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entitled The Metaphysical Value of the Doctrine of "The Spiritual Life" in the Philosophy of Rudolph Eucken

be accepted as fulfilling this part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by:

Guy A. Tawney

THE METAPHYSICAL VALUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF

'THE SPIRITUAL LIFE'

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF EUCKEN

A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

to the Graduate School of the
University of Cincinnati

1930

by

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

This thesis reviews the life and the major points of interest in the philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, whose main contribution to philosophy was in the field of spiritual values. An attempt will be made to analyze what he meant by his doctrine of "The Spiritual Life". The relation of this particular idea to the whole field of Idealism will come within the limits of this discussion.

The treatment of this study will take, roughly, the basic form of what John Dewey calls the five steps in a complete act of thought. Though Eucken is not a logician and gives very little attention to the demands of logical consistency, he does recognize, formulate and analyze his problem in accordance with these steps. His suggestion and testing of solutions to the problem as he finds it, and the adoption of a particular solution by pragmatic tests, completes the scheme which Mr. Dewey declares must be recognizable in any complete act of thought. The thesis in general will point through its outline to the realization of and finding of life's problems and the testing and settling upon a solution and finally a defense of this solution and its method.

After the meaning of this solution and its relation to movements and men have been considered, the thesis will close with a criticism and an appreciation of Eucken and his life work in the field of philosophy.

Chapter I

THE COUNTRY AND TIMES OF RUDOLF EUCKEN

Rudolf Eucken was born on January 5, 1846, in Aurich, the chief town of the Province of East Friesland in Prussia. This town was the natural center of the province and for this reason gained its prominence. The province was small in extent, lying between the North Sea, Holland and the Dutchy of Arenburg and Oldenburg.

Because of its location and the surrounding conditions, East Friesland has always been thrown much upon its own resources. The sources of its economic life were chiefly agriculture. A very successful business of horse-raising and trading was carried on. East Friesland was always more or less in a disturbed political condition until the formation of the strong Prussian Empire. This fact, together with the location of the province and the struggle for economic welfare developed a local type of character.

The people of Eucken's country were serious minded. Firmness was a characteristic of their nature. They loved work and had a great power of resisting dangers. At the same time they had a certain quietness and reserve, in fact a slowness of expression. Eucken characterized them as "rather retiring and laborious than brilliant." Their struggles were many and continuous. There was the struggle with the stormy ocean that laid waste their fields; the struggle with the neighbouring princes who threatened their independence; a struggle to preserve their proper character, which they guarded obstinately even in the face of ecclesiastical orders.

The people of this Province became known as "The Free Frisians". They showed great independence in their constitutions, customs and way of thinking. They developed a manner of life peculiar to themselves. The East Frisian was religious but tolerant of other people's creed.

Frisia was a part of the Holy Roman Empire in the Tenth Century. In the middle of the Sixteenth Century it was a part of the Hapsburg Territories. During the reign of Frederick II it was added to Prussia. In the early part of the Nineteenth Century it was a part of the Possessions of France under Napoleon; and then again a part of the great Prussian Empire under Bismarck. Battling back and forth from one state to another and being a part of one nation and then a part of another, it seems quite possible that the Frisians were required by the very exigency of the situation to develop for themselves some rugged characteristics to sustain their life.

Gladstone said; "Bismarck made Germany Greater, but the German People smaller". The affairs of 1865 stirred the University life and changed many points of view. Eucken tells us that in 1869 there were in Berlin three things worth seeing; Bismarck, whose greatness was now beyond question; Strousberg, who had a very high position as a railway engineer; and Pastor Knaack, who was the butt of Berlin wit, because, in his antiquated Biblical scheme, he regarded the earth as the center of the Universe. (Rudolf Eucken, His Life, Works and

Travels, by Himself. p-90)

Kant, Fichte, and Hegel died before Eucken was born. Schelling lived until 1854, and Schopenhauer, the last of the Metaphysical School inspired directly by Kant, died in 1860. In the next few years there rapidly developed, in Germany, the Philosophies of Naturalism, Materialism and Positivism. These were all the logical outcome of the new development of Science and the rapid progress of the new age of Industrialism.

Intimately Eucken knew all these Philosophies which were at variance with Idealism and yet he clung to Idealism. In his defense of Idealism he prophesied the approaching downfall of civilization, the coming of great and mighty human catastrophies, unless the mind and spirit of his people and the spirit of all the world changed.

Within Eucken's life time the great world war happened. This he looked upon as the final mark of evidence of the breakdown of the Spirit of civilization. Of course, he defended German participation in the war, but he, nevertheless was of the opinion that the German People had given too much power to the War Lords. Their Idealism was gone; attention was centered on material things and industrial progress. The Life of The Spirit was languishing.

Rudolf Eucken died in 1926. The trying period of World and National reconstruction came before his eyes. Through all these things he maintained his great hope in the

Philosophy of Idealism which he inherited from Plato, Kant, Augustine, Fichte and Hegel.

Chapter II

THE INFLUENCE OF TRAINING, FAMILY AND FRIENDS

Rudolf Eucken was the first child of parents after ten years of wedded life. His father came from Frisian Jeverland and belonged to an ancient, and formerly well-to-do family of farmers. The family had lost its property in the terrible flood of 1825. This compelled his father to seek an official position, and he entered the postal service. The young Eucken was only five and half years old when his father died.

In spite of the fact that his father died thus early, Eucken in his later year said: "I may note that I have inherited from him a gift for mental arithmetic and a great interest in statistics and commercial returns, in which my relatives on my mother's side took little interest. This interest in statistics was not at all in harmony with my general character, yet it has persisted in me, and my acquaintances at Bremen have often joked about the accuracy of my knowledge of the trade and shipping figures. Probably my father would have had a deeper influence on me if he had lived."

Of course we could not expect to find in the man any lasting influences of his father. The above quotation from "The Life, Work and Travels of Rudolf Eucken, by Himself", indicates only that he believed this mathematical characteristic came by way of inheritance from his father.

There is a different story when the influence of the mother is considered. His mother lived until May 10, 1872.

He did not marry until after the death of his mother. She was, during those twenty-six years, his teacher, his confidant, his companion, his home-maker, in fine, perhaps the greatest influence in his life.

We will let Eucken speak his own testimony. "Incomparably greater was the influence of my mother, who may be said to have passed on to me the chief features of her character. She was the daughter of a respected Clergyman, who was (1776-1848) one of the leaders of Rationalism in East Friesland. He worked indefatigably in the cause of thoughtfulness and enlightenment. His Rationalism was of the kind that takes predominantly a moral view of Christianity, regarding Jesus as above all a friend of men and children. Rationalism of this kind was certainly modest, and it never got beyond the status of a popular philosophy; but it did valuable work, especially in connection with education. My Grandfather followed very sympathetically the reform movement amongst teachers, and in his own house he set up a private school which attracted Dutch, Norwegians, etc., as well as Germans. He was not without artistic gifts. In his earlier years he wrote novels, and some of his poems were widely and greatly appreciated. He worked also very zealously for the popularisation of gardens. The village in which he spent most of his life has, thanks to his efforts, some very good plantations."

Eucken's Maternal Grandfather graduated at the

University of Rinteln, in the year 1801, with a dissertation which was entitled; "Man is from his very nature either morally good or morally bad." And he expressly adds; "According to Kant's Principles."

Thus it is quite clear that the home of Eucken's grandparents was full of intellectual and social life. His mother received her training and her scientific education from her father, though he was not at all in favor of learned women. His mother often said that her father might have done more for her in this regard.

While the maternal grandfather was intellectual and scientific, the maternal grandmother was predominantly practical, and she took a particular pride in making everything that it was possible to make in her own house. Thus Eucken's mother developed at home an alert and practical sense. She was considered both clever and lovable, and was much esteemed by all her friends. She had a fine capacity for giving form to her impressions of human life and nature.

Eucken says of her; "In the course of her life she showed a remarkable elasticity and strength. From her early years my mother was full of literary interests. She had excellent judgment, and it follows that she was far from content with the prevailing social life of the middle of the nineteenth century. She took great pleasure in nature, especially in the forest and the sea, and often refers to this pleasure in her diaries."

Eucken's childhood days were not very happy. Soon after his first birthday anniversary he had an accident that was very serious. As he sat playing on his mother's knee, he quickly snatched an open curtain-fastener out of her key-basket, and thrust it in his mouth and began to swallow it. It was a narrow escape from suffocation. His mother tried with all her strength to reach and pull out the fastener. The throat was badly torn. In the end she succeeded in getting it out, and then fainted as soon as she had done so.

Scarlet fever came later, and left behind it ugly growths on the cornea of his eyes. He was first given the wrong treatment and the doctors said that he would go blind. Doctor Lange, of Emden, supported by the famous Professor Frerichs, saved the sight. Eucken was, because of this eye trouble, exempt from military service.

His health suffered more through illness and he had to do a good deal of sea-bathing. "These experiences," he says, "Tended to make me serious and indeed often brought fits of brooding upon me, especially as they were followed by the painful loss of relatives." First his only brother, then the death of his father, broke up the family circle. "Thus a flood of sorrows fell upon my poor mother, but, shaken as she was, and painfully as she felt all her life the loss of her loved ones, she never lost the courage and strength to fight on."

After the death of the father, the mother and son went to Hanover to spend some time with relatives. On the train, in a coach from Gifhorn to Celle, they met a worthy rabbi who talked with the mother. The rabbi took an interest in the young boy. As he left them, he put his hand on the boy's head and blessed him and said; "He will go through distant lands, and will do great things in the service of God." This made a very deep impression on the stricken mother.

Upon their return from Hanover, they settled down in modest surroundings in Aurich. Writing from the vantage point of age and experience Eucken said; "Aurich is a very suitable place for growing children. The town is situated on a wide stretch of sand, which is continued under the moor; and there are woods of various sizes for pleasure trips. The gardens between the meadows are enlivened by plenty of butterflies in the summer, and there were flowers in great variety, with which the pupils used to fill their herbaria."

Eucken's mother took in a boy to board and kept him until he was ready for college. This gave Rudolf some outside interest. He said of himself; "For me it was essential that I should not be solitary, but should have others about me every day. My mother had an even pious disposition and she was very fond of the young."

The mother carried forward persistently. All her efforts tended to one aim - - to lead her son to the heights of academic education. That was her sole object in life.

Year by year a small sum was laid by, and a careful counsellor, of old Jewish stock, whose grandson was a great friend of Eucken's, saw that it was safely invested.

In the earlier days the teachers in the schools were mostly clerics. These men were educators rather than learned men. The technical instruction was secondary to the practical moral training. Until he was ready for the university Rudolf Eucken was under the instruction of men of this type in the public schools of Aurich.

In these schools each boy could grow according to his own nature, and had time enough to follow his own interests. In those days, Eucken says; "There was no such thing as our unhappy 'Voluntary Examination', which has done so much harm to our higher students, as it means the preponderance of military and bureaucratic interests over intellectual and spiritual development." He believed that the middle class in particular had suffered severely from it, and he was glad the unfortunate institution did not then exist in Hanover and East Friesland.

Ruprecht, co-rector, was the first in the Aurich Gymnasium to take a warm interest in Eucken's spiritual development, and made it possible for him to pass over one of the classes into the upper third.

Volkmar, a later director, introduced them, "with taste and much ability", to the masterpieces of ancient literature. The co-rector Funck taught them to appreciate French

literature; and the co-rector Mohring cultivated Eucken's leaning to mathematics.

The strongest of all influences in the Aurich Gymnasium was that of Rector Wilhelm Reuter, who was class leader in the second form, and who, both by means of religious instruction and by his German lessons to the two higher classes, worked with extraordinary depth and warmth upon the souls of his pupils. He was by nature more of a theologian than a philologist, but he had had a good philosophical training, and had made a thorough study of Hegel and Krause. He was deeply religious and very influential.

The chief strength of the life of Wilhelm Reuter was his deep religious and moral influence on the hearts of his pupils. He infused his whole personality into it, and took infinite pains with each individual, so as to develop him, not only intellectually, but also spiritually, and above all morally. "He often gave me a special theme for myself," to suit my interest in philosophy."

Reuter devoted his entire life to the subject of Religion. He moulded and spiritually raised whole generations.

Eucken devoted the greater part of his time, out of school, to his own work. At first it was the study of the classic languages, and then the study of philosophy. The main part of his scientific requirement was mathematics. The remarkable gift which he felt he inherited from his

father developed into a pronounced liking for mathematics. Pure algebra was more attractive to him than geometry, with its more concrete forms. This liking for mathematics led Eucken and his mother to conceive the idea of studying mathematics and physics at a technical school. Afterwards, however, philosophy displaced mathematics in his affections; but he remained a good mathematician to the end of his school days.

His interest in philosophy was strengthened by the lively concern about religion which he had entertained from early youth. Modern liberalism was the tradition of his family. They were not satisfied with the orthodoxy which prevailed in East Friesland. His people held an antagonistic attitude not because of particular propositions but rather because this orthodoxy was, in spite of the personal character it inspired, not fitted to cope with the great problems of life. For this reason, chiefly, they went their own way.

The educated youth of Eucken's day were convinced that they were called upon to bring about a free and united Germany. Thus the heart of the nation seemed to lie in the educated middle class. Each one felt that his own contribution meant something; that it was, in fact, indispensable. This, of course, gave a great warmth of moral feeling toward the nation and her problems. Eucken thought it a great mistake when, at a later date, the students seemed to have so

few ideals of their own for the common life, and that they merely acquiesced in the existing order.

When Eucken was sixteen years of age, Reuter gave him a regular commission. A merchant's son, who was to go on to the university, was to be prepared for his final examination. The German Essay was the chief material to be studied. Then the classical studies were to be reviewed. The merchant's son passed his examination.

At the end of the year 1862, Eucken finished his school work at Aurich. At that time he definitely chose Philosophy as his major study. He and his mother moved to Gottinger for his university work. They were exceedingly happy but overshadowed by the great problems of religion and the closely related problems of ethics. "I had a strong feeling of the inadequacy of the religion of my country. People inherited religion. All my days I remained devoutly thankful to my home for the quiet rest, the untroubled development of my strength, for many a personal stimulation; yet I had myself to seek where my path lay, and not without earnest efforts did I find it."

The professors in the University did not match his expectation. He expected to find here the scholars and the wise men of the world. Said he; "I expected their words to open broad vistas to me, and in that I was naturally disappointed." They even seemed to lack some of the qualifications which his earlier teachers possessed.

Soon, in the life of the University, he realized the impossibility of specializing both in the classical studies and in philosophy. Philosophy had far and away the largest place in his heart and mind.

The first philosophical lecture that he heard was in Lotze's class room and it dealt with the philosophy of religion. "We could not answer his arguments, but they did not entirely convince us. Psychology was his chief auxiliary and it served well as an introduction to the problems." So he criticized Lotze's philosophy on the ground that it seemed too much a matter of learning and it had too little bearing and influence on the totality of life. Thus early our Philosopher began to shape his thought and system away from the tempting morsels of speculation and in accordance with the totality of life.

Teichmuller was especially useful to Eucken at Göttinger. To this philosopher Eucken was indebted for a deep interest in the work of Aristotle. Though he turned from the principles of Aristotlianism, Eucken always carried in his courses exercises in the works of the great student of the Academy.

In his early university days Eucken studied very carefully Kant's Critiques; but they raised many problems which were at that time beyond him. His own writings, however, often show very markedly the influence of Kant upon his thinking. In those days he even tried to form an

independent judgment on the chief work of David Strauss.

At the end of October 1866, Eucken and his mother left Gottinger and moved to Berlin. This move was for the purpose of making some good connections for work in the educational field of German life.

In Berlin there arose a deep friendship between Eucken and Trendelenburg. This association was very important to Eucken. He found his Sunday afternoon visits with Trendelenburg very profitable. The family also received Eucken and his mother in the most cordial manner. This gave Eucken the further advantage of meeting many of the greatest savants of Berlin in the social gatherings at Trendelenburg's house.

Now the work in the schools began to open to Eucken. First he was assigned on January 9, 1867, by Councillor Hoffman, to go on trial to the Sophien Gymnasium. This position carried a salary but it was a very modest beginning. Within six months he was offered three different positions which were in many respects attractive. Then he was offered the post at Stolpe by the head of the Prussian Department of Education. This he refused. Soon he was summoned before Wiese again and offered the position of higher teacher at the gymnasium and the secondary school of Husum in Schleswig. He was not very anxious to take this position but he feared that to refuse would antagonize the Commissioner of Education and so prejudice his future work.

He was all the while anticipating a call back to Berlin

and awaited it with some anxiety. His stay in Husum was short but somewhat pleasant. While there he owed his pleasure to Gidionsen, the director of the school. He enjoyed his work and liked his students.

The greatest man in Husum was Theodor Storm, whom Eucken much admired but with whom he had no intimate personal contact. Why this was so he does not tell us. But it hardly seems that the young Philosopher would have missed such an acquaintance without very good reason.

In the opening of the year 1869 Eucken received the long-desired call back to Berlin. The position gave him no advantage from a material point of view, but in Berlin there were better opportunities for making progress in and following up his scientific work. Wiese did not like it that he did not return to Husum; but later acknowledged the wisdom of the move. Eucken's position in Berlin was at the Friedrichs Gymnasium.

Again he changed positions. In the fall of 1869 he was established at Frankfort as the successor of Professor Baumann. He taught in the old Gymnasium, situated in a narrow street. At that time there was a great zeal for science, which was very interesting to him. But his main interest lay in the field of philosophy and to that field he decided to stick.

In the year 1870 Eucken and his mother were much occupied with a long trip to their home in East Friesland,

to see their relatives and friends. The passing years had been very satisfactory to them and it gave them pleasure to recount their experiences to their friends. Their journey through life had been something of a speculation, but the speculation had succeeded. All their cares had disappeared and life opened out a clear prospect before their eyes.

At this time Eucken again changed his position. He received a very unexpected offer from Basle. Teichmüller had been transferred and Eucken was invited to succeed him.

"Thus at the age of twenty-five I obtained a good position as ordinary professor of philosophy and pedagogy."

Basle was a small university - about one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty students - but it had a large number of distinguished teachers. Nietzsche was there at the time. But because of an argument and debate in which Nietzsche was engaged, Eucken did not have intimate contact with him and so missed much.

Eucken's classes at Basle in the beginning were small. His first series of lectures dealt with the history and scheme of Paedagogics, and they were marred, he says, by the usual mistake of introducing too much matter. He also at once introduced Aristotelic exercises and put a number of very good students through the 'Ethics'. In the next term the number of his hearers arose to forty.

In 1872, Trendelenburg, Eucken's very dear friend, died. "In him I lost, not only a thinker of somewhat similar mind,

but a fatherly friend who always sought to confirm me in my own way of thinking, and who did not in the least aspire to the position of head of a school. Through him I obtained a good standing in academic circles."

Apart from the painful experience of the death of this friend, Eucken seemed to have reached the height of life at Basle. His scientific career had taken an extraordinarily good turn. Pleasant, even important, positions had been offered to him in quick succession. He had escaped the labours and dangers of a tutor and had found a good place that fulfilled all his wishes and absorbed all his strength.

But the death of his mother shocked him out of the quiet academic surroundings and made it necessary for him to change the routine of his life and to find other anchorage.

Eucken's mother was delicate, but elastic and of great strength of will. She had borne well the trouble of the removals with her son. With the family of his friend, the philosopher Sengler of Freiburg, Eucken and his mother made a trip on May 10, 1872 to the beautiful Hollental. His mother became worse and it was clear that she already believed that she was going to die soon. One morning she came into the common breakfast room in a cheerful mood and told her son that she had at last had in a dream a perfectly clear picture of her younger son, which she had never had before. She made no further complaint, however, and she lived to see Eucken receive his first book on Aristotle's Method,

with the payment for it, from the firm of Weidmann. "After that she sank rapidly, and she died, without severe struggle, on May 31st. The medical man, Professor Miescher, then told me that her death was really a blessing, as she had already developed cancer, from which there was not the least hope of recovery."

Perhaps it will be best to let Eucken tell in his own words the effect the death of his mother had upon him. "The unexpected grief was bound to affect me very seriously and make an essential difference in my position. The loss of a mother is terrible to every man; to me it was an exceptionally severe stroke. Not only was I unexperienced in practical matters, and accustomed to rely on her wise and kindly help, but I had had the habit of telling my mother my scientific plans and discussing them with her. The gap in my life therefore deeply pained me, and at first it was as much as I could do to discharge my daily task. For a time I lost entirely even my old joy in nature, so that the Alps themselves did not charm me."

At the time of his mother's death there was a profound change in his scientific position. But this change did not come without long preparation. From the first he sought to devote himself chiefly to the great vital problems of philosophy. Though much of his time was spent with Aristotle's works, he considered that everything he got from this philosopher served only as a bridge leading to further

efforts. Eucken did not feel that there was entire harmony between his works and his thoughts. His chief work was related to Aristotle, so he was ranked in the category of Aristotelians, but his own thoughts really inclined him more toward Plato.

At this time his mind turned toward systematic philosophy and he decided to write on the subject: "The Metaphysical Assumptions of Ethics." On this subject he took notes for some time but did not finish the task.

But again he returns to the thought of his great loss. "My grave loss now dragged me entirely out of the conventional frame of mind, and I wondered whether I ought not to abandon my academic career. I very seriously considered whether I ought not to devote myself chiefly to social problems, and seek some connection - of a free character - with Socialism. I was repelled by the flatly negative and Positivist tendency of the Socialist leaders. To follow in the steps of Feuerback and Marx was for me a psychic and scientific impossibility."

