistence upon the all-comprehensive, most inclusive 'class' in which the separate realms of discourse are found, partial in themselves, though necessarily contributing to, and in turn benefitting from, the Whole.

X. Summary

In this section we first pointed out that appeal to common sense in name is no guarantee that common sense plays a unique role in a particular philosophy. Next we attempted to show how the eighteenth century was favorable for the popularity of such an appeal as a part of the Nature-idea, and how Hume becomes the precursor for Reid from the standpoint of both his skepticism and his regard for 'custom and habit.' After this we sketched the development of the Scotch School of Common Sense from Reid through Hamilton and pointed out some similarities between Reid and the Königsberg Professor, Immanuel Kant. The presentation of Hume's views permitted a comparison between the Skeptic and Reid, and we discovered that at bottom they had much in common, that, in fact, their appeals to common sense were in each case indispensable for their philosophies. Then we turned to the moderns and found that they regarded common sense positivistically and made no attempt to plunge into the metaphysical depths. Rather, their chief concern was to draw out the full implications of the common sense position by careful analysis and criticism. All agree that common sense implies a very definite realism, and that acceptance of common sense involves the truth of this realism. Stout, differs from the positivists in having a metaphysical goal before him, i. e. in attempting to present a synoptic view of reality, which he believes is the goal of the philosopher. In conclusion we tried to show that all the appeals have a common element among themselves and with the ordinary, non-philosophic use of the term, common sense.

NOTES

1. See Dewey, Experience & Nature (2 ed.): Preface, iii; pp. 2a, 4a, 7-8, 17-18, 21, 36.
2. Cf. Essays in Critical Realism, London, 1920, pp. 7, 15, 85, 119, 224.
3. Cf. The New Realism, New York, 1912, pp. 10, 12-13, 21.
4. The fact that part of a philosopher's 'success' rests upon the acceptance of his philosophy by common sense, gives some prima facie evidence of the significance of common sense. This is also noted by Stout, Op. Cit., p. 7.
5. With one exception, this is true. In I, 2, iv, he says, "He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side, or on the other side went to give reason why 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.'" (I have underscored 'common sense')
6. Essay, II, 8, viii: "Whatsoever the mind perceived in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is."
7. Ibid., I, 3, ix.
8. That is to say, when some thinkers ask us to accept their 'representative ideas,' 'sensa,' etc. admittedly there is no way to prove their reference to what they represent. And unless they do refer to something they are meaningless. Our knowledge is always of something, even when we only perceive sensa; but sensa, in turn, derive their significance not in themselves, but extrinsically, being like currency, a medium of exchange, and valueless unless firmly and securely backed by cash and good-will. Thus when we are asked to accept the veracity of sensa on faith, we are being asked to reintroduce that which philosophers have condemned, namely, the same sort of faith in the veracity of our knowledge of an external, independent reality. We discuss this same issue below in Part Four, Section 2.
9. Cf. James Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations, Cambridge, 1917, pp. 182 ff.
10. Santayana, Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1933, Locke, the Frontiers of Common Sense.

11. Cf. Third Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 378, 397. (Bohn's edition, ed. George Sampson, London, 1908, vol. 1). In his introduction to the set, Mr. A. J. Balfour, cites a memorandum of the youthful Berkeley: "Mem. -- To be eternally banishing Metaphysics, etc. and recalling men to common sense." And Cf. Principles Introd. 11, "I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be." (My italics) Again in the body of his Principles, 113, he appeals to common sense in support of his views regarding motion.
12. Principles, 37.
13. "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, 'I refute it thus.' -- Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. G. B. Hill, Oxford, 1887, v. 1, p. 471.
14. Itself not an 'idea' but a 'notion'. Here we have a good example of the very thing Berkeley warns against in the Introduction to his Principles: the haphazard use of words. When he got rid of the material substratum Berkeley had to place the ideas somewhere, so he retained soul 'substance.' But he dare not term the soul an 'idea' for two reasons, (1) he had to have a subject -- a knower -- as an indispensable element in the knowing situation, in contrast with the known, i.e. the ideas (accepting Santayana's criteria, Berkeley would be a realist -- at the lowest level. Cf. "Three Proofs for Realism," in Essays in Critical Realism, p. 163); (2) in order to preserve the soul intact, free and independent, he had to make it other than an 'idea' (which was dependent), though he might have argued that the soul was a 'special idea' perceived by God -- a view, perhaps, more consistent with his later mysticism of Siris. Here, however, making the soul an 'idea' would be to degrade it to the level of matter.
15. Cf. Descartes, Meditations on the First Philosophy, etc. Meditations, III, IV.
16. See below p. 67.
17. See p12 above, and Note 31, part one, section 1, p. 19.

18. For the Scottish School see James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, London, 1875; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, Scottish Philosophy, 4th ed., Edinburgh and London, 1907; W. R. Sorley, A History of English Philosophy, New York and London, 1921. Emile Bréhier, in his Histoire de la Philosophie, Tome II, Fascicule ii, refers to Buffier and Reid (pp. 331-334; 497-499), and to the French followers of Reid in Fascicule iii, pp. 647-667.
19. For Kant and Priestley, see above, p 12. In G. Watts Cunningham's The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy, New York and London, 1933, there is an outline of Ferrier's criticism of Reid (pp. 18-21). Ferrier showed that Reid's substitution for the Lockean theory of representative perception was purely verbal, and was in fact a partial return to the very 'ideal theory' he attacked. This is my own conclusion; see below p. 108.
20. McCosh's views may be partially found in his volume on the Scotch School (op. cit.) and in his two volumes, Realistic Philosophy, New York, 1897. For a comprehensive survey of the wide influence of Scotch realism in America, I. Woodbridge Riley's book American Philosophy: The Early Schools, New York, 1907, is invaluable. Cf. pp. 10, 13, 18; and the section devoted to Realism, pp. 475 ff. McCosh also has a chapter devoted to American Philosophy in his survey of the Scotch school, pp. 183-190.
21. Lovejoy's account of the first stages of the realist revolt may be found in The Revolt Against Dualism, Open Court, 1930, pp. 7 ff.
22. Cf. the Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy, "Philosophy and the Ordinary Man," by Sir Herbert Samuel, (London, 1932). The complaint is lodged that it is time to turn from the epistemological controversy to the more important issues of life which people are vitally concerned with -- waiting for a philosophy, they wait in vain.
23. The identification of common sense and reason was often made.
24. See Topics, I, 1, vi; Prior Analytics, I, 3 iv; Posterior Analytics, I, 2, xvi. Hamilton has gathered these references in citing the witnesses for the universality of Common Sense Philosophy. Cf. Reid's Works, v. ii, pp. 771-773.
25. Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century, New Haven, 1932, pp. 30-31.
26. For a good analysis of the histories of Fénelon, Fontenelle, Gibbon, Grimm, Hume, Robertson, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Herder, see Becker, op. cit., pp. 88 ff.

27. Cf. Treatise, Part IV, Sections 1 and 2; Enquiry, Section XII, Part I.
28. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part XII.
29. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, p. 126, compares Kant's remarks, in the First Preface of his Critique, to the effect that the ideal consists in "a system of the mind ... an inventory, systematically arranged, of all that is given us by pure reason" with Reid's concluding remarks in the Inquiry: "A clear explication and enumeration of the principles of common sense is one of the chief desiderata in logic." The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. Sir Wm. Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1863, (6th ed.), p. 209.
30. Reid was a great admirer of Bacon. See Dugald Stewart's comment in Works, pp. 9-12, and p. 200; also pp. 708-713 in A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic.
31. Cf. Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay II, ch. x, pp. 280 ff. where Reid points out that what Berkeley avers to be self-evident appears absurd to the average man who holds the "sun and moon, the earth and sea as objects" of knowledge. Reid also confesses his early apprenticeship in the Berkeleyan idealism: "... I once believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it...." (p. 283)
32. 'Suggest' and suggestion' are one example. (For Reid's use of the term see Part II, section 2, II.)
33. Thomas Reid, by Alexander Campbell Fraser, Edinburgh and London, 1898, p. 22.
34. *Op. Cit.*, p. 97.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 31. McCosh quotes from Shaftesbury: "Some moral and philosophical truths there are withal so evident in themselves, that it would be easier to imagine half mankind to have run mad, and joined precisely in one and the same species of folly, than to admit any thing as truth which should be advanced against such natural knowledge, fundamental reason and common sense." McCosh does not cite the reference which is to Shaftesbury's Characteristicks (2 ed., 1714), the essay entitled, "SENSUS COMMUNIS; An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour," p. 146. Reid quotes this same passage along with other excerpts in Essay VI, ch. ii, Intellectual Powers. At the close of the essay "SENSUS COMMUNIS" there are these remarks, "But shou'd you find I had moraliz'd in any tolerable manner, according to Common Sense, and without Canting, I cou'd be satisfy'd with my Performance." (Pt. 4, sec. iii, p. 149)

36. I am indebted to Brehier, op. cit., p. 331 ff. for the account of Buffier's writings. The translation is mine. Hamilton also quotes from Father Buffier in (Reid's) Works, pp. 786-7, and Reid notices him in Intellectual Powers, Works, pp. 467-68. A matter of historical interest is the accusation appearing in the 1780 English translation to the effect that Reid and his followers had plagiarized Buffier. (Noted by McCosh, p. 220, Note 1). Reid was stoutly defended by Stewart in his Elements, v. ii, pp. 63-64 and by Hamilton. The latter points out, (p. 789, op. cit.) that in Reid's account of Aristotle's logic, published ten years after the Inquiry, the author says, "I have lately met with a very judicious treatise, written by Father Buffier." Suffice it to say that it is really impossible to trace the philosophic concept as employed by Turnbull, Hutcheson and Reid. If it were at all important the chances are that one could find much evidence that Locke approached the concept as used by the Scotch thinkers in his appeal to 'natural law' and to intuition.'
37. Brehier, p. 332.
38. Ibid
39. And, for that matter, compares Locke's remarks: "God has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure." Essay, IV, 20, iii.
40. Intellectual Powers, Works, p. 425.
41. Inquiry, Works, p. 108.
42. Ibid, p. 97.
43. This list is in the Intellectual Powers, Essay VI, ch. v, pp. 441-452.
44. Reid admits, p. 443, that "If any man asks a proof of this, I confess I can give none." It remained for Kant to use the transcendental method to prove the necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception.
45. Cf. Inquiry, p. 199; "However, we agree with the author of the 'Treatise of Human Nature,' in this, that our belief of the continuance of nature's laws is not derived from reason. It is an instinctive prescience of the operations of nature, very like to that prescience of human actions which makes us rely upon the testimony of our fellow-creatures; and as, information from men by language, so, without the former, we should be incapable of receiving the information of nature by means of experience."

46. Contained in Chapter VI, pp. 452 ff. (Intellectual Powers)
47. In Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of Man there is an interesting chapter on the idea of power, Works, pp. 520-522.
48. See Note A, "On the Philosophy of Common Sense," Works, pp. 770-803.
49. Works, p. 434.
50. Pp. 99-104. And pp. 245 ff., Essay II, Intellectual Powers.
51. See especially, Inquiry, pp. 182 ff.
52. Intellectual Powers, Works, p. 423.
53. Ibid., p. 421.
54. Ibid., p. 422.
55. See page 47 above, and reference, Note 40.
56. Several authors have indicated that Reid approaches Kant's critical philosophy. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison notes this, pp. 109-149, op. cit., and McCosh, p. 224, cites one of Reid's Mss. papers to show an anticipation of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Reid said, "In some first principles...the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it. There are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject, as when we affirm that a thing which begins to exist must have a cause."
57. Intellectual Powers, Works, p. 430.
58. This is his first proposition regarding First Principles in General, X ibid., pp. 434 ff.
59. The second principle in general, p. 435.
60. The third proposition, p. 436.
61. The last principle, p. 437.
62. Cf. below, Division V, p. 60.
63. Works, p. 26. Stewart adds, that "Such truths no man but a philosopher ever thinks of stating to himself in words; but all our conduct and all our reasonings proceed on the supposition that they are admitted." (p.27)

64. Supplementary Discussions, Works, p. 742 ff.
65. Ibid., p. 743.
66. Cf. Reid's Principle Five (under contingent truths), above, p.48.
67. I do not mean to assert that the definition given is common, as it stands, to all the members of the Scotch School. Reid gives numerous definitions, but I believe that they all imply this more generic one which certainly expresses his ripest reflections, just as the various attempts of the several members of the School are summed up in the unsatisfactory attempt of mine. There is difference in expression, but I believe unanimity in meaning.
68. See reference to Burns above, p.14 and quotations included.
69. There is no evidence that Kant, e. g., had ever read one writer of the Scotch School. (I am excluding the Scotch Hume, whose Treatise never reached Kant.)
70. More about this is said below, p.142 ff.
71. I am not implying that, "It is false that philosophers ever argue from prejudice, superstition or passion."
72. See Intellectual Powers, Works, pp. 437-441.
73. For full context, see above p. 47.
74. This concurs with A. K. Rogers' opinion, English and American Philosophy Since 1800, N. Y., 1928, p. 4.
75. "...In reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But, on the other hand, Philosophy... has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots." Inquiry, Works, p. 101.
76. Hume's Enquiry, i. e. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section V, Pt. 1. (I shall refer to Hume's work as the Enquiry in contrast with Reid's Inquiry.)

77. Disillusionment does not always entail despair, though quite often the two go hand in hand. The Faith of the 18th century was too great to stop at a little intellectual discouragement. Had there not been serious apathy, on the other hand, enthusiasm for reform might not have culminated in the conflagration of feeling which spread into the revolutionary holocaust.
78. Cf. Enquiry, Sec. XII, pt. ii (Open Court ed. p. 170): "And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches, when he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself..." Cf. Treatise, Part IV, sec. i.
79. "Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new production, that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and experience. The next question, then, should naturally be, how experience gives rise to such a principle?" Treatise, Part III, Section iii (Everyman ed., pp. 84-85)
80. The "principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity and Causation." Enquiry, Sec. V, Part ii. Cf. Treatise, Part III, Sec. vi)
81. This and the two following quotations are taken from the Treatise, Part IV, Section i. The italics are in the original.
82. Inquiry, Chapter I, Sec. vi.
83. Enquiry, Part IV, Sec. ii.
84. Ibid. (In the Everyman edition, pp. 193-202; 203; 205-207.)
85. See my opening remarks above, p.6.
86. Enquiry, Sec. I. While this is an attack upon the popular philosophy of common sense it is indeed no polemic against the philosophy of Reid. For one thing, Reid's Inquiry did not appear until seventeen years later; for another, when Reid submitted his Mss. to Hume, the latter commended him, saying, "It is certainly very rare, that a piece so deeply philosophical is wrote with so much spirit,

and affords so much entertainment to the reader..." (The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, Oxford, 1932, v. 1, p. 375) Reid acknowledges Hume's kind remarks in a letter which may be found in the Works, p. 91.

87. Kant's noumenal world is a Humean hangover, as well as a Leibniz-Wolff vestige. Kant, more so than Hume, is closer to the common sense position; for he starts with organized experience and finally ends there, making it the real, so far as common sense and philosophic (and scientific) knowledge are concerned. Besides, the factors which make experience possible are discoverable within experience--as essential phases of experience. Hume seems to confuse the epistemological and ontological issues from the start. If he meant to say that ontologically nothing exists but 'perceptions' (in the broad sense, including 'ideas'), and yet, epistemologically, we nevertheless do know an external world, apparently independent and continuous, he would have been clearer, though the problem of how we come to experience the apparent world remained. Both are philosophical problems. We cannot speak of 'philosophical reasoning' in ontology and 'moral reasoning' in epistemology without subjecting ourselves to the justifiable charge of partisanship. Hume held that 'moral reasoning' comes to the surcease of skepticism (Enquiry, Sec. XII, Part iii.) which springs out of 'philosophic' reasoning, supplying that for which there is no evidence, and Kant resorts in his Practical Reason to the postulates of God, Freedom and Immortality, shown in the Pure Reason to be unknowable. In each there is tacit respect for common sense, if not full acceptance of its obvious conclusions.
88. For a careful account of Russell's position, see Lovejoy, op. cit., pp. 193-221.
89. See below, p. 148 ff.
90. C. E. M. Joad, Essays in Common Sense Philosophy, London, 1919.
91. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
92. Ibid., p. 46. It should be indicated here that Joad's later views have outgrown his early naive realism. According to his own statement, he "gradually advanced from a more or less naive realism of the Meinong type (advocated in his Essays, above) ...to the more extreme position known as neo-realism." (Contemporary British

Philosophy, ed. J. H. Muirhead, London, 1925, v. 11, p. 159.)

93. Contemporary British Philosophy, pp. 193-223.
94. He admits that there may be some 'propositions of common sense' which are false. These, however, are not included in the list he gives.
95. I have paraphrased in some cases, but for the most part the wording is essentially that of Moore.
96. This is paraphrased from pp. 195-196, op. cit., and the above propositions extend from pp. 194-195.
97. Ibid., p. 199.
98. Ibid., p. 205.
99. Ibid., p. 207.
100. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
101. A. C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, London, 1934.
102. Ibid., p. 292.
103. This is my parenthetical comment. Ewing apparently assumes that the analogy is self-evident here; he is more explicit later, on page 299, where he says, "It is obvious that any proposition I assert about a particular human being implies his independence of any observers and is not merely a proposition about the *sensa* of these. But if so it is difficult to avoid holding that this is the case with propositions about his body, since, when I say, e. g. that he is in the room or is in good health, I am certainly not usually speaking only of his mind, and in that case it would be senseless to oppose a similar view of propositions about other physical things."
104. Ibid., pp. 296-299.
105. G. F. Stout, Mind & Matter, N. Y. & Cambridge, 1931.
106. See above, p.
107. Op. Cit., p. 3.
108. Ibid., p. 4.

109. Ibid., p. 5.
110. This aside is mine, not Stout's, yet it expresses what he is saying.
111. Op. Cit., pp. 6-7.
112. Ibid., p. 10.
113. Ibid., p. 13.
114. Ibid., p. 241.
115. This first demand, along with the others, is stated on pp. 242-244.
116. Ibid., p. 8.
117. 'First' in three senses; as logically prior, in that philosophy entails Common Sense; as materially prior, in that Common Sense presents the concrete data with which one philosophizes; temporally prior, in that Common Sense comes before any philosophy or any philosophic 'interest.'
118. The points of agreement listed in this division are not included specifically in each case, though they are implicit in each Common Sense philosophy. See Part Two, Section 3.

Part Two. The Function of Common Sense
 Within the Common Sense
 Philosophies.

Section 1. The General Problem of the
 Common Sense Philosopher.

I. Introduction.

The purpose of Part Two is to make more explicit what has already been partially outlined, namely, the distinctive function of Common Sense¹ within the philosophies which appeal to it. We have been forced to explain at some length the function of the concept within the various philosophies in order to make clear the definition of the term. It will be noted that logically speaking we have thus indicated both its intension and extension, though not exhaustively.² Taking it in its most general sense, as including both the ordinary and the philosophic employment, we have outlined the logical comprehension of the term. We have seen that it comprehends a vast number of applications and uses, and that in its philosophic significance it has enjoyed extensive use, reaching its maturity during the eighteenth century and experiencing new youth in the present twentieth century revival. I believe that we have a fair picture, in good pastel tones, if not in precise chiaroscuro, of these two aspects. It remains for me to attempt to point out more definitely the internal significance of the concept within the philosophic organism.

