

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

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I hereby recommend that the thesis prepared under my supervision by Siegmund A.E. Betz
entitled A Study of Francis Osborn's Advice to a Son

be accepted as fulfilling this part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by:

Robert Shager

F.W. Chandler

A STUDY OF FRANCIS OSBORN'S
ADVICE TO A SON

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by

Siegmund Alfred Eduard Betz

A.B. University of Cincinnati 1931
A.M. University of Cincinnati 1932

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PART I

FRANCIS OSBORN: LIFE AND WORKS

PART I

FRANCIS OSBORN: LIFE AND WORKS

The lineage of Francis Osborn, though scarcely of great antiquity, was not without distinction and importance. The earliest record of the family tells of their coming from the North and settling at Purleigh in Essex, where a certain Peter Osborne, Esq., is found residing in 1442. During the reign of Edward VI another Peter Osborne, the great-grandson of the first, and the grandfather of Francis Osborn, was Keeper of the Privy Purse. To him and to his heirs was given the office of Treasurer's Remembrancer in the Exchequer. Notable for his zeal in the cause of the Reformation, he was during Elizabeth's reign one of the High Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Affairs, and as a reward for his services received the manor of South Fambridge in Essex, together with the advowson of the church.

Francis Osborn's father, Sir John Osborne, succeeded Peter Osborne as Treasurer's Remembrancer. He was the first Osborne to live at Chicksands Priory, Shefford, in Bedfordshire. He "bought and restored to the church the rectory of Hawnes near Chicksands which had formerly been alienated," and built an adequately furnished house on the property, according to an account in Fuller's Church History. This living he presented to Thomas Brightman, a celebrated preach-

er of the day, who stood well in the favour of his patron.¹

This Sir John Osborne married Dorothy Barlee, daughter and coheiress of Richard Barlee, Esq., of Effingham Hall, Essex.² Five sons were born to them: Sir Peter, Christopher, Thomas, Richard, and Francis.³ Francis epitaph states that he was born 26 September, 1593⁴; and it is probable that Chicksands was his birthplace. Indeed, the Priory

1. For this biographical information I am indebted to Edward Abbot Parry's Advice to a Son, by Francis Osborn, "a new edition with an introduction and notes". London, 1896. Introduction, pp. x-xi. Parry uses the title Advice to a Son to refer to that portion of the work which was published originally in 1656, which is as much as he reprints. At that time Osborn seems to have had no definite intention of publishing a continuation. Accordingly, this earlier portion of the work in all editions published during Osborn's lifetime is simply entitled Advice to a Son, and the second portion, published in 1658, Advice to a Son, The Second Part. Since this is the least confusing way of referring to the two parts, this terminology will be adhered to throughout this essay. All references and quotations to either part refer to the editions of 1658, the last printed before Osborn's death. The full titles are as follows: Advice to a Son. Or Directions for your better Conduct, Through the various and most important Encounters of this Life. Under these Generall Heads. I. Studies, &c. II. Love and Marriage. III. Travell. IV. Government. IV. Religion. Conclusion. The Sixt Edition. Oxford, 1658. (This will be hereafter simply designated Advice in all notes.) Advice to a Son, The Second Part. London, 1658. (This will be hereafter designated Advice, Second Part. in all notes.)
2. Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. Francis Osborn.
3. Parry, loc. cit., p. xi.
4. See "Memoirs of the Life of Francis Osborn, Esq." in The Miscellaneous Works of that Eminent Statesman Francis Osborn, Esq.. London, 1722, 2 vols. Vol. 2, p. xx.

served also as Osborn's school, for, as he states in Advice to a Son, his education was in his father's house, and though adequate, failed to furnish some of the valuable experiences of the public school. Wood says that Osborn "was bred mostly at home, not so much as in a free-school or university, being altogether void of such kind of faculties that universities afford."¹

"At ripe years," continues the same authority, "he frequented the court, became a servant in the Pembrochian Family, and at length Master of the Horse to that most noble count William earl of Pembroke."¹ How long he continued in this position it seems impossible to ascertain. At any rate, he entered into the life of London in the spirit of other young country gentlemen who came to the city to seek their fortune. He frequented St,Paul's, the daily meeting place of "the principall Gentry, Lords, Courtiers, and men of all Professions not meerey Mechanick," he says. "And I being young, and wanting a more advantagious employment, did, during my aboad in London, which was three fourth parts of the yeare, associate my selfe... with the choicest company I could pick out, amongst such as I found most inquisitive after affaires of State; who being then my selfe in^a daily attendance upon a hope (though a rotten one) of a future Preferment^t], I appeared the more considerable,

1. Anthony à Wood: Athenae Oxonienses, ed. by Philip Bliss, London, 1813. vol. 1, column 706.

being as ready to satisfy, according to my weak abilities, their Curiosity as they were mine."¹ Other allusions in the Memoyres of the Reign of King James point to Osborn's having had some access to the court and to his continued interest in London affairs. For a time, at least, he was employed in the office of the Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer, which was in the keeping, successively, of his father and his brother Peter.²

Further information concerning his life is wanting until 1641, when, says Wood, "he ran with the times, having been puritanically educated, had public employments then, and under Oliver, conferr'd upon him."³ Just what this public employment in 1641 was it is difficult to tell; in his Life and Times, Wood states that "Francis Osbourne, author of Advice to a Son, did run and truckle to the times in Oliver's raigne, and accepted of petty offices under him. He was one of the seven for the countie and city of Oxon that was a judge as to all prisons and persons committed to any prisons in comitatu vel civitate Oxon 1653."⁴

1. Historical Memoires on the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James, London, 1658. Traditionall Memoyres on the Raigne of King James (hereafter designated as Memoirs-James, as the Traditional Memoires on the Raigne of Queen Elizabeth will be designated as Memoirs-Elizabeth) pp. 65,66.
2. Osborn says that the father of Felton, who killed the Duke of Buckingham, "owed an Employment" under him in the office. (Advice, Second Part. p. 143.)
3. loc. cit.
4. Wood: The Life and Times of Anthony Wood, antiquarian of Oxford, described by Himself, ed. by Andrew Clark. Oxford, 1891. vol. 1, p. 185.

The exact date of Osborn's removal to Oxford is difficult to ascertain. His letters to his brother-in-law, William Draper, printed in the 1722 edition of his works, are full of references to various changes of residence, but the chronology of the letters is extremely hard to determine. Wood says that Osborn, "in his last days lived in Oxon purposely to print certain books of his composition that then lay by him, and to have an eye on his son John, whom he got by the favour of the parliamentarian visitors to be fellow of All-Souls coll. 1648."¹ The last statement, however, is erroneous, as Parry shows in the introduction to his edition of Advice to a Son,² and therefore gives no information about the date for Osborn's taking up residence in Oxford. Sir Sidney Lee, in the Dictionary of National Bio-

Ateneae Oxonienses,
1. loc. cit.

2. pp. xvii-xix. He states that the visitors, of whom Draper was one, on "June 10th, 1648-9" passed a resolution "that Jo. Osborne ... shall have the first Scholars place that shall be voyd in the gift of the Visitors." The visitors, however, had difficulties with the Parliamentary committee. On 6 August, 1648, John Osborne entered Magdalen as a demy; and in January 1651 the visitors appointed him fellow of All Souls. But the Parliamentary committee gave the fellowship to a man who already had his B.A., in preference to Osborne, who had not matriculated until 19 November, 1650. He did, however, get another fellowship which conveniently fell vacant at the time.

graphy gives 1650 as the approximate date. Osborn's residence in Oxford, must, however, have been broken by one or more removals to other places. Some of the letters to Draper and to his sister are addressed from "Kilden," identified by Parry as Kelvedon in Essex, and from London, and speak of changes in residence. The investigations of G.C. Moore Smith¹ have shown that from 1649 until 1655 Osborn was involved in lengthy litigation concerning the manors of North and South Fambridge in Essex, in the course of which Francis and Thomas Osborn claimed that their elder brother Peter had defrauded them of their legitimate share in the Essex property of their father. The quarrel ended in defeat for Francis, who later gave vent to his bitterness in at least three passages in Advice to a Son.² Since in

1. The Letters of Dorothy Osborne to William Temple, ed. by G.C. Moore Smith, Oxford, 1928. Appendix IX, pp.311-317.

2. Advice, p.25: "Let not the Titles of Consanguinity betray you into a prejudicial Trust: No blood being apter to raise a fever, or cause a Consumption sooner in your poor Estate, then that which is nearest your own; as I have most unhappily found, and your good Grandfather pressed, though God was pleased to leave it in none of our powers, to prevent: Nothing being truer in all Solomon's Observations, than that A good Friend is neerer than an unnatural Brother." Advice, Second Part., pp. 46-48: "Sad experience hath, amongst others, left me this unquestioned Legacy, That no relation, below a Father, is to be confided in by Younger Children. The feare of having their Joynter questioned, terme more pernicious to the Major part of Man-kind, than the destruction of it might possible prove to the persecutors and oppressors of the Children of God: These Gypsies (found commonly Slaves to their wives or vices) and performing their taske in this world

1650 Francis had been living at North Fambridge for some time, perhaps another reason in addition to those given by Wood, for his going to Oxford, was the difficulty over the estate.

Whether or not he went directly from Essex to Oxford seems impossible to ascertain, but in Letter I of the collection mentioned above, which must have been written in 1653 or 1654, since it speaks of the approaching conclusion of peace with the Dutch, he mentions having to leave the house he is living in, "by our Lady*Day"; and he says that he is expecting a cart from his brother-in-law, to whom the letter

under a richer canopy of Honour than some of their younger brethren ever stood neare, have, besides the cruelties and unnatural burdens they lay upon them, through their power and a bare deception in Law, converted into stubble the straw their more charitable Fathers left their brethren to cover them withall. And for Uncles &c. their eyes are so intent upon the Splendor of the House, as they oversee, out of feare, or Ambition, all but the top-branch, commonly the weakest. But lest Interest should transport me into a generall declamation against the most Noble part of the Nation, out of a particular experience of the ill Natures of Some. I shall couclude with an advice to put all younger Children to such courses as may protect them from undoing by the worst of Heires. It being unlikely the Lawes of England should stand unbent in their favour, so long as they remaine the Major part in all Parliaments, And have not throughly survaied the wayes to Infelicity and Ruin." In the dedicatory letter of Advice, Second Part., addressed "To my dear Brother William Draper," Osborn begs him not to "weigh your acceptance or my will to serve you, at the common Beam, but by the Standard of your love, in which you have so far exceeded those of my own blood, as I cannot but acknowledge you, and subscribe my self Your most affectionate Brother, Fr. Osborn."

is addressed. In Letter II Osborn and his wife seem to anticipate leaving sometime "after Monday in Easter-Week," and are still expecting the cart. Inasmuch as he had already in 1652 published two pamphlets in Oxford, it seems probable that he had lived there before these letters were written. He and his wife seem to have lived at Kilden after this time, and it was only after her death in 1657 that Osborn once more removed to Oxford. Letter IV, dated 14 August, but with no year, speaks of his wife's death as though it were of recent occurrence and of his intention to seek a new home. "My heart is set upon Oxford, where I hope to find some Estimation, if not Content; and in the meantime, encouraged by former Favours, and the kind Invitation you gave at your being in this doleful House, I have above all Places fixed upon Nether-Worton for my second Remove; presuming, if I should prove intolerable to you, I were not far from that Place I am confident I can live in, with as much Content as my Age and Condition is capable of."

Osborn's wife was Anna Draper, a sister of this William Draper,¹ who was a colonel in the parliamentary army and also a parliamentary visitor of the University of Oxford. It was through Draper's influence that Osborn ob-

1. The author of the 1722 edition memoirs wrongly criticizes Wood for saying in his "notorious collection of Falshoods" that Osborn married Draper's sister: "It was John Osborn, Esq; (the son of our Author Francis) who married the Daughter (not Sister) of William Draper, Esq."

tained his position of "judge as to all prisons." Osborn's friendship with Draper seems to have been very close, as the tone of the letters indicates; and it is probable that he found in his brother-in-law a friendship which was denied him by his kinsmen.

During the latter part of his life Osborn seems to have gone to London frequently, and he is said to have been a "great acquaintance" of the philosopher Hobbes.¹ This connexion in the eyes of his contemporaries must have supported the view that Osborn was an atheist - a charge from which the anonymous editor of the 1722 edition of his works takes great pains to absolve him.

Osborn died at Draper's house at Nether Worton, near Deddington, Oxfordshire, on 11 February, 1658-1659², and was buried in the church there. He was survived by three daughters and the son to whom his Advice was addressed.

This son, John Osborne, remained at Oxford as a fellow of All Souls College until 1654, when he received the degree of B.C.L. Parry gives the following account of him³: "In

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1. John Aubrey: Brief Lives, chiefly of Contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey...ed. by Andrew Clark, Oxford, 1898, vol. 1, p. 370.
 2. So D.N.B.; but the memoir writer of 1722 claims to correct this date, which is Wood's, on the authority of his version of the epitaph, which gives 4 February.
 3. op.cit., pp. xix-xx.

1657 he was called to the bar by the honourable Society of the Inner Temple, in whose records he is **spoken** of as 'the son and heir of Francis of North Fambridge, Essex, arm,' which puts his identity beyond doubt. He must have been a practising and successful barrister and a man of eminence in his profession. He attained the dignity of Prime Serjeant-at-Law in Ireland, 1680-1686, and in 1689 was made a Bencher of the Inner Temple. In the same year he was made one of the King's Counsell in Ireland. He was deprived of his office of Prime Serjeant in 1686, restored to office by William III., and again dismissed in 1692. In 1691 it is known that he declined the office of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in Ireland. The editor of the 1722 edition of Osborn's works mentions him as 'dying in the honourable post of King's Serjeant-at-Law in the kingdom of Ireland,' and says that he married a **daughter** of William Draper, presumably his first cousin."¹

All of Osborn's works were published during the last eight years of his life, roughly the period of his intermittent residence in Oxford, where facilities for the publication and distribution of his writings seem to have been generally favorable.

1. Cf. n.1, p. 9, above. The value of the 1722 memoir writer's comment, which appears in vol. 2 of the edition, is considerably imparted by the fact that he seems utterly unaware of the only obvious interpretation of the Letters and of the dedication of Advice, Second Part. These documents substantiate Wood's contention.

The earliest pieces to be published were two pamphlets which appeared in 1652.¹ A Perswasive to a Mutuall Compliance under the Present Government, Together with a Plea for a Free State Compared with Monarchy (Oxford, 1652), dedicated to "his Excellency The Lord Generall Cromwell," was issued anonymously by the author "out of no other feare, then to keepe himselfe in a condition to doe You farther service. For though Kings fall before You, their Instruments may rise up against others that endeavor to give evidence to an opposite Government." The "perswasive" is mild in tone, as its title suggests, and is directed towards the royalists in the hope that they will with good conscience accept the Commonwealth government as being of legitimate authority. In the second part of this pamphlet, the "plea", Osborn attacks his problem from a new angle: in the first essay he proves the authority of the Parliament to be valid as that of a de facto government; in the second essay he proves it valid as that of a de jure sovereignty.²

1. Wood, ibid., assigns both these works to Osborn without question. For the Perswasive to a Mutuall Compliance there is further authority. In an edition of Advice to a Son published in 1656 (either the second, third, or fourth edition) at the end of the preface "To the Reader" appears an announcement: "Publish't of late by the Author of this Advice, A Perswasive to a Mutuall Compliance under the Present Government."
2. The two Scripture mottoes on the title page make clear this distinction. They are Rom. 13.1: "The Powers that be, are Ordained of God"; Prov. 11.14: "In the Multitude of Councillours there is Safety."

The other pamphlet, A Seasonable Expostulation with the Netherlands, Declaring their Ingratitude To, and the Necessity of their Agreement With the Commonwealth of England (Oxford, 1652), like the Perswasive of the first pamphlet is generally mild in tone and urges the mutual advantages that England and the Netherlands could enjoy by a peaceable alliance.

In 1656 Osborn published the first part of Advice to a Son. This was divided into five sections: "Studies", "Love and Marriage", "Travel", "Government", and "Religion." The work became popular at once and within two years ran into five editions before Osborn finally forsook the anonymity under which he had at first issued it. In July, 1658, "the vice-chancellor (Dr. Connant) [of Oxford] caused all the booksellers to appear before him, and commanded them not to sell any of Mr. Osborne's booke. He was complained of then by severall ministers in the country that [he] bred severall principall[s] of Atheisme in country gentlemen. The book afterwards sold the more."¹

In 1656 also appeared Politically Reflections upon the Government of the Turks, Nicolas Machiavel, The King of Sweden's Descent into Germany, The Conspiracy of Piso and Vindex against Nero, The Greatness and Corruption of the

1. Wood, Life and Times, p.

Court of Rome, The Election of Pope Leo the XI, The Defec-
tion from the Church of Rome, Martin Luther Vindicated,
"By the Author of the late Advice to a Son" (London, 1656),¹
a book of politico-religious essays, of which the first is
the most considerable. All these are useful in determining
Osborn's political and religious views. He shows himself
here an interested observer of the problems of government,
which he tends to look upon in a detached and objective
practical manner. In religion he is clearly enough a Pro-
testant, but he is not blind to some of the practical and
philosophical difficulties that are the result of the Refor-
mation. The point of view expressed in these essays is in-
dividual, intelligent, and tolerant.

The provocative character of Advice to a Son brought
forth in 1658 Advice to a Daughter, In Opposition to the
Advice to a Sonne, Or Directions for your better Coönduct
through the various and most important Encounters of this
life, Under these general Heads, I. Studies, &c. II. Love
and Marriage. [I] II. Travell. [I] III. Government. V. Reli-
gion. Conclusion, By Eugenius Theodidactus (London, 1658).
This work was written by John Heydon, by common report and
his own admission in this work, an astrologer and a Rosicru-
cian. There is little in his book that could have per-
manently damaged Osborn's reputation. The causa belli was

1. All references are to this edition throughout this essay.
It will be designated hereafter in notes simply as Politi-
cally Reflections.

apparently Osborn's misogyny; Heydon felt himself under obligation to act as the champion of the injured ladies of England. The work was compiled in a white-hot fury, it seems, since it required only sixteen days to complete, as the author boasts. The letter "To his Daughter," which follows a dedication and a poem "To the Book and Reader," is a crude burlesque of Osborn's prefatory letter to his son. The body of the work consists of a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion of Osborn's Advice through its five sections. Heydon's answer to each point is not very often a direct refutation of what Osborn says; generally it is simply slightly relevant comment, interlarded with abusive epithets such as "you Natural Knave, and Artificial Dissembler," "you cramped Compendium," "Mr. Puny," et cetera. Sometimes the comment is so unrelated that it is difficult to know what to think of Heydon's intelligence or even of his sense of humour. Under travel, for instance, he answers Osborn thus: "3. If your genius tempted by Profit, &c. I answer; a genius is that which from God, to one of the seven spirits, (is given) to be transferr'd by Sephiroth, through the several orders of Angels to the spheres of the Planets..."¹

It seems quite impossible to disentangle from this work either a very definite purpose or a genuine reason for disliking Osborn's work. Very infrequently, indeed, is there

1. p. 23.

a bit of luminous comment to constitute an island of sobriety in this chaos. Such a passage for instance is the following, in answer to Osborn's advice against academic learning: "I answer. (You clumsy Epithite) Nothing wraps a Man in such a mist of Errors, as his own Curiositie in twisting himself into things above him. How happily do they live, that know nothing but what is necessary? Your knowledge doth but shew your Ignorance; Your most studious scrutenies is but a discovery of what the Spirit knew before it was embodied: You find the effect, but not the Cause."¹ A few such passages might atone for much nonsense, were it not that Heydon's work is so clearly an outrageous piece of unskillful plagiarism.

For exposing this fact one can be grateful to Thomas Pecke's Advice to Balam's Ass; or, Momus Catechised, In Answer to a certaine Scurrilous and Abusive Scribbler, one John Heydon, author of Advice to a Daughter, By T.P. Gent (London, 1658).² Pecke, too, adopts the method of point-by-point answering, without much more wit, but with considerably greater pertinency, than Heydon. His praise of Osborn is somewhat fulsome: "When the Wisedome, Prudence, and Learning, of Mr. Osborn lively depainted in his book...had five times

1. p.7.

2. D.N.B., s.v. John Heydon, says that Advice to a Daughter "occasioned various burlesques such as Advice to Balam's Ass" which is, therefore, not the only defence of Osborn that was issued.

been invested with the Trabea Triumphali, the honourable
Robe of universal applause [Heydon had said, in his Epistle
Dedicatory, "I found him a Nameless over-worn Wittall, that
five times before I espied him, had adulterated the Press."]
we had lesse reason than the female instructor [iee., Heydon]
hath braines, to suspect an Homero-mastix, one that dūrst
mađepertly endeavor by the interposition of his opacous and
ridiculous conceptions, to eclipse the splendour of such an
eminent Author."¹

But Pecke demonstrates clearly the inadequacy of Heydon's book, pointing out ^{that} the ~~the~~ advice on studies, travel, and government is scarcely applicable to a daughter at all. He shows Heydon's contradictions and mistakes, and, most important of all, he makes clear Heydon's plagiarism, large passages having been filched from John Cleveland, Sir Thomas Overbury, and Sir Walter Raleigh in order to make up a good portion of Advice to a Daughter. In one place (which Pecke, however, fails to notice) Heydon, who since he is writing anonymously can praise his other works to his heart's content, even quotes a passage of Raleigh's Instructions to His Son as though it were part of one of his own earlier publications.²

1. In the preface "To the ingenious Reader."

2. p. 111. "Remember (as Mr, Heydon saith in his book of The Rosacrucian Method of Physick) When you were a child, that then you did love your Nurse," et cetera.

The supreme impudence of Heydon is demonstrated by his daring to publish another edition of his work: "The second edition, With a Word of Advice to T.P." (London, 1659). Except for a change in the dedication of the work and in the letter to his daughter, the only new thing in this edition is an essay "Thomas Peck Counsellor, examined, turn'd over the Bar, and sent to Bedlam for his madness." This is further designated as "The Bull of Basan chain'd." There is no definite attempt to excuse the plagiarism of Advice to a Daughter, nor any intelligent defence of its author. Except for the insinuation that perhaps Osborn himself wrote Advice to Balam's Ass, the burden of the essay is scurrilous abuse of Pecke, which is sometimes strangely incoherent.¹

1. The last three paragraphs serve well to illustrate Heydon's style in this essay:

"And now our Dogs are uncoupled, and spend freely upon the scent, the old Fox is unkennell'd, and our hounds together make a chearful cry: There Bowman, that's he Rockwood, that's he Kilbuck, Jowler and Juno, Speed-deep, Avoz, Avoz Fox, take him Light-foot. Let us now save his life, and couple him to the Bull of Basan: give him rope enough, lest he hang himself, mean while let us laugh our fill, Ha, ha, he.

"His Books must not come abroad without my examination and approbation. Mr. Heydon scorns once to name him, being an empty upstart of the times. [Heydon never acknowledges that he is Eugenius Theodidactus, but there is no reason for doubting Pecke's verdict.] I never fought with beasts before; a man-fox, and a man-bull: my Book may stand up under the Ascendant of Almarick, for I have made a fortunate Telisme, והיה קאתר אלגלר that as Mars hath a coercive power in the superior world, so it hath below: The name of the Ruler is Necokoros, because אלס'ואן was in the seventh, but upon the body of the Image was inscribed Asiesta Aptota: and now I will play with them in the following Discourse. And let not my Reader think that I studied any thing against Francis Osborn Gent. or Mr.

The Undaunted, and perhaps rather encouraged, by this attack, Osborn in 1658 issued a sixth edition of Advice to a Son, and published Advice to a Son, The Second Part, in each case forsaking the anonymity he had maintained, but which it was now futile to continue. "Nor did I intend that my Name or Merit should have ever become the Argument of Discourse, but that I found it impossible to conceal it: The hope of which, and not ostentation drew me first to the Presse; as want of a more profitable employment tempts me, being made bold through custome, to feed it," he writes in the letter "To the Readers" at the beginning of Advice to a Son, The Second Part.

In 1658 Osborn also published his next most interesting work, Historical Memoires on the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth, and King James (London, 1658). In this Osborn does not attempt to give a full historical account of the periods he discusses, nor does he merely narrate attractive gossip. The memoirs are an analysis of the temper of England under different monarchs. At times Osborn's method is to tell some incident from which he can draw a shrewd conclusion about government in general. Elsewhere outstanding charac-

Tho. Peck Counsellor at Law.

"And now Tom read M. Heydon's book of Geomancy, and his other books, they will teach you great Truths, there you shall know that the King of Swedland will loose his Kingdome before the twentieth of July 1660."

It would be difficult, even at the present day, to match this style with anything short of a madman's prose.

ters are sketched in brief, and the way in which their careers illustrate the spirit of the times is indicated.

In 1659 Osborn issued A Miscellany of Sundry Essays, Paradoxes, and Problematicall Discourses, Letters and Characters, Together with Politicall Deductions from the History of the Earl of Essex, Executed under Queen Elizabeth, (London, 1659), dedicated to his niece, Elizabeth Draper. In this collection of literary fragments are represented many types of seventeenth-century prose. In connexion with the letters there is some incidental verse, rather perfunctory in quality. The History of the Earl of Essex is much in the vein of the Memoirs, although it is naturally more unified in thought and structure.

Osborn has been credited with three other works: The ^{Private} ~~Private~~ Christians Non Ultra, or, A Plea for the Lay-Man's Interpreting the Scriptures, Written by Philolaoclerus; (^{Ox-}Lon-^{don}, 1656); A Dialogue of Polygamy, Written Originally in Italian, Rendred into English by a Person of Quality, and Dedicated to the Author of that well-known Treatise call'd Advice to a Son (London, 1657); A Modest Plea for an Equal Commonwealth against Monarchy, In which the Genuine Nature and true Interest of a Free-State is briefly stated, Its Consistency with a National Clergy, Mercenary Lawyers, and Hereditary Nobility examined; together with the Expediency of an Agrarian and Rotation of Offices asserted, Also, an

Apology for Younger Brothers, the Restitution of Gavil-Kind,
and relief of the Poor, With a lift at Tythes, and Refor-
mation of the Lawes and Universities, All accomodated to
publick Honour and Justice, without injury to any Mans Pro-
priety, and humbly tendered to the Parliament, By a Lover of
his Country in order to the Healing the Divisions of the
Times (London, 1659). The first of these Wood lists fourth
among Osborn's works, with the comment, "There is no name
to it, only strongly reported to be Fr. Osborn's." Of the
other two he writes: "'There was A Dialogue of Polygamy,
translated from Italian into English by a person of quality,
and dedicated to the author of that well known treatise
call'd Advice to a Son. Dr. Barlow saith, that it was sus-
pected that Francis Osborn, author of Advice to a Son, an
old atheistical courtier then (1657) living in Oxon did
translate the said book into English, and dedicate it to
himself. The said translation was printed at London 1657,
oct.' After his death appeared in public a book entit.
A modest plea for an equal Commonwealth against Monarchy,
with other things added to it, as An Apology for Younger
Brothers, and A lift at Tythes, &c, all printed twice in
1659, in qu. and oct. These treatises, tho' they were pub-
lished by another person as his, yet some scholars, more
envious than prudent, did not stick to say, that the pub-
lisher found them among the papers of Fr. Osborn (with whom
he had acquaintance) after his death, and disguising the

language, or making some alterations in, published, them, as his own. However all that knew him well and were intimate with him, (as the writer of these matters was,) knew him able to write such a book as that was."¹ The identity of this "publisher" is made clear in Wood's other account of the same matter. He says that the Plea and its companion essays "were . . . published in Aug. 1659; but being both full of faults, were corrected and printed in oct. in December following. They were greedily bought up, and taken into the hands of all curious men, and being by them highly recommended, some malicious persons there were particularly Henry Stubbe of Christ Church, that reported that William Sprigge was not the author of them, but Franc. Osbourne, who died in Feb. 1658; some of whose papers coming after his death into the hands of the said Sprigge, his intimate acquaintance, he published them therefore as his. Yet all that knew Sprigge well, knew him to be an ingenious man, and able to write such a book, as elsewhere it hath been told you. They were answered in a pamphlet entit. A Modest Reply, in Answer to the Modest Plea for an equal Commonwealth, against Monarchy: Lond. 1659, in 3 sheets in qu. written in three letters to a worthy gentleman. But our author Sprigge looking upon it as an inconsiderable piece, never made answer

1. Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, Vol. I, columns 706, 707.

or reply thereunto."¹

There is no good reason for believing that The Private Christians Non Ultra is by Francis Osborn. The work was printed by H. Hall for Tho. Robinson, as was Advice to a Son, but this connexion is surely insufficient to warrant assigning the work to Osborn's authorship. There is a short preface by one "Iohn Owen" on a leaf facing the title page; this mentions "the evidence which the Author (whom I know not) hath given herein of his piety, modesty, and learning." These three traits are indeed characteristic of the author, and in a fashion to suggest definitely that Osborn was not he. An extensive learned apparatus is used, and the argument is couched in strictly formal logical terms, as is evident from a list of the chapter headings: "CAP. 1. The opening of the Termes...CAP.2. Containing the Arguments, by which 'tis proved lawful for private Christians to interpret...CAP.3. Containing an Answer to all the Objections, which are usually made against private mens interpretations. ...CAP.4. Containing an exhortation to these private Christians with some cautions." Such a systematic division of subject matter is found nowhere in Osborn's works, and is in fact illustrative of the scholastic kind of writing that Osborn vehemently disapproves. The whole book, however, is written in a tone of simple but scholarly and earnest piety

1. Ibid., vol. iv, column 560.

that tries to effect a reconciliation between the traditional authoritarianism of the clergy and the Puritan freedom of the laity. There is nothing in the views expressed or in the general character of the book to warrant assigning it to Osborn. To some people the work may have appeared revolutionary in spirit and was therefore accounted Osborn's, who had something of the reputation of being a radical around Oxford.

This same state of affairs may be assumed with regard to the Dialogue of Polygamy. There is nothing in Osborn's character that should warrant the suspicion that he was likely to dedicate a work to himself. The dedicatory letter seems harmless enough, though there is implied an identification of Osborn with liberal opinion: "Having rendred this short Discourse of Polygamy¹ into English, I could not devise to whom, I might more fitly Dedicate the same, than to your ingenious and free-spirited Self; and in and by You, to all other Gentlemen of like Noble and manly temper, so much (and that deservedly) magnified by Charron, as a principall accomplishment of that Wise man, whom he so excellently describes. For indeed, this Treatise requires such Readers.

1. Note the definition of polygamy given in the stationer's preface to the reader: "The subject Question of this Treatise is whether he that (if the Law of the Land give way) should with the Consent of his first Wife, upon just grounds and reasons marry a second being able to provide sufficiently for them & their children, and living with them as becomes a man and an Husband...whether this Man in so doing, should offend against any Law of God...or...the Law of Nature and right Reason..."

As for Pedantic and vulgar Spirits, I warne them to stand a loof, lest they breake their shins upon it." The translator's apology for the work is curious: "The Discourse it self, asserts nothing, positively determines nothing; only the chief and most considerable, if not all, the Texts of holy Scripture, and Arguments from Reason, and the Lawes and Customs of Nations, that have been, or can be brought for, or against Polygamy, are urged and Answered interchangeable, by the two Persons of the Dialogue; and the Authour being one, is a stiffe Pleader for Monogamy, & fighter against Polygamy. The Point it self is left free and undetermined, to the understanding & conscience of the serious and judicious Reader: And therefore, I know not why any discreet person, (what ever he thinks of the Point) should find himself offended at this Discourse." The author of the Italian treatise was Bernardino Ochino, a famous Italian Protestant who for a time lived in England. In the dialogue he calls his opponent "Telypoligamus," and it is obvious that this opponent, rather than "Ochinus", expresses the author's real opinion, despite the translator's remarks.

Some connexion between this dialogue and Osborn might be established through Osborn's awareness of the social and individual problem that is the occasion of the dialogue. Telypoligamus states his dilemma as follows: "I have a Wife not suitable to my minde, so that I cannot love her, and as far as I can perceive, she is both barren, and unhealthful;

and I finde my self so disposed, that I cannot want the Company of a Woman: also I desire to have Children, both for Posterities sake, and that I may instruct them in the fear of God."¹ One of Osborn's reasons for advising his son not to marry is this: "If it happen that your Wife be impotent or infected (as not a few are) with one or more of those loathsom Diseases incident to weake feminine nature, which render her unsociable, you are posted off, both by Lawyers and Divines, to the same patience, I do here more opportunely propose, before you are fallen under so mischievous and expensive a Conjunction."² Such parallels of thought, however, might even be urged as proof that some one other than Osborn wrote the dialogue,³ since it comes as a solution to a problem proposed by Osborn in the "Love and Marriage" section of his Advice.

The dedication makes it seem probable that the translator admired Osborn's work and would sympathize with such a solution. One suggested authorship for the dialogue has considerable probability. In the second edition of Advice to a Daughter Heydon accuses Thomas Pecke of being the author of what is probably this work: "And your pragmaticall man T.P. I doubt not but the Boys will hoot at him when they

1. p. 2.

2. Advice, p. 53.

3. The argument is continued in "A Dialogue of Divorce" which is printed together with the other.

are acquainted with his tricks, and what a sawcy unmannerly rude fellow he is. He it is said writ a Dialogue of Polygamy."¹ There is much to recommend the soundness of this suspicion; Pecke defended Osborn's Advice, and it clear from what Heydon says that Osborn and Pecke were good friends and stood to each other in the relation of master and student, to some extent. It seems natural, under these circumstances, that Pecke would dedicate a work of his own to Osborn.²

The most interesting, however, of the Osborn apocrypha is the Modest Plea for an Equal Commonwealth against Monarchy. As in the case of the other dubious works, there can be little question of Osborn's being the author. There is no good reason for not assigning the work definitely to William Sprigge. The whole work is thoroughly Puritan, and, when one considers the date, surprisingly enthusiastic over the Commonwealth, which this writer calls the new Jerusalem and of whose ultimate and permanent success he is very confident. The book is imbued with an almost fanatical religious spirit; and it is extremely earnest in its advocacy of proposed measures for reform. It is based more on enthusiasm for the Good Old Cause than on a genuine study of contemporary events, and generally is characterized by fervor rather than by clarity of vision. In all these traits it departs widely from

1. In the essay abusing Pecke.
2. D.N.B., s.v. Pecke, states that "Heydon...gave currency to the report that Pecke was the author of 'A Dialogue of Polygamy,' a translation from the Italian of Bernardino Ochino."

Osborn's work. It is difficult to see how merely making alterations or disguising the language could have transformed anything by Osborn into this work, since the fundamental ideas are so thoroughly different from Osborn's most frequently expressed opinions.

What has happened, on the other hand, is that the author of this work had read Osborn and had developed a considerable enthusiasm for him, and either did not scruple to borrow some ideas and passages from his friend, or was so familiar with his work that he unconsciously made his book resemble some things Osborn had written. For instance, the title page has a motto, "In the multitude of Counsellors there is safety," which appears in a similar position in Osborn's 1652 pamphlet, the Perswasive, where it is obviously intended to refer to the second part of the little piece, the Plea for a Free State, the title of which suggests Sprigge's work. So also, Sprigge would have the functions of the magistrate and the ministry combined, by allowing magistrates to preach - a suggestion that reminds one of Osborn's praise of the Turkish mufti, who is both priest and civil officer. Sprigge further reminds one of Osborn when he points out various vices of the clergy: "It is too well known how apt the spirit of the Clergy is like that of Peters, to call for fire from Heaven upon the heads of their enemies, and to hold the people in a blind fear and expectation, that their prayers shall be answered."¹ Enthusiastic as he is about the

1. p.30.

Commonwealth, he is, like Milton and Osborn, somewhat disillusioned about the rule of Cromwell, whom he accuses of being "insnar'd by the pomp, and beguiled with the honours of this world."¹ The plight of the universities, which produce far too many superfluous scholars, is clear to him as to Osborn, and he suggests that the curriculum be made more practical, to include scientific laboratory study and mathematics. Like Osborn, he has no use for the traditional logic and disputations, and says of the universities in general that "its more than time, that the poisoned waters of these defiled and polluted Fountains that intoxicate and make drunk with madness and folly the whole Nation, were either dried up... or rather... purged."² He is keenly aware of economic questions and in agreement with the author of Advice to a Son says, "Wisdom is good with an Inheritance, but the wisdom of the poor man is despised."³ Such examples of parallel thought might be multiplied indefinitely, but would lend no strong evidence in themselves for substantiating the theory that Osborn wrote the Modest Plea.

This theory was probably once again due to Osborn's well known sympathy with revolutionary ideas. In this case, however, the suspicion received added strength from the similarity of the titles of the two Pleas, of the ~~attacks~~ upon

1.p. 32.

2.pp. 48,49.

3.p. 63; cf. p. 43 of this essay.

the universities, and perhaps from the fact that the Apology for Younger Brothers deals with a problem that caused Osborn much vexation and anxiety.

These three apocryphal works were not included in any of the available editions of Osborn's works as they were later published. The two pamphlets of 1652 also are omitted, and apparently never went beyond a first edition. The volume of Political Reflections was popular enough to have come to its third edition by 1662,^{and} there were frequent printings of the collected works. A "seventh edition" (whether this^{number} refers to complete reprintings or to Advice to a Son only, it is impossible at present to tell; all the works printed later are included) appeared in 1673 and was brought before the House of Lords on 13 March, 1676, apparently without significant results, as dangerous and seditious literature.¹ Reissues of the Works followed in 1682 (eighth edition), 1689 (ninth edition), 1701 (tenth edition), 1722.² This last edition (the eleventh) was in two volumes and contains a memoir and letters of Osborn's addressed to Colonel Draper, as was indicated above. Instead of the essay "Deductions from the History of the Earl of Essex," which does not appear in it, there is found "Sir Francis Bacon's Apology in Certain Imputations concerning the late Earl of Essex." Except for Scott's reprint of the Traditional Memoirs³ and Judge Parry's reprint of Advice to a Son there are

1. See Ninth Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, (House of Lords Calendar) part II, p.75.

2. D.N.B., s.v. Francis Osborn.

3. In Secret History of James I (Edinburgh, 1811) - D.N.B.

no modern reprints of any portion of Osborn's works, as far as it has been possible to ascertain.