Just at this point the last change in Eucken's academic career came. He had just begun to feel himself well established in Switzerland when, about Christmas time, 1872, he received a telegram from Seebeck, the Curator of Jena University. The meaning of the telegram was clear to Eucken. Within twenty-four hours his decision was made. There was much to keep him at Basle- the glorious scenery, the fine

and friendly character of the people, the solidity of disposition, all strongly appealed to him. In addition, there was at that time a project of a Federal University, which would have afforded a wider field for scientific work. But the call of the Home Land was stronger than all of these things. So to Jena he went.

In tracing the influence of family and friends, there remains but to say a few words about the life of our Philosopher at Jena. For more than fifty years he was a part of the life of this University. His life is already formed and so is his philosophy. The influence, mostly, radiates outward. There are, however, a few items which need to be pointed out.

The Theologians were at that time among the leading professors at Jena. Eucken's interest in religion would assure him a place in their company. He tells us that his relations with his colleagues were very pleasant. Many of his colleagues at Jena were older men who, because of the quiet position of the city, seemed to have lost touch with the world. They did not take very well to modern innovations. No doubt they and Eucken had some very interesting and perhaps warm discussions about religious matters. Eucken was not at all orthodox in his theology and his lack of conformity must have startled and upset some of those older men.

The students at Jena came from all parts of Germany and abroad, and the teachers had the satisfaction of seeing

their ideas carried far and wide. Eucken was fond of mixing with the students. These intimate contacts helped him greatly. Of course their influence would be worth noting.

But the inner life of Germany troubled Eucken. Great things had been accomplished in politics, economics, social life and all other matters appertaining to material things. There, however, seemed to be a great spiritual let down. "It was impossible not to notice a marked externalisation and emptiness of life." The cultural activity of the day wrought much and improved much within its own limits but in its successes forgot the soul of men. Eucken is saying these things as he looks backward fifty years. Let us believe that the young man did see the coming spiritual shadows even as the philosopher of seventy-six years of age interpreted the events which had happened in his latter days.

These tracings have been done for the purpose of indicating the background of Eucken's philosophy. No philosophy is independent of the training, associations with people and things, the cultural life, the ambitions, the prejudices, the mental equipment and the habits of life of the philosopher himself. All these things which have been mentioned in this sketch of the life of Eucken have had a part in determining his philosophical view points.

A short summation may be worthwhile in bringing all these items into a focus. The inherited characteristics

have been noted. Eucken, himself, makes much of them. His estimation of these inherited qualities must stand for what it is worth to each reader.

There can be no doubt that his continuous interest in matters religious and ethical was due to the influence of his mother and her father. Her steadiness, power of concentration on a single object, certainly kept Eucken pointed always toward an academic career and no doubt gave direction to many of his own thoughts.

The widely varied positions in schools, considering the faculty, student body and civil life, certainly had some influence upon the developing mind of the young philosopher. Among the men of learning who influenced Eucken must be mentioned Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Fichte. Others of more intimate acquaintance who influenced him greatly were his maternal grandfather, Ruprecht, Co-Rector in Aurich, Wilhelm Reuter, Rector in Aurich, Teichmüller at Göttinger, and Trendelenburg at Berlin. These were all men who, in the early years of his training and study, brought to bear their characteristics upon Eucken. Because of the influence of these men Eucken developed not into a builder of philosophical systems but into a philosopher whose main interests were prophetic and ethical.

A word might be added concerning the influence of two other particular matters, i.e., the sickness of his early childhood and the blessing which the Jewish Rabbi gave to

the five year old lad soon after the dual tragedy of the death of the younger son and the father in the Eucken family. Eucken gives enough attention to these two things to indicate that he believed they were important incidents in his life. No doubt they helped to set the mother's attention. She perhaps reiterated them again and again to her son.

What influence could such things have on one's later philosophy? Much if we may be permitted to take the testimony of religious men. None if we are compelled to take the testimony of psychology. Eucken thought they were of value and looked back upon them as real influences in his life. We may note them and take them for what they are worth to us.

By the time Eucken got established at Jena, his position was set. He saw his problem and his task. We turn now to find what Eucken thought was the problem of life. With him we seek to understand an interpretation, an approach to the difficulties which seem to hamper life and with him we seek a solution.

Of the problem and the task Eucken said: "I saw my task in an inner strengthening of our people and of humanity; and in the course of time this gave me enough to do."

Chapter III

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

Professor Eucken does not seem, in fifty years, to have changed his conception of the problem of life. We read in "Rudolf Eucken, His Life, Work and Travels, by Himself" p-124, "After my return from Switzerland I found German life in a peculiar condition. A great military victory had been won, and the strength and ability of a great statesman seemed to have delivered the country from every peril. But within itself there were menacing developments, though they were slow to enter into the public mind. One could at least recognize a pronounced narrowness; a political development, on the one hand, which made the government the centre of gravity of all action and gave little play to the independence of the people, and on the other hand, a rapid evolution of economic interests, which assumed an ever increasing importance. Great things were done on both sides, but life was wholly taken up with these enterprises. There was no common goal for the whole of human nature, no inner exaltation, no clear understanding of the problems and conflicts of modern life. The main feature of the times was an unrestricted affirmation of life. Material existence increasingly absorbed all the available energy, and there was an unmistakable insincerity in the general profession of a belief in a spiritual world and a religion of a Christian complexion." This quotation shows very distinctly the problem as Eucken saw it in that early day. But it must not be forgotten that this statement was written fifty years after

the time when Eucken first entered Jena. It is possible that he is reading back into his thoughts about that earlier time the conclusions to which he had lately arrived. In reality this does not seem to be the case. Wherever one turns in the writings of this Philosopher, the same analysis of conditions is found. It is found in his earliest writings. Without any appreciable change it is there in the writings of his middle age and old age. The period of life from which the quotation is drawn does not seem to make any difference in the content of his meaning. Naturally, his ideas turn first to conditions in Germany; but he is not partial. The problem of life in Germany is the problem of life everywhere in the civilized world.

"The chief problem of life is life itself, as the complete unfolding and effective co-ordination of its own nature; as the poet says, 'the important thing is to become what one is'." (Life in the Spirit p-113). Modern life is not showing the best of life as Eucken sees it. Material progress has been enormous but it has cheapened rather than bettered life.

Machination and mechanization of life predominates in the modern world. These have brought to life many things but have not given the thing which life needs above everything else. Humanity, however, is becoming increasingly aware of its limitations. A growing feeling of hollowness forces itself upon us. "Does not this bear witness to the irrepressibility of the subject and to the impossibility of

denying ourselves all inner satisfaction?" (Main Currents p-45).

Eucken's quarrel is with the human product of the industrial life of the day. Industry specializes man's work, speeds up his labor and causes him to lose his individuality. "This life must bind man hand and foot to the temporary situation, keep him in a state of breathless tension and transform him more and more into a mere struggler for existence. It cannot be denied that the whole has led to prodigious results, but it becomes clearer and clearer that the man as a whole finds no happiness in such a life. But if this work thus strains him to the utmost without leading him through all his toil and agitation to any genuine happiness, and if at the same time it becomes clearer and clearer that in spite of the pre-eminent cultivation of his skill in particular directions, man is sinking to a lower level in the whole of his being, is becoming insignificant and in the end empty, the question necessarily arises whether all this work of civilization which renders man neither happy nor noble nor great, is not a self-deception on the part of humanity; whether it is not a huge contradiction to set all one's power in motion with such passionate earnestness, and, as regards the whole of one's being, to lose rather than to gain. What is then the real object for which man works if he thus becomes a mere means and instrument in a soulless

process of civilization? He works for a future wholly veiled from him and further confusion for the whole of humanity; craving after independence of life and time and happiness which drives him beyond the civilization based on mere work and compels him to seek further widths and depths of life." (Life of the Spirit. p-382)

Life is a tremendous struggle in which all are engaged. The struggle is for material things, which do not bring inner satisfaction to life. The capacities, forces and abilities of life are prostituted in the world of material things and the life is left empty and unhappy. "We see clearly before our eyes the hard and pitiless struggle for existence both in nature and among men, the constraint and insecurity of spiritual life in the world in which we live, but above all, the insufficiency of man for spiritual tasks on which the value of his existence depends, the wide interval between genuine spiritual culture and what men like to call culture." (Life of the Spirit. p-161,162)

Eucken believes and feels that all the so-called progress of civilization is without value because it has caused a real poverty of life. Because of this, under the modern scheme of life, "man will finally become a mere bundle of sensations, feelings and impulses." (Life of the Spirit. p-86)

Man has indeed made notable triumphs over the world. These triumphs, however, have failed to bring any adequate

satisfaction to the inner man; "nay, it would seem that it is precisely this development of power which makes us feel the limits of our capacity, and that progress itself gives rise to ever greater complications." (Essay-Philosophy and the Religious Movement of To-Day).

In reducing the present situation to its lowest terms, Eucken gives the following ultimatum: "Everything comes to a point today in the question whether our existence has a meaning and value at all, or whether it has been cleft by such a deep division that truth and peace remain denied to us." (Philosophy and The Religious Movement of To-Day). He adds, as proof of his contention, the fact that all the brilliance of our human culture and all the greatness of our achievement cannot satisfy us; and insists that this lack of satisfaction reveals within us the presence of a greater depth.

The insistance comes, on the other hand, that the modern movements of today are movements in the direction of man's freedom. He has found his power; he has conquered the material forces of the world and bent them to his will. He seeks full freedom. But this seeking for freedom has led in the direction of superficiality and the dissipation of energy. "In addition, the course of the movement in modern life has revealed that the complications are much greater, and the resistance much more strenuous than was anticipated at the beginning, when men were filled with joyful confidence,

and a further fact has become evident, viz. that it is not only at particular points that civilization does not correspond to the demands of the spiritual life, but that civilization as a whole is in many ways in conflict with these demands. We feel with increasing distress the wide interval between the varied and important work to be done at the circumference of life and the complete emptiness at the center. When we take an inside view of life we find that a life of mere bustling routine preponderates; that men struggle and boast and strive to outdo one another; that unlimited ambition and vanity are characteristic of individuals; that they are always running to and fro and pressing forward, or feverishly exerting all their powers. But throughout it all we come upon nothing that gives any real value to life and nothing spiritually elevating. Hence we do not find any meaning or value in life, but in the end a single huge show in which culture is reduced to a burlesque." (Life of The Spirit p-86,87,88).

All this, of course, is contrary to the expectation of the modern period. Man's efficiency and natural goodness were confidently expected to form the firm basis for the modern movement. If he could fully develop his powers, everything would shape itself for the best and a kingdom of reason would be established. Now security from all kinds of restraint has been achieved and human powers have been unfolded as never before. In spite of these human developments,

complications have arisen. "At the beginning of the modern period the conception of humanity included an emphatic judgment of value: to develop the human element in man still seemed to be, at our classical period, to raise life to a proud height, but now we are more conscious of what is petty, and mean in man; we perceive the sharp conflicts in his being, we find him not merely inadequate for the tasks which his own nature sets him, but we see his liberated spiritual powers to a large extent enlisted in the service of selfishness and, in general, of pettily human interests, and thereby diverted from their true ends. Hence it is not to be wondered at if there is aroused a longing for deliverance from the pettiness of man, a craving for greatness; but it must be confessed that as a rule these ambitions quickly succumb again to the influence of pettiness and vanity." (Life of The Spirit p-375,376).

And then the question of happiness arises. Man looks for this experience. "Our age has particularly urgent cause to occupy itself with the problem of happiness, for we are confronted by the remarkable contrast between the greatness of the outward achievements of the age and the insecurity of its sense of happiness. In successful devotion to the work of civilization we surpass all other periods: how far are we in advance of them in the knowledge of nature, in the mastery and utilization of its forces, in the humane ordering of society! But it cannot be denied that all these

achievements do not help us to attain a joyous and assured sense of life, that a pessimistic tone has become very widespread and continually extends further. How is it that with us work and happiness refuse to associate?

When such a disclosion compels us to consider the nature and conditions of happiness, we immediately encounter a grave misgiving. May man as a general rule make happiness the goal of his efforts; is it not a sign of a narrow and petty character that in every effort man should think principally of what gain he is to receive in happiness?" "The Life of The Spirit p-334,335).

Obviously, then, this age has not discovered the thing it thought was right ahead. Happiness and contentment seemed to be the natural outcome of the apparent great advancement in civilization. "We should have expected, when life became so much richer, more plastic, and more pleasurable, and when unceasing progress was made in every direction, that an overflowing happiness would have filled man's hearts. How does it come about that the very opposite has occurred, that we have become depressed rather than elated? This cannot be satisfactorily explained merely by arguing that what is taken up in youthful enthusiasm usually brings with it certain disappointments; that the resistance is apt to prove greater than was expected; that even in the case of success we do not find all that we hoped for; that where proud reason seemed to have established itself, much

that was irrational lay in concealment; all this would explain a certain lowering of our life-feeling, but not a complete reversal. The latter cannot be understood, unless the experiences of life have made our aims themselves uncertain and destroyed our faith in them. And to a very large extent this has taken place.

We are painfully conscious of an inner weakness; and life, thus uncontrolled, becomes vacillating and insecure. Under these circumstances, all elevation may seem impossible and all aspiration futile." (Essay - Against Pessimism - 1910).

What, then, may be said of the Modern Movement as a whole? Wherein lies its weakness? Why has life not been satisfied by it? "The Modern World, throughout its whole development, has been characterised by an inner unrest, by a restless struggling forward - not only in an external sense, but also on the part of man against himself - by reflection and doubt with regard to our own being, by a yearning and craving for clarity as to our purpose. Within the modern period there have been, not only hard conflicts in the world of concepts, but real transformations of the most deep-going description. The Renaissance was compelled to give way to the Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment to the New Humanism, while the last saw itself forced back and destroyed by the modern movement (in the narrow sense of the word modern). Humanity was forced again and again to abandon the point at

which it had begun to settle down. Ever anew the modern itself became a problem and a task, a war-cry of one party and a term of reproach in the mouth of the other.

Such insecurity and unrest proclaim that modern life, from the very beginning, is by no means simple, but on the contrary contains different goals within itself, nay that it is burdened with a thoroughgoing opposition, an unbearable contradiction. Such a contradiction cannot be overcome without a complete transformation of the first position, without the heroic building up of a new life and creative work - our entire existence being thereby converted into a great task." (Essay - The Inner Movement of Modern).

This age, according to Eucken is trivial, volatile, and of opportunist temper; it is mediocre, pedestrian, and futile. We lack, he thinks, the solemn and instant sense of final issues which marked men who went before us. And those who know life must admit, and they do admit, that there is a faint, vagrant troubling of life, an intangible vexation of spirit, a shifting ache, an irksome suggestion in our spiritual life to-day. But there is rarely a cry from the depths. We dimly sense the trouble but have no depth of spiritual life to work against it. (Eucken and Bergson - Hermann p-19). "We have the dropsical sentiment of the religious dilettante existing side by side with the most desolating and coarse grained rationalism and the violent reaction against theology as being too formal and external

to interpret the deep cravings of the spirit, coupled with a superstitious deference to Sluge the medium." (Eucken and Bergson - Hermann p-20). Of sustained and systematic work in the spiritual life, "there is deplorable paucity." (Ibid p-21).

It is the belief of Eucken that this modern age has become insecure with regard to all its ideals and even with regard to the very being of man. There is left no common ground of convictions from which to draw in order to unite and direct and elevate the forces of life. There is a noticeable increase of subjective activity but an inner decline of life is unavoidable if this uncertainty should continue to spread. (Main Currents p-306). Myrick Booth, in "Rudolf Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence", indicates that he is personally of the opinion that in this idea we have the key to the failure of our present day culture. "The lack of a positive standard of values paralyzes culture in its vital nerve."

By the payment of a price, the modern world has been won. The question comes - Has the achievement been worth the price which man has paid for it? Eucken thinks man has been cheated. "Anyone who thinks it all over and reflects upon the difference between the enormous labor that has been expended and the accompanying gain to the essentials of life, must either be driven to complete negation and despair, or must seek new ways of guaranteeing a value to life and

liberating man from the sway of the pettily human. But this will force men to resume the quest for inner connections." (The Life of The Spirit p-88).

Labor has been expended; outward conditions have been changed, but the essentials of life have not been gained in the process. "It has been brought home to us more and more that, however much we are able to alter and improve in the external relations of things, we do not thereby attain an essentially new life and a higher kind of being. All the progress of civilization has resulted in little genuine culture and little development of the condition of the soul. We cannot avoid asking the question whether such an activity on the mere surface of things is worth the enormous toil and labor which it costs." (The Life of The Spirit p-375).

So, in Eucken's opinion, the modern movement has produced more problems than it has solved. The state of the world is worse instead of better because the inner life of man has suffered a severe set-back. "Not only an abundance of problems encompasses us on all sides, but our spiritual condition as a whole has become insecure. We feel with particular distinctness at the present day that the life of humanity is not being built up in peace and security on a fixed foundation, but that we have continually to renew the struggle for its continuance and its main principles. Everything tends to show that our period is full of tension and occupied with high tasks; it is obvious that we have

come to a point where it is a question of recurring to the fundamental problems, to the elementary conditions of our spiritual existence: we are urgently called to search for new paths, to independent creative effort. But the average attainment of the period by no means corresponds to the demands of the spiritual condition. The spiritual situation of the present urgently calls for a synthesis of life, for an overcoming of oppositions, for a systematization which should deal with the whole, and also for a concentration of men on the search for common paths." (The Life of The Spirit p-396,397).

The present position of life is made exceedingly difficult by the complications of to-day. The need is to stabilize our spiritual basis. Life, however, may become narrow and restricted if stability degenerates into something rigid and immovable. What is to be the starting point? The subject is of chief interest to modern thought: the development of its potentialities its aim. The world, therefore, cannot be the starting point, and the attempt to use the subject, or some quality of it, as the starting point is not convincing. If man is to be the starting point, "then he must be himself the uncontested center of existence. If he is not this, then it is a presumption to take him as the starting point - a presumption for which we shall soon pay the penalty in an inadequate conception of life and a lack of confidence in our own enterprise. Thus the customary

handling of the problem leaves us feebly vacillating between two solutions." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-92).

Eucken is saying in the above quotation that neither side of the Cartesian dualism of subject-object is sufficient to solve the problem of today. To give full attention to either but adds to the unsolved phases of life's problem. Such an attempt to handle the situation adds to the perplexities. Life seeks progress but the contradictions involved in either the emphasis upon the subject or upon the object - the world of self and the world of things - lessens the chances of progress. Any hope of improvement comes to grief upon the rocks of these contradictions. In the struggle for growth and development the main issue is to retain the true emphasis on the inward life. The urge for spiritual self preservation compels us to search for further depths. We seek profounder sources of energy from which to draw fresh ardour of life and free the self from the limitations of finitude.

Beyond the realm of immediate experience this venture must carry us. An inversion of the "given reality" must take place. Interest is not only in the self and in things but we are driven to search the deeps for reality: the path leads into metaphysics and religion.

The confusions of thought, the social, industrial, moral and political upheaval of the modern period have impressed upon us the seriousness of our problem. The world needs to

win a new life; the soul of man and the world needs to be saved. The human and the divine need to be united in a new way, a way not like that which was set by earlier generations.

So Eucken analyses the world and the life of his day.

Everywhere there is a sense of a deep problem. Life has progressed by many degrees in material things but life has no abiding satisfaction and peace. This lack is felt everywhere. No group is free from it. What is to be done? "The problem, then, is to unify life from the standpoint of our immediate experience; give it, if possible, a meaning; and, in particular, transcend the intolerable dualism of subject and object. Modern thought has approached this problem along two different lines. Either it has set itself to find a life that shall be more than merely subjective - a world life which includes man wholly and entirely within its own being, leaving the subject no shread of independence - or it has made the subject itself the central and controlling factor while the world has been conceived of as merely furnishing the environment and serving as a means for securing man's welfare." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-25).

How does this movement of today compare with the movement of other days? "We are, today, in this modern world, moving in contrast to the direction of the middle ages. To-day it is a movement of the subject towards the object, from man towards the world. In the other case, the truth of man's action depended entirely upon his relationship to the world."

Then, the whole, as an organism, embraced man within it as a member, so that the human sphere was dominated by organization, at first in the form of the state, then in that of the church; to break away from this was to abandon all reason. The leading idea of life and conduct was accordingly ORDER, which assigned to all freedom its measure and its limits.

In the modern period, the subject strengthened and deepened, felt this bond and this subordination to be an unbearable coercion, and at the same time perceived, in the previous view of the world, a mere reflection of his own activity. Fixity changed to fluidity; the subject becomes the central point; at the same time the individual becomes the supporter of society and communicates to it its life and power. Order gives way to freedom, while man's activity and self-consciousness increase immeasurably. This aggrandisement of man is the most conspicuous feature of modern life." (Essay - The Inner Movement of Modern Life).

This movement in modern life is opposed by the thirst for reality, the pursuit of which sinks the individual in truth for truth's sake.

"In face of the influences of the world which press so strongly upon us we lack a rounded-off world of thought to mitigate, transform, and turn to account the doubts and difficulties of life; in particular we lack a single supreme truth, and hence we stand defenceless in the face of an all-powerful

fate. Is it to be wondered at if in these circumstances pessimism boldly raises its head and ever advances further? (The Life of The Spirit p-388,389).

In the modern era the idea has somewhat changed to a similarity to that in the age of the Sophists. They said; "Man is the measure of all things". And today the subject, man, has become the all important feature of life.

"Thus man is himself a great problem. No closed circle can shut his nature in. What is so characteristic of him is in fact just this, that a special limited form of being - the merely natural in him - comes into contact with a life that is universal and supra-natural. The result of this contact is to induce collision and strife, and leave the whole life tense with conflicting emotions. We all know well what a pervading unrest takes possession of human life the moment it begins to struggle free from nature." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-88).