In ordinary life extremes of every kind are resisted by an obstinate conservatism. The reason for conservative

action, however, is not always so obvious: it may be fear, it may be superior insight learned from early acquaintanceship with unwise extremes, it may be sheer inability to understand, or there may be countless other explanations. The strange thing is that all parties concerned believe they possess the sole truth,—both extremes, and the middle ground; and stranger still is the fact that the mean, in so far as it is eclectic, is composed in part of earlier extremes which have been incorporated into it, in due time, and after passing the test of utility in practice or in thought, as an end or as an instrument. It is also true that the passage of time has found many final death blows given to so-called extremes, some of which have been excavated at a later date from old remains and found, like fragments of an ancient civilization, to be intrinsically beautiful and true. The mean, however, does not always triumph; sometimes one extreme replaces another—with equally unsatisfactory results. The history of thought has borne out both of these phenomena. The genius of an Aristotle completed the devastation done to the science of the atomists with the result that science was held back a mere couple of thousand years; and eclecticism early paved the way for a universal philosophy of the Christian world.

II. The Clash of Systems and the Common Sense Protest.

As far as philosophy is concerned, eclecticism, conservatism, or common sense do not always play such prominent parts during a particular era. And no one system sweeps the learned world, for there is always somebody of critics lying in

wait to pounce upon each new candidate. Usually, in the ordinary-world-at-large, common sense is an adequate 'philosophy' for the average person. This universal philosophy (common sense) functions somewhat after the manner outlined above in Part One, Section 1. Philosophers are in part men of common sense, so it is natural to expect some of them to react, in the name of common sense, against any extreme doctrine which violates their beliefs and practices. This reaction may be common to most men, but the philosopher, with his special learning and technique, can make explicit and formidable what is only vague and impotent in the protest of Everyman. Thus rises a philosophy of Common Sense.

There have been many reactions and counter-reactions to philosophies of a type expressing a general, all-inclusive view of things. In fact, attacks and counter-attacks have been so numerous as to make many persons despair of philosophy itself, and this same vacillation has always offered ready powder for the skeptic's guns. An age of Idealism will follow a period of Realism, only to give way to a metaphysical realism of extreme materialism; ages of faith and religion bow to succeeding periods of agnosticism and atheism; what has been shown erroneous yesterday will be revived tomorrow, and demonstrated away the following morning. It is an easy thing to point out the clash of systems or doctrines and easy, also, to draw the conclusion that philosophy is getting nowhere. But this is a betrayal, (1) That the critic has

either, (a) only a superficial knowledge of philosophy, in its scope, and in its specific problems; or (b) no tolerance; (2) That he has failed to grasp the logic of the situation in leaping to his generalization; (3) That in denouncing the futility of philosophy, the critic is setting up his own philosophic generalization, viz., that all philosophy is futile. (Something else, perhaps, poetry has the sole insight into Reality). The thorough student of philosophy readily perceives the agreement underlying the party-tags of the various factions, knows how many battles are battles of words in which philosophers, as Berkeley said, lose themselves in their own dust, and quickly admits that philosophy cannot answer every question.

Extremes are to be anticipated in a universe of infinite variety. The birth of a genius presages creation of speculative flights, half-mad visions of the Ineffable and various mystical trances. When these 'truths' are finally put into words to convey their esoteric meaning they are open to misunderstanding, of course, and if they are understood at all, they must submit to the examination of Everyman along with the host of philosophic experts. In the controversy which follows, the conviction of the Mystic, while highly valuable as an 'experience', is not sufficient to meet the rival convictions of the ordinary man. In a few cases the average person may accept some authority as final, but even then he wants to know why the obvious is not obvious and why this particular vision is to be accepted in preference to any other revelation. The facts of life and theory have to square in the long run, and the former, apprehended

in their sensuous concreteness, have a preeminence even when the whole material world is regarded symbolically as a poor reflection of the eternal world. The things men live in contact with throughout a lifetime are essential to the continuance of life itself, and the ideas, or the One, are remote from the Many spatially, as well as metaphysically. Hence, when some hermit brings his message of spiritualism, eradicating all evil along with all matter, the ordinary distinctions between the 'material' and the 'spiritual' are stoutly insisted upon in reaction and the sage is called upon to show how the distinction is falsely arrived at. He may succeed in convincing mankind that he is right in theory, but ordinary life will continue as before and the customary distinctions will be made.

The philosophic reaction in the name of Common Sense has been something of the kind we have suggested above. At first, in the early stages of the debate, a specific issue is met by a general protest that common sense has been violated; later, when the full implications of the particular philosophic problem are brought out and organized into a system, the protest is reiterated more vehemently--one general system is met by another. This specific citation of transmutations among certain 'fixed' species of lower animal and plant life may be met by a faint protest in the name of common sense, but it is unlikely, since its application is too limited and narrow to affect the interests of mankind and only a biologist is likely to make the protest. Extend the evolutionary concept to in-

clude, as members of the class, the more highly developed animals, and the protest grows stronger--a few more stones tumble down the mountain side. When the inevitable step is taken and the concept is made to include man, the accumulated feeling of centuries roars down upon the poor theorist in an avalanche long before understanding of the new concept occurs. One of the tests (by no means the only one) of the truth of a concept is its acceptance in the long run by society at large. Acceptance means that the cogency of the theory and the proofs readily observable in experiment have been received by reason. Today we are not at all disturbed by evolutionary doctrines;³ in fact, we have absorbed them into common sense and tend to look upon most questions from the evolutionary point of view.

The evidence of past history is in favor of the persistence of a realistic point-of-view from the very beginning.⁴ This continuity further implies that efforts to overthrow it have been unavailing and that no newer doctrines have been incorporated in the common sense of mankind to replace it, as in the reception of evolution. This same body of truths, known as common sense, is a very positive, certain doctrine. Hence, the appearance of either some other positive doctrine which contradicts common sense or some negative doctrine of skepticism which denies common sense is a signal for the protest we have been talking about. We have seen that Reid's general answer was an appeal to Common Sense, as possessing a body of self-evident propositions, against the skeptical conclusions of Hume's philosophy; that the present reaction is generally

directed against idealism or, narrower, against representative perception, on the ground that our ordinary beliefs imply some form of realism, and against the inadequacies of the one-sidedness of science.

Because of the ambiguity of the term Common Sense, philosophers soon realize the need of showing how their general appeal implies very good reasons in some restricted issue for this appeal. In brief, they are showing why there is justification for setting up Common Sense as an authority, since the mere appeal to authority is in bad favor today, in the first place, and because the appeal to Common Sense is usually taken for a plea on behalf of vulgar common sense, in the second instance. All Common Sense philosophers, however, have recognized that some distinction must be made between the vulgar and the philosophic concepts if only for the sake of treatment. They have agreed also that the presence of some shifting, ever-changing elements does not deny the possibility of a nucleus of persisting, unchanging elements; that, in fact, these do exist in a general way, and that until they are disproved they have a claim for acceptance by all men.

III. Analysis of the General Argument from Common Sense.

Common Sense first emerges, then, as a concrete general term, indicating an interpretation of Reality and attitudes of all kind toward Reality, and including numerous 'isms' in its intensional aspect. From the standpoint of ontology and epistemology (the 'what' and the 'how' in the knowledge

situation), realism is held to be one intensional factor, and with this in view some philosophers have felt justified in making an appeal to Common Sense. Where they have not yet fully analyzed the implications of this one aspect in connection with a particular problem, they make their appeal in the name of the general, knowing (i.e. being convinced, psychologically, and thereby judging) that there is some further analysis yet undiscovered, which nevertheless must be because of the general meaning. All the time, their opponents, phenomenologists of the most extreme, solipsistic kind, e.g., may be offering a strictly demonstrated argument which proves that they are right, and the Common Sense philosopher, knowing that he is right, his opponents wrong, cannot adduce any argument proving his own position or disproving his opponent's position. But the opponent is also in a predicament, for he cannot prove that the Common Sense position is wrong; all he can prove is that he is right, and therefore, Common Sense must be wrong by the Law of Non-contradiction. It is true that the phenomenologist may attempt to show how the 'illusion' of the Common Sense position naturally arises; but this is quite different from refuting the Common Sense propositions.

We may have this situation, then: Philosopher A (phenomenologist) advances X, which he finds contradictory to Common Sense, and supplements his philosophy with X' (an explanation of the 'illusion' of Common Sense); B (Common Sense philosopher) asserts his general Common Sense objection "Z"

(while seeking Z, the philosophical analysis of his general position), finding it incompatible with X. It is X or "Z" (Common Sense), so far. But B may show, upon reflection, that X could not be, that not-X is true.⁵ This does not theoretically strengthen his position, since something else, perhaps Y (not Common Sense "Z") is the true stand; and A may make this claim in his obstinate refusal to admit the cogency of B's general stand. At this juncture B can show A that where he (B) has a strong belief about things, A is left with nothing but doubt, and next show that conduct requires just the beliefs of B's position, in fact, belies A's old position (X = phenomenalism), and perhaps, in addition, gives no credence whatsoever to Y. Now, if A holds that conduct and philosophy can be exclusive, B has only to show that it is incumbent upon A to prove his position, since he is now taking just the stand he criticized in B, viz. arguing merely from the authority of his beliefs. If A agrees that there is harmony between philosophic beliefs and practice, he is essentially in agreement with B, who has shown that there is a necessary connection in general, between what we believe and how we act (e.g. we treat persons, not as if they were phenomenal experiences, impressions or ideas, but as particular existents, having a body like ours and experiences analogous to our own). At best, what A can show is that, (1) No proof is possible (on the ground that none yet has been forthcoming, or for some other equally untenable reason), or (2) if B should advance

some theory, supposedly in harmony with Common Sense, Z, that Z is false. But then A has not shown that B's general position "Z" is false, but that B's specific analysis Z is false. We have now arrived at the place where both are in general agreement, acknowledging that analysis X and Z must be dismissed as false and looking for the proper analysis of the Common Sense positions, not Z, but perhaps something like Z, since Common Sense so far as it goes, "Z", has a presumption of truth in its favor.

All the arguments from Common Sense in their most general scope take this form, I believe. If we overlook the inadequacies of the term, together with all the irrelevancies, errors, and falsehoods it contains, and accept it on its face-value, as a concrete general term, possessing some relevant meaning for the knowledge situation, I feel that it must be admitted as a valuable philosophic concept.⁶ Protests, then, like Reid's are a valuable beginning for further philosophic analysis, though hardly adequate in themselves. Common Sense as a general term points out extremist errors and in calling men back to the normal mean, prepares the way for a philosophic answer, in connection with specific problems, or in satisfying demands for a synoptic view. It is not only 'useful' (and therefore pragmatically true) in harmonizing philosophy and conduct, but also, in so far as persistent, recurrent 'beliefs' are concerned, 'regulative'--pointing to some necessary analysis, intensionally.

NOTES

1. Following Stout's example I shall hereafter designate the general philosophic concept with capitals, reserving the lower case letters for the customary, non-philosophical use of the term.
2. The limitations of human knowledge preclude this, especially with such a general term as Common Sense. The concrete individual, apparently known in every detail, is never exhausted, and it is doubtful whether 'simples' in fact exist. Some qualities, e. g. 'redness' seem to be obvious atomic facts--taken intensionally; extensionally their application and use in concrete instances is unlimited.
3. In some quarters--primarily the state of Tennessee--the doctrine is regarded as simply a 'theory,' and for this reason inadmissible as a scientific fact. On the other hand, there have been numerous 'proofs' of evolving species under the control of the scientist, and there seems to be presumptive evidence, in the light of prehistoric discoveries, of man's development. The positivistic scientist who welcomes as data only what can be immediately observed seems to be restricting himself unduly.
4. The evidence of language is strong, indeed, showing that realist distinctions were incorporated into the signs, thus retaining definite meanings. Terms--logically and linguistically--reflect certain original 'differences' --between persons, things, and objects (or 'forces') beyond perception. It is this difference of kinds, in contrast with the reduction of all apparent differences to a monistic reality, which sharply distinguishes realism from idealism.
5. He may show that their argument is logically impossible if A is a solipsist, since an argument requires at least two persons. If A holds that an argument does not necessarily require B in addition to A, B has only to assert that his own position, from his own standpoint, must be correct, since he alone affirms it and knows no argument against it. In addition, he can ask, Who is A anyway,--since by hypothesis he cannot exist?
6. Final word must be reserved until later. See p. 210, below.

Section 2: Two Common Sense Treatments of Particular Issues.

I. Introduction.

Granting that the general appeal to Common Sense is an imposing weapon against such extremes as phenomenism, were a philosopher to rest content with his generality, he would soon find himself the object of ridicule, fit only for verbal polemics, and too often the butt of satire at the hands of his literary opponents. The game of mockery and persiflage thrives on easy generalities, a fact which accounts for its popularity. Philosophy, however, moves not in the realm of the tenuous, but among fine distinctions, clearly made, and accurately tested; and these require care, caution and attentive reasoning,—a fact which no doubt explains the unpopularity of philosophy. The next step, then, for the Common Sense philosopher, after he has launched his general protest, is to make his position definite on the particular issues raised by his opponent. Even if no answer is possible in the nature of things he is not excused from the effort; for he cannot know a priori that no answer is possible—at best he can assert that such is probably the case in view of very definite reasons. The hope that a satisfactory conclusion may be somehow reached is what drives the philosopher on and the seeking is often its own reward.

II. Reid's Attempt to Analyze the Knowledge Problem.

The Common Sense philosophers whom we have studied did not shirk their philosophic obligations. Reid, above all, made a serious effort to retrace the steps of the "ideal theory" in order to determine what errors lead to

the inevitable skepticism of his famous predecessor. From the first philosophers have employed representative perception theories, that is, they have felt the need for some intermediary, an image,--a something like the object--which the mind directly perceives, since by hypothesis and by common sense the object itself does not enter the mind, and which, in turn, enables us to know the material world as something very much like the sensation or image. In short, philosophers have adopted uncritically many metaphors, among them being those of the 'reflection' or the 'mirror-image', and have allowed them to become dogmas, little realizing that some of them are the source of subjectivism and skepticism.¹

"But let us, as becomes philosophers," says Reid, "Lay aside authority; we need not, surely, consult Aristotle or Locke, to know whether pain be like the point of a sword."² Experience and common sense tell us that pain and a sword-point are "as unlike as the passion of anger is to those features of the countenance which attend it."³ Those philosophers who have eliminated the material world on the ground that things and sensations are identical have done so because of an "idol of the imagination." There is nothing wrong with their logic; their conclusions must follow. We can, however, do two things: show that their premises are false; or, in the absence of criticism hold out for common sense against reason (since there is something wrong somewhere, and we cannot locate the error at this time), later attempting to construct a theory in harmony with common sense. "But are we to admit nothing but what can be proved by reasoning? Then we must be

sceptics indeed, and believe nothing at all."⁴ Brute facts, which all men believe, are more potent than hypotheses.⁵ Reid, therefore, proceeds to attack the ideal system⁶, as he calls it, in both the Inquiry and the Intellectual Powers, holding out the beliefs of common sense, i.e. our conviction that we immediately know, not ideas or representations or sensations, but extended material things.

Having shown how other theories are false, Reid's next objective is to give a positive account of perception. He reveals his debt to Berkeley in several ways and, according to Hamilton,⁷ may be termed an egoistic idealist on the strength of his analysis in the name of Common Sense. How does this happen--that a Common Sense philosopher terminates in subjectivism? In the first place, let us see what factors enter into our perception of any object by smell.⁸ Here is a bottle of rare perfume. The most poignant factor in the perception is the sensation of the exotic smell itself. Science tells us that objects give off effluvia, and we know that, unless our organs of reception and our nervous system are in good condition, we shall not enjoy the perfume with all its delightful suggestions. We have, then, the medium, the organ of smell, perhaps a mechanical or chemical activity which is transferred somehow to the nerves or 'animal spirits,' and the sensation which differs from all these factors necessary to its existence and having neither place, color, figure, or likeness to anything is located only in a sentient being. But so far we have no assurance that the effluvia come from a definite object; in fact, we are no better off than Berkeley.

Lest we wonder, Reid reassures us that a sensation necessarily carries with it in some mysterious manner belief both in its own existence and in an external cause. The technical term is taken from Berkeley--"suggestion," "We all know," argues Reid, "That a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind, a coach passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but the belief, that a coach is passing. Yet there is here no comparing of ideas, no perception of agreements or disagreements, to produce this belief: nor is there the least similitude between the sound we hear and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing."⁹

The importance of this doctrine of suggestion for the Inquiry may be gathered from the paragraph which follows the above quotation.

"It is true that this suggestion is not natural and original; it is the result of experience and habit. But I think it appears, from what hath been said, that there are natural suggestions: particularly, that sensation suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its existence. And, in like manner, as shall be shewn when we come to the sense of touch, certain sensations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion, which are nowise like to sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them."

An original principle of our nature thus assures an external

object, as cause of our sensations, and a difference between them (the object and the sensation), so that it is impossible to hold that the esse of a thing is percipi. Now, how are we to meet the plain man's demand for the objectivity of secondary qualities, say of our perfume's fragrance? Reid shows that odors or smells are objective and that we can say that 'smell' is in the thing, though the sensation-smell can occur only when some sentient being perceives the object. Difficulty arises from the use of the same term to denote both the objective quality which is sensed and the subjective state of sensing.¹⁰ We do not know this distinction a priori; we learn it from experience, which warrants the causal connection, owing to constant conjunction, between the smell-in-the-thing and the smell-sensed-in-the-mind.¹¹ In Humean language Reid holds that the ground or antecedent (the object) and the effect or consequent (the sensation) are "associated in the mind, and constantly found conjoined in the imagination."¹² Our nature leads us to regard the cause as a constant antecedent, entirely different from the resulting sensation.