PART II

FRANCIS OSBORN: IDEAS

Chapter 1

Education

Osborn's most characteristic attitude, perhaps, is his great predilection for criticising institutions. In an age when such criticism was the sport of apprentices as well as the labor of philosophers, Osborn could have earned himself only slight distinction by attacking monarchy, Christianity, or university education. He is rather more noteworthy for his philosophical abstinence from offering a solution of his own for these problems, although his Political Reflections on the Government of the Turks is little else than a greatly prolonged and elaborate hint to the English people, too Machiavellian, however, to be acceptable to them.

Theories of education, like those of religion and government, reflect the cultural and philosophical ideas of their proponents. In education, too, innocent but culpably ignorant proponents of unsound doctrines are perhaps as frequent as in government and religion. Few men take the trouble to track down the ultimate origin of the ideas they adopt, and still fewer attempt to understand or to regulate their practical conduct in the light of its historical and philosophical relations. In so immediate and necessary a matter as education this unfortunate obtuseness is especially common. One

need only to call to mind some of the educational practitioners of the twentieth century, who make elaborate promises about the future generations that are to preserve and perfect an enlightened democracy; glibly prophesying the size of tomorrow's figs from today's thistles, as though children reared according to principles fundamentally those of Freud and Marx will somehow grow up venerationers of Shakespeare and Plato. Osborn and his contemporaries seem to have had much more native wit, for in general they saw whence their ideas came and whither they were going. In religion, Osborn's perception of his own true position, of the true terminus of his logic, was defective;¹ as for government, his attitude was limited by a skeptical disgust; but in the practical and concrete matter of education--the very raison d'être, after all, of such books as Advice to a Son-- Osborn knew his ground thoroughly and stated his position with clarity and good sense.

It is not a position agreeable to the most enlightened thought of our day, nor was it to that of Osborn's; but it does represent an attitude which was common in the seventeenth century, and which, although it may not receive one's sympathy, can nevertheless be explained and to some extent justified. Educational practice then as now was the

1. See below pp. 108 ff.

result of experiment imposed on tradition, but the circumstances of the time tended to halt the development in institutional procedure that had been the result of the labors of the early English humanists, so that the experimental part of education was left in the hands of private individuals who made great efforts to direct the studies of their children along lines that were neglected in the regular curricula of school and university; in a few cases, also, especially talented students, like Milton, outstripped the intellectual pace of the institutions they attended and were, therefore, their own educational experimenters.

A proper comprehension of Osborn's ideas on any subject is dependent, first, upon some understanding of his philosophical temper and of the logical workings of the mind. Practicality and a restraint that inhibited any tendency to let a particular point of view dominate his mind too far are among his chief characteristics. This latter tendency, which in some cases prevented his carrying his arguments to their logical and necessary conclusion, and therefore prevented his realizing his true position as fully as he might, was in other cases instrumental in giving him some of the calm sagacity of Halifax's "trimmer" : "This innocent word Trimmer signifieth no more than this, That if Men are together in a Boat, and one part of the Company would weigh it down on one side, another would make it lean as much to the

contrary; it happeneth there is a third Opinion of those,
who conceive it would do as well, if the Boat went even,
without endangering the Passengers; now 'tis hard to imagin
by what Figure in Language, or by what Rule in Sense this
cometh to be a fault, and it is much more a wonder it should
be thought a Heresy."¹ Osborn's intellectual equanimity,
however, comes not so much from a genuine desire for the
safety of the "Passengers" as from his desire for an object-
ive point of view.

With regard to education in institutions, for in-
stance, he is, despite his "practical" prejudices, sometimes
rather sensible. He regrets that he was not given the benefit
of a public school education, the social aspects of which
seem in his mind to outweigh whatever intellectual advantages
private instruction may possess. "Though I can never pay
enough to your Grandfather's Memory, for his tender care in
my Education, yet I must observe in it this Mistake; That by
keeping me at home, where I was one of my young Masters, I
lost the advantage of my most docile time. For not undergoing
the same Discipline, I must needs come short of their Exper-
ience, that are bred up in Free Schooles; who by plotting to
rob an Orchard &c. run through all the Subtilties required in
taking of a Towne: being made, by use, familiar to Secrecy,

1. The Complete Works of George Lavile, First Marquess of
of Halifax, ed. by Walter Raleigh, Oxford, 1912, p.48

and Compliance with opportunity; Qualities never after to be attained at cheaper rates than the hazard of all: whereas these see the danger of Trusting others, and the rocks they fall upon, by a too obstinate adhering to their own imprudent Resolutions: and all this, under no higher penalty than a Whipping: And 'tis possible, this Indulgence of my Father might be the cause, I afforded him so poor a Returne, for all his Cost." ¹ This approval of institutions in education does not extend, however, to the universities, which, in their present state at least, he condemns. "Cambridge or Oxford ... like Stonage, the Pyramids, and other Rarities, may well be worth a visit, but not to be made Habitations or places of abode. It not residing in the power of any Tutorage to inculcate a wisdome beyond the extent of its knowledge, and the ability it hath to back its Rudements, by visible experience." ²

Despite his violent attack on university education as it was practiced in the seventeenth century, he is fair enough to admit that, despite their deficiencies, the universities are the natural centers of learning. He admits, too, that, after all, even the kind of erudition that he approves is naturally to be sought in them: mathematics and medicine, which he counsels his son to study, are both university subjects. Those who would despoil the colleges he does not encourage, "For

1. Advice, pp. 1,2.

2. Advice. Second Part, p.64

though thousands are found to bury their Talents in the ocean of Controversies, and an implicit adhering to the writings of the Ancients... yet all ages do afford some that scorn to be tied up to Patternes, but enrich the world with such new Inventions, as may not onely expiate the Charge, but the Ignorance of all Foundations." ¹ He finds justification for the universities in the possibility of their merit, much as he questions its probability.

The reason for Osborn's attitude in this matter can perhaps best be stated in terms of his theory of the nature of education. In all his work one can perceive traces of Hobbes' philosophy and psychology, and these are especially marked in the case of his ideas concerning education. He thinks of every man as clearly in conflict with and in competition with his fellows, and of the purpose of education as instruction in how to gain an advantage over them. Just as the desire for advantage is instinctive, so is the growth of the mind largely a matter of instinctive response to external stimuli. For example, he advises his son to "Beware what Company you keep, since Example prevails more than Precept, though by Erudition dropping from these Tutors, we imbibe all the tinctures of Vertue and Vice. This renders it little less than impossible for Nature to hold out any long Siege

1. Politically Reflections, pp. 115, 116

against the batteries of Custom and Opportunity." ¹ It is clear from this and other passages in Osborn's work that he considers education as an external social influence exerted on the natural impulses of the individual. But in this same passage one can perceive that Osborn's ideal method of education would be to lead the natural impulses in their proper, easy channels. This philosophy accounts, too, for his emphasis on practical experience. Education by practical experience as Osborn understands the term excludes the notion of a moral conformity to an ideal spiritual law -- the educative principle of the older dualistic tradition -- and substitutes a system of trial and error, which through rewards and punishments develops habits of prudent action. Osborn's distrust of the contemplative and philosophical aspects of human thought leads him to make of education both as to end and means a thing of instinct and impulse.

Formal education, which, despite its mistakes and its perverse rigidity, had up to Osborn's time clung to a spiritual conception of its nature and purpose, is, therefore, generally condemned by Osborn, despite his concessions to the public schools and in a less degree to the universities. The public schools, it will be remembered, he approves for the social experience they impart, rather than for their curricula. But the universities, which have to deal with men at a period in their lives when subject matter as well as social environment

L. Advice, p. 39.

is important, are for Osborn well-nigh useless because of the very nature of the instruction they give. "The Faculties of Soul and Body ...are observed at long running to receive seldom amendment, often Detriment from the Restriction of Art: unlesse in things like Painting meerly Delusive, or Grafting, and Planting wholly Laborious. These being Imbellishers, if not Restorers of Nature, whereas the Liberall Sciences (as the Schools call them) Labour to Confine Experience within General Rules, though found to be as Diffusive and Numberless as the Accidents and Events depending on Motion." ¹ University education and institutions render the understanding "more bold than rational," since they fail to provide real experience.

These errors in educational principle, as Osborn conceives the plan of university study, are not without effect on the state. In the first place, the supply of graduates, which far exceeds the demand, irritates Osborn almost as much as their poor quality. He feels contempt, too, for the scholar's lack of social grace ² and finds him unable to cope with the practical situations of life. England is overrun by such pedants, who are the curse that indiscriminately bestowed education always entails. Osborn points to the Turks as an example of a nation, who, despite

1. Miscellany, p. 83.

2. Cf. Earle's character of "A Downright Scholar". John Earle: Microcosmography, ed. by Alfred S. West. Cambridge, 1920. pp.59-60. Here the scholar's lack of polish is treated with greater geniality than in Osborn.

the tyrannic character of their government, have at least the advantage of control in education. By combining legal and ecclesiastical functions in a single learned class, and by limiting learning through the prohibition of printing presses and other devices which lead to such abuses as are current in European universities, the Turks have been able to make learning of real civic value.¹ As far as England goes, great men come from its universities, but their greatness owes nothing to the formal processes of education.

For Osborn, education must be useful to the commonwealth as well as to the individual --useful in the very practical and essentially materialistic way that he never ceases to advocate. The bad effect of university education on the individual, whom it makes unpractical, is naturally evident in society, where he becomes useless. This much at least Osborn had in common with certain of the Italian humanists and with their English successors: he was convinced that education should train men for the benefit of the commonwealth, although no one was more conscious than he that public office is irksome to its possessors.

Much as he may have agreed with the Italian humanists as to the social use of education, Osborn had little sympathy

1. Political Reflections, pp. 111 ff. Osborn's admiration for the efficient, if nevertheless tyrannic, Turkish government is interesting when one compares it with the avowed republicanism of his 1652 pamphlets. There seems to be a genuine development here in the direction of Hobbist absolutism.

with their conception of learning and of its value to the individual. Assuming as he does that learning is not in itself a worthy end, and that it is at its best merely an embellishment of life or a thin summary of experience, he feels strongly the justice of the attack he makes upon "pedantry". For him this word must have had a very special meaning, because he seems to include under it much that the best judges of his time and of the earlier Renaissance recognized as the first-fruits of study. He says, "Such as make Learning a full Employment have their Judgement so over-awed by Antiquity, that like Players they dare present nothing in publick, but what their Poets have left them written." ¹

At its face value, this is sober, if somewhat unoriginal, comment. In the light of other remarks of Osborn's, however, it indicates rather clearly his position with regard to humanistic education. He shows no signs of understanding literature as the the substance of an educational discipline. Aside from occasional condemnations of contemporary writings and some praise of Bacon, Raleigh, and writers of similar ideas, literary comment is rare in his works. His notion of classical literature seems limited to historical and philosophical writers. All the evidence points to his being utterly oblivious to any genuine understanding of the nature or the educational value of literature. The manner in which he brushes aside foreign language study, together with his sceptical attitude toward the

1. Miscellany, p. 80.

cultural value of travel, confirms this judgment. When he speaks contemptuously, then, of those who make of learning a full employment, it seems that Osborn is referring not only to real pedants but also to studious men of letters in general.

But the harm that learning does to the Commonwealth is greater than that which would result merely from its breeding stupid people for public office. With the contrast of the Turkish Empire evidently in his mind, Osborn deploras the widespread interest in learning that characterized the seventeenth century. Undue liberality in educating the lower classes has redounded "to the prejudice of the Plough, and the more beneficiall Manufactures of our Nation: The Sonns of the Menu lying so long under this lazy course, that they are rendered ever after resty to Labour and Travell: which fills the Commonwealth with Theeves and Beggers ; no way to be prevented, but by garbling out of them all Boyes of an incapacity, and retaining none that make not more than an ordinary demonstration of an extraordinary propensity to learning: since through the contrary Practice, we lie under the Curse Jeroboam brought upon Israel: For by making the meanest of the People, both for Parts and Birth, and so of the least credit, Priests, Religion is not fallen into contempt." ¹ It can scarcely be questioned that Osborn has here perceived a real abuse, but his condemnation is not due to any sympathy on his part with the real

1. Advice, pp. 2,3.

function of learning. Beyond a necessary minimum, learning is bad for anyone. An aristocrat becomes useless to himself and to the state; a plebeian, on the other hand, unless he is eminently qualified for intellectual pursuits, is made dissatisfied with his normal rank, and becomes dangerous, as well as useless. Osborn recommends, indeed, a mixed education, including a variety of subject-matter and well strengthened with much practical experience, since such an education alone will enable a man to rise to any position without betraying the fact that his new station in life is foreign to his original environment.¹

There are two reasons for Osborn's hatred of institutional education. The first is, as has been indicated above, his general dislike for institutions of all kinds. He distrusts the state and church quite as much as he distrusts the school, and his bitterness extends even to the simplest of all institutions, the family.² For Osborn, organized society is a necessary evil, and is itself dependent on the evil propensities in human nature for its existence -- the social doctrine of Hobbes, it will be remembered. Osborn is not, however, without hope for human organizations, and although he never espouses Utopianism, he seems to think that vigorous remonstrance may eventually be successful in abolishing abuses.

Greater than Osborn's distrust of institutions is

1. Advice, pp. 4, 5.

2. See above, pp. 7, & Notes 2.

his hatred for tradition, which every permanent institution tends inevitably to embody. Osborn hates traditions much in the same spirit as does Ananias in Jonson's Alchemist. In his casual dismissal of art, in his disapproval of hawking and duelling, and in his bourgeois care for profit, Osborn is the stage Puritan, whatever his religious position may have been. And on the whole, he, too, hates traditions because they are "popish", if by "popish" can be meant "requiring the submission of individual opinion to the cumulated wisdom of the ages".

The connexion between education and tradition is a complex matter, of whose difficulties seventeenth century intellectuals were well aware, since the traditional factors in education govern the purpose as well as the method of education. No one could be more aware of this relationship than Osborn. He realizes that contact with a curriculum determined by classical standards must of necessity create a characteristic mental and moral outlook for the student. And he is aware of the great depth to which this process extends. He seems to condemn the pedant not as a man afflicted with an unfortunate but curable humour, but as a man whose whole life has been spoiled by improper influences.¹ It is because he realizes how great the influence of the universities is, that he would prevent its exercise in directions he deems wrong. And he considers the universities guilty on the score of per-

1. Cf. passage quoted above, p. 40.

nicious traditionalism of method. For the vicarious racial experience of scholarship and its ideal of appreciative culture Osborn has little respect. History, a study where tradition and reason labor together to determine both scientific and humane truth, Osborn considers unworthy of serious attention. Literature he apparently thinks a mere toy. That he should thus despise the educational subject-matter of the universities is only natural, for the end he proposes for education is not the enrichment of personal experience or the definition of humane truth, but the acquiring of useful information and skill in manipulating one's fellow men to one's one advantage.

Osborn's ideal method of education, accordingly, is based on experience --experience unqualified by any except the simplest kind of traditional sanction. Advice to a Son, however, does not indicate in detail Osborn's formulation of his method. The book is based on the father's experience, and is avowedly autobiographical. It is not an attempt to start a new genre of didactic literature, and is as personal in tone as an anxious father's letter might well be. But even toward his own work Osborn takes an attitude which reveals the manner in which he would make experience replace academic education. For his lack of faith in written manuals of conduct extends to his own writings, confident though he is of their merit. "But if this savours too much of the Stoick, You may qualifie it as you please : For I doubt not, but the zeal your Youth doth yet

retain towards the Creed and Practice of others (possibly not so well taught) may at present make much of This look like Blasphemy: But when so many Winters have snowed on your Head, as on your fathers, you will think it Canonical, and fit to be read to Posterity." ¹ That is to say, the father's experience will have to be confirmed by the son's before it will be "canonical"--i.e., valid as a guide for life.

Here, however, Osborn runs into a genuine difficulty. His skepticism tends more and more to make him insist on the value of individual, personal judgment as opposed to traditional or social sanctions. And in the passages quoted above, it seems rather clear that he realizes only too well that if the moral dictates of religion and philosophy can be distrusted as not personally verified, then the counsels of a father can be despised on the same grounds. Furthermore, he understands that experience is a hard teacher, and that not all of those who would be educated in her school survive the rigor of her discipline. Some concession to stable authority ² must therefore be made, especially since almost pusillanimous

1. Advice, p. 72

2. His longing for authority in education as in other matters is interestingly expressed in his approval of the Jesuits; "The principal business of Youth ... is, to be perfect in Patience and Obedience: Habits no where so exactly learned, as in the foundations of the Jesuits, could they be fetched thence without prejudice to Religion or Freedom." - (Advice, p.6.)

cautiousness easily makes him fear the consequences of too much and too general experience. Very interestingly, therefore, he says that his son should look upon "these Admonitions, as markes to saile by, not for presages of Ship wrack".¹

Experience, therefore, is not to be made an excuse to cover any number of youthful lapses; it is not synonymous with "wild oats". The whole tenor of the Advice to a Son is in direct opposition to such a confusion of ideas. Osborn's reason for writing the book is to enable his son to avoid the father's mistakes. Many things, accordingly, which ordinarily one would include in practical experience are carefully excluded. Travel, for instance, is condemned as leading to debauchery that is scarcely compensated by the meagre intellectual development it gives.² Travel is of value to a man only in proportion to the previous experience he has had. Before one enters a foreign country, says Osborn, one should be familiar with the manners of one's own, and should have already acquired a sound judgment. That

1. Advice, preface "To his Son."

2. Is not this distaste for travel another proof of Osborn's singular lack of insight into the real character of genuine education? His recommendations against travel match well with his lack of interest in literature and art. The question of the advisability of travel was one of the most important issues in the whole field of education, from the time of Henry VIII onwards. One recalls Ascham's condemnation of it, and as late as 1764 there appeared a work entitled Dialogues on the Uses of Foreign Travel Considered as a Part of An English Gentelmen's Education: Between Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Locke. By the Editor of Moral and Political Dialogues. London.

is, experience is not to be sought indiscriminately and without the balance of a well-ordered reason capable of profiting wisely from the lessons experience can give.

Finally, therefore, Osborn's principles seem to turn against themselves. Basing his theory of education on a definite rejection of tradition, on individual enterprise rather than accumulated thought, he proceeds to set up a system of learning which in practice shows signs of submitting, after all, to external restraints, of setting up tradition anew. It would be only too easy, in some respects, to say that therefore Osborn's thinking is shallow, that his ideas are only half-formed and that he inevitably and unconsciously is involved in an inconsistency. Such, however, is not the case. One must remember, in analyzing a work such as Advice to a Son, that it was written not as a systematic treatise on education, but as a brief compendium of its writer's most significant thoughts. By close observation one can discern the intelligent logical scheme that unites them. The difficulty with Osborn's theory of education is due not to a want of thought on his part, but to the wrongness of his premises in much wider aspects of life than mere educational procedure.

That such is the case is evident when one considers some of the practical conclusions to which his educational

theory leads him. As long as Osborn is dealing with matters that are relatively unphilosophical, as long as the point in question is ethically indifferent, his advice is that of a sensible, clear-headed thinker. For instance, his advice on how to learn to write is as follows: "The way to Elegancy of Stile, is to employ your Pen upon every Errand; and the more triviall and dry it is, the more Brains must be allowed for Sauce: Thus by checking all ordinary Invention, your Reason will attain to such an habit, as not to dare to present you but with what is excellent: and if void of Affectation, it matters not how mean the subject is, There being the same Exactness observed, by good Architects, in the structure of the Kitchin, as the Parlour." ¹

Nothing could be sounder. Notice, however, the rather less worthy character of this advice: "Make some inspection into Physick; which will adde to your welcome, wherever you come: it being usuall, especially for Ladies, to yield no less reverence to their Physitians, then their Confessours... ..The Intricacy of the Study is not great, after an exact knowledge in Anatomy and Drugs is attained. . ." ² One begins to suspect, in reading passages like this, that Osborn had little faith in man's ability to achieve success by genuine worth and dignity, nor much desire to encourage his son in acquiring these traits, whether socially useful or not.

1. Advice, pp. 16,17.

2. Ibid., pp. 6,7.

Consider, finally, such a piece of **counsel** as the following: "It cannot be looked upon as an act of prudence, to do more for another, than in reason may be expected from him againe upon a like occasion; unless so far as I am obliged to it out of gratitude."¹ That education should be practical insofar as practicalness means an appreciation of the everyday problems of human life as they really exist and an ability to cope with them as they arise in the life of the individual, can scarcely be denied. But when the practical matters of personal safety, livelihood, and general economy of intellect and effort come to exclude all loftier sentiment; when the substance of a father's advice is concerned with shrewd observations whose moral basis is little more than the most thinly disguised expediency, practical education loses its harmless aspect. As will be evident later, however, Osborn's reduction of education to the amoral basis is the direct and only possible logical result that could follow from his philosophical premises.

In fine, then, Osborn believes that education by experience is the most natural, that it involves less waste and is more effective than academic education, and that it is ultimately more consonant with a rationalistic philosophy of life. True education, he seems to say, is neither imposed on a man, nor is it won by his direct effort; it comes, rather, as the natural result of a normal, intelligent participation in the life of one's fellow men; more particularly, in the life of one's

L. Advice, p.78.

contemporaries, for the records of the ancients' experience are not to be trusted. Education comes through intimate connection with the practical affairs of life. The purpose of really sensible academic studies, and of the counsel of parents, is not to take the place of experience, but to enable one to assimilate it properly. They act as safeguards against the natural dangers of experience. Seeing his path by the light of his early life at school and of a few well-studied books, a young man will be able to go forward in such a fashion that he will be able to apprehend properly the lessons of whatever experience comes to him. Experience is not so much to be sought out, as to be utilized when it is found.

The practical character of Osborn's Advice is no more clearly brought out in any field than in his conception of the character and purpose of manners. The necessity of conforming to social usage was, of course, apparent to any seventeenth century gentleman in search of preferment. Now manners have always been subject to two uses and to two corresponding interpretations. In the first place, manners may be the external expression of inward worth. Such is Castiglione's conception. The Courtier is to be endowed with an "air that shall make him at first sight pleasing and agreeable to all who see him; and I would have this an ornament that should dispose and unite all his actions, and in his out-

ward aspect give promise of whatever is worthy the society and favour of every great lord." ¹ Manners for Castiglione are not only the symbols of inner worth, but grow out of it, and are the means whereby it is naturally made known to the world. On the other hand, manners can be interpreted as being no more than the symbols of inner worth -- symbols which can be adopted and displayed -- by anyone, whether or no he has the qualities of character they represent. It is this latter interpretation of manners that aroused in the popular English mind distrust of courtiers in general and occasioned great dislike for Italian and French elegancies.

Osborn's relation to these two attitudes is interesting. He denounces nothing so vigorously as hypocrisy in religion, yet he is quite willing to recommend in secular affairs a course of action questionable in sincerity. "Court him alwaies you hope one day to make use of, but at the least expence you can: observing the condition of Men in power, to esteem better of such, as they have done curtesies for, than those they have received greater from; looking upon this as a shame, upon the other as an honour." ² In all such pieces of advice in Osborn's work -- and they are by no means rare -- two principles seem to be concerned. First, Osborn has a good eye for practical advantage, and short of out-and-out dishonesty, he does not hesitate to recommend using what-

1. Count Baldesar Castiglione; The Book of the Courtier, transl. by Leonard Eckstein Opdycke, 1929. p. 23.
2. Advice, pp. 129, 130.

ever available means present themselves. Second, Osborn's appreciation of material profit is tempered by an equally prudent realization of the dangers attendant upon advancement. Accordingly, his private Machiavellianism is made rather innocuous by an unusually large proportion of caution. And it is this caution, rather than any strong ethical sense, that prevents his counsel from appearing utterly ruthless and unmoral.

His attitude toward manners, accordingly, might be expected to have more in common with the second of their two interpretations. The curious fusion of Puritan and Machiavellian that Osborn was is made clearer in nothing than in this: he has the Puritan's and the simple Englishman's distrust of etiquette, and he knows well enough the multitude of courtier's sins that it can hide. He has also the Puritan's and the bourgeois Englishman's contempt of the Italianate refinements of art and letters. Yet despite these opinions, he recommends that his son learn thoroughly the tricks of courtiership and the elegancies of manner which shall enable him to be successful in the world. Manners have for him become, just as learning and even religion itself, a mere device for personal advancement. External polish is, indeed, he says, a necessary accompaniment of inner worth --not, of course, in the sense that it arises from inner worth, but in the sense that it is essential to the practical use of inner worth. Manners must be

perfected because it lies "in the power of a foolish Custom or Gesture to render the most able ridiculous." ¹

To understand Osborn's conceptions of the relation of education to the welfare of the individual and the state it is necessary to view him against the background of English educational theories of the Renaissance, for which he supplies an interesting commentary. In his objections to the universities Osborn is by no means alone. His opinions can be traced in several directions. In part, of course, they are derived, by adoption or reaction, from the general stream of Italian educational theory. In other respects they are expressions of English obstinacy toward the revival of learning. To give Osborn credit for too much originality in his theories of education would be a serious mistake. The author of Advice to a Son, it must be remembered, was not so much an original thinker or a leader in thought, as a perceiver and recorder of social trends. Osborn's cultural limitations are only too obvious; but he was acutely aware of the most important social issues of his time, and education assuredly was one of these.

He lived in a period of great and serious interest in education when a vast readjustment was in process. During the Middle Ages, learning had been employed largely in the service of the Church, and scarcely possessed an independent existence apart from the Church. The secular interests of the Renaissance,

1. Advice, pp. 140, 141.

as well as the influx of pagan interests, set up rival purposes beside the ancient purpose of furnishing an educated clergy. Secularism saw in university training an opportunity for the development of competent, intelligently practical public servants. Furthermore the pagan philosophies that were now revived presented other conceptions of life than the Christian. Those, however, might depend equally much for their thorough study on the learning of the universities. For many reasons this readjustment of educational procedure did not appear in England as early as on the Continent, and when it did come it was further complicated by the religious and political problems of the seventeenth century. As a result arose the reliance on individual technique that has been noted above. Another consequence of this state of affairs is that opposition to traditional kinds of education can be generally on religious, political, or humanistic grounds, or as in Osborn's case, on grounds suggested by the individualism and rationalism of the age.

Three chief kinds of opposition to the universities can be distinguished as coming from distinct groups of men, varied in interests and in educational purposes. The first of these included men like Milton, who were dissatisfied with the failure of universities to take up the new learning that had been received more enthusiastically elsewhere than in England. Milton's disgust with the scholasticism that still held sway over the university curriculum is amply expressed in his

Prolusiones Oratoriae: "I shall produce abundant active effect at present if I can induce you, my auditors, to turn over seldomer those huge and almost monstrous volumes of the subtle doctors as they are called, and to indulge a little less in the warty controversies of the sophists ... I think there never can have been any place for these studies on Parnassus..."¹

Other critics of the universities, however, opposed them not out of love for the things that belong to Parnassus. Powerful prejudices against university training were always noticeable in certain sections of Puritan thought. Osborn, indeed, expresses apprehension for the safety of the universities. "Nevertheless, if Zeal, over-heated in the narrow hearts of men ignorant and covetous, should dry up the Fountaines of Learning, by appropriating their Revenues, and demolishing those Monuments (to the fame of which forraigne Nations resort in Pilgrimages, for to offer up honour and admiration to these Shrines, never empty of glorious Spirits, and returne more loaden with satisfaction, then they could possibly bring Prejudice) yet she should pull downe no more, then she had formerly raised, when incited, by a contrary affection, to Charity and Knowledge."² The Puritan questioning of all established institutions did, in fact, extend to the universities. "There was . . . alarm lest the Universities might be destroyed on the ground of the doctrine of William Dell, Master of Arts, that University teaching was useless to produce spiritual ministers of religion. Dell,

1. Prolusiones Oratoriae, III, (Masson's Translation), quoted by James Holly Hanford, A Milton Handbook, New York, 1933, p.15.
2. Advice to a Son, pp. 3,4.

however, distinctly held that universities might be useful to the Commonwealth, standing 'upon a human and civil account as schools of good learning for the instructing and educating youth in the knowledge of the tongues and of the liberal arts and sciences.' " ¹ Rumors of this kind must have persisted for some time when the issue was doubtful into whose hands control of Parliament would come.

The last group of critics of the universities, who were numerically perhaps the least significant, were men who like Osborn felt little or no sympathy with a mode of education that was, in the last analysis, based on a philosophy to which they did not subscribe. For Hobbes, as an example, the universities were to be made the servants of the monarch in teaching the people, through the clergy and "such others as make shew of Learning", and he finds that "though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of the subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority."² This view, which Osborn might, except for his indifference to the form of the government, have shared, is similar to the Turk-

1. Samuel Rowson Gardner: History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. London, 1916. Vol.11, p. 322, note 2.

2. Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, ed. by A.R. Walker. Cambridge, 1904. pp. 249, 250.

ish notion of education mentioned above. It is indicative of the changing attitude toward education. Only a little way separates this distortion of the purpose of learning from the even more utilitarian abandonment of it. Despite superficial similarity, how far this doctrine is removed from the ideal of civic and personal virtue which had been the educational principle of the Italian Renaissance of the Quattrocento! That great ideal had, indeed, had very little chance to flourish in England, and had in the seventeenth century been crowded from the field by its Puritan rivals. The utilitarian dogmas succeeded in quite debasing it. Already in Bacon's Of Studies one can see education beginning its downward path toward the meanly useful. Various studies are good for various mental ailments; "every defect of the mind may have a special receipt".

The first of these three attitudes toward university education is clearly on the side of humanistic training. But it should be remembered that Milton himself in his later life renounced classical culture, and took up definitely his position against university education, aligning himself with the second of the three attitudes. This and the last, indeed, were fundamentally illustrative of a widespread reaction against humanism that was proceeding on the Continent as well as in England. The Puritan controversy over the education of the clergy arose as a natural consequence of the Protestant veneration of the Bible as the sole source of religious authority, a veneration which not infrequently made it the source

of all civil and social authority as well. The Reformation, however, also championed private judgment, which, carried far enough, could in the hands of skeptics become a powerful weapon that was directed against the traditions even of Protestant Christianity, and which in its attack on all traditions, would naturally strike at those of education. Both reactions to humanistic education, therefore, are, like that education itself, a result of the Renaissance, which in its direct influence was rapidly drawing to a close at the time when such men as Milton and Osborn were writing.

The divergence between Osborn and the humanist educators can best be understood, it seems, if one remembers that men utterly different from Osborn in philosophical temper were quite at one with him in their denunciation of what might be called the mechanical errors of Renaissance education. The early part of the Renaissance was concerned with linguistic matters, with a revival of ancient style. But the second period, which begins approximately around 1550, was a period of thoughtful, scholarly study of the subject-matter of the ancient literatures.¹ Without the work of the first period the second could never have achieved what it did. But it is also true that many tendencies in education that were formulated during the first period later proved a serious hindrance to the larger purposes of humanism. Accordingly, humanists like Milton, who had a strong faith in the educative property of literature, became aligned with men like Osborn and Hobbes,

1. H.T. Mark: An Outline of the History of Educational Theories. in England. Syracuse, New York. 1899. p. 14.

who scorned literature and had faith in science and mathematics, whose practical use was more immediately apparent. The genuine humanists of the later Renaissance hated the pedantry that inherited the scholarship of their predecessors; the new individualist skeptics, on the other hand, disliked the older education because of its obvious deficiencies, but also because of its clear alliance to the humanism to which they were unfriendly. In order to view Osborn in the light of an appropriate background, it will be profitable, then, to consider a few of the educational treatises¹ which illustrate the progress of Italian ideals of education among the English people.

Thomas Elyot's The Boke Named the Governour, which was published in 1531, is the first work of major significance relating to humanistic education to appear in England. Elyot regards education from the point of view of the tutor, who he feels is a necessary means for the training of a gentleman. The gentleman is to be educated for civil life, and the liberal arts are studies preparatory to the fulfilling of patriotic duty. Following Cicero and Quintilian, Elyot states that excellence in rhetoric is not sufficient for the true orator, who must have inner excellence and greatness of character in order to be genuinely capable. The whole basis of Elyot's scheme of education is the study of classical antiquity. What he expected

1. For information concerning these treatises, and for quotations from them, I am indebted to William Harrison Woodward, Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, Cambridge, 1906.

from this is made clear by the following passage: "I think verily if children were brought up as I have written, and continually were retained in the right study of very philosophy until they passed the age of twenty-one years and then set to the laws of this realm ...undoubtedly they should become men of so excellent wisdom that throughout all the world should be found in no common weal more noble counsellors."¹

Assuredly, one cannot say that Osborn has much in common with such an ardent Humanist. But there are numerous and interesting points of contact. For instance, like Elyot, Osborn assigns to education a purpose in the commonwealth. But this similarity is qualified by the difference between the two men's conception of the state. To Elyot the state is a cooperative enterprise, with the burden of the government resting on the shoulders of a ruling class. "He starts with the concept of the community as an unit organized in due order of capacity, functions, and skill, each factor in society existing as an element of an organic whole, obeying a law of proportion based on the relative importance to the State. The Republic has obviously suggested to him this idea of a division of labour, with honor graded according to the nature of the services rendered. That there must be one sovereign he proves from the examples of Moses and Agamemnon; from Venice and Ferrara; from Edgar, King of England, under whom

1. Quoted by Woodward, op.cit., p. 259.

2. ~~Ibid., p. 272.~~

prosperity and security notably advanced. Democratic Athens is a standing warning; Rome also was forced to rely upon Dictators and Emperors." ¹ But Osborn assigns to no one form of government a great advantage over others; nor does he conceive the state in the spirit of the Republic. Although he recognizes the cooperative character of organized society, he disavows the responsibility of any one particular class. ² Osborn would have education include those studies which will be conducive to the safety and profit of the individual. His emphasis is on the competitive, rather than the cooperative, character of life. The Italian doctrine of the supremacy of the state, which in Osborn's political thought retains much of its original force, in matters of education largely gives place to a concern for the welfare of the individual.

This characteristic makes clear another important aspect of Osborn's thought. In evaluating anyone's philosophy one of the most significant aspects that are to be considered is its social adaptability: How far does it give the individual a workable plan of life which could be applied to all men? How far is it concerned with the safety and welfare of society as well as of the individual? Osborn's philosophy, however, well it may provide for the individual, is utterly indifferent to the harmony and safety of society, nor does it propose any action for the individual that might be construed as of ultimate great social advantage.

1. Op. cit., p. 272.

2. See below, p.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find in Osborn no trace of the high conception of eloquence that Elyot drew from antiquity. This Osborn replaces by the ideal of circumspection in speech. Then, too, whereas Elyot would prepare the gentleman for leadership through contact with the masterpieces of classical literature, Osborn would substitute mathematics and medicine. The two men's ideas on historical studies form an especially valuable contrast. Elyot praises historical studies highly. At least in four ways do they instruct: "The style of the historian, the lessons of the military events described, the causes of the growth and decline in states, the political skill and the moral worth of rulers, with the effects of these on national well-being."¹ The familiar distinction between truth and fact enables Elyot to dispose of the objection that literature and history are full of the falsehood of myth. "If by reading the sage counsel of Nestor, the subtle persuasions of Ulysses, the compendious gravity of Menelaus, the imperial majesty of Agamemnon, the prowess of Achilles, the valiant courage of Hector, we may apprehend anything whereby our wits may be amended and our personages be made to serve our public weal and our prince, what forceth it us though Homer write leasings."² Osborn, on the other hand, objects to history because of its lack of fidelity to fact. He encourages the study only of modern history,

1. Woodward, op.cit., p. 287.

2. Quoted by Woodward, ibid.

which is to be learned from original documents: "Though the study of History be an ancient Prescript for the avoiding of Ignorance, and production of Knowledge, and to this day far more in use than other Politick Aphorismes: Yet with reverence to this confessed excellent Dose of others Approved Experiment, Doubt not but Princes and men in power might finde a readier, if not a more infallible way to Prudence, by being conversant in all sorts of Letters relating to Embassadors, and such Spies and Ministers (of Common-wealths especially) as are employed abroad or at home in the Transactions of Treaties, where all things appear bare-fac'd and at first hand, not smutt'd with Interest, or adulterated by the red and white paint of Envy, Fear or Flattery."¹

Most significant of all the points of contact between Elyot and Osborn is Elyot's anticipating just the kind of objection to humanistic training that Osborn makes. Elyot places emphasis on the necessity of the tutor in education, because he felt that at the time he was writing the humanistic schools of Italy would be impracticable in England, since the ruling classes did not then live in the towns. The Italian schools depended on the intellectual development of social groups that were permanent enough to attract scholars and artists, and which made possible the cultivation of the better pursuits of leisure. Such a situation did not obtain in England even a hundred years after Elyot's book was published. Historical Memoires (Elizabeth) "To the Reader."

lished. "In the reign of Charles I. an attempt was made on the part of some ladies, who were tired of the country, to take up their residence on the capital and parade in fine dresses in Hyde Park, while their husbands disported themselves at the play-houses across the river; but a royal proclamation from the most paternal of governments, enforced by some fines in the Star Chamber, soon drove back these pioneers of fashion to their rural duties."¹ The manor house in the country, with its limited cultural opportunities, was still the social center of England's ruling class. Provincialism and a distrust of cultivated town-life held out long against the forces of the Renaissance. The English aristocracy, like the German, was essentially rural, and was therefore generally indifferent, and sometimes even hostile to the new learning. It was not until well in Elizabeth's reign that the town became the recognized center of education. Osborn himself was educated under the old system: in his father's manor-house by a tutor; and although he recommends the superior instruction of the public school, he shows much of the countryman's distaste for the elegancies of town-learning. He distrusts the court and the universities; he has the rustic's practical stubbornness and is unwilling to relate the unsubstantial processes of learning to any real acquisition of ability.