Life, therefore, is the problem in Eucken. Not the life of the world, but the life in man. What is his status? This may seem to be egotistical but the inference is that the main impulse in life is man's struggle for the salvation of his spiritual being, for the overcoming of all the irrational forces which are working to oppress and destroy him. "And when such a desire makes itself felt and develops to full consciousness, it will force everything else into the background and know no appeasement until it has found

some sort of satisfaction. For nothing less than the highest we know is here at stake; and in the whole of infinity nothing can possess any value for us if the hostile powers triumph at this decisive point." (Essay - Philosophy and the Religious Movement of Today).

If the life of today is thus out of kilter, what is our major need? This question is asked and answered over and over again. "We need a firm basis, a spiritual anchorage; again, we need initiative, capacity to originate and create; and finally, we need a release from sordid motives; our life must be great and magnanimous if it is to have any meaning and value. Let us see whether a life which springs from the recognition of an independent spiritual world within us can fulfill these requirements by making life firm, free, and heroic, and can fill the emptiness of our heart with a rich and satisfying content." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-91).

This new life, to overshadow and take the place of the old, this spiritual life, must come before us as our own. "In order to make an effective appeal it must have its roots in our own nature, and subserve the development of this nature. But at the same time it looms aloft above all human frailty, and has, or at least may have the power to overrule all human ends." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-88).

This new life, the life of the Spirit is neither subjective or objective. It lies beyond either and beyond

the antithesis of subject and object. "The task of synthesis, while fully recognizing the existing complications and antitheses, presses forward beyond these to a depth at which the life-process is able by reason of its own inner firmness to bridge the gulf and in itself to gain a cosmic character." (Essay - The Inner Movement of Modern Life).

According to Professor Henry C. Sheldon there are two main endeavors in the philosophical writings of Rudolf Eucken. In the first place, he aims to uncover with utmost distinctness the great deficiencies of the age. And in the second place, he seeks to direct a remedy which is alone adequate. This first aim we have tried to discuss and point out in this chapter. In concluding this point, four pointed quotations from Eucken will be added.

"We witness with painful clearness today a strong decline of inward culture; ever less does man find definite satisfaction in all the bustle of our modern mechanism; ever more is the inward life lowered in its pitch to the commonplace; and ever clearer it becomes apparent that all the gain on the periphery of life cannot counterbalance the loss which occurs at the center. In the last resort it is true that we live our existence from out the center, and, although this fact may be forgotten in our relationship to the environment, it can never be permanently lost..... It is wonderfully great in its mastery of an achievement within the environing world; but, on the other hand, it is

deplorably poor and insecure in regard to the problems of the inner life and the inner world." (The Truth of Religion p-117,118,605).

"The position at the present moment conclusively proves that the content of man's life is not the easy unsought product of a natural process of historical development, for, after all the weary work of many thousand years, we are today in a condition of painful uncertainty, a state of hopeless fluctuation, not merely with regard to individual questions, but also as to the general purpose and meaning of life." (The Problem of Human Life as Viewed by Great Thinkers p-565).

"A paralyzing doubt saps the vitality of our age. We see a clear proof of this in the fact that, with all our astounding achievements, we are not really happy. There is no pervading sense of confidence and security, but rather a tendency to emphasize man's insignificance, and to think meanly of his position in the universe. A closer scrutiny reveals the presence of a genuine endeavour to unify life, but even so the processes adopted are so widely divergent as to be directly antagonistic...Over against a lavish output of departmental work we have to set a woeful incapacity to deal with life as a whole, and a growing uncertainty as to the goal aimed at and the nature of the path to be followed." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-2).

"Sharp contrasts have always been found in human

experience; and in transitional periods in history they have been felt with painful acuteness. But never did they so extend over the whole life and so deeply affect fundamentals; never was there so much uncertainty with regard to what should be the main direction and endeavour and the meaning of all human existence and man's relation, as in the present." (Life's Basis and Life's Ideal p-93,94).

Eucken has recognized the need. He has sensed the trouble with the world and life. He settled very definitely upon what he thought was the need and where the trouble lay. In all his writings he seemed never to shift from the fundamental conception of these matters as he evidently formed them upon his return from Basil to Jena to take up his professorship at the University to which he was to give more than fifty years of his life.

Chapter IV

ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS

Eucken discusses very freely the solution which others have offered for the problem of life. His discussions of the theories of others is remarkable for the fairness, breadth of view, sympathy, insight, and accurate knowledge shown. No superficial criticism is given and he does not concern himself with the unessential details of the theories.

Abel Jones declares, "What is the meaning, the values, and purpose of life, and what is the highest and the eternal in life - the great reality? This is the question that Eucken would solve." (Rudolf Eucken - A Philosophy of Life. p-15).

In viewing the proffered solutions to this problem, Eucken lists five - Religion, Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism and Individualism. Of these five, the first two consider the invisible world and the reality in life; the other three lay emphasis on man's life in this present world. These five are chosen by Eucken out of all the philosophies of life, A. J. Jones thinks, because they are the ones which form the basis for a whole system of life. "Mere theoretical ideas of life, especially negative ideas such as those of agnosticism and scepticism, do not form such a basis, but the five chosen for discussion can, and have to some extent, posed as complete theories of life, upon which a system of life can be built." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. p-16).

Religion is one of the oldest solutions to the problem.

This solution has been offered to the satisfaction of many, but Eucken chooses to examine it. Has it solved the problem? Does it answer the questions which arise in the difficulties which face us?

In dealing with the religious solution, Eucken quickly comes to Christianity as being the best exponent of religion. When he speaks of Christianity, he is thinking of traditional Christianity; the Christianity of the Creeds, Doctrines and Dogmas. He answers his own question in the negative with respect to traditional Christianity being the solution to the problem? It has done some things. It has been the source of consolation to many; it has helped man to live, but it has not solved the problem and can not be counted on ever to solve the problem.

Christianity, the representative type of religion, attempted to solve the problem by placing stress upon a higher invisible world, a world in sharp contrast with the mere world of sense, and far superior to it. In it there is the supernatural world to which man is raised above the natural world. This supernatural world is man's resting place, his source of help, his deliverance from evil, his salvation.

This solution has given man great hope and confidence. Because of the promises of Christianity, this supernatural world has been of great influence. It has colored life everywhere and remains today a great influence. But doubts have arisen, especially in the modern movement. These

doubts are thrown against the very foundation of this belief. The change has been brought about by the new interest in the natural sciences.

In Christianity, man was made the center of the universe. The sciences have changed this emphasis. The world is a broader and greater thing than man. Man, because of the sciences, has literally been compelled to take a broader view of the universe. Natural laws have entered into the controversy and have, for some, broken down entirely the belief in a super-natural world.

Not only science but history has had something to do with the change through which religion has gone. The philosophy of history has revealed many things which do not seem to be in harmony with the claims of the supernatural world. For instance, "some historians have brought to the fore arguments to prove that the belief in an overworld is merely the characteristic of a certain stage in the evolution of mankind, and that the ideas of religion are, after all, little more than the mental construction of a God upon the image of man's own self."

Besides this, history has not been very lenient with the doctrinal forms of religion. It has showed the fact that the prevailing ideas of the times have given to religions their colors. Are these elements, then, anything more than temporary? If they, the forms and doctrines and dogmas of religion, are due to the prevailing current ideas

of an age, then they can not claim their origin in an over-world. Their origin is clearly traced in most cases, therefore, the fact of a supernatural world receives a staggering blow.

Not only has science and history played a part in the new attitude towards a supernatural world, but human activities are very strong in the modern movement and have drawn man's attention from the far away to the near at hand. Man's attention to the world near at hand has given him a chance to pit his strength and wisdom against the material world. Man has done much in gaining control over nature and in harnessing nature to his will. Nature has responded and man's zest for the conquest has correspondingly increased. The Supernatural has, in a measure, lost its appeal because the Natural gives such a great appeal and man is fascinated. The overworld sinks into the background. "The sense world at present makes a strong appeal - and the stronger it becomes, the less man listens to the call of an overworld."

And so Eucken's conclusion is: "Religion (in the traditional form), despite all it has effected, is for the man of to-day, a question rather than an answer. It is itself too much of a problem to interpret to us the meaning of our life, and make us feel that it is worth the living." Eucken has much more to say about religion and we will come to that in another chapter. Religion, "The Fact of Facts", wields a great power and it must be reckoned with in a

sympathetic way, but traditional religion will not solve the problem of life.

Immanent Idealism, also, gives life an invisible basis. There is, however, this difference between the invisible world of religion and that of Immanent Idealism: the former gives a separate world outside our own, the latter postulates an invisible world that lies at the root of the present world.

God, or the Divine, in the theory of Immanent Idealism is considered as a power existing in and permeating the world. It is the divine which gives to the world its truth and depth.

Man is a citizen of the world of material things, but does not need to be bound to them. He finds his depth not in the superficialities of the natural world, but in the ideal world which is at the root of the natural world.

Immanent Idealism is facing the same criticism that confronts Traditional Religion: "Does this so called deeper invisible reality in the world exist?" A belief in the theory of idealism involves a belief in the goodness and rationality of the universe. It, the universe, must be on the side of man as he works for the highest things.

"But a serious study of things reveals to us the fact that the universe is not entirely reasonable and harmonious. If it were, then man's effort towards the ideal would be helped by the whole universe, but that is far from being the

case; progress means fight, and difficult fight; there is definite opposition to the efforts of man to raise himself. Moreover, there is evil in the world, let pantheists and others say what they will. Eucken refuses to close his eyes to, or to explain away, opposition, pain, and evil - the world is far from being wholly reasonable and harmonious, and idealists must acknowledge this fact. The natural sciences, too, by emphasising the reign of law, tend to limit more and more the possibilities of the human being, ultimately robbing him of all freedom - hence of all possibility of creation. And how can one be an enthusiastic devotee of idealism if he is led to doubt man's power to aim at, fight towards, or even choose the highest?"

(Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life p-20. A.J. Jones).

Then, too, the mind of today does not seem to fit into the theory of Immanent Idealism. Ideals today do not gain much support. Man is not enthusiastic about following lofty aims. He is quite indifferent to the whole realm of ideals. The interest of man lies in the field of material things, the natural world, and he has apparently little time or inclination to interest himself in ideals.

The teachings of Idealism are more abstract than those of Religion. Idealism does not possess, in its theory, a personal God who is the driving and rewarding and punishing power in Religion. Therefore, today, Idealism seems to lack authority or driving power of any kind.

Again, the mind, of today is democratic and Idealism has about it the air of aristocracy. Idealism flourished in the days when culture was at a high state; when great personalities produced masterpieces in art, music, and literature. But there are very few people who are thus raised to cultural heights. Great things in the realm of culture are the monopoly of the few. The common level of man, which group includes the vast majority of the human race, never rises to these heights. They have not the time, the leisure nor the inclination to be interested in the cultural features necessary to the life of Idealism. They turn their attention to the so-called hard facts of life, the processes of making a living and gaining control of the natural world and bending natural forces to their aid. Idealism is shut out. We are now, Eucken thinks, at this stage.

There is, about the theory of Immanent Idealism, a vast amount of uncertainty. It seems to be just a makeshift compromise between religion and a life devoted to sense experience. "That which was intended to give a firm support, and to point out a clear course to our life, has itself become a difficult problem." So, instead of solving our problem, Immanent Idealism leads us into more problems and uncertainties, without possessing the virtue of solving them. It cannot solve the problem of life because it postulates an invisible world which presupposes that the universe

is reasonable, good, and helpful to man in his struggles; whereas experience proves the contrary. The mind of today is not a fertile field for the theory. Man is interested, not in high aims and ideals, but in the control of the natural world. The culture of today is not of the arts, music and literature which breathe of aristocracy, but the culture of democracy in which the general level of life holds the center of the stage and the majority is interested in the hard facts of life in the natural and material world; it leaves us in as much uncertainty as prevailed at the beginning. It not only does not solve the problem of life, but actually adds other unsolved problems.

Obviously the theory of Naturalism should here be tested. Does it solve our problem? In Naturalism the interests and powers of the physical life and the physical world predominate. Life is declared to be composed of only the physical elements and reality is found in sense experience. The life of the soul is subordinated to the level of the natural, material world. The theory of Naturalism stimulates self-confidence, hope in this life and faith in the normal human efforts. This is quite in harmony with the statement of Aristotle that men take their notions of happiness from the lives actually lived around them. Naturalism has no place for an overworld or for a theory of amelioration through spiritual intervention in the affairs of man.

Naturalism has come to great power in our day. Because

of the adoption of this philosophy of life, man has become independent and has succeeded in a great measure in gaining control over nature. It, nature, operates according to law; discover the law and control is achieved. Because he has learned to understand the laws of nature, man has invented machines to profit by the knowledge he has gained. Human activity has reached a very fruitful period.

Man's life has taken a new turn. The sense world has become more absorbing in its interest. He is a seeker in the realm of natural life and has little time for other interests. "The interest of mankind became so concentrated upon material things that the interest in the invisible decreased, while the mechanical, soulless elements with their ceaseless actions and reactions in definite order, and according to inviolable law, were held sufficient to account for the phenomena of nature. The keynote was 'relation to environment'; a constantly changing environment, changing according to law, called for ceaseless readjustment, and the adaptation to environment was held to be the stimulus to all activity in the natural world." (Rudolf Eucken, a Philosophy of Life. p-23).

Through the influence of the theory of Naturalism man came to believe that some of his former observations and theories had been erroneous. He had marked the differences between himself and all other life and had concluded that such distinctions were due to the favor of the gods. His

theories of life had been to him sacred and of divine origin. Now he learned their source. Biological evolution, of course, is a part of the new theory of Naturalism, and through this science man came to understand the development of his own life. "What he had regarded as his distinctive characteristics were held to be but the product of natural factors, and his life was regarded, too, as under the domain of rigid, inviolable law. There was no need for the conception of free, originitive thought....Man was simply the result of the interaction of numerous causes - and like the rest of nature, involved no independent spiritual element." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. A. J. Jones p-23,24).

Eucken thinks that in Naturalism there is but one test or standard of value: that is, usefulness. He evidently would class Pragmatism, and Instrumentalism and Naturalism as similar in this regard. "Hence at a single stroke the spiritual world is wiped away, the soul of man is degraded from its high position, the great truths of religion are cast aside as mere illusion." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. p-24).

In spite of all the greatness of Naturalism, and notwithstanding the apparent favoritism with which the modern world considers it, this theory is not able to solve the problem of human life. It has some virtue as a theory. For instance it is simple and easily grasped and is therefore very attractive to the human mind. It does not possess the

difficulties contained in a conception of a higher world. Eucken acknowledges all the greatness of Naturalism and yet denies that it is the solution of our problem.

He contends that the existence of the theory of Naturalism is, in itself, a denial of the theory. The very existence of the theory disproves it. Man has sought out, organized, formulated this theory. "Nature is indeed subdued by man; why then degrade man to the level of a universe he has mastered?", asks A.J. Jones.

Naturalism considers the world of things experienced but fails to account for the mind which experiences them. An intellect which is nothing more than a mirror of sense impressions cannot get beyond sense impressions. The mind of man has gone far beyond the mere world of sense impressions as indicated by the theory of Naturalism itself. It is strange but true that Naturalism postulates nature without mind, "When only by the mind processes can man become aware of nature, and construct a naturalistic scheme of life." As Eucken says: "To a thorough-going naturalism, naturalism itself is logically impossible."

In many places in his writings, Eucken declares the inadequacy and insufficiency of Naturalism. Following will be written four quotations from his book, "The Meaning and Value of Life", and three from his book, "The Life of the Spirit".

"A life which complies entirely with the mechanical requirements of a merely natural order resolves itself into a

mere series of isolated states which entirely lack organic connection. What connection there is is purely external - mere addition and juxtaposition; there is no inner principle of relationship. The struggle for existence between competing individuals is the law of Life's evolution, and life itself is but the system of interactions which this struggle calls into play. No individual can step out of his place in the series, and thus all life is strictly derivative and dependent. There is no room whatsoever for any originality, independence, and free decision. All that we can say about anything is that it has happened. There can be no such question as why? and wherefore? Nor can there be any opposing values such as good and evil, but only a greater or a less expenditure of force.

It can hardly be denied to-day that human life corresponds very largely to this description, and that even our psychical life is, to a far greater extent than was formerly supposed, a mere prolongation of the physical. But the question still remains whether this is the complete truth and a just description of life as a whole. If life has no inner coherency, if it moves only in response to stimulus from without and lacks all free initiative, if it resolves itself entirely into a tissue of external relations, into mere adaptation to constantly changing environments, then not only is religion doomed, but equally all morality and justice."

"The Meaning and Value of Life. P-28,29).

Eucken insists that the Naturalistic scheme does not give man any task to challenge his activity. "Again, what task is there within the naturalistic scheme to challenge our activity? Are we even justified in using the terms 'task' and activity'? Nature within and without us pursues an unswerving course; resistless forces control her every movement. It is not really man who acts; something acts in him, something that is essentially alien to his nature. His consciousness can only register and observe what is done; it can neither originate nor change anything. Thus, for all his physical endowment, man would be a mere observer, a mere shadow of the genuine reality, were he not impelled to exert himself in order to rid his existence of error and illusion. The only stimulus to exertion that Naturalism can offer is a call to oppose any attempt on man's part to transcend the limits of nature, a summons to engage in active warfare against human prejudice and superstition. If once the victory were won, if the enlightenment were complete and man put back into his rightful place in nature, it is hard to see what would be left for him to do. His inward development would come to a standstill, and all further achievement would rest with nature, and not with the human will. Thus the real goal of our highest effort would coincide with the complete extinction of all spiritual life.

Now is it possible for man, the product of a long historical evolution, to revert to his natural, primitive

condition, and, divesting himself of all that makes him distinctively man, to hope thereby to realize his essential nature and satisfy his craving for happiness?" (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-29,30).

What, then, can Naturalism offer and how valuable is that offering? "The only thing Naturalism can offer in return for all that it takes away is emancipation from illusion and superstition, and a clear perception of man's oneness with nature. But however valuable such enlightenment may be, how can it conduce to nobility of character? How can it nourish man's inner life and help to develop a spiritual individuality? Can it give him an added force? Can it put him in more intimate relation with his fellows or with the universe? Can it allow him any conceivable form of initiative? And if not, can it still convince us that life is worth the living? Surely not, unless our claims are very modest or our thought unthorough, or, indeed, we steal our opponents arguments and gradually veer round to their position. He who thinks things out to their logical issue will find that Naturalism leads nowhere. He will find himself driven to negation and despair. It is only through the intensity of her opposition to what she holds to be superstitious and illusory that Naturalism herself can be deceived as to her own emptiness and her lack of any spiritually productive power." (The Meaning and Value of Life p-32).

And Eucken further contends that man, in his activities,

is not limited to the materials of the sense impressions. "In virtue of his thought, man can overcome the distraction of sensible impressions and the transience of external stimulations: he can grasp permanent values and aims; in fact, he can leave behind him the whole domain of civil life with all its petty interests, and in the contemplation of the universe, with its eternal order and wonderful beauty, he can attain a true and lasting happiness. He can return hence to man and his soul, and here also strive to attain a condition essentially higher than the average." (Life of The Spirit. p-339,340).

In answering the questions of Naturalism, man, who is the one chiefly interested in the matter, must have a right to reply. Eucken's conception of man makes Naturalism untenable in his philosophical scheme. "Man's greatness and worth do not lie in what he is as a natural being, nor in what he is as belonging to a particular nation, or a particular religion, but in what he is as a reasonable being." (The Life of The Spirit p-236).

As a reasonable being man is more than is revealed by the mere test of sense impressions and experiences. "Naturalism itself, as a system of thought and a totality of life, bears witness to this superiority of the inner, for without this superiority the diversity of things could never have been co-ordinated, worked up and experienced as a whole." (The Life of The Spirit p-247).

Thomas Hill Green agrees with Eucken that the very fact that man can build up the theory of Naturalism and that the theory itself presupposes a mind greater than it, is sufficient proof against Naturalism as the solution of the problem of life.

Naturalism does not take into account the inner life of man. It ignores the possibility of such a life and offers no substitute for it except the world of external things. Eucken is not satisfied that it is the theory he is looking for. His conclusions about Naturalism are given in the following quotation from "The Meaning and Value of Life" p-33.

"Thus Naturalism is inadequate as an explanation of life. But so far we have disputed its pretensions to be supported by the facts of our immediate experience. And so long as this claim remains uncontested, all the fruits of spiritual labour may well seem to be but secondary or supplementary. But are we to-day so absolutely sure that the sense-world really does supply the most immediate and solid basis for life? It is doubtless immediate and indisputable so long as we surrender ourselves wholly to sense-impressions and sense-perceptions, so long as we do not think, or so long as our thought remains under tutelage to the sense-world, and never becomes independent. Now, to a large extent, human thinking does remain in such tutelage, and, in so far as it does so, cannot overstep the limits of the natural order. Experience shows us that a considerable degree of intelligence

can be displayed even within these limits. There is no lack of prudence, cunning, and cleverness in the animal world. But all that such intelligence does is to supply us with weapons of self-preservation; it subserves the continuance of the individual or the species; but it does not enable us to escape from nature's mechanical routine and to strike out new paths towards self-chosen ends. Intelligence, understood in this limited sense, stands precisely on the same level as any bodily advantage. Cunning and prudence are to one creature exactly what a coat of mail is to another, or nimbleness and agility to a third. Now, to a large extent, this is true of man also. His intelligence is, in the first instance, a mere weapon enabling him to sustain the fierce struggle for existence. But it is also something more, inasmuch as it is able to free itself from its dependence on the sense-world, place itself over against it, and calmly survey it from without."