In attempting to explain the confusion between the sensation and the thing sensed, Reid introduces another term, evidently taken from Berkeley (who got it from Locke). Some sensations we immediately take as signs of external objects constantly conjoined with them, and in naming the objects the sensations are never considered as more than "accessory." Other sensations, however, are different; their liveliness and vivacity make us attend to them alone. And our states of pleasure

and pain compel us to attend to the sensations themselves. In these instances we give a name to the sensations alone. There thus arises a confusion which has led some to believe that names refer only to subjective sensations--a confusion which obscures also the different kinds of sensations. As far as sensations of smell, taste, sound, and color are concerned, they are "of infinitely more importance as signs or indications, than they are upon their own account; like the words of a language, wherein we do not attend to the sound but to the sense!"¹³ A little later, Reid adds that sensations are signs "by which we know and distinguish things without us; and it was fit that the variety of the signs should, in some degree, correspond with the variety of the things signified by them."¹⁴ Under "Touch" a whole section is devoted to "Natural Signs,"¹⁵ but nowhere is there a satisfactory explanation of their relationship to the things they suggest. Other than merely assigning our belief in suggestions to natural tendencies of mind we are left in the air. Of course, confronted by the works of Berkeley and Hume who showed that we cannot reasonably infer the existence of things from our impressions or ideas, and in lieu of definite argument explaining the relevance of the sign to the thing signified Reid fell back upon the terms he was nurtured upon and expressed his Common Sense credo: we know we know things as they are, and we know that things and sensations of things are not identical; therefore, having before us as objects of the mind only sensations, these must 'suggest' the objects we believe in

according to our common sense or 'animal faith'; to use a contemporary phrase. Extension is suggested by touch; no notion (i.e. conception) of it being possible as a deduction from sensory experience. As if he realized the danger of his phenomenistic position, Reid stresses our knowledge of the existence of a material world in a section which we have already examined above.¹⁶ Indeed, equipped only with a flimsy doctrine of suggestion, Reid's argument is a return to his general position of immediate Common Sense knowledge; his analysis in detail has failed to give him positive support. If he had shown how we immediately perceived things, rather than sensations, he would have logically followed out his Common Sense convictions.¹⁷ Immediate knowledge and knowledge through suggestion are inconsistent.¹⁸

As a result of his analysis, then, Reid sacrifices the demands of Common Sense for a mediate theory; and if Common Sense implies a doctrine of immediacy, his denial of the consequent denies the antecedent--at least on the grounds of logic. This state of affairs went apparently unnoticed, however, unless we can infer from Reid's heated insistence upon the priority of belief and conviction over logic that he was aware of his deficiencies and retreated in self-defense to his fortified base, the general propositions of Common Sense, in order to hold out his realism against Berkeleyan idealism and Humean phenomenism. At the end of the Inquiry he says, "Perception...hath always an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived; an object object which may exist whether it be perceived or not....I know

this also, that the perception of an object implies both a conception of its form, and a belief of its present existence. I know, moreover, that this belief is not the effect of argumentation and reasoning; it is the immediate effect of my constitution."¹⁹ In effect, we cannot question such a natural phenomenon as perception, which functions as our God-given, instinctive mechanism directs; belief we are sure of--why seek, in reason, an explanation of these mysterious processes? In this mood Reid closes the Inquiry. The absence of any discussion concerning error and illusions of sense further reflects the shortcomings of his analysis. And hardly without realizing it, he has returned to a modification of the type of theory he severely criticizes, namely, representationism. For his 'sensations' substitute **Locke's** 'ideas', and we are back in 'the ideal system' again. Even if Reid meant to differentiate sharply between objects of the understanding and purely mental states, or modifications, we have a form of representationism,--'sensations' representing the objects we apparently perceive. All the errors of phenomenalism are still latent. On the other hand, dualism and Common Sense are by no means mutually contradictory; but analysis has to show how the demands of the latter are adequately realized in the former.²⁰

In a passage which discloses the eighteenth century veneration for Nature and which links Reid and Hume with unmistakable signs of their common heritage, the master of the Scottish School passionately speaks:

"...I consider this instinctive belief (in external objects) as one of the best gifts of Nature. I thank the Author of my being, who bestowed it upon me before the eyes of my reason were opened, and still bestows it upon me, to be my guide where reason leaves me in the dark. And now I yield to the direction of my senses, not from instinct only, but from confidence and trust in a faithful and beneficent Monitor, grounded upon the experience of his paternal care and goodness."²¹

With this we shall take our leave of Reid, remembering ever that with all his Common Sense faith and trust he was a true philosopher who sought, by analysis and constructive criticism, some positive doctrine.

III. The Analysis of Professor Moore.

We shall select Professor Moore's analysis as our other example of philosophic treatment in detail of data immediately supplied by Common Sense. Above, we showed that Moore had argued that to admit Common Sense beliefs implied their truth. In turn, these general propositions, which we can call 'primitive' or 'primary'²² propositions, require further analysis before we know their full import and meaning. And where Common Sense is a class of propositions (known immediately or mediately, as the case might be) self-evidently true, analysis leads us to other propositions which vary in their truth, from those we know with certainty to be true to those whose truth we have no way of ever knowing. It is one thing to analyze in a general way what we know with certainty to be true (the propositions of Common Sense), and another to analyze the relationship between the knowing mind and the thing known.

To begin with, Moore clinches his realism by arguing

that there are no good reasons for believing the universal proposition held by some 'idealists' that 'no physical facts are wholly independent, logically and causally, of mental facts.'²³ Some facts are independent; some are dependent either logically or causally-or both. He concludes, after carefully analyzing what we mean by 'physical facts' and 'mental facts,' that a proposition of the type, 'Object A is nearer object B than object C' in no way entails some mental fact, as is the case with the proposition, 'I am seeing now,' which entails, 'I am conscious;' and, secondly, that a proposition of the type, 'The earth has existed for many years past' in no way is causally dependent upon some mental fact, as is the case with the existence of my desk, which was dependent causally upon some conscious, creative mind (though at the same time being logically independent of mind).²⁴ This argument serves, in addition to making more positive his realism, as an attack upon various anti-realistic philosophies, especially that type which holds that all physical facts are causally and logically dependent upon mental facts. Common Sense if convinced of anything is indeed convinced of the independence of some objects, and Moore's analysis has shown that the Common Sense position implies this.

A very complex proposition is the primitive proposition of Common Sense, 'Material things exist.' Common Sense tells us that this is true; but the truth of any one analysis of this proposition (which involves the analysis of our perception of individual objects) is not at all certain, but at best probable,

that is, the correct analysis is doubtful indeed. This attitude has been opposed by some philosophers who have been firmly convinced of their analysis, yet have denied the truth of the general proposition, 'Material things exist.'²⁵ Moore, of course, insists on beginning with the facts and making use of all the available knowledge in the attempt to discover their meaning. We are thus immediately plunged into a problematic situation where actual conditions determine the probability of our conclusions. If we are in doubt as to the difficulty of the complex proposition, 'Material things exist,' we have only to attempt an analysis of the relatively simple proposition, 'I am now perceiving a human hand.' This apparently simple proposition seems dependent upon two other propositions, (a) 'I am perceiving this;' (b) 'This is a human hand' ('this' being equivalent to a 'sense-datum' plus other factors).²⁶ Analysis of these simple propositions seems to reveal that there is (1) Always some sense-datum, which is the subject of the proposition; (2) A distinction between the sense-datum and the thing sensed, so that they are never one and the same thing. Some philosophers, moreover, have felt that 'sense' and 'sense-data' do not exist, and so Moore proceeds to show on what grounds they do exist. In looking at our hand we see something which is identical with at least the surface of it (or appears to be identical with it), and we identify it with a particular part of the object, certainly not in this case with the whole hand, since a hand has many parts,--bones, tendons, blood-vessels, etc. none of which is a part of the sense-datum we now perceive.²⁷ The surface we see thus represents the whole hand; certainly we

do not perceive directly the hand, in fact, the most we see is something identical with a part of the hand. Finally, we seem to know all these things with certainty.

The question now arises, "What, when I know 'This is part of the surface of a human hand,' am I knowing about the sense-datum in question?" Moore believes that three alternatives exist, none of which comes anywhere near being true with certainty: (1) The sense-datum is itself part of the surface, so that when I may be said to perceive my hand I do not directly perceive it, but part of its surface; (2) Granting the need for a theory which takes "representation" into account, what relation would there be between the sense-datum and the thing it represents, the object? There seems to be need for either (a) something to be both a part of the surface and in relation R to the sense-datum, or (b) a set of things "of which it is true both that that set, taken collectively, are part of the surface of a human hand, and also that each member of the set has R (the relation) to this sense-datum, and that nothing which is not a member of the set has R to it;" and (3) Granting the failure of (1) and (2), only one more alternative (according to Moore) exists, viz. what Mill seems to have implied when he said that material things are "permanent possibilities of sensation," that is, that what I know about the sense datum is not that it is a part of the surface of an object, nor that it is in relation with a thing which is part of the surface of a hand, but "a whole set of hypothetical facts each of which is a fact of

the form 'If these conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum intrinsically related to this sense-datum in this way,' 'If these (other) conditions had been fulfilled, I should have been perceiving a sense-datum intrinsically related to this sense-datum in this (other) way,' etc. etc."²⁸

Moore finds objections to each one of these theories. Under (1) we are forced to introduce the relativity of sense--for who can determine which are the true qualities, considering both normal and abnormal situations and such phenomena as double-images? These factors, which must be considered, do show, however, that some representative theory is required. Granting in (2) therefore, the necessity of "representation,"²⁹ it can be understood only by the introduction of a relation--or relations--between something and the sensum. But if something 'x' (apparently a part of the surface of the hand) is in a relation R to the sensum 'y' and this 'x' is both part of the surface of the object and that of which the sense-datum 'y' is also an appearance, the problem arises as to how we can know there is this one thing--and only one thing--related ultimately to the sense datum, and if there is this one relation, how we can know other relations, such as those which reveal size, shape, etc. As for (3), we may sometimes consider our knowledge to be hypothetical, such as, 'If these conditions had been fulfilled, etc. I should have experienced sense-data, etc.' but if I believe that I experience different sense-data of the same surface, the conditions seem to be the same as those holding for, 'If this and that material thing had been in those

positions and conditions.' Also, how we could have knowledge of intrinsic relations existing between sense-data, so that when I am said to perceive a sense-datum of a certain kind under these conditions, I know something about other sense-data (relating perhaps to a surface) under those conditions, is not known. And if it were true that we had knowledge of relations holding only between sense-data, " the sense in which a material surface is 'round' or 'square' would necessarily be utterly different from that in which our sense-data sensibly appear to us to be 'round' or 'square'.

IV. Analysis of the Extension of the General Argument from Common Sense.

The primary issue growing out of Moore's analysis is this: What is the status of Common Sense in the analysis of such simple propositions as, 'I perceive a hand,' or 'I perceive a tree?' In the previous section we tried to describe the function of Common Sense in its general competition with rival philosophies, and in the present section two detailed attempts to analyze the particular elements involved in our knowing material things were examined. Each philosopher in question concluded that some sort of representationism was necessary. Reid was positive that his analysis was satisfactory--and we saw that it in fact led to the skepticism he was trying to combat. Moore's analysis showed him that we always directly perceive something partial which represents the whole object known; also, sense-data seem to be such that they represent some part of an object. While we are certain of the first half of the preceding sentence, the second half offers one of three possible alternatives which explain how we come to perceive

the object known; so that at best our detailed knowledge is probable. Moore thus preserves his general Common Sense position, known to be true with certainty, by protecting it against some construction based on any one analysis which might lead to a contradiction of his main position.

Letting S represent what we term Common Sense and 'S implies P' stand for a primary analysis of Common Sense at the first stage of reflection (e.g. Common Sense, (S), implies (P), that objects exist independently of a knower), and granting that both Reid and Moore are Common Sense philosophers in general agreement as to their primary analyses of Common Sense, we find that R (which shall be taken for Reid) finds, after reflection, that P ('that objects exist independently of a knower') implies Q (where Q is another proposition, e.g. there is some mediating factor representing the object known); M (Moore) agrees that P implies Q, and further admits that his implication is known with certainty to be true, since it entails $S \supset P$, which is true. But we cannot rest with our analysis, that $S \supset Q$ (and $Q \supset S$, so that $S \equiv Q$)³⁰ unless we are unwilling to take the risk of further analysis, resting content with our positive logical certainty. R and M again set out; R finds that Q implies proposition T (where T, perhaps, is something like, We know only modifications of our own brain, and these somehow mediate between me and the object; and T is accepted in spite of grave objections) and precipitously completes his string of implications, i.e. $S \supset P, P \supset Q, Q \supset T, \therefore S \supset T$. In order to give a consistency and coherence to his argument he may readily show that

just as $S \supset T$ so $T \supset S$. Now, however, he is lost in making his judgment, unless the nature of things is such that a necessary connection (which can never be established among matters-of-fact) exists between the first and last members, i.e. between S, the Common Sense position, and T. For if some philosopher, say Critic A (of our general analysis above³¹), shows that T is a phenomenalist interpretation, and "Common Sense" implies T, in fact is equivalent to it, since $S \supset T, T \supset S = S \equiv T$, philosopher R is in a quandary. He is in even hotter water if another philosopher, say C (above), shows that R's argument that $Q \supset T$ is false, because T is false, while Q is true. Now it has been shown that $S \supset T$ is false. This in no way destroys the validity of $S \supset Q$, yet it precludes the broad assertion that $S \supset T$. R is now confronted with a dilemma: A has shown that his analysis results in phenomenism; C that it is false; and if R insists upon T, he must make his choice: either give up his Common Sense position (which generally holds phenomenism to be false; or he can admit that phenomenism is true and equivalent to "Common Sense", but not his original Common Sense), or give up the effort to philosophize, thereby admitting that analysis in accord with Common Sense is impossible. Of course, R can readily escape between the horns by showing that T is not exhaustive, but this requires that his original position ($Q \supset T$, therefore $S \supset T$) be given up.

Logically, C's proof, that T false and Q true cannot hold, eliminates the possibility that $Q \supset T$ is true, though, granting the validity of the implication, three alternatives held: that both Q and T were true, both were false, or that Q was false and T true. This holds for any step in the sorites,

and $S \supset T$ may involve the falsity of the entire Common Sense doctrine, while the specific analysis, T , is yet true. As it stands, after C 's devastating proof, R must look around for another analysis of Q --or blindly cling to his conviction in general, thus committing a sort of fallacious argumentum ad hominem (i.e. putting it up squarely to the critic's own experience, e.g.), arguing that $S \supset P$, $P \supset Q$, and Q must (since you and I cannot see how it could be otherwise) imply T ; and therefore even if T is false, somehow $S \supset T$ must be true on the strength of our previous implications and of all our experience. We have shown above that Reid seems to have been in this predicament when backed against the wall by his critics.³² He is torn between his philosophic frustration and his Common Sense convictions. Had he admitted the truth of adverse criticism, and attempted to discover what Q implies, reasserting meanwhile the truth of his first steps as a sound groundwork on which to build, the fate of the Common Sense philosophy might have been different.

Let us return, now, to M . We have seen that R and M were in agreement that S and Q mutually implied each other, and hence were equivalent. M 's next step, however, is more cautious. He finds that Q implies R , T , or U --or possibly some unknown " x "; the complex disjunction R or T or U being in no way exhaustive, since in the nature of the problematic situation no categorical assertions can possibly be made. M concludes, therefore, that a definite analysis of Q is impossible, and that, tentatively, we may select R as less objectionable and as having a greater probability of truth than any other alternative. Now if

philosophers A or C show all three of these alternatives to be false, M has only to fall back upon his unknown "x". In time, perhaps, added knowledge or research may enable us to discover another alternative, let us say W. Then we shall put forward the tentative analysis, $S=Q$ and Q probably implies W. Our Common Sense position is not endangered and remains true until someone can show that in the earlier steps the antecedents are really false, that is, that they are in fact false, since hypothetically their falsity in no way precludes the validity of their implications.

V. Summary.

We have now discovered the function of the Common Sense concept as applied within a particular philosophic problem within a particular philosophy. We have seen that the difficulties do not begin until we enter the metaphysical mazes. Here, some, like Reid, lose their way, without admitting it, preferring to save themselves by crying for Common Sense to deliver them; others are on the lookout for a possible cul de sac, ever ready to retrace their measured steps back to certain ground, ever experimenting before an advance is attempted. The latter are seldom lost. On the other hand, they rarely enjoy the hidden beauties of unpenetrated passages, which the impetuous glory in, before perishing in the enveloping darkness. Now and then, however, one of the former class finds his way out of the hodge-podge and returns with new light, new inspiration. Philosophy, indeed, finds each class indispensable for its very life.

As far as the announced purpose of determining the

intension of the term Common Sense is concerned, I have thus far indicated the difficulties which beset the philosopher who keeps pursuing the further implications of each proposition analysis brings to light. Two concrete examples of extended analysis were chosen to illustrate the philosopher at work. This was followed by a general analysis of the relation of Common Sense to the specific analysis, just as in Section One the general role was symbolically illustrated. In conclusion, then, we have found that intensional analysis of a concrete general term comes easy in the realm of the generic and in its widest application, but that there is a point of "saturation" reached as we confine ourselves more and more to particular, real situations, where at best a probable analysis can be reached. The limitations of our experience in the matter-of-fact world have their reverberations in philosophy; however, in no way is the truth of our general, Common Sense beliefs, which, in reality, have their origin in our interaction with the matter-of-fact world, invalidated.³³

NOTES

1. Hamilton criticizes Reid for holding that representative perception leads to subjectivism and for failing to note that idealistic philosophies can consist of a mind and its own modifications, or of an extreme phenomenalism of the Fichtean type. (Works, p. 128b, Note*) This is true, yet I feel that Reid is correct in assuming that the Cartesian ideas, alone immediately known, yet standing for some object, or the atomist's eidola flitting from thing to mind, are the source of both subjectivism and phenomenalism.
2. Inquiry, Works, p. 127.
3. Ibid., p. 128.
4. Ibid., p. 129.
5. Cf. ibid., Section 8, p. 132. (This is quoted in Note 2, Part Four, Section 3, p. 201 below.)
6. Reid refers always to 'the ideal system,' by which he meant that some tertium quid, different from both the mind and the object, mediates between them. Discussion of the ideal system and the philosophers who adopted it may be found in the Inquiry, Introduction, Sections 3-8; Chapter V, Sections vii-viii; Intellectual Powers, Essay II, Chapters vii-xv.
7. Works, p. 128b, Note*.
8. Reid treats "Of Smelling" first. His favorite example in this connection is our perception of a rose.
9. Compare this passage with the following from Berkeley: "Whenever we say an object is at a distance, whenever we say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always mean it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the touch, and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the eye, in like manner as thoughts by the ear." New Theory of Vision, 51. Cf. Principles, 43.
10. Thus anticipating later realist criticism of subjective idealisms founded upon the Berkeleyan dictum of esse est percipi. See e. g. G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism."
11. Reid, speaking of our perception of a rose, says its smell signifies two things: "First, a sensation which can have no existence but when it is perceived, and can only be in a sentient being or mind; secondly, it signifies some power, quality, or virtue, in the rose,

or in effluvia proceeding from it, which hath a permanent existence, independent of the mind, and which, by the constitution of nature, produces the sensation in us." (Works, p. 114)

12. Works, p. 112
13. *Ibid.*, p. 114. The term 'sense' at the close is not well chosen. 'Meaning' would have been more satisfactory.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 117, in the chapter, "Of Hearing."
15. *Inquiry*, Chapter V, Section iii, Works, p. 121 ff.
16. See p. 110 above.
17. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers Reid corrects his doctrine, yet never gives up 'suggestion.' See Essay II, Chapter v, "Of Perception" (Works, p. 258 ff.), where he asserts that "it is not by a train of reasoning and argumentation that we come to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive; we ask no argument for the existence of the object, but that we perceive it; perception commands our belief upon its own authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon any reasoning whatsoever."
18. Hamilton's own doctrine endeavored to remedy the shortcomings of the Common Sense School. He held out for an immediate presentism, making perception an intuitive act in which belief "is not a faith blindly created or instinctively determined, in supplement of a representative or mediate cognition, but exists in, as an integral constituent of, perception proper..." (Works, Note D, p. 883) Against Reid he also held out the subjectivity of secondary qualities. (p. 885)
19. Inquiry, Chap. VI, Sec. xx, Works, p. 183.
20. It is the boast of the critical realists that they have accomplished this.
21. Works, p. 184.
22. These are my designations, not Moore's.
23. Contemporary British Philosophy, v., ii, p. 208. This aspect of his essay is an echo of his famous "Refutation,"

24. Ibid., pp. 213-214.
25. That is to say, some philosophers set out with certain preconceived notions or hypotheses that carry them to a position which forces them to exclude some of the propositions of Common Sense, normally accepted as facts. They cannot turn back without sacrificing their system, so they hold out in opposition to Common Sense to the end. Cf. below, p.
26. Ibid., p. 216.
27. Ibid., p. 218.
28. Ibid., pp. 219-222.
29. Moore believes that while there are many possibilities depending upon the nature of the relation R, there is only one view having plausibility, namely "that which holds that R is an ultimate and unanalyzable relation, which might be expressed by saying that 'xRy' means the same as 'y is an appearance or manifestation of x.' I. e. the analysis which this answer would give of 'This is part of the surface of a human hand' would be 'There is one and only one thing of which it is true both that it is part of the surface of a human hand, and that this sense-datum is an appearance or manifestation of it.' (p. 221)
30. I am using equivalence here and below in the broadest possible sense. This use is justified if we admit that two propositions mutually imply each other, and in the analyses we have indicated, the more specific proposition would intensionally imply the more general and vice versa.
31. Part Two, Section 1, III.
32. See page 116 above.
33. This position is made clearer in Part Three.