1. George Macaulay Trevelyan: England under the Stuarts. New York, 1920, p. 5.

That Osborn has sympathies with the higher class rustic is clear when one considers others educational treatises which expressed a related point of view. Such appears in Sir Humphrey Gilbert's Queen Elizabeth's Academy, which in English educational tradition marks a considerable departure from the humanistic ideal. He recommends essentially a practical, useful training. He "accepts the Platonic doctrine that education should be under the public authority in that the community has large concern therein. He holds that the Universities ought not to be burdened with the present and evil example of worthless youth; that both Oxford and Cambridge have none but a learned training to offer, and that is little to the purpose in hand. For the youth he speaks of has need of training through 'matters of action meet for present practice, both of peace and war'; and especially must all teaching be through and in the English tongue."¹ This is the kind of education that Osborn would have been delighted with. Both men have the love of the practical and the realization that the English public weal requires a different conception of education from that fostered by Humanism. One should notice, too, that Humphrey Gilbert himself was aware of the difficulty of arousing a proper sense of the value of education among the landed classes. But he, like Osborn, was not especially concerned so much with their indifference to Humanistic education as with their ~~general~~ stupidity and their lack of general intellectual development.

1. Woodward, op.cit., pp. 302,303.

In most respects, indeed, Osborn and Gilbert are thoroughly harmonious. Both propose a practical education, and the academy, from which the humanistic feeling for poetry and philosophy is excited, is perhaps the kind of institution that Osborn himself would have proposed if he had attempted to do more than merely hint at an ideal system of education. Osborn and Gilbert agree further in recommending that historical instruction be concerned with contemporary material. It should be noted, however, that Gilbert still retains considerable faith in the classical language. Although English is to be the means of instruction, the study of Greek, Latin, and dialectic is retained as the most effective training for perfection in the mother tongue. And furthermore, this very fundamental difference should be noted: Gilbert is prescribing plans for an academy that is to serve a very special social purpose:- he is not, it seems, proposing an institution that is to take the place of all other existing systems of education: his comment on contemporary procedure, therefore, is considerably qualified; Osborn on the other hand is speaking of education in general and in recommending a practical discipline he is advocating the kind of training that is to be given not only to merchants but to statesmen and to philosophers as well.

This difference in the attitudes of the two men is made clear in several ways. For instance, Gilbert, like Osborn, perceives that the universities have failed to educate the

youth of the gentry as they should be educated. It is interesting to note here the connexion with Osborn. Gilbert does not, apparently, condemn learning as useless or foolish, but as in some cases extravagant and ill-chosen. Osborn, however, carries his dislike of learning further and believes that, aside from its failure to provide adequate education for the class of persons Gilbert is speaking of, it does not even do very much for those who quite properly pursue it. So in the matter of languages: Gilbert recommends that instruction be in English in order that a definite practical purpose, for the success of which foreign languages are not indispensable, may be most speedily and efficiently accomplished. Osborn, on the other hand, disapproves of foreign language study on principle, because, as he says, translations are so generally available that the study of another language is not worth the trouble it costs.

Other aspects of Osborn's ideas on education are anticipated in a work appearing in 1607, The Institution of a Young Nobleman, by J. Cleland. In many respects this author represents a renewal of the Italian influence in education. Like Elyot, he introduces the ideal of nobility characterized by service; he insists on the general principle of naturalness advocated by Castiglione, and urges that history and a visit to court be used as means to inspire a boy with the proper conception of duty and manners. His methods are a kind of transition between those of the true Humanists and those of

the practical rationalists like Osborn. Cleland would not have a "pedant" for a boy's tutor. He urges a discipline of letters, however, and states that boys should be forced to study whether they had inclination or not. The student's fare is to be a combination of experience with sound learning. In general, Cleland would use the classical procedure of Erasmus, leavened, however, by the practical wisdom of Montaigne. His true kinship with Osborn appears in the intellectual Puritanism of his work; like Osborn he advises against fencing as a sport, and he has a characteristic distrust of poetry. These ideas, together with the practicality of method both men advise, establish a significant relation.

Osborn's divergence from Cleland, is, however, a convenient index of his position with respect to humanism. The Institution of a Young Nobleman, despite its concessions to the exigencies of seventeenth-century England, remained in spirit a genuine Humanistic document. Its ideals were those of the Renaissance, freed somewhat from their earlier dependence on learned tradition, yet full of their original vigor in defending the noble character of duty. The grace and beauty of the cultivated mind are praised as conducive to the highest life of which man is capable. Furthermore, Cleland "insists upon the high dignity of scholarship as leisure."¹ Such an ideal conception of education is en-

1. Op.cit., p. 316.

tirely foreign to Osborn, who sees in all worthwhile learning and in all practical experience only a means for the accomplishment of personal success or of civic ends which in themselves are nothing more than mere arbitrary matters of custom.

The difference between Osborn's conception of service to the state and that of the Humanists is of great significance in the history of seventeenth-century thought. For England during the seventeenth century was divided, not geographically and politically as was Renaissance Italy, but socially and spiritually. In Italy humanism had the ideal of a possible national state to lend dignity and worth to its purposes. In England such an ideal could be realized by any one party only in terms of the suppression or extermination of all other parties. The disturbed condition of the times prevented that leisurely interest in letters which was the foundation of Humanism, and the unity of political purpose among learned men, which was its social manifestation.

There was, to be sure, an abundance of scholarship and no deficiency of great minds that had mastered the technique of historical and literary study. But in general the interest of these minds was diverted, or in some cases almost impressed, into the service of political and religious factions, whose struggle, though inevitable and perhaps ultimately salutary, was destructive of the ideal contemplative scholarship which

can discover and express great truths and which can embody them in living men who will serve the state with wisdom. How many scholars of that period, having a distaste for the literary warfare of the time, must have become, like Robert Burton, melancholy scavengers of the debris of mediaeval learning! Occasionally some one like Milton appeared, who, although he was in the thick of battle, could see beyond immediate ends to ultimate purposes. More than ever in this century it was the fate of great minds to be unsuccessful and unhappy. Milton's life was a long, finally a wearying, philosophical Odyssey. Men like Osborn also had their share of disappointment and grievance, and, finding little consolation in philosophy, turned from it in annoyance. Possessing intelligence enough to understand the problems of their time, they lacked the earnest nobility of purpose to strive for any solution but the most direct and personal. Osborn as a shrewd observer and a keen thinker, saw and obeyed the necessity of the century, which led to expediency and regard for personal safety as the best plan of action and as the best aim for organized education.

Chapter 2

Politics

As regards politics, Osborn again attacked his problem from the point of view of the individual who in a competitive world has to protect his personal safety and to advance his own interests. A young gentleman in the position of Osborn's son would very naturally take an interest in government, as a possible means of obtaining an income, if for no other reason. Never were the dangers of public office, however, more pronounced than during the seventeenth century. The importance of great governmental personalities acting through a centralized institution was as great as ever; but the new forces of democracy, which made government less a thing of the capital city and more a thing of the nation at large, caused the alignment of parties and factions to depend more and more on the feeling of the people rather than on the whims of courtiers: the ancient importance of leaders was, accordingly, qualified by a new responsibility of the ruler toward the ruled. This democratic tendency did not, naturally, simplify the problems of the young man in search of preferment; the traditional dangers of the court were as great as ever and to them were now added the manifold complications of various social revolutions.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find Osborn devoting a whole section of the first part of Advice to a Son to the relation of the individual with the government. As has been said before, it was not Osborn's plan to give his son a set of everyday platitudes; he gave advice on these topics where it was most needed, and this relationship was one such place. The section on government, like these on travel and marriage, is a compendium of shrewd, practical rules; for Osborn sees government, like most institutions, with the eyes of one whose observation of his contemporaries has made him cynical toward everything in human life that pretends to idealism.

Osborn begins his advice concerning government with a general disavowal of responsibility. "Such...as cannot make all well, discharge their conscience in wishing it so; Government being the care of providence, not mine."¹ With this principle as a basis, he develops the system of conduct that his son is to follow in his contacts with rulers and governmental affairs. There is no general social ideal of action in what he has to say. Even personal honour, the traditional mark of the aristocratic spirit, he dismisses with his usual practicality. "Nurse not Ambition with your own blood, nor think the wind of Honour strong enough to blow away the reproachful sense of a shamefull, if possibly that of a violent Death."² He quotes Solomon with satisfaction:

1. Advice, pp. 104, 105.

2. Ibid., p. 106.

"A living Dog is better than a Dead Lyon."¹ Fundamentally, it would seem, Osborn prefers to have his son take no part in politics: the moral responsibility of the citizen for the safety and guidance of the commonwealth he does not recognize. The dangers inherent in political life are sufficient deterrent to point out the folly of seeking office.

This attitude of near contempt for government is an interesting combination of two traits in Osborn. The first is a matter of character rather than of philosophy. Osborn's caution has already been commented on above in connexion with his idea of experience. It extends, however, beyond the educational process to all other relations of life. He would have his son be circumspect in choosing a wife. If he is wisest of all, he will not marry. He would have his son travel with extreme precautions, and finds the possible dangers greater than the probable advantages. Osborn will never give up a smaller good in the present for a doubtfully larger good in the future. Beyond this simple caution, however, Osborn's contempt for government springs from a larger philosophical principle, his disillusionment with human society. He has great respect for practical wisdom, but he is himself scarcely a Solomon. He did not care to set down in succinct, epigrammatic form the wisdom of mankind's general experience. He chose rather to consider himself superior to the world around him, to consider mankind as a thing part from himself. He even

1. Ibid., pp.106-107.

treats his readers with a certain degree of scorn. His letter "To the Readers" at the beginning of the second part of Advice to a Son begins as follows: "Did all your Heads owne a like Mode and Figure, they could not but be fitted with something here might give the Buyer satisfaction for the price of the Book; but you found in the generality, so contrary to the Camelion (a true Emblem of Hypocrisie, Levity, and Sophistication) as not to take colour for what you judge, from the tincture of Sense and Reason, but the pled and contaminated constructions fuming from brains suborned out of Interest, or a contrary practice to condemn of Errour, Ignorance, or Irreligion, all things though never so modestly proposed, that suit not with their breeding, nor fall within the narrow circle of their understanding." This feeling extends, naturally, to the body politic, which he seems to think embodies the sum of all the evil tendencies of its component individuals. As a result of this latter attitude and of his cautiousness he makes the substance of his counsel on this point quiet submission.

The moral problem that this raises he handles in an interesting fashion: Conscience, he says, has no concern with politics, and should lay down no prescriptions for the individual's action toward the government. ¹ "He that suffers his

1. An interesting bit of research, it seems, could be done on the seventeenth century attitude toward conscience; Osborn's extraordinary (from the modern point of view) notions might be ~~interestingly~~ connected with the whole question of toleration, which was treated in a philosophical and psychological manner as well as in a political one, in many works of the time. Note

his Conscience to mislead him in civill obedience, makes his guide a stumbling-block; not considering that All Governments now extant had their foundations laid in the dirt, though time may have dried it up by oblivion, or flattering Historians lie't it off."¹ Since government is a kind of necessary evil, with which the wise man will concern himself as little as possible, Osborn says that one should not trouble himself whether his fetters are made of many links, or of only one. For the well-behaved, according to Osborn's standard, the duties normally imposed by the State will be a light burden.²

Nor does loyalty to the state fare much better than personal honour and conscience. To serve the government from loyalty rather than from a desire for profit is folly; just as it is unreasonable to do more for a friend than he can be

such works as A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie; Wherein the Authority of the Civil Magistrate over the Consciences of Subjects in atters of External Religion is Asserted; The Mischiefs and Inconveniencies of Toleration are represented, and All Pretenses Pleaded in Behalf of Liberty of Conscience are Fully Answered, (anonymous, London, 1670) and A Short Answer to His Grace the D. Buckingham's Paper, concerning Religion, Toleration, and Liberty of Conscience, (Anonymous, London, 1685,)

1. Advice, p.113.

2. Cf. the opening paragraph of Strigg's A Modest Plea for an Equal Commonwealth, etc.: (vide supra p.) "I have sometime (by what charms I know not) been so strongly possest with a fond opinion of the indifferency of all forms of Government, that I have looked on none as objects of greater pity, than such as prompted by an ignorant and blinde zeal, have left their memories on the file of History, and their names registred in the bloody Rubricks of Times-Calendar as Martyrs of State; for as I presumed all Governments alike subject to corruption and oppression, so I supposed none uncapable of becoming the Conduits of Justice, and administering Truth and Righteousness to the people."

expected to do for one in the future, unless one has a debt of gratitude to pay for past favours. Furthermore, one is not by right obliged to remain loyal to a party that is falling, since "All we owe to Governours, is Obedience, which depends wholly on Power, and therefore subject to follow the same Fate and perish with it."¹ The very nature of governments supports this conclusion, since they are established that the people may obey them rather than live for them. It is always dangerous, says Osborn, to be "overobliging" to civil authority, and especially to a king. To do good out of hope of requital is perhaps the greatest folly, since princes, like subjects, are creatures of ingratitude.

From these general principles relating to the character and the persons of government Osborn deduces an elaborate set of instructions about manners in relation to the ruler. One should be especially careful about giving advice, which should not be offered, and which even when it is asked should not be given too readily. Great caution must be exercised not to offend monarchs by putting them at a disadvantage in repartée. Since it is always "slippery about the Throne", one should be especially careful not to reveal the faults of great men in writing or conversation. Similarly, a person acting as a great man's secretary should limit himself to the task of an amanuensis, not presuming to offer correction to his master.

1. Advice, p. 118.

Two things are to be avoided, giving offense and the necessity of assuming responsibility.

One gets the impression that Osborn disassociates ethics from government, as indeed his remarks on the subject of conscience might lead one to expect. There is no wrong, he says, in serving a monarch who has come to the throne wrongfully, or in courting "him whom you hope one day to make use of." On this point, however, Osborn adds the caution that men in power esteem better such as they have done courtesies for than those who have done them greater ones. One must always be on one's guard against treachery --that of friends as well as that of enemies, and especially that of sovereigns.

Osborn closes this discussion of government with comment on the reward that those who enter public life may expect. They will see fools promoted above wise men, and their hopes for success will be clouded by the dangers to which they expose themselves. Seekers after public office become the victims of false ambition and are deluded by fame, in seeking which one should not let the glamour of any one person lead to his adoption as a model. One should rather take one's example from several persons, for only by so doing will one be apt to win universal approval. Osborn has a traditional and salutary distrust of fame, both as a desirable and to be achieved and as a reliable criterion of true worth.

He advises his son not to judge things by the standards of those who are mere followers of fame and fortune. But if one should seek fame --and Osborn here as in the case of travel suspects that his son will probably not obey his first counsel and therefore gives advice for the event that he should disobey-- it can be successfully and safely obtained through a cautious use of the knowledge gained by experience.

In this section of Advice to a Son Osborn reveals perhaps as clearly as anywhere his detachment from social classes and organizations. Evaluating most things in life in terms of practicability and profit, Osborn is nevertheless not lacking in a sense of morality. But in his dealings with human institutions he refuses to introduce honour and virtue as dependable motives of action. No class is exempt from his general accusation of humanity. "The truth is, if wise men will make it their business, they may be easily able, where the people are unsettled, to obstruct good, & promote evil, under the specious pretences of Religion and Safety: therefore cheaper pleased, then discontented; being otherwise in true policy, capable of no slighter security then shall be able to cut off all hope or desire of future revenge: The consideration of which, though it cannot make me altogether approve, yet it abates my severity in the condemnation of that Legislator, said to have writ his Laws in Blood, which might be more suitable to the complexion of some times, then may

possibly hitherto have been thought."¹ Not much confidence can ever be placed in individuals or in groups: as social beings most men are, Osborn believes, like himself interested in safety and profit, and if they possess intelligence, are shrewd rather than moral.

Just as in the case of education, Osborn's sceptical attitude toward an institution is tempered by a recognition of its inherent possibilities for good, so in the case of government his cynical distrust of organized society is qualified by a definite acceptance of its necessity and usefulness. The governments of his own time Osborn considered all about equally corrupt. It is significant that in his political writings he displays little preference for one form of government over another. In advising his son, he gives counsel applicable to "free states" as well as warnings about princes. In his discussion of the reign of James I, although he announces his purpose as being to show how the present difficulties of England are due to that prince's evil and folly, he says nothing obviously prejudicial even to the most absolute monarchy. Osborn's clear-enough opportunism on an accusation that he lacks the courage of his convictions might easily be made to explain his failure to take a definite stand with respect to the argument of monarchy vs. democracy. But a preferable explanation is that in an age when faith in

1. Advice, pp. 144, 145.

traditional institutions was shaken and when new structures seemed as weak as ancient ruins, it appeared to Osborn wisest and most practical to cling fast to whatever workable systems society had devised or would devise, even though those systems were subject to inefficiency and corruption. For, pessimistic as he is about virtue and honour as effective motives in human life, Osborn finds the inefficiency of men's organization to some extent a natural consequence of man's spiritual status. " He that seeks perfection on earth, leaves nothing new for the Saints to find in heaven: For whilst Men teach, there will be mistakes in Divinity; And as long as no other governe, Errors in the State: Therefore be not licorish after Change, lest you muddy your present felicity with a future greater, and more sharp inconvenience."¹

Osborn's faith in original sin, in fact, seems a little stronger than his faith in the Redemption. It is his pessimistic evaluation of human nature that is the keynote of his understanding of government. The creation of an adequate means of civil control is always accompanied by tyranny, man's evil nature becoming especially noticeable in rulers.

Osborn's conception of the origin of this evil nature in society is not, however, theological in character, but definitely naturalistic: "The golden Age, so much celebrated in Poetry, is as remote from Fiction as Miracle. The Earth afford-
1. Advice, p. 142.

ing more felicity to a Few than a Many, which those people bordering upon the Sun, from when Mankind is at first said to proceed, might, by reason of a slower increase, longer enjoy; Till by falling into conjunction with colder Climes, & (so) after for Generation, she came to over-stock herself: Loosing the universal felicity in a crowd of Inhabitants. From whence sprung not only the Use, but an unavoidable Necessity of introducing Government, which falling under distinct Headships or Royallets, needed no greater provocation to Rapine and War, than the strongest found in their Naturall Temper." ¹ At first glance this suggests Rousseauism; but Osborn looks upon the golden age as something never to be recaptured, no matter what means men may try. Nor are institutions to blame: they are the result, not the cause, of human discontent. Osborn is not a Utopian; he is thoroughly reconciled to government and attendant evils as they are. "Oppression & Tyranny is not only Naturall but Necessary to preservation. For if the stronger Creatures did not spoile and devour the weaker, the whole mass of Animalls would perish by famine; or stifle for want of roome." ² Submission to the powers that be is, therefore, not only a profitable and safe course, but a philosophical one as well.

1. Advice, The Second Part, pp. 123, 124.

2. Ibid., pp. 154, 155.

The notion of the state as an indispensable social organ to which the individual is urged by reason and expedience to render obedience is based on the principle of utilitarianism: "The good of the Generality, is Voted, by all Right and Reason, the Supreme Law ...for whose Salvation Innocency himselfe was willing to die." ¹ This doctrine is really a socialized form of Osborn's concern for personal safety. The importance and the power of government reside not in a divine origin but in the sanction that the need for order gives to a supreme civil organization. Just as the individual is forced to the use of reasoned circumspection and care to protect himself against the dangers of the world and his own folly, so is the community compelled to avail itself of a system that shall protect it from external attack and internal rebellion. The second principle is not incompatible with the first, because submission to the state is an outstandingly necessary measure for the preservation of the individual's safety.

Submission to the state does not, however, arise for Osborn from any conception of the need for social cooperation. His philosophy is ever written from the point of view of the contemner of mankind, and the course of action he wishes to teach his son is not the most desirable behavior of a man among others, but of an intelligent man among the mass of

1. Political Reflections, p. 34.

stupid, inferior beings. Accordingly, he makes no effort to organize a system of thought that will be universally applicable to all: his advice is intended for a limited audience. He is not tremendously interested in his son's ethical peace with the universe but in his practical peace with the powers that be on earth. Osborn is anxious for the safety of his son: of the state as a body composed of many unit-members, of ideals of intelligent cooperation, and of a standard of public ethics he knows little or nothing. Of him it can scarcely even be said as of Hobbes that he "has mastered only the first half of Aristotle's famous dictum that 'the city comes into being that men may live, but continues to be that they may live well'."¹ He never establishes fully and clearly a system of ethics or ideals that will integrate the purpose of the state with the needs and rights of the individual citizen. For to Osborn the state is not so much a phenomenon to be explained philosophically, or an institution to be defended for the good of mankind, as a fact to be reckoned with. Better it is to let Leviathan pursue his own course and not to come within snapping distance of his jaws, Osborn seems to say. The management of the state is one problem and the citizen's attitude toward it is another. For Osborn the commonwealth, like the Church, is an historical entity with certain definite claims to men's obedience. A.E.Taylor: Thomas Hobbes. New York, n.d., p. 89.

ience. Both institutions, he seems to say, have certain faults, and both have frequently erred, but the fact of their existence and of their necessity remains, and submission is wise and practical. Osborn has little use for rebellion against the existing scheme of things. His Perswasive to a Mutuall Compliance under the Present Government, despite its defence of the Commonwealth and his dedication to Cromwell, is written in an absolutist spirit, that blends expediency and spiritual sloth. It ends with these words: "Then since this Nation hath endured so many severall changes, in these later years, without any considerable diminution of her splendor and felicity; I heartily pray it may not run a severer fortune hereafter; which cannot be better prevented, then for all Parties in their severall relations, quietly to submit to this present Government: Which having the only power of Protection, cannot in justice be denied the duty of Obedience. To perswade which the more easily, I most humbly beg of those in Authority, To concede to the just desires and Tears of a Nation."¹ The idea of the definite responsibility of the governors to the governed, which had been so clearly expressed at the opening of the controversy between Crown and Parliament, and which was surely well enough known in England, seems to have occurred seldom or not at all to Osborn. His interesting use

1. p. 10.

of the word justice in the passage just quoted indicates his real political philosophy, for it is exactly in this sense --justice as the will of the ruler, whose sovereignty is determined by his ability to compel obedience-- that Hobbes uses the word in Leviathan: "The nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them."¹

But Osborn's relationship with Hobbes is even more apparent, it seems, in connection with some of his theories of the Church. Whatever may be the claims of the Church, for Osborn the state is the highest authority on earth, to which even there representatives of God are subject. Such a conception of the supremacy of the state follows directly from the principle of utilitarianism, for it is only by being without a rival for power that the state can accomplish perfectly its task of promoting "the good of the generality". This task cannot be divided with a competitor. Henry the Eighth, accordingly, did not need the sanction of the clergy for his divorce. The Church indeed, although it is not necessarily to seek civil sanction for all its acts, is in all things to come to the support of the state. Under the best system the Church will become the handmaiden of the state.

1. Hobbes, op.cit., p. 98. Milton probably satirizes this view of government in Paradise Lost, I, 245 ff. Satan's idea of the moral law is that right is the whim of the person in power.

"The Keyes of the Church can hang no where so quietly, as at the Gi[r]dle of the Prince,"¹ says Osborn, and admires the Turks in their wise use of religion to support the government. From the example of the Turks Osborn deduces another reason why a close union of ecclesiastical and civil power, with the latter having supremacy, is desirable. Religion, rightly handled, is valuable to a government because "Law can promote no Good, nor prevent Evill, but what is open to publick cognisance; whereas Religion penetrates so low as to erect a Tribunall in every mind."²

Not only religion, but other social traditions as well, are legitimately subservient to the purpose of increasing the prestige of the state. "If the good of All ... be the Supreme Law, & grounded upon that of Nature, whose chief businesse is to intend the preservation of the whole ... why should such be blamed, as take the most probable ways to promote peace,"³ even if these ways are not perfectly in accord with an ideal truth. Custom, education, and ignorance are the three social villainies that Osborn recognizes as the foes of clear thinking. But he admits they play a useful part in the efforts of the "Magistracie" to establish its power more firmly, and with characteristic

1. Political Reflections, p. 29.

2. Ibid., p. 22.

3. Ibid., p. 38.

ethical callousness concludes that to use them for what they are worth is the natural privilege of rulers, especially justifiable because it may promote the common welfare.

Further evidence of Osborn's close relation to Hobbes is to be found in his ideas concerning the relation of ethics to law. Since right and wrong are, according to him, mere matters of custom, and since the state is the supreme authority to which all men owe obedience, it follows that the ruler has the privilege of declaring himself the arbiter of right and wrong. The state, as the legitimate judge of custom, and as the guardian of education, and religion, has all the most powerful means of social influence in its power and has the right to use them as it pleases. The question of the ruler's conscience and moral responsibility of the ruler Osborn ignores,¹ beyond expressing his disbelief in the frequency of virtuous character among princes.

1. Hobbes' ideas of the responsibility of the ruler is interesting in this connexion. He, it will be remembered, said that David committed no injustice against Uriah, but only against God as is clear from Psalm LI: Tibi soli peccavi. It is only against God, therefore, that a King can sin. Osborn, speaking to the Royalists about this point, says, "Yet if your doctrine be infallible, That a King is only responsible to God for his worst actions; it cannot but increase all wise men's affections to a Jurisdiction so modest, as to acknowledge their best correspondent to the people, at least in their Representative." On the same page, however, he uses this very doctrine to defend the regicides: "God hath called him [Charles I] to an higher Court: An that he hath reserved all cognizance of the manner of his remove all wholly to himself appears by placing the Authors of it above the reach of any power but his own." (Persuasive to a Mutual Compliance, etc.p.5.)

The thoroughness with which Osborn's practical spirit of inhuman efficiency extends into his ideas of government is especially clear from his Political Reflections upon the Government of the Turks. Osborn is pleased with the idea of such an officer as the mufti, who combines civil and ecclesiastical functions. The ease with which an offending magistrate can be disposed of in Turkey is also a subject for his commendation. This is accomplished "through clandestine deaths", which have the supreme advantage of disposing of an abuser of an office without casting disgrace upon the office itself by the publicity of a formal impeachment. The strangling of superfluous princes of the imperial house also has certain obvious political advantages that Osborn does **not** fail to call to his reader's attention.

How completely Osborn was able to divorce ordinary morality from government is even clearer from some of his remarks in the essay entitled Some Advantages may be deduceable from Court-Factions.¹ Observing that a single unopposed party prevents all mitigation of oppression, Osborn goes on to say that he has heard that "Divers persons of equall authority, though both wicked, do in experience produced more justice than a greater probity in a single individual",² at any rate in such a time as his own. Government should not be entrusted

1. Miscellany, pp. 240 ff.
2. Op.cit., p.241.

to human passions: bribery is better than love, fear, and hope, as a civil tool.

The problem with which rulers seem to be faced in the administration of their realms consists in a complication of the ordinary ethical difficulties of man by the stupidity of subjects. Actions that are ethical by traditional, general human standards, will not always not always prove expedient for the welfare of the sovereign, nor for the commonwealth, apparently. So, for example, Elizabeth by the execution of Essex, spoiled her popularity, though the justice of the deed was unquestionable: "The Death of Essex like a Melancholy cloud, did shade the prospect of her peoples affection, from being so discernable at the shutting of her dayes, as it was during the Dawning and Meridian of her reign. Yet if Essex had been try'd by a Peerage of Angels, they would have passed a like sentence upon him, or exposed Monarchy to contempt. Wherefore Prudence cannot lay the fault at the door of her Justice, but the illmanagement of her Mercy, as not knowing how to employ it, towards the best advantage of her future Affairs."¹ In questions of government there seems to be especially noticeable a conviction of Osborn's that also appears elsewhere in his work. This conviction is that prudence and morality need reconciliation of some sort. Just as

1. Op.cit., pp. 229, 230.

the sovereign, though righteous, may make grievous mistakes by failing to take into account the reactions of the mass of mankind, so can the individual get himself into difficulties by allowing his sense of morality to function inopportunately. Osborn's advice on government is largely concerned with justifying the necessity for submission even to a government which is known to be that of a usurper. He quotes the example of St. Paul in submitting to the jurisdiction of the Roman emperor, and other examples. "That it is not unlawfull to Serve, beare office or Armes, under such as ascend the Throne, or other high places, by steps washed in blood, you may be abundantly satisfied in Conscience, by the Church in Nero's House, the good Centurion, & many others mentioned in Scripture."¹ And he says elsewhere that "our Saviour himself is not heard to inveigh against the present Power, though it had made the Head of the Baptist the Frolick to a Feast."² And again, "Our Saviour would never have commanded under a like Emphasis, Innocency and Subtilty, had he thought them incompetible, or not rather as Necessary in things Sacred as Prophane."³ And he goes on to defend what is in substance Hobbes' doctrine of the necessity of submission to the civil authority in matters of religion. If the civil authority should go astray, even if it should wander into idolatry, such error

1. Advice, p. 129.

2. Ibid., p. 108.

3. Advice, Second Part, p. 160.

is to be considered a trial of patience, until God should incline the heart of some lawful power to do otherwise! Osborn here and elsewhere is not unaware of the moral struggle that is involved in such submission, and one perceives that his advice regarding pious conviction is essentially similar to the attitude taken by many men of the period with regard to religious conviction --that it is wisest to conform externally and to remain free within one's own mind.

In attacking the general problem of the state in this fashion Osborn has at his command more of a formulated tradition than in the case of his similar probing of education. For in the problems of learning the Renaissance writers of the Continent and even of England had in mind ends for which Osborn had little sympathy. The educational trends that he represents did not receive as full expression as these that were more Humanistic in character, or, later, Puritan. In matters of government, however, Osborn had the advantage of a number of definite precedents clearly in line with his own ideas.

Perhaps the greatest of his non-English predecessors was Machiavelli, whose The Prince, the most significant definition of the Renaissance idea of the state as a work of art, was misunderstood even in Italy. Tolerated by one pope, it was denounced by his successor. "Of all that thought it possible to construct a state, the greatest beyond all comparisons was Machiavelli, he treats existing forces as living and active,

takes a large and accurate view of alternative possibilities, and seeks to mislead neither himself nor others ... In truth, although his writings, with the exception of a very few words, are altogether destitute of enthusiasm, and although the Florentines themselves treated him at last as a criminal, he was a patriot in the fullest meaning of the word. But free as he was, like most of his contemporaries, in speech and morals, the welfare of the state was yet his first and last thought."¹ This purpose, however, was not generally understood. His rejection by his own countrymen was followed by an even more violent attack upon him by members of other nations. It was no wonder that France --the traditional enemy of Italy and one of the dangers to Italian unity that Machiavelli had in mind-- should have misinterpreted The Prince and unhesitatingly have connected it with such political outrages as the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. This feeling manifested itself in Gentillet's Anti-Machiavel, from which the English in turn received their notion of Machiavellian principles. In England Machiavelli soon became a legendary figure, the embodiment of all private as well as public villainy. By that time that The Prince itself was known in England, which was not until about the middle of the seventeenth century, hatred of the Italian political writer's principles had come to be an established tradition.

It is, accordingly, interesting to find among Osborn's
1. Jacob Burckhardt: The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy, translated by L.G.C. Middlemore, London, 1909.

works A Discourse Upon Nicholas Machiavel, or, An Impartiall Examination of the Justness of the Censure commonly laid upon him, which gives sufficient evidence of its author's familiarity with the corrected interpretation of Machiavelli. Realizing that the subject of his essay has received abundant censure, Osborn opens with a defense of him. In the first place, Machiavelli wrote other works than The Prince, in which nothing is found that detracts from his character. Whatever wickedness there is in Machiavelli, Osborn continues naively, must be somewhat excused by the consideration that Machiavelli was employed as an ambassadour.¹ The contents of The Prince, however, is in itself justifiable, because more wickedness can be found in the lives of real monarchs than in that of Machiavelli's ideal prince. Yet the Italian writer is to be praised for his faithfulness to the aim of the historian, which is accurate delineation, of the wicked as well as of the good. Osborn understands also the relation of Machiavelli to his period, which was characterized by great governmental evils. Machiavelli's rules² are really no other than the History of the wise Impie[t]ies, long before legib[li]e, and since imprinted with new Additions in the hearts of every ambitious Pretender.²

1. Cf. Sir Henry Wotton's famous definition of an ambassador: "Legatus est vir bonus, peregrè missus ad mentiendum Reipublicae causâ." An interesting anecdote is centered about this definition, and its somewhat ambiguous English translation ("An ambassador is an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his country"). See Izaak Walton: Lives of John Donne, Henry Wotton, Richard Hooker, and George Herbert, ed. by Henry Morley. London, 1888. pp. 105, 106.

2. Ibid., p. 134.

The Prince is, therefore, an accurate description not only of Italian Renaissance politics but of governmental matters at all times. The characters of princes tend everywhere to become like that of Jereboam. Saul as a subject consulted the prophets about his father's asses; as a king, a witch about a battle. Reacting clearly against current estimates of Machiavelli, Osborn says, "He that knowes not how rare a Commodity Probity is, in the Market of Princes, is no fit Reader, much lesse a competent Judge of Machiavell."¹

Since Osborn was himself interested in government and since, like Machiavelli, he was impressed with practical expediency, it is natural that he should sympathize with the author of The Prince. This sympathy has its basis in a recognition of the accuracy with which Machiavelli characterized government. Princes generally count "all things honourable that are safe: And if this be an Evil, it is the Kings, and no way curable, but by the King of Heaven."² With regard to the opportunism of princes, "The truth is Machiavell is observed to have raked deeper in this, than his Predecessors, which makes him smell, as he doth, in the nostrills of the nice and ignorant."³

In addition to this foreign source of information about government, Osborn shows very definitely similarities of thought with, and probably influence due to, two important Eng-

1. Op.cit., pp. 136, 137.

2. Ibid., p. 146.

3. Ibid., pp. 146, 147.

lish political writers. The first of these is Francis Bacon, for whom he expresses his admiration. Bacon's conception of the state "was rather of the Tudor than the Jacobean age, rather of the State as an organism in which the King was the sole source of power. The state is a cosmos, of which the King is 'the primum mobile which moveth all things'."¹ Bacon was, of course, one of the great apologists for absolutism; the Parliament and similar democratic concessions he does not consider significant at all, the king alone being enough authority, whose efficiency can be increased by an extension of his prerogative. His is the Utopian dream seen through the glass of Elizabethan politics. However, "in contemplating the beneficent uses to which the prerogative [of the king] could be put, he forgot how precarious are the benefits derived from irresponsible power and how degrading such power is to its holders themselves. In concentrating his vision on an efficient executive he forgot the political education of the people."²

Osborn's notion of the supremacy of the government is many respects consonant with Bacon's conception. Both writers advocate a tolerant Erastianism with regard to ecclesiastical policy; both assign to the government definite responsibilities and almost unlimited authority. But enthusiasm for a particular

1. G.P.Gooch: Political Thought in England from Bacon to Halifax, London, 1926, p.30. I am indebted to this work for several instances of the interpretations of Hobbes's theories of government in the following pages.

2. Ibid., p.33.

form of government, and faith in its powers for good, are absent in Osborn's thought. He is thoroughly disillusioned about princes. Not only James, Bacon's idol, but most monarchs, are corrupt. Nationalism, too, which in Bacon is unlimited, makes no appeal to Osborn, who gladly praises the methods of the Turks and considers European civilization as everywhere nearly equally afflicted with bad government. In Bacon the Renaissance enthusiasm for the state preserved some of its Italian eagerness to make an art of government. For Osborn, on the other hand, government was a necessary evil, whose avowed purpose was seldom properly fulfilled. He is once more the recorder rather than the planner of an epoch.

The other English writer with whom Osborn shows interesting connections is the philosopher Hobbes, who was among his personal acquaintances. In this writer the Baconian emphasis on the king has disappeared, being replaced by a more general insistence on the sovereignty of the state. Although monarchy is still the recommended form of government, other kinds are feasible. Hobbes denies any distinction in government between de jure and de facto. "The duty of the sovereign is to keep men from cutting each others' throats; and that duty can be discharged as efficiently by a usurper as by the anointed decendant of a hundred kings,"¹ he seems to say. Hobbes takes the final step --perhaps already suggested by Bacon, and surely tacitly assumed by Maciavelli--of stripping government of all divine prerogative or sanction. Govern-

1. Op.cit., p.38.

ment is a natural outgrowth of human society, subject neither to "natural law" nor supernatural authority.

It is in Hobbes, of course, that Osborn finds his closest parallel. Although he may have gathered from Bacon something of his tolerant spirit toward varieties of religion and some appreciation of the practical problems of government, it is essentially with Hobbes that he agrees. Both men see the state as connected with the natural dissension of mankind. Government is related to an effort to escape from the misery of unorganized social life. Osborn and Hobbes agree further in giving the state supreme authority, to which obedience is due in everything. They are alike prone to give the Church into the hands of the state, religion having--at least on earth-- the very practical use of making subjects submissive to their rulers.

But in many ways, Osborn pursues a path diverging from that of his more famous acquaintance. Osborn is milder in his treatment of religion, though his mildness, to be sure, has its origin in the suitability of the English ecclesiastical settlement to his own theories. Neither England nor Osborn ever came to a real decision with regard to the relations that should exist between Church and State. Hobbes, on the other hand, frankly shows his contempt of the Church, and uses Scripture in an ironic fashion that suggests his contempt of all religion. Nor did Osborn concern himself so deeply with

the division of power between king and parliament, which Hobbes attacks violently.