Then Eucken turns his questions upon Humanism. What has it, as a philosophy of life, to say to our problem? Can it give us any help? Humanism, for the purpose of his study, Eucken divides into two parts, Socialism and Individualism. The modern movement has so taken up with these different aspects of life because the idea of the overworld has receded into the background. Man has turned to himself and to his neighbors in order to find a firm basis of life.

Socialism and Individualism have followed each other

in repeated succession, first one and then the other. Man has tried to find the answer to his questions in socialism, and then socialism has given way to individualism. Eucken contends that neither one has given satisfaction and neither one can solve the problem of life.

Having been denied both the overworld and also the world of nature, man has turned, naturally, to his fellow-men. In socialism, the progress of humanity is the chief aim. His social relations seem all important. He realizes the interdependence of human life. The growth of modern industrialism has advanced the theory that the value of the individual depends largely upon his being a part of society. He no longer stresses the value of the individual, but agrees that worth and value are in society as a whole. The development of the community becomes the all important thing in life.

In socialism a most pressing problem is that of the distribution of material things. How to organize the community so that an equal and just distribution of the fruits of labor and the values of natural production, becomes the paramount question. All this is well and good, but Eucken does not believe that such a solution is the solution to the major problem of life. There is more to life than its materials; there is something to it that socialism does not and cannot touch.

Socialism fails in that it trusts too much to the will,

whim and fancy of the majority. The theory seems to be that what the majority want is right and they should have it. History has clearly proven that often the best interests of life have been carried in the lives of the minority. The truth, according to socialism, is to be found in the will of the majority. "The tendency of the masses as such is to consider material advancement the most cherished good. Hence, inevitably, a thorough going socialism must become materialistic, even though at an earlier stage it was accentuated by the desire for opportunities of spiritual culture." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. p-29).

Eucken again objects to socialism because of the minor place which it gives to the individual. The individual has value only as a member of the society. Eucken contends that such was the case in primitive society but as civilization progressed the individual became characterized by an inner, spiritual life which made him conspicuous on his own account. It is out of the deepening of this inner life that spiritual creativeness comes. The spiritual life advances and spiritual tasks develop a kingdom of truth and spiritual interests which transcend mere human standards.

Eucken cites historical data as the proof of the reality of this spiritual kingdom. Socialism can give no explanation of it. Therefore the solution which it offers for the problem of life is not comprehensive enough.

Another criticism which Eucken offers to the socialistic

philosophy of life is that it makes no place for the spiritual creativeness of the individual. Such a thing, he contends, destroys the most fruitful activity of life.

When socialism fails individualism springs up as the natural reaction. Extreme follows extreme. "Individualism opens up a new life, a life which is free, joyous and unconventional." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. p-30).

But individualism is too subjective. The individual has recourse to nothing outside himself. He stands or falls on his own because he lacks any relationships. "Even in the case of strongly marked personalities, they can never get beyond themselves and their own subjective states, for they must always live upon themselves, and eternally reflect upon their own doings." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. p-30). Eucken is avowedly opposed to subjectivism. "Once for all, man is more than his mere subjective states." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-53).

Eucken has the following to say about man's interest being shifted from a world outside of himself. "When man's confidence in another world is shaken, and the world of nature and thought, as immediately present to him, treats him as a mere tool, and thus strikes at the very root of his spiritual existence, there is but one way left by which he may still preserve to life a meaning and value: he must trust to the self-sufficiency of human life, and devote himself to fostering and furthering its interests." (The

Meaning and Value of Life. p-42).

Never, however, will Eucken agree that life will permit itself to be left to such a state. If it is to have no other goal than earthly prosperity and the forces of the individual, then civilization is a fatal mistake.

Eucken analyzes the implications of the socialistic and individualistic humanism in the following quotation. "If the socialistic program is adopted, then we are to presuppose that the various forces involved combine easily, work together happily, and utilize the collective reason of the community. If we take the individualistic program, we are to think of the individual as being noble and high-minded, interested only in the things that matter. A certain faith in humanity is needed to supplement the deficiencies of man as we find him, and enable us to see him in an exalted light. But is the impression left on us by the movements of our own day such as would justify this faith in humanity? Do we not see the great masses of our population possessed by a passion that sweeps all before it, a reckless spirit of aggressiveness, a disposition to lower all culture to the level of their interests and comprehension, to replace quality with quantity, making of life a rougher, ruder thing, repressing individual freedom, and evincing the while a defiant self-assertion? And on the side of the individual what do we see? Paltry meanness in abundance, embroidered selfishness, idle self-absorption, the craving to be conspicuous at all costs,

shouldering aggressiveness, repulsive hypocrisy, lack of courage despite all boastful talk, a lukewarm attitude towards all spiritual tasks, but the busiest industry when personal advantage is concerned. All this is far too glaring to be overlooked; and if, notwithstanding, we talk carelessly of the greatness of humanity and the excellence of individuals, asserting that if only given a free field they will infallibly make life everywhere happy and great, we thereby manifest a remarkable faith in man, a faith which of all faiths is the most open to criticism." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-56).

Our Philosopher is of the opinion that both types of humanism presuppose a spiritual atmosphere as a setting for our human life and effort. And the pre-supposition in each case is inconsistent with the assumptions of humanism. "In the one case, the cementing of a union between individuals appears to set free the springs of love and truth; in the other, each single unit seems to have behind it the background of a spiritual world whose development is fostered by means of its individual labour. In both cases alike, life acquires forthwith a meaning, but only at the cost of abandoning the premises of a merely realistic culture, so that we find ourselves back in the very perplexities from which we were to have found escape." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-55).

In searching for a statement from Eucken which seems to

sum up his conclusions about humanism, the following quotation from "The Meaning and Value of Life", is chosen.

"Thus a merely humanistic culture comes to grief, no matter which it selects of the two directions open to it.

(Individualism or Socialism). Neither the mutual attraction nor the mutual repulsion of men gives to life any meaning or content whatsoever. Socialistic culture directs itself chiefly to the outward conditions of life, but in care for these it neglects the life itself. Individualistic culture would fain deal with life in itself, but since it can never refer us back to anything beyond isolated states and moments, we cannot see life whole, nor as possessing any inwardness or any inner world. Thus here, too, the soul is wanting; our activity cannot reach beyond the surface. In neither case has the soul any true self-immediacy. But the incessant warfare of the opposing tendencies serves to conceal this emptiness and lack of content. Each has a certain amount of justification and a certain advantage over the other, and while it is bringing this out and adapting it to the needs of the age, life becomes intent and keen, and it looks as though progress were undeniably being made." (p-54) But either type only deceives itself and the movement of modern life.

"Either there is something other and higher than this purely humanistic culture, or life ceases to have any meaning or value. Once put the problem universally, and

any third alternative is at once ruled out." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-140).

Eucken has set certain tests for any theory which is offered as a solution to the problem of life. (1) It should offer an explanation for life which can be a firm basis for life. (2) It must admit of the possibility of human freedom. (3) It must release the human being from sordid motives. In his analysis of Traditional Religion, Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Humanism, he has concluded that neither answers satisfactorily the requirements of these tests. We must look elsewhere for the solution to the problem of life.

Chapter V

EUCKEN'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

If one is not satisfied with the solutions which have been offered to the problem of life, in all fairness he must do something more than prove the inadequacy of the attempted solutions. He must offer one which is not erroneous as the others are. Eucken accepts the reasonableness of such a demand and offers a solution which he feels fits the needs of the situation and is better than any solution previously offered.

In his book, "Rudolf Eucken, His Life, Work and Travels, by Himself", our philosopher gives an intimate picture of the way in which this solution developed in his own mind. He analyzes, first, the trouble with the philosophy of Germany at the beginning of his work at Jena, and then goes on to point out the steps by which his own philosophy developed.

"We had on one side the adherents to the older Idealism and on the other the Realists and Positivists. The Idealists clung to the fundamental belief in an independent spiritual world, but wished to tone down the dogmatism of the speculative systems, to prune their excessive luxuriance of ideas, and to give more weight to experience in nature and human life, and to appreciate more carefully and impartially the contents of history. In this way they infused more caution and reserve into philosophy. Yet, valuable as the results were, they did not yield an independent view of life, or afford such new direction as our distracted and fermenting age required. This sort of Idealism was a sort of reaction

against the prevailing Realism, a clinging to inherited ideals, rather than an original creation out of the whole, an inauguration of new paths in the historical situation of the present time. One could therefore quite understand the victorious progress of Positivism. It took its stand exclusively on the kind of existence given in experience, and did not acknowledge an independent world of action. It set aside the problem of existence as insoluble by man, and, in the shape of 'Scientific' philosophy, tried to divest itself of all metaphysics. Philosophy, in fact, chiefly meant for it a systematic arrangement of the particular sciences."

"But its attempt to proceed from without to within, and to dissolve the whole of reality into a network of relations, and therefore into a purely external world, could not possibly meet the needs of the German mind. It is no matter of chance that great Positivists have arisen in France and England but not in Germany." (p-126)

How to combat these faults and failures in the life of German thinking was the task to which Eucken early set himself. Could Hegel help him? "Speculative philosophy of the Hegelian kind seemed to me to be an overstraining of the human faculty, yet I had no sufficiently clear idea of the relation of the world to man. Thus I remained at first a seeker." (P-128) But inactivity was not a part of his nature. Through all the difficulties of an unsettled philosophical outlook Eucken came to a definite position of his own.

"In this (working out his own system) I succeeded very slowly and with great trouble. Certain points seemed to me clear. I must put spiritual life above nature without contesting the rights of the latter. It seemed to me impossible to admit a monistic co-operation of the two worlds. I conceived the spiritual life as essentially ethical, in the broader sense, not intellectualistic. I always have regarded intellectualism as an impoverishment of life, yet fully recognized the importance of conceptual activity." (p-127,128)

He says of his struggles and the slowly developing ideas that he received great sympathy from a few people; some of whom were Roman Catholic in their faith, such as Sengler and Hoffmann. He was greatly disappointed, however, that it was only the older men who were interested in his work. The younger were indifferent to it. "The old epoch was over, and I could not associate myself with it, and the new era followed a different tendency. I was therefore alone." (p-132.)

His ideas fell into shape in firm general direction most clearly in the years 1881 and 1882. "The starting point of all my efforts was the conception of life. Within this conception, however, I distinguished between a lower and a higher stage, a biological and a zoological level. At the lower level life was bound up with nature; at the higher it attained independence and self-containedness.

In the former case life consisted only of the reciprocal relations of the various elements; in the latter there ruled a single force, and it brought about an ordered realm of the contents. Thus existence with its experience and the world of action diverged sharply from each other; though they had, of course, to be adjusted somehow." (p-133.)

Eucken took a special view between the old and the new view of life. "The old way, as we find it in ancient thought and earlier Christianity, presupposed a self-contained world that dominated man; either an artistically conceived cosmos or the Kingdom of God and the Church with its ethical values. In this the thought of the whole had absolute precedence; it had to give man both the aim and force of life. The great change in modern times was mainly due to the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The starting point and the chief concern was man and his thoughts. The idea now was to build all reality upon man, and to find a content for life from this point of view. Every province of life had thus to be rearranged, and philosophy had the inevitable task of establishing an inner connection between man and the whole, and offering this to him as his mental property." (p-134.) But Kant pointed out very clearly the fact that if you start with man you cannot get beyond man. He did think, however, that freedom could be attained if morality were the starting point.

Eucken criticized Fichte, Schelling and Hegel because

they tried to see the "whole fullness of reality in one single feature of it, and they would have man raise himself to creative height by his own powers." (p-135) Positivism, with its inner detachment of man from the world, was the natural consequence of this strain. Man is of himself much too small if he does not feel a relation to the world, and is not conscious of a world-task in himself. Thus whatever external progress he made, he would spiritually be confined in a cell. Man is no absolute creator, but a co-worker with a creative life.

Eucken aimed at a spiritual positivism in which the fact with its proper reality was more decisive than the reality of the assumptions and conditions. "I found a starting point in what I called 'the world of work'. My task was by a process of reduction to resolve the apparently solid and rigid structures into living action, and to understand each particular thing as an outcome of the whole: to awaken and detach some principle that was enclosed, almost buried, in the perceptible action. In this I found of great use the idea of a 'syntagma', a collective event of a peculiar kind arising on historical ground. These syntagmata had to be tested by the world of work, and thus we could attain an immanently real criticism of the event." (p-140) (These ideas are developed also in "The Unity of the Spiritual Life").

From this point, he says, "I then approached the positive task of sketching a life-system of a personal world,

and it was laid down that all life-systems must be developed on the basis of a personal world and only reach a spiritual content in connection therewith. This set up a system of the universal personal life. In the end the following were indicated as the chief defects of naturalism and intellectualism. Naturalism is wrong in regarding as due to its own forces what nature derives from the mind in being experienced, and so taking the mere conditions of the event for the creative reasons of it. Intellectualism is wrong in assuming that the contents of the mind are identical with thoughts, and thus treating the operations of thought, not as the form, but as the essence of reality." p-141.

Eucken was now ready to begin in earnest. "My scientific work had now to assume the character of building upon the foundations I had laid down. This was done first in my book, "The Struggle for a Spiritual Content of Life". Quite apart from religion, I felt strongly the insincerity of contemporary life, professing spirituality, as it did, yet wholly taken up with material things. My remarks in that work were sharply opposed to the conventional and official Idealism, since they too obviously treated the problems as in a state of suspense and they demanded changes far too radical to please those who thought that everything was settled and fixed. The work had a simple structure. The first part traced the movement in three stages: the struggle for the independence of the spiritual life, the struggle

for a character of the spiritual life, and the struggle for the world-wide power of the spiritual life. The second part gave a general picture in relation to the age, and then dealt with the various branches of the subject. Throughout the work I demanded that we should clearly work out what was necessary to the maintenance of the spiritual process of life." (p-146.)

Eucken's contention is quite clear. Nothing but the attainment of a spiritual content of life will save mankind from an inner collapse.

His next publication was "The Truth of Religion". His interest in religion was very keen. He felt the hollowness of the religion of his day and sought to do constructive work for the field of religion. "The task was to detach the imperishable kernel from the contemporary shell of religion and present it in as original a form as possible." (p-148) Eucken thought of his attitude toward religion as "A Super-sectarian Treatment" of the subject.

In the modern movement, freedom is the experience sought after. "Freedom from every tie, complete emancipation, now becomes the main aim and a demand to which everything must give way." (Life of The Spirit p-64). Eucken is convinced that this freedom has become the end and aim of man. Of course this aim is the natural result of modern philosophical tendencies and the increased development in the field of natural science.

But even here Eucken is convinced that something really lies back of the struggle for freedom. This is not merely a struggle for freedom. Something provoked the struggle and stimulated its continuance against great difficulties. "But that this striving after freedom was in reality something more, that it was the result of a spiritual necessity, is proved by the enormous enrichment and development of life to which it has given rise, and the enormous range of actuality which it has opened up." (The Life of The Spirit p-65).

But in seeking for a solution to the problem of life, our Philosopher ultimately turns from the movements in modern philosophy and science. All these new developments, he thinks, leave us no better off than we were before we began. In other words, the spiritual life is not satisfied. No solution is satisfactory which does not take into consideration the spiritual life and satisfy the demands of this inner life. The modern movement ends in conflicts and "does not satisfy the demands of the spiritual life and does not guarantee us the necessary support for our struggles and aspirations. The general result then is that the movement which emerges in the modern period does not find in it any sufficient counterpoise, that it is therefore bound to advance further and further with elemental force and to destroy everything that still offers resistance." (The Life of The Spirit p-154).

Eucken also makes a strong appeal for permanency and persistency in aims and ideals. He will not agree that his ideas about the matter tend to stagnation and rigidity of life principles. The appeal is for definiteness and certainty in aims and ideals. This conception savors very much of Platonism. The Platonic Ideas were to mediaeval philosophy just about that the spiritual life seems to be to Eucken.

Evolutionary philosophy seems to epitomize for Eucken the whole tendency of the modern movement. This he criticizes because it looks for nothing but change. There is no stability, no permanency in it, and he thinks he leaves no place for these spiritual factors of life which are concepts in the overworld; permanent fixtures of human life, and one might almost say, "Structural Features of the Universe". "A Life of nothing but change cannot look forward to the future with any joy or certainty, for where there are no persistent aims, the future, as regards its spiritual character, is hid in deep obscurity and we cannot tell whether tomorrow may not bring a complete revolution. Such a life has no fixed past, and therefore no history, for the constant change places things perpetually in a different light. It is bound to make our past character and actions seem as if they did not belong to us; our own selves dissolve into a kaleidoscopic succession of pictures; and least of all has such a life any genuine present: a present which

is spiritual in its nature." (The Life of The Spirit p-157).

Eucken, therefore, postulates what he calls, "The Spiritual Life" as the solution of the problem of life. With respect to the present situation, his opinion is that mankind ought to go on, in the midst of the perplexities of the day, using its own powers to work out the solution. The old type of life and culture has broken down and a demand for a new type of life and culture grown more and more insistent. And since the present spiritual situation is the result of a crisis brought on by the whole of life, it can be overcome only by a further development of the whole. (Life of The Spirit p-168).

It is therefore necessary that the Doctrine of the Spiritual Life be brought into the open and tried in the perplexities of life. "Spiritual Life needs to be clearly thrown into relief against human conditions in order to preserve its independence and transcendence of time which are indispensable to its substance." (The Life of the Spirit. p-170).

And Eucken does just this with his theory for the solution of the problem of life. In his books, "The Life of the Spirit", and "The Problem of Human Life", he traces the problem and its solution through the whole history of philosophy. In every case he suggests his own solution and then draws this conclusion about the whole matter: "If, then, the conclusion of the matter is that we cannot over-

come the complications and gain a share of happiness from the immediate situation, but can do so only by an energetic transformation of the whole, it is our obvious course to turn our gaze upon the whole of history in order to gain thereby a wider perspective and perhaps a point of support. Thus viewed, however, the problem really seems to be greater rather than smaller. For our own examination showed that wherever the desire for happiness found satisfaction on the high level of spiritual life it involved definite convictions, but that these convictions in the changing course of the ages came to lose their immediacy and their force. With the Greeks the struggle for happiness rested on faith in the rationality and beauty of the universe, the vigorous realization of which would raise man above all the constraints of existence: in Christianity it was the steadfast faith in the loving care of an almighty Deity which supported man in all the trials of life: the modern period relied on the reason indwelling in the human race and on the unlimited capacity for increase possessed by human faculties: here it was faith in a better future which raised man above all the limitations of the moment. For us moderns, however, the thought of the beauty of the universe has faded away before the dark actuality and the severe struggle for existence which modern science displays to us; and we all know how religious faith has been most severely shaken in the life of culture; but least of all can a

closer examination fail to recognize how seriously faith in man and his spiritual greatness has been impaired; for here the test of experience lay nearest to hand, and experience, wherever it has a candid verdict, has decided in the negative." (Life of the Spirit. p-387.388).

What, then, is left? Eucken answers: "The Spiritual Life". The spiritual life must stand out as the only hope for the solution of our problem. It must stand as the rallying point for all the aims, ideals, and virtues of life. "The one imperative task for the creative spiritual life is that it should gather forces together on the new basis supplied by modern conditions. In no other way can it adjust and control the activities of ordinary life, and counteract its levelling influences." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-141)

Moreover, our ideas about the spiritual life must be clear and definite. The modern period, interested in the spiritual life, must be certain in its analysis of the situation and in its understanding of the spiritual life. "It is, above all, important that the dominating characteristics of the spiritual life should be forcefully disengaged from the welter of things and clearly impressed upon the human consciousness." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-130)

Spiritual life, as the proposed solution to our problem, must be put to the test. It must enter the arena of this modern movement in life and bring life to higher things; it must be able to restore values of a permanent sort; it must

be able to restore ideals; it must add character to human existence; it must be able to contribute to life that satisfaction which the new science and new philosophy did not seem able to give.

It is this spiritual life, alone, which will solve the problem of life. "It is, moreover, only a faith in the spiritual possibilities of man that can fit us to cope with the saddening impression which the immediate aspect of affairs to-day must produce upon every thoughtful mind. We are confronted with the vastness and pitilessness of nature, the forlornness of man amid its immensity, the wild whirl of social existence with its passionate excitements and spiritual barrenness, the moral littleness of man with his selfishness, his enslavement to appearance, his entire subjection to natural instincts which he cannot control; all this is obvious to every observer, and cannot be explained away." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-77).

In his book, "Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life", A. J. Jones compares Eucken's problem and purpose, in general, with the problem and purpose of other philosophers. This quotation will set up a general impression of what Eucken attempted to do. "If Eucken's problem differs fundamentally from that of most other philosophers, perhaps the purpose of his investigations is still a more striking characteristic. He is anxious to solve the riddle of the Universe in order that there may be drawn from the solution an inspiration

which shall help the human race to concentrate its energies upon the highest ideals of life. The desire to find a meaning which will explain, and at the same time, infuse zest and gladness into every department of life, has become a passion with him; and in finding that meaning, his great endeavour is to prove the truth of human freedom and personality. He wishes to solve the riddle in order that man may become a better man, the world a better world. His aim is definitely an ethical aim, and his purpose a practical one of the noblest order, and not one of mere intellectual interest." (pages 13,14).