Section 3: Consensus of the General Propositions
of Common Sense and the Kinds of Appeals which
Emerge from our Study.

We have just seen above that if we grant the truth of Common Sense certain conclusions follow which preclude alternatives to our general position. Even in the analysis of a specific problem, Common Sense directs our search and guides us in a paternal manner to further meanings which must not contradict our general position. But, philosophically, all this could hold if the Common Sense position were admittedly purely hypothetical, i.e. if in saying--as we all do--I know such-and-such to be true and this implies this-and-that, the same "this-and-that" might be implied by the hypothetical, 'If such-and-such were known to be true...' In Part Three we shall briefly attempt to determine the reasons why we consider the propositions of Common Sense to be true.

Before we turn to the next Part, however, it might be well to review the general propositions of Common Sense commonly accepted as true by the Common Sense philosophers. If we confine them to our problem in this essay (excluding, thereby, all references to moral or religious truths), I believe we can summarize the Common Sense view of the physical world in the following propositions:

1. I exist as an embodied self, and in my existence I experience many things--memories, anticipations, feelings, etc.--as objects of my understanding. And my identity continues throughout my experience.
2. There exists an extended physical world which is known by me and known approximately as it really is, not as it merely 'appears' or seems. Its identity likewise continues throughout my experience.

3. This objectively knowable reality exists independently of my experience (and of any experience like mine)--spatially as apart from my embodied self, temporally, as before and after, as well as during, the event of my experiencing or knowing it. The things (particular continuants) of reality are independent, for the most part, both logically and causally, of my experience, though some are dependent one way, some the other.
4. I know other embodied selves, or persons, which exist independently of me--as having experiences like my own, as being like me in nature--and I can communicate with these other selves.
5. I know that I and other persons share a common body of knowledge and that we are in agreement in knowing facts concerning reality, in having meanings of all kinds in common.
6. More specifically, I--and other persons--have immediate knowledge of reality, i.e. of the things and objects of the external world. (The fact that a sensum may be the thing immediately intuited in the process of perception in no way contradicts this proposition.)
7. The analysis of sense perception requires some mediating factor--a sensum, sense-datum or 'idea'--which functions as a 'representative' of the thing known. Hence, some form of epistemological dualism is demanded.
8. The so-called secondary qualities appear to be as objective as primary qualities and to have a presumption of this objectivity in their favor.

The above propositions sum up, I believe, propositions common to each of the particular philosophies of Common Sense. In the generalizing process, some propositions have been omitted, but this was necessary in order to present as a whole the basic beliefs of common sense in so far as they can serve philosophy, in general, and the epistemological problems, in particular. Personally, I should like to include one more generic proposition,

9. Man is not 'apart from reality', but definitely in interaction with things, and this fact accounts both for his immediate knowledge and his ability to alter and change his environment for his own uses,

but I fear that not all of the philosophers treated above would admit it as basic to Common Sense. In my own treatment later, however, I shall refer to it.

In concluding Parts One and Two, it might also pay us to briefly recall the specific types of argument from Common Sense which indicate the novel role the concept plays in each philosophy. The following seem to me to be the general categories into which the appeal falls:

- A. Original and Natural First Truths of the Understanding, which enable man to philosophize and act. These principles are self-evident, and, in their functioning, necessary and universal; in their origin relative to experience, a priori, though discoverable through experience. With Reid these principles include both the rational and irrational; with Hume they are chiefly irrational, though in serving conduct they produce rational results.
- (1) Common Sense is thus looked upon from the standpoint of METAPHYSICS--as a body of principles and truths enabling man to know Reality, in fact as generating his specific beliefs in concrete, - as making experience possible.
- B. The Body of Positive Facts Rising in Experience and Known to be True, which in themselves express both the truths of practice and conclusions about the nature of things. They are not only necessary for conduct, but in philosophy play a definite part in the analysis of the problem of knowledge, positively and negatively.
- (1) Common Sense is thus regarded--by the Cambridge School--from the standpoint of POSITIVISM--as the body of facts, empirically discovered, rising out of 'experience', which form the data for philosophical analysis.
- C. The Demand for an All-inclusive, Synoptic View of Reality, both in regard to particular problems and the general speculative view, and the Body of Propositions Concretely

Fulfilling This Demand, which is the view of Stout, uniquely relating Common Sense realism to the broader issues of a GENERAL METAPHYSICS or COSMOLOGY.

- (1) Here, we have no study of the categories of the understanding (as with Reid), nor satisfaction with the partial scientific analysis of specific problems, but a COLLECTION of PROPOSITIONS FORMING A WORLD-VIEW, so that all the essential elements, recognized by Common Sense, must be included, and none omitted.

While A, B, and C express the categorical views with which Common Sense was regarded and sum up the unique function each played in a definite philosophy, they are only meant to be 'summaries! in no way accurate, precise descriptions of the separate philosophies (which I trust have been more adequately delineated above). By no means are they meant to exhaust all the kinds of argument from Common Sense. So far as I can determine, however, they represent the most important types of Common Sense philosophy.

PART THREE: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE

Section 1: The Significance of Public Facts.

I. Introduction.

Thus far in our essay we have shown that Common Sense is a definite philosophic concept, just as in its own right, common sense, too, is very much a term in ordinary use, possessing varying significance. We have described the function of the term in its widest extension in ordinary life and have pointed out how the philosophic concept emerges during the eighteenth century as a definite body of propositions, denoting what exists and what is known, in so far as man's interaction with Nature is concerned. We have noted how the concept functioned in general and in particular, having chosen the philosophies of Hume, Reid and Stout, and the analyses of some of the Cambridge positivists in illustration. In Part Two we indicated the role of Common Sense, generally and specifically, within two Common Sense philosophies; and our analyses of this function suggested how the term might function in any philosophy--a problem which is to be discussed in Part Four. With the exception of our introductory remarks in Part One, we have not as yet treated fully the problem of the legitimacy of the appeal to Common Sense. This will occupy us in the present division.

II. What We Mean by Facts

It may perhaps seem strange to some that we should question the validity and authority of the appeal to common

sense. Positivists, denying the value of metaphysical inquiry, content themselves with the data of experience. Many would agree that we should stick to concrete 'facts' and leave speculation well enough alone. The question, What do you mean by 'facts'? is ignored or easily answered by making all 'facts' indefinable, and for all I know this may be the final answer and also the same answer for the question, How do you know that what you know is a fact?--viz. that our knowing that we know a fact is something indefinable. Our exposition in Part One, I believe, shows that some philosophers have considered the appeal to Common Sense to be a fact which is highly important in revealing certain other indispensable facts about the nature of things and our knowledge of them. They have looked upon the Common Sense view of the world as primary to all philosophy. And in their acceptance of the testimony of Common Sense they tacitly assent to all those so-called facts which admittedly Common Sense implies. By a 'fact' we usually mean something having existence of a sort that it may be said to have 'public truth.' This eliminates unique, private experiences, indigenous to the individual, alone. These experiences, e. g. a vision of a departed loved-one, or a hallucination of a pink alligator crawling across a cafe floor are indeed very poignant psychological 'facts,' having endurance and leaving their impression in memory. But if I have had these experiences you must take my word for them, since there is no way of verifying them. Seldom do they

interest other persons, unless there is a direct, important relationship between my experience and the experience of others, as the case might be if I went suddenly insane under the influence of the first experience, or began popping at the alligator with an automatic in the second instance. Usually, the interest is of a primary sort for the individual alone; his feelings, sensations, associations, etc. seldom arousing sufficient secondary interest. His private experiences are true facts for him alone.

'Public truth,' on the other hand, admits of close approximations to the sharing by many individuals of a common experience, or of facts common to everyone. We qualify the preceding statement by "close approximation" because our own experience tells us that another fact (shared by all) is e. g. the relativity of sense perception, though we are doubtful whether relativity holds in our awareness of universals¹ or in our intuition of 'atomic facts' such as this particular bit of red color.² For the most part, there is unanimity in regard to the fact, 'I see the moon.' Whether some see it as a flat disk, a sphere with mountainous craters and valleys, a man's face, or a piece of green cheese is beside the point. In every instance it is 'the moon' which is seen, i. e. experienced in a specific way, and the fact that I see an object which you, too, are seeing--along with many other persons--and that we agree are the significant factors. In like manner, 'triangularity' is recognized as a fact held in common by many persons, apart from the question of its 'particularity' or

'universality,' its concreteness or abstractness. It suffices that there is some agreement as to its meaning, so that when I speak of a triangle you understand what I mean, and that when I write these words the reader will know, just as I know, what 'triangle' means. We can also mention some other factors which distinguish private truths from public truths, as well as differentiate, for the individual, error and illusion from truth: corroboration by other persons, individually or collectively; additional experiments, by means of other senses, actual technical equipment, or further experience (especially in 'practice'); submission to some recognized authority; etc.³

Unfortunately for the career of some of these so-called public truths, it is shown that they are either false or ungrounded in reality, that is, if there is a basis for them, they are not adequately representative of their background, and in fact might give a false impression of the nature of things; or if there is no basis at all, no possible occasion for their existence, they are doubly malicious, because something has been created out of nothing (in reality), and this something has been advertised as real, just as it appears. If behaviorism were a public truth, admitted by all persons to be a fact, it might be shown that where it has some basis in fact, it is false; likewise, if belief in the real existence of centaurs was prevalent enough to be ranked as a public truth, possibly some ingenious person might show that the centaur had no ground, or basis, in reality at all,⁴ and was therefore false. Public truths, to persist, then, must

meet these two requirements, (1) a foundation in reality; and (2) adequate, relevant expression of all the factors involved, which contribute to its being just the fact it is and no other. 'Public truths' implies, of course, their acceptance by a great number of persons who are in essential agreement as to the meaning and import of the facts in question.

III. How Facts Are Known to Be True

The number of persons who are in agreement upon the factuality of some thing or experience is not important, primarily, though the weight of numbers is valuable, in some instances, if it is to be the deciding factor in a relatively insignificant issue. In the correction of many alleged public truths the great majority has been shown to be wrong by the few. And it is very likely that many of our undoubted so-called public truths of today are double false, having no basis in reality. The reasons for either the rejection or retention of these truths and the possibility of their being experienced directly are far more important than accepting them on authority, whether it be invested in an individual or in the many. And when we enter the realm of the empirical, where a fact may be tested by direct submission to experience, our response to any questions of doubt is immediate: we have only to trust the authority of our own experience; and if we still question our experience (since we may have a reason for doubting our perception), we can submit the issue squarely to others or to future experiences of our own under still other conditions.

This is how the prestige of sheer numbers enters: the increasing testimony of many experiences of a great number of persons increases the probability of my immediately experienced facts; in like manner, the recurrence of a particular experience many, many times within an individual's life increases the probability that a fact is true. Of course, in the test of numbers it is presupposed that in each instance a 'test' is really being made to determine a possible source of error. A mere appeal to numbers--the submission of philosophic issues to a plebiscite--has little weight. The most that such a vote can do is to give increased significance to a hypothesis concerning the necessity for some proposition grounded in the nature of things: i. e. universality shows that proposition P, thought by philosophers, A, B, C, D, and E to apply necessarily to persons a, b.....m within area (I) because of the structure of reality (the Nature-Man realm) must be accepted by philosophers F, G, H, I, and J (and possibly others; though not all, since some philosophers insist upon a perpetual state of skepticism) as necessarily applying to all persons a.....z⁵ throughout all areas I, II, III and IV, which together form the area of the inhabited world. The factor of Time, together with the many limitations of our knowledge and intellectual faculties, forever prevents us from asserting the universality of any fact as more than a hypothetical proposition, even when the probability is overwhelming.

The work of the philosopher has to do with special problems, among which is the problem of testing the alleged necessity of certain facts. Philosopher and scientist thus work hand in hand; the difference between them is that where the philosopher criticizes the presuppositions of the scientist (as well as those of other philosophers), the scientist is in no position to criticize the philosopher in the same way (if he should criticize the philosopher on the grounds that he is not 'scientific' he is being rather irrelevant, since philosophic method and philosophic subject-matter differ from scientific method and subject-matter). This distinction may seem trivial; yet it is of paramount importance when the scientist claims to have the last word on some issues which the philosopher somewhat jealously guards for himself. Also, I take it to be a fact 'That it is a fact that not all facts are scientific' (i. e. that some facts are not scientific) and, further, that it is also a fact 'That some of the propositions of Common Sense are not amenable to science.' The problem of the apparent objectivity of secondary qualities (which seems to be implied by Common Sense), or if a more general proposition is preferred, the problem of an independently existing extended reality, is in each case no problem of the scientist; in fact, in the first instance the scientist begins with philosophical presuppositions about the nature of the qualities, and in the second, he must assume at least his subject-matter to

begin with. The philosopher, moreover, always depends upon the scientist for some facts in his analyses. In his special study of the possibility of a necessity and universality in regard to facts confined to his surveillance, the philosopher tests them on their own merit, on their scientific feasibility, and on their consequences, theoretical and practical.

A 'public truth' or 'fact' may thus begin with the philosopher's private truth or fact; or an alleged public truth or fact may be found to be one in fact, i. e. in reality--after the philosopher (or scientist--if it is that kind of fact) has put it to test. A fact may be tested in several ways:

- (1) By submitting it to experience (Empirically, a fact is a fact if I can assert that I experience it and understand by its meaning just what it was previously held to mean, as is the case e. g. with the proposition, 'I see my desk!');
- (2) By placing it in the context of 'recognized truths' (Rationally, we can admit a fact when it fits into the general system of facts, i. e. when it implies and is implied by some of the already accepted facts, or when it proves 'fruitful' in our reasoned theories--and, we should add, stands up under criticism);
- (3) Closely related to the preceding test, we can test a fact by determining whether it fits into the general scheme of facts having to do with our daily conduct (The concepts of 'order,' 'harmony,' 'control,' 'efficiency' and 'results' are important in determining the practical rationality of a fact; pragmatically,

of course, many so-called facts are accepted, not because they have been proved (they might be classed as beyond proof), but because of their value in regulating future practice in the light of past successes.

IV. The Significance of Meaning.

The average, ordinary person is very positive about his beliefs; what he knows, he knows. He will admit that some things are very doubtful, some have a great probability, others are certain--for him, at least. And in each case he knows various things⁶ possessing these relative degrees of certainty. In addition, he recognizes that the relative meanings⁷ of things are not numerically the same; that in some cases the only meaning of a matter-of-fact is the name or proposition describing it: that is, at its very minimum, something is being asserted which serves to indicate a 'fact,' whose brute occurrence or existence--and possible the relevance of the event or existence to his immediate circumstances, or to future circumstances--is recognized and named--or otherwise marked--for his own uses and purposes. Not that he regards the significant aspect of the phenomenon as a mere 'name;' indeed, what is important is the Reality or Nature, in this or that aspect, is known in itself and not alone for its immediate effect on his own existence,, as mere fleeting 'appearances' or 'impressions,' no matter how vivid the sensory or psychic experience. The relative

meaning' of things accounts for frequent misunderstandings. Person A may be thinking of a highly specialized and sophisticated meaning of thing, 'cosmic ray,' as he talks with B whose experience with it has been highly circumscribed and very much limited, with the result that while they know what they are talking about they do not fully understand each other. This is often the case in everyday life. Relative meanings do not indicate, however, that things ontologically have a relative being; on the contrary, their being is absolute, their essence, likewise. When the ordinary person, then, enjoys acquaintanceship with an object or thing, he is aware of knowing its meaning--if only at the lowest possible level which barely differentiates it from other things. It may be that this meaning is purely aesthetic, referring to the unique experience the enjoyment of it has occasioned: in this event it is private. At a little higher level, perhaps, the meaning is of its essence: now it is public and shareable. The ordinary person now has found something which is. 'Meaning,' then, at its minimum of significance intends 'existence'--real existence. The next step includes certain relations, which are themselves thus recognized as connecting 'things,'--between the thing known and the self (together with the subjective experiences indicated), between the thing and other things (perhaps better known than the newly discovered thing, owing to previous experience). At this primitive

stage of experience the meaning is naturally vague and incomplete, but the existence of some fact⁸ has already been noted as having significance, i. e. a meaning of some kind has become the object of the understanding, and the subject, without knowing how he believes, knows that he knows--in short, knows that he can give assent to his belief and judge it to be what it is.

Additional experience, be it practical or intellectual, modifies the meaning in certain respects. This, too, the ordinary man recognizes to be a fact. As he matures and undergoes a variety of 'experiences,' the meaning of things changes: some take on new richness, as their value or importance increases; others lose luster and fade away like the wondrous "dream castles" of youth. This much of their meaning is never lost, however: their unique existence, the fact that once they had such-and-such a meaning, the fact that they were related in numerous ways with other things and persons in the past, and the fact that, now, under new circumstances, they have a definite meaning as one of the objects of my thought. Where the primitive meaning of some one thing excluded significant relationship with other things and persons,--perhaps was confined in its relation to me (and I have later discovered that the experience was private, in no way immediately shareable with others), I recognize the experience to have been a factual event and my memory tells me that my judgment is correct. When an event or thing does

have relations with other things and persons, I know that it has meaning as a public fact; and when I find that I can identify the things of past experience with those which I now experience, partly through their 'identity,' partly by means of a repetition of their manifold relations, they become 'physical' objects,' having a more or less determinate, continuous existence through time and in space, undergoing 'change,' and possessing the possibility of entering into many other relations. The recognition of the public character of the thing known conveys this proposition, which has been implicit in all our discussion of public facts: That I know that other persons and I know the same things and are in agreement as to their primitive meaning.

There is another important factor which enters into both private and public fact. This thing which we know as existing, and as having definite relations, first, to me, secondly, to other things is not always some logical (perhaps metaphysical) entity, symbolized by an impersonal Greek letter, " ϕ " or " θ ,"--that is, something known, but not seen. From the first, the things known most vividly are those things immediately sensed in the flesh of 'materiality,' as it were, vibrant with qualities of color, sound, taste, odor, and giving off intriguing tactile sensations; equipped with a formal structure; having size, weight, and possibly motion of some kind. The significant fact of our first experience

with it is that we recall it as an individual--a unique, particular something! And saying that we know it implies that we know it as it is, in its particularity; its meaning, therefore, to us lies in our knowing it in its essence.⁹

Furthermore, when we experience other things like this first thing, we immediately realize that we know them as they are essentially; we seem to grasp what is common to them all in coming to know the meaning of one, that is, to know the 'universal' which transcends the many. Likewise, we know that we can enter into discourse with other persons concerning the many similar things experienced and known, without referring to any one particular: the meaning, held in common, and represented by a common symbol, does the trick. We must, then, add this proposition to the above remarks concerning our 'public facts:' Just as I know that when I know a thing (and it has meaning for me), that its meaning includes what it is in itself--its concrete particularity--and that it is this fact of meaning which enables me to know many things having a like 'nature' or 'essence' (the many included in the one); so I know that other persons grasp the same meaning common to many things; and, finally, that there is social recognition and understanding of this common meaning--even on the primitive level--and that this phenomenon makes communication of ideas possible, i. e. the recognition and expression of public facts by means of language symbols.