More significant, moreover, than any similarities in idea that Hobbes and Osborn may show is the difference in the essential tone of the thought of the two men. Hobbes prided himself on the deductive quality of his philosophy, and maintained a "uniform silence as to the 'inductive' method method of Bacon, the avowed object of which was to eliminate the 'anticipation of nature' by the framing of initial hypotheses altogether from the work of science."¹ Now Osborn's admiration for Bacon is evident not only from the commendation he bestows on him, but also from the obvious similarity of style between the two men, which suggests that the younger man studied the Elizabethan philosopher's work with an affectionate care. And much as Osborn may agree in his conclusions more nearly with Hobbes than with Bacon, it is the spirit of the latter that is noticeable in his work. Osborn's conclusions about government are based more on direct observations than on deductive reasoning. "Pedantry" is the term he would apply to the deductive approach to social problems. Hobbes' errors are due to a too tenacious development of rather dubious premises, and his refusal to let observation of life supplement his logic prevents him from experiencing the normal correction. About human society as it

1. Taylor, op.cit., pp. 35, 36.

really exists in the world, about human motives as they really are in the hearts of men, Hobbes has little knowledge. That in several--perhaps in many--things he chances upon the correct interpretation of human phenomena cannot be denied. But the very beginning of his philosophical method, which denies the importance of observation, dooms him to grievous errors. And Osborn, who is deeply imbued with scientific method and who reacts with characteristic English practicalness against unsupported theorizing, is aware of the difficulties of such a system of philosophy. The following passage suggests his probable opinion of Leviathan. "Huge Volumes, like Oxe roasted-whole at Bartholomew Faire, may proclaime plenty of Labour and Invention, but afford lesse of what is delicate, savory and well concocted, then smaller Pieces: This makes me think, that though upon occasion, you may come to the Table and examine the Bill of Fare, set down by such Authors: yet it cannot but lessen ingenuity, still to fall aboard with them; Humane sufficiency being to narrow to informe with the pure Soul of Reason, such Vast Bodies."¹

The essential difference between the two men is that Osborn,

1. Advice, p.9. The last sentence of this passage suggests, by contrast, Cowley's praise of Leviathan:

"I little thought before-
Nor, being my own self so poor,
Could comprehend so vast a store-
That all the wardrobe of rich eloquence
Could have afforded half enough
Of bright, of new, and lasting stuff
To clothe the mighty limbs of thy gigantic sense."

though he approaches problems with less of a purpose of definitely explaining and systematizing society, and, one might say, with less deep thought, has probably come to a truer estimate of the world because of the superiority of his method. Osborn's distrust of institutions is perhaps greater than Hobbes's, and he lacks the will, perhaps the requisite logical dexterity, to develop a whole system. He is not a scientist; yet he has the scientist's distrust of tradition. More than this, he has a highly developed sense of intuitive insight into human behaviour, and though he was not a "man of letters", he looks at life with a perception that could have made him an excellent satirist, in the best sense of the word.¹

With one other seventeenth century figure -- a satirist, it happens -- Osborn can be compared with respect to attitude toward government -- Samuel Butler. A comparison of

1. The quality of his style, which often tends to be epigrammatic, is, however, extremely variable, suggesting a variety of models. Evidence of a non-satiric kind of perception that shows he had considerable mastery of a genuine artistic use of language is seen in passages like this: "Neither can I apprehend such Horror in Death, as some do that render their lives miserable to avoid it, meeting it often-times by the same way they take to shun it. Death, if he may be gness'd at by his elder brother Sleep (borne before he was thought on, and fell upon Adam, ere he fell from his Maker) cannot be so terrible a Messenger, being not without much Ease, if not some Voluptuousnesse. Besides, nothing in this world is worth coming from the house top to fetch it, much lesse from the deep grave; furnished with all things, because empty of Desires." (Advice, pp. 186, 187.) Such prose is sufficient defense of the literary merits of Osborn against criticism like that of the writer in the Cambridge History who says Osborn's style "has all the faults and none of the merits of the older prose".

Osborn and Butler could, indeed, be made in education or in philosophy as easily as on matters of government. But Butler is known chiefly as a critic of certain social tendencies in the seventeenth century that were, in general, governmental in character. Furthermore, as has been shown above, Osborn's attitude toward the government is dependent largely on his aloofness from mankind in general--the very attitude that is prominent in Butler. In the author of Hudibras this aloofness from the things he criticizes has its origin in his rationalism. He had as much contempt for court-life as for Puritanism; it was not merely class-prejudice which caused him to view the chief object of his satire as something of little personal relation to himself. The Restoration brought him no reward. He saw in the Church of England many of the same vices he attacked in the Puritan church. He was not impelled by any genuine love of King or bishops to attack their enemies, although he may have found it profitable to do so. The motives and methods of his attack were primarily intellectual. He was the rationalist making fun of stupid and silly people, as he felt the Puritans to be. His genius as a satirist sometimes let his rationalism remain hidden under the roughness of his burlesque, but the deliberate manner of the satire, its subtle shifting of attack, and the author's real insight into some kinds of folly, all are evidence of his detached manner of judging people and events,

and, therefore, of at least some of the elements of rationalism.

Osborn, Hobbes, and Butler, all three illustrate one great characteristic of seventeenth century rationalism--its distrust of human instincts, and its policy of submission to prevailing institutions simply because no remedy was at hand. A curious situation arose from this submission, however. To all superficial intents and purposes the three men defended Church and state vigorously; but the slightest reading between the lines will show that their defense of the Church was largely a mere gesture; and a careful examination of their defense of the state shows how far thought of such quality as theirs threatened the stability of existing institutions. Hobbes, for instance, writes a brilliant defense of monarchy, yet the character of the argument is such that it lays monarchical government open to grave moral faults, because the whole theory is based on the selfishness and ruthlessness of mankind, on the instability and insincerity of the better impulses. Of the same general character is Francis Osborn's philosophical attitude toward government. He does not even pretend a justification for government, for he is not quite so fully aware of the character and organization of society in a large group as Hobbes is, and therefore concentrates his attention on the individual's attitude toward society. Accordingly, he recommends submission to the government and to the Church.

It is interesting that his work should have been condemned for atheism during his lifetime, just as Hobbes' Leviathan was rejected by the royalists whose cause it defended; and perhaps rightly in each case, for the kind of submission to and defense for Church and State that Hobbes and Osborn made were really veiled attacks on those institutions. And as they saw through the arguments of these two, so may the more intelligent conservatives of the seventeenth century have perceived that Butler belonged in the same category.¹

The rationalism of Butler and Osborn is not, however, quite the same. Osborn is the practical man, who turns from tradition and even from art, because he is deficient in aesthetic sense and because his mind is centered on contemporary things. He cares nothing for history, which is often counterfeit, and is generally of little profit to study. Butler, on the other hand, takes delight in traditional stories and in the manners of other ages: he has wide knowledge of various cultures. One is not surprised to find him looking about in contemplative fashion, when he sees follies and abuses, preparing himself to lash them in his destructive way. His satire is not deeply imbued with a moral purpose of correction, and it attacks vices not as general human weaknesses but as specific faults. The moral standard to which it would refer seems to be un-

1. Privité-Orton, C.W.: Political Satire in English Poetry, Cambridge, 1910. p.17.

formulated; yet it is not without a philosophical insight and an intellectual basis. It represents, in its crude way, a groping after truth and an effort to destroy what its creator believed to be shams. Osborn, on the other hand, is not concerned much with arriving at the truth, but rather with developing a practical code of action. Accordingly, his rationalism is directed toward the discovery of maxims of expedient conduct.

As a result the two men differ greatly in moral tone. Both of them are essentially conservative, and express loyalty for the existing régime even though they perceive its weaknesses. Both of them, too, have the Hobbian notion of man's corrupt and self-seeking nature, and think that moral principles are largely a cloak for base motives.¹ But Osborn approached the matter from the side of expediency and believed in loyalty because it was safe and profitable for the individual. Butler, who was apparently more deeply impressed with the events of the Civil War, believed loyalty was the wisest policy because it assured the closest approximation to social justice. Each man, using the intellectual equipment of rationalism, was aware of the current abuses of government. But Butler is morally higher in tone than Osborn because his submission

1. See Dan Gibson, Jr.: The Ideas and Influences Reflected in the Writings of Samuel Butler. Cincinnati. (U.C., M.A. Thesis) 1831, p.16.

is based on a genuine philosophical analysis of the situation. Butler, too, is much more concerned with sincerity than is Osborn. The dangerous intolerance of the Puritans was only part of his indictment: insincerity was also one of his accusations, perhaps the one of greatest import. With Osborn sincerity matters relatively little--man's conscience is easily warped; how then could mere sincerity be an evidence of morality, especially since by skillful dissembling, useful and even righteous deeds can often be performed? A good conscience, says Osborn, should be just as able to acquit as to condemn its owner; hence one should not be too scrupulous about fulfilling obligations. This, it is clear, is the very sort of casuistry that Butler condemns in Hudibras.

Chapter 3

Philosophy and Religion

At first sight, the practical spirit that Osborn so often expresses seems to exclude speculative philosophy from the realm of his interests. Like many another keen intelligence of his time, he was probably more annoyed than distressed by the theological wranglings that were prevalent. Like that of most seventeenth century men, his theological and philosophical position was a rather individual matter, eclectic in tone, a combination of various kinds of thought. With certain great phases of seventeenth century theology and philosophy, however, he had little to do. The prevalent Platonism, for instance, has practically no part in his ideas. Such an omission is significant, since it shows once again the distaste Osborn had for speculation that extended beyond the immediately here-and-now. Osborn's practicalness, however, is not of the kind that springs from an absence of thought; it is rather in itself a clue to a philosophical system. Its obvious relation to certain ideas of Hobbes and Bacon points out clearly the general trend of Osborn's ideas. He has the atheist's cynicism toward insti-

tutional religion, and can look at other religions than his own with an objectivity that is characteristic of a lack of enthusiasm for, rather than of confident assurance in, ~~in~~ his own creed. He has the scientist's distrust of tradition and his eagerness to handle palpable fact. These traits are signs of something deeper than a materialistic complacency of the bourgeois who leaves philosophy to the doctors. They show, rather, two important things: first, that Osborn was aware of the intellectual forces of the age; second, that, however wrong his conclusions may be, Osborn did come to them by a process of thinking that was no mere submission to religious or philosophical fashion, but which involved the use of shrewd observation and careful judgment.

The independence of his thought is even more clearly brought out by the significant way in which Osborn departs from the philosophers whom he comes closest to resembling. He does not have Hobbes' bland confidence in the infallibility of logic. And in many matters he has too much distrust of all evidence to attempt the application of Bacon's scientific method to any practical problem: he falls back on personal experience and the rough approximations of cool common sense. He lacks the atheist's unwholesome stubbornness and the scientist's wholesome curiosity. This lack of curiosity, however, is evident only in the ~~sense~~ sense of "natural knowledge"; in social, political, and religious matters he shows interest enough. He was not, therefore, utterly given over to the newest interests of the time. The central subject of thought, for him as for the

Humanists, was man, as an individual and as a component of institutions; and even his very practicality itself, a trait which could easily have led him toward the modern idolatry of materialistic knowledge, was centered around the development of man as a being with a life to fulfill.

The searcher for a well-rounded, complete system of philosophy will find Osborn a serious disappointment. Sometimes, indeed, there seems to flash upon Osborn the realization that if his ideas were carried to their ultimate conclusions he would find himself denying utterly the things which he now feebly affirms. This final carrying-out of his opinions Osborn never quite accomplished. The same unwillingness to classify and to integrate information which keeps him from really entering into the scientific spirit, prevents him, it seems, from ever setting down in a systematic fashion his philosophical ideas. He simply has not the intellectual vigor of a Hobbes or a Bacon. Yet he avoids inconsistency. His ideas change, but they change not through mere whim or fashion. And beneath them there is a strong, intelligent consistency that gives to his pronouncements an air of sober evaluation. It is a consistency that arises not from thoroughness of philosophical method, but from a uniformity of philosophical temperament.

The philosophy, therefore, of a writer who is metaphysical only insofar as the convention of his age made all men

to some extent theologians can best be treated in terms of a definition that makes philosophy consist in a man's conception of the ultimate sanctions lying behind his beliefs and actions. To regard Osborn as merely a summation of certain seventeenth century tendencies, as no more than a bundle of borrowed ideas, would be unjust. The fact that he was capable of considerable vividness and originality in expression shows him to be more than an eclectic essayist, copying whatever devices fall into his hands. This originality extends beyond the literary form to the content, which, as is evident above, is distinctive enough to make him an interesting figure in the period.

In its general character Osborn's plan of life has already been suggested. He has great respect for the value of practical experience, yet he would temper the curiosity of youth by the admonitions of reason. The two in conjunction--reason and experience--form a policy of "expediency" for the individual and of utilitarianism for the state. It is no mere opportunism that Osborn commends, but rather the cultivated shrewdness which he identified with the wisdom of Solomon.

This shrewdness and circumspection in conduct is matched in thought by an equally great objectiveness. Though Osborn is interested in government, he prefers to have nothing to do with it. Although he conforms to the Church, he is free in his sympathy with other religions and understands the posi-

tion of the man with no religion whatsoever. He is eager in his pursuit of historical information, but distrusts historians because they are generally not disinterested. Some of his impatience with traditional education is due to its failure to inculcate in students this same objectiveness. It also in his discussion of historical events tempers his opinions with a very considerable restraint. Osborn distrusts the passion for righteousness, which can, apparently, like its evil counterpart, disturb the cautious and impartial judgment of reason.

Yet for all his confidence in reason, Osborn appreciates fully the weakness of human intellectual powers. He dislikes tradition largely because to him it seems a presumptuous exaltation of human opinions, which are seldom supported by reason and observation. In an age when speculation was rife, Osborn urges his readers to cling fast to the closest approximation of truth afforded on earth, the reasoned evaluation of objective data. His plan of life is not, therefore, the stark opportunism that it at first glance seems. Nor can it be explained entirely on the basis of an interest in practical matters inhibiting idealism. It is rather the mature conclusion of a man who, in an age when there were no great certainties, advised his fellow creatures to turn to petty probabilities, to the matter-of-fact concerns of life, and to wrest from them stability for the spirit and safety for the flesh. In all things, therefore, he champions the mean --not the golden mean of the Humanistic Renaissance, but the safe mean of the

English Restoration. The most fruitful field of investigation regarding the deeper implications of his philosophy, is, of course, his attitude toward Christianity. Osborn's epoch demanded of everyone a specific decision regarding religion. Many, of course, chose to evade the issue through lip-service to one party or another, through downright lying, or through a complete refusal to debate religious matters in their own minds. On the whole Osborn belonged to the unconscious evaders. He professes a decision which on its face bears the marks of sincerity and logic, yet which is qualified by considerations that reveal the magnitude of its author's doubts.

In general principle Osborn professes adherence to the authority of the Church of England, which he sees somewhat in the light of Anglo-Catholic interpretations. As regards Church government, however, he has little to say outside his denunciations of the Roman hierarchy. The important thing, he feels, is to have an adequate authority --whether of presbyter or bishop does not seem to trouble him. The necessity of an authoritative Church is apparent, even though such a Church may at times fall into error. "He that herds with the Congregation, though in an Error, hath Obedience to stand by him, whereas a Truth in the other may be rendered more peccant through a solitary obstinacy." ¹ Occasionally this partiality toward authority in religion even leads him

1. Advice, p. 152.

to make surprising concessions to Rome. He hopes that "our Sampsons in successe, who have stript... the [Church] of her Ornaments... may not one day have cause to repent, when they find themselves annlyed, no lesse than the eyes of Truth put out, by the dust and rubbish, the fall of so great and antique a frame is likely to make."¹ With regard to the authority of Scripture his attitude is also somewhat inclined toward the less Protestant division of the Church of England. He cautions his son not to be lad astray by random interpretations of Scripture or by the improper use of it in skillful hands. In cases of doubt "take fixation from the authority of the Church, which cannot be arraigned of a damnable error, without questioning that truth, which has proclaimed her prooffe against the gates of Hell."² And Osborn has scant praise for "the vagabond Schismatick" in this connexion.

It is interesting, in the light of all this authoritarianism, to see to what great lengths Osborn goes in religious tolerance. He has good things to say for Puritans, Papists, Millenaries, even for Arians. He disapproves of Dissenters occasionally on the grounds of public safety, unity in religion being an important factor in the maintenance of peace: but for the doctrines of these various parties he has extremely light criticism. In his own way, he sees the Reformation as an accept-

1. Op.cit., pp. 148, 149.

2. Ibid., p. 148.

able middle path, "most conformable to the duty we owe to God, and the Magistrate; if not too flagmatick, in passing by decent Ceremonies, or too choleric and rigid, in obtruding upon weak and tender Consciences."¹

In the light of the statement just quoted Osborn seems a tolerant and perhaps even a somewhat pious Anglican, accepting Christianity in the Erasian manner. But in connection with remarks about the Puritans he says some things that seem to hint at what he himself styles "darker Infidelity". Osborn has a good reason for opposing the persecution of the Puritans: they should have been left alone to recover sanity of their own accord, since violent opposition tends to arouse rather than to suppress a movement. But a deeper reason, perhaps, is one that lays his whole religious position open to serious doubt: "The exposing of any religion to contest... is dangerous, seeing that all at this day in veneration are under persecution in some place or another, wherefore unable to silence the Reason of those formerly suborned through contrary Education."² Acceptance of the religion of one's native country, then, is justified not only on the basis of the supremacy of the government, but on the grounds that fundamentally men's religions, like other cultural factors, are determined by education. That the religious development of the individual, apart from direct supernatural intervention, and from the spontaneous promptings of reason and conscience, is based on social environment has of course been acknowledged by religious groups generally. The attitude in it-

1. Op.cit., p. 157.

2. Memoirs, James: p.70.

self is not at all indicative of a lack of faith. But when it is coupled with the timorousness that Osborn shows it is a mark of faint assurance. And Osborn's virtually saying that to expose any religion to contest is dangerous to all, is a rather good indication that the concept of "true religion" was only feebly present in his mind. The elaborate cautions, indeed, with which he plies his son, show how he was infected with the fear of so many of his contemporaries --the fear of losing his faith. He is continually advising his son not to expose his religion to influences that will disturb faith by disproving the unique character of Christian doctrine. Traveling is dangerous to faith because it exposes it to other forms of Christianity. He points to the example of the English who have forsaken Anglicanism for Roman orders. Seldom have they profited by their apostasy. According to Osborn, the wisest way of life demands that in religion, as in clothing and manner, one should remain true to the culture in which one has been born. In matters of doctrine, as of social behavior, one should be well grounded in one's native custom before one goes to observe other nations.

These two bases of ecclesiastical loyalty: Erastian submission to the power of the state, and expedient submission to the most familiar form of Christianity, are fundamentally related. Each is the result of the attempt to establish some kind of check to the unlimited divergences of religious practice and opinion that resulted from the Reformation. The Renaissance, it must be remembered, was characterized by an increased spirit

of nationalism. What could be more natural, then, when church government became a thing to be quarrelled about, than to turn to the state as the new means of ecclesiastical control? This tendency was further strengthened by the skepticism that grew to be a significant factor in Renaissance thought. Machiavellianism, though without faith in religion, has a great use for it. From more than one direction, pressure was brought to bear on the reformed religion that tended to drive it into the arms of the state. The need for a new authority to take the place of the old, the desire to make religion conform to the national temperament, and sometimes the recognition that religion is a useful tool for the accomplishment of the sovereign's will--all tended to vest religious authority in the civil government and to identify religion with national culture rather than with universal human ideals of belief and conduct.

Osborn especially well illustrates all of these forces as they were manifest in England. It has been shown above¹ how Osborn would make religion largely a tool of the state; and he admits that he is not unfamiliar with Machiavelli's doctrines, which in fundamental spirit are not far distant from Hobbes' ideas about the means of securing a stable commonwealth. He was, furthermore, aware of how much Christianity had lost in England by forfeiting the security and stability of Roman Cath-

1. See p. 92.

olic authority. And, finally, Osborn was thoroughly a nationalistic Englishman, as his near-contempt for travel and his enthusiastic interest ~~interest~~ in English historical events shows. It was a good deal easier for him to be certain about England than about the Kingdom of Heaven.

Osborn's Erastianism is, indeed, the stumbling-block of his theology. Like other thinkers of his time and since, by granting to the civil powers the right to determine the religion of his subject, he has admitted that the authority of the Church is of human origin and is necessarily arbitrary. This attitude has its origin in one of the most unfortunate aspects of the Reformation. That the historic Christian Church had in the course of the centuries preceding the Reformation become entangled--and oftentimes in a most compromising fashion--with the State can scarcely be denied. Gallicanism and other attempts to found national Churches within the Catholic Church were forerunners of the nationalistic Erastian churches of the Reformation. Church and State struggled often, and various degrees of minglings of their functions existed from time to time.

The Reformation, however, introduced not only national control of the organization of the Church, but also national determination of doctrine. And anyone who, like Osborn, makes a defense of Protestantism, must in some way account for the resulting difficulties. The English Church, in many ways, presents a special cause. More than any of the other reformed

creeds, it retained Catholic ideas of the nature of the Church; yet its elevation of the king into a substitute for the pope made it most susceptible to the Erastian idea that the civil government can decide on doctrinal questions. Apologies for the Church of England, accordingly, vary between the extremes set by Laud and Hobbes. Between these two Osborn hesitates, at times seeming to embrace an almost Anglo-Catholic point of view and at other times counselling submission on the basis of arguments like those of the great atheist. That Osborn was strongly tempted toward atheism seems pretty evident; yet his consciousness of the subtler moral difficulties that beset submission to ecclesiastical authority is too great to allow one to conclude that he is quite an unbeliever.

His dilemma eventually leads him to a resolution that is, however, philosophically rather unsatisfying. It has been seen above how he decides that religion, like manners and custom, is a matter of education. To remain loyal to the Church in which one is born is the best course, because, after all, ^{it} is part of one's cultural heritage, loyalty to which is expedient and wise. Its wisdom lies in the necessity under which men labor in this world of confusion and doubt, of clinging to the closest approximation of truth that is available. To change religions, Osborn says, is folly, because one thereby disrupts the unity of one's life. Even to study other religions too attentively is dangerous, he says. Fundamentally, this attitude has at its

basis Osborn's disillusion with human knowledge. It assumes that real truth in matters of religion can never be determined. Consequently it is easy to deny the moral duty of searching out and acknowledging the truth. In the desperate need for something solid to cling to, Osborn accepts nationalized English Christianity as the most expedient form of religion.

This submission to the Church of England, however, is seen even more clearly in its true character when one understands the relation that religion bore to philosophy in Osborn's life. In order to comprehend properly the difficulties that he was facing one must recall once more some of the fundamental changes that the Renaissance introduced into the belief of certain parts of Christendom. Most significant of these changes in connexion with Osborn is the readjustment of the relation between philosophy and religion, which the Renaissance almost everywhere produced.

Catholicism in its attitude of otherworldliness had never denied the importance of this world. Otherworldliness was a matter of emphasis. The life of the soul was more important than the life of the body; eternal things were more important than temporal things. But the two phases of existence were not mutually exclusive. Both existed, rather, side by side, the one visible, the other invisible. The invisible, furthermore, gave to the visible meaning and utility. The so-called materialism of Catholic belief and practice is an ex-

pression of this very fact. The Church found in herself a spiritual repository whence all life might receive strength. She was the last and most perfect of the means for the fulfilment of the divinely conceived end of the creation. Not ashamed of the material gifts of God, she reconsecrated them with the courage of the authority by which she proclaimed herself literally the tabernacle of God come to dwell among men.

Such a system of belief, which saw Earth subtly pervaded by the presence of Heaven, the Renaissance met with a determined emphasis on life apart from its heavenly relations. The conflict was not immediately apparent. The new forces of the Renaissance were so different from what men were accustomed to, that common ground for a quarrel could scarcely be found between the old and the new. Accordingly, the two systems of thought existed side by side, often even in the mind of the same man. As a result, in practice men were drawn more and more from the other world, which in theory they continued to acknowledge as more important. This mental state easily brought about a complete modification of the religious spirit. "The passive and contemplative form of Christianity, with its constant reference to a higher world beyond the grave, could no longer control these men...The form assumed by the strong religious instinct which, notwithstanding all, survived in many natures, was Theism or Deism, as we may please to call it." ¹ That is to say, Heaven receded from the Earth. Men

1. Burckhardt, op.cit., pp. 547,548.

could still believe in God, but they failed to perceive His immanent presence in a world that for all practical purposes seemed to go its way without Him.

It is natural that the influences of paganism which impregnated some kinds of humanism should have added to the confusion of religion, and have increased the uncertainty in men's minds. Without formally renouncing Christianity many adopted systems of philosophy utterly opposed to their old faith. The new separation of this world and the next made it possible to hold such a position without insincerity. In the event of hesitation it was still possible to take such a stand by arbitrarily assigning to religion and to philosophy non-conflicting provinces of thought. In the Middle Ages such a procedure would have been impossible: Scholasticism, it should be remembered, can be defined as an effort to make of philosophy and religion one body of knowledge. There can be no question that philosophy and religion have often run conflicting courses that need reconciliation or demand of the intellect a choice between them; but the arbitrary division of knowledge into the separate provinces of philosophy and of religion could only have taken place in an age that by emphasizing visible experience had given faith a position remote from everyday thought.

One of the most significant results of the Reformation was its completing the threatened severance of philosophy and religion, which had originated in Italy and come north with the

Renaissance. The dogmatic character of Catholicism and the rigor of its sacramental system would require of a person whose mind was undergoing such a severance a tremendous, perhaps an impossible, intellectual readjustment. But the Reformation, itself a product of the rationalism which had encouraged non-Christian philosophies, discarded deliberately many Catholic concepts which were characteristic of a belief in the presence of God on earth. The sacramental system was broken and the significance of what remained of it was minimized. Adoration of Deity present on the altar in flesh and blood was replaced by sermonizing about the Ruler of a distant Heaven. The disparity between philosophy and religion was therefore increased, since through the removal of Heaven from Earth men could with less strain on the conscience think and act in terms of beliefs unrelated, or even opposed, to Christianity.

Seventeenth century England is particularly interesting in this connexion. The works of nearly all of its greatest writers reveal that not only the subject matter but the ideology of classical antiquity --and therefore its philosophies-- interested and influenced them, often coming into conflict with Christianity. As on the Continent, the difference between actual philosophy and professed religion does not always result in struggle. Bacon is a typical case of a man who despite an evident and probably sincere conformity to his Church, holds views that were deeply opposed to much that is vitally characteristic of Christianity. And in this same position is Francis

Osborn. Both men see life from a fundamentally rationalistic, unreligious angle: and both are willing to put the Church at the mercy of the state.

Neither, however, wishes to give up the hopes and fears of traditional religion. Insincerity or hazy thinking is not necessarily the cause of their attitude. The severance of philosophy and religion did much to make such a position entirely feasible. Then, too, the enthusiastic spiritual courage of the Renaissance was on the wane in England, and many of the wisest saw that a hasty dismissal of faith was not only indiscreet, but perhaps opposed to the higher spirit of rationalism itself. The emphasis on reason was prominent, it must be remembered, in Milton's philosophy too, and he surely was not a man to make two systems of philosophy and religion. Thinkers like Bacon and Osborn, then, though they were unable to arrive at a new synthesis of philosophy and religion,¹ took the attitude of a great part of the Renaissance, conforming in probable sincerity to the Church, although involuntarily disregarding its teachings in their speculations. As far as they

1. There are examples, such as Donne and Sir Thomas Browne, of men who accomplished this. Puritanism, too, in its Hebraic intolerance, accomplished a new union of philosophy and religion. But these were all instances of reaction against secularism. Among the secular-minded the synthesis is rare. During the Restoration particularly it is common to find men even of the intellectual caliber of Dryden acting toward religion as though it were an important but nevertheless distinctly separate compartment of life. To explain this in terms of time-serving seems too easy a solution. One is dealing here rather with a social insincerity than individual hypocrisy: it is as though the period had inherited Christianity as a kind of impossibly old-fashioned heirloom that it would be embarrassing to show to the sophisticated world, yet somehow impious and ungrateful to throw away.

go in their thinking in various fields they mean what they say. They have "sincerity of the part". "Sincerity of the whole" demands greater intellect and greater moral passion than these men had, and if they had this, either their philosophy or their religions would be very much different from what they are.

To penetrate into the secret recesses of Osborn's mind, and to pronounce on his sincerity is, of course, not possible. It is possible, however, by means of certain tests to determine the relationship in Osborn's thought of philosophy and religion, and to show by means of such an examination just where he stands with regard to important phases of the problem of reason and faith in the seventeenth century.

The first of such tests concerns itself with Osborn's explanation of the nature of faith. Officially he says that faith is above reason. He has "ever thought it a lesse impiety to limit reason, then Faith."¹ Yet he acknowledges revelation only in connection with reason; if faith is above reason, reason nevertheless is next in rank: "He offers an high indignity to the Divine Nature that robs God of his honour by owning thoughts of him unsuitable to the Dictates of Reason (the exactest Engine we have to measure him by, out of the Volume of his Word)."² Osborn seems to be forever haunted by the apparition of atheism, which he would lay with a rationalistic incantation. Osborn argues frequently for the existence of God, as much, it seems, to convince himself as his readers. A passage of singular inter-

1. Advice. Second Part: Preface "To the Readers".

2. Advice, p. 177.

est (as well as of considerable beauty) is the conclusion of Advice to a Son. The Second Part, "exploding atheism", as the gloss says. There is in this passage neither the use of reason, however, to explode atheism, nor yet the assertion of a vigorous faith based on the usual Christian premises, What Osborn discusses is the age-old problem that occupied the Psalmist: "Why do the wicked sometimes flourish, and the just suffer?" And Osborn concludes that the success of the unrighteous or the sufferings of the righteous are no good excuse for atheism. One should continue to believe in God, he says, because by not doing so one is cheating oneself of a hope.

"Wherefore knowledge being at a nonplus (a thing she doth naturally aborre) many, because they cannot decipher a Reason, why Providence in this world appears so oft in the favour (to our seeming) of wicked and unjust designes, and so far discourages the good, as to leave them in the hands of oppressors, they, like inconsiderate Sea-men, do cut the Cable of hope, and forsaking the Anchor of Providence, resigne the conduct of all things to Fortune, who is yet so constant in her vicissitudes (familiar to Gamesters) that in a small time she doth not only take away, but returns to every man his Money again."¹ There is, however, or rather, there may be, a hidden compensation for the just and the unjust. "Nor can any man ghesse how another Fares by an outward aspect taken from his Moveables, but must sleep with him & enter his bosom, which God doth; and can no doubt by

1. Advice, Second Part. pp. 185, 186.

slacking of Grief in one, and winding up Feares and Jealousies in another, make the world even. It being the Spring and intrinsick part of the watch that the work-man lookes after, and not the case, though it may possibly be gold, or some richer Materials, which the Rabble do usually cast their eyes upon."¹ In regard to supernatural things as in regard to the things of this world, the wise man takes precaution.

"Though the ways how he operates be beyond our fathome, and past finding out, why should not credulity rest the brinck of this Abyss (by all acknowledged the least dangerous) rather than hazard all hope of future beatitude, in the uncomfortable Gulfe of a retchlesse Atheism."²

Osborn's excuse for adopting reason as a guide in matters of faith is connected with his feeling for tolerance. He is intensely conscious of the sectarian difficulties that began to trouble Christianity with the coming of the Reformation. Reason is the only guide left: since neither the successors of St. Peter nor the judgment of princes or of the common people can be relied upon, in reason alone can there be found an adequate help in deciding religious questions, "Reason being all the Touchstone besides left in our hands, to distinguish this Gold from the dross, they pretend our Religion has contracted."³ Even Scripture cannot decide all difficulties, so that an ap-

1. Op.cit., pp.186,187.

2. Ibid., p. 188.

3. Advice, p. 168.

peal to reason is necessary. "Now if Faith be not allowed to be taken implicitly from the Authority of any Church, a freedom of choice, by consequence will result to all, by which Salvation must be wrought out: And in this wilderness of contention we have no better guide to follow than Reason, found the same for many thousands of years, though Beliefs hath been observed to vary every Age."¹ Believing, as a Protestant, that miracles have ceased, he continues his argument by saying that Reason alone is left to men in this age: other things beg belief, but it is reason alone that commands it. "All truth familiar unto mortals is only legible by the eye of Reason: Revelation, Prophecie, &c. being strangers now to flesh, and ever too high elevated for the perpetuall commerce of such weak Creatures, who may sometimes enjoy a glimmering of them, as the Northerne inhabitants do of the Sun in winter, not permanent longer than they are able to fan away the dark Clouds of infidelity, which dims their Light upon the absence of the Extasie."² The universality of reason, furthermore, proclaims it likeliest to be "the Oracles of the everliving God."³

In this conception of faith Osborn departs in two ways from traditional Christian theology. In the first place, when Osborn argues that man should believe on the hazard that if he does not believe, dire things may come to him, and because, after all, hope is pleasant in itself, he is anticipating the

1. Op.cit., p. 169.

2. Ibid., p. 170.

rather more modern argument of the agreeable delusion --the feeblest sort of apologetics. On the other hand, when Osborn bases faith on reason primarily, he is again departing from Christian theology in a serious manner. The definition of faith determined by the Council of Trent is one that Christians of all denominations will have little to object to: faith, according to this decree, is " an infused, supernatural habit inclining the intellect to firmly assent to the truths revealed by God and proposed by the Church, on account of the authority of God, the Revealer."¹

The kind of faith that Osborn has in mind, is not, in fact, orthodox Christian faith at all. Christianity has always, however, recognized that there is a kind of faith which is based utterly on reason --the faith of natural religion. Man can by the effort of his intelligence and the right use of his conscience arrive at certain fundamental articles of faith, such as the existence of God, His omnipotence and goodness, the necessity of prayer and of righteous living. Despite the attempts of the schoolmen, however, to show that other articles of belief, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Trinity, for example, could also be deduced from nature by simple logical principles, it has been generally held that for knowledge of these mysteries man is dependent on revelation, for trust in which a supernatural grace is necessary. The faith

1. Quoted by Kenelm Vaughan:The Divine Armory of Holy Scripture. St.Louis, Missouri, 1921, p. 254.

which rests on reason alone is the faith of deism. And it is this faith which Osborn seems to have. His remarks on Mohammedanism in his essay on the government of the Turks seem to indicate that such a belief is not very improbably his. He believes in the existence of a Creator to Whom we owe certain duties of worship, and he believes that the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth as well as peace within the hearts of men is dependent on religion. But beyond this it is hard to say what he believes. His essay concerning the Turks --altogether one of the most useful pieces for judging his religious temper¹--contains allusions to the "absurdities" of worship that Mahomed avoided-- "absurdities" which are clearly to be found, at least in the Roman and Greek churches, and from which the High Anglican ritual that Osborn seems elsewhere to favour is surely not entirely free. He takes especial delight, also, in pointing out that Christians have not especially distinguished themselves by superior virtue over the Turks. And, although he states clearly enough that the Mohammedan system is a clever piece of statescraft rather than a divine organization, in his preface he says that he is describing it in order to give English statesmen a hint as to how England should be "settled" ! Much as Osborn may counsel belief in God, human action should be based on prudence rather than piety, it seems. The non-interference of God in human destinies on earth, a point with which he is con-

1. In several respects Osborn in this work interestingly anticipates Gibbon.

cerned at the close of Advice to a Son. The Second Part, he again discusses in this essay. Among the Turks, "all hope of perfect Happinesse in this world is suppressed, and their Imaginations wholly engaged on that which is to come: By this, the feare of lapsing into grosser Idolatry, or profounder Atheisme, is prevented ... [the Mohameddians] assigning their Maker an higher employment then the attending or accomplishing our earthly desires..."¹

Another test of Osborn's religious position is his attitude toward Christian tradition. Abundant evidence has already been cited to show that in religion Osborn accepts tradition and authority as he does in no other province of thought. This fact in itself does not signify that he is insincere or inconsistent, for authority in religion is an entirely different matter from authority elsewhere--in literature, for instance. However much a man may admire the ancient writers, his conception of their authority is normally qualified by a recognition that, though they were exceptionally gifted men, they were subject to the failings of the natural intellect, and accordingly infallible only insofar as they were able to work out the truth by their own efforts. In religion, however, the notion of authority involves the working of a supernatural will, either upon a supreme pontiff, or upon a council; supernaturally guided, the Church, whether she be Roman or Anglican, cannot, as Osborn says, "be arraigned of

1. Political Reflections, pp. 16,17.

damnable error, without questioning that truth, which hath proclaimed her prooffe against the gates of Hell,"¹ such, at least, must necessarily be the position of any true authoritarian. The definition of faith given above, which refers all authority back to God, in no way prevents a person who subscribes to it, from being as skeptical as he pleases about authority in literature, government, and other matters, and yet claiming to have a firm religious faith. Traditionalism in religion is not the same thing as traditionalism in other provinces of thought.

Yet on such grounds Osborn cannot be acquitted of inconsistency. The fact that he recommends submission to authority for reasons of personal safety in this world, together with his setting up of reason as a guide to faith, demonstrates conclusively that he does not know the genuine authoritarianism of Christianity. Expediency in this life, adequate precaution for the next, rather than faith in the revelation of the Spirit, are his reasons for submitting to authority. If there is any acquittal for Osborn with regard to the inconsistency thus manifested, it must come from the disparity between philosophical principles and religious belief mentioned above. In all the practical concerns of life, in matters of education and morality, he rejects authority. It is only in religion, which for him has already assumed its

1. Advice, p. 148.

frequent modern aspect of a thought-category removed from life and the principles of action, that Osborn can be tolerant of tradition.

Even more important is the third test of Osborn's relation to Christianity. This lies in his interpretation of morality and ethical responsibility. Of prime significance is the matter of conscience. Orthodox Christianity did not place so much emphasis on the individual conscience as its Puritan descendants. Puritanism was in many respects a return to Old Testament moral standards, which in the absence of other recognized authority it interpreted in the light of individual conscience. Here Puritanism left its mark on the ordinary kind of Anglicanism, so that both systems burden the conscience with a definition of the law. Rome, on the other hand, assigns to the conscience the task of carefully evaluating the individual's departure from, or adherence to, a law defined in advance by infallible authority. But Osborn, in his unconscious reaction from all Christian belief, accepts in reality neither the Protestant nor the Catholic interpretation of the conscience. His most interesting discussion of the subject occurs in Advice to a Son, The Second Part, where he gives an interesting account of what he is tempted to believe about the doctrine of some Catholic teachers in this respect: "Those learned among the Catholikes do not with us look upon Conscience as A distinct quality or Naturall Indowment of Man, but meerly ac-

quired by Customs at the mediation of shame or Loss."¹ To them conscience is "but a meer bubble in the Imagination, which Feare and Hope by the assistance of Use, can blow like a glasse in what fashion or bignesse they please, shewing there, to the Life presented, good or bad according to the tincture a former suborned passion may have dipped them in."² The context seems to indicate that this view has a certain plausibility for Osborn.

An examination of other portions of Osborn's work confirms this suspicion. The explanation of his attitude lies in something deeper, however, than a technical definition of what conscience is. On at least one point Christianity has varied little in doctrine: that the universe contains a moral order which is inherent in it. Certain acts are very definitely sin, irrespective of their relations to circumstances. Often indeed, circumstances are taken into consideration in granting forgiveness or in mitigating the guilt of an offense. But the notion of the definable character of sin is clearly maintained in all Christian theology. Certain acts are connected with ethical values which are independent of time and place, sharing the permanent quality of Deity. Osborn, however, generalizes thus about sin: "All things, we stile Sin ... [lie] in the bowels of men, as Metals do in the Earth,

1. Advice. Second Part, p. 175.

2. Ibid., pp. 176, 177.

under an equal parity, till Policy, for the benefit of Commerce, stamps them with the image of the Devill, and on their Ranverse Punishment and Shame: No more proper to them by nature, than for Gold and Silver to bear the Impress and superscription of a Prince."¹ This passage comes in the middle of a section of advice concerning the proper conduct for a traveller. As might be expected, Osborn advises compliance with the customs of the country, and though he cautions his son that he should comply only "where Conscience and Reason give ...leave," the attitude he shows toward sin would give the former term dubious significance.