Eucken's method has some original qualities in it. As has been set down in the previous chapter, he first makes a survey of the theories which have been offered for the problem of life. Neither one of these fulfills conditions which he declares an adequate solution must possess. Then, having refused every previous solution, he begins the difficult task of outlining a solution which will be acceptable. In doing this he minutely and sincerely searches the story of the past, analyzes carefully the conditions of the present, and meditates and speculates upon the future. His investigations lead him to the conclusion that in all these realms there is revealed an eternal something, unaffected by time, which was, is, and ever shall be, the eternal, universal, Spiritual Life, which then must be the great reality. "Upon this basis he builds a system of Philosophy,

which he considers to be more satisfactory than the solutions already offered; with which contention, there is little doubt, the majority of his readers will be inclined to agree." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. p-14).

A recognition of the existence of this universal spiritual life, Eucken makes the starting point of his constructive work. This reality existing in the spiritual life is neither material nor mental. It is superior to both. He admits the existence of the senses, the reality of the natural world and the mind. His concern is with the superiority of the spiritual life. He believes that the spiritual life is the synthesis of all the problems arising in the conflicts of the modern movements in life.

A. S. Eddington in his Swarthmore Lecture, 1929, entitled "Science and the Unseen World", declares that the attitude of science toward spiritual matters has changed. "Perhaps the most essential change is that we are no longer tempted to condemn the spiritual aspects of our nature as illusory because of their lack of concreteness." In defending this position, he indicates that physics does not penetrate behind its symbols to the reality, and that knowledge comes over nerve centers to us about the outside world, but the reactions to the stimulæ are not identical with the stimulæ. Therefore, he concludes, "Surely then the mental and spiritual nature of ourselves, known in our minds by an intimate contact transcending the methods of

physics, supplies just that interpretation of the symbols which science is admittedly unable to give."

In a general way, Eddington defends the hypothesis of the spiritual life which Eucken has set as the only adequate solution to the problem of life. In the following chapter Eucken's definition and development of the Doctrine of the Spiritual Life will be given.

Chapter VI

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

Eucken postulates "The Spiritual Life" as the only satisfactory solution of the problem of life. This, he thinks stands all the tests. Especially is this true in the history of mankind. In his "The Problem of Human Life", and in his "Main Currents", Eucken finds this theory to be the connecting thread for the solution of the problems of every generation and every period. The question of primary importance is "What does Eucken mean by "The Spiritual Life?" How is it defined?

The clearest interpretations and the most definite definitions are found in his books, "Main Currents", "The Problem of Human Life", "The Meaning and Value of Life", "The Life of the Spirit", and "The Truth of Religion". In all his works to some degree this theory is expounded. He seems to vary it little if any. From the earliest beginnings of his philosophical writings until the last it is the same, invariably so.

What is the fundamental concept of the spiritual life? In answering this main question Eucken postulates the theory that always there has been a distinction between man and the rest of the animal world. Man is characterized by a life of a spiritual nature. It is this factor which raises him above the mere animal world. There is a difference between man and the other animal life in the mental realm. In the merely animal world mental life is on a very low plane and is exercised for the purpose of surviving physically.

Intelligence, for the animal world, is just a tool for coping with the natural world. "Being a mere tool, intelligence cannot attain to inner continuity, secure self-dependence, or any content of its own." And yet these are just the elements which characterize the spiritual stage of life. Herein is the spiritual life different. It is the INNER LIFE. This inner life gathers into a unit the multiplicity of relationships and attains an inner continuity which alone can be called a self-life.

So far the problem has been increased. "Is this self life directed towards forming a separate domain of its own, apart from external reality, in isolated security and contentment, or does it still retain a connection with the world as a whole?" If this theory is to solve the problem first set upon, then it must be operative in the affairs of the world and man. To solve the real problem of life, it must submit itself to the tests of the affairs of the world. It is here that Eucken finds the chief argument in favor of his hypothesis. For it does work out in practice. He submits it to the pragmatic test and finds it not to fail.

This spiritual life is the principle of unity in all life. It is a whole from the very beginning, an independent and self contained life. "Such a whole possesses a unity which transcends all manifoldness, and hence the contrast between subject and object. This whole develops itself through the agency of the antithesis of subject and

object, of power and resistance, but it remains superior to it, and holds both sides together even while they are divided. In the spiritual sphere, neither side can develop itself and find its own highest level without the assistance of the other." It is the creative synthesis of the spiritual life which produces an inwardness and at the same time a complete and self-contained reality. Such a reality cannot come from without.

In arguing this point Eucken insists that nothing can be done if the attempt is made to develop the idea from a given state of being. The life-process itself is the point of beginning. Because of this kind of a beginning the dualism of subject and object loses itself in a state in which the former division is replaced by a superior connection.

This conception of the spiritual life Eucken analyses by a comparison with the theory of the Enlightenment. "The Enlightenment recognized, side by side with the mechanism of nature, no reality other than the juxtaposition of separate souls; there was no mention of a spiritual world - only a world of spirits." To Kant he gives the credit for formulating the tendency which dominated the spiritual world of the nineteenth century; i.e. the recognition of a spiritual life as distinct from the mere workings of the soul. Kant insisted that there is a common and fundamental spiritual structure, superior to all merely individual

differences. This forms a network embracing every spiritual manifestation, dominating it, and giving it its characteristic shape." The followers of Kant, according to Eucken, did not follow the lead set before them. Instead, they elevated the spiritual life to a position of complete independence, "But at the same time they unhesitatingly treated human spiritual life as absolute, and regarded it as the parent of reality." In order to do this they had to replace spiritual life by some special activity. The result was that they came to rely more and more upon thought. To Eucken, the result was a conception of the world which was too narrow and anthropomorphic. At the same time reality threatened to vanish by becoming a mere restless process.

As opposed to this view, Eucken insists that spiritual life should be definitely raised above human existence. Spiritual life is not originated by man, but man may attain to participation in it and also attain to a higher stage of reality. "Spiritual life does not appear as a special manifestation, as a special aspect of life, but as a self-contained life, itself giving rise to reality; a life which our human activity is far from penetrating, but towards which it strives as a great goal."

The spiritual life forms a world-life. "To participate in spiritual life means therefore to participate in a world-life." It is no small, isolated particle of life. It is

the whole of life and the unity of life. It is an independent reality. It is universal and timeless.

Now that the spiritual life is postulated there must be some science to elucidate it. The special science for this purpose is Philosophy. Spiritual life opens up a new aspect of the world; it is not merely older elements in juxtaposition; it is an inner whole. And in this movement towards truth and reality in their wholeness, philosophy makes its independent contribution. "The corner stone of all philosophical thought and the axiom of axioms is the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life."

The aspect of the cosmos and nature is changed by the claims of the spiritual life. Not only is spiritual life something more than nature; it is also a significant movement of reality towards its own inner nature and the "self-immediacy" of life. Eucken insists that this new stage must be considered as the last stage. It, therefore, takes for granted the privilege to judge everything and to understand everything from its own point of view and measure everything according to its own standard. How can this be? Here is the problem which the Doctrine of the Spiritual Life furnishes for philosophy. But more about this factor later.

We are given to understand; "Spiritual life does not appear as a particular manifestation, but as a new kind of reality, a new stage of being, to which the particular

manifestations (including scientific thought and moral conduct) have to subordinate themselves and into which they may fit." This quotation, (Main Currents p-273) is a fair sample of the statements which Eucken makes to indicate what he means by the spiritual life and the work to which it set itself. So often, however, he is apparently guilty of the fallacy of using in his definition the term which he is supposed to be defining.

And in this scheme, Eucken understands civilization as the development of an independent spiritual life. This makes civilization something more than it usually signifies. It is not merely a change of names, but so understood, civilization permits the fulfillment of demands, essential to all genuine culture, aspirations and demands which the current conception entirely fails to satisfy.

(All the quotations in this chapter up to this point have been taken from Eucken's book, "Main Currents". Now statements and analyses will be added from the book, "The Life of the Spirit".)

Again we have the same ideas repeated. "Spiritual life is not something that is ready-made for us, but is a difficult problem - in fact, the problem of problems." (p-21).

And further; "Spiritual life is above all the formation of a coherent system in life. In it not merely the potentialities of the subject are aroused and heightened, but confronting the subject there arises a field, and indeed a

whole kingdom, of an objective nature. Subject and object are comprehended in a self-contained activity and assist each other's further development. Nothing short of such a comprehension of the two sides can supply life with contents and values which, with all their inwardness, possess an indubitable superiority over all merely human powers and opinions." (p-15,16).

Naturally the question arises, "Have we a life of this kind or is there any evidence of such a life?" Eucken is very positive in his affirmative answer. If we are in earnest in our investigation we have only to set what he calls spiritual life in sharper relief against the environment in which human existence involves it, to become aware that it offers the very thing which we desire and seek.

It is the presence of this spiritual life which indeed makes human history possible. The revelation of the spiritual life gets started and gains ground as the development of a new stage of reality. But this development is by no means steady and simple. "In the first place, spiritual life has no domain of its own in the human sphere, and no independent starting point, but it develops out of our life in nature and society and cannot dispense with it. In doing so it does not appear from the beginning as a whole, but starts from separate points and gradually extends to larger connections, which again may diverge from one another, and its progress through history is not orderly and sure, but resembles rather

a groping and seeking. It makes a step forward but encounters insurmountable obstacles and is often driven back a long way; new starting points are tried, but they lead to a similar result. The life is often split into opposites and then again the impulse towards reconciliation gains the upper hand. Much drops out of sight only to come up again later and exercise new influence, and so the whole becomes more and more complicated and involved. In particular a permanent complication proceeds from the relation of the spiritual life to man. Spiritual life stands in need of the feelings and faculties of man, and so far as it gains these it raises him above that which is merely human. But at the same time this merely human element persists and is always ready to drag down the spiritual life to its own level. It does this especially when no great spiritual tension and no powerful spiritual creative effort exercises a counteracting influence. At such time it almost appears as if this merely human element looked upon the spiritual life as an enemy and would like to take vengeance on it for its troublesome interference." (The Life of the Spirit pp-22,23.)

The modern movements in philosophy and science are looked upon as competitors for the favor of man. Any sort of metaphysic is tabooed by many scientists and laughed out of court by many philosophers, but Eucken contends for the spiritual life. He thinks of the spiritual life not as a mere addition but really as an essentially new life.

(Life of the Spirit. p-256.) In spite of the opposition Eucken contends that everywhere this spiritual life is assumed. (Life of the Spirit. p-255.)

But in order to prove the spiritual life it is necessary to show that there is a world which lies within life itself. "The constant presupposition is that a spiritual life which is a unified whole is at work in the depths of our soul. It is only when it does this that main lines of effort can be developed out of it; that truths of the soul can be elaborated, and that the way can be prepared for an inner solidarity of the soul." (The Life of the Spirit. p-100.)

This spiritual life about which Eucken speaks is not possessed by man; he only possess a human spiritual life; that is a spiritual life whose superhuman core is never accessible to him except through human wrappings. For this reason man falls into error if he attempts to explain the whole of reality. Human spiritual life is but a part and any advance by man is made thru struggle. Spiritual life is not merely the basal fact of life, but also a task which is always claiming the attention of man. There are opposing forces, antitheses. Spiritual life sees everything in a unit, a whole, therefore human spiritual life must work the necessary syntheses as it struggles toward the spiritual life. "Thus man in his struggle for truth does not transcend himself, he does not reach in knowledge a point where a universal life springs up in him, but remains always confined

to his own circle of thought, the contents of which cannot be universally valid, since they have arisen under special conditions and have not proceeded from an original creation." (The Life of the Spirit. p-315)

In order to find a permanent basis for the spiritual life there must be a faith in the ultimate rationality of reality. The whole system breaks down without this faith. Besides, it requires the belief that life seeks its satisfaction not alone in the mere attainment of external good but rather in its own unfolding and activity. And Eucken will not consent to call his theory subjectivistic. (Life of the Spirit p-176.)

To make spiritual life possible there must be an inner connection, a creative activity proceeding from the whole. "Such life can never be produced by mere juxtaposition; it must be acquired and maintained by some power above the separate elements. On the other hand, the spiritual life must have spontaneity, independence and pure inwardness, if it is to exist at all; it must be lived for its own sake and cannot be imparted or transformed from without. It does not persist in the condition which it has once reached, but begins to ebb if it is not continually renewed." (The Life of the Spirit. p-96)

Eucken traces through the history of thought in order to show that the goal is really the spiritual life. (Main Currents and the Problem of Human Life.) A careful study

of history is necessary and is an index for our direction. It shows us where to begin. "This experience leaves us in no doubt that when we take up the struggle we cannot start from the world nor from a transcendent Deity, but only from the process of human life." (The Life of the Spirit p-327.) We must, therefore, learn to know life, human life, with all its faculties and learn to develop them in the light of this spiritual life which includes the whole of life.

And in the doing of all these things which the Doctrine of the Spiritual Life requires, "Complete spontaneity is essential to genuine spiritual life, and this spontaneity requires both freedom and self-activity". This spiritual life is not something far removed from actual life. It is a matter applicable to common everyday affairs and is usable in the real affairs of the world and man.

It, however, is not to be thought that this proposed solution to the problem of life is to come without struggle. Activity is the cry of Eucken. Nothing can be done without honest hard work. Hermann, in the essay on Eucken and Bergson, says of the spiritual life in Eucken's Philosophy; "Instead of a triumphal march with an omnipotent God at the head, the Spiritual Pilgrimage becomes a slow, grim, contracted path, beset with stern barriers, and malignant foes. Nature brutally ignores spiritual interests, and drives her chariot of destruction over the very Christ of God. In the world of men wrong triumphs, and unspiritual ends degrade

spiritual powers. And within the soul there is an even darker and more turbulent world of antinomies."

This spiritual life about which Eucken speaks is not forced upon mankind or individuals. Anyone who accepts the theory does so by personal choice. After making the choice one has to deal with a spiritual idea which must be maintained in an unspiritual world of contradictions and tyrannies. The contest is sustained and courage among the contestants is maintained on the one assumption that this life has its roots outside and beyond the world it seeks to reconstruct. In choosing the spiritual life man links himself to the ultimate reality. "It is at this point that the conception of the spiritual life merges into a conception of God, and the cosmic-personal into a religious idealism." (Hermann, Eucken and Bergson p-61.)

After the choice has been made the spiritual life is a struggle. Never can it be said to be a quiet, assured possession. Constantly it calls for renewal and incessant labour. (The Meaning and Value of Life p-107.)

In order to attain this experience which is the solution of the problem of life something must be done to alter the course of man. He must "be shaken out of his spiritual laziness, whether through circumstances which at length render intolerable the ineptitude of the Philistine's life, or through violent catastrophes of the social order, or through the advent of forceful and magnetic personalities, or

perhaps in all three ways at once. When we shape our life with prime reference to the struggle for spiritual self-preservation, and with a view to winning for it both meaning and value, there will be found in us the self-confident and defiant energy of creative passion, and with it a complete indifference to the opinions and prejudices of the conventional life about us which expresses with such pitiful inadequacy the true powers that are latent in human life."

(Christianity and the New Idealism p-150.)

But this we do know, the spiritual life has not yet been won in this modern period. It has not, as a whole, won over the human race any influence that can be really called great. In this respect it lags behind the older forms of religion.

(Christianity and the New Idealism p-158.)

Another point in Eucken's description of the spiritual life must be noted. The spiritual life is independent of man in his merely human capacity. It is native to reality itself. In the domain of nature this reality works but seems not to be able to overcome multiplicity, separateness and mere juxtaposition. On the other hand, in spiritual life it concentrates into a whole, does attain a self-immediacy and a substantial content. Here, in the spiritual life, reality for the first time wins an inner unity and a soul. Dimness, unfathomed depths beyond life itself, are not the field of investigation, but the life process is now the author of being, and becomes the supporting principle of a world of reality.

These ideas are contrary to the common conceptions of modern man. "They introduce us to a new world, an organized spiritual realm which appears as something independent of human opinion and inclination, transcending the narrow limitations of our specifically human condition." The fear of lapsing into metaphysics, Eucken feels, is the reason why the modern movement is so slow to recognize the spiritual life; and yet the modern movement is so largely characterized by superficiality. "But if we do refuse to acknowledge it, and yet seek for truth, seek to maintain any truth whatsoever, then we are denying the very principle of that which we proceed to assert, nor can we ever muster our forces bravely and press forward to victory." (Christianity and the New Idealism p-10,11,12.)

Therefore Eucken insists that the spiritual life is both immediate and independent. It must be described in these terms if it is to be able to solve the problem of life.

A further question is involved in this problem. Is the spiritual life immanent or transcendent? On this point Eucken is not always clear. But he has some good company. The question is quite appropo with respect to the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas. Quite recently the problem of the transcendental or instrumental value of the Ideas has been raised. Professor J. A. Stewart, of Oxford University, has expounded the instrumental theory of the Ideas. So with Eucken, one is not quite sure all the time. Now he speaks

of the spiritual life as being an inner life and then he switches to the transcendental conception. At one time he is writing about the concept being at the very heart of the life of the world and man, and again he writes of it as if it were the overworld.

"Thus we find that within man there is something which goes beyond him. He himself must become something different, and his whole life assumes the form of a problem when a unified world thus makes its appearance in his life and distinguishes itself from that which is merely human." (The Life of the Spirit p-16.) This is an illustration of how Eucken speaks about the life within.

But turning to the other side of the question: "There must be within reach of man a life which can rise above divisions and can counteract them, a life, further, which can develop out of its own movement comprehensive connections and, indeed, can show itself active in moulding the world. Finally, it must be a life which not only touches and interprets what it lays hold of from the outside, but shapes it from within and admits it to its own depths. Only if man is able in this way to share in a universal life and thereby outgrow the limits of his particular nature, can his thinking advance from a mere cognition of things to a true knowledge." (Life of the Spirit. p-14)

Moreover this spiritual life at one time seems to be something from the outside spread upon life and then at

another time it seems to be something within life growing up from the inner life and consciousness of man. "But the great change that ensues when spiritual life comes upon the scene is that now the inner life becomes independent and begins to prepare for itself a world of its own. This change, with its introduction of an essentially new kind of life, and its construction of a world from within, with its own particular contents, values and order, can never be the work of man by himself. It is only to be understood as a movement of the whole of reality itself, which surrounds man, takes hold of him and drives him on. Thus the movement towards spiritual life appears as a movement of reality towards an independent conscious existence. A depth of the world is revealed which before was hidden, and this gives rise to a complete transformation which must produce an essentially new view of reality." (The Life of the Spirit. p-18)

It is difficult in these transcriptions from Eucken's own pen to discover which he means. Perhaps he means both points of view. There is this spiritual life on the outside of man, superior to him and timeless, which finds sympathetic connection with a similar element in himself, a human spiritual life. This union of the two breaks down the antitheses of life and shows reality in one whole; it is the unifying principle of life.

"Though it (the spiritual life) must necessarily insist on a truth which transcends time and possesses absolute

stability, the stability of this truth does not lie in man but in the spiritual life, and if man, as grounded in spiritual life, must in some way or other participate in this truth, to work it out to a self-active possession is a high goal to which we can only slowly approach." (The Life of the Spirit p-331.)

Eucken, however, thinks all this theorizing and hoping and desiring and working will go for naught unless a belief in this life which partakes of the very essence of things is not an incontestable fact for man. So in the final analysis this Doctrine of the Spiritual Life rests not only on an hypothesis but also on a hope and a faith that the hypothesis is true.

Sometimes Eucken writes as if he thought of this spiritual life as a fact lying dormant in man and needing some struggle or experience to wake it up and develop it. "We can make no progress unless a successful attempt is made to extract from the experience of human life an all-embracing fact or supreme truth which shall help us to concentrate and strengthen our powers and render them superior to obstacles. The experiences and changes of the ages show that we have to seek a fact of this nature primarily not outside but within ourselves, that is, not in the mere circumstances of the individual but in a vital process superior to him." So again he finally becomes entwined with the perplexing difficulty of trying to combine the inner and the outer. (The Life of the

Spirit. p-392)

And, yet, in spite of these references and many more of a similar nature which could be quoted, Eucken decries any attempt to bring the spiritual life down to the human level. "But if spiritual life has often been dragged down to the level of the merely human, it has not submitted for any length of time to this degradation. It has always escaped again, and, however it might be disintegrated, it has always made a fresh effort to regain its unity; in fact, throughout all the mistakes and passions of men it has made substantial progress in self-realization. It has been able to liberate life and thought from the tyranny of the mere passing moment, and by separating the temporal from the eternal, the human from the spiritual, to gather up the results of thousands of years, so as to be taken in at one view."

(The Life of the Spirit p-23,24.)

So that, notwithstanding Eucken's analysis of the spiritual life as the unity producing element in the inner life of man, he insists that the spiritual life is elevated "above the position and caprice of mere man."

The realm of unchangeable truth and reality "must be raised above the world which envelops us, in order to preserve its independence and purity, but it exercises a formative influence over the world and gives its efforts a fixed goal and an impulse towards higher things. Knowledge is here raised to a position of control over the whole of life,

for it is knowledge alone which is able to reveal to us this transcendental world and keep it abidingly present."

(The Life of the Spirit p-109.)

The element of time enters into Eucken's discussion of the Doctrine of the Spiritual Life. He insists that spiritual life is eternal, timeless. "There can be no real spiritual life unless it is raised above time; otherwise the true is subordinated and sacrificed to mere opinion, the good to mere utility and, generally, all independent spirituality to the trivial round of merely human activities. Man, too, in the end cannot tolerate such distortion of the spiritual life, for it deprives everything which distinguishes him from nature of its end and meaning and condemns his life to absolute emptiness." (The Life of the Spirit p-163,164.)

And again the same idea: "The important point is to find something eternal which leaves behind it the whole domain of becoming and reveals to men a new life. Such an eternal element, however, is not to be found in the world, but only above it, and hence the endeavour to attain to it acquires a religious character." (The Life of the Spirit p-117.)