We have seen that there are various kinds of significance at the most primitive level of knowledge, ranging from the meaning of brute existence, through the meaning of various relations (of things to each other, of things to persons, and--implicit in our knowing that other people can communicate with us--of persons to persons) and the meaning of particular essences, on up to the meaning of universals (which logically includes relations). With more experience, thought and insight, meaning does change, as we indicated above (p.144), but not essentially: not only is the mere fact of having known an object (not necessarily a particular) with a certain meaning preserved, but also, when the object loses value and is discarded or apparently destroyed, its meaning may be preserved in memory or may--according to some philosophers--even continue, in immortal, immutable subsistence. Also, the relativity of meaning is directly related to the kind of object. From the standpoint of public objects, in general the relativity of meaning of certain objects decreases as their extension increases and as they are understood by more and more knowers. To be more specific, imaginative constructions are directly related to some particular imagination of some one person who creates the object. Imagined things, it is true, in taking on their unique kind of 'existence,' may be understood by great numbers of persons. The point is, however, that the dependence of the thing upon the creative imagination makes its stability

and continuity of meaning less likely.¹⁰ There is less relativity involved in our knowledge of independently existing things, though the exhaustive meaning of any one thing taken in isolation is never got, even after equally exhaustive study and experiment of many minds working indefatigable together. For there seems to be an ideal point, forever beyond the grasp of the most exhaustive knowledge of any one thing, from every possible point-of-view; and this ideal preserves the old concept of the "unknown thing-in-itself." At the primitive level of our experience, where we may grasp the essential meanings, relativity is reduced to a minimum, so that we can be fairly confident that many persons know the same things in the same way, i. e. as having a meaning common to all. This state of affairs, in which meaning is a fact, and communication and understanding are facts, achieves the 'universal,' at the expense of sacrificing the 'particular' (which may be retained in individual memories in more or less detail); and with the emergence of the universal by discovery (others might hold up their production through 'creation' or 'convention'),¹¹ knowledge, as understood by scientia, is made possible: we can rise from 'becoming' and soar into the realm of 'being;' we can understand particular occurrences by means of universal laws.

V. The Significance of 'Common Sense.'

We can now return to our original problem of how it could be possible for very many persons to be in agreement

on some issue, which, in time, might be both universal and necessary. The necessity, we have seen, grows out of the nature of the case: in knowledge a thing is known as it is (no matter how inadequately) because we are able to grasp its meaning--or essence; ontologically, perhaps, this same essence is an integral part of reality--at least, we know that in knowing real things we know their unique nature. In like manner, universality rises from the nature of things, since reality is such that many persons share common meanings and have similar experiences.¹² The vote of numbers, therefore, as we said in the beginning, is relatively unimportant, though, in some instances, the generality of some belief unfounded in reality takes on apparent authority, in which case it has a tentative presumption of value, if not of truth.

In what has been said above we have not been concerned with the various problems of perception as such. Our pre-occupation has rested solely with the problem of how it is possible for many, if not all, persons to have understanding of reality in common. For Common Sense, if it has any validity whatsoever as a body of propositions expressing certain publicly accepted 'facts,' must be such that it truthfully represents the meaning of things as they really are. Therefore, we have tried to indicate a possible explanation for the phenomenon of Common Sense and its conviction of knowing, and knowing with certainty, or rather, with great

probability, facts. That these facts are known relatively, that is, that various 'reports' differ in detail, does not prevent at the same time the phenomenon of being known in essence. A nucleus--that which makes them what they are--may be included in every relative meaning, and this common or universal element is what makes their meaning--or sense--common, i. e. which produces, metaphysically, the phenomenon which has come to be called throughout the centuries, Common Sense.

Now it may be that some will protest that a theory of perception must be considered before we tackle the problem of how common meanings occur, possibly on the ground that we must first determine how it is that an object can become known, i. e. enter consciousness, before we are privileged to say that we know things and what they are. For all I know they may be right; but it seems to me to be a question-begging procedure which assumes that we do know things (and, of course, in practice everyone admits he knows things as they are and daily uses them) in the very act of attempting to show how we know them, and, in some extraordinary cases, even demonstrating that we cannot know them. What the appeal to Common Sense asserts very definitely is that in any philosophizing we must start with what we know to be a fact, namely, that we know things which are a part of an external, extended physical world. I have tried to indicate a possible

explanation of how in rerum natura this claim of Common Sense is itself well-founded in reality and how its propositions take on validity and authority. And if my analysis has suggested a possible solution (which, in no wise, is offered as 'original') of how we know what we admit we know, then there is additional evidence, in addition to the 'tests' of reason and the authority of everyday practice, for the presumption of truth which Common Sense seems to possess.

NOTES

1. There is relativity so far as awareness of the meaning of universals is concerned.
2. Overlooking, of course, the obvious relativity in terms of a person's color-blindness.
3. No one test suffices. In addition, we do not have to choose between various theories of 'truth'. 'Correspondence' seems to be involved in private perception, but this correspondence can only be verified by additional experience, of one's own, or of other persons'. Thus, 'coherence' immediately enters into the correspondence doctrine and reaches its own peak in science's 'system'. Also, some things can be tentatively accepted so long as they 'work' pragmatically. All are involved -- along with 'authority' -- in 'public' truth.
4. He might ask to feed one, e.g. -- or attempt to domesticate them for economic reasons.
5. Persons a...z would thus include those philosophers who openly deny the validity of the argument. Philosopher K may thus hold to his solipsism in spite of a contradictory conclusion.
6. Throughout my discussion I refer to 'things' as inclusive of real existents and ideal subsistents. The meaning of a matter-of-fact 'thing', say an automobile, is related definitely to certain ideal 'things,' not only as known, but in its meaningful relations: the idea of an automobile is related to the idea of a summer vacation, etc.
7. This is not to be confused with the meaning of the thing as an 'essence,' cited on p.146.
8. That is to say, some part of Reality is known as an existent. The fact may have to do with a concrete object of sense or with a relation, but it is usually a combination of both which is first recognized and experienced as an existing fact.
9. See Note 7. Discussion of the various kinds of significance -- or meaning -- is given in the next page. Also, we could use the Scholastic term "quiddity" here as signifying the 'whatness' of the thing known.
10. Berkeley certainly had in view this point as well as the factor of relativity (mentioned above) in his argument for the dependence of 'objects' upon consciousness.
11. Our concern is not with their ontological status (though we have hinted at their reality), but with the recognition of

their significant existence. The reference to 'creation' and 'convention' refers to the conceptualist - nominalist tradition.

12. The similarity of experience seems to corroborate the necessity of our experiences. But it is not logical necessity, strictly. Reality is not known to us, after the Leibnizian ideal, as mathematically rational. Indeed, it may be mathematically rational, every aspect may be related to every other aspect and to the whole with strict necessity; but we do not know this a priori, and experience conveys much that is capricious and irrational (to us) in the nature of things. The fact that such-and-such an event occurs, however, is owing to its cause -- as such, the effect is necessary.

Part Three: The Legitimacy of the
Argument from Common Sense.

Section 2: Appearance, Reality and Common
Sense.

I. Introduction.

The purpose of the inadequate analysis of Section One, which makes no pretensions of exhausting a problem that has occupied some of the world's best minds for a lifetime, was to indicate how facts of various kinds entail significance and meaning for persons who--as knowers--discover these meanings as they exist in Reality. Meaning--in some cases, if not in all--implies that we have grasped the essence of a particular thing, of a relation (which may include the relationships of class-inclusion, class membership or attribution, as well as definite relations between things in the concrete, or between persons), and of a universal (and knowledge of universals, taken in the broadest sense, enables us to have scientific knowledge). If we take the significance of a brute fact, for example, we find that the lowest level of meaning assures us of an atomic, indestructible existent of some kind, of a determinate nature, and having relations with at least one person.¹ Public facts presuppose that a meaning is shared by many persons who know that they know the same thing, so that communication of ideas implies mutually on the part of these persons an awareness that they hold, in common, the common essence of many particular things and relations, and even relations of (other) universal relations. Concrete sensible objects are known most vividly because they affect the perceiver's organism in a striking manner, setting up all sorts of intense

feelings of pleasure and pain, as well as involving various kinaesthetic sensations. This is because the life of the organism is very intimately related to the things of the environment. These must be carefully used and controlled if the struggle of life is to be prolonged with any success, and the senses play their indispensable part in directing the organism. Concrete sensible objects are known to be facts even more obviously because of their importance for the life of the organism: the awful hazards of Nature, food, clothing, shelter, and family or tribal life are first necessities of life, just as the Cause controlling these things (and many others intimately related to them) become the first object of genuine intellectual curiosity.

We saw in the introductory section of this essay (in Part One) that these concrete facts are preserved through names or other signs. And we have just seen that these signs specify definite meanings shared in common by a great number of persons. The meaning of sense objects forms a body of facts, not only of first importance, but of ultimate importance, so long as the life of the human organism continues. From the cradle to the grave life involves inextricably the course of a body (which I know to be my own more vividly than I know other sense objects to be part of my environment) which is at all times in space and time, at varying distances from the surface of the earth, in immediate contact with an infinite variety of things (which resist and oppose me, or adjust themselves to me, or submit to my purposes, however defiantly) which are understood to be physical or material, and related in

numerous ways with other embodied selves or persons. With the possible exception of those rare moments when reason contemplates reason and man becomes immortal like the Aristotelian God, we are always dimly aware of our embodied self and of a vast background, or context, of things known and 'felt' to exist.

It may perhaps be pointed out in criticism of the above analysis of knowledge, that all we are immediately cognizant of is facts, that is, meanings, and that, therefore, the existence of a world of real objects, independent of any knower, still remains an intellectual bugbear. The chief point of the argument, however, insisted all along on the primacy of knowing, and if we should be forced to face an 'egocentric predicament,' which, incidentally, is most unintelligible to the ordinary common sense person, we have only to refer to the immediately recognized significance of knowing some real object (in no way a part of the subject, nor dependent on it, logically or causally), which is taken to be a primitive fact and understood as meaning such by very many persons. That is, if meaning itself has significance --if it hasn't there can be no dispute, for no reader will have read this far in this essay, in the first place; secondly, there can be no argument, for there will be no mutual understanding; thirdly, there would be no point to any question asked, anyway-- then the meaning of the brute existence of some concrete aspect of reality, known and shared as a public fact, perpetuated in the signs of language, assumed in all science, and suffered and endured in daily interaction with the environment has significance and truth; since all the 'tests' (excluding the first, perhaps, because it begs the question)² plus the collective authority

of all history establishes this fact--of real existence--with a probability amounting to certainty.³

II. How Common Sense Regards the Distinction Between Appearance and Reality.

The distinction between 'appearance and reality' has frequently been made by philosophers on the assumption that they know what is real and what merely appears to be real (to those less fortunate). Apart from the dogmatism which has perpetuated this conviction, enabling sages to proclaim with unction what appears to be real, but isn't, and what is real, but doesn't appear to be, critical study of what we mean by the 'real' has been singularly lacking. In ordinary life, however, some of the things plucked from objective reality and lightly held by philosophers on the ground that they are 'mere appearance' are, on the contrary, respected as most real. The reality of the secondary qualities, for one, is never doubted, and concrete sense objects are known with certainty to be a part of reality. Again, the permanent (often equated with the real) has always enjoyed a monopoly on the metaphysical market, and even the competitive efforts of philosophers of change include due regard for the permanence of their principle of change. We cannot get away from it if we try, for, as we saw above⁴ the requirements of rational discourse demand the logically permanent as subject-matter, as the principles of knowledge and science require it formally.⁵ This impotence of ours, however, in no way affects the vital issue at stake, for it is not a question as to the desirability of the permanent or impermanent; it is, rather, the

problem of knowing something that really is, something that can be known. And this introduces the fact of the close relationship of epistemology and ontology: each is incomplete without the other.

When Common Sense, therefore, holds that in knowing concrete sensible objects it knows reality it is asserting that our knowledge is of what exists. At the primitive level of knowledge, essences are grasped as more or less permanent aspects of reality; at the same time, the fact of change, the birth, growth and decay of all things is also recognized. Reality seems to include necessarily both the permanent and impermanent as polar aspects. The relations holding between unique particulars is discovered in universal laws: but this in no way robs the particular of its 'uniqueness:' generality and particularity are known to be reciprocal factors in reality. The minimum of meaning which any object has for us is never lost as we saw above, by the relatively exhaustive, rich collection of meanings discovered by many specialists: scientific analyses do not essentially destroy our primitive meanings: my desk and typewriter may be a highly complex mass of vibrating atomic or sub-atomic particles or events, yet the ordinary meaning that it has for me is not lost at all. If efforts are made, however, to debunk our well-known ordinary meanings on the ground that they are not real, we protest, for we believe we know the reality we are in interaction with and know it immediately.

The only sense in which we can fairly distinguish between appearances and reality is in differentiating between partial-truth and Truth, or reality, in this or that aspect and the Whole of Reality; for these contrasts are discovered in our everyday experience: we know the limitations of our knowledge, just as we know there is the boundless extent of Reality. Besides, the term 'reality' tends to be regarded as the ultimate summation of all that is potentially knowable and to become an Absolute, including change and becoming with it, but itself transcending all change, becoming, and 'appearance'. The ideal goal of knowledge, knowing everything that is, becomes the ontological Whole, and it is not hard to see how what we know becomes what there is to be known, in short, how absolute idealism based upon the exigencies of knowledge is born. For Common Sense, however, the identification of what is with what is known can never occur, not only because it immediately recognizes the difference between being and being-known, but also because of the natural difference in kind between the thing and the known meaning of a thing.

Another factor which gives some pretensions to the distinction between appearance and reality is the kind of dualism which makes man exist apart from the world he knows in so far as mind and consciousness are absolutely separated from the material world. In such a dualism the idea of separation seems to imply spatial separation, rather than logical (or even ontological) difference, and this is responsible for many theories of knowledge growing out of the obvious query as to how something entirely

'removed' from its ultimate object of knowledge can ever know that object. Common Sense is quite aware of a difference between consciousness and material things, meanings and concrete objects, unseen universals and seen particulars, but it cannot conceive of a reality apart from man, so that man can know only vagrant appearances which somehow arise as bastard offspring of reality. On the contrary, keenly aware of the direct interaction of man with things, together included in reality, Common Sense sees no difficulty in directly knowing the reality of which man's embodied self is one aspect. It must be also said in fairness to the claims of dualism that dogmatic monism, whether it be of the kind we suggested in our remarks on the Absolute, or extreme materialism, in like fashion is equally unwarranted. The attempts to reduce the distinct reality of qualitative experience to matter-in-motion, as an apiphenomenon, or to equate consciousness with gross matter (in combination of some kind) are offensive to Common Sense because it knows that such reductions in the name of some superior 'real' is ill-founded. What common sense at the ordinary level and Common Sense at the philosophical level are certain of is that there are all sorts of 'realities' together included in the all-embracing, conveniently logical class, Reality.

III, In What Sense Appearances May Be Said to Be Saved.

We can now see in a new light why it is necessary to save the appearances for Common Sense (especially for common sense).⁶ Appearances are 'saved' because, paradoxically, if they are not, part of reality is sacrificed. They must be saved if reality as it is (and not as some would have it) is to be

presented in the philosophical portrait. For the confusing distinction between appearance and reality we can substitute primitive meaning (or primitive description) versus advanced, or sophisticated meaning (perhaps scientifico-metaphysical description). What we have said above about the relativity of meaning also comes to our assistance, here. For we can now save the appearance of the rising and setting sun and the stationary earth by retaining the original meaning as a simple relation between an object and an observer; and, at the same time, realize the cogency of the mature discovery of the many relations between the sun and the planets from another position. While we tend to look upon the new 'construction', which accounts for the 'illusion' of the moving sun, as final, it is just as relative, in the sense that we have employed this term above, as the original picture, limited by the physical and mental equipment which makes the additional meanings discoverable. It is relative because we have no necessary assurance that it is the final, absolute view. But the first 'appearance' is not contradictory to the more mature view unless it is narrowly held to exhaust all the meanings possible. When the first is seen to be included in the second, which has gone on toward new discoveries in the light of new knowledge, it is 'saved', even though, unknown to man, its 'safety' is assured by the nature of things. And it is a fact that ordinarily we tend to regard the sun as in motion, the earth as stationary. The real danger of this whole problem of saving the appearances

rests in the dogmatic tendency to hold out for one view-- a partial view--to the exclusion of all the necessary, though minor, aspects. It is to the credit of Common Sense that it fully realizes the hold it has on reality and the certainty of its knowledge, no matter how incomplete this knowledge is at any stage in history; that, further, it accepts the cogency of the new developments in the light of the reasonableness of the explanation; that, finally, it is quick to protest against any one-sided picture which distorts the relations and meanings of things in favor of some pet theory or idea at the expense of omitting 'the really known', so vivid at a so-called 'lower' level of experience.

IV. Summary.

In this section we have attempted to submit additional evidence for the validity of Common Sense. We found that while some sort of dualistic distinction is immediately recognized by Common Sense to be a fact, the kind of dualism which absolutely separated man and nature is opposed to the beliefs of Common Sense and logically incompatible with man's knowledge and practice. Likewise the dualistic distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality' was found to be misleading. It is true that there are many realities (even if one Reality) and many relative meanings referring to these realities; none the less, the position of Common Sense, that it knows these realities and knows them meaningfully stands up. The fact that some appearances must be saved was seen to be not as serious as it first seemed; that, in fact, it is natural and corroborative of what we all know in coming to know things progressively in experience. The metaphysical position, therefore, which

Common Sense presupposes is one of interaction, with man definitely a part of reality, in definite and direct relations with things. This seems to be confirmed, not only by our 'direct knowledge', but also, by our practical experiences which enable us to use things and undergo (with them) mutual adaptation and change. Common Sense, therefore, entails a metaphysics which justifies our knowledge of things by direct enjoyment (experience) of them. And any other scheme—perhaps extreme dualism—must show not only how the interaction hypothesis is wrong, but also how Common Sense is wrong, since the acceptance and admission of Common Sense entails, I believe, the kind of metaphysics I have indicated.

NOTES^{163a}

1. The relation may be that of simple 'awareness' -- perhaps a response of an organism to a stimulus plus the recognition of awareness. If recognition does not occur, of course, there is no known fact, though the existence of certain things is in no way dependent upon their being known. Many things occur daily within my bodily organism -- but I do not know them, yet they are potential 'facts'.
2. The test of experience cannot prove what we are here trying to establish, namely, real existence; for the real world of objects must be presupposed before an alleged known object can be said to correspond with the real object.
3. For all practical -- and most theoretical -- purposes, it is with certainty that we know the real world to be a fact. Only on highly theoretical logical grounds are we forced to admit that deep in the depths of Nature's organism there may possibly some potential action which would sweep away all existing physical 'things'. The contrary of every matter of fact, as Hume put it, is possible. Even if it were true that nothing but meanings have been shown to be -- this is realism of a very definite kind. See below, Part Four, Section Division
4. See Part One, Section 2, p.23 Note 7, p.30.
5. Meyerson has shown how the demand for logical 'identity' has affected our view of reality from the standpoint, as I understand it, of phenomenalism. In the Preface to his Identity and Realism, op. cit., he announces his purpose; to show how Common Sense occurs, by which he means (I believe) the belief in an enduring, continuous world of individual objects, i.e. 'things'. Thus, his defense of Common Sense is Humean -- an attempt to account for its 'illusions'.
6. See above, pp.6 ff.

Part Three: The Legitimacy of 'The
Argument From Common Sense.'

Section 3: Analysis of the Preceding
Arguments.

Four hypothetical propositions, offering four alternatives, seem to rise from what has been said above. A. If Common Sense, represented by the propositions we listed in Part Two, Section 3, is certainly true, i.e. absolutely necessary, then it follows that any conclusions drawn from it are also true, and that a philosophy arguing from it is making use of a legitimate concept in a sound manner. B. If it has a probability of truth and has no rival (with an equal probability of truth), which is its contradictory, then an argument from Common Sense is ipso facto legitimate. C. If it is one of two or more possibilities, each of which has an equal claim of truth, to argue from Common Sense would perhaps afford

formal legitimacy, but hardly material legitimacy: we could not say that our conclusions owned real truth, though the possibility that the argument drawn from the Common Sense propositions produced conclusions which in the long run might be true still exists. D. If it can be shown that a rival claimant, contradictory to Common Sense, has a greater probability of truth in its favor, any argument drawn from Common Sense will command little respect, unless it can be shown that Common Sense and its rival are not incompatible, in which event we are returned to C.