Indeed, his use of the word becomes almost ironical. In speaking of the wisdom of complying with religious authority he says that conscience is a tribunal "erected in our Soul, to detect our miscarriage, not to betray our well-being, and therefore subordinate not only to a superlative Authority, but also our owne honest, safe and wholeome conveniences."² A more theological discussion of conscience he presents in connection with comment on the religion of savages. At this point he speaks of the moral law in characteristic Christian fashion, saying that unbelievers who keep it are perhaps "within the compass of God's secret grace." Turning to conscience, however, he says that though it is a good guide, one should not only ask the "conscience, what is Truth, but give her full leisure to resolve thee,"³ the implication being once more that a

1. Advice, p. 88.

2. Ibid., pp. 162, 163.

3. Ibid., p. 173.

good witness should be able to testify for the accused as well as against him, as Osborn says elsewhere.

In the same section in the passage where he speaks of the supposed Catholic idea of conscience, he discredits all faith in conscience as an adequate guide in moral questions. Reason and affection can always find plausible excuses with which to suborn it. When conscience is disregarded, oaths become a trap, he admits, for their unpunished breaking leads atheists to feel confident that they shall not be punished, and Christians to be assured that they shall not be rewarded in this life. But immediately turning on his own argument, he says that when conscience is active but swayed by interest, it cannot make true judgment of fault or merit. And conscience, which Osborn considers a "passion", can be thus swayed. Accurate, intelligent analysis of self is accordingly possible for no man. Once again Osborn arrives at bitter disillusion with regard to human knowledge!

A further development of this trend of thought makes it possible to test Osborn's religious position in still another aspect--the question of tolerance. Since a man cannot through conscience judge himself, how much less able is he to judge others! exclaims Osborn. It is really from this failure of the critical powers that Osborn derives his generous tolerance. All quarrels between churches are based on an assumption that men have the ability to make accurate judgments. For Osborn, obviously, this assumption is fallacious. Accordingly, he has

an enormous charity for all creeds. With an intense interest in human passions and weaknesses of thought, Osborn sees the possibility of error in religion having the same external manifestations as truth. From the case of Martin Luther he draws the lesson of tolerance. For though Luther was undoubtedly a man who showed "sings of God's spirit", he occasionally went into error. We should, therefore, be generous to those who have "zeal kindled (though perhaps at the wrong end) [yet]...something resemble the first Messengers of Truth."¹

Superficially considered, such wide tolerance as Osborn shows is not foreign to the spirit of Christianity. Provision for the salvation of those who obey the moral law is recognized by orthodox theology. In addition to the baptism of water for those who know the doctrines of the Church there is the baptism of desire for those who strive for the truth and obey the dictates of conscience with regard to morality; even though they never hear of the true doctrine, they are saved by the grace bestowed on them because of their desire for the truth. Such a doctrine naturally leads to a tolerance which works no harm to the spiritual authority of the Church, since in no way it lowers the responsibility of those within the fold of knowledge.

Were there any reason to believe that Osborn's tolerance is founded on a recognition of this doctrine, one might still classify him as an adherent of historic Christianity.

1. Political Reflections, p. 228.

But his tolerance, like his idea of sin, is founded on a naturalistic conception of human society. Religions do not differ so much as they seem, he says. The religion of the Turks he discusses in a very matter-of-fact way, treating it as a natural development in the corporate life of mankind. He even makes it the basis of a generalization about all religion, Christianity not excluded. " Thus doth Religion run from one Meridian to another, thriving best at first; for after a long abode she so far sharpens and refines the spirits of men, as they are able to discover such Abuses and Errors, as may afford them a pretence to cut her own throat for what she possesses; when, God knows, it is not the Doctrine that is changed, but their Apprehensions."¹ The fact that Osborn is thus able to extend his objective method into religion

1. Political Reflections, pp. 50,51. The manner, also, in which Osborn connects religion and witchcraft is especially significant for what its revelation of a sinister relationship between Church, state, and superstition is. " What... [King James'] Judgement was of Witchcraft, you may, in part, find by his Treatise on that Subject, and Charge he gave the Judges, to be Circumspect in Condemning those, Committed by Ignorant Justices, for Diabolical Compacts. Nor had he concluded his Advice in a Narrower Circle, (as I have heard) Then the Denyal of any such operations, but out of Reason of State; and to gratifie the Church, which hath in no Age, thought fit to explode out of the common-people's minds, And Apprehension of Witchcraft. The greatest Miracles, now extant, making their Apparitions, in the Dark Corners of this clouded Imagination. Into Whose Cause I shall not presume further to peep; as esteeming it more Dangerous than Terrible." (Miscellany, pp.4,5.) The conclusion of the essay devoted to this subject ("On such as Condemn All they understand Not a Reason for ") runs as follows: " I shall make no Paraphrase, nor pursue the Argument further, to avoyd Prolixity, no less, then Offence. The Doctrine of such &c. being a Diana, out of Which, no small Profit is made, and Credit purchased, in reference to Opinions, otherwise Ridiculous, and Untenable." (Ibid., p. 9.)

argues for his essential disinterestedness. And it is from this attitude that his kind of tolerance proceeds. Although he never expressly denies the supernatural, he everywhere treats religion merely as a human institution with certain methods of accomplishing its earthly purpose. He is interested in the effectiveness of the methods, rather than in the moral relations to Deity that they express. So, too, his tolerance is occasioned not by altruism or by principle of doctrine, but by his feeling that fundamentally no man can be held responsible for what he believes, all religion being a matter of training.

In the instances, then, of all four of the tests proposed, Osborn shows a disparity between his real philosophy and the Christianity he professes, a disparity which is not inconsistency in the ordinary sense of the term, but which arises rather from the separation of philosophy and religion noted above. A John Evelyn or a Sir Thomas Browne would never have been betrayed into such admissions of weak faith, skeptical as Browne may have been at times; Osborn belongs with those who clung to the fringes of the Church only, with little joy in their religion. Finally, there should be added his own admission of the difficulties that prevented his adopting Christianity as more than a formally acknowledged code of belief. Speaking once more of conscience, he relates it to religion and confesses that to many of his contemporaries neither is any longer vitally significant in ethical questions.

" The sense of honour... [is]...supplying in divers persons the place of Conscience: Religion, in our daies, being so blended in Hypocrisy, that tis come to signify in Statesmen greater danger, than advantage." ¹ In another place he laments with apparently great sincerity of feeling the loss that the shaking of faith has brought to the world. Perfect freedom from worry, he says, is perhaps possible only in the Roman priesthood. With this joy of an absolute faith, pervading life with the comfort it brings, forever gone, Osborn turns elsewhere than to religion for his real guidance in life. "But now since the blood of the Saints together with their names are expunged from the Gates and Doores of the Sanctuary, Good works have lost their value, & nothing [is] ...more in esteem than new Opinions. Wherefore since in the absence of protection from the Altar, nothing remains without able to secure us quite from the sense of Oppression, let us turn our indeavors toward such remedies as Prudence and Philosophy are found to prescribe for us." ²

The philosophy toward which Osborn turned in preference to religion was not got from the ancient world, as were the philosophies of earlier men of the Renaissance. Osborn's real distaste for tradition and antiquity is manifested more than ever in his following a distinctly modern system of thought. That system was rationalism, a phase of the Renais-

1. Advice. Second Part, pp. 102, 103.

2. Ibid., pp. 36, 37.

sance spirit which before the seventeenth century was kept under control by the Humanists' love of the traditional ethics of the ancients. In his choice of a philosophy, accordingly, Osborn went much farther from Christianity than even the neo-pagans of Italy had gone. He turned to a system of thought which would, of course, fall into line with the policy of expediency that he cherished, although it might be said that he chose practicality as an ideal because it was dictated by his rationalism.

This appeal to reason, it should be noted, was in essence a proclamation that his rationalism was thoroughgoing. For purity of Logic (though not for the study of formal logic) he has great admiration, and he proclaims mathematics the highest science because of its rational basis. Yet his praise of reason did not stop with an acknowledgment that it was a sure tool for the mind. He applied it to many aspects of human life; and he acquired thoroughly the cynical spirit that such rationalism usually tends to bring about. Reason, as Osborn understood it, was a reason which limits itself to certain characteristics of experience and which tries to make these "do" for the whole of life. Osborn tried to understand everlasting questions in terms of his own epoch alone; and this effort is largely responsible for the tone of unhappy disillusionment that his works exhibit. More than many of his contemporaries does he show the utter ebbing of the Elizabethan love of life. In him the characteristic gloom of the seventeenth century, rarely lightened by cavalier wit, takes to it-

self a cynicism and a distrust of human nature that beyond mere wariness shows an irritated inability to understand the universe.

Osborn's distaste for tradition is in itself an evidence of his failure to obtain satisfaction from his philosophy. Among practical men antitraditionalism is always a latent tendency; but when a man of such evident intellectual power as Osborn turns against not only the formal tradition of learning but even against the graces of literature and art, there seems to be at work a powerful, directed reaction against some important stream of thought. Osborn's great reaction was against the Humanistic as well as against the romantic strains of the Renaissance, and involved an increased emphasis on the rationalistic phases of the same movement.

In addition to his animosity against learning, Osborn shows an equally great opposition to those aspects of life that are the more usual concerns of literature. Classifying all human feeling as "passion", he adopts the tone of bitter cynicism toward sentiment and sentimentality alike. His scant and perfunctory poems do little to dispel the impression gained from his advice about love and marriage. This section of the Advice to a Son has deservedly been one of the main points of interest in Osborn's works, and loses little of its effect through the renunciations of an appended apology "To the Women Readers". Marriage is for Osborn, like other institutions, the result of an unavoidable necessity occasioned by

civilized life. The love-instinct, he says, is implanted by Nature for the propagation of the species. In animals it assumes an entirely normal and understandable rôle, In human beings, on the other hand, it leads to many varieties of folly. " Our fellow Creatures, (the exacter Observers of the Dictates of Nature) promiscuously [bestow love] ...on every distinct Female of their respective Species; whereas Man, being restrained by a particular Choice, by the severity of Law, Custom and his own more stupendous Folly," is carried away by "the first apparition of an imaginary Beauty" , love causing " Madness in some Folly in all." ¹ Both the Church and the law connive at deceiving men into an acceptance of marriage. But such persuasion is superfluous, Osborn adds, for there are always fools enough to stock the world. Taken as an expression of the young Osborn (he admits this part of his work was written in his youth), the section on love and marriage reveals all of the moral obtuseness that was to characterize the Restoration, without the gayety, of that later time. It is typical of a period when that part of the Renaissance which produced sonnets was no more.

The passage comparing the love-instinct in animals with its counterpart in human beings is interesting in showing how Osborn anticipates in a limited, but significant way a later cycle in the history of philosophy. A person who is evidently worldly, and who therefore comes to look on spiritual values as more and more remote from his own life, who loses faith in his own spiritual nature, begins to look at the

1. Advice, pp. 48,49.

at the world with the half-open eyes of materialism. But sight and intellect do not die, though the eyes be partly shut and though the intellect be confined to a narrow province; as far as the worldly man can see, he sees with great clarity, and he becomes keenly aware of the sham and mockery that cling to human life. He is rationalistic, and therefore formulates with careful logic all that he sees. As a result the state, law, literature, art, religion -- all the institutions and branches of thought that deal with man's moral nature--are condemned. Brought to the point of suggesting a substitute for these things, he finds himself powerless, except to say that man himself is satisfactory; only the institutions and traditions are at fault. And then he easily enough accepts the ideas of the back-to-nature cults. All will be well if men will live like savages, or even like animals. How well Osborn illustrates this development later to be played out on a greater scale in eighteenth century France! Beginning with the rationalistic disgust with mankind and the ways of mankind, this train of thought ends by having nothing left to base its reconstruction upon except mankind: - but a highly ~~changed~~ sort of mankind. Worldliness, ennui with life, cold reason, these are eventually followed by a very simple, and very irrational emotionalism that seeks to avoid the problems of life altogether. Even though Osborn scarcely attains this last stage, various hints in the section on "Love and Marriage" and in other passages seem clearly enough to indicate the

trend of his thought.¹

Yet, much as rationalism may have embittered Osborn's life because its acceptance was not to him compatible with a real sense of religion or a normal sympathy with mankind, one can in terms of it work out the consistent body of philosophical belief that guided him. For in the maelstrom of seventeenth century thought the bark of rationalism was able to voyage forth boldly, when other ships were compelled to remain isolated in a safe harbor of seclusion. It was a kind of philosophy that could be very successful then, as far as the security of its possessors, and their ability to describe the times is concerned. For Osborn rationalism not only gave sanction to an expedient course of action, but also pointed out to him the position in which he stood. Among like-minded contemporaries regret for the faith of the Middle Ages and the beauty of the earlier Renaissance had turned to a cynical bitterness long before Osborn began the composition of his extant writings. But in Osborn's bitterness and dissatisfaction there was an element of thought that many others had not: the clear perception of the historical significance of what was going on. Several times he mentions the Reformation and the invention of printing as heralds of the downfall of the old order, and despite his contempt for antiquity there is regret for the times that are gone.

1. See above, p.143.

In fine, rationalism was for Osborn a useful, though limited, weapon of thought. Although it was by no means a telescope whereby he might discern clearly the prospects of the past and future, it served well as a compass to tell him in what direction he was going for the present. If he failed to develop his system of philosophy completely, it is still to his credit that he at least saw the world of his contemporaries as it needed to be seen. Although Osborn built upon rationalism a metaphysical system of belief, he did use it as a technique of thought. Accordingly, although he does not go so far as Hobbes in his materialism, he is certainly not very spiritual in his interpretation of life. For this reason he is all the more valuable to study as a seventeenth century figure, since he has affinities with various kinds of thought, and yet stands just far enough from each of them to view them with objectivity.

PART III
ADVICE TO A SON AS A LITERARY GENRE

PART III

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The literature of admonitory precept and instruction is, in a sense, an inevitable genre. The most obvious reason for its existence is its practical utility. Nothing could be more natural than that a genuine philosopher or even a much humbler thinker should, out of conceit or out of a genuine consciousness of the worth of his conclusions, set them down formally as advice to posterity. Such works offer a most convenient literary vehicle for the expression of philosophy. Cicero's Offices has as its raison d'être as much the presentation of his stoicism as the intended welfare of his son Marcus. Like the literary epistle, a book of advice gives a certain concreteness and immediate applicability to ideas that otherwise might fail to arouse interest because of unsatisfactory, insufficiently human expression.

Some such motive, one may be quite sure, must have inspired Francis Osborn to publish his most famous work. The fragmentary character of his advice might lead one, it is true, to think Osborn's first intention was merely to provide his son, as he says, with "marks to sail by" - a few of the less well known but necessary admonitions that he felt his son might not elsewhere have called to his attention.

But the systematic manner of the treatise might also be interpreted as indicating that Osborn may very definitely have had the intention, not of providing his son with a continuous, complete set of instructions for living, but of setting down ideas and reflections that would startle contemporary society. There is much that tends to justify this latter interpretation. The general tone of the work suggests, of course, Bacon's apothegmatic condensation of thought. But there is in addition a challenging, almost a belligerent, manner, as though the author had^a tolerably clear idea of who would be shocked and who would be pleased. Although Osborn's other works may in many instances be more systematic in their treatment of certain subjects, it is in Advice to a Son that one finds the completest expression of his ideas. The academic instinct was not very strong in Osborn, and he did not care to set down his opinions in a well-articulated, logically planned discourse, as did his friend Hobbes. The advice genre, which had already enjoyed a considerable vogue in England, was conveniently close at hand, and in looking for an attractive, popular medium of expression Osborn could have chosen none better.

Indeed, the rather disorganized quality of Advice to a Son is a valuable hint when one is attempting to trace its literary affiliations. Apart from its connexion with simple books of precepts, it shows definitely traces of relation to the Italian courtesy books and their English adaptations and imitations. Some of the subjects Osborn treats with

great brevity, such as fencing and poetry, matters in which he challenged tradition by his matter-of-fact Puritan opinion, one might almost say had been included only because custom demanded that such matters should be dealt with in a book of advice. But such subjects, which originally were important aspects of the general notion of courtesy, are for Osborn matters of scant import that can be dismissed by a slight and scornful notice.

Few works show more clearly than Advice to a Son the desintegration that had taken place in the literary type of the courtesy book. The philosophical temper of the sixteenth century in Italy, where the genre had originated, and that of the seventeenth century in England, where it was assimilated into other literary traditions, were two aspects of the Renaissance that were vastly different in the influence they tended to exert on ideas of proper and advantageous conduct. The desintegration of the courtesy book in England is in large part due to purely national conditions. "The fact is, there was less apparent need in England than in Italy for the perfect courtier. In small southern states there was a general call for service, at court, in diplomatic business, or in war. But in the larger life of England men left school to teach or preach, to manage their estates or follow one of the professions. Furthermore, as men of letters outgrew the financial dependence on the nobility that hampered early humanists like Budé, their attitude

toward the nobility was altered. Consequently the court training lost its hold. Naturally, therefore, the old book of courtesy desintegrated, and its parts were assimilated by writings of other kinds."¹

In many ways, however, this change in the status of the type was due not so much to conditions in England as to certain inevitable trends in Renaissance literature, which, complicated as they may have been by special qualities of the English temper and national tradition, are nevertheless distinctly connected with the fundamental thought-habits of the Renaissance wherever it appears. It has been shown above that Osborn's rationalism, as far as it went, was the result of carrying certain Continental ideas of thought and religion farther than many English thinkers had at the time dared to carry them. And just as the intellectual content of Osborn's work is significant in showing the philosophical attitude that was to grow out of the Renaissance, so is the form of Advice to a Son significant in showing how the character of some kinds of literature tended to change as time went on.

It is a far cry from Castiglione's Book of the Courtier to Osborn's Advice to a Son, not only in the conception of courtiership that the two works reveal, but also in the attitude towards literature of each writer. A comparison of the two works is valuable for the light it throws on the changing temper of the Renaissance as it followed its destiny

1. Elbert N.S. Thompson: Literary Bypaths of the Renaissance. New Haven, 1924. pp.152,153. I am indebted to Mr. Thompson's chapter on "Books of Courtesy" for many suggestions in the following pages.

on the Continent and in England.

In the first place, The Book of the Courtier itself is in a sense the product of the local condition as much as of the Renaissance; it is the result of the intimate and cultivated humanistic society that flourished in the small states of Italy. The definition of conduct in such an environment would naturally be imbued with an ideal, philosophical spirit. And this philosophical spirit, which was nourished by the rediscovered ancient literatures, had not yet been troubled by the vexing individualism which soon permeated all Renaissance thought and action. In general quality, The Book of the Courtier retained much of the sublime impracticalness of the Middle Ages. One could fancy it easily as The Mirror of Courtiership, were it not for its obvious indebtedness in form and thought to the dialogues of Plato. It was concerned with the presentation of an ideal that was sponsored by cultivated Italian society, and this alone it accomplished; the practical achievement of the ideal, the method of educating the courtier, is neglected. Despite the abundance of concrete illustrations that Castiglione uses, his work remains an ideal discussion, whose practical value consists not in the specific instructions that it offers but in the richness of the inspiration it possesses, in its intellectual subordination of individual whim to the larger purposes of religion and philosophy. Like any mediæval writer, Castiglione assumed a universal moral law, a

great ethical generalization, which the concrete details of life are used to illustrate.

Castiglione's work, accordingly, expresses a philosophical attitude which the Middle Ages, in a slightly modified form, had continued from Plato, but which the Renaissance was finally to reject: the cooperation of logical inquiry and spiritual affirmation, which was Socrates' great contribution to Western civilization.¹ The revival of Greek literature had nearly everywhere renewed the strength of scepticism as an intellectual device, and in some cases, such as Castiglione, had also, by adding the weight of an alien authority (Plato), strengthened the principle of spiritual affirmation that in the Middle Ages had been developed on a purely Christian basis.

In other cases, however, it was ancient skepticism alone that was adopted, and spiritual affirmation was suppressed. The effect of this trend in Renaissance thought upon the courtesy books is closely connected with matters that are historical rather than philosophical. The courtesy books of men like Castiglione were written with the idea of increasing the spiritual attainments of a society which was already cultivated; they were not mere books of etiquette. A certain practicality, however, they could not help having. Both in Italy and in the countries where the courtesy book

1. See the opening chapters of Platonism, by Paul Elmer More. Princeton, 1917.

was to penetrate as a literary type, nationalism was fast increasing. The courtier of Castiglione, accordingly, is not to be accomplished or virtuous only for his own sake, but for that of his prince, whom he is to counsel and inspire. Not always, however, was the new spirit of nationalism connected with ideals of virtue and increased intellectual activity. Such a book as Machiavelli's The Prince shows clearly enough how the idea of national solidarity, the desire for a stable government, might come to be the enemy of traditional morality. To a court fashioned on Machiavelli's pattern courtiers would still be useful, and a corresponding ideal of the courtier could be developed. At any rate, a conception of conduct based on utilitarian ideas began to assume importance in opposition to one based on Platonic philosophy. The decline of the importance of the notion of spiritual affirmation as a concomitant of healthy scepticism tended naturally to shift men's attitudes at least towards the practical, and not seldom towards the unscrupulous. The ideal of elegant behaviour changed correspondingly. For Castiglione good manners and social ease were the garment of spiritual greatness; for Della Casa they were the proper clothing of social success; for Machiavelli they became the cloak of advantageous unscrupulousness.

Giovanni della Casa's Galateo, in fact, represents a variation of the genre which was bound to appear at some

time or other, the book of etiquette, which is distinct from the book of courtiership proper. Its attitude seems to be not that spiritual development is to be disregarded, but that manners should be developed for their own practical usefulness, not as a screen for villany, but simply for the worldly benefit they are capable of conferring. This innocent, bourgeois interest in social refinement, however, combined with the conception of the courtier as a useful governmental figure, tended to change courtiership from a philosophical to a purely utilitarian matter.¹

And it is the utilitarian conception of courtiership which easily led to the development of courtesy books into simple manuals of advice. As long as the genre retained the philosophical characteristics of The Book of the Courtier it retained the form of an extended general discussion of important aspects of life; but once its purpose became utilitarian, the genre tended to assume the form of isolated bits of counsel - the most practical kind of literature imaginable. This degeneration of the type is only the logical result of the abstraction from it of its original spiritual purpose.

The new genre, moreover, filled a need which was itself the result of developments in Renaissance culture parallel to those that have been outlined above. A book of advice tends to be an individual thing written by one man to another;

1. For information concerning Galateo I am indebted to Mr. Thompson article cited above. Galateo was translated in 1576 into English. Mr. Thompson points out its similarity to Chesterfield's letters in general tone.

even if, as is the case with many books of the type, it is intended ultimately for the general public good, its counsels must be sufficiently original and fresh to merit attention. Osborn is here a good case in point, for his advice, though it deals with commonplace subjects could very definitely not have come "straight from the lips of Polonius."¹ Now if one looks in age-old tradition for pieces of fatherly counsel, it is only too easy to find great quantities of suitable platitudes that are from a moral point of view often good advice, but from the literary standpoint difficult material to set down with freshness. In some periods, indeed, such literary expressions may be rather superfluous, since the principles of morality have been generally agreed upon by mankind in general. Such, for instance, was the case in the Middle Ages, when moral teaching was rather uniform throughout the Christian world. When, however, men's repose in the moral precepts of an active teaching institution like the mediaeval Church is broken, argument over moral matters breaks out afresh, and definition rather than the inculcation of virtue becomes the function of didactic literature. Further, when men lose trust in the tradition that is handed from century to century, they revert to an adherence to that simple prototype of all tradition, the precept handed from generation to generation, from father to son. The greater moral and religious confusion one finds in a given period,

1. This characterization of Osborn's advice is by A.A. Tilley, writing in The Cambridge History of English Literature, Cambridge, 1927. vol. viii, p. 377.

therefore, the more frequent will books of advice tend to become. Cicero's Offices appeared in such a time of moral confusion, and the advice books of seventeenth century England, by their very number offer strong evidence for the truth of the principle here indicated. ¹

In England, more perhaps than in any other country, was felt the need for direct, immediate practical advice. For in England the Renaissance did not reach its greatest strength until its skeptical and rationalistic elements had already acquired considerable vigor. Failure to decide what form of Christianity should be the national religion had already over a great many years been weakening the authority of the Church and had been throwing men on their own moral resources. Puritanism, which had abundant moral convictions but was deficient in authoritative unity, prepared the ground for the atheism of the latter part of the seventeenth century, since by rejecting the intellectual and cultural tradition of orthodox Christianity, it tended unwittingly to play into the hands of continental rationalism, which began by attacking the Roman Church, but which eventually became the foe of all religion. From the religious turmoil of seventeenth-century England emerged, accordingly, at least two types of Renaissance individualism. The first, unorthodox but deeply religious, was the individual-

1. Note, further, such a work as William Cobbett's Advice to Young Men, which grew out of its author's revolt against and distrust of conventional society.

ism of Luther's private judgment. The second, rationalistic and worldly, was the individualism of the Italian skeptics, transmitted to England through French writers.

As might be expected, there is a kind of advice book that corresponds to each of these. That the genre should appeal to Englishmen generally seems rather obvious when one remembers their national temper. The natural piety of the English, combined with a certain lack of mysticism but with a strong regard for practical morality, would find suitable expression in simple manuals of devotion and sober precept. Such works as Nicholas Breton's The Mother's Blessing, his An Olde Mans Lesson and a Young Man's Love, William Martyn's Youth's Instruction, and John Norden's (?) The Fathers Legacie, With precepts Morall, and Prayers Diuine, Fitted for all sorts, both yong and old, exemplify this class of books.¹

Intermediate between them and the type of advice book to which Advice to a Son belongs, the shrewd, worldly counsel of men like Sir Walter Raleigh, stand a few works which have some of the characteristics of the latter type, but which in general trend belong rather with the pious works of the religious advisers. The most outstanding example of these is King James' Basilikon Doron, which, as it natural from the scholarly quality of its author's interests, reflects

1. For these titles, and for much information incorporated into the following pages I am indebted to W. Lee Ustick's article "Advice to a Son: A Type of Seventeenth Century Courtesy Book." Studies in Philology XXIX (July, 1932), 409-411.

considerably Castiglione's idea of nonchalance, proving that the ancestry of the advice book was still evident. James puts great emphasis on religion, and despite his hostility to Puritans wrote a book that in many respects a Puritan would not have been ashamed to call his own, as W. Lee Ustick points out.¹ Pagan ethics and Christian doctrine form the basis of its moral philosophy. Like its ultimate Italian prototypes, it attempts to cover the fields of clothing, sports, and general social demeanor; and these matters it refers to a religious basis as well as a utilitarian one. The loftiness of Castiglione's ideal courtier is absent, but the work has the simple, straightforward piety and good sense which in English thought often took the place of the more high-flying virtues.

Closely connected with the religious spirit that was manifest in some of the seventeenth-century advice books was an attitude which was in some senses the very opposite of Castiglione's. Many of the popular counsellors of the day, instead of recommending the court, as did Cleland,² as the best place to learn manners and true gentility, decry the demoralizing influence of court life. Men like Ascham, Mulcaster, and Milton, all of whom wrote works on education, object to the training youth receives at the court.

1. op.cit.

2. See above, p. 158.

Strangely enough, Osborn, who gives abundant advice about the proper procedure with regard to persons of eminence, and who might be classified with those who show an interest in the manners of the courtier, was also opposed, like many Puritan and religious writers, to court life as the proper environment for anyone who valued his character and peace of mind. But with Osborn this distaste comes not so much from disgust with the possible immorality of courts (much as he is aware of that aspect of the question), as from his realization of the folly of trying to make a living or a name for oneself at court. His naturally cautious mind, too, recognized the dangers of the courtier's life. In general tone, a certain Puritan distaste for unnecessary elegance may be responsible for Osborn's attitude in this matter.

The second great class of advice books, then, to which Osborn's belongs, was that which had little or no religious quality, but confined itself to the most practical kind of advice based on a philosophy of expediency. This naturally represents the greatest departure from the Italian courtesy books, since it presupposes a pessimistic evaluation of mankind, and is thoroughly materialistic in its conception of the value of manners and good conduct. Osborn's somewhat hurried comment on the subjects usually elaborated in courtesy books shows that even here there was a survival of the early form, even though the consciousness of such subjects

is confined to a definite reaction against the older ideas.

The immediate continental literary counterpart of the worldly kind of advice book seems to have come from France, where there appeared such works as Du Refuge's Traité de la Cour (1616?). As the century grew older the increased connexions with French court life that the Cavaliers were engaged in must have led to a general introduction into England of the Parisian idea of the courtier, which has succeeded the older Italian idea. In 1722 there appeared in London a volume entitled Instructions for Youth, Gentleman and Noblemen, consisting of reprints of four treatises that had been popular during the seventeenth century. In addition to Raleigh's Instructions to His Son, and to Posterity and Burleigh's Precepts (designated in this volume as The Lord-Treasurer Burleigh's Advice to a Son)¹, it contains The Instructions of Cardinal Sermonetta, To His Cousin Petro Castano and Walsingham's Manual of Prudential Maxims, For Statesmen and Courtiers. These last pieces are both of them translations of continental works, and appear to have been known in England long before this publication. The first work, although it gives distinctly worldly advice, bordering at times on a rather doubtfully ethical shrewdness, makes some attempt to justify the social procedures it suggests, and is careful to define some kind of moral distinction. The other

1. For a full discussion of this work see Appendix A.

work, however, which seems to be of Spanish origin, while it admits that a moral man would never engage in such activity, described all of the trickery and deceit that could be employed in the court. Works like this must have had a great influence in shaping Osborn's opinions of court life, and in contributing to his pessimistic evaluation of human nature generally.¹

The general characteristics of the second group of advice books, then, are practicality, unscrupulousness, time-serving, and the kind of caution that comes from distrusting mankind everywhere. Religion receives mention, of course, but the disillusionment that the religious troubles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought to England had penetrated deeply into the minds of many thoughtful Englishmen, and had a counterpart in a further disillusionment with regard to government, friendship, love, and human nature generally. The advice that these books give, therefore, is not an advice designed to bring its recipient close to an absolute and ideal perfection, for what this is writers of such works would not and could not say; it was an advice intended to keep away from men the most obvious causes for pain and discomfort. To get along as best one could was the hope of these writers, just as to live gloriously and magnanimously had been the hope of Castiglione.

1. For a full discussion of these works, and for further comment on the courtier manuals in general, see Appendix B.

Because of its closer relation to Osborn's work, as well as because of its own intrinsically greater literary importance, this kind of advice book is of greater interest for the purposes of the present discussion than the more pious type of the genre. An excellent example of the extremely practical, ethically callous advice book is the ninth Earl of Northumberland's Advice to His Son.¹ This was written at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. It appears to be the work of an experienced, thoroughly educated, and well cultivated man, but is entirely lacking in all religious sentiment, even of the purely conventional kind. Its not being intended for publication may account for its frankness in treating the evil aspects of human nature, and for its omission of the usual pious conventionalities.²

In content Northumberland's Advice is closely related to later example of the genre. In form, however, it is a continuous discourse, broken into two parts; most of the

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1. For a full discussion of this work see Appendix C.
 2. Osborn's little couplet, "Now You are Taught to Live, there's nothing I/ Esteem worth Learning but the way to Die," with which he closes the earlier portion of Advice to a Son is really an excellent commentary on the relative importance of religion in comparison with that of worldly wisdom, since it admits that "learning to die" has not been included in the advice, and therefore is, after all, perhaps not so very important. Northumberland does not even include a pious epilogue of the kind that Osborn has before this couplet.

advices, on the other hand, tend to be fragmentary in character, being composed of a series of short essays, as is Raleigh's Instructions to his Son, and to Posterity, or of a series of loosely connected statements arranged in groups according to subject-matter, as is the first part of Osborn's Advice. It has been suggested above that this form is to some extent due to the degeneration of the courtesy book, due to its being changed from a continuous, philosophically integral discourse into a series of short precepts. But this fragmentary form suggests another source for the advice genre that cannot be neglected.

This source, the wisdom literature of the Hebrews, is, in fact very valuable for the light it sheds on the fundamental nature of the genre. The closest parallels to the advice books in ancient literature are to be found in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus, and The Wisdom of Solomon. The great importance of this similarity becomes especially apparent when one remembers that Ecclesiasticus, as a matter of fact, is largely written in the form of advice to a son. Like the later examples of the type, Ecclesiasticus is written in the imperative mood: "My sonne, defraude not the poore of his liuing, and make not the needy eies to waite long." ¹ And mingled with the precepts there is, just as in Osborn's Advice, philosophical comment and explanation. Osborn's Advice, indeed, is as distinctly apothegmatic as it

1. Ecclesiasticus 4:12.

could be. It depends for its effectiveness on a style often resembling the Hebraic proverb couplet. For example, "Propose not them for patterns, who make all places rattle, where they come, with Latine and Greek; For the more you seem to have borrowed from Books, the poorer you proclaim your naturall Parts, which only can be properly called yours."¹ ~~With Osborn~~ ~~owne.~~ ¹ ~~Enphism~~ only lately dead, and with the character sketch flourishing in his day, there was abundant reason why Osborn should adopt a style that was full of contrasts and depended for its vigor on the skillful balancing of two related parts of a thought, or on the amplification or restatement of a proverb. The seventeenth century loved "witty" rhetoric, a device which found its way even into the pulpit; and a man of Osborn's spirit, cynical and worldly, would have perhaps an additional reason for saying what he had to say in terms of pointed maxims that were like the swift thrust of a rapier or, sometimes, of a short, blunt sword.

The similarity of the work of the cynical Osborn and Raleigh to that of the venerable and pious Jesus Sirach, strangely enough, has a philosophical basis. One must remember in this connexion the character of the wisdom literature. As Professor Moulton has pointed out in The Literary Study of the Bible,² the very term "wisdom" has an especial significance which distinguishes the books with which it is ordinarily connected from other portions of Scripture. The name "wis-

1. Advice, p.14.

dom" suggests "that its literature will have a practical bearing on human conduct. A great part of such writings is made up of specific observations or precepts in matters of social and family life, or business management, public policy, and general self-government. And where such works as Ecclesiastes or the Wisdom of Solomon are occupied in interpreting history, or reading the riddle of life, they make it clear that the argument is followed with a constant reference to the bearing of the whole on conduct. It is only when a comparison is made with the kindred department of Prophecy that we see the right of Wisdom literature to be classified under the head of Philosophy, the organ of reflection. Prophecy also is concerned with conduct, but it starts always with a Divine message, on which all that it contains is based. Of course Wisdom is in harmony with the revelation contained in Law and Prophecy, but it never appeals to it. The sayings of the Wise come to us only as the result of their own reflections, in combination with the general tradition of Wisdom."¹

Because of this difference between it and prophecy, the philosophical importance of the Wisdom literature is easily forgotten, as, by Fowler, for instance, in his Literature of Ancient Israel, who glibly remarks about Ecclesiasticus that "the general observations of Ben-Sirach

1. Richard G. Moulton: The Literary Study of the Bible. Boston, 1896. pp.255,256.

do not concern themselves with problems more perplexing than the best way to get along smoothly and honestly in the world as it is."¹ The distinction between the Wisdom books and prophecy is made clear when one remembers that inspiration and revelation are not identical. Those who identify the two processes would discount human reason entirely, with the result that the wisdom literature, because of its practicality, seems to them superficial and superfluous as a part of Scripture. The consensus of Hebrew and Christian tradition, however, agrees that the proportion of revelation varies in different parts of the Bible, but that the whole is inspired. The wisdom books, accordingly, can be considered the products of inspired reason, and therefore can be more easily considered by the methods used in treating non-canonical philosophies. They are, in many respects, exceedingly realistic: they disentangle truth from the tangled skeins of experience, and then state it in terms of that experience. One might call them the skeptical parts of Holy Writ, for many passages of them reveal the temporary bitterness and disillusion that, whether or not it be ultimately compensated as it is in the wisdom books, is generally a characteristic symptom of realistic, clear thinking about human life.²

1. Henry Thatcher Fowler: A History of the Literature of Ancient Israel. New York, 1922. p.353.

2. Such a realistic perception of what man is like untouched or imperfectly touched by spiritual regeneration of some kind is by no means abandoned in the New Testament, Apostolic enthusiasm for mankind is based not on a naive, un-

In this connexion once again the problem of the relationship of skepticism to faith becomes highly significant. The wisdom books are a clue to its solution, or, at any rate, to the statement of some men's reconciliation of these ways of thought.¹ Jesus Sirach very definitely does not merely generalize on "the best way to get along smoothly and honestly in the world as it is"; such an attitude would be an only slightly modified opportunism, and the whole spirit of the book is opposed to this sort of conduct. Despite its practicalness, the work teaches a lesson far more elevated than any of the simple matters of conduct it inculcates: it preaches the necessity of inner integrity, and shows how this will encounter the life of the world. The honest man need not be afraid of life: despite the wickedness of mankind he can look forward to considerable happiness and contentment on earth. But this happiness and contentment is not to be sought nor to be obtained in material prosperity, nor even in a calm life as the world conceives it. It will come rather

thinking faith in the fundamental goodness of man, but on the good possibilities of human nature when modified by grace and reason. Any philosophy or religion which is based on an emotional assumption that the imperfections of mankind need only to be overlooked in order to be destroyed is fundamentally opposed to Christianity.

1. The non-prophetic character of the books should, in fact, lead one to expect that the skeptical point of view will be answered, and, further, will actually be used as part of the religious argument. Huxley once said he could gather a grammar of skepticism from Newman's works. Similarly Heinrich Heine called Ecclesiastes "the Canticles of Skepticism", while Franz Delitzsch thought it was entitled to the name of the Canticles of the Fear of God." (Haupt, in The Book of Ecclesiastes, quoted by Fowler, op.cit., p.341.)

from the ability the honest man has of enjoying the good things of life with a clear conscience and of bearing the evil things of life with fortitude. No matter how fully he realizes the evils of the present life, the wise and virtuous man can find in it satisfaction and peace. Wisdom and virtue, indeed, are for the author of Ecclesiasticus identical. The wise man is the man who knows and loves the Torah, the law and the teaching of God, that is, wisdom. He strives to apply it in his daily concerns: he will not needlessly get himself into difficulties, and if difficulties come, he bears them understandingly and resolutely.