But in contrast to the above quotation, see what he has to say about the immanental value of the spiritual life. "The spiritual, however much it is raised above the sensible, does not sever itself from the one reality which embraces

them both; it does not form for itself an inner life which neglects the world, but it finds its task in uniting and revivifying this world and raising it to a higher level. Hence in its inmost self it is an incessant working and creating, virile power and joyous activity. Its fundamental impulse thus seems to be towards the undeviating pursuit of the true and the good. At the same time, however, the sensible, because of its close connection with the spiritual, remains indispensable at all its stages." (The Life of the Spirit. p-201,202)

The difficulty of finding a definition of the spiritual life in the philosophy of Rudolf Eucken disappears when his attempt to solve the problem of life is approached with sympathy. In spite of the older conception of the subject, object dualism in philosophy to which Rene Descartes gave so much prominence, it is most generally accepted now that such a division of life is a fallacy. Life is a unit but it does have its inner and outer aspects; the aspect of the knower and the thing known; the aspect of the tool and the material upon which the tool works; the aspect of the thinker and the thing thought about. But in view of the fact that reality is one and knowledge is one, it is not to be wondered at that Eucken was not always consistent about the inner and the outer aspects of the spiritual life. He refuses to be called an absolute Idealist, and yet, the spiritual life partakes of the nature of an absolute in the

sense that it is eternal, superior to man, fixed and indestructable.

Though our Philosopher does not give anywhere a concise and clear definition of the spiritual life, he is forever describing what he means by the term. A few stock words in the vocabulary of philosophy will indicate what he is driving at. The spiritual life may be characterised by such terms as independent, immediate, absolute, reality, cosmic force, the inner life, the overworld, and others of this nature. One readily sees that there is no harmony or necessary similarity between the terms. Eucken himself, no doubt, realized the contradiction between the terms which he used to explain his meaning of the doctrine which would solve the problem of life.

When Plato advanced the doctrine of the Ideas; when Kant gave to philosophy the doctrine of the Thing-in-itself; they were paving the way for the ethical philosophy of Eucken, his doctrine of the Spiritual Life.

In modern philosophy, when John Dewey promulgates his instrumental philosophy and writes about "The Quest for Certainty"; when A. Eustice Hayden covers the whole history of the thought of man with the blanket of "The Quest of Life", they are, in general, taking the same attitude toward the problem of life that Eucken takes in his doctrine of the Spiritual Life. The thing which they are all interested in is humanity in general and in particular. They are

interested in the human race and seeking the best interests of the individual as well. Neither of these philosophers would be willing to say that life is nothing more than material or that his best interests could be satisfied merely on the ground of naturalism.

For Eucken the way of the spiritual life is not easy; it has not yet attained full control. "We see clearly that the very thing which exalts man above nature involves him in vast problems with which he seems unable to cope. We cannot fail to recognize that a new kind of life arises in him and separates him from other things. This life, however, seems to find no support and help in the great world; it sees itself bound to unintelligible conditions and treated by the process of nature as if it were a thing of no importance. Since at the same time in man himself it is generally languid and burdened with sharp contradictions, it seems unable to prevail against all that alien world upon which it supervenes. But with all its weakness and constraint, this new life yet maintains its standards and forces man to apply them to all his doings and dealings. After this movement the mere comfort of natural existence can no longer be felt as satisfying: man's awakened power demands a goal and an intrinsic value, but it does not find what it seeks and renunciation is impossible. Man's thought carries in itself the idea of infinity and eternity, and thereby destroys all the satisfaction which can be found in the temporal

and finite." (The Life of the Spirit. pp-389,390)

Eucken feels so deeply that this is the solution to the problem of life that he requires all civilization to give it right of way. Civilization is absolutely dependent on it for progress and development. There is no hope in any other way or method. "It is only as a characteristic expression of the spiritual life that civilization can have any inward coherence, clear meaning, and controlling purpose, that it can really make man anew, and counteract all the pettiness and perversity that on man's side are so apt to cling to every development of human culture. Thus our specifically modern civilization demands an infinite, underrived, independent life. But where do our human relationships show us such a life? Surely nothing but faith in a transcendent spiritual necessity and the vivid inward realization of this necessity could produce the mighty movement which such demands have given birth to. Now, no movement can bear us resistlessly along, unless it rid us of some intolerable contradictions which arise only when a new power that merits the ascendancy comes into collision with some older rival that cannot authenticate its claim. What we need, then, is that the new should reveal an overmastering, compelling force, a force which it can never win from the natural man. This recognition of an authoritative over-life raises the spiritual level of the social order: it enables us to feel our connection with a cosmic life, to make

it our own, and thus leave far behind the lowliness of our beginnings." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-105)

And this spiritual life, for Eucken, is no hedonistic matter. For him, SPIRITUAL denotes that which looks to the needs and satisfaction of the whole man: it is essentially of a moral nature. "Spiritual values sever themselves definitely from all considerations of mere pleasure and utility. They are ours and yet more than ours. They lift us into another than the mere human world and at the same time they are to us more inward and essential than aught else can possibly be." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-88,89)

Again, let us repeat, this spiritual life is reality. Man, the spiritual being, is within this reality. "From the beginning man, so far as he shares in the spiritual life, is not a being adjacent to reality, but within it. He would never be able to attain to a reality if he did not bear it within himself and needed only to develop it." (Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. p-223)

Eucken's interest is in building life in such a way that the oppositions, antitheses, and divisions will be overcome. He seeks for humanity the kind of life that will indeed be happy, peaceful, graceful, progressive, satisfactory and enjoy the fullest measure of success. This accomplishment is possible only as the real self is attained. The real self is won only in the spiritual life. "A

genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual." (Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. p-186,187) The winning of the genuine self is the perfect performance of the Doctrine of the Spiritual Life. The self thus attained lives in the realm of the spiritual life and the human spiritual life grows towards it. In this struggle for the real self and the coming together of the spiritual life and the human spiritual life the problem of life finds its solution.

Chapter VII

METAPHYSICS

Philosophy is generally divided into its theoretical and practical aspects. The theoretical aspect is called metaphysics. In turn metaphysics is divided into epistemology and ontology. Metaphysics is the theory of knowing and being. It is sometimes used in the sense of epistemology and sometimes in the sense of ontology. In epistemology, properly speaking, there are three problems: (1) What are the sources of knowledge--whence is our knowledge derived? (2) What is the place of knowledge in the world of being--what is the relation of cognition to reality? (3) What are the norms, the criteria, the standards of knowledge? On the other hand ontology is defined as "That department of the science of metaphysics which investigates and explains the nature and essential properties and relations of all beings as such, or the principles and causes of being." It deals with being in general, irrespective of whether it is material or spiritual; and a special part deals with the three chief forms of being, namely, God, the world, and the soul. Sir Wm. Hamilton defines ontology as, "The science which infers the property of unknown being from its known manifestations."

Wolff's identification of ontology with the logical principles of identity and contradiction had a great influence (in a reactionary way) upon Kant. With Kant, ontology becomes a pretended science, since it attempts the

impossible task of dealing with objects without any reference to the way in which they are given and known. Largely through his influence, ontology and ontological became terms of reproach, meaning vain attempts to deal with being apart from its presentation in consciousness.

The Sophists were the first in ancient philosophy to raise the epistemological question by their skeptical impeachment of the possibility of truth or universally valid statements. This is the epistemological view which is mainly discussed by Plato and Aristotle. In modern times, epistemology first stepped into the foreground in Lock's work. The study of epistemology includes both the theory of the origin, nature and limits of knowledge and the systematic analysis of the conceptions employed by ordinary and scientific thought in the interpreting the world and including an investigation of the act of knowledge, or the nature of knowledge as such, with a view to determine its ontological significance; otherwise a theory of knowledge.

Metaphysics, the word itself, comes from Aristotle's works. It is the name applied to that collection of his works which came after his physics. Aristotle's own name for it was "First Philosophy" or "Theology". The name metaphysics first appears as a single noun in Averroes and the Scholastics of the Thirteenth Century. Kant was influential in spreading the term. He said of metaphysics: "It is the only science which admits of completion." It is nothing

more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason. Wolff defined it as "The science of all that is possible, as far as it is possible."

Systematically arranged, according to Kantian usage, metaphysics would become synonymous with epistemology or with a part of that science. It is simply the systematic interpretation of experience and the explication of all it implicates. Metaphysical analysis shows the impossibility of identifying experience with the isolated particulars of sensationalistic philosophy. It seeks to exhibit experience as a system or interconnectional whole.

Wm. James in his text book of Psychology (p-461) says, "Metaphysics means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently." And Plato says, "Metaphysics is the effort to think things together - not in isolation and abstraction, but in relation to one another, and as parts or aspects of one concrete whole."

"Metaphysics aims at correcting the abstractions of the different sciences, and relating them to one another, reaching thereby an expression of the concrete truth of experience as such. The truth which metaphysics seeks to reach, even when presented under the questionable designation of absolute truth, does not really transcend its parts. This is like the logic of Hegel." (Baldwin Dictionary)

In his definition and analysis of the field of metaphysics, Borden F. Bowne, (Metaphysics, A Study of First

Principles) says that metaphysics begins where science leaves off. He declares that there are two orders of mental action - "an order of impressions and an order of reason." For him, it is the task of metaphysics to relate these two orders. It is the effort of thought to reduce the order of impressions to the order of thought, or to rationalize its sense experiences. It is the province of metaphysics to criticize our notions of reality and thus determine the true nature and connections of things. "The question of metaphysics, then, finally becomes, How must we think of reality?" And metaphysics, according to this interpretation, finds its warrant in the mental demand for harmony in thought.

Taylor and Bradley are agreed that philosophy needs to distinguish between appearance and reality. Taylor declares the whole point of metaphysics is to point the way through appearances to reality. "Metaphysics sets itself, more systematically and universally than any other science, to ask what after all is meant by being REAL, and to what degree our various scientific and non-scientific theories about the world are in harmony with the universal characteristics of real existence." (Elements of Metaphysics p-5) Taylor further is of the opinion that the question is not whether we shall deal in metaphysics but rather whether we shall do so consciously and in accord with some intelligible principle, or unconsciously and at random.

On the other hand, Will Durant has this to say about metaphysics: "It is a mirage, as Michelet puts it, it is 'the art of befuddling one's self methodically'." While Schopenhauer calls man, "The Metaphysical animal."

A significant question for this thesis is - "What has Eucken to do with the field of metaphysics?", or, stated in other words, "What connection, if any, is there between Eucken's doctrine of the Spiritual Life and the field of metaphysics?"

Eucken insists on being classed among the metaphysicians, but he reserves the privilege of defining metaphysics in his own way. Of course, in order to get any place in the process of reasoning, definitions must harmonize in their essentials. It is true that some philosophers give different interpretations to the same definitions. So it might be nearer the truth to say that Eucken insists on applying his own interpretation to the definition of metaphysics. He does not permit any other philosopher to analyze the definition for him. "Only let us not understand by metaphysics something gratuitously added by thought to a rounded-off world, but something which, by a vigorous reversal of existence, forms the very first step to a stable and essential reality." (The Life of the Spirit. p-326) By "a vigorous reversal of existence", he means that mankind must insist that the apparent basis of life in materialism or naturalism is false; it is rather in the

spiritual things.

And Eucken is quite certain that there is no way of escaping a metaphysics. "We find ourselves in the end agreeing with Hegel that a highly educated people without a metaphysics resembles a temple without a holy of holies." (The Life of the Spirit. p-326) Things are not altogether what they seem. Sense experience does not tell the full truth about life. The truth is something more than appearance and reality is beyond the fact of mere sense experience.

When there is any attempt to understand life and its problems there will be a revival of the metaphysical basis of life. The naturalistic basis is sterile and pure intellectualism is futile. Eucken believes that the solution is found only by a reversal of appearances. "But this attempt at an understanding rests on a definite assumption with which it either stands or falls; a spiritual life superior to our merely natural existence must have its seat of authority in us, resist our acquiescence in the demands of the natural order, and reveal to us the possibilities of a new world. But to this end our first impressions of reality must suffer a spiritual change; our life must turn to the metaphysical, not indeed in the narrow academic sense of the word, 'Metaphysics', but in the sense of it which implies that an invisible world is accepted as the soul's true home. But from such a venture as this our age shrinks as from a pernicious illusion. And yet it, too, feels how

unsatisfying is the ordinary life of acquiescence and compromise; it, too, desires a deepening of life; but it asks that life shall be deepened without offending the canons of common sense or colliding with public opinion. It would reach a new end by the old name, and is anxious to climb the highest peaks without forfeiting the comforts of the walk on the plain." (Christianity and the New Idealism. pp-149,150)

John Dewey would agree with Eucken's analysis of the attitude of this modern period toward metaphysics. "Philosophy should be released from the vain metaphysical task of distinguishing between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds and the epistemological task of telling how a separate subject can know an independent object." (Reconstruction in Philosophy. p-124)

The objection raised to the above criticism of metaphysics seems to be that such a movement in philosophy would deprive philosophy of all, or nearly all, of its problems. Dewey denies this emphatically. "Is there not reason for believing that the release of philosophy from its burden of sterile metaphysics and sterile epistemology instead of depriving philosophy of problems and subject matter would open a way to questions of the most perplexing and the most significant sort?" (Reconstruction in Philosophy. p-126)

John Dewey seems to deny metaphysics any place at all

in the field of philosophy. His whole attitude toward the subject is one of condemnation. He condemns not only the subject but denies it the right of a respectable parentage in the field of mental science. "Metaphysics is a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor of higher moral and social values - that is the leading theme of the classic philosophy of Europe, as evolved by Plato and Aristotle - a philosophy, let us always recall, renewed and restated by the Christian philosophy of Mediaeval Europe." (Reconstruction in Philosophy. p-17)

In contrast with Dewey's evident enmity toward metaphysics is Eucken's faith in it as the only hope of mankind. For the latter, metaphysics leads away from mere sense experience and the limitations of a philosophy of materialism. Reality is found not in appearances but in the spiritual life which lies beyond appearances, and connects and gives a meaning to all sense experiences.

"Therefore, there must be present in such a need of the life of man something deeper; for man through some kind of energy, will hold fast to his life and fill it with a confident hope and trust, although these cannot be justified by any nearest-at-hand view of things.

No great thinker has more truly experienced these problems and brought them more powerfully to expression than Augustine. Before his eyes the old world sank before a new one not yet emerged. He found himself haunted by the phantom

of an entire void, and felt all the havoc and barriers of human existence with the most painful intensity; and yet he held fast to life and withstood the total destruction of his soul. But why? Because the hindrance itself brought him to the consciousness that something greater than it is imbedded in it; because all menace and intimidation made him absolutely certain of something in his nature which can never be lost. This something is something axiomatic - something, first of all, mysterious, but out of the mystery a powerful energy originates and gives birth to a new and higher need of life which, over against the energy of nature, may be termed metaphysical. Whence all this if life had exhausted itself with the hitherto prevailing situation, and was not able to bring forth a further depth for the strengthening and renewal of man?" (The Truth of Religion. p-402)

"The new kingdom of the spiritual life is a movement which presupposes an entire change and a new standard of life; there appears a metaphysic within life itself. "Such a metaphysic of life is not exposed to the opposition which is raised against the prevalent view of metaphysics, because this metaphysic of life is not mere thought, which constructs a merely conceptual view of the universe, but a new life of great actuality, which arises within our own domain and which culminates in the removal of man from what he possesses by nature to a life which is original, and from an atmosphere 'merely human' to a superhuman world. Thus

the metaphysic of life is not something that is merely added to a finished and enclosed world - not something that is as useless as it is impossible; but the world nearest to our hands appears from this standpoint of the life of the spirit throughout insufficient, as wanting in self-subsistence and also in a genuine life. It is therefore an aspiration after a true and genuine life as well as after a reality originating out of such a life which renders necessary a transformation and, at the same time, a metaphysic." (Knowledge and Life. pp-156,157) Without such a metaphysic all movement towards unity and individuality stops and all human effort sinks into incompleteness and insecurity. For this reason Eucken insists that a metaphysic is necessary.

In a philosophy which thus depends upon a metaphysic, a theory of knowledge must be developed; knowledge which Eucken calls the eye of the mind which beholds the invisible world. It is knowledge that guides us away from the illusion of the senses to the realm of reality. (The Problem of Human Life. p-20)

Eucken's method, which he calls the noological as distinguished from the psychological, requires an inversion of reality as it first appears to us, and a complete recasting of life. Such a program of readjustment requires a consideration of the universe - a metaphysic is, therefore, demanded.

The metaphysical theory is accepted by Eucken and held against the oppositions of the modern period not because he

is partial to theoretical subtleties but because he feels driven to this shelter by the very necessity of spiritual self-preservation. The only plea he makes is that he might have the freedom to conceive metaphysics in his own way. (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-22)

No achievement or accomplishment can quite compare to that in which the invisible world is made credible, convincing and constraining to man. When this is done in fashion true to metaphysical procedure, the overworld, the spiritual life, is given an overwhelming simplicity and so near that man finds it in his truest nature, and can live and die for it. (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-92)

In two different sections in his "Main Currents of Modern Philosophy", (ppl41-148 and p-80), Eucken gives his analysis of metaphysics in the modern period. In the former passage he declares that philosophy has the specific task of transcending the world of mere sense experience. This task involves from the very beginning sharp contradictions. In trying to harmonize these contradictions there are two alternative solutions; either the spiritual life must be abandoned or it must be assigned to a position in opposition to the immediate world and be made a vehicle of a world of its own.

If spiritual life has full independence, it can dominate reality and draw it to itself. In the human sphere, however,

spiritual life is merely a derived phenomenon; while from the point of view of historical existence, it is merely a product of the social life. Spiritual life, also, represents its truth as superior to time, while human life runs its course in time and must follow its movement. The natural world offers opposition to the spiritual life. The latter must demonstrate its superiority. In this process speculation becomes metaphysics. The resistance of the given world to the spiritual life and its unfolding, gives rise to difficult complications and severe conflicts. The conflicts deepen and the undertaking is a reckless venture unless there is a "meta-physic" of life which stands behind the "metaphysic of thought".

Metaphysics brings to light the problem which is everywhere noticed in life, i e, "all genuine spiritual life is developed, in the human sphere, not only as transcending but also as contradicting the immediate world." Morality is an illustration of this idea.

True it is that to go forward in the development of the self, a kingdom of ideal ends must be kept steadily in view. This kingdom must possess its own rulership and provide for its own development from the inside out. It stands in contradiction to the world of mere sense experiences and is not fettered to the immediate world. It involves a cosmic standpoint; a new order of things is demanded by it and it possesses, of itself, a cosmic character. "This cosmic

character, however, does not become vividly present to man if there be no vision of reality to support it; thus it is that the self's very effort to preserve itself drives us to metaphysics. We thus see that in metaphysics a conflict is waged for the maintenance of an independent philosophy."

Metaphysics is the natural outcome of the development of philosophy. Philosophy, unless it falls to pieces, comes naturally to metaphysics. If philosophy rejects metaphysics either it has not sufficient strength to go on in spite of the resistance of the immediate world, or the resistance is underrated because of a shallow optimism.

Even though metaphysics is severely opposed by the modern period, it can accomplish much by stirring up life, remove indifference and give life an imperative inward and outward impulse. It can probe life to its depths, causing unrest and discontent. Life will be given a new incentive and will have a guide along definite paths. Considered in this light, metaphysics is not something left floating loose and vague about the efforts and experiences of the task of human history. It is related in the most intimate fashion with the movements of history and of the individual life.

No matter what the type of civilization, each has had its own metaphysics. In this each civilization has struggled to attain and to express its own highest life and idealism.

"Through this relationship to history metaphysics makes no surrender to what is merely temporal; rather does it

elaborate the timeless element of truth contributed by the passing generations. This element does not disappear with the age, but remains continually present, at any rate as a possibility and a challenge."

Metaphysics thus considered has no difficulty in self-defense. But there is no time for idle play. There must be a change in the program of the metaphysical movement. Old paths must be changed for new ones. "There must be a decisive break with that unfettered speculation which believes itself able to produce a new world out of mere thought; this fits rather the old-fashioned mode of thinking which conceived it possible to discover the whole spiritual content of life through knowledge, and then to communicate it to the remaining departments of life, whereas we set knowledge within an underlying spiritual life and permit it along with the other departments, to struggle simultaneously for truth and for the development of this deeper life. More particularly the new metaphysics forms the sharpest contrast to the ontological, and therefore, at the same time, abstract and dogmatic character of the older metaphysics."

So Eucken declares that the older type of metaphysics, the formal, dogmatic, abstract type must be discarded; but insists that to refuse one type is not to reject all metaphysics. He agrees readily with Kant who said that "some sort of metaphysics has always existed in the world and will doubtless continue to do so."

This new Metaphysics, Eucken's type, will not be guilty of the same errors which prevailed in the older types. It will never grow into abstractions and dogmatism so long as there is a spark of life interest left in mankind. In order to reconcile the differences between the world of appearance and the world of reality, the world of sense experience and the spiritual world, there must be a metaphysical theory. Sincere investigation in the field of philosophy drives one towards metaphysics, "not through any delight in forms and universals, but through a desire for more character, for a profounder actuality, for a more energetic renovation of our sphere of life."

This new metaphysics will not fall into dogmatism and abstraction because it preserves the connection between the endeavour after knowledge and a fundamental and comprehensive spiritual life. It also will keep in closest touch with the movements of universal history, and at the same time will gain a history of its own.