Any 'argument from Common Sense' would be legitimate if it produced valid and true conclusions, formally and materially true, since logical legitimacy alone would be of little value for a debate about real things. To meet these requirements, it is readily apparent that the kind of conclusions we desire would follow only from alternatives A and B. The ordinary man is positively certain about A, and we have seen that the Common Sense philosophers of the eighteenth century agree that the propositions of Common Sense possess self-evident, apodeictic truth, permitting fruitful deductions. Today, however, we hesitate at the threshold of the blind faith which accepts the finality of the 'absolutely certain;' we feel that A cannot be accepted, since such knowledge requires omniscience, both empirically and intuitively, and even from the standpoint of authority, for who can tell when in the future one or more of the propositions might be modified? The ordinary man bases his belief in their authority, not so

much on strictly philosophical grounds, as on the very practical ground that all his conduct daily seems to corroborate them. This, in his philosophical moments, leads him to the conclusion that reality must be such-and-such so that he must believe what he does, even when a strenuous effort to the contrary is made (for all these efforts fail in their objective). The philosopher, on the other hand, recognizes the contingency of all propositions related to matters-of-fact and to the obviously limited human mind: this forces him to discard A (though it may be true) and admit B.

If we are agreed that B, and not A, is to be accepted, what evidence is there for B? In the first two sections of Part Three we suggested several hypotheses which might explain how we ordinarily come to know what we admittedly do know, the supposition being that belief or conviction, in short, knowing that we know something, is fundamental. For this reason we confined our attention to the ontological factors which account for intelligibility. But in trying to show how many persons can have meanings--and meanings in common--we did not mean to imply that the problem of how one can perceive an object was either unimportant or irrelevant. It was indicated, however, that the problem of perception entails the more general fact of knowledge, contrary to those philosophers who felt that we must first solve the problems of perception before we can determine whether or not knowledge is possible. Also, our speculations were not regarded as

a 'proof' of the legitimacy of Common Sense. For one thing proof in the manner of proving a geometric theorem is impossible, as is direct reference to experience, for how can I refer to experience for proof of the alleged fact that an extended, material world exists? At best, we can assert an identity: the real world exists because in experience the real world exists. There is 'transcendental' proof if we admit that Common Sense is necessary for experience; and there is 'historical' proof in the sense that there is evidence that many persons in the past have believed what we believe. In the latter case, however, all the persons involved might have been nursing a fictitious body of propositions. We are reduced, then, to the place we started from in our speculations of sections 1 and 2: to the immediate, intuitive awareness of the meaningful factuality of the Common Sense propositions. We know that P is a fact shared by many persons, but we can also supplement this awareness with the additional statement, that all our experience presupposes P, while at the same time corroborating it. Immediate conviction led the eighteenth century thinkers to regard Common Sense propositions as a part of the original furnishings of the understanding. They may be, but the difficulty of verifying so-called 'categories' is very great.

The fact that we are always reduced to the acceptance of Common Sense without 'proof', does not prevent any 'proof' from being discovered in the future; nor does a positive proof, i.e. a logical demonstration, guarantee the real validity of those conclusions which are incompatible with

Common Sense. For, in the case of the latter, it is discovered usually that the premises contain or imply the denial of one or more Common Sense propositions which are firmly and positively accepted under all circumstances other than those under which the philosopher speculates in private. If we assume that we are to test the factuality of any proposition, that is, ask ourselves how it is that we know such-and-such to be true, or how anyone knows that P is a fact, five answers are possible. (1) I immediately intuit it to be a fact; (2) It is given on the authority of someone else; (3) It can be verified by you and me in experience; (4) It has rational consistency and coherence; and (5) All my practice seems to establish it; or, I do not see how I could act as I do if it were not true.

If we ask a willing subject specific questions, we can determine how legitimate the so-called facts are. We may ask, How do you know that you yourself exist? He will submit reasons 1, 5, 3 and 2 (possibly 4), probably in the order given, and stress 1. Or we may try, How do you know that your memory (granting the existence of such a thing) of 'last night's opera' is a fact? His answer will once more emphasize 1; after a moment's though he may give 5 also, claiming that the aria he kept whistling throughout the day was not brought up by associations growing out of 'last night's dream'. Now, we may feel that we can catch him up with, How do you know that 'last night's dream' was in fact just a dream, and not part of your 'ordinary, consciously-awake existence?' The answer will

give 1, 4 and 5. If we venture the general issue, How do you know that your belief about the independent existence of the external, physical world is true? the reasons are given in proportion to their vividness: 1, 3 (in the sense that someone else verifies it as he does, e.g.), 5, 2, and 4. It is significant that when we ask a fact, which is a public fact, all the reasons are given unhesitatingly. All this evidence shows how Common Sense has a great probability of truth.

The rival of Common Sense fails to summon all, if any, of these reasons when questions are asked. If I ask a subject who knows the meaning of phenomenalism and who feels that there is a true explanation of how he knows it to be a fact, he can answer 4, 2 and 1; or he can pretend to feel strongly its truth, giving as an answer, 1, 4 and 2. If he sincerely believes it to be true, perhaps has experienced a mystical revelation giving this assurance, he can reply 1, 2 and 4. Under no circumstance (save those where a group of mystics 'commune' with each other mysteriously) can he reply with 3 or 5, since 3 is ruled out by the nature of phenomenalism and 5 seems to imply the contradictory of phenomenalism in that experience involves other persons and real things. Our subject may regard 3 and 5 as superficial; if so, the burden rests upon him of showing why they are superficial, or why it is unnecessary to consider them seriously: in short, they must be shown to be false.

If, after we have progressed thus far in our argument, someone holds to C and asserts that it is quite possible for two persons, X and Y, to hold rival views incompatible in every respect (and on all the points, 1-5), we admit that it is

possible, though as it stands, unintelligible--since 3 and 5 seem to be important factors in the lives of any two individuals living together in the world we know. In fact, it is hard to see how any understanding between X and Y would be possible in the first place--and how they can even begin to debate the respective merits of their positions; and if they submit (by some queer turn of cosmic events) their cases to an impartial judge, they are worse off, since X and Y now become definitely related by the mediator, M, and in the relationship X-M-Y, these same tests must be applied, without discrimination, to each.

Where we are not concerned with generic incompatibility, the same difficulty does not arise, though it appears to hold. In the case of objective idealism, e.g. we have a type of 'realism' which may pass all the tests safely. Even here the qualifications of the candidate are in doubt. The illusion or appearance of materiality must be accounted for in view of the spiritual reality, alone considered ontologically real. A Berkely, Hegel, or Leibnitz thus has the responsibility of showing Common Sense why things appear as they are and how they know that they are not what they appear, i.e. as something else; perceptual experiences of a Perceiver, the logical process of an absolute Rationality (or rational Absolute), or a universe of monads. In the same way, objective materialism is called upon to explain the phenomenon of conscious experience, intuitively felt to be generically different than 'the material.' And, in passing, it may be said that all constructions of the scientist require the same explanation, viz. how it is that sub-atomic occurrences produce the world as it seems. If, in all these cases, no explanation

of the Common Sense propositions is given, or, worse, if they are explained away as erroneous, the dichotomy between philosophy and Common Sense or Science and Common Sense becomes (perhaps justly) absurd.

Metaphysical theories of the type just mentioned raise some objections to Common Sense (on the ground that the latter is incompatible with their speculative picture); and science, when it tends to become metaphysical, sings the same song. The only reply to these objections, in view of the tests which Common Sense has passed, is that if they cannot convince the natural light of reason that their explanation of reality and its 'appearances' (Common Sense propositions) is satisfactory, they are at best only 'possible'. When objections are not made in view of a preconceived theory, they are made on the ground that the very certainty and conviction with which they are held, as well as the intuitive test, are suspicious authorities,--since anyone can claim anything equally. In reply to this objection the champion of Common Sense has only to point out the intuitive convictions of his opponent's belief in some other propositions on which his majestic metaphysics rests. If it is objected that the Common Sense position is uncritical, this is not even admitted on the level of common sense since the ordinary man is critical of some views; certainly it is not true on the philosophical level where some of the keenest of critics (Mr. Moore, e.g.) have debated the question from all angles. Perhaps the trite objections that Common Sense is 'too general,' or 'too vague,' or 'too ambiguous' will be raised. In defense it can be pointed out that the

intension of the term includes necessarily the general or common meanings of things; also that while it is vague and ambiguous to those who have not distinguished between Common Sense and common sense in detail, and is, therefore, to be condemned when lightly used, it is nevertheless valuable in meaning what it indicates by the very words making up the term: a body of propositions having sense, or meaning, common to very many persons, descriptive of their beliefs about the nature of things, so that in speculation and in practice they prove fruitful. Finally, if it is pointed out that the term has only general use in philosophy (this issue we analyzed in Part Two, Section 1, III) but no specific applicability (which we touched upon in Part Two, Section 2, IV) in philosophic problems, we might agree, though not fully. Part Four will attempt to answer this objection.

In view of these objections, (a) that Common Sense is incompatible with a metaphysics; or (b) with science; (c) that the source of the beliefs in intuition is a dangerous and inadequate basis; (d) that it is uncritical; (e) that as a term it is too general, vague and ambiguous; and also in view of the evidence in favor of Common Sense, it must be concluded, I believe, that it is (1) a legitimate concept, and (2) a legitimate concept for philosophy, whether it is used in a very general sense or in a more specific function. This last aspect has not, of course, been carefully and completely established, but we turn now to Part Four for just this purpose.

Section 4: Conclusions.

We have shown above how Common Sense propositions--what we know about reality--may come about, granting the existence of the world we know exists and of the knowing selves we know exist. How Common Sense is possible owing to the nature of things--this was one of our chief problems. We tried to discover how it was that many persons shared common meanings and understood these meanings, and we found that the structure of reality enabled man to grasp the essential nature of things in their unique particularity as well as their universality. At the same time we attempted to explain how the directness and familiarity of things immediately knowable were likely, and we found that man was intimately in interaction with the things he knew. Thus, certain views of some philosophers seem to be precluded definitely: those who attempt an analysis of the perceptual situation, without first admitting the claims of Common Sense, beg the question; those who attempt certain metaphysical hypotheses concerning man and nature are in the same boat, for if they arbitrarily remove man from the things he knows he is immediately in contact with, they can have no knowledge, which they admit they have. At the same time, some sort of philosophical analysis of the kind I suggested seems to be required by Common Sense if it is legitimate. That it is, in fact, legitimate is proved, not by our analysis of the background of its meaning, but by its meaning for experience and for philosophy. When we act we act with assurance and with success; and when we philosophize--starting with the admission that we know something and share this knowledge with others--we philosophize with success, arriving

at some harmonious reconciliation of practice and theory. And if we apply the 'tests' of philosophy to our Common Sense convictions and successfully meet objections, we determine their cogency.

Finally, perhaps, we are reduced to no proof at all. But we must start somewhere--any philosopher must start somewhere. And in every instance he is reduced to some ultimate for which there is no proof. It is thus with Common Sense. Ultimately, we start with the frank assumption that we know that we know; but if we immediately ask how we know that we know that we know, we are reduced to the old issue of infinite regression. There is this to be said, however, about the approach from the point-of-view of Common Sense: as practical, active organisms, all philosophers are obliged to be Common Sense persons and perform in general life what they perhaps argue away in their study. Also, the advantage of this approach is that it reconciles theory and practice, appearance and reality, thereby removing the necessity of multiplying principles which might be needed to explain the discrepancies. Our attempt at a metaphysical basis serves to show how Common Sense gains its priority and becomes valid, necessary data for philosophy. But even without this analysis the legitimacy of the concept for philosophy is assured by its possessing meaning and significance, since philosophy-- even though it properly questions all things and takes nothing for granted--by its nature has to do with meaning--the meaning of this and that, and the meaning of the whole. The meaning of Common Sense cannot be denied, nor dismissed; just as its importance for philosophy

cannot be overlooked. What we have said does not, however, answer our final question, Is a Common Sense Philosophy possible? We turn, then, to our attempt to answer this.

Part Four: The Possibility of a
Common Sense Philosophy.

Section 1: Philosophy and Common Sense.

I. Introduction.

At the close of Part Three we considered the various objections to Common Sense. We answered all but the last of these, which had to do with the question which forms the problem of this part of the essay. The question is, Is a Common Sense Philosophy possible? By a 'Common Sense Philosophy' we understand the detailed analysis of specific problems and perhaps, in addition, the logically coherent view of the universe as a whole, not simply the general body of Common Sense propositions, generically summing up partial views, or grouping together all the partial views into one whole. By a 'Common Sense Philosophy' we also mean that product which survives critical reflection and research, just as any other so-called philosophy stands or falls on its own merits. Finally, we also mean that philosophy harmoniously related to the body of Common Sense propositions from which it develops, so that conclusions reached entail the general propositions and never contradict them.

In what has gone before, in Parts One, Two and Three, we have shown that it is a fact that Common Sense philosophies have existed—in name at least, that 'Common Sense' had definite philosophic significance for each philosophy, playing a definite role in each, and that there seems to be a legitimate basis in the nature of things for some philosophy which we may call Common Sense philosophy. Parts One and Two then, presented the historical evidence for particular philosophies taking

the name 'Common Sense.' But the fact that Common Sense philosophies have existed in the past does not necessarily imply that they can exist legitimately, or that they are possible; since the name may be a misnomer, adopted to win the applause of the common sense multitude. Part Three, therefore, went a long way in establishing the possibility of a general philosophy by showing how a body of meaningful and significant propositions, happily named Common Sense (in spite of the obvious objections to such a name), come into being, but even more important, how they warrant our respect. Their success in passing various 'tests' and in bridging the abyss between theory and practice, reality and appearance, justifies the serious regard with which these propositions are held. Also, in Part Three, we were considering Common Sense in itself, apart from any one philosophy which has appealed, or which may appeal, to it, or argue from it. Earlier, in Part Two, when we analyzed its role within philosophy, in general and in particular, we were primarily concerned with any philosophy, or any possible philosophy- how Common Sense functioned if it were true. Again, in Part Three, it was shown how Common Sense has a very great probability of truth, and how it has thereby importance in eliminating types of philosophy generally known to be false. In the present division of our essay we shall combine the methods of approach and assume the truth of the general body of Common Sense propositions, along with its general function, in order to determine whether any philosophy is privileged to call itself a Common Sense Philosophy in the sense outlined above.

Since we are assuming the general function of Common Sense as established, it might be well to review the ways in which we found Common Sense function generally. (1) Some philosophers have regarded it as formally important (a) in regulating the general approach to philosophy, as the logical basis for further thought, and (b) in determining the specific approach to definite problems by means of analysis; and closely related to this is (2) its material significance, as offering a body of general facts, making up a general philosophy, or standing as the data whose implications lead to the solution of particular problems. Finally, some philosophers without questioning it further, have regarded it as an authority, which may be appealed to at any time (during debate), or even referred to within a technical analysis—as somehow clinching a point or pointing to a preferred conclusion. This last type of appeal finds it a general, unanalyzed concept of convenient utility, not really significant for philosophy, though indispensable in rhetoric.

What we are primarily concerned with here is the possibility of appealing to Common Sense in one of the highly specialized divisions of philosophy, epistemology,—and in the problem of perception within epistemology. For in the past it has been customary for some philosophers to appeal to Common Sense in the midst of their special analysis of the special problem of how we actually perceive an object. How far the specialist may go and yet call his work a 'Common Sense Philosophy,' and how the answers to highly specialized questions

are related to Common Sense--these are the paramount issues which we shall try to meet. In facing them we hope to answer the objection of many philosophers that he who argues from Common Sense is in fact a pseudo-philosopher and mountebank.

II. How Philosophy Differs from Common Sense.

By way of a brief reminder, let us recall some of the distinctions we made early in the essay between philosophy and Common Sense. First of all, we found that common sense is a summum genus, embracing all beliefs of all kinds and summing up at any period of time the propositions growing out of ordinary experience. These propositions, infinite in variety and number, are quasi-scientific and quasi-philosophic, and out of them, as a result of critical reflection emerge the propositions of Common Sense. It is likewise a fact that unless there is some curiosity and reflective ability philosophy never rises out of common sense and the philosophic concept 'Common Sense,' does not come into existence. But man is essentially a philosophic and scientific organism, as he is a practical, predatory animal; and on any level of 'intelligence' there is some body of philosophic beliefs about the universe as a whole--its processes, its value, its destination--and about the function of the individual person within this universe. As new knowledge is produced and new discoveries are made, an increasing number of problems is solved. These, in part, answer the questions which rise in more and more detail as man speculates on the commonplace things around him, especially when he is enabled to observe hitherto 'hidden' phenomena by some newly discovered apparatus and thereupon ask

more and more questions, going ever deeper into the innermost workings of things.

Thus, while Common Sense is usually a summary of certain fundamental beliefs about the nature of things in the light of a synoptic picture of reality, there is often included, in addition, a summary of conclusions about a restricted problem. These conclusions are reached by a philosophic analysis going beyond the general Common Sense limits, or they may filter down from specialties and be absorbed into ordinary language. And we must not forget that Common Sense comes into being as a result result of philosophic distinctions, made with a view toward solving philosophic questions, not as a result of any other interest. Common Sense is thus a product, satisfying very definite demands, which in turn call forth other answers to more detailed problems. These answers to specific problems are accepted as valid providing they agree in general with Common Sense; in no way are they even tentatively accepted by common sense, if it can be shown that they contradict the more inclusive view, which has determined, in advance, the logical ultimate which no analysis can gainsay. Many philosophers, emancipated from common sense, have, however, felt that some of these contradictory answers are very definitely true--whence arises the conflict between Common Sense and philosophy (and of course, between common sense and philosophy when the position of the philosopher has been interpreted to the ordinary man), a conflict, in fact, between two philosophies: one claiming that no analysis must deny the first premises; another arguing

perhaps from the results of his particular conclusion in a specialized problem backwards to a position incompatible with Common Sense, to new premises. We have already analyzed the competitive struggle of some philosophies to transcend Common Sense by a superior insight, or to rationalize it away with a formidable dialectic. Now we shall consider Common Sense in its widest extension.

Whether or not the extension of the concept to a specific problem is justified on more than a merely nominal basis, and if it is, how it is, and upon what grounds we may designate a philosophy (in the sense in which we defined 'Common Sense Philosophy' above, in I) by the name Common Sense, can best be brought out by turning immediately to the battleground of Perception where the colors of the various schools flutter in gallant display.

Part Four: The Possibility of a Common
Sense Philosophy.

Section 2: Common Sense and the Perception
of Objects.

I. Introduction.

We have already shown the many dangers which lurk in the path of the philosopher who tries to tackle some of the problems growing out of the perceptual situation. We saw how two Common Sense philosophers employed different strategy to account for what they knew to be a fact, viz. the perception of objects. Reid made a courageous effort -- and went down fighting, emitting the while, in an audible sigh, the name of his beloved mistress, Common Sense. Moore, unlike his Scotch predecessor was more canny; he admitted that several answers were possible, none of which was unimpeachable. At the same time, he was satisfied with a bare outline of the problem, leaving to others the task of deciding which of his alternatives will be accepted. We found that each of these Common Sense philosophers recognized the necessity for some kind of representative perception. This, I believe, is contrary to the view of many philosophers who regard Common Sense realism and naive realism as synonymous -- Mr. Joad, e.g. (at one period of his thought, at least). Why Common Sense realism has been thought synonymous with naive realism¹, how, on the contrary, they cannot be equated, and why some kind of epistemological dualism is required are three questions which we shall face in the sequel.