When, then, arises the practical character of the book? one might ask. In the first, place, the author is concerned with a presentation of life in this world rather than the next. He is attempting to prove that loyalty to the divine law is a source of contentment even on this side of the grave; he therefore draws a portrait of the wise man as distinguished from the foolish and wicked man. Second, Ecclesiasticus, like all the wisdom literature, approaches moral law to some extent from the sceptical side. The wisdom literature continues the train of thought that was started in the book of Job: "the rewards sought by men are not always given in direct proportion to the wisdom and virtue of the seeker."¹ The wisdom books are efforts towards the reconciliation of revealed truth with this experience. Like Socrates,


1. Fowler, op. cit., p.337.

the teachers of wisdom believe that truth is approached by active doubt as well as by active faith. And just as in the case of the courtesy books centuries later a decline of spiritual affirmation is symptomized by practicalness, so in the wisdom literature the desire to supplement spiritual affirmation by scepticism led to an emphasis on practical matters.

So intimate is the relationship that exists between the ideas and the form of the wisdom book that before going on with a more detailed comparison of the genre with the advice book, one should say something about the history of the form. The importance of the wisdom books as a literary influence in English writing of the Renaissance is well recognized by Professor Moulton, who says, "There is a whole literature of essays in the Wisdom books of the Bible and the Apocrypha. They are not essays in the more modern sense which the English reader associates with the name of Lord Macaulay: but they rather represent the oldest type of such compositions, to which contributions were made by Bacon and Montaigne, by Feltham and by the author of the Microcosmography. Indeed, there can be no doubt that these writers (Montaigne excepted) owed largely to the influence of Ecclesiasticus and kindred books the sententiousness of their style and the asyndeton of their sentences."¹ The significant relationship to Osborn becomes apparent when one remembers his expressed admiration for Bacon and Solomon.

1. pp.cit., p.267.

Moulton represents the development of the various literary types exhibited in wisdom literature by the following ingenious diagram.¹



The significant thing to notice here is that all the literary types which are represented spring fundamentally from the "unit proverb." And if one examines proverbs in general one finds that they are usually simple, practical statements of the less profound truths of life.² Their origin is not al-

1. Ibid., p.260.

2. A further striking confirmation that the advice book develops easily out of simple proverbs is to be found in Irish literature. The development here is on many respects similar to the Hebrew, and may in fact be another instance of Hebrew influence. The similarity of the "Triads of Ireland" to characteristic manners of expression of the wisdom literature is strikingly obvious, and Kuno Meyer believes that "the model upon which the Irish triads, tetrads, pentads, &c., were formed is to be sought in those enumerative sayings - Zahlensprüche, as the German technical term is - of Hebrew poetry to be found in several books of the

ways specifically religious and one is tempted to speculate whether they might not be the kind of moral teaching mankind resorts to when religion and philosophy fail to provide an adequate code of moral or judicious conduct. This is just the situation, it will be remembered, that calls forth the advice book. The impulse to supplement or to reinterpret traditional teachings is, of course, rather general at all times, but crises in the moral and religious life of the people augment the tendency and stress the individual character of the advice that is given.¹

The wisdom literature shows this same individualistic tendency. Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and Ecclesiasticus were written between 332 and 168 B.C. - a period not distinguished for political quiet. As is clear enough from the wisdom books, the dangerous qualities of rulers were not left to seventeenth century England to discover. Advice to stay away from persons of great power, to walk warily if one cannot avoid their presence, is abundant in the wisdom literature, as in the advice books, and for the same reason, the corruption of government and the political disturbances of the times. But deeper than these difficulties of Palestine were the spiritual difficulties of the Jewish people. The situation was,

Old Testament." And he quotes passages from Ecclesiasticus and Proverbs to prove his point. (Royal Irish Academy, Todd Lecture Series, vol. xiii, The Triads of Ireland, ed. by Kuno Meyer. Dublin, 1906. pp. xii-xiv.) Among the Irish, gnomic literature apparently took most readily the form of such ~~elaborative~~ **proverbs**. It is interesting, therefore, that there existed in ancient Ireland a class of literature corresponding to the advice genre, which shows here again its develop-

indeed, in many points similar to that of Europe at the time of the Renaissance. After Alexander's conquest the process of Hellenization began, and came to its climax in the Maccabean struggles. That is, Hebrew culture was put on the defensive against a foreign culture, just as European culture was put on the defensive against the same invasion centuries later.¹ During the centuries immediately preceding the birth of Christ faith and morals among the Jews were disturbed. Confidence in the sacrificial system of the Temple was already shaken², and a mere appeal to traditional faith and practice was accordingly insufficient: therefore the wisdom literature, with its approach of religious through practical life, arose. For its materials this literature naturally drew upon the traditional body of proverbs - the reasonable propositions of common sense and popular shrewdness - and also upon the wise sayings of the learned philosophers. The wonderfulness of the divine law was to be demonstrated in

ment from the proverb. "Among the gnomic literature of ancient Ireland," says Meyer, "the instructions given by princes to their heirs, by tutors to their disciples, or by foster-fathers to their sons form a group by themselves." (Ibid., vol. xv, The Instructions of King Cormac Mac Airt, ed. by Kuno Meyer, p. v.)

1. Ecclesiasticus was, in fact, written with a definite anti-Hellenic spirit: "The mass of information which the book contains regarding Jewish religion, thought, and ethics, during a period for which we do not otherwise possess such information, marks it out as a work of high importance. The writer evidently intended to offer to his people a kind of text-book to which men and women might have recourse for guidance in almost every conceivable circumstance of life. He does this, however, with the primary object of setting in clear light the superior excellence of Judaism over Hellenism. In a sense, therefore, Ecclesiasticus may be regarded as an apologetic work, inasmuch as it aims at combatting the rising influence of Greek thought and culture among the Jews." (W.O.E. Oesterley in the introduction to Ecclesiasticus (The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges) Cambridge, 1912. p.xxiv.)

2. Ibid., p.xxxii.

terms of common sense as well as in terms of philosophy. The situation is again parallel to that of seventeenth-century England, where, as has been said above, there was a tendency to develop a type of literature that gave brief, apothegmatic advice, isolated and terse, proverbial and epigrammatic. It is interesting that the seventeenth century, too, should be the century in which the essay assumed form in the English language, just as the period of the wisdom literature was the time of its development in Hebrew.

That the advice were, therefore, in general spirit similar to the ancient wisdom literature, is clear enough. But there is a connexion between the two genres that can be postulated on more palpable ground than only historical parallel. A careful examination of the advice books shows that they owe a large and direct debt to the wisdom books, especially to Ecclesiasticus. This debt, to be sure, is not discoverable in terms of general philosophical spirit in the case of the worldly advices, but rather in the very subjects chosen for advice, in manner of phrasing, and in shrewd knowledge of human nature.¹

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1. Notice that Heydon calls Osborn's advice "a diseased piece of an Apocriphe." (Advice to a Daughter, 1658, p.3.) On 22 June, 1614 there was entered into the Stationers' Register a book called "BATHSHEBAE's Instructions to her sonne LEMUEL or an exposition vpon the last chapter of the proverbs by John Dod and William Hynde. In 1597 Thomas Middleton had published The Wisdom of Solomon Paraphrased (See Middleton's Works, ed, by A.H.Bullen. London, 1886. vol. viii, pp.137-297.) These are all instances proving the interest in the wisdom literature and its connexion with advice books in the years preceding Osborn's greatest writing activity.

The most remarkable parallel between Ecclesiasticus and an advice book is that offered by Walter Raleigh's Instructions to his Son, and to Posterity.¹ Any such comparison must be entered into warily, because the advice genre obviously will have certain favourite hackneyed themes that all the givers of counsel will use. Yet, the fact that the fundamental spirit of a writer like Raleigh is so vastly different from that of a writer like the author of Ecclesiasticus makes it somewhat easier to establish a relationship, since it is men who are writing in a similar spirit who may unconsciously say the same thing; when two men writing from a different point of view say similar things the probability of direct borrowing is much greater.

Raleigh's advice seems to be a strange mixture of ruthless worldliness and of simple, practical piety. One recalls immediately Osborn's defence of Raleigh ^{against} ~~against~~ the charge of atheism.² That Raleigh is obviously disillusioned, that his pious remarks may be little more than a conventional close to an advice book, is clear enough. It seems reasonable, however, in the light of the resemblances to wisdom literature which the advice genre shows in its social background, to find in Raleigh's pious remarks something more than a mere submission to contemporary convention.

In the wisdom literature there is something of a para-

1. See Appendix D.

2. Cf. p. 229.

dox in that the author will arrive at ^othoroughly religious conclusions from evidences gathered by approaching his problem in a worldly fashion. Raleigh, like Osborn, quotes Solomon with evident approval, and seems to have drunk deep at the well of the wisdom literature. He quotes also from Proverbs, and at the end of Chapter VIII, from Ecclesiasticus without even acknowledging the source: "Make not the hungry soul sorrowful, defer not thy Gift to the Needy, for if he curse thee in the Bitterness of his Soul, his prayers shall be heard of him that made him."¹ And it is to Ecclesiasticus that Raleigh's counsel^s, indeed as those of the advice books generally, have the greatest similarity. The easiest way to demonstrate this is to abstract from Ecclesiasticus all of the material that is chiefly theological or locally Hebraic in character; what is left is still a good-sized manual of practical advice, just such as a father might give to his son. And for nearly all of the principle kinds of subject matter that Raleigh has in his advice, something corresponding can be found in Ecclesiasticus.

For instance, Raleigh devotes a whole chapter to friendship, a subject that Jesus Sirach mentions again and again, in warnings as to the choice of friends, in admonitions concerning duties toward friends. The whole question of the restraint of speech, one of the most noteworthy ideas in Ecclesiasticus receives extensive discussion in Raleigh. The advice not to go surety for anyone is played up significantly in both works. And Raleigh's comment on mercy and justice toward the

1. Ecclesiasticus iv:5,6.

poor, is, of course, directly taken from the same source.

Taken as a whole, the works of Raleigh and of the author of Ecclesiasticus cover about the same fields of interest in approximately the same proportions. If the similarity were not so marked and if Raleigh's subject matter were more general, the connexion might be explained away as being due to the obviousness of certain pieces of advice that will occur to any father writing to his son. But if one will contrast Raleigh's advice with Osborn's, or with the Marquis of Argyle's¹, one will immediately see that not all of the advices tended naturally to fall into quite the same channels. Much is determined by the temperament of the counsellor, and if one traces a relationship by means of the emphasis placed on various kinds of counsel the connexion between Raleigh and Ecclesiasticus seems very remarkable.

The Italian courtesy books and their various descendants, the wisdom literature of the ancient Israelites, and, finally, advice books written in England in the half-century preceding his own work - such was the background of Francis Osborn's Advice to a Son. That this book represents the greatest development of advice books as a separate genre, can, it seems, be postulated with a considerable degree of certainty. The great fame of the book, its undoubtedly original quality, its obvious consciousness of the subject-matter of other examples of the type, all point to it as the English culmina-

L. For a full discussion of his work, see Appendix E.

tion of a literary form that had grown up out of a variety of materials in order to meet what was pressing need of the day.

Especially convincing is the claim of Osborn's work to being the most significant of the advice books, when one remembers that Osborn is notably connected with the very conditions that have been pointed out as being the social causes for the appearance of the genre. He was well aware of the disturbance in politics (the 1722 edition of his works even calls him an "eminent statesman!"); he had heard the arguments of all the religious sects of the time; he had come into contact with his fellow men in important places of life in an intimate way: he knew his times as few men did. Most significant of all, by natural temperament and through the influences of the day, he was a vigorous antitraditionalist, who felt strongly that individual effort and thought, apart from received patterns of conduct, were necessary.

What elevates him far above all the other advice-writers is the fact that he not only states his point of view, but is also aware of its ramifications. Raleigh, Burleigh, and Northumberland illustrate well enough the amoralism of certain kinds of thought during the period, and they are interesting examples of the way in which this trait was connected with the advice genre. But it is only in Osborn that one finds the complete and open statement of the philosophical dilemma

that lies behind it. His thought is in many ways imperfect and faulty; but of all the great advice writers he most clearly shows to the reader the relationship existing between the philosophical temper of the period and the advice books that it produced. Though he does not solve the problems of faith and rationalism, he states them well.

John Henry Newman, who understood such temperaments, as they appeared in the seventeenth century and elsewhere once gave an excellent description of an intellectual type that might very well be accounted a description of Osborn, except for certain rather serious modifications. Newman said, "It requires a great deal of reading, or a wide range of information to warrant us in putting forth our opinions on any serious subject; and without such learning the most original mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion. There are indeed persons who profess a different point of view of the matter, and even act upon it. Every now and then you will find a person of vigorous or fertile mind, who relies upon his resources, despises all former authors, and gives the world, with the utmost fearlessness, his views upon religion, or history or any other popular subject. And his works may sell for a while; he may get a name in his day; but this will be all. His readers are sure to find out in the long run that his doctrines are mere

theories, and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff instead of bread, and then his popularity drops as suddenly as it rose."¹

This portrait of the self-sufficient wit bears a striking resemblance to Francis Osborn as he appears after a time to the student of his life and works. He is, beyond question, one "who relies on his own resources," and although he does not despise quite all former authors, he definitely rejects the scholarly tradition of literature, and this rejection has earned for him the doom of the shallow thinkers whose ~~final~~^{works} are finally discovered to be "chaff instead of bread." This he does not quite deserve, for, much as one may be convinced that in these particulars ~~Osborn~~ resembles the pseudo-philosopher Newman has pictured, there is borne in upon one with equal force the realization that Osborn's writings are not quite "chaff" - that there is behind them a significant body of thought. Carefully examined, it is of extreme interest, not as something truly great and noble, but as something vigorous and vastly important. Osborn's ideas are not entirely "mere theories"; they are based on hard, clear facts - of the kind that Osborn was fitted to perceive. He had a thorough distrust of metaphysical logic, and made no attempt to carry his generalizations into remote universal conclusions. For his philosophical principles one

1. John Henry Cardinal Newman: The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated, eighth edition. London, 1888. p. 129.

must look, rather, into the manner of his observations, and through them to the environment of ideas that leads him to think and write as he does. He is illustrative in a more vital way than any of the other advice writers, since he presents in an extraordinarily distinct way the problems of seventeenth-century society.

It is to be hoped that in the course of time mankind will conclude that the sort of philosophy upon which some of Osborn's views are based is indeed chaff. But until such a conclusion is held more generally than ^{it is} today, the principles that often guided Osborn's observation and thinking will have tremendous intellectual and social consequences; and he will be a figure deserving considerable study.

One fact that certainly warrants a careful examination of Osborn is his popularity with his contemporaries. In a sense it was his fate to be among the prose writers of the century what Abraham Cowley was among its poets. Both men were received enthusiastically by the literary world of the time; and both suffered a swift oblivion among subsequent generations. Advice to a Son was important enough to be prohibited by the chancellor of the University of Oxford, and to occasion a literary battle of some magnitude. Even more striking proof of its significance is given by Pepys, who himself studied the Advice with considerable care, and to whom Sir William Petty said that the three most popular books of his time were Osborn's Advice, Browne's Religio

Medici, and Butler's Hudibras.¹ Anthony à Wood thought it worthwhile to collect all of Osborn's published works, and to determine as far as possible the authorship of certain disputed items.²

The eighteenth century, however, seems to have lost its relish for Osborn, obviously for stylistic reasons, since Osborn's prose is guilty in so many ways of all the quaint old failings that Dryden had banished. This distaste for Osborn's style is clear in Swift, who mentions Osborn as an example of a writer affecting phrases in fashion at court which later became unintelligible, and who points out that other earlier seventeenth century writers did not display this fault nearly so much.³ Boswell's comment is interesting: "I expressed a liking for Mr. Francis Osborne's works, and asked him [Dr. Johnson, of course] what he thought of that writer. He answered, 'A conceited fellow. Were a man to write so now the boys would throw stones at him.' He, however, did not alter my opinion of a favourite writer, to whom I was first directed by his being quoted in the Spectator, and in whom I have found much shrewd and lively sense, expressed indeed in a style somewhat quaint, which, however, I do not dislike. His book has an air of originality. We figure to ourselves an ancient gentleman talking to us."⁴

1. D.N.B., s.v. Francis Osborn.

2. See index, vol. ii, of Life and Times, s.v. Osborn, for various places where Wood speaks of buying his works.

3. Tatler, No. 230. (Ingpen's Note)

4. James Boswell; The Life of Samuel Johnson, ed. by Roger Ingpen. Boston, 1925. p. 416. The Spectator paper referred to is No. 150 (Ingpen's note.)

Paradoxically, both Johnson and Boswell were right: Osborn's style was impossibly old-fashioned to any eighteenth-century literary man. Even in the seventeenth century his prose stands out as difficult to read in comparison with other essayists'; yet once the reader has caught the meaning, what Osborn says is often shrewd and lively.

A more modern critic has said that Osborn's style "has all the faults and none of the virtues of the older prose," and that "when it is not terse and apothegmatic, as of one trying to imitate Bacon, it is stiff with conceits and long-winded sentences."¹ This judgment is much too harsh. It must be remembered that Osborn himself was the last to care about matters of literary structure. His purpose was simply to get his thoughts before the reading public. Some consciousness of style, however, he must have had. He advises his son to learn writing by practice. Of the use of models he makes no specific mention; but all his writings can easily be classified in the familiar categories of the century, and the great variations in his sentence-structure might well be symptoms of the conscious imitation of varied models: his characters he writes as pointedly as Hall, and some of the shorter essays, and the first part of Advice to a Son sound much more Baconian than anything in Shakespeare's plays. If Osborn's own word and the evidence of the contents of some of his writings are to be trusted, he enjoyed

1. See The Cambridge History of English Literature. Cambridge 1912. vol. viii, p.431.

writing for practice, and in the preface to the Miscellany, the best account of his attitude towards his own work, he states that his purpose in writing is not to court the reader, but to give expression to a spirit that would otherwise break the containing vessel. His subjects, he says, he has chosen with freedom and with no attempt at exhaustive or scholarly treatment. He insists, as he has insisted elsewhere, that a man can write if he has an experience and understanding of society, even though he lack formal university training.

This preface, as a matter of fact, is perhaps the best possible introduction to Osborn, since its bitter frankness serves as nothing else could to make clear to the reader the kind of man Osborn was. He says that he cares nothing either for praise or blame, and that he cannot be held accountable for the errors in his writing, "being from my Birth, uncapable to receive the Rich Talent of Learning, look'd upon, as The onely Key of Knowledge: which if obtayned, had been Little Advantage, since I want a Memory wherein to Hoord up what I had stollen. And so the Acquired Groat, might not unpossibly have spoiled, and adulterated the more Natural Shilling. Wherefore, if a Chymistry might be found, able to Extract any thing useful toward the Conduct of Man, out of such Ordinary Simples, as These, They were highly to be esteemed; And in likelyhood, more suteable to every Tast, as Fresh-gathered from the Tree of Experience, then those Sophisticated by the Schools, or of a Narrower interest,

then That, of the whole Society of Man." Later, in the same place, he says, "I remember, to have heard from Sir William Cornewallis, (esteemed none of the meanest Witte, in his Time) That Montaigne's Essay's, was the likeliest Book, to advance Wisdom: because, The Authours own Experiences, is the Chiefest argument in it. For as St. August [i]ne saith, of Short and Holy Ejaculations; That they pierce Heaven as soon, if not quicker, then more Tedious Prayers: So, I have reaped greater Benefit, from concise and Casuall Meditations, on severall, Topics, then long and voluminous Treatises, relating meerly to one and the same thing." It is his purpose "to redeem the World out of a Common Error, by shewing, Men are not so unhappy in the Absence of Learning, as Scholars pretend.- Whose First Question is, What University you are of? And their Last, if answered, None: For then, they consider the Party as irrationall, and below Conversation. Forgetting, That though Books may produce a few rough Materials; it is only in the power of Experience, and Naturall Parts to Build up and Burnish a Perfect Man." ^{This} ~~These~~ very interesting preface, more than anything else in his writings, shows how thoroughly Osborn understood the manner in which his work was being received, and the significance of the reception. To condemn a man for not agreeing with one, he says, is like condemning him for having a nose of a different length, since minds, like ^{bodies} ~~bodies~~, vary. He has no illusions that his fame will endure. Here as elsewhere the fugitive quality of literary fame is only too apparent to him. He is honest in ad-

mitting the possible deficiencies of his work, in confessing that argument and persuasion are of little use in the world as it is. He admits, further, the limitation of his own point of view, and satisfies the discerning reader, it seems, that his work is a reasonably careful and a reasonably sincere exposition of his views. He offers his subject-matter and his literary style for what they are worth, conscious within himself of having thought as clearly, and of having written as intelligently, as he could.

There is, however, a deeper cause than style why Osborn should have failed in such a singular manner to maintain a position of importance among seventeenth-century writers. Even more than in terms of purely literary taste, the decline of interest in him can be explained in terms of philosophical temper. In the first place, Osborn, like many more distinguished men of his time, was not devoted to literature as to a fundamental interest in life. True literary criticism is almost absent from his works; the nearest approach to it is his querulous complaint against the undue authority given to ancient writers, and here, as might be expected from other portions of his work, the emphasis is on the very practical matter of education. Osborn's interest in literature lies not in form or expression, though he has things to say about style, but in content, in letters as a part of the possible equipment of the successful worldly gentleman. It is for this reason that ^{he} despises the study of foreign languages as a needless

waste of time; the study of contemporary native authors is for him more profitable than that of foreign or ancient writers.

The result of this attitude towards literature is not only a spirit of practicality, of blunt and expedient advice rather than of elegant persuasion, but also a tendency to see things, and to express them, from a strictly here-and-now point of view. Contemporary political problems and personal incidents connected with them are Osborn's chief interest. Whatever philosophy he has to present he develops not in terms of recognized tradition or learned authority but through the careers of Englishmen of his own time, through the ideas and incidents of the court life he has observed. Obedience to the Church is his single concession to ancient authority and tradition. And yet it is to the Church of England, clearly defined on Erastian principles, and almost to an absolute minimum of orthodoxy, that he is loyal, rather than to the idea of Christianity. The tradition he accepts is not the precious vessel that must not be shaken lest its priceless contents be lost, but rather a convenient measuring cup, which should not be battered too much, for changes in its shape will occasion quarrels. Both his concern with the problem of leading a safe life in a dangerous age, and his neglect of all that was not to be formulated immediately in contemporary terms and for a contemporary purpose, resulted in his work's having as its outstanding literary character pertinence without perspective.

It is no wonder, therefore, that his contemporaries should have found in Osborn's work much of interest, even purely for the sake of the information it contained. He knew things about his times and could present them in a substantial, matter-of-fact way; men were looking for just such sound advice as he was giving. More significant, however, is the fact that Osborn was competent to state the problem of his age. Beneath all his ^{submission} ~~ambition~~ to governmental and ecclesiastical forces, as beneath all the cautious adjustments that he advises his son to make, lies the feeling that fundamentally such compromise is only a makeshift. Like Machiavelli among the Italian politicians, Osborn had the ability to state the facts about his times, and by the very callousness of the only practicable course of action to indicate vigorously enough philosophical difficulties that he scarcely mentions in explicit terms.

But these same qualities which made Osborn a center of interest in the seventeenth century were not sufficient to sustain his reputation with people of a different epoch. The incidents ⁱⁿ ~~he~~ terms of which he develops his ideas ceased to have other than merely historical interest. Men not of the seventeenth century could not trace in Osborn's ideas the problems of that century, simply because Osborn had limited his background to one period. He wrote, it might be said, for a single generation. The power of his intellect and the deep interest he took in contemporary life made him

sensitive to being influenced; but the limitation of his method and purpose left him powerless to influence. He characterizes, rather than contributes to, the temper of age.

Osborn's predominant importance in the advice genre, then, is due to his representing so clearly the very conditions that lead to the development of the genre. He filled a definite and great literary need with intelligence and vigor. The type, of course, did not die with him, but continued to flourish into the eighteenth century and reached a new climax - though of a somewhat different sort - in Chesterfield.

Of examples later in the seventeenth century than Osborn one of the most interesting is the Marquess of Halifax's Advice to a Daughter.¹ This work, like Osborn's, was extremely popular in its day, and deservedly so, for it is full of shrewd, intelligent thought, vigorously expressed, being in this way very much like its predecessor. It shows, however, a few tendencies towards weakness in the type, and after Osborn's Advice, which it often reflects in idea and method, seems somewhat paler by contrast.

An interesting phenomenon toward the end of the century is the interpenetration of the religious and the worldly kind of advice in books like Stephen Penton's The Guardian's Instruction, Or, The Gentleman's Romance, and his New Instructions to the Guardian.² In these works there survives the idea of the earlier advice books, and the writer is indeed con-

1. See Appendix F.

scious of being part of a tradition; but the older characteristic divisions of subject matter, and the apothegmatic expression of thought are gone. The day of smooth Ciceronian English prose was on its way, and Denton's advice, or rather, his suggested educational procedures, though they have a charm all their own, lack the strength and force of Osborn's cruder wit. In the early years of the eighteenth century appeared J. Barecroft's Advice to a Son in the University.¹ Here, as in Denton's books, there is a trace of the worldliness of the older books in the appreciation of the difficulties that honesty has in preserving itself in a rather generally wicked world; ~~generally~~ ^{usually}, however, this book has a calmness and assurance of the value of piety and study that is in marked contrast to the bitter tenseness of Osborn's ideas.

Barecroft, in fact, together with Denton, expresses a new kind of advice-ideal. Both men are interested in the cultivated life of the university, are definitely religious, yet have the practical perspicuity to see the need for understanding the non-moral world about the moral man. Both these works are concerned seriously with a problem which of necessity was bound to arise sometime during the seventeenth century - the relation of the Christian to the gentleman. The advice books of the earlier part of the century were concerned with the courtier, the man of action, and whether or not they despised the court, they took into account the practical necessities of conduct that were universally recognized.

1. See Appendix G.

Mr. W. Lee Ustick, in an article entitled "Changing Ideals of Aristocratic Character and Conduct in Seventeenth Century England" (Modern Philology (November 1932), XXX, 147-166), has discussed in an interesting fashion the process by which ~~during~~ the earlier Renaissance ideal of the courtier was changed during the seventeenth century. He says that there were two main traditions of the aristocrat: the magnanimous man as portrayed by Aristotle, and the Stoic hero as depicted by Epictetus and Seneca, the ideal aristocrat combining both of these. Of the two types, however, the English people naturally preferred the latter. Stoicism is natural to the Anglo-Saxon temperament and the prevalent Calvinistic gloom threw men back on individual interior resources. This attitude was one of the most significant in the century; "planted by the disillusion current in England in the early seventeenth century, and watered by Puritanism, stoical self-reliance which would prohibit a display of the feelings becomes the tired, cynical spirit of distrusting every outward show of either enjoyment or grief."¹

The seventeenth century, it must further be remembered, was the century in which democracy, though unsuccessful, fought its first great battle; it was the century of the Levellers and the Commonwealth. And the ideal of aristocracy that Castiglione had fostered and which was not very

1. Ustick, op.cit., p.150.

sympathetic to the English temper in the first place, would scarcely thrive in this new atmosphere. As Mr. Ustick points out, ~~the~~ great encroachments, both of them related to Puritanism, gradually transformed the ideal of the aristocrat. The first of these encroachments was the bourgeois spirit, which is apparent in such a writer like Braithwaite,¹ who condemns idleness and insists on the gentleman's being useful as well as ornamental. The other ~~encroachment~~ is the religious spirit. As has been shown above, the Renaissance and Reformation were characterized by a divorcing of philosophy from religion. Puritanism, however, the Protestantism of Protestantism, with its effort to mould the state into a theocracy and to make of every preacher a prophet, desired once more to make otherworldliness penetrate the hearts and minds of all men, so that philosophy ~~apart~~ from religion would be excluded. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find, even among Anglicans like Penton and Barecroft, an effort to weld together more firmly the supernatural and the natural world. While Restoration and early eighteenth century ~~society~~ was going ~~ats~~ its own way, with great show of religion and little practice, men like these did not cease to point out to the age the necessity of integrating belief and conduct. The Guardian's Instructions and Advice to a Son at the University are vigorous ~~attempts~~ to show the possibi-

L. In The English Gentleman and English Gentlewoman.

lity of uniting once more learning, courtesy, and religion.

In a sense, therefore, these books suggest a completion of the cycle of the advice-book tradition. In its original form the genre arose to meet the practical needs of men, whether religious or worldly, who were disturbed by the severance of philosophy and religion. In many of the earlier examples that have been discussed here, the attitude is frankly worldly. Machiavelli's The Prince was, in the early part of the century, considered an example of the advice genre.¹ And sympathetically tempered fathers did not hesitate to use its maxims in their own advices. Except for a few instances, the advice books are either religious or worldly, not usually eclectic in spirit, but making a definite decision (allowing of course for purely conventional submissions that crept into both kinds). Osborn's significance in the genre is enhanced by the fact that his persistent probing of philosophical difficulties made it especially clear to contemporary Englishmen that the worldly ^{attitude} ~~spirit~~ had dangerous spiritual implications. Though Osborn himself was probably not an atheist, his tendencies in that general direction of thought were clear enough to show what was really behind worldly advice. He made the genre show its true colours - no slight achievement for any author.

The advice genre, then, has at its basis what every genuine literary form must have, the fulfilling of a need that

1. On 20 June, 1613 there was ~~entered~~ in the Stationers' Register a book called the vncasinge of MACH[IL]AVEL[LI]s Instructions to his sonne with the answeare to the same.

calls for a definite medium of expression, Just as tragedy sets forth man's heroic stability in the face of ill fortune, just as lyric poetry expresses the mutable but important passions of the individual, just as the novel expresses man's attempt to study society by recreating it in fiction, so does the advice genre represent the need for individual advice when tradition seems to fail, and the desire to condense the whole problem of conduct into a few expedient rules when a well-rounded philosophical wisdom is difficult of attainment. And nowhere are these distinctive needs to which the genre responds better met than in Francis Osborn's Advice to a Son, which for all its imperfection is nevertheless perhaps the most distinguished example of an important literary type.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

The briefest available example of the advice book, very similar to Raleigh's in tone and in its great simplicity, is the Precepts of the E. of S. a Noble Peer, to His Son, "Under these following Heads; viz. I. Marriage and House-keeping. II. Children. III. Servants. IV. Kindred. V. Suretiship. VI. Suits at Law. VII. Friends. VIII. Superiors, Equals, Inferiors. IX. Trust, as to Life &c. X. Conversation."¹ To each of these subjects is allotted a short, rather blunt paragraph, so that the whole is brief enough to be printed on a broadside, as which it was published in 1704, in a form suitable "to be Observed by every Person of Quality and Estate, and to be set up in their Houses." Beneath the ten precepts in the broadside, appears the following statement: "These Precepts are believed to have been written by Robert Cecil Earl of Salisbury, in the beginning of the Reign of King James the First."

1. Although this work appears in the 1722 volume of Instructions to Youth, Gentlemen and Noblemen; I have employed in my discussion the 1704 broadside, which seems to be a better edition generally. This work is probably identical with a work mentioned by Ustick ("Advice to a Son: A Type of Seventeenth Century Conduct Book") as Certain Precepts or Directions for the well ordering of a Man's Life by William Cecil, Baron Burghley. This was published anonymously in 1617, and by 1637 had been republished three times. Ustick says it is sometimes attributed to Sir Henry Sidney.

In general ~~pleasit~~^{spirit} they are obviously similar to the advice of Raleigh and to that of Northumberland. Like Raleigh, Burleigh recommends that wealth and beauty should be the criteria of a wife, beauty being desirable for the sake of the children that shall be born. He advises his son to be thrifty and to reserve his estate, and repeats Raleigh's and Northumberland's warnings against being surety even for one's friends. Like Raleigh, he shows a tremendous horror of poverty, and places financial prosperity above traditional distinctions of honor, saying that "Gentility is nothing but Ancient Riches."

His advice with regard to children is singularly shrewd and sensible: "Bring up thy Children in Learning, and Doctrine, and Obedience; yet without Austerity: Praise them Openly, Reprehend them secretly: Give them a good Countenance, and convenient Maintenance according to thy Ability; otherwise thy Life will seem their Bondage, and what Portion thou shalt leave them at thy Death, they shall thank Death for it, and not thee. And I am persuaded that the foolish Cockering of some Parents, and the Over-stern carriage of others, causeth more Men and Women to take ill Courses, than their vicious Inclinations do." Influenced probably by the educational ideas that were already current in Ascham's time, Burleigh opposes travel as a means of education, for he says

"suffer not thy Sons to pass the Alps; for they shall learn nothing there but Pride, Blasphemy, and Atheism."

His advice is concerned also with the practical affairs of managing an estate. His son should not live "in the Country without Corn and Cattle about" him; he should be hospitable to a moderate degree, and should be especially kind to relatives and friends, but should be careful to avoid parasites. Like Raleigh and like Osborn, Burleigh believes in observing a wise caution about all things. "Trust not any with thy Life, Credit, or Estate; for it is meer Folly in a Man to Thrall himself to his Friend; although Occasion be offered, he shall not dare become his Enemy." He also recommends once again the watching of the tongue. "I have seen many so prone to Quipp and Gird, as they would rather lose their Friend than their Jest; and if it chance their boyling Brains yield any Quaint Scoff, they will Travel to be deliver'd, as a Woman with Child. These nimble Apprehensions are but the Froth of Wit."

These - the last words of the whole piece - are a hint that behind Burleigh's advice is something more than the ordinary platitudinous wisdom. And the "Preface", read in the light of the philosophy of education that Osborn later espoused, is illuminating with regard to the history of the advice genre:

"Son Robert, The Virtuous Inclinations of thy Matchless Mother, by whose Tender and Godly Care thy Infancy was Governed (together with thy late Education under so zealous and

Pre-excellent a Tutor) puts me rather in Assurance than Hope,
that thou art not ignorant of that Summum Bonum which is able
to make thee Happy in thy Death as well as Life; I mean, the
true Knowledge and Worship of thy Creator and Redeemer; with-
out which all other things are vain and miserable: So that thy
Youth being Governed by so All-sufficient a Teacher, I make no
doubt but he will furnish thee both with Divine and Moral Docu-
ments. Yet, that I may not cast off the Care beseeing a Parent
towards his Child, or that thou shouldst derive thy whole Feli-
city and Welfare from others, rather than from whence thou re-
tainest thy Breath and Being, I think it fit and agreeable to
the Affection I bear thee, to help thee with such Advertisements
and Rules for the squaring of thy Life, as are gained rather
by long Experience than much Reading; to the end, that thou
entering into this Exorbitant Age, mayst be the better prepared
to shun those deceitful Courses, whereunto the World and thy
Lack of Experience may draw thee. And because I would not con-
found thy Memory, I have reduced them into Ten Precepts; and,
next unto Moses's Tables, if thou Imprint them in thy Mind,
thou shalt reap the Benefit and Content. And they be these
as follow."

Nothing could reveal more clearly than this that the writers of advice books were generally aware of the situation that was demanding something of the sort,^{of} the need of supplementing the traditional instruction by the more immediate

material to be derived from the parent's experience. It throws a new light, further, on the so-called practical worldly advices, by suggesting that their ~~relation~~ to the religious and traditional instruction was, as far as their authors could tell, complementary rather than substitutionary. As has been pointed out above, it was not so much a disbelief in the truth behind religious morality, as the removal of that morality from the ordinary affairs of life, which troubled the counsellors of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Religion was for such people as Osborn true enough, perhaps; but it did not seem substantial enough to be of much use in solving the problems of practical life. For that purpose new rules had to be devised that would take care of what was felt to be a distinctly "modern" exigency.¹

1. That Osborn knew of Burleigh's advice, moreover, that he perhaps received from Burleigh the idea of writing such a work, seems to have at least a shade of probability in the light of the fact that Osborn through his position in the office of the Treasurer's Remembrancer would in all likelihood have come into intimate contact with the Burleighs, in whose correspondence can be found numerous references to Osborn's family, (See Reports of the Historical Manuscript Commission, vol. i of "The Laing Manuscripts preserved in the University of Edinburgh", p. 24; "Marquis of Salisbury", vol. ii, p. 171; vol. vii, pp. 371, 386, 403, 421, 438.), which seem to indicate that the Lord Treasurer was familiar with Francis' grandfather Peter, who preceded John Osborn in the office, and who obtained from Cecil the reversion of the office to John Osborn.

Appendix B

Closely related to the advice/books in form and type is the manual of courtiership, which enjoyed a great popularity during the same period. Its purpose is not mingled with Platonic philosophy, nor is it concerned with the cultured use of the leisure time that the courtier will have; it is concerned rather with the very practical matter of the courtier's ambition, and with the dangers that beset him on his path.

An excellent illustration of the courtier manual as far as its practicality goes, is The Instructions of Cardinal Sermonetta, To his Cousin Petro Caesano, At his first going into Flanders to the Duke of Parma, to serve Philip King of Spain(Printed in Instructions for Youth, Gentlemen and Noblemen by Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Treasurer Burleigh, Cardinal Sermonetta, and Mr. Walsingham. London, 1722.) Much of the material here is practical in tone because, unlike most of the advices, it does not aim to be a general treatise even incidentally, but is specifically directed to only one man. The cardinal advises his cousin to be diligent in taking notes of what goes on around him, to be faithful in his correspondence, to be attentive and to ask questions, to study

the art of war by all possible means.

Much of what he says, however, is naturally of universal application; and so it is with the advice he gives with regard to serving a prince. He exhorts to the same caution that Osborn was later to recommend. "If you do make Intercession for others (which by my Advice you shall take upon you but seldom) let the Things which your Lordship shall desire, be just and fit for you, and convenient for the Time, not unusual to be granted."¹ Sometimes this prudent kind of advice touches in this work, as in others apparently rather callous, upon genuine philosophical morality. "Silence is above all Vertues, and saveth a Man from infinite Errors."² "Disdain no Man, tho' he be never so base, remembring with your self, That in Time and Place one Man may be worth a Thousand, especially in Occurents of War."³

More often, however, this prudent advice shows its more common characteristic, something that looks like a close approach to immorality; at any rate, the book bears witness to the fact that court life is no good soil for probity. For instance, that cardinal takes great pains to delineate the various kinds of dissimulation, and although he is very careful indeed to caution his ~~son~~^{cousin} against real lying, the spirit of the whole suggests that court life and morality are very difficult to reconcile. "Dissimulation is necessary for every

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1. p. 81.
 2. p. 84.
 3. p. 87.