Eucken laments the fact that the absence of a real metaphysics from our modern period is considered by some philosophers as an advantage. He thinks that perhaps the absence of a metaphysics would not be so noticeable if the thought life of our day were flourishing, and firm convictions ruled our lives. But the absence of these things makes a metaphysics all the more necessary. "But in point of fact we cannot avoid recognizing a limitless disintegration, a

lamentable insecurity of conviction in all matters of principle, a helplessness in the face of the trivialities of our human lot, a soullessness in the midst of an overflowing outward plenty. Those who can quietly endure such a state of affairs will not be led to metaphysics by any theoretical considerations. But those who recognize how imperative is the task of welding our civilization into a more compact and purposive whole, and of winning for it an inner independence (thereby at once more sharply dividing and more closely uniting men's minds), will side with us in our retention of metaphysics and in the seeking of new paths along which to carry on the ancient task." With these words, Eucken draws to a close the section on "The Tendency Towards Metaphysics." (Main Currents of Modern Philosophy. p-141-148)

It would be natural for the opposition to raise the objection to Eucken metaphysics that it does not touch actual life. It rests in a belief in an overworld, it is the old transcendentalism in new garb. But Eucken is willing to keep company even with the Pragmatist in wishing for a conversion of life into activity. Eucken, however, insists that "this cannot be realized so long as we start from life as we find it with all its rigid limitations. It can only take place through a reversal of this existence, through going back to a new starting point and developing a new life." (Main Currents of Modern Philosophy. p-80)

If this is metaphysics, and Eucken does not deny that it

is, we must have it, he says. It is only through the possession of such a metaphysics that an original and self-active life is made possible. His conclusion is that the spiritual life cannot maintain itself without some kind of metaphysics.

Eucken's metaphysics seeks a closer connection between truth and life. By this he means that the life of the spirit as a self-sufficient life (*Beisichelbstein des Lebens*), forms with its own contents and values, something essentially new over against all merely human conditions and requires, moreover, a complete reversal of the immediate state of affairs.

"Eucken's activism rests upon definite metaphysical assumptions, while pragmatism is purely empirical." (The German Edition, Wm. James - Pragmatism.) Eucken would not deny this characterization of the metaphysical basis of his philosophy, activism. He would, however, insist that it had as much connection with the actual problems of life as does pragmatism. And it supersedes the latter in the sense that activism does solve the problem of life while pragmatism only gestures at a solution.

Eucken's defense of the metaphysical aspect of his philosophy may be summed up in the words in which he shows his appreciation of the Doctrine of The Ideas in the philosophy of Plato. He says of this doctrine that it discloses a great truth which we cannot relinquish.

"It is the recognition of the fact that there is a realm of truth beyond the likes and dislikes of men; that truths are valid, not because of our consent, but independently of it, and in a sphere raised above all human opinions and power." (The Problem of Human Life. p-21)

Chapter VIII

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE AND THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

In approaching the subject of this chapter, it must be kept in mind that we have discussed Eucken's opinion of five of the particular problems which come into the field of our interest, i.e., Traditional Religion, Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism and Individualism. This present discussion will recall some of the former discussion to mind. To each one of these philosophical ideas Eucken refused to add his assent. They, for him, do not appear to be the proper solution to the problem of life.

Eucken, in "Main Currents" and "The Problem of Life", traces the philosophical movements with the idea of finding what is truth and reality, the significant problem of all philosophy. He traces the movement of this problem and its attempted solutions by whole philosophical periods, i.e., the Renaissance movement in which the subject was strengthened. The chief thing done by the Renaissance was the unravelling of the mediaeval entanglement of subject and object (the knower and the thing known). The Enlightenment took up the task of further distinction and classification between the subject and object. It sharpened the antithesis of subject and object to an extent hitherto unknown. Nature is now to win full autonomy, and for this purpose it must discard every psychic quality and become a system of mere masses and movements. At the same time the subject becomes concentrated in itself, man discovers a reason immanent in himself, a racial possession of eternal truths; and with such support

he feels himself strong enough to develop a 'Natural' justice, a 'Natural' morality, a 'Natural' religion, independent of tradition and environment.

And then the New Humanism took up the struggle. In the New Humanism the movement towards clear distinction gives way to that towards fruitful union, and an original life takes the place of rational reflection. The desire for great systems of relationships acquires an irresistible power; nature and spirit, as they are now called, again strive towards union and form a common life; spirit is now to be purified and enlarged through nature, while nature by contact with spirit is to acquire transparency and soul. It is in this way that freedom and truth appear united in one life. (Essay - The Inner Movement of Modern Life.)

In this manner Eucken traces what he considers to be the main philosophical trend of this modern period. Of course the foundations are much further in the past than the point at which he begins in the above essay. In his more elaborate works, the books mentioned above, he traces the problem through the main schools of philosophy from Plato on down to the Modern Movement. Each period reveals to the careful student its shade of emphasis upon the problem of knowledge and Eucken concludes that each period also shows the movement of his Doctrine of the Spiritual Life.

History is considered by Eucken as something transcending time. (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-46) It

shows not merely the 'drift of things', but reveals the heart and center of man's struggle for knowledge and attainment, his struggle for truth, reality, and a self. "But at the same time it has become clear that the problems of the past reach into the present and that our work is conditioned by the strong influence of history. Now the goal appears as the overcoming of traditional oppositions, now as the more vigorous following up of a course successfully begun, but in almost every case a glance backwards will make our own tasks clearer: we cannot doubt that our work to be successful must meet the demands of a situation conditioned by its antecedents." (The Life of the Spirit. p-395)

So does the movement of history affect the philosophy of man. But this movement has been such that at the present time man is seeking anew the answer to his questions about Truth, Reality, Knowledge and the Self. Man craves something which he has not yet acquired or achieved for himself and for the life of the world. "The craving after more soul and more love in human existence has to remain unsatisfied. Hence, as a general rule, the modern movement after some sort of connection (between unity and multiplicity; subject and object; the knower and the thing known) is too external and does not go back to the spiritual foundations. We are conscious of a great gap with nothing to fill it." (The Life of the Spirit. p-92)

Eucken rejects the theories of Knowledge which are

advocated in Empiricism, Rationalism, and Pragmatism. In the place of these theories he sets up his own, namely Activism. Indeed the theory of Knowledge in Empirical Philosophy is the simplest of all. All knowledge must be gained through experience of the outside world and our mental states. The knowledge that is possible to the Empiricist is limited to that which is derived "from direct experience and simple summations or generalizations into a single assertion of a number of similar assertions, all of which were individually derived from experience. This is the position scientists as such, and believers in the theory of naturalism, take up as to the possibility of the knowledge of truth to the human mind." (A.J. Jones -Eucken's Analysis of the Theory of Knowledge. p-33)

But Empiricism leads to agnosticism because knowledge is limited to the world of our mere sense experiences and we know nothing beyond them. Empiricists over-emphasize the importance of the sense organs and forget that while these have a part to play in life, they do not constitute the whole of life.

Rationalism, as a theory of knowledge, is more satisfactory to Eucken than is Empiricism. It admits that the human mind has some capacity for working upon the data presented to it by the sense organs. Man is able to weigh and consider the facts presented to the mind. Its method is that of logical deduction. His criticism of this theory is

on the basis of the fact that the mind by simple logical processes will never find the way to absolute truth and reality. The mind may bring into prominence truths that were only implicit, but it can go no further. It can get at only that truth which is implied in the premises with which the reasoning began. For this reason it will never discover truth.

Pragmatism is another theory which Eucken attacks. This theory is closely akin to the theory of Instrumentalism. These theories come from laying chief emphasis on life and action. Its test of truth is the value test. Anything is true for the time in which it is useful as a tool for life or valuable in solving an immediate problem. That contains the most of truth and the most of reality which is the most useful and helpful for life. Truth and reality, therefore, are relative terms.

To this theory Eucken never will agree. In it knowledge severs itself from the whole and is limited to utilitarianism. (Knowledge and Life. Eucken) To make truth and reality mere tools is to spoil both truth and reality; and truth that is merely a useful thing is no truth at all. Truth and reality to be of any worth must be absolute and permanent.

The theory which Eucken will accept, even the theory which he promulgated, is that of Activism. In common with Pragmatism it is a matter of life and action. It is not of mere intellect. Truth is truth; it is something deeper than

mere human decision. It is truth, not because it is useful to someone but it is independent of anyone's experience of it. This truth is gained intuitively through a life of action. "By acting in a certain way, man comes into intimate relationship with the great reality of life, and then he comes to know not so much ABOUT reality as WITHIN reality." (Rudolf Eucken - A Philosophy of Life. p-42)

This reality, according to Eucken is gained through the activity of the self. "The inwardness that we advocate is not a feeble echo and a yearning for dissolution, but it is active and masculine in its nature and rests on ceaseless self-determining activity." (Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. p-247) G.S.R. Mead thinks that Eucken almost makes Activity the absolute.

It is this activity, this striving, that arouses within man a new world. A problem is here set up. The center of man's life must be removed to the spiritual. Then the spontaneity and self-determining activity that are distinctive of the spiritual manifest themselves within man. Man must cooperate to bring about this change. (Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. p-174)

The theory of Activism does not regard the inner life and the approach to truth as a static matter. "The basis of true life must continually be won anew. Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at the height to which it has attained." (Quests Old and New. p-147) "For our life

is not given us as a whole without our co-operation, but presents itself at first as a juxtaposition and succession of individual processes. The binding into a whole is the work of the thinking and active spirit; it is an attempt, a venture, which must always justify itself." (The Life of the Spirit. p-191,192)

Aristotle's opinion was that true happiness and satisfaction come only from human activity which finds its task in itself and does not strive after anything beyond itself. When all the powers of the life unite and acquire a great depth of purpose under the guidance of reason, such an activity is reached. Eucken states his ideas thus: "The activity through action. Eucken states his ideas thus: "The activity which decides our happiness undoubtedly postulates the fulfillment of many conditions and the co-operation of many auxiliaries. A maimed and crippled man cannot exercise any full activity, and generally we must to a certain extent be favored by circumstances if we are to unfold what is latent in us. But however strongly Aristotle recognizes this, he does not believe that man becomes on this account a plaything of fate, for the main thing in all activity is always the inner power and capacity." (The Life of the Spirit. p-345)

The sphere of truth is entered when the full powers of man are strained to the utmost. Ancient thinkers were therefore right when they declared that a well directed and vigorous struggle for truth must undoubtedly reach truth. This

theory of Activism provides the way in which a synthesis of the spiritual life and the experiences of the senses is reached. This synthesis "overcomes the indeterminateness of the initial situation and gives life a definite character." (The Life of the Spirit. p-192)

When this synthesis gains the control the naturalistic and idealistic opposition is overcome. The natural world becomes important only as it promotes the unfolding of the spiritual life. As the spiritual life unfolds, the personality is developed. This development comes through action which involves nothing less than the complete transformation of the old, and the building up of a new reality. Truth, reality and the self are therefore reached by Activism, Eucken's theory of knowledge.

Plotinus said: "Without perpetual activity, thought and being could not exist." Eucken's activism is, therefore, not new. "Speculation is a luxury, while action is a necessity." (Bergson - Creative Evolution. p-44) In speaking of the Activism of Eucken, Hermann says: "His Activism stands not only for the Kingdom of God in the making, to be progressively realized through action, but also for that complete renewal of the GIVEN without which such realization is impossible." (Eucken and Bergson. p-87)

In whatever way the problem of knowledge is stated, the course of the development of the epistemological dualism of subject and object must be considered. This problem is as

ancient as the science of Philosophy itself. In one way or another it has been stated in every period of history of thought. At different times it has been stated as the Problem of the One and the Many; the Problem of the Knower and the Thing Known; the Problem of Subject and Object; the Problem of Reality and Appearance; the Problem of the Truth and Sense Experience; The Problem of the Infinite and the Finite; the Problem of the Absolute and the Limited. The course of this epistemological dualism can be traced everywhere in the field of philosophy.

This question of epistemological dualism appears in the Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken. "If thought remains on the side of the subject there is no knowledge - neither is there knowledge unless thought bridges the gap between subject and object." (Knowledge and Life. p-119) How bridge the chasm between subjectivism and objectivism? "The most influential attempt is that which aims at so inwardly broadening and strengthening the subject as to enable it to win a new insight into the universe and with it a new life. This is to take place in the main (though not completely), along Kantian lines." (This and the following quotations will be taken from Eucken's "Main Currents", the chapter on Subject - Object)

Eucken criticizes the theological aspect of the solution of the dualism of subject, object on the ground that it depends too much on feeling. "Man cannot arrive at truth at

all unless there is born within him a life elevated above his natural particularities and individuality. Truth bound down to such limitations as these is no truth."

There is something more to life than its subjective condition. The objective is to be considered also. The subjective and the objective must be brought into a relationship. The rift between the two must be overcome. Man really feels that the confinement to the merely subjective condition is an intolerable restriction.

In the field of philosophy, as opposed to the field of theology in which the above suggestions were made, the concept of 'Value' becomes the center of the movement. In ancient thought the chief antithesis of reality is that between a permanent 'being' and a transitory 'becoming'. It is, therefore, easily concluded that the essential being is at the same time the good and valuable being. This conception permits the good to become detached from activity and independent of all human affairs. On the other hand modern thought will not permit of such a conclusion. The good, the essential being cannot be considered apart from a living and active being. The good can be of value only as it touches life at some point of need. And the value of the good is in proportion to the importance it holds for life.

And then in his book, "The Life of the Spirit" (p-45) Eucken points out that "Spiritual life and philosophy consist entirely in the search for unity and the apprehension

of it." Wherein is this unity in manifoldness to be found? How are the sense experiences which reveal nothing more than things in juxtaposition, to be brought into a unified experience? Eucken answers that this can be done only as mankind places faith in the spiritual life which transcends mere sense experience. It is faith in such a spiritual life and the utilization of it in the affairs of life that civilization has developed as much genuine culture as we now have. "We cannot understand it (the growth of genuine culture) save on the assumption that spirituality in man derives its being and its independent status from the spiritual life as a whole." (Can We Still be Christian. p-101)

"Over against all anxiety and doubt concerning any particular truths there is a movement towards Truth - a movement which is very far removed from all subjective inclinations and human opinions." (Knowledge and Life. p-199) This movement is the spiritual life. This spiritual life which bridges the gap between the one and the many, which transcends the dualism of subject and object, is, at the same time, a universal thing. For Eucken there is no truth except it be a complete and universal truth. "How could we strive towards an all-embracing truth, independent of the peculiarities of this or that period, how could we seek to make this truth the very atmosphere of our life, if we did not recognize a universal that transcends the particular, and did not interpret the manifoldness of the

particular as a mere unfolding of this universal? The characteristic mark of the eternal is not a capacity to maintain itself consistently unchanged amid all the changes of time. It is rather the ability to enter into the varied life of different epochs without losing itself in them; to manifest in them all its transcendent power, to pursue in them all the same end of freeing time from its purely temporal character." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-65)

In the life of this modern period there is much to set up resistance to this spiritual life, this unifying principle in life. The materialistic and naturalistic philosophies of the day are on the side of the opposition. "There is only one way in which a spiritual movement can offer successful resistance to the increased influence of the natural environment and its attempt to invade even the sanctuary of the inward life; it must be the unity within which the manifoldness of our human striving is focused, and thus enabled to assert itself with unanswerable force." (Can We Still be Christian. p-44) This statement indicates the force of the opposition as Eucken sees it. It likewise points out the tenacity with which Eucken holds to his faith in the power of this inwardness in man and the transcendent spiritual power which is the independent universal. The antithesis is synthesized in the unity of the two.

Eucken thinks of this synthesis as showing in a series

of movements by which development the epistemological dualism is transcended. "Thus we see revealed a series of transcending movements; a transcendence of mere juxtaposition in space and time, a transcendence of the opposition between subject and object through a full creative activity, a transcendence of the gulf between activity and being by the formation of a spiritual self operative in the action and the development of a spiritual character inspiring its whole extent. This series of transcending movements did not arise from any merely theoretical considerations, but from an actual unfolding of new life, a total change of life's condition." (Can We Still be Christian. p-95)

In all of this discussion Eucken is recognizing both the natural and the spiritual life. He thinks that "the great aim of the universe is to pass gradually from the natural to the spiritual plane of life." The development of self brings about this change from one plane to the other. Problems arise, antitheses show themselves. As the ability to synthesize these clashes between the planes of life grows, the self is built up into the spiritual plane. "The spiritual is neither the product nor any attitude of the natural. Man is a border creature of two worlds; he represents the ultimate possibility of the one and possesses potentialities in regard to the other. The great object of his life must be to develop, through making use of and

conquering the life of nature, his higher self into a free, spiritual, and immortal personality." (Rudolf Eucken - A Philosophy of Life. A.J. Jones. p-54)

So Eucken does not think of his theory as being the product of any group of natural events or sense experiences in mere juxtaposition. It is not limited to space and time. It is transcendent in spite of his attempt to keep it from being so. Further, he thinks of it as having a cosmic character. "Once we have grasped the fact that the spiritual life is a cosmic power opening up new depths of reality, and bringing reality to self-realization, we naturally expect, nay, demand that a process so universal in its drift shall show itself superior to all other movements, draw them all into its service, press forward along well defined lines of its own, lightly thwarting all obstructions, human or material, and yet the while controlling the manifold divergences of things and guiding them all towards a common goal. Thus, as we view the puzzle from our own philosophical standpoint, it grows more baffling than before; far from having solved the mystery, we have but wrapped it in deeper gloom." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-118) This gloom would settle deeply and in a permanent fashion were it not for the hope which is raised by the power of the spiritual life. This power it does possess. Mankind must give it the right of way to work in his life.

Hope springs eternal in Eucken's breast. In spite of

the devastating war, his hope stills clings to this spiritual life of which mankind may partake. All through the days of his work in philosophy he kept this as a central point in his message. Naturalism, materialism, humanism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, nothing could ultimately defeat it. It is the universal truth. "This fundamental fact - the fact that an independent spiritual life springs up thus within us - cannot be controverted by citing the ways of a refractory world, however terrible these ways may be. They may indeed convince us that the world's condition does not answer to the requirements of the spiritual life, and may compel us to judge in no favorable light the condition of the world and the state of mankind. They may also prescribe fresh tasks for our attention, but never can they cast the shadow of a doubt upon the bed-rock of fact already referred to; they can but set it in sharper relief, define it still more clearly. And yet, strictly as we maintain the universality and incontrovertible certainty of this fundamental fact, much as we deprecate its reduction to a mere matter of subjective taste, we hold that its power to convince either an individual or an age comes only through the clear consciousness and forceful unfolding of its own spiritual resources. Where there is no such spiritual content, wherever life, inwardly rent asunder, can no longer bring an elemental might to bear upon the resistant forces of the world, there the world triumphs, doubt

and unbelief stand out invincible and it is idle to speak of the meaning of life." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-120) Herein is both the note of hope and the note of pessimism. The question in Eucken's mind is just this: "Will the world of this modern period have insight and wisdom enough to seize its opportunity and save itself through the value of the spiritual life?"

The real greatness of the spiritual life, as Eucken interprets it, is in the fact that "it is no mere department of our being, no mere haven of refuge wherein, weary of noise and toil, we may immure ourselves securely; it is its very nature, rather, to claim the lordship of all reality, nor can it abandon this claim, or its right to maintain it against resistance, without losing vitality and becoming more and more narrow and subjective." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-121) This spiritual life, Eucken believes, is really becoming more clearly defined in the life of man. As it becomes more definite and clear, its inspiration gives man zeal for work and sacrifice.

Eucken never thinks of the spiritual life as being limited in time and space. Man is continually subject to these limitations but the spiritual life never is limited by them. Therefore, man is not compelled to let the tides of time and space sweep over him unresisted. The spiritual life furnishes him with a counter-force. Because of this force "he can sift the abiding from the perishable, the

spiritual from the merely natural, and claim an ever larger share in that which is not temporal but eternal." (The Meaning and Value of Life. p-112)

Man has not only, then, the finite self but also an infinite self. Not only is he characterized by the momentary sense experiences, but he also shares in the spiritual world. In this manner the infinite self is brought to light. "By sharing in the spiritual world, in the self-immediacy of reality, he becomes possessed of an infinite self, while yet his life's activities assume a more and more positive direction. Remaining in his own sphere, he is yet in direct possession of a world of which he feels himself to be part-builder. The infinite, which for mysticism was a matter of mere feeling, and could not therefore be wrought deep enough into the very substance of life, has now become the motive force of labor, and can extend its revolutionary activity in every direction."

(The Meaning and Value of Life. p-108)

In a somewhat recent essay -Philosophy and The Religious Movement - Eucken discusses the relation of his Doctrine of the Spiritual Life to psychology. His opinion is that if, as he does, one starts his theory at the point of the "Inner Feeling", it is quite in accord with the modern movement toward the subject. Granted this inner, psychic life of man, what relation has it to reality? If it is limited to phenomena, then the world of truth does not

come within its scope. But if this inner life forms a part of a great invisible relationship, if with the appearance of the spiritual life there begins a new stage of life and a new development in the world, then the inner life deals with matters far deeper than phenomena. Its cosmic character is brought to view. The individual is not isolated but shows his participation in the whole of reality. "Only when a world process is perfecting itself in us and through us, and man is able to convert it into his own action, can we obtain experience of anything superhuman. Then alone is it possible for divine powers to reveal themselves to us and raise us above the whole realm of the petty human. Then alone is there any possibility of a philosophical foundation of religion." (Essay - Philosophy and the Religious Movement) In this way Eucken justifies the psychological basis of his Doctrine of the Spiritual Life, and leads into the subject of its relation to religion.