II. Why Naive Realism and Common Sense Have Been Regarded
As Synonymous.

Naive realism arises from one of the dominant demands of common sense -- for immediate knowledge of things as they are. That is, granting the existence of a world of extended physical objects, independent of any knower or knower's 'experience,' it is believed early in man's philosophic reflection that they can be known with the same ease with which I can reach forth and pick up my pack of cigarettes for immediate gratification of my smoker's-desire. It is believed, in short, that I know things just as I immediately use things; that a man's grasp of a thing in knowledge is as secure as the possession of his wife. Any intermediary coming between the thing possessed and the possessor is regarded with great jealousy, and in fear of the 'eternal triangle' -- or rationalized away by a threatening flourish of Occam's keen-edged razor -- any suggestion of a ménage à trois is banished, any metaphysical philanderer is sent running on his way. But this domestic problem comes about -- as so many do -- through a misapprehension: immediate knowledge of the real world and mediate perception of a particular thing or continuant are felt to be incompatible; our knowing (in its broadest sense) is confused with our perceiving (in its narrowest sense). Since our knowledge of things is one of the prime facts of our experience, it is considered better to hold on to the respectable helpmate, rather than flirt with any dubious fly-by-night, Mr. (or Miss)

Tertium Quid, even at the risk of flouting a rigid logical analysis (which shows the necessity and lawfulness of the bohemian relationship) by some broad appeal on behalf of intuition or non-rational knowledge. Any suggested solution of the problem of our perception of things is either dismissed as unanswerable, or as 'solved' by the simple expedient of dismissing the interloper.

Philosophers like Mr. Joad have got into their predicament by accepting a dogma which has enjoyed undiminished prestige through the centuries. They agree with Reid that the 'ideal theory' not only denies the propositions of Common Sense, but entails the far worse positions of Subjectivism and Skepticism, and they point with a reformer's finger to the tragic examples of the pious Berkeley and the good Hume -- as if the contemplation of a theory could actually destroy the facts of experience.² Tacitly, the respect for this dogma confesses to a cynicism which does not hide a faulty logic; for it is argued from the repeated failures of philosophers in the past to the universal proposition that all philosophers, now and forever more, must fail if they admit the doomed 'ideas' which represent the precious things we know. It is accepted as a foregone conclusion that any theory of representative perception, which certain well known facts of experience seem to require (if we are to understand them), necessarily includes immediate awareness of sense-data, somehow referring to objects which we cannot be sure of, since there are only the sense-data which represent them. They appeal to common

sense for support of their general stand and strain the imagination to discover some basis for their position.

When any form of representationism is discarded as untenable, in the act of asserting his naive realism, the philosopher faces the difficulty of accounting for other demands implicit in common sense, e.g., the demand for some explanation of error and illusion, of memory, and of everyday 'experience'³ with distant objects and with the different size of objects in relative spatial relations with the knower. For if we perceive things directly, without any mediating factor, we should never err in our perceptions, and the memory of my grandmother, dead these many years, would necessitate her 'presence,' in the same sense that any object is immediately present to the knower. In like manner, in view of the finite velocity of light and sound (and the difference of their velocities), how I can perceive a distant moving star (in location⁴) at any one instant, or how there is a discrepancy between my perception of the smoke and the sound of a cannon fired a mile away, or how it happens that Mr. Jones, a six-footer, becomes increasingly smaller, only to fade away into a dot, then melt into nothingness, as he walks away from me down the wide concrete highway which also loses its width in becoming a point are some of the questions which the naive realists, to say the least, are hard put to to answer.

When the 'new realists' in America announced their program of reform⁵ they also assailed the 'old realism' and its use of representative or mediate perception on the ground

that it had to result in subjectivism; and like the naive realist, they turned to epistemological monism. The results of the switch to monism were not at all satisfactory: the real world was saved from all types of subjectivism and phenomenalism, the demand for immediate knowledge of the things forming the real world was met, but the equally important demand for the explanations mentioned above was not met. Nor was the relativity of knowledge satisfactorily explained in a realist way; for if we immediately know objects in their freshness, why can't we know them in a degree approaching the absolute? The introduction of 'relations' effects a partial answer at the expense of approaching a monistic interpretation, since ideally nothing can come between the knower and the known (excepting, of course, the bare relation of 'knowing;' which is not the same thing as the kind of relation which may account for the relativity of knowledge and which varies in each circumstance), and the content of the knowing or perceptual experience and the object known must be one and the same, just as the perceptual content (and other mental content) must be objectively real and enjoy an existence in kind like that of the real, physical objects they are one with.

What was especially hard for common sense to swallow was the bitter pill of the objective subsistence of certain entities -- dreams, illusions, hallucinations, imaginary figments -- whose private and subjective existence had long been accepted. It was also hard to take the 'permanent' existence or subsistence of the ordinary objects of experience, which,

as particulars, were known to come into existence, change, and perhaps disappear. But the stiffest blow was the kind of metaphysics put forth to sustain the new realist's position. When it was understood -- if ever -- by the common sense man, he was appalled not only by the epistemological monism which identified percept and entity known, knowledge and existence, but also by the tendency toward psychophysical monism, as well. Indeed, he might have asked, along with the philosophical critics of this new brand of realism, how it differed essentially from the various kinds of monistic idealism, which likewise identified the esse of the entity with its percipi. For if the object of experience is the content of experience it is difficult to see how solipsism can be staved off, -- how, in short, my knowing Mr.X carries with it assurance that Mr.X is no more than the mere content of my experience. And if all content is reduced to a realm of 'neutral entities,' the common sense awareness of the difference between physical objects and embodied knowing selves, or between Mr.X, Mr.Y, and Mr.Z, so far as these individuals are related to what I formerly called myself, disappears entirely. We are in fact reduced to a new kind of 'phenomenalism,' save that in place of the Humean impressions and ideas we have logical or mathematical entities floating about, and the distinctive thing called 'self' or 'consciousness' as well as the self and object in Hume's philosophy. In its final character, the new realism is a highly sophisticated metaphysic -- a body of esoteric truths shared by the elect, but hardly by

the better educated, and more intellectually mature, common sense persons.

III. The Common Sense Background of Epistemological Dualism.

The first dualistic distinctions emerged at the common sense level as a result of man's discovery that the experiences of dreams and the experiences of ordinary life were in no way compatible. Very early in his life he also learned to make allowances for the normal illusions rising out of the perception of distances, etc. The level of Common Sense finds these distinctions made more explicit. Today, Common Sense is faced with an internal struggle forcing a choice between the inherited, traditional differentiation between primary and secondary qualities and the 'natural' tendency to regard all qualities as objective. In spite of all the arguments calculated to clinch the subjectivity of secondary qualities, such as the relativity of colors (due to varying conditions of light or of the observer's distance from the object), the projection of 'after-images,' the experiences due to jaundice, etc., Common Sense clings to their objectivity. And, of course, it may be argued that since every extended sense-datum is also colored, as every colored sense-datum is also extended, that color is as objective as space, which is supposed to be a very important characteristic of the real world. If it is possible to argue that sense-data change as various other factors change (in the object, in general phenomena, such as light, and in the subject's organism), even though the 'object' remain essentially unchanged, and in every instance sense-data are

somehow 'objective' (or seem to be objective, though in fact they are not), always preserving the integrity of their relationship to the object which they represent, then, I believe, Common Sense would readily and wholeheartedly accept the secondary characteristics of certain qualities. Common Sense, again, might assent even if the sense-data were shown to be purely subjective, entirely confined to the inner world of consciousness, providing a satisfactory explanation 'saving the appearances' is given.⁶

At the reflective level of Common Sense, the sense in which every sense-datum is a partial representative of the object perceived is understood. The fact that I can say, I see the books on my desk, in no way conveys the proposition, I see a group of books wholly, from every possible angle. We are thus always limited in our perceptions, especially in our perceptions of sight. We never perceive the object in its whole-ness (as the sum total of all possible perceptions), since the relationship of object to knower involves innumerable perspectives. If it is objected that we are really perceiving the object, and it is owing to natural laws of location in space and perspective that we see the object in various frames of reference, the argument on behalf of a sense-datum, partially representing the whole object, still stands; for an explanation of how, according to nature, it happens that we see various appearances in no way discounts the point which is being made, viz. that there are these appearances which continually vary, even though they refer to an object which we regard as

a determinate continuant, i.e., a something having an identity persisting in its 'private' existence apart from the variable appearances entering into my private experience.

The technical problem of the relationships holding between subject and sense-datum, sense-datum and object known, and subject and object, is a thing apart from the ordinary interests of common sense, as is, perhaps, the distinction made in the preceding paragraph. One point, however, is very definitely recognized at the common sense level, and this is also incorporated into Common Sense. The issue was brought up earlier, in Part Three, Section 2. It was said in one place, "For Common Sense, however, the identification of what is with what is known can never occur, not only because it immediately recognizes the difference between being and being-known, but also because of the natural difference in kind between the thing and the known meaning of a thing."⁷ If it is true -- and I believe it is -- that Common Sense knows these distinctions to be an incontestable fact, then some form of representationism is assured which even the monists must admit. We seem to certainly grasp the meaning of things, but we never consume the object in discovering (or 'finding') the meaning. If the knowing of an object caused it to enter completely into our narrow circle of consciousness, the prime distinction between the knower and the independent world of real objects would disappear. And if we are to retain our realism, and avoid the hidden idealist pits which do not fail to catch unsuspecting game, we must first preserve the original dualism

which is basic to realism. At the same time we must do full justice to the fact of knowledge, which we know is knowledge about objects of the real world, never knowledge concerning mere ideas or simulacra confined within the human skull, if we are to maintain our realism. Closely related to this last problem is the further demand for separate, independent existence and being, and knowledge of this being, so that we know that we know things as they are, and not simply as they appear. For if it is admitted that we know things only as they appear, in no final sense can it be said that we know reality -- the ultimate, real things. In short, the realist demand for knowledge of an independent, real world necessitates an answer which shows how we can be sure we know these real things. And if this demand is not met, realism is doomed.

The trouble with the old realism, which made so much of ideas (immediate objects of the understanding) was that it failed to meet the demand for transcendence: there was no philosophical assurance that the idea referred in a very definite, necessary way to a real object. There is, of course, an unpleasant confusion between the immediate object of the understanding and the ultimate object of knowledge. The real thing -- a particular entity in space and time -- is the object of knowledge, and our knowledge is about this entity; but we know this real thing by means of representatives which perhaps out of space and time thrives within consciousness (as the object does not). That we do know

the object (especially since we interact with it actively in producing certain 'effects' in the environment, passively, in experiencing within ourselves other 'effects' caused by some external stimulus) is one of the prime facts of life; that we require sense-data, sensa, etc. is one of the prime discoveries of reflection. How the ubiquitous sense-datum, now here in consciousness (in spite of its apparent 'objectivity'), now out there somehow related to the object whose representative it is; how, in knowing, in grasping a meaning or essence, e.g., we can be assured that that which we have is necessarily related to the thing known; how the essential 'whatness' of a particular, unique object, adequately represents the content within the common structure of knowledge shared by many persons, so that this, and this objective thing only, has inviolate identity for all the purposes of knowledge -- in short, how there is true significance (in the original sense of forming a sign (signum) of something known): these are the important questions which Common Sense can put (since they are necessarily related to it), but which only a specialist can answer.

IV. Immediate vs Mediate Knowledge.

Earlier we stated that one demand of Common Sense is for immediate knowledge of the real world. But in view of the various ways in which mediate knowledge of particulars seems to be required, how can we reconcile our stand? In the first place, we qualified our statement by saying that we had

immediate knowledge of the extended, real world (no mention being made of particulars). The choice of 'immediate' is unfortunate, for in epistemological discussions the term is used as indicative of the non-mediate. In a true sense, all knowledge of things is mediate, since a host of biological conditions must be fulfilled ere we have knowledge even of the simplest kind. But the kind of 'immediacy' I am thinking of grows out of our awareness of the general context of reality, which is logically and perhaps temporally prior to our discovery of particulars within this whole.⁸ It may be that this 'immediately given' is the stream of consciousness, or perhaps, with Ward, the "presentation continuum."⁹ Only at the risk of ultimate contradiction can we say that somehow, in a mysterious way, we are immediately aware of that which is given in its wholeness, yet mediately aware of individuals within the whole. Still, our first waking moments of this life seem to provide us, in James' picturesque language, with a "blooming, buzzing confusion" out of which we shall differentiate individual things and learn to separate ourselves from them, more and more, as a 'spectator' of that of which we are -- on other considerations -- an integral part. The presented complex is at least mediated by means of consciousness, and if we rely upon some kind of representationism under other circumstances, our logic compels us to adhere to it throughout, so that we must give our weight at least to mediation, even though it does appear that we grasp the whole -- and perhaps real space and time (rather

than perceptual space and time) -- immediately.¹⁰ What is most important is the fact that we grasp reality as a context, never atomistically. Nor -- as our earlier suggestions also indicated -- do we seem to be cut off from reality with only Humean impressions and ideas as materials out of which to formulate (as Lucretius would say) a concilium of real things, and eventually, a real world.

Another possibility exists: that in the perception of *sensa* or sense-data (or whatever the 'representations' are called) we obtain 'immediate' knowledge of reality by means of the mediating factor. To overcome the ambiguity and self-contradiction here apparent, it is necessary to show that the nature of the sense-data is such, that in knowing them, we either intuit immediately, or 'infer' (by an immediate process) the real context of which they are an aspect. This suggestion seems to be what Stout hints at in Mind and Matter.¹¹ Reality is such that very many things are connected to many other things¹² by various ties, among them the causal tie. And in perceiving, say, one terminus of an aspect of reality, the subjective appearance, we ipso facto are aware of the other terminus in reality, as, for example, is the case when we infer the real existence of our friend at the other end of the telephone line from the 'voice' we perceive at this end. In short, the *sensum* carries transitively back to the real world. This ingenious explanation certainly meets the demand for real reference, and may be feasible, though it suspiciously looks as if it is the Common Sense desire to eat the cake and have it, too.

One has only to apply the traditional objections to neo-realism to discover the limitations of Stout's theory. In addition, Stout's argument from the memory-experience (where we seem to know the past immediately, yet obviously the past is not present) is none too clear. And what we actually fall back upon is inference of a special kind, which revives, in the memory situation, the original effect a real event, or thing, occasioned, by tracing the 'memory' of the original even to the original event and from there, on to the 'real' it is connected with, without error; and in 'direct' perception, by tying up the representation with the real cause. This inference is not a leap from an effect across a void to the cause, but from an effect to the cause by means of a metaphysical bridge, which connects the effect and the cause.¹³ Thus, we are, I believe, back with the neo-realists (with whom Stout, himself, disagrees); yet in one respect we must always be back with them on the question of logical reference and identity, connecting the sense-datum and the real entity. In any case, we have to introduce certain 'unknown quantities,' ever holding to our faith in new facts and discoveries which might enable us to decide this way or that.

The emphasis Common Sense places on the apparently 'immediate' data of consciousness in general is at least a significant protest against atomic sense-data, or that type of representative perception which leaves us alone with 'ideas' somehow relating to something we know not what. We start with the fact that we know real things, not the stuff of the 'ideal

pluralists' (whether they be of the Berkeleyan, Leibnizian or Russellian type). And Common Sense makes its protest felt on the ground that such analyses end up at the wrong end of the metaphysical cornucopia, with only the empty husks (impressions, ideas or 'logical atoms'), never the abundant richness of fecund reality. Common Sense believes that is confronted with reality, perhaps not in richness of detail (which must be found), but at least in potential plenitude, awaiting recognition, as the human organism more and more interacts sensitively to its moving, living environment. It may be possible that we have a special faculty which enables us to intuit the real, immediately, as a continuum. The evidence, however, seems to indicate otherwise, and 'immediate' knowledge of the general context is really 'prior' knowledge -- or 'original' first knowledge.

The other sense in which it may be said that we have 'immediate' knowledge of the real world grows out of 'normal' experience. When our range of perception is restricted to the things very close to us in space and time we overlook the factors which may alter our perception of things. We tend with Locke to consider our lot, as humans, equipped with sense organs of a definite range, to be part of God's plan, and the nature of things seems to be adjusted to our experience of them. Thus we discount any divergence from the ordinary: the real becomes the conventional. What we can use practically in the world's business becomes the standard in testing what is 'real.' Because, in most of our experiences,

we tend to overlook the exceptions to our normal perceptions, we regard every perception to be what it most obviously appears to be: an instantaneous, immediate perception of the object. We ask, as though one or the other alternative must hold, Do you see object O, or do you see some sense-datum, D? The answer is given in terms of customary experience, I see O. But both the question and the answer hide the quite logical possibility that I may see O by means of D.¹⁴ When one reflects on the perception of very distant objects, it is quite obvious that immediate knowledge of any one particular entity is impossible -- in any sense. But the fact that all knowledge of particular objects is mediate does not contradict the possibility of an intuitive immediate awareness of the general context extending far beyond the limits of the farthest particular.

What this presentation continuum is is another question; at least, it seems to include space and time, as well as 'gross matter' which is particularized, and, for all I know, it may include the realm of universals or essences, since I am inclined to believe that these may be ante rem and in re, as they obviously are post rem in the knowledge structure.¹⁵ For if we discover or find the real objects of the real world, and if we know that our knowledge is very definitely related to these objects, then the meanings and essences which give us universal knowledge about the things of experience would seem to be likewise related in an essential way to the things they refer to. That is, it seems logically

possible that in discovering objects we also discover real essences or meanings which have at least a dual being within the thing (as a part of the particular objective entity we know) and within the content of knowledge. This does not imply that particulars are nothing but a group of essences in a definite location in space and time, since Common Sense, if it is assured of anything, is quite vehement about the existence of unique 'material' particulars. But it does suggest a coherent mode of explaining our real knowledge. For granting the dual realms of being and knowledge, if the latter is purely conceptual, or nominal, the difficulty of transcendental reference is increased, and the burden of showing how our conceptual or nominal knowledge refers to the real things, it seems to me, is much greater. This tremendous issue cannot, of course, be solved here. So long as the transcendence is accepted as an ultimate fact which must be met, reflective Common Sense can admit any theory which explains how our knowledge is real knowledge. And so far as I am concerned, it seems that the kind of realism I favor very definitely avoids the charge that has been made in the past that in knowing things we 'create' things, since our knowledge is often regarded as a 'construct.' If we admit that we construct our knowledge, using certain 'materials' of experience, coming partly from our interaction with the things which we could not have constructed, we must show how our knowledge 'construct' honestly refers to the real world.

This last requirement prepares the way for a theory of perception which must avoid the evils of the old kind of representative ideas and do full justice to the structure of knowledge. Both neo-realism and the critical realist reactionaries are faced with difficulties growing out of the demands of Common Sense: the former, e.g., is hard put to explain error; the latter has to give a satisfactory explanation of how we know real 'things' in knowing, immediately, 'content.' So far as Common Sense is concerned, it knows the limitations of its general views, which, at best, can but indicate and regulate analysis: it can point out the demands which must be met in view of what we admittedly do know and experience; it can reject any analysis which contradicts its general position. It may be impotent in making clear the meanings lying unrecognized in its depths, but when they are brought to light it is quick to welcome them into the fold, at the same time reserving the right to refuse to accept any alleged meaning, which, after repeated efforts, remains unintelligible. Again, Common Sense generously turns over the job of analysis to the philosophic specialist with the proviso that, in the long run, the body of propositions which has survived time and change and criticism is an authority which must have the final word on the validity of the results of analysis.