Man, especially in Armies and in Courts; yet is not every Dissimulation good and honourable, but that only which tendeth to a good and honest End, and which with the Observations of due Circumstances, denieth not the Truth, nor goeth against that which is right: Such kind of Dissimulation is a part and kind of Prudence, and consisteth for the most part in Silence, in holding your Peace."¹ He goes on to say that reason justifies this silent dissembling, hard as it may sometimes seem to keep things from one's friends. "But sometimes it falleth out, that we must also dissemble with Speech; and that falleth out when we are driven of Necessity to answer...and we are commonly as desirous to keep ourselves from Danger in telling a Lye, as from Danger in telling a Truth."² Accordingly, "In making Answer, three Things are most to be observed; first, Not to deny the Truth: Secondly, Not to tell that which we should not: Thirdly, Not to leave the Mind of him that maketh the Demand, in the same Terms wherein we found him. And the Answer is so much the more commendable, if it be restrained within these Limits."³ There is, further, the dissimulation of action, which consists in hiding one's true feelings about a matter one hears of or witnesses.

Surely the attempt to be an honest man and yet a dissembler is a difficult task, and the Cardinal's rules for

1. p. 90.

2. p. 92.

3. p. 93.

dissembling seem none too easy. The restraint imposed on dishonesty, however, is considerable. The final justification of the whole procedure is interesting: "And be it known unto your Lordship, that in the whole Life of Man, and all his Actions and Business, Dissimulation is no less profitable than Counter-Poisons, and true Preservatives are in Physick; for even as Things do preserve and keep us from Poison, and many other Evils, so doth Dissimulation save us from many Deceits and Errors, and from infinite other hurtful Things."¹ Much as this looks like the argument that a good end justifies evil means, there is a certain wholesomeness about it, suggesting that the author has in mind as an ideal for his cousin not so much the usual type of sycophantic, intriguing courtier, but rather a man of sense, who for the public good as well as his own is engaged in government affairs, and who uses his intelligence to guide him safely through the dangers that such a position necessarily imposes. The near underhand tactics are scarcely more than what a realistic view of court life would almost necessarily demand, and in general can be reduced to the familiar maxims of innocent prudence. "Give no Ear to such as report other Mens Actions, and make a Profession of it."² "Tell no Tales, use no Discourses, oppose not yourself against others; give your Judg-

1. p. 94.

2. p. 87.

ment or Sentence against no Man; speak well of every Body, especially of those which are in Favour with his Excellency."¹ The last phrase makes the sensitive reader recoil perhaps; but there is reassurance in the latter portions of the work, where the Cardinal gives his cousin advice that well suits one who would be an upright, bold, and intelligent man of war and courtier. He tells him to seize opportunity when it comes, and counsels him: "In the Execution of any Thing, your Lordship must be, both considerate, and also hardy; for he that feareth, performeth less, and he that useth no Consideration, performeth more than is convenient; which is the original of all Danger."²

The circumstances of the writing of this work indicate that it was ~~written~~^{composed} sometime between 1578 and 1592, since it speaks of the duke of Parma as governor of the Netherlands. It is likely, therefore, that the version of this work used in the preparation of this essay was a reprint of an earlier seventeenth century edition, since courtier's manuals were in considerable demand in the early parts of the century, and were frequently translated. Ducci's Ars Aulica was Englished in 1617, and Du Refuge's Traité de la Cour in 1616(?). Native English manuals also appeared, and one, The Court of the Most Illustrious and Magnificent King James,, by "A.D.B.",

1. p. 85

2. pp. 97,98.

which appeared in 1619, ran into five editions by 1636. All of these works are characterized by a worldly practicality and unscrupulousness that makes them worthy successors of Raleigh's Instructions.¹

In the same volume with Cardinal Sermonetta's Instructions appears a work that seems to have a rather curious history. In his preface "To the Reader" the eighteenth-century editor of the volume remarks of it and its companion pieces as follows. "The Fourth tract is Walsingham's Manual, which Crowns all, and is thought to be the Performance of some unfortunate Spanish Minister in his Retirement; and we are indebted to Mr. Walsingham (whose Name it bears) for the Excellent and Masterly Translation which he has given us of it. Mr. Walsingham was Secretary to the Famous Lord Digby, in King Charles the First's Time; whose Father, the Earl of Bristol, succeeding the Duke of Buckingham in his Embassy in Spain, in all Probability Purchased this incomparable Piece in Manuscript; from whose Study Mr. Walsingham is thought to have obliged the Publick with it; and it deservedly wears his Name, (for it never as yet has had any other) all the Foreign Translations in Latin, French and Italian, being extream Imperfect, Obscure and Faulty. These Tracts are highly to be valued as coming from the Pens, not of Schollers and Persons famous for Learned and Refined Notions, but of great Genius's; whose Parts and Abilities advanced them to the Stations and Greatness they gloriously

1. W. Lee Ustick, in the article "Advice to a Son: A Type of Seventeenth Century Conduct Book", is the source for these titles and information about them.

attained, and whose Experience entitles them to dictate with an undoubted and almost Divine Authority to Mankind."

Of all advice books, Walsingham's Manual of Prudential Maxims for Statesmen and Courtiers is perhaps one of the least likely to impress the reader as inspired with anything resembling divine authority. Of all the works in this volume, none of which are especially idealistic, it is quite the most ^{un}scrupulous. The moral depravity of this work is made all the more apparent by the author's clear conception of what the good life should be. He remarks with brazen boldness: "Truly, he that desires to lead a Life altogether innocent, and remote from the Conversations of Men addicted to Vice, and to their own corrupt inclinations, shall, in my Opinion, do very well to absent himself from that great Courtesan the Court (if I may so call it) that sometimes corrupts Men of the greatest Integrity and Innocence." 1

An honest man, he says, will wonder at the compliance that is enjoined as necessary to be shown toward a prince's wishes. However, "if any, either thro' the Necessity of his Fortune, the Eminence of his Birth, the Dignity of his Office, or the Desire of serving either his Friends or his Country, is led unto it, or called thereunto by the Prince, shall undergo this kind of Life, and as occasion shall require, seek to do thereby Good unto himself, and serve his Friends; in my

l.p.119.

Judgment he may persist therein without Prejudice to his upright Heart, at leastways for a Time."¹ Furthermore, good men, in going to court, should seek to impede the evils of corruption if they possibly can. A good man may win the respect even of a bad Prince, but princes generally like to keep around them men worse than themselves.

Such concessions to honesty, which appear at intervals throughout, are curiously mingled with as cynical a view of human nature, and with as good a description of the various means of deception, as one could imagine to have come from the brain of a diligent student of Machiavelli. Several times the question, What of the honest man? arises. In at least one case the answer is curious. What happens when an honest man is given an evil commission to perform? This author says that of course the righteous man suffers anything rather than yield, but there are few such in the world! The best plan, generally, will be for him to shift the evil task on to some worse person.²

Like other kinds of cynical advice book, the courtier's manual depends for its usefulness largely on a thoroughly cynical estimate of human nature. The author of Walsingham's Manual, accordingly, advises the courtier to study the prince's actions. For instance, it is advisable to know the prince's vices, since it is obvious that he will generally like those

1. pp. 121, 122.

2. pp. 142ff.

who know how to share his sins. Furthermore, it seems as though the whole book avoids the appearance of being too clearly a piece of immoral counsel by posing as a description of the vices of princes and courtiers. The work is developed largely in terms of examples from Roman and Byzantine history; an especially large proportion of the illustrations is derived from the career of Sejanus, who seems to have been the classic instance of a shrewd but nevertheless unwise courtier.

The author of this method of courtiership does not, however, have any illusions about the efficacy of his methods: he realizes that courtiership is a precarious business. His counsels (or rather, as he would probably have it, his descriptions of the clever courtier) are those of hard prudence and merciless ambition. For instance, "It is an old Art of Courtiers, not to take unto themselves any Companions, but such as in Vertue and Prudence they shall much excel, to the end, that in Comparison of these, their own Lustre may so much the more appear, and that the Prince, being surrounded with such as these, may not easily know where to find one, whom he may either prefer or oppose unto the Introducer of these. Moreover, these grosser Souls, as often as he hath need of them, to whom they do now their present, and may owe their future Advancement, are easy and obnoxious to be debauched by him, and ready for Corruption."¹

1. pp. 157, 158.

Such are the artifices of the courtier, and by means such as these he may protect himself and further his ambition. Eventually, however, he should expect his fall. The fortieth and last chapter of the work is a curious renunciation of all that has gone before, and one is tempted to say that it represents the triumph of conscience, which, as is evident from what was said above, shows occasional signs of survival throughout the work.¹ "Out of our Discourse hitherto-

1. Naturally, this disparate moral spirit, appearing at unexpected places in the work, and finally triumphing, suggests that perhaps one is here concerned with a case of multiple authorship. The history of the book as narrated above points to such a probability, or to the likelihood of the English translator's injecting Christian-Stoic morality into the work of his own accord. A further hint that the work has been tampered with is apparent from the following parallelism with Sermonetta's Instructions. Walsingham's Manual, p.305: "If any one disgusted or injured by the Prince, shall come and make his Complaint to us, we must let him see we are sorry for his Misfortune, perswading him to Patience and Silence, and encouraging him to hope well, lessening the Injury, and excusing the Prince. But with such as these we must deal warily, for there are those that counterfeit Wrongs and Discontents, to see if they can draw any Testimony of an Ill-will to the Prince out of us, that thence they may take an Occasion to undo us. Others are injured indeed, but yet are weak and imprudent, not being able to conceal what is out of Friendship committed to them in Secret." Sermonetta's Instructions: pp. 83-84: "If any Man come to complain himself of his Grievance to your Lordship, give him the hearing for once; and make as though you were moved with Compassion toward him: Put him in good Comfort, and exhort the Party to hold his Peace, and be patient; especially be very wary in offering or ministring any Counsel to such Persons; for such kind of Men do not use always to speak the Truth, and oftentimes are very full of Infirmities, and commonly we do not know who is their Adversary, nor what they report of us in Secret."

to, it is evident how little Certainty is in all the Greatness and Favour at Court; wherefore, the best Counsel that can be given to all Courtiers, is, to prepare themselves for their Fall" by gradually withdrawing from the Court before they are violently compelled to leave.

0) The conclusion of the work is curious, so that one is at a loss to know^b whether it is ^{the} usual seventeenth-century device of adding a pious ending to an otherwise immoral piece, or whether it really gives the explanation of the whole work as designed simply as a bitter exposition of the evils of courtiership. Perhaps it is the work of another hand than that which wrote the remainder of the work. At any rate, it is significant in showing the kind of thought that was being opposed to the ideals of Machiavelli and his disciples, and is well worth quoting as an example of the philosophical opposition to court-life which found expression in the religious and poetical writings of the time as well as in practical manuals of conduct like this. This conclusion is as follows:

"Behold here the Compendium of all that I desired to say for our Courtier's Instruction: Whether these Precepts be pertinent and select or no, I will not determine, but leave that to the Judgment and Experience of my Friends. For my own part, I confess, I have at present no great Use of them, and am so far from being transported with Sadness, at my private and retired Condition, that I do heartily say with Seneca,

Let him that will, ascend the tottering Seat
Of courtly Grandeur, and become as great,
As are his mounting Wishes; as for me,
Let sweet Repose and Rest my Portion be.
Give me some mean, obscure Recess, a Sphere,
Out of the Road of Business, or the fear
Of falling lower, where I sweetly may
My Self and dear Retirement still enjoy.
Let not my Life or Name, be known unto
The Grandees of the Times, tost to and fro
By Censures or Applause; but let my Age
Slide gently by, not overthwart the Stage
Of publick Action; unheard, unseen
And unconcern'd, as if I ne'er had been.
And thus, while I shall pass my silent Days
In shady Privacy, free from the Noise
And Bustles of the World, then shall I
A good old innocent Plebeian die.
Death is a meer Surprize, a very Snare
To him that makes it his Life's greatest Care,
To be a publick Pageant, known to all,
But unacquainted with Himself, doth fall."¹

Appendix C

The ninth Earl of Northumberland's Advice to His Son, which has only recently been published in full (Advice to His Son by Henry Percy, Ninth Earl of Northumberland, ed. with a biographical introduction by G.B.Harrison. London, 1930), is a striking example of the worldly advice book. The work falls into two parts. At the beginning of the second, which is headed "An. 1609," the author says, "This discourse...was written fourteen years after the former," so that one may conclude that the first part was written in 1595 or 1596, when the Earl was expecting the birth of a child. The earlier portion of the work, therefore, has a rather curious form. It consists of advice as to how a child should be properly educated, and falls into line with the work of sixteenth-century educational writers like Ascham and Mulcaster. The probable history of the composition of the work is as follows. "The first part was composed in 1595 or 1596, and the latter, and far more interesting, part of the treatise was written in the Tower when the Earl had given up hope of any release, and was expecting that his imprisonment would be perpetual, or end in execution. It is clear, however, that the first section has been revised. In 1595 the Earl had no reason to talk of 'the forlorn state of this life,' nor could he have addressed his son as one furnished by education 'with sufficiency and means'; for his

first child was not born until 1596. Probably the opening pages belong also to 1609, the original treatise on the education of a nobleman's son beginning about page 58 in this printing of the manuscript. There is something rather attractive and typical of the author in supposing that Northumberland began to write on the education of the young as soon as he heard that his wife was with child. The first treatise, one may expect, was composed more for the benefit of the father than of the child; Northumberland was here ordering his own views on education by expressing them on paper."¹

The second part of the work "concerneth officers and servants," and, after a brief introduction, there were to be six chapters that were to endeavor "to lay open the Three Principles and Three Cautions already given, by way of reason and experience, as I have found them mixed together."² The Three Principles are these:

"1. First that you understand your estate generally better than any of your officers.

"2. Secondly, that you never suffer your wife to have power in the manage of your affairs.

"3. Thirdly, that your gifts and bestowing of your actions be your own without intercession of others."

1. Introduction, pp. 43,44.

2. p. 74.

And the Three Cautions "that are to be observed to proceed from your officers and servants are these:

"4. All men love their own eases, and themselves best.

"5. Envy will ever be hatched where multitudes are drawn together.

"6. Men easily will not be removed out of a track of life once entered into; for the effects at hand are ever more persuasive and apparent than those which are more remote, which will ever seem more impossible and hard to be compassed."¹

As the work stands, however, there are only three chapters, principle and caution having probably been drawn together, during revision, under one head.² It is in this second part, which stylistically is far superior to the first - probably since, as Northumberland admits, he was no longer deeply interested in elegant style - that his observations on human nature and his misogyny are clearly expressed. His interests, furthermore, seem to have shifted largely to the economic and practical. Throughout this latter half, as also in the added introductory pages of the earlier half, one is aware of the autobiographical significance of what he says.

It is, indeed, an interesting fact in connexion with

1. p. 75.

2. p. 76, Harrison's note.

the genre that generally the writers of advices have been men who had experienced the ills of this world in abundance. Osborn's advice surely is the fruit of bitter experience, and the Marquess of Argyle's Instructions to His Son¹ are also largely directions for avoiding his father's mistakes. So Northumberland, an earlier writer of the type in England, bases his counsel largely on his own mistakes and misfortunes. His career was full of the vicissitudes that often characterized the lives of his contemporaries.² Born in May 1564, he became heir to the wealth and honours of one of the greatest houses of England at the age of eight years. His father was a Catholic, but Henry was placed in the charge of an Anglican clergyman. When he was seventeen he travelled, as was customary. About four years later, his father, who had been imprisoned because of alleged complicity in a Catholic plot, was found dead in the Tower; according to a pamphlet issued by the Council his death was by suicide. Difficulties with his mother, who disapproved of the young Earl's way of life, together with the sufferings he endured at the hands of his countess, probably were the cause of the misogynic views he puts forth in his Advice. Northumberland, it seems, "proceeded to purchase experience at the usual rates." He was interested in science and mathematics, and was probably connected with the notorious athe-

1. See Appendix of this essay.

2. For the following biographical account I am indebted to G.B. Harrison's introduction.

istical group that included Marlowe, Chapman, and Raleigh. At the age of thirty-one, the Earl married, as a political match, the Lady Dorothy Perrot, the widowed sister of the Earl of Essex and of Sidney's Stella. "By his marriage the Earl evidently hoped to advance his own fortune, for Essex in 1595 was very generally regarded as the man of promise which would soon be fulfilled."

But the wife and her possible political influence were both disappointments. She was such a shrew that the whole Court knew of Northumberland's unhappy life with her; and in 1597, he apparently quarrelled with Essex, at least in his own judgment for good and sufficient reason. He then became entangled with the intriguers who were anticipating the succession of James to the throne. Having as an enemy of the Essex faction for some time opposed the Scottish succession, the Earl began, however, in 1602 to negotiate with James. In 1605, because of the complicity of Thomas Percy, a distant cousin of Northumberland's, in the Gunpowder Plot, he was almost immediately seriously embarrassed, was later tried in the Star Chamber, and finally was imprisoned in the Tower. Despite numerous attempts to have him freed, he was not released until 1621; afterwards he lived until 1632 in retirement.

Although the Earl of Northumberland was obviously an intelligent man, well educated and distinctly cultivated, his advice to his son is singularly unliterary. He is, how-

ever, clearly influenced by the Italian conception of education, and it is noteworthy that he fails to express anywhere the pious sense of the morality that other English advice-writers derived from their humble reading and commonplace experience. The scope of education is for him "only to perfect a man perfect in four things especially, graceful manners, commendable exercises, true studies, and a well-fashioned mind."¹ Like so many of his Renaissance contemporaries, he has a tremendous faith in education. The absence of religious counsel is significant, and though this may have been due to an effort to maintain a neutral silence, the severe secularism of his work points to a deeper cause. Although he arrives at some conclusions that are Christian enough, his kinship is both neo-pagan rather than with Christian Humanism. "A well-fashioned mind I call it when it is free from perturbations and unseemly affections. Knowledge must keep up the matter, and ratiocination must play the workman, then will the building follow of necessity beautiful, if the former principles be truly acted; for the very means to quit ourselves of these ugly perturbations are to esteem nothing of the world at an overvalue, for so shall we sorrow ever, neither anything at an under-rate for so shall we err often. This is the groundwork of tranquillity... For superficial understandings can but put

1. p. 60.

on superficial and outward contentments, and where passions are bridled but by force they will be found in their right shapes of necessity, to ourselves ever, to the world often."¹ Even in connexion with a subject so immediately ~~related~~ to religion as this, Northumberland maintains his characteristic silence. A passage of this kind makes one suspect immediately, however, the influence of classical philosophy.

It is with Italian Humanism, in fact, rather than with the new scientific empiricism that his silence on the subject of religion must be connected. There is evidence that he believed in astrology and in alchemy as arts when they were based on "scientific" principles;² - an indication that his scepticism was rather limited and perhaps not very intelligent. In one place he is probably criticising the greatest figure in the new scientific philosophical movement, Francis Bacon. "And, believe me, empirics, what masks they put on, either concerning matters of engines for use, or projects to serve their country, or of health to help themselves or their friends, or of essays to pass away the time having nothing else to do, yet shall you find that either gain or glory is their end, not knowledge."³ And the difference between Northumberland's attitude toward science

1. pp. 71-72.

2. p. 70.

3. p. 118.

and Bacon's is clear enough in the following passage: "So as if these things be dabbled in to satisfy the mind, they are good, for many phinomes [phenomena] enrich the understanding; but if for gain you will miss your end, for there are certain works fit for every vocation."¹ That is, Northumberland reminds his son that the dignity of his social position demands a certain aloofness from science. Like the Italian courtier, the English nobleman should never allow his interest in a thing to degenerate from a dignified amateurism to a vulgar professionalism.

In fact, the general temper of the work is outstandingly aristocratic; and yet it is extremely practical. Northumberland is endeavoring to write for his son an account of the proper mode of life for the scion of a great house. The book is therefore thoroughly impregnated with the attitudes and problems peculiar to the ruling class. How to judge the merits and demerits of suitors for favours, how to keep servants in the proper awe, how to guard oneself against treachery, against financial and political disaster especially - these are the interests of Northumberland in writing his Advice. His consciousness of the social and political position of his son is, however, responsible for the distinctly bourgeois tone of the work. Northumberland is unidealistic enough: he is not portraying the perfect Christian nobleman

1. p. 129.

surrounded by and defying the temptations of an ignoble sinful world; nor is he portraying the humbler gentleman who is not tempted to become a Machiavellian ruler, as the great nobleman might be. He is concerned rather with a man who will perhaps one day be important in the counsels of the nation,¹ but who will always be in need of money, will always be in danger of being cheated out of what he has by an unscrupulous servant, no matter how important or unimportant he becomes. Accordingly, to Northumberland the management of estates is a more permanent concern than the problems of civil government, and a more tangible concern than the fine growth of character and intellect.

Northumberland's intellectual accomplishments, however, may have been great enough, as the company he kept, whatever its moral lapses may have been, was certainly not without intellectual power and considerable aesthetic discrimination. Furthermore, he recommended for his son "deeper contemplations as Arithmetic, Geometry, Logic, Grammar Universal, Metaphysics, the Doctrine of Motion of the Optics, Astronomy, the Doctrine of Generation and Corruption, Cosmography, the Doctrine De Anima, Moral, Politics, Economics, the Art Nautical and Military"² - a typical set of interests for an Elizabethan or Jacobean gentleman who was eager for the universal education of the Renaissance. But it must be remem-

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1. Northumberland himself was once rumoured as a possible fiancé for Arabella Stuart, who was suggested as a claimant and for the throne (See Introduction by Harrison, p.11.).
 2. p. 67

bered that this list was offered as a plan for the future rather than as an accomplishment, and though Northumberland describes the field of each study briefly, there is no way of telling just to what extent the "contemplation" of each was carried. Northumberland is greatly interested in style, in the early part of the work, at any rate, where he recommends that authors be read for style rather than for content. His final dictum on learning seems to confirm the suspicions which the excessively practical character of his advice tends to arouse: "By knowledge this benefit you shall attain to of them of the learned sort, at least not to wonder at anything but that the cause of all things cannot be known precisely; or if known in part, yet that all things cannot be managed by us as we would. These are the two great wonders of the world; besides I know not any."¹ A cynic's conclusion, if there ever was one!

Despite such remarks on knowledge, there is one kind of information in which Northumberland is especially proficient, as is only natural to his temperament - it is the stock in trade of the cynic and the shrewd practical man, both of which he surely was. This is the pessimistic knowledge of human nature that Osborn, who in this respect is very similar to Northumberland, exploits in his Advice. It is perhaps one of the clearest functions of the advice to convey to its reader the author's perception of the

1. p. 116.

workings of human psychology. The wisest portions of Northumberland's Advice, for all their cynicism, are the passages in which he characterizes his fellow men. For example, he distinguishes the true and false lovers of learning in this fashion: "The one, though you be not capable, will undertake to teach, that you may wonder at him, yet in the end will teach you nothing; the other will never press you to learn, or ever open himself, unless he find you capable and industrious, and then very charitable to give you what help they can, and glad you will learn anything, so as their own contemplations be not hindered, which above all the world they prize."¹ Despite the general turgidness of his style, Northumberland is often capable of setting down a shrewd thought in forceful language. "Not to be able to deny with a constant brow, if there be cause, is a sign that your courage is mixed with a cowardly kind of diffidence... A methodical tongue and a good utterance much tickles a dull ear, and sweet words sways a mind that is not over-seriously bent."²

This interest in human character in its external manifestations is related to the Renaissance emphasis on the individual, and must be carefully distinguished from a philosophical interpretation of human nature, which is not so peculiarly confined to any one age. Often, however, a faintly moral tone appears in Northumberland, just as in Osborn inherent goodness sometimes triumphs for a time over expediency.

1. pp. 117, 118.

2. p. 123.

It is not the morality or righteousness, however, so much as the morality of strength and blunt sensibleness;¹ since it disdains an aff^{ec}ted fool more than a crafty villain.¹ A profound English sense of dignity, coupled with the Italian conception of sprezzatura, is perhaps at the basis of this feeling. Northumberland illustrates it well when he says, "Mothers' tender cares to preserve them children beautiful would [i.e., should be] forgotten, for that procures effeminateness on their overweenings, and stirs up in their thoughts endeavours only to the preservation of that silly reputation, and that reputation causes sloth in matters of greater weight; for glory in what subject soever will ever account that dearest and most praiseworthy in which they esteem themselves most excellent and perfect ~~in~~; and that estimation doth but rise from other's opinions, and these opinions do follow out of desert or flattery, and flattery out of divers ends in the end will transform a man unreasonable, if he be not the better able to disacquaint himself with partiality and overself-believing."²

This eager, close analysis of human nature, which is generally pessimistic and cynical, becomes especially revealing when Northumberland deals with women. Like Osborn, he is a misogynist, but whereas Osborn recants his misogynism

1. Even innocent fools seem to get more than their share of contempt in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; contempt for the cuckold is sometimes more intense than indignation against the adulterer.

2. pp. 62, 63.

(at least formally) as the rash judgment of youth, Northumberland proclaims his the fruit of experience and meditation. He is disillusioned with mankind in general, but he finds women an especially troublesome aspect of life. Like most of his contemporaries he emphasises the advantages to be gained by choosing a wealthy wife. "Time will tell you of many imperfections on her that plenty must make plasters for."¹ And this idea is only slightly modified by his blunt injunction: "So as you must needs love, love a mistress for her flesh, and a wife for her virtues."² The conclusion seems to be that woman is a necessary evil, which by judicious care can be prevented from doing too much damage. Marriage is necessary for social considerations; but it must be ~~undertaken~~ ^{undertaken} with ~~under~~ great cautions. Even then, the result is not likely to be happy. "Neither is it possible but continual acquaintance will give satiety, although sometimes dissembled out of fear to discontent, other times out of a slackful bashfulness to adventure, sometimes out of holy cogitations, other times out of sluggish ease, and sometimes out of a reputation for gravity; but such men gain it only by seeming; which novelties wives cannot daily feed a strong wit, and repetitions either in act or discourse is tedious, for few varieties can flow from few knowledges."³ Northumberland's contempt for the intellect of women is great indeed.

Although it was not published in full until the present

1. p.111.

2. p.112.

3. p. 54.

century, and could therefore have probably had no influence on the genre at large, Northumberland's advice shows clearly enough the characteristics of the type. Its subject matter tends to fall naturally into a few well known divisions, it is developed largely in terms of the author's personal experience, and, most significant, it is filled with the cynicism that is nearly always characteristic of the non-religious advice book. It has been pointed out above that the advice book would logically appear as a literary form when confidence in a comprehensive system of morality is shaken and private counsel acquires a new significance. Similarly, when the form does appear it tends often to be cynical in spirit. The man who writes a book of advice is generally displeased with the world. If he has a profound religious sense, he is angry with its sin and vice, and will urge supernatural precautions against possible danger. If, however, he is skeptical, his displeasure at the world is concerned more with the world's folly than its wickedness, and he will urge his son to know the worst in man, that by being forewarned he may be forearmed. The religious counsellor urges submission and loyalty to a threatened, universal ethical code; the non-religious counsellor urges individualism and shrewd competition. The latter is generally cynical because his reason for giving advice is his distrust of, and his disgust with, mankind.

Northumberland's book is an especially interesting case in this connexion. He had bitter experiences enough to make

him cynical about mankind, as his Three Cautions testify. But his consciousness of superior social position is strangely intermingled with his distrust of his fellow men. "The oath of a mechanical man," he says, "is not to be trusted."¹ This attitude is simply the nobleman's delusion of superior worth. Shrewd as he is, Northumberland has a sense of dignity that prevents him from being a mere opportunist. He has, perhaps, something of an ingenious justification for the sense of superiority, since for him a firm morality is based on a knowledge of human nature that comes from study. The most important part of education is the study of the "Doctrine de Anima," since this teaches one about "those dispositions, powers, operations, passions, mutations, and motions, which are observed in our own souls by ourselves, or in other men's by effect and signs."² This doctrine ties up all of the other speculations^{so} that "moral virtue will be produced of necessity...And this morality, mixed with the rest of the doctrines, will form a politic demonstrative, not consisting upon stories and examples, but out of grounds more certain and infallible, which politics must needs reduce an economic general to the best fashion of government."³ This statement, to be sure, was written before Northumberland's bitterest experiences; but, inasmuch as he evidently had sufficient opportunity for revision, it

1. p.53.

2. p.70.

3. p.71.

can safely be accepted as his mature conclusion. And as such it is very significant: surely cynicism has not quite destroyed morality and honour. His conception ^{of VIRTUE} ~~toward~~ is rather earthy, and shows a tendency toward opportunism, toward making virtue the ability to save one's skin through a perception of mankind's weaknesses. But it also shows, dim as it may be, some shadowy reflection of the philosophical attempt to equate virtue and knowledge. Whatever Northumberland's deficiencies were, he is not quite a pure opportunist; he is, at any rate, a thoughtful recorder of his own opinions, though they may, like Osborn's, have been imperfect and sometimes distinctly amoral.

Appendix D

Francis Osborn is not especially noteworthy for the liberality of his praise for other writers. Sir Walter Raleigh, however, is one of the few who earned Osborn's commendation. He mentions him in the letter of "The Authour to the Reader" at the beginning of his Miscellany. "Sir Walter Raleigh was the first (as I have heard) that ventured to tack about, and sail aloof from the beaten track of the Schools: who upon the discovery of so apparent an error as a Torrid Zone, intended to proceed in an inquisition after more solid Truths: Till the mediation of some whose Livelihood lay in the hammering shrines for this superannuated study, possessed Queen Elizabeth, that such Doctrine was against God no lesse then her Fathers Honour, whose Faith (if he owed any) was grounded upon School-Divinity. Whereupon she chid him: who was (by his own confession) ever after branded with the title of an Atheist, though a known asserter of God and providence." It is interesting that Sir Walter Raleigh, with whose ideas Osborn seems to have had such profound sympathy, should be the author of an advice entitled Instructions to his Son, and to Posterity.¹ Raleigh, who was for a time confined in the Tower when

1. Reprinted in Instructions for Youth, Gentlemen and Noblemen, by Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Treasurer Burleigh, Cardinal Sermonetta, and Mr. Walsingham. London, 1722.

Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, was there imprisoned,¹ may have been moved by him to the composing of a work similar to the Earl's Advice to His Son. At any rate, Raleigh's work, like Northumberland's, shows a great similarity in tone to Osborn's Advice. All three works belong to the tradition of worldly prudence in advice, rather than to the tradition of piety; they are much more emphatic in asserting the wickedness of men than the goodness of God.

Raleigh's advice is shorter, and, if that is possible, even more practical than Osborn's. He begins with a discussion of friendship, advising his son to shun the poor and needy in this respect. He should look for his friends among his betters, but should "remember always that thou venture not thy Estate with any of those great Ones that shall attempt unlawful things."² He concludes his remarks on this subject with the following comment: "Let thy Love therefore be to the Best, so long as they do well; but take heed that thou love God, thy Country, thy Prince, and thine own Estate, before all others: For the Fancies of Men change, and he that loves to Day, hateth to Morrow; but let Reason be thy School-Mistress, which shall ever guide thee aright."³

1. There seems to be good reason to believe that Osborn was familiar with the group of men who were known as atheists in Elizabeth's day. In the Memoirs-James he devotes several pages to a discussion of Northumberland's woes. Osborn's interest in mathematics and some other subjects identifies his interests with those of the Raleigh-group, and it is quite possible that he knew Raleigh and Northumberland personally.

2. p. 11.

3. p. 12.

Like Northumberland, he has much to say about the transitoriness of love, and repeats the stock warnings against being deceived by beauty. He reminds his son, however, that in choosing a wife, beauty is not to be utterly disregarded; it and money are to be especially considered.

The third chapter is concerned with flatterers, by whom even "Wisest Men have been abused"; and the fourth cautions Raleigh's son to avoid private quarrels, which are occasioned chiefly by a loose tongue.

Raleigh's three rules for preserving one's estate are reminiscent of what Northumberland had to say about such matters: 1. Know that you have; do not let servants and officers waste it for you. 2. Never spend anything before you have it. 3. Don't be surety for another. The preservation of one's estate is a most vital matter, for "Poverty provokes a Man to do infamous and detested Deeds: Let no Vanity therefore, or Perswasion, draw thee to that worst of worldly Miseries."¹

Later in the book he gives similar advice: "Money in the Purse will ever be in Fashion; and no man is esteemed for gay garments, but by Fools and Women."² But this very practical and worldly advice is tempered in the latter portions of the work by admonitions that approach the religious point of view more than anything Northumberland says, though they might be simply moral tags added as an afterthought.

1. p.31.
2. p.34.

Raleigh warns his son in a chapter entitled "Riches not to be sought by evil Means" to be merciful and kind to the worthy poor. He counsels his son to avoid drinking and even recommends total absintence. "In Youth there is not so much as one Draught permitted; for it putteth Fire to Fire." ¹Artificial stimulants are not to be used until the natural heat of the body is decayed. Finally in the tenth and last Chapter, Raleigh, like Polonius, commends his son to God and sums up his advice. "Let God be thy Protector and Director in all thy Actions...Resolve that no Man is wise or safe, but he that is honest."²

1. p. 38

2. p. 41. Note the similarity that can be traced between Raleigh's advice and Polonius's, which is made clear in the following table.

Polonius	Raleigh
Yet here, Laertes! aboard, aboard, for shame! / The wind sits in the shoulder of your sail, / And you are stay'd for. There; my blessing with you! / And these few precepts in thy memory / See thou character. Give thy thoughts no tongue /	
Nor any unproportion'd thought his act. /	Let Reason be thy School- Mistress. (p. 12)
Be thou familiar, but by no means vulgar / The friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, / Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel; / But do not dull thy palm with en- tertainment / Of each new-hatch'd unfledg'd comrade. /	Make election of thy Bet- ters rather than Inferi- ors... Thou shalt never find a Friend in... young years... please thee [later] (pp. 9-11.) Let thy Love be to the Best, so long as they do well. (p. 12)
Beware / Of entrance to a quarrel, but being in, / Bear't that the op- posed may beware of thee. /	Be careful to avoid pub- lick Disputations... but if thou be once engaged,

carry thyself bravely, that
they may fear thee after.
(p.23.)

Give every man thy ear, but few
thy voice;/ Remember the Divine Saying,
He that keepeth his Mouth,
keepeth his Life.(p.23.)

Take each man's censure, but re-
serve thy judgment./ He that will in private tell
thee thy Faults, is thy
Friend.(pp.21,22.) Forbear
to speak evil...of Men, tho'
...true. (pp.23,24.)

Costly thy habit as thy purse
can buy, But not expressed in
fancy; rich, not gaudy;/ For the
apparel oft proclaims the man,
And they in France of the best
rank and station/ Are of a most
select and generous chief in
that./ Exceed not in the Humour of
Rags and Bravery.(p.34.)

Neither a borrower nor a lender
be;/ For loan oft loses both it-
self and friend, And borrowing
dulls the edge of husbandry./ If any Friend desire thee to
be his Surety, give him a
part of what thou hast to
spare; if he press thee far-
ther, he is not thy Friend
at all, for Friendship rath-
er chooseth Harm to itself,
than offereth it...Therefore
from Suretiship, as from a
Manslayer, Or Enchanter, bless
thy self; for the best Pro-
fit and Return will be this,
that if thou force him for
whom thou art bound, to pay
it himself, he will become
thy Enemy. (pp.30,31.)

This above all: to thine own
self be true, And it must fol-
low, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false
to any man./ [Is total abstinence a way of
remaining true to oneself?]

Farewell: my blessing season
this in thee! Let my experienced Advice,
and fatherly Instructions,
sink deep into thy Heart. So
God direct thee in all his
Ways, and fill thy Heart with
his Grace. (p.41)

If the hypothesis that Polonius' advice is meant to be an illustration of his folly and absurdity be true, could it not be extended somewhat further so as to make Shakespeare be satirizing fathers who gave advice to their sons. Raleigh's manual would have been a convenient example to be held up for public ridicule. For Shakespeare's version of the more philosophical kind of advice to a departing son see John of Gaunt's speech to Bolingbroke in Richard II, I, iii, near the close of the scene. Another occurrence of advice to a son in drama is in Jonson's EveryMan in His Humour, I, i, Knowell's advice to Stephen, which is even more worldly than Polonius's counsel. (For these last two instances I am indebted to Miss Helen Stanley, of the English Department of the University of Cincinnati, who pointed them out to me.)

Appendix E

An excellent example of a book of advice which, though it belongs to the general group that advocates high-thinking and an idealistic conception of life, nevertheless shows distinctly some of the characteristics of the more cynical treatises, is the Marquiss of Argyle's Intructions^s to a Son "Written in the time of his Confinement", published originally in Edinburgh and reprinted in an English edition at London in 1661. Argyle's introduction to the volume indicates that he is generally aware of the ramifications of the genre:

"Son, I know there are several books in print, written Prudently, Politickly, and Piously of this very title of late years. I confess, most of them were of particular entendment to their own relations, the reason probably that they are not of such general observation and use others designed out of presumptuous ambition, of exceeding by imitation such rare patterns as went before, in the accessions of wit and elegant discourse, discoloured sometime with urbane, facete Prophaness."¹ Th

The last phrase almost sounds like a reference to Osborn's work, and it is indeed entirely possible that Argyle knew Osborn's Advice, and though regretting its "Prophaness" found it in many respects sound, wholesome counsel. He di-

L. p.1.

vides his work into ten chapters: "I. Of Religion; II. Of Marriage; III. Of the Court; IV. Of Friendship; V. Of Travail; VI. Of Hous-keeping and Hospitality; VII. Tenants and other concerns of Estate; VIII. Of Study and Exercise; IX. Of Pleasure, Idleness, &c; X. Considerations of life." In addition there are two introductory epistles, one to the son mentioned in the title, the other to Argyle's other children. Two unnumbered chapters conclude the work: Maxims of State, and Miscellaneous Observations. The general similarity of the subject matter to that of Osborn's Advice is clear enough, and there are interesting similarities, furthermore, of attitude. The greatest of these occur in those sections of Argyle's book devoted to the court, to study and exercise, and to Maxims of State.

One finds, for instance, that he shares Osborn's prejudice against academic things. "The science which we learn by books, is water out of a Cistern, that which we gain by experience is living water, and in its spring; so though among scholastick men we find couragious and refined spirits, yet Princes take not usually such as they intend for their service from the schools though they be knowing and able persons; for 'tis business and action that strengthens the brain, while contemplation weakneth it."¹ In Chapter VIII, also, there are included these four cautions to be observed by Argyle's son: "1. That the study of vain things is a la-

1. p. 139.

borious idâeness. 2. That there is no way which leads ingenious spirits more easily, and with more certain appearances of honour and goodness, to delicacy, softness, and unmanliness, then learning and study. 3. That to study only to pass away time, is a most inept curiosity, and an unthrifing of time, and very misbecoming active and noble spirits. 4. Though good letters be the best informers, yet company and conversation are the best directors for a Noble Behaviour and Deportment."¹ The studies which he recommends as profitable are, curiously enough, the very ones that Osborn is most interested in (though for him, of course, history is more closely confined to contemporary events). "History and the Mathematics, (Imay say) are the most advantagious and proper studies for persons of your quality, the other are fit for the Schoolmen, and people that must live by their learning; though a little insight and tast of them, will be no burden to you; y^eur knowledge in them joyned with your Authority may be of good use to your Country in awing of pragmatick professors, either of Law or Divinity."²

His view of politics is generally milder than Osborn's, perhaps because his rank demanded that he show a certain respect to the government; he intimates in the early part of his work that he has had difficulties which threatened the possible forfeiture of his estates, so that he warns his son not to provoke the waath of those in power. He is

1. p. 99.

2. p.101.

glad, however, that his son is not concerned with politics but has chosen "private" life. He is aware from experience, like Osborn, of the disappointments and regrets that are the courtier's lot. Most of his maxims of state are rather commonplace bits of traditional political advice; but occasionally there enters a bitter thrust that reminds one of Osborn's cynicism. For instance, "Offences which Princes take are like fixed pillars, but their love like the spokes in a running wheel."¹ And the following might have been written by Osborn himself: "Great princes ordinarily endeavor to bring petty ones into their snares, ~~or~~ to do their affairs at their expence; they embark themselves in their quarrels, and forget and leave them out in the accomodation^m of them, under colour of defense and assistance keep those places for their own, which were put into their hands for gage and caution."² Argyle's distrust of court-life is quite as strong as Osborn's, though he is somewhat less penetrating, perhaps, in his analysis. Like Osborn, he hopes his son will never be tempted to leave private life, yet gives him advice about the court because he suspects that at some future time his son's attitude may change. "But if your curiosity shall invite you to the danger, when time may look with a better aspect upon you, remember these

1. p. 138.

2. p. 145.

observations of mine own, who both at distance, and at close view have well considered it."¹ Here again, some of the passages sound so much like Osborn that one is tempted to believe that Argyle was imitating his predecessor.

"Against the envy of the Court as against the Plague, there is no better preservative, then retreat and eloyment; a ~~medy~~ practised very often but with different success; it being very dangerous for popular persons, and such as have had great ~~Com~~mands to absent themselves without leave or dismissal; for ~~at~~ not only breeds suspicions and jealousies of their disaffection, and consequently of the danger of a Rebellion, but likewise exposeth them to the unobstructed designs and malice of their enemies, which seldome end but in ruin."² The concluding paragraph of the section on the Court is an interesting combination of earnest counsel, piety, and shrewdness: "Fear God, Honour the King, Live and Home, and Love your Neighbors."³

In other provinces of thought there is less agreement between the two men. As regards religion, for instance, one finds instead of Osborn's half-skeptical, ~~half~~^{anal} authoritarianism a simple, reverent loyalty to the Kirk of Scotland. Argyle piously defends his own Church against attacks. Like Osborn he is concerned with the question of the relation of Church and State. Also, he finds in the

1. pp. 49, 50.
2. pp. 55, 56.
3. p. 58.

state a solution of the religious problem, not, however, by giving to the state authority in matters of doctrine. Argyle anticipates a period of religious peace for England and Scotland, and believes that there is no reason why the two ecclesiastical systems should come into conflict. The solution for whatever friction may still exist lies in the fundamental similarity of the two religions, which can easily be reconciled, "All impatient zeal being turned into an emulation of Loyalty to the King."¹

With regard to marriage, Argyle again shows much less of the cynicism and rationalism of Osborn. He bases the choice of a good wife on three things: virtue, beauty, and wealth. Like Osborn he warns his son to beware of beauty as too important a criterion, pointing out its transitoriness and its frequent deceptions. Without wealth, the chances for a happy marriage are reduced, he says. In conclusion he urges his son to make a genuine effort toward a happy family life and to avoid jealousy, If he and his wife will do this "the rest of your life will be but an advantageous repetition of your first joys, and adde number to your contents and pleasures, as to your years."²

Of the dangers of travel and the necessity of having prudence before undertaking it, Argyle is fully aware, and agrees with Osborn that travel is not equally good for all men. But he does not have Osborn's great sense of timorous

1.p.35.

2.p.47.

caution, so that he commends the educational value of travel highly. He understands better than Osborn the difference between reading about a place and actually visiting it. In the chapter on travel one can discern traces of the spirit in which Argyle was writing - a spirit far different from the cautious bourgeois opportunism of Osborn. Argyle is conscious of the social and political position to which his son will fall heir; and that position is far different from the simple gentleman's rank that was John Osborne's. Much of the material of Argyle's Instructions is applicable only to the lord of a great manor, as is evident to some extent even from the table of contents. Argyle belongs distinctly to the more genteel tradition of counsel-givers, as is shown in a passage like the following, which recalls the Italian conception of the courtier. Argyle thinks it "pedantic, and unworthy and unhandsome for a Nobleman or person of Honour to be affectedly excellent in any one science, it seems as ridiculous as Nero's mad ambition of being counted the chief Fidler and best Sing^{er} the world."¹

Furthermore, Argyle is much more conservative than Osborn in his views of religion and of the state. In part this conservatism is due to a much less analytical mind. Osborn's loyalty to Church and state must be justified to himself. With Argyle these loyalties are fundamental and almost morally axiomatic - he concerns himself with persuading his son of the virtuousness and wisdom of being loyal, not with informing his son of the philosophical character of these

1.101.

institutions. Osborn, on the other hand, is concerned with enlightening his son in a rationalistic fashion and with giving him a code of conduct that will be expedient and safe. But beyond differences in the degree of their analysis of human life, there is an underlying difference in philosophy. Argyle's religion never seems questionable; much as he is concerned with his son's material prosperity, he is ever urging the necessity of fulfilling ethical and devotional duties. Although his work does not belong to the group of advice-books that are explicitly religious handbooks, it is imbued with a religious spirit to such an extent that one might say it gives religion the first place in life - not only nominally, for even Osborn's Advice might give this impression, but actually and sincerely.

Appendix F

One of the most interesting successors of Francis Osborn in the writing of advice books is George Savile, first marquess of Halifax. This talented writer and statesman, who had the advantage over Osborn of having viewed the England of the Restoration before he set down his suggestions for conduct, shows in an interesting fashion how the trends of thought that were already beginning to be noticeable in Osborn's time blossomed out, as it were, under the benignant rays of Charles II. For Halifax is especially valuable as a commentator on that age, because, though he lived in the midst of a corrupt society, he preserved a philosophical character and an intelligent critical estimate of things as they really are.

His Advice to a Daughter¹, accordingly, is an interesting sequel to Advice to a Son. Fundamentally the two writers agreed in at least two provinces of thought: in refusing to follow classical literary precedent, and in basing their ideas on immediate practical experience. As Walter Raleigh, the editor of Halifax's works, has judiciously remarked, "It is the fascination of the writings of Halifax that they were suggested by his experience of life, and are crammed with

1. Reprinted in The Complete Works of George Savile First Marquess of Halifax, ed. by Walter Raleigh. Oxford, 1912. The full title of the work is The Lady's New-Year's-Gift: or, Advice to a Daughter.

the lessons drawn directly from that experience, Here are no flights of the imagination, no ingenious ornaments of style, no beautiful vanities of authorship. He quotes none of those fallacious historical precedents which are dear to the mind of the academic scholar; his writings are bare of classical allusion. What he has to tell is what he has found out for himself in the course of his traffic with the world; but he tells it with so much wit and irony, with such acuteness of observation and pungency of phrasing, that he runs some risk of losing the esteem of those who think wise men must needs be dull."¹ And as in the case of Osborn, this disregard of literary tradition has meant, finally, literary isolation and near oblivion, a neglect by succeeding generations that Halifax probably, like Osborn, anticipated and scorned. "It would have given no displeasure to ...Halifax, to think that by later generations of his countrymen he should be almost forgotten."² In its way, Advice to a Daughter was by no means neglected, however. It was addressed to the woman who was later to become the mother of Lord Chesterfield, perhaps the greatest advice-giver in English literature. The book was the only thing by Halifax that was prepared by him for the press to be published during his lifetime, and achieved a great popularity, running

1. Raleigh's introduction to the Works, p. viii.

2. Ibid., p.vii.

through approximately twenty-five editions, keeping its importance for almost a century," to be superseded at last by Dr. Gregory's Father's Legacy and Mrs. Chapone's Letters on the Improvement of the Mind.¹

Even the most cursory examination of this work shows that it deserves more study than most of the other examples of the genre. It is not like Raleigh's or Burleigh's work, a mere compilation of devitalized piety and cautious platitude, but represents a genuine philosophical point of view, and like Osborn's work, shows the originality with which a good intelligence is capable of treating a hackneyed subject. The divisions of the book, to be sure, are commonplace enough: after an introductory letter to the daughter come sections devoted to "Religion," to "Husband," to "House, Family, and Children," to "Behaviour and Conversation," to "Friendships," to "Censure," to "Vanity and Affectation," to "Pride," and to "Diversions." The book does not picture the world as a very cheerful place, and all of its advice, like that of Osborn's book, is pervaded by a spirit of wary caution that regards men and women largely as possible dangers.

Halifax's ideas of religion are, generally, in strong contrast to Osborn's: he is earnest and sober, impressed with the importance of a proper religious attitude in the life of the individual. A wise epicure, he says, would choose

1. Ibid., p. xx.

religion for pleasure. He suggests that his daughter be careful not to fall into extremes of enthusiasm but to have a sober, genuine ^{faith} religion that shall have a substantial basis. A Jonsonian avoidance of the predominance of any one humour seems to be his ideal. Religion and nature, he says, are twins, and are not opposed to each other.¹ Religion for Halifax is a powerful stabilizing influence upon the emotions; it is morality improved, raised to Heaven, "the only place where Perfection resideth."² In two ways does this view of religion depart from Osborn's conception: first, it shows the influence of Stoic and Platonic thought; second, it insists on the personal quality of religion, rather than on its being an aspect of the social life of mankind, which is Osborn's chief interest in the matter.

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1. What Halifax means by nature might, of course, be something of a question. He says that "unskilful Dawbers" have painted religion wrongly, that they have "made it an irreconcilable Enemy to Nature; when, in reality, they are not only Friends, but Twins, born together at the same time...Nothing is so kind and inviting as true and unsophisticated Religion: Instead of imposing unnecessary Burdens upon our Nature, it easeth us of the greater weight of our Passions and Mistakes." (p.5). Nature as understood by Halifax seems to be, not the unrestrained play of impulse that the followers of Rousseau understood by the term, but rather the nature that Seneca told men to follow, and which Cato is made to speak of in Cicero's De Senectute, to follow which is to maintain the balance of human life in accordance with the universal laws of existence. How this conception of nature degenerated in the seventeenth century so that finally nature was identified with the mere social code is interestingly treated by Spingarn in Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, vol. 1, introduction, section vii. Oxford, 1908.
 2. p. 5.

There are, however, considerable similarities to Osborn's ideas on the subject. For instance, Halifax warns his daughter, "Take heed of running into that common Error, of applying God's Judgments upon particular Occasions," a sentiment that Osborn expresses in his Advice. Furthermore, Halifax advises a cautious cleaving to one's own religion as the best policy, and recommends not attempting to enter into the arguments of theological schools; with this advice, too, despite his controversial attitude, Osborn is substantially in agreement, since he realized well the dangers that might attend the comparative study of religions.

Halifax's advice about a husband further echoes Osborn's ideas. He says that a woman must accept with resignation the fact of man's superiority, since in man the rational faculty is greater than in woman. She should remember, however, that when all is considered, the greater advantage is on the woman's side, who in the nursery has the grave authority of educating men as children, and who has the ability of governing them by love when they are grown. This idea is a close parallel of Osborn's suggestion in the misogynic parts of his Advice that things in this world seem to be arranged for the benefit of women. But the general tone of this section of the work is pessimistic, and recommends the usual resigned bearing of misfortune, - a resignation which in this period springs from despair as much as from fortitude. Though

law and custom sometimes work injustice, it is best to obey them; marriage is too sacred to be tampered with, and "affected Ignorance" is the wife's best and most probably successful rebuke to an unfaithful husband. Even a drunken husband should be condemned, since all life has troubles.

Curiously enough, however, something of the spirit of the courtier manuals appears in connexion with Halifax's advice regarding husbands. Wives should learn to take advantage of their husband's moods; they should watch for their opportunities to secure what they would have. A wise husband, like a wise prince, is a great blessing, since "a rational subjection to a Prince, great in himself, is to be preferr'd before the disquiet and uneasiness of Unlimited Liberty."¹ And in the next section of the work Halifax makes this remark, which sounds much like the cynical talk of the courtier of Osborn's day: "I must tell you, that no respect is lasting, but that which is produced by our being in some degree useful to those that pay it."²

As in other writers, a somewhat pessimistic view of human nature leads to a tremendous caution. Love, rather than fear is to be the basis of obedience for children; yet the mother should remember "to have as strict guard upon your self amongst your Children, as if you were amongst your enemies."³ Halifax is careful to emphasize that virtue needs

1. p. 18.
2. p. 20.
3. p. 23.

prudence to help it, if it would succeed. All of this kind of thinking flows, of course, from a view of human nature that is thoroughly disillusioned about man's "natural goodness." In his views on friendship, too, Halifax reflects something of Osborn's worldly cynicism: positive aspects of the subject he leaves untouched, and devoted his remarks to a pointing out of the possible dangers. Avoid too great intimacies, is his most prominent rule.

He continues in his article on "Censure" to point out the dangers of judging one's fellow men. He combines in a most interesting fashion the traditional caution to maintain silence about other people and the intense and thoughtful critical spirit which an intelligent man should have towards mankind. "An Aversion to what is Criminal, a Contempt of what is ridiculous, are the inseparable Companions, of Understanding and Vertue; but the letting them go farther than our own Thoughts, hath so much danger in it, that though it is neither possible nor fit to suppress them intirely, yet it is necessary they should be kept under very great Restraints."¹

He does, however, offer a corrective for the faults of mankind, which Osborn and other moral thinkers of the century seem to have neglected. This corrective is laughter—the remedy of Jonson and Aristophanes before him. It is a good cure for upstarts, says Halifax; "a little seasonable

1. p. 36.

Raillery, a little Sharpness well placed, without dwelling too long upon it."¹ Like Milton and Osborn, he compares a vainly decorated and affected woman to a ship in full sail; yet thinks it is better "for a Woman to be thought too proud, than too familiar."² Haughtiness as well as laughter should be exercised toward folly and vice, but one should not "carry the Contempt of things to Arrogance toward Persons."³

Finally he concludes that wit and virtue are to be his daughter's guardian angels. In this attitude Halifax represents well one of the finest types of character of his age: the gentleman who values moral probity and intelligence as fit companions, who would not have men and women be, like the dumbfounded Satan in Paradise, "stupidly good," but would have built up within the individual that relation of virtue and knowledge, in which alone each of these can exist most perfectly. In this respect Halifax excels Osborn, as is evident when one compares the use of reason in the two men's ideas. Halifax is, doubtless, also something of a cynic; but he is a cynic with a greater spiritual purpose than Osborn; his prudence, therefore, is not merely a disguise for opportunism in search of material advantage and personal safety, but rather a wisdom preserving

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1. p. 43.
 2. p. 44.
 3. ibid.

the balance of the soul and inhibiting the natural tendency of the critical intelligence to despair at the sight of human folly and sin.

To conclude that therefore Halifax's Advice is the more important of the two works is a mistake, however, and would lead to a mistaken conception of the history of the genre. One circumstance, apparently trivial, that makes Osborn's work more significant is the simple matter of its being addressed to a man. For Halifax there was little opportunity to include comment on politics, and on the larger relations of human society. The whole work is based on the premises of woman's inferiority and of the social conventions surrounding women at the time. Accordingly, not nearly so much significance can be attached to the cautious prudential spirit of the work; since such an attitude was naturally appropriate advice for a woman, no matter what the father's philosophy might be. The two works, therefore, form interesting complements to each other. In Halifax there is not nearly so much downright information about the world as in Osborn, simply because of the limited scope of women's activity; yet Halifax has developed a more balanced and altogether loftier philosophy than Osborn, and imposes it on his daughter. Osborn, on the other hand, writing to a son who will travel and perhaps be a courtier, shows a greater interest in the facts of the contemporary world, and wrestles with them vigorously in an effort to deduce work-

able conclusions and principles; these principles in themselves, however, being scarcely conducive to the formulation of a way of life based on a real philosophical interpretation of the world.

And it was this latter view that in many respects prevailed in the seventeenth century; Halifax was a rather isolated figure in the period of his greatness, and belonged to a moral order that, though not destroyed, did at any rate not win out in those days. Then too, that Osborn's work was known to Halifax seems rather likely, when one remembers the popularity that Advice to a Son enjoyed up to the end of the century. And though Halifax followed in the tradition of writing from experience, it can scarcely be said that he was as much of an innovator as Osborn, whose fame indicates rather clearly that he had put fresh novelty and vigor into a somewhat stale genre. On two counts, therefore, Osborn, rather than Halifax, wins the palm: he more nearly expressed the prevailing temper of the age, yet he was the more original of the men, even though he did allow the age to influence him to the greater extent.

Appendix G

One of the most delightful pieces of literature that resulted from the development of the advice genre is Stephen Penton's The Guardian's Instruction, Or, The Gentleman's Romance, "Written for The Diversion and Service of The Gentry", (London, 1688). This work, which embodies a kind of advice that is none too frequent in the type - advice relating to the details of life at the university, - is as much a piece of counsel for the guardians as for their wards. The author in his preface "To the English Gentry" admits that the subject he is undertaking has been amply written upon, that advices are plentiful, and that he has all due respect for those that have appeared. "After they very copious Treatise of Education, the Gentleman's Calling, and other Excellent Advices of Manners, Civil Prudence and Institution, it looks somewhat assuming to invade any the least part of that Subject." But that part of his tract which overlaps the material of other advices has as its "main Design...to exemplifie and illustrate the Practicableness of those General Rules and Instructions which the forementioned Authors have deduced from Nature and Reason. And therefore sometimes a Coincidence of the same Thoughts upon the same Subject is unavoi-

able, as Mr, Osborn hath alledged to excuse himself on the like Occasion."¹ From the first one is conscious that Penton is opposed to the spirit of the age. He dislikes Hobbes and rejoices to see "the Slye Connexion between Dangerous Conclusions and Plausible Premisses exposed."² In this preface, further, he justifies his method, which departs entirely from the usual style of the advices: he develops his ideas in terms of what he calls "characters", but what are really little conversations, fictional sketches of possible incidents connected with the education of a young man. He recognizes various objections to his work that might be offered. "Objection VI. Why doth it come out at such a time as this?"³ is of especial interest. Penton answers that English gentlemen are very feeble with respect to learning and politics: he proposes to suggest a method of remedying this condition.

The book proper opens with "A letter from a severe enemy of the University to his Guardian, a person more moderate, and Member of the Parliament at Oxford." In this letter the guardian is rebuked for not attempting to enter Parliament again, and the writer - the guardian's nephew, it is later revealed - says he will himself seek the vacant seat if his uncle does not. Oxford, the meeting place of the prospective Parliament, he calls "That Idle, Ignorant, Ill-bred, Debauch'd, Popish University of Oxford."⁴

1. Preface "To the English Gentry."

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. p. 2.

The answer to this letter constitutes the body of the work, The guardian gives advice to his nephew with regard to the means of attaining popularity; he defends the university; and finally he offers some instructions concerning conduct in the Parliament after one is elected.

Immediately the reader is aware of the intensely moral and religious quality of Penton's thought. The way to true popularity is to let "a sincere design of Honour and Justice be at the Bottom of all you Actions."¹ One should not be afraid of censure; fear and cowardice are the worst of evils. As for himself, the guardian is going to retire and prepare himself for death; he lists the books that he has found helpful in religious thinking. He would have his ward strive to make his life easy and useful. By "easy" Penton means genuinely happy, and his description of the intelligent man's faith is interesting: "I would have it a solid Persuasion, not the fancifull Presumption of every hasty Believer; and upon Terms of the Gospel, to distinguish it from an holy Stupidity, which is as far from true Peace of Conscience as the Sleep procured by Opiates is from the natural Refreshment of a sound Constitution."² He offers thirty-seven rules for living an easy life. It is significant that here, where the proverb form of writing would obviously be natural, Penton does not employ anything resembling it: he suggests various defects of the passions, and how they

1. p. 4.
2. p. 7.

are to be overcome. He in some cases gives Scriptural references to support what he says. The usefulness of the nephew's life is to be his moral influence in the community, which he is to exert, first, by being a good example to humbler men; second, by studying carefully, especially the law, in order that as a justice of the peace he may give just judgment; third, by using the power of his position to do good; and, fourth, by using his wealth charitably.

Then the guardian comes to answering the attack upon Oxford. He relates his own experiences at the institution before the time of the Commonwealth and admits there was much to complain of. He then tells the story of his son. In disgust with Oxford because of his own disappointment, the guardian had resolved not to send his son there, not to the Inns of Court, which were as much tainted with immorality as Oxford itself. Accordingly, the boy was sent to the Continent instead, from whence he came back much improved in general,¹ but still betraying a lack of knowledge. This deficiency led the son to spend his time on hunting and to take to foolish dissipation. Originally the situation was caused by the mother's refusing to send him to a good school. Resolving then to take greater pains with his second son, he went to see an old clergyman, who convinced him that the ex-

1. The only flaws were "1. An humour of magnifying things abroad in comparison with his own Countrey. 2. A stateliness of behaviour, and contempt of mean Acquaintance." This last has its advantages, however, Penton says, for he has often known men to behave as well out of a mere sense of public decency and social pride as others out of a genuine, supernatural conscience.

cesses prevalent at Oxford some time before were the result of undue rejoicing over the Restoration, and had by no^w been moderated. At Oxford, whither he goes with the second son, he converses with a tutor, who by his frank, honest manner completely convinces him of the value of academic education. Some of the remarks of the tutor are exceedingly interesting. "I believe (generally) an honest Tutor sells his hours cheaper than the Fencer or Dancing-master will."¹ If a young man "once grows dissettled in his mind from the Publick Worship, then he will pickeer out under every hedge, for a new Religion, and find inf himself disappointed, 'tis odds but in twelve months time he may magnifie the Leviathan, and when he comes to that, if he doth not cut your Throat (provided he can do it safely) for fear you disinherit him, truly you are beholden to him."² The tutor agrees to accept the boy as one of his charges, but he imposes thirteen rules for the guardian to settle with his son beforehand. These rules the tutor supplements with thirty-four other rules³ to be observed in the breeding of a child in its younger years, added at the request of the guardian for the benefit of a friend of his who has a very young son.

1. p. 49.

2. pp. 58, 59.

3. Of these, rules 27. and 28. are especially interesting: the former warns against letting the child hear "any Paradoxes disputed...either of Religion, Morality, Government, &c," which sounds almost like a warning against Francis Osborn; the latter recommends the "Proverbs of Solomon and the Proverbs of each single Nation" as of great use because they stick in the memory readily.

This work deserves to be famous because of its lively humour and its good pictures of university life in the seventeenth century; if it is, as its author claims, entirely fictitious in its portrayals of people, Stephen Penton ought to be recognized as something of a novelist; and the skillful way in which the advice genre is made to bear the burden of several interesting kinds of writing is itself testimony of his ingenuity. The work is scarcely The Gentleman's Romance, as the subtitle designates it, but it is an agreeably carried out picture of the gentleman's education, clearly expressed, and written with sense and "wit." The book is another instance of ^{the advice genre's} ~~written wit~~ tending to become a treatise on education - a characteristic which was very evident in Northumberland's Advice.

A second work of Penton's is New Instructions to the Guardian, "Shewing That the Last Remedy to Prevent the Ruin, Advance the Interest, and Recover the Honour of this Nation is, I. A more Serious and Strict Education of the Nobility and Gentry. II. To breed up all their younger Sons to some Calling and Employment. III. More of them to Holy Orders. With A Method of Institution from Three Years of Age, to Twenty One." This work is rather disappointing after the first volume, and one is tempted to conclude that Penton did not improve, at least as far as writing goes, through his opportunities for meditation.

In some respects, however, this second book is useful, since it expresses rather more clearly than the first some of Penton's ideas, who is not here speaking through the mouth of a fictitious guardian. The form of the work is somewhat less interesting and is rather heterogenous, being made especially disagreeable by Penton's too frequent references to his earlier book. His intense English patriotism, which seems to derive from a similar educational enthusiasm of Ascham's, is closely connected with the aristocratic kind of temper evident in the first book. This is, indeed, a peculiarly genial kind of aristocracy, as is evident from the rules of a useful life, where high rank is made a responsibility and an opportunity to do good. So in the New Instructions, Penton says, "I think an English Gentleman, Religiously, Vertuously, and Wisely bred, the finest sight in the World."¹ Associated with this spirit is a rather strong conservatism that realizes that change must come slowly for the sake of the greatest good. "The common Rules of Teaching here, either by Custom or particular Injunction of Benefactors, are so established, that an attempt of change is extravagant."² It should be noted, however, that Penton advises the study of Continental methods and a judicious use of them in connexion with the usual English education. And at the close of the seventeenth century science had so far extended its authority that even a writer like Penton, whose

1. p. 39.

2. p. 77.

whose sympathy was not with new things in general, admitted it into his scheme of ideal education.¹ "After a short System of Physick, in the old way, a taste of the new Philosophy would relish well, to understand the differing Principles upon which it proceeds."¹

Whatever may be the deficiencies of this later work of Penton's, it offers a clear, intelligent statement of the character and use of a genuinely liberal education & a much needed corrective of the kind of pedagogical ideal that men like Osborn and Locke were advocating. "What Preparatory Directions are to be given for undertaking any one of the eminent Professions, either of Physick, Civil-Law, Common-Law, or Divinity, (each of which are capable to reward as much Industry, as any Gentlemen shall think fit to bestow) are here to follow, and compleat the design of an Academical Education, which I take to be absolutely necessary, to fit any Person of Quality, to serve God and his Country in any publick and useful Employment, or Calling: And therefore I wish $\text{\textcircled{C}}$ were able to remove those Prejudices against the Universities, which hinder many Persons from sending their Sons thither."² His portrait of the educated gentleman is also worth reading: " I cannot better compare a Person who by his honest Industry hath qualified himself to serve his Generation in some special Course of Life, than to a Man who hath laboured a great while with many a Sigh and weary Step to climb up an high Hill, and at length reaching

1. p. 96.
2. p. 99.

the Top, rests and pants, and with delight looks back down on the tedious exercise of his Limbs and Patience; then turns about and views a mighty Plain, which offers to the curiosity of his Choice variety of Paths to walk in, according as his Ability and Condition shall direct him to take."¹

In this connexion some take to travelling, and for their benefit Penton, like Osborn, offers rules. Penton's rules, however, are the simpler in content. It is noteworthy that in these rules Penton uses the pronoun "you", which suggests that even in this book, which is really an educational treatise pure and simple, the advice method survives.

The close of the book is full of grief over the degeneracy of the English people and concludes that the thing necessary is to improve the status of the clergy, who are educationally and financially sometimes in sorry condition. The closing words are rather despairing: "I pray God mend both the Failings of the Clergy and Gainsaying of the Laity too; if God will not, I fear an Earthquake, or the French King must do it."²

1. p. 101, 102.

2. p. 143.

Appendix H

J. Barecroft's Advice to a Son in the University,

"In Two Parts... --To which is now Added Concionatorum Instructio: or, Rules for Preaching; Plainly intimating what Subject, Method and Style may be Requisite in that Divine Art,"¹ is an interesting sequel to Stephen Penton's work. More clearly than any of the specimens examined in this essay, this advice is a religious book, even containing forms for morning and evening devotions. The author states in the preface that he wishes to contribute his share toward the improvement of the age. But like other writers of advices, he has a more personal motive in writing this book. "I was willing to leave something with you, besides your Patrimoine,¹ that may be of more lasting Use, as well as give a better Testimony of the Love and Care of a Father."² He hopes that his advice will be all the more acceptable because it comes from a father's kind hand.

Barecroft's interest in education parallels that of Penton in many respects, although he is not so conscious as

1. "The Third Edition", London, 1713. But "Part II" of the Advice, though continuing the paging of the first part of the volume, is preceded by a title page which names the printer instead of the publisher, and is dated 1710; The Concionatorum Instructio also has a title page of its own, giving the name of the³⁴⁵ publisher and of a bookseller, and dated 1713; a new pagination begins with this work.

2. p.1.

that writer of the prerogatives of aristocratic position. He is aware of the character of a liberal education, and sees it in connexion with religion, which is his major interest. (He is given a "J. Barecroft, D.D.," on the title page of his book.) Like Penton, he views education as something more than merely a working knowledge of the ways of the world, or as a preparation for the carrying of a profession, but as means of acquiring stability of intelligence and peace of soul that are valuable in themselves. He recommends the practice of daily self-examination. "By this, your Conduct will be every way directed and improv'd; That which really distinguishes beyond Arts and Literature: The want of which casts so many Clouds upon them, that they sometimes appear even Mean and Little things, without it." Barecroft's sympathy with classical education is, indeed, somewhat guarded; he has none too great a confidence in the educative values of classical literature, and perceives in such study a possible danger which Osborn had not only perceived, but had exalted into a vehement argument against university education. Barecroft says, "Continue not to please yourself with the Relish of a Classick, as to be without a Taste for any other Learning. I am far from perswading you to break off from a Pleasure that may be of so much farther Use to you, and will give Ornament as well as Satisfaction to your Life; but to dwell upon it, is not only to defeat my Purpose of removing you, but your own Growth and

1. p. 5

Improvement in any other Science; And it will particularly hinder your progress to the most useful practical knowledge, that of Men, and Things."¹ He is by no means oblivious too literary values, however, and recommends that the Scriptures be studied not only for theological and moral instruction but also for their literary character. Classical writers, however, are read for style rather than morality. His conception of the final ^{aim} of education is thoroughly in accord with these principles, although it is not the most exclusively religious conception possible: "all this is in order to a farther End, viz. Moral Good, the Command of your Passions, and the Government of your Conversation."²

Barecroft has some shrewd things to say about conversation, that are especially interesting because of the contrast his ideas on the subject offer to Osborn's. Osborn, it will be remembered, found in conversation a better means of education than in books. Barecroft says, "A Scholar has not the Business of the World to divert him, and therefore is a sort of forlorn Creature, if he cannot in a good Measure make his Books his Pleasure: Company is then his only Refuge, and he must sit down with it as he finds it; and thus he is under the danger of losing his Virtue, and his and his Improvement too. For what Wonders soever Conversation without Reading may be able to do amongst other Men, it must be remembered that it is in the way of their Business, and they venture little whether they gain or lose by it.

1. Op.cit., pp. 48, 49.

2. Ibid., pp. 26, 27.

But the Scholar leaves his proper Business, for the uncertain Hope of making it up another way. And the Event too often proves how little his Knowledge is advanced by that alone: He possibly Recommends himself as a pretty Companion; but the Publick by that means has too much Reason to complain, not only of a want of Virtue, but Endowments too."¹

The whole matter of conversation Barecroft relates to the kindred subjects of restraint in speech, dissimulation, and general honesty. Like Penton, he has faith in the power of virtue to assert itself. "Stick close to that honest Plainness of Conversation, flowing from the true Probity of Mind."²

"For as you come more Abroad, and begin to look about you, you will behold every body so much in Disguise, that you will think it not only Fashionable but Necessary, to put on the Vizard too."³

Barecroft urges sobriety of speech, the avoidance of a "smart-aleck" manner of speaking. He realizes clearly what a moral struggle the necessary effort toward meekness can be, and says of its success, "Victories of this kind, give a Joy and Triumph to the Mind; a Sort of inward Heaven, to which no Pleasure on Earth is equal."⁴ The honest, moral man, however, need not fear; he ~~may~~^{may} be compelled to retire from the world some times, but he should not despair. He may find others like himself; and honesty has the faculty of recognizing its own; hypocrisy

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1. Op.cit., pp.30, 31.
 2. Ibid., p.40.
 3. Ibid., p.41.
 4. Ibid., p. 35.

is, after all, rather transparent. This startling idea Barecroft balances by a keen appreciation of the psychological and moral factors involved in dissimulation. In this connexion one of the petitions included in the prayers he appends to this part of his work is illuminating: "And because I cannot deceive thee, but I may too easily deceive the World and my Self, assist my Endeavors to be Plain and Sincere in my Words, and truly Upright in all my Dealings, and make me both more able and more willing to walk in Integrity before thee."¹

In the second part of Barecroft's advice, he takes up in detail the kind of study that the son at the university is to pursue--a matter which Barecroft had at first intended to leave to the university authorities. It contains much sound and sober counsel, and shows that the author was a man of considerable wisdom. He urges his son to study systematically, according to some plan or design, since such study is both profitable and cheerful. Languages he should study while he is young and impressionable; he should remember that they are only a means to further learning. Translators should not be trusted. Barecroft bemoans the current neglect of the study of English as a language, but recommends French as a good means for tempering the natural quality of the English tongue.

There is evidence in these traits that even at this

1. Op.cit., p. 55.

time the struggle between scientific and literary education was beginning. Barcroft himself defends the traditional scheme, which places great emphasis on Aristotle and logical disputations. "The Advancers indeed of the New Philosophy i.e., Cartesian and Baconian philosophy, under any of its various Schemes, would not be thought Friends to the old Systematical Logick; and yet 'tis observable enough, when they set forth any of their own, how naturally they fall in with good old Aristotle, only by clothing old Terms under New Ideas."¹ Of old-fashioned logical reasoning he says, "I will add, that this Art is not without its Use, even in Common Conversation, especially in a Country of Freedom, such as ours; where there is not only an open Communication of thoughts about all manner of Knowledge, but such Variety of Opinions, both in Religion and Politicks, and as great a Liberty in venting them without Controul."² If the best way to improve society "is to be got from the opposite Arguings of Men of Parts," logic surely is a useful art. The argument that logic and disputations are characterized by unseemly warmth of expression he answers by saying that the heats and indecencies of dispute come "from Ignorance, or a Moral Cause, Mens ungovern'd Passions, their Pride and Stiffness, or their great Insincerity, which I think an University Education

1. p. 81.

2. pp. 86(numbered "110" in the book),87.

does not naturally lead to."¹

An especially valuable study is moral philosophy, which helps one to "attain to what ordinarily gives Prosperity, and never fails of Esteem in the World, Wisdom in Council, Dexterity in Business, and Agreeableness in Conversation."² It cannot, however, furnish the summum bonum; it is able only to "furnish out a Virtue...to serve in a measure the purposes of this present World, whose ground is Praise and Reputation or...Honour."³ Perhaps it can go further and make action or suffering for a noble cause a reward in itself. This kind of virtue, however, will not bear logical examination: only belief in a life after death can give virtue strength.

In this part of his work, Barecroft again discusses science, this time with a clearer realization of the significance of the subject in the philosophical readjustments of the time. Interest in science should lead to a greater faith in God, through the contemplation of His works, he says; in practice, however, this does not appear, probably because of a kind of judicial curse sent upon those who become infatuated with their own reasoning. His comment on scientific learning is interesting and reveals much about the conflicts of thought that were current in his time:

"The new philosophy, as it is call'd, tho' in its first Principles as old as Democritus, received great Advantage

1. p.88.
2. p.91.
3. p.92.

from the management of the famous Des Cartes; who indeed has recommended his Hypothesis rather from the Art and Dexterity of his Explications, than from its Probability or any Foundation for it in Nature. And tho' I see not the Advantages that the reading of it can give to Religion, as a late Author has thought fit to urge it in his Advice to his Children, yet comparatively as an ingenuous Scheme of Philosophy, it may be worth some of your Regard.

"But indeed, the Philosophy that is founded upon Observation and Experience, and which has more justly obtain'd, as it has been greatly improv'd of late, will deserve your closer Application, as far as your Leisure and Circumstances may afford it...a Gentleman of Letters (and what is a Gentleman without them?) cannot be excused if he spends not a part of his diverting Hours in this way."¹

His final conclusion about science is that it "seems a much better Amusement than Musick, or even than Poetry it self."² Music, indeed, is to be practiced only by those who are geniuses; for others it is not worth the trouble. Osborn, years before, had expressed a similar sentiment in his Advice; contrary to his idea, however, is Barecroft's notion that the value of mathematical study lies in its logical training rather than in its practical use. His concluding words, in continuation of his remarks about non-tutorial studies, are: "In all

1. p. 101, 102.
2. p. 107.

your Readings of this kind, endeavor to be acquainted with the Natural, Civil, and Ecclesiastical Histories of your own Country, as very fitting, and as Entertaining, and much more Profitable, than any other."¹

1. p. 110. The Concionatorum Instructio, which follows, is an example of the Artes Concionandi, really a remote kind of advice genre themselves, but whose specialized technical character excludes them, however, from this discussion. There were professional manuals in the form of advices of all kinds, and preachers were especially well taken care of in this respect. For a bibliography of Artes Concioandi, see W. Fraser Mitchell: English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson. London, 1932. pp.408,409.

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Note: The works marked (*) in this list all appeared in a single volume used in preparing this essay. They were not, obviously, originally bound in this manner.

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