V. Summary.

We have seen above, then, that Common Sense is not synonymous with naive realism, nor is it synonymous with any one detailed analysis of the problems of sense perception. Its basic propositions indicate a general position which must not be contradicted and point out the direction in which analysis of the full implications of Common Sense must go. Progress on this journey is expedited by reflection -- going a little beyond the Common Sense borders. Reflection takes notice of certain essential features of experience which can be incorporated into Common Sense. These features include, e.g., the recognition of the need for a satisfactory explanation of 'abnormal' phenomena, such as the experience of illusions, hallucinations, etc. If a theory of representative perception satisfactorily accounts for the abnormal, then it is welcomed by Common Sense. At the same time, a theory of knowledge must account for the minimum of epistemological dualism between 'the known' and 'the existent,' as well as the sense in which our sense-data are at best representative of the object known. In view of known scientific facts, such as the finite velocity of light, and nervous energy (and forgetting the customary and habitual), we inevitably discover that normal perception also involves mediation. Epistemological dualism is thus required by Common Sense to explain the general facts of Common Sense perception. Whether the analysis of philosopher X or of philosopher Y is to be

accepted depends upon the logic of their position, the thoroughness of their analysis, and their regard for facts, chief among which are the regulating facts of Common Sense.

NOTES

(Part Four, Section 2)

- 1 - I am not implying that Common Sense realism has always been equated with naive realism.
- 2 - Cf. Reid's remarks: "These facts (the existence of an external world, etc. in which all men believe) are phaenomena of human nature, from which we may justly argue against any hypothesis, however generally received. But to argue from a hypothesis against facts, is contrary to the rules of true philosophy." (Inquiry, Works, p.132)
- 3 - That is, perceptual experience, in the most inclusive sense.
- 4 - Meaning 'in the place where I see it.'
- 5 - Cf. The New Realism, pp.2-11, 21-31; Cf. Holt's remarks on "Illusory Experience," pp.303 ff.
- 6 - It should be noted that the apparent subjectivity of secondary qualities is used as an argument for representationalism. This is not a good argument, for it may be that we directly sense an objective entity and the mind adds the secondary qualities, e.g., color. On the other hand, it might be that both the primary and secondary aspects are subjective, or -- to take a most extreme view -- that the secondary are objectively real, the primary epiphenomenal. All of these combinations are possible; yet if we are to accept a representation theory we must go all the way and show how it holds under all circumstances. The subjectivity of the secondary qualities at best adds additional evidence to a theory which gains its most substantial support elsewhere.
- 7 - Cf. above, p. 159.
- 8 - Our 'immediate' knowledge of the first 'presented complex' is immediate by comparison with our subsequent knowledge of individuals, gained only by a struggle and through additional experience in time. The contextual background, apparently infinite in space and time, is always dimly realized, without effort on our part. We open our eyes -- and there it is! We may, e.g., have great difficulty in focusing our eyes after they have been treated with belladonna -- yet the complex is

there, in undifferentiated mass. Even when blind-folded we experience the background by other senses. Paralyze all the senses, one by one, and it would disappear, for the continuum is sensible, not intellectual -- another reason why one should not confuse perceptual 'appearances' with the conceptual.

- 9 - Cf. James Ward, Psychological Principles, (Cambridge & New York, 1919), pp.75-76: "Psychologists have usually represented mental advance as consisting fundamentally in the combination and recombination of various elementary units, the so-called sensations and primitive movements: in other words, as consisting in a species of 'mental chemistry.' If needful, we might find in biology far better analogies to the progressive differentiation of experience than in the physical upbuilding of molecules. The process seems much more like a segmentation of what is originally continuous than an aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct... To the child, it is said, all faces are alike; and throughout life we are apt to note the generic, the points of resemblance, before the specific, the points of difference. But even when most definite, what we call a presentation is still part of a larger whole. It is not separated from other presentations, whether simultaneous or successive, by something which is not of the nature of presentation, as one island is separated from another by the intervening sea, or one note in a melody from the next by an interval of silence. In our search for a theory of presentations, then, it is from this 'continuity of consciousness' that we must take our start."
- 10 - Logical consistency compels us to look for uniform representationism -- as does the Law of Parsimony. On the other hand, the possibility of an 'intuitive knowledge' always remains, no matter how much it confuses or adds to the complexity of our theory.
- 11 - Cf. pp.240 ff. Stout is a former pupil of Ward's, hence the 'sensory continuum'. It should be pointed out that we do not discover the continuum from atomic data, since the "total object" is really cognized before any individual. But we do discover the interconnection of things -- as well as their interrelationships -- by tying up the given with the larger given.

- 12 - An important detail of Stout's theory is the connection of the knower's body (of which he has intimate knowledge by way of 'internal perception') with other things. We are thus sure of real knowledge as though we were a 'soul' within a billiard ball body, which reacts to the motion of other billiard balls (which may or may not have sensitive souls). The contact of one ball upon another would eventuate in real knowledge of the 'external' object through the experience of the subject.
- 13 - While admitting the strong arguments on behalf of the causal theory, Stout also points out its inadequacies. See Mind and Matter, pp.233-239.
- 14 - If we put the question disjunctively it is obviously unfair, for it may well be that we know both simultaneously, as we sense the datum alone. In addition, 'see' -- as all verbs of perception -- is very ambiguous, usually indicating the objective terminus. Thus both the medium (which may or may not be 'seen') and the subjective experience of 'seeing' tends to be excluded.
- 15 - Real space and time, real matter, real universals are obviously not given in their nakedness in the sensory or presentation continuum. They must, however, be potentially there, included somehow in the data, so that eventually they may be known. The passage from sense to pure form is one of the lasting mysteries of the knowledge process.

Part Four: The Possibility of a Common Sense Philosophy.

Section 3: Further Analysis of the Limitations of Common Sense.

I. Introduction.

The purpose of this section is to consider in detail the objections (1) that Common Sense Philosophy is false, and (2) that Common Sense Philosophy is impossible, remembering that we are regarding 'Common Sense Philosophy' as a name applied to the philosophic analysis of a particular philosophic problem, e.g. the problem of the perception of objects. In the preceding section we showed that Common Sense not only does not imply a naive realism, but actually does imply some form of representative realism. The reason for this is that the former does not account for phenomena which Common Sense feels must be accounted for, while the latter is really implied by the body of Common Sense propositions. We indicated, also, how naive realism is mistaken for Common Sense realism, by showing that the demand for immediate knowledge of real things--as they are, ontologically (the assumption being that things are what they seem to be)--can most easily be met by the simplest theory possible. The analytic impotency of Common Sense was also indicated, and it was suggested that the intensive analyses of such problems as the problem of perception are of interest to Common Sense only in so far as they (1) bear out its general position (by entailing Common Sense), and (2) provide a satisfactory body of explanations for any member of the common sense world who might be philosophically adept at understanding them.

II. The Relation of Common Sense to Any Analysis.

Let us recall for a moment our analysis of Part Two, Section 2, where the function of Common Sense within a particular philosophy was symbolized. We showed that Reid and Moore set out from a common body of Common Sense propositions which they knew to be true with certainty, and that their first analyses led them to other propositions implied by Common Sense which they also agreed were true. Then we saw that as we extended Common Sense more and more and came up against the brute facts of experience our chances of certainty became more and more limited. In short, we came up against the limitations of induction from matters-of-fact: a great probability was the best we could hope for in any analysis. Then we showed that Reid precipitously held fast to one analysis which - if it were true - would entail something other than his premises, viz. egoistic idealism. In contrast to Reid's position was Moore's. The modern analyst admitted that, within the problem of perception, the limitations of knowledge were so great, that we had to rely upon theoretical constructions, which could be taken as explanations to be tentatively accepted, until further knowledge throws more light on the issues involved. We were also convinced that theories capable of meeting critical objections could result only from the special technique of a trained philosopher.

Now, then, if we turn to the situation in which critic A, a philosopher who considers his position to be in harmony with Common Sense, protests that analysis V (let us say, Lockean dualism) of philosopher B is false; that, instead of V, his own analysis U (naive realism) is true; we may find that some other philosopher D, whose position is not yet developed, by a logical argument in every respect consistent, shows that U is false, and in addition agrees with A that V also is false. If philosopher A (alleged Common Sense philosopher) fails to discover flaws in philosopher D's criticism, he may want to discard V (naive realism). Now his nerve is tested. He may know, for example, that his Common Sense position was generally recognized to imply naive realism, in fact, that in some learned circles -- and in footnotes appended to learned articles -- his position was named 'Common Sense Realism' and 'Naive Realism' interchangeably. Others, too, perhaps none too friendly to a philosopher who will insist upon the vulgar appeal to the multitude (which they believe characterizes his general philosophical position), will glow with sadistic joy as their rival A sinks under the weight of D's attack. All may feel that D's argument in the modus tollens denies Common Sense, which seemed to be the antecedent for naive realism. Feeling that the job is done, philosopher E may invite the victor, D, to a carouse in honor of the occasion, secretly hoping in the midst of the revelry to convert D to his own analysis, W (phenomenalism). While the celebration is at its height, an

emissary from A arrives, bearing the news that A's name has been seriously sullied by the attack and that A desires satisfaction on the field of honor, inasmuch as he is confident that his general position has in no way suffered by the cruel polemic and equally certain that, given the opportunity, he can vindicate himself in a metaphysical duel of wits.

When the day of the battle arrives A is coolly assured that as champion of Common Sense he cannot fail. Besides, he is armed with a new weapon, though a strange one. The peculiar nature of A's technique is soon discovered in the effectiveness of his attack. For rather than destroy his opponents D and E, he convinces them that they must be on his side. Step by step he clarifies his position, then shows that D and E have all along presupposed the very propositions which they wrongly attacked, for, before, they had never taken the trouble to analyze the full significance of Common Sense.¹ When D and E finally admit that their position is that of Common Sense, A next proceeds to break down phenomenalism -- not a very difficult task. He now enjoys the last laugh by using D's own procedure. He signals for the modus tollens, which like some deus ex machina nearly scares them out of their wits. Equilibrium is soon restored, however, when A explains that the meaning of Common Sense is such that granting its truth it could not imply what has been shown false, so that the falsity of the consequent, U, or W, proves not that Common Sense is false, but that it is the wrong consequent, not really connected with Common Sense in meaning.² The

mistake occurred when A asserted that Common Sense really did imply an analysis of the naive realism type. He now confesses that what he should have done was to say that Common Sense may imply U, and it remains to be seen whether U can stand up under fire, or be replaced by an improved V (e.g., V, Critical Realism).

Something of the above has frequently occurred, I believe, in philosophy. It is thought that the destruction of a special analysis necessarily implies the destruction of some general position. And it is often overlooked that naive realism is not really naive, but a sophisticated analysis resting on uncritically accepted philosophical presuppositions. Naive realism is a true competitor of the various brands of realism, idealism, or phenomenism, each of which is attempting a special analysis of a special problem. It is also forgotten that, in connection with any one particular problem, Common Sense stands aloof, as the body of propositions implying some one analysis, perhaps not yet discovered. In no sense does the destruction of any one of these analyses destroy Common Sense, unless it is shown that a necessary relationship holds between them.³ Analysis can show, as we have indicated above, earlier in the essay, that some of these analyses are false, and, further, that if some are admitted as true and put forth as entailing Common Sense, which they really contradict, that they must be false, even when we cannot logically demonstrate their falsity. At the same time, it can be

shown that even though there is no final proof for Common Sense we must hold to it -- even against some other rival which may enjoy a logical proof apart from reference to practice -- in view of the body of propositions surviving all tests and the exigencies of daily life which demand it.

If the man of common sense were to stand alone against a powerful array of philosophic talent, united in opposition to his philosophic propositions (Common Sense), his only defense would be a protest like that of Adeimantus:

"... when you (Socrates) talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the minds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear to be turned upside down. And as unskillful players of draughts are at last shut up by their more skillful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too find themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right."⁴

In a similar manner, defenders of Common Sense may hold out the hope that a definite 'proof,' not only for their general position (which really does not require any, since all life presupposes it), but also for some detailed analysis, may be some day found. In lieu of it, however, several alternatives can be held simultaneously, awaiting the ultimate fruits of further knowledge, or if speculation demands a choice, the risk must be taken, the consequences faced.

III. Final Remarks Concerning the Possibility of a Common Sense Philosophy.

A Common Sense Philosophy is thus possible up to a certain point. We can move through our analyses, discovering a proposition here, another there, step by step. This does not mean that a common sense philosophy, in the same sense, is possible. Common sense, by its very nature, is not equipped to pursue the work of the highly-trained specialist. Common Sense Philosophy, on the other hand, presupposes the special training of some philosopher who has taken the pains to start from Common Sense. This philosopher will regard his philosophic data, the propositions from which he starts, as a true, but general, view of reality. The manifold meanings latent within it must be discovered and unravelled. And since the authoritative body of facts must be accepted as final, at least for the purpose of any analysis, within limits Common Sense becomes an ultimate, unchanging body of propositions, possessing both theoretical and practical import. There will, however, be change within this body, just as there is a constant flux -- new additions, new rejections -- within the most general class, common sense (as we saw in our opening section). Old analyses will be discarded, new analyses tentatively accepted. Common Sense is in fact both one and many, both static and changing -- and this, of course, adds to its already anomalous position.

Common Sense is thus not only a starting point for further philosophic analysis, but also a regulative concept

which guides such analysis, positively in suggesting certain leads, negatively in rejecting incompatible propositions. It is, in fact, both 'possible' and 'impossible' as a philosophy, since it is (1) a synoptic view of reality -- as a summary of all the propositions concerning the nature of reality; (2) the data from which further analysis proceeds; yet is not (3) any one analysis in any one specialized field of inquiry (and this analysis rightly takes the name which is best adapted to signify its peculiar nature); nor (4) a logically coherent view of reality as a whole, since this too requires a specially trained mind. Common Sense is (3) and (4) only in potentia, and logically its meaning intensionally embraces some conclusion in each, which we may approach, and in time even attain. Its importance consists in the determination of certain limits beyond which an analysis cannot go (since it may contradict Common Sense) and in very positively providing the data for philosophic advance, both critically and speculatively. Within the epistemological problem it has most important significance, and this essay has tried to do justice both to its positive advantages, and its apparent disadvantages, as a philosophic concept playing an important part in spite of many handicaps. If there is any one conclusion which stands out at the close it is this: There is a great probability that not only is a Common Sense Philosophy possible (within the limits just mentioned), but also that epistemologically every philosophy must be a Common Sense Philosophy. We have seen that none of the objections can be sustained when the meanings of

Common Sense and Common Sense Philosophy are understood. If it is still objected that the term is ambiguous, in view of our study, I think it must be granted that such a calamity is a necessary evil, since Common Sense -- if not common sense -- has significant utility as it stands.

That Common Sense is a nucleus of certain truths about the nature of things cannot be doubted. As such it will always be -- perhaps even clothed in a better name. But if we are sure of a meaning, we can ask with Juliet, "What's in a name?" If, then, the significance of Common Sense has been made a little clearer, the purpose of this essay has been fulfilled.

NOTES

(Part Four, Section 3)

- 1 - Or he may argue like this, "Let us assume that Common Sense is false. What will the consequences be?" He then can show by a reductio ad absurdum that Common Sense must be true, for practice and philosophy alike.
- 2 - This, of course, is a variety of the reductio.
- 3 - It is assumed that Common Sense is the genus, any analysis a sub-class, so that the latter has to be consistent with the former. The contrary possibility holds; that we may determine the falsity of the genus by showing it to be the wrong class inclusive of a species which we know with certainty can occur, though the presumption is that the former instance is true.
- 4 - The Republic, 487 B.C. (Jowett's translation). The italics are mine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Books

Berkeley, George. Works. Ed. George Sampson, London, 1898, v. 1.

Broad, C. D. Scientific Thought. London and New York, 1927.

Contemporary British Philosophy. Ed. J. H. Muirhead, London and New York, 1925. 2 vols.

Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. 2 ed. New York, 1934.

Essays in Critical Realism. London, 1920.

Ewing, A. C. Idealism: A Critical Survey. London, 1934.

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Everyman Edition. 2 vols. London, Toronto and New York, 1928.

---- . An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Chicago, 1930.

---- . Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edinburgh and London, 1907.

Joad, C. E. M. Essays in Common Sense Philosophy. London, 1919.

Jouffroy, Théodore. Mélanges Philosophiques. Paris, 1866.

Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Chicago and London, 1902.

Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser, 2 vols. Oxford, 1894.

Maritain, Jacques. An Introduction to Philosophy. Tr. E. I. Watkin. London, New York and Toronto, 1930.

McCosh, James. The Scottish Philosophy. London, 1875.

- McCosh, James. Realistic Philosophy. New York, 1897.
- Meyerson, Emile. Identity and Reality. Tr. Kate Loewenberg. London and New York, 1930.
- Montague, William P. The Ways of Knowing. London and New York, 1928.
- Moore, G. E. Philosophical Studies. London and New York, 1922.
- The New Realism. New York, 1912.
- Reid, Thomas. Works. Ed. Sir William Hamilton. Edinburgh, 1863. 6th ed. 2 vols.
- Stout, G. F. Mind and Matter. Cambridge and New York, 1931.

B. Articles

- Armstrong, A. C. "Philosophy and Common Sense," Philosophical Review. Vol. XXV (March, 1916), pp. 104 ff.
- Braithwaite, R. B. "Solipsism and 'The Common Sense View of the World,'" Analysis. Vol. 1, no. 1 (November, 1933).
- Colvin, S. S. "The Common Sense View of Reality," Philosophical Review. Vol. XI, 1902, pp. 139 ff.
- Cornforth, Maurice. "Is Solipsism Compatible with Common Sense?" Analysis. Vol. 1, no. 2 (January, 1934)
- Cory, Daniel. "The Origin in Experience of the Notion of a Physical Object," Analysis. Vol. 1, no. 4 (May, 1934)
- Ewing, A. C. "Two Kinds of Analysis," Analysis. Vol. 2, no. 4 (January, 1935), pp. 60 ff.
- Gregory, Joshua C. "Philosophy and Common Sense," Philosophical Review. Vol. XXIX (November, 1920), pp. 530 ff.
- Schinz, Albert. "Sens Commun et Philosophie," Revue Philosophique. Tome XLIX (Janvier, 1900), pp. 53 ff.
- Stebbing, L. S. "Concerning Solipsism; a Reply to R. B. Braithwaite" Analysis. Vol. 1, no. 2 (January, 1934).

II. Secondary Sources

A. Books

- Becker, Carl L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven, 1932.
- Bréhier, Emile. Histoire de la Philosophie. Tome II, Fascicules 1, 2. Paris, 1929; Tome II, Fascicules 3, 4. Paris, 1932.
- Cunningham, G. Watts. The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy. New York and London, 1933.
- Evans, D. Luther. New Realism and Old Reality. Princeton, 1928.
- Fraser, Alexander C. Thomas Reid. Edinburgh, 1898.
- Gibson, James. Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations. Cambridge, 1917.
- Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Revolt against Dualism. New York, 1930.
- McCosh, James. The Scottish Philosophy. London, 1875.
- Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth. Scottish Philosophy. Edinburgh and London, 1907.
- Riley, I. Woodbridge. American Philosophy: The Early Schools. New York, 1907.
- Rogers, A. K. English and American Philosophy Since 1800. New York, 1928.
- Sorley, W. R. A History of English Philosophy. New York and London, 1921.
- Windelband, Wilhelm. Die Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie. Vol. 1. Leipzig, 1922.

B. Articles

- Sidgwick, Henry. "The Philosophy of Common Sense," Mind. Vol. IV, n. s. (April, 1895).