Because of the sheer physical limitations of this thesis, much that Eucken has to say about the theory of knowledge must be omitted. Many of the separate and individual items have been touched upon under the heading of the harmony of the epistemological dualism of subject and object. More could be written about his discussion of the problem of being and becoming; the spiritual life of man and the spiritual world behind it; freedom of the personality; metaphysics; truth; the ontological argument; teleology; but

further discussion of these interesting matters must be omitted from this thesis.

Room must be given in this chapter for the statement of Eucken's position on the matter of religion. This question brings up many of the problems of philosophy. In the chapter in which was discussed Eucken's analysis of the solutions which had already been offered to the problem of life, it was found that he definitely refused the solution which was offered by traditional religion. Nevertheless he was deeply interested in the subject of religion. His interest in religious matters, he tells us in "Rudolf Eucken, His Life, Work and Travels, by Himself", was due to the loss of his brother and father, his own delicate health, the blindness that early threatened him, and other restrictions and limitations which were cast around him in early life. And yet in spite of these difficulties and handicaps he never lost his belief that a higher power cared for men in general and him in particular and that he might trust it. At no time in his long life did he abandon this faith.

He was, however, early repelled by traditional religion and the ecclesiasticalism of his day. He became a constant critic of the creed which he inherited. Because of his own inner experience and his family connections, he was a free-thinker. His own attitude toward the problems of religion was "free of all sectarian narrowness." He thought of his own attitude toward this subject as "a supersectarian treatment" of religion.

His interest in studying the problems of religion and writing on religious subjects was somewhat due to the fact that he was convinced of the inadequacy of the religion of his country. His people INHERITED religion.

With this background it might first seem that his religious interests were founded in emotionalism purely; and yet he warns against that weakness and failure in this field of study. His advice is that one must always be careful in the approach to religion not to give too much place to feeling. "Man cannot be resolved into mere states of feeling; there is something objective in his constitution, and with this he must reckon." (Essay -Christianity and the New Idealism. p-5)

Religion is not something merely private and individual for Eucken. Man has large interests and religion lives in this field of his larger self. "A spiritual being, a microcosm such as he is, is forced by a necessity of his innermost nature to concern himself with the universe."

(Christianity and the New Idealism. p-5)

Therefore life to Eucken is more than practical life. It is more than the mechanical application of laws and doctrines to the daily task. It is a comprehensive thing. Every possible kind of activity comes into its field and it is, in itself, superior to all its particular parts. So that when he defines religion it becomes a sweeping, limitless thing. "Religion. . . . is not merely a belief in

some supreme power, nor do I consider it to be the establishment of relations of any kind between this supreme power and ourselves. It is an inner identification with it and the creation of a new life through it. The problem may be defined in this way: Does man in the wholeness of his being experience an impulse to acknowledge a divine element and if so, can he identify himself with it and rise to its lofty height without transforming his previous condition?" (Religion and Life. p-12,13)

In life there are two stages - a natural stage, and a spiritual stage. In the first stage the principle of cause and effect move, while in the latter stage life as a whole is viewed. As life expands it reaches beyond the natural stage; it evolves and a new life within the soul is attained. In this spiritual stage man distinguishes between subject and object and then transcends the distinction. Man cannot achieve this new life alone; some higher power must do it for him. This in brief is the place and function and meaning of religion for Rudolf Eucken. (Religion and Life. pp-13,20)

In his book, "The Truth of Religion", Eucken tells us what religion is in these terms: "Either religion is merely a product of human wishes and ideas which have been sanctioned by tradition and society, in which case as a human fabrication it must be destroyed by the advancing tide of spiritual progress, and no art or might or cunning can arrest its

downfall; or religion is based upon facts which are more than human, and then the fiercest attack is powerless to shake it, but will rather help it through all stress of human need and toil to come to its full strength and unfold more freely its eternal truth."

Eucken divides religion into two parts- universal religion and characteristic religion. He defines the universal type as a more or less vague appreciation of the spiritual life, which results in a diffused, indefinite spiritual life. He defines the characteristic type as "a life of pure inwardness", which draws its power and inspiration from the infinite resources of the universal spiritual life in which he finds his being. Religion for him is rooted not in belief, but in life. His interest is not in "a lazy, shallow rationalism but in a living faith." (Hermann - Eucken and Bergson. p-94)

Real religion does not have its beginning merely in the individual awakening to a conscious contact with God who is thought of as a personal savior of the individual life, but rather as the individual becomes conscious of the absolute spiritual life and begins to identify himself with it.

Psychology has a work to do in the study of religious phenomena. It must show how the movements of religion reveal themselves in the individual and under human conditions, but psychology is not the basis of religion. Neither is religion based in intellectualism. The basis of religion

must be sought in the soul itself, and in the characteristic experiences and disclosures of man's inward life. "An overpowering conviction persuades us that we need not wait for some other sphere than this in order to prove the reality of a higher order and put ourselves in relation to it. The one possible point of departure is the life-process itself, and only in so far as we bring its content and procedure into clearer light can we realize that a new order already exists." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-3)

What is the fact of religion? This question is very important for Eucken. His opinion is that the fact of religion is not something ready made and given. The fact itself becomes the main problem in religion. Every discussion about the method of religion includes the problem of the fact or content of religion. "The point of crucial importance for such a religion is the life-process itself. We are urged to view and value all outward manifoldness from the standpoint of inwardness and unity." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-24)

Religion of the spiritual life gets stated in human documents of creeds and doctrines but these must always be referred back to the universal from which they get their meaning, their source, which is the spiritual life itself.

"The central fact of religion is nothing other than the opening up of a reality superior to the world, the revelation of a new life-process in the midst of our own

life, an inner reversal of the world." (Essay - Modern Man and Religion.) In this way he states the fact of religion. Religion is a kind of Weltanschauung, a knowledge of that which lies beyond the realm of experience.

The essence of religion does not lie in circumstances, and temperament, phenomena of the material and intellectual world and life, but in the characteristic spiritual reality. This does not spring from sense experiences; it has its beginning in the 'Overworld', in the reality which transcends phenomena.

Religion, in its essence, is characterized by the demand for this new world which is more than the given world of appearances. "Religion, however, is not a communication of overworld secrets, but the inauguration of an overworld life." Freedom and redemption from the old world of sin, contradictions etc., are obtained by the working of this spiritual life which synthesizes all the struggles and contradiction between the 'low' and the 'high' in life.

A. J. Jones in his book, "Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life" (p-65) expresses his opinion of Eucken's view of religion. "The first great concern of religion must be the conversion - not of man, as mere man, but of the spiritual life in the human being, and it means 'a mighty concentration of the spiritual in man'. The essential basis that makes religion possible is the presence of divine life in man -- 'it unfolds itself through the seizure of this life as one's

own nature.' Religion must be a form of activity, which brings about the concentration of the spiritual life in the human soul, and sets forth this spiritual life as a shield against unworthy elements that attempt to enter and to govern man."

What is the truth of religion? Eucken answers that the truth of anything is in the whole. Since religion seeks unity and wholeness of life in all its affairs, therefore the truth of religion is in this spiritual life which is the unifying and transcending principle of all life. "The fount of certainty is in the last resort the whole, and thence alone can such certainty be transmitted to the parts."

(Christianity and the New Idealism. p-29) The movement of the spiritual life within the individual is not of the individual entirely, but rather of the spiritual life itself. It is not adjacent to reality but within it. The truth of religion involves the positive assertion of an independent kingdom over against all human likes and fancies. Above the human fancies and weaknesses which prevail in the purely human discussion of religion, there abides this certain kingdom of the spiritual life. It will never be changed; it will never be dismayed by the dissensions and differences of opinion as the conflict goes on among men. Genuine truth comes as the individual willingly and freely accepts this spiritual life within himself.

What is the conviction of religion? "Religion stands

for the conviction that God, and not man, is the measure of things. It represents, therefore, a truth transcending the opinion and caprice of man, a truth which weighs and judges all man's undertakings." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-66) Truth thus has an independent standard. Eucken is by no means Sophist at this point. If truth is subject to the whims and fancies of men and dependent upon the materials and experiences which come through sense experience, there is no real truth. Never will Eucken condescend to agree that truth is a relative matter. His religion abides in the conviction that God is the measure of all things.

Again the religion which Eucken advocates carries the conviction, on the other hand, that "The ultimate secrets of the cosmos declare themselves to the inmost soul and become man's personal possession. Apart from such a conviction, religion could not claim to be central for life. That which is essential and necessary must at the same time be something that can be the subject of the immediate experience." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-66) Thus we see that even though religion is based on the conviction that truth and reality are in God, because he is the measure of all things, at the same time it carries the conviction that God reveals to man both truth and reality and that in the association of God and man truth and reality become the possession of man.

Religion in the beginning is latent in man. In

the conflicts of life the spark is fanned. When the old struggles with the possible new, the life of religion proves itself. In these crises of life, either the life sinks back into naturalism and sense experiences or goes forward and up to the new standards in attaining the spiritual life. This development cannot be on the mere basis that such a power does exist; the superior power must become operative in the life of man.

Eucken does not argue the question of God. He, however, rather fancies the use of the term 'Godhead' rather than God. God, says Eucken, is "an absolute spiritual life in all its grandeur, above all the limitations of man and the world of experience - a spiritual life that has attained to a complete subsistence in itself and at the same time to an encompassing of all reality."

He is very anxious to do away with the older anthropomorphic ideas of God. For him God is the ultimate spirituality which inspires the struggling personality and gives to it a sense of unity and confidence. (Abel J. Jones) "Only a power that is not of this world can guard us from the perils of an alien and hostile order." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-4)

Eucken justifies his conception of God on the basis that he has a right to make this inference from man to something beyond man because man is something more than a mere point over against the infinite; because man has

within himself a particular and universal aspect and because he inwardly participates in a cosmic life. (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-4)

Religion stands upon the supreme truth that there is above man a higher power communicating itself to him and working in and through him for his renewal and transformation. Christianity, particularly, stands for the fusion of the divine and the human. The divine enters into the human and thus lifts the human up to the divine. "It is this entry of the divine into man's sphere, with its inversion of the primitive order of things, that first gives the elements of the Christian life their full depth and force. Only thus can we do equal justice to its love and gentleness on the one hand, and to its seriousness and truth on the other." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-80)

A. S. Eddington in his lecture "Science and the Modern World", justifies a belief in God and defends the general position of Eucken in these words: "Our relationship (with our friends) is such that we could read philosophical arguments designed to prove the non-existence of each other, and perhaps even be convinced by them - and then laugh together over so odd a conclusion. I think that it is something of the same kind of security we should seek in our relationship with God. The most flawless proof of the existence of God is not a substitute for it; and if

we have that relationship the most convincing disproof is turned harmlessly aside. If I may say it with reverence, the soul and God laugh together over so odd a conclusion." Eddington further adds, "The crucial point for us is not a conviction of the existence of a supreme God but a conviction of the revelation of a supreme God." For Eucken, religion gets its meaning and man gets his religious values from the fact that God and man meet in the fusion of the spiritual life with the life of man.

What about the soul? Eucken declares that Christianity has moved heaven and earth to save a soul to man. (Can We Still be Christian p-169) He does not argue the matter. That man has a soul seems to be a foregone conclusion for him. He indicates that the human spiritual life, which he differentiates from the spiritual life, has the seat of its life in the soul of man. The seat of intelligence is not in the mechanical make up of the mind of man but rests in the fact that man has a soul.

The problem of immortality hinges upon the conception of the soul. The scientific movements of today oppose the doctrine of immortality and present day religious movements are more concerned with this present life and not much disposed to go beyond it. Eucken believes, and rightly so, that if one single instance of the influence of the spirit world upon our existence could be incontestably proved, the problem of immortality would enter upon a new phase. (Essay -

The Problem of Immortality.)

In this same essay he points out that the whole question of the immortality of the soul depends upon the nature of the soul, and the content and meaning of life. "Wherever belief rises above naturalism, something unique, something superior to nature will be recognized in the soul of man. And as this can only be understood as the effect of a new order of things, it may not then seem impossible to construct from human life theories which reach beyond experience." (Essay - The Problem of Immortality.) This essay likewise discusses the point of view that since the spiritual life transcends time and the soul is the spiritual life, it also transcends time. Spiritual life is lifted above time; it is independent of time. Man becomes a fellow worker in a spiritual order; he is a life-center of spiritual energy; therefore he is a sharer in the whole of the spiritual world. To this extent he is in his own inward being supreme over mere time. "The continuation of the spiritual life is assured. The question is: To what extent has man a share in this spiritual order?" In "The Truth of Religion" (p-435) Eucken expresses the conviction that the inner life of man can never be fully and completely overcome by the flow of time.

The book, "The Truth of Religion", Abel J. Jones, calls "The greatest apology of religion ever wirtten." In it Eucken gives the full content of his ideas and opinions

on religious matters. He gathers up therein all his convictions and analyses elsewhere expressed. His definitions and discussions are repeated but not changed. What he once calls religion is always religion for him. What he once expresses as his opinion of God, the soul, immortality, is always for him the same. Wherever is found his criticism of religion and especially the religion of Christianity, it will run true to form. Often is Eucken criticized because he seemed never to change his opinions. Did he not grow? Or is it because there is no room for change because he had searched the complete field so thoroughly before he first expressed himself?

In his book, "Can We Still be Christian", Eucken takes up a very thorough analysis and discussion of Christianity. He turns down completely the old ecclesiastical organization known as the Christian Church; and yet he has a very fine sense of appreciation of the gist of the Christian movement. With dogmatism and creeds, he has no patience, but recognizes the necessity for some kind of organization to sponsor the Christian movement.

Christianity, he believes, is the first religious movement to secure the superiority of spirit to nature. Again; "The real truth which Christianity has brought out is that what seems outwardly small and weak may quite well possess an inward greatness." (Can We Still be Christian. p-163)

In relation to this period in which naturalism has gotten such a grip upon life, religion needs to bestir itself anew. Religion needs a new simplicity and a new emphasis upon its immediacy. It needs a sharper distinction of the essential from the non-essential. It must work for the development of a characteristic unity of life. "Modern life does not feel the deep need of religion, the need for a new world. That which drives man to religion is the break with the world of their experience, the failure to find satisfaction in what this world offers or is able to offer. But there is much discord today between man and his world." (Christianity and the New Idealism. p-115)

So much seems to be against religion in this day of naturalistic philosophy that hope often runs low. Eucken declares that the shallowness of modern culture and the starving of all inward life may be overcome by returning to the "deepening and quickening forces of religion." (Can We Still be Christian. p-211) And A.S. Eddington (Science and the Unseen World) matches this word of hope with the corollary, "Dismiss the idea that natural law may swallow up religion. It cannot even tackle the multiplication table single handed."

In answer to the question, "Can we still be Christian?" Eucken gives an emphatic affirmative answer. "Our answer is that we not only can but must be Christians."

Chapter IX

EUCKEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISM -
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

The next problem is to discover the philosophers who greatly influenced Eucken and to note the elements of their influence. In this way an approach is made to Eucken's own contribution to the field of philosophical idealism.

Eucken himself writes that Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Plotinus, Kant and Hegel were among the philosophers who influenced him most. In the early days of his student and teaching life, Eucken gave much attention to Aristotle, but when he turned from philology to philosophy he gave up the study of Aristotle and turned more to the teacher of Aristotle and the school of Idealism.

Plato's influence is clearly recognizable. Although he does not say it in so many words, there nevertheless is an important similarity between the Ideas in Plato and the Spiritual Life in Eucken. And this similarity holds true whether the Ideas are considered in the older absolutistic, transcendental sense or in the newer pragmatic and instrumental sense.

Eucken's theory of the spiritual life has been pointed out and analyzed in previous chapters and both its transcendental and pragmatic or instrumental features were mentioned and discussed. Attention is called to those elements in the chapters "The Doctrine of the Spiritual Life", "Metaphysics", and "The Doctrine of Spiritual Life and the Problem of Philosophy".

Moreover, Eucken agrees with Plato in the matter of

the values of life. Plato gave emphasis to the ancient cardinal virtues, courage, wisdom, temperance and justice. Life for him was made up of a hierarchy of virtues. This hierarchy was crowned by "The Good". Eucken's chief interest was in ethics and morality.

Eucken's interest in religious matters was very intense. No doubt he was acquainted, and intimately so, with the life and writings of Augustine. He declares Augustine to have been one of the six men of greatest influence in his life. There is considerable similarity between the sentiment in "The Confessions of Augustine" and Eucken's analysis of the deeper elements that he calls "Characteristic Religion."

Eucken, however, would not have agreed with the rigid, nonflexible theology of Augustine. They would have much in common in their belief in God, the overworld and the soul. The intensity of the religious fervor of Augustine is matched by the intensity with which Eucken insisted that life went to pieces and became meaningless without the full and complete working of the spiritual life.

Eucken cannot match Kant in the systematization of his philosophy, but there are certain features of similarity in their ideas and purposes. There is nothing in Eucken to faintly suggest the vast systematization of thought which is found in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." But Eucken shows the influence of Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason."

The "Thing-in-itself" in Kant finds a kindred element in Eucken's "Spiritual Life." Eucken would agree with Kant's assertion that there are two worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal. Kant subordinates the theoretical reason to the practical reason. So does Eucken. Kant affirms the primacy of the moral consciousness. Eucken is more interested in ethics and morals than he is in systematic philosophy. Kant's ethics culminates in idealistic monism. So does the ethics of Eucken.

In Kant the "Thing-in-itself" exists above the particular thing and gives to it its form and meaning. In Eucken "The Spiritual Life" transcends the individual but bridges the gap between the object and the subject, i.e., it steps down, as it were, to work in the practical affairs of mankind.

Eucken would agree with Kant on the point that the "Thing-in-itself" or the "Spiritual Life" cannot be proven by means of reasoning. They exist of themselves and are not dependent upon reason or experience for their reality. And yet in spite of their independent existence they are in contact with practical life in a very useful and intelligent manner. In Kant the "Thing-in-itself" cannot be known. In Eucken the "Spiritual Life" can be known and experienced.

The problem of knowledge is not raised in Eucken to the extent to which it is raised in Kant. The latter asked: "How is knowledge possible?" or "How are synthetic judgments

a priori possible?" Eucken did not take time to ask: "How can these things be?" He deliberately assumed both the hypothesis and the knowledge of it. This is a weakness in his logic but he was not concerned with logic. His concern was with life.

John Dewey in "German Philosophy and Politics" (p-55) says, "Professor Eucken represents a type of idealistic philosophy which is hardly acceptable to strict Kantians. Yet only where the fundamental Kantian ideas were current would such ethical ideas flourish."

A point at which the philosophy of Kant and that of Eucken come together is indicated in a passage in Eucken's book, "The Life of The Spirit". Eucken here is referring to the meaning which both he and Kant give to personality. In establishing a meaning for personality, the spiritual life is valuable. "The thought of personality possesses value only in so far as the word is backed by action and indeed action which involves nothing less than the complete transformation of the old and the building up of a new reality." How much this thought demands is shown with particular clearness by the life work of Kant. He saw clearly that there is no personality unless life is raised to freedom, independence and spontaneity, but he saw just as clearly that for such a freedom and spontaneity the world of natural existence does not afford the smallest room; hence a complete reversal of the former world picture

became necessary, and Kant employed all his mighty powers in its accomplishment. But today it often looks as if life could be raised to an essentially higher level within the world of natural existence without much trouble if only it were brought into more vigorous and direct relation with the individual units. This, however, is a dangerous error. If we do not bring the living units into connection with a new kind of being and thereby give them an essentially new content, this movement by awakening their self-consciousness and self-complacency may easily do more harm than good and, with all its subjective stimulation, provide little genuine happiness. It is also dangerous in so far as it veils the difficult problem with which we are here concerned." (pp-385,386) In this manner Eucken brings Kant's ethics to his own and makes the purpose of each a very practical matter, i.e., the building and establishing of a free personality.

Troeltsch, in The Harvard Review, October 1912, writes "In Eucken we have a combination of Plato, Fichte and Hegel." Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Kant must each have been of much satisfaction to Eucken. To which ever one he might have turned on occasion he would have found much to substantiate his own claim that the life of sense experience does not lead to truth and reality. Plotinus was ashamed of the body which was his and the manner in which he entered into the world. Eucken would accept more readily the

God of Plotinus than the God of Plato. The God of Plato is not above the Idea; in fact he often interchanges the term God with the Idea of The Good. With Plotinus, on the other hand, God is above all. God is the power which produces everything, the active power. God or the Godhead, as he would prefer to call it, for Eucken is paramount even to the Spiritual Life.

Macintosh in "The Problem of Knowledge" sums up the doctrine of Hegel in a way which is useful here. "The real is the rational, not in the sense of mere logical idealism but in the sense that if being is interpreted after the manner of psychological idealism in terms of consciousness, it is further determined by the principle that the real is the rational within the psychical, the universal within the particular facts of any individual consciousness, the objective within the subjective - in other words, the concrete universal. Absolute reality, in which all that is real must be included, is an absolutely rational system in which all particulars of conscious experience are included. Hegel is commonly interpreted as intending to teach a monistic metaphysics." (pp-130,131) Eucken would agree to this.

Hegel has become famous with his "Triple Dialectic" of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. In reading Eucken this same dialectic is met with over and over again. Hegel's point of view in general was that by such an action progress

is made, the problems of life solved and philosophy, science, society, politics etc. are developed. For Eucken, the spiritual life is the synthesis in all questions and problems.

Hegel's philosophy is often branded as intellectualistic idealism. In this Eucken would not agree with him. Although Eucken's philosophy bears imperishable marks of idealistic philosophy, it should never be branded as "Intellectualistic Idealism."

Eucken is related to these representatives of various schools of Idealism, even as he is related in some fashion to every representative of the schools of Idealism, because he should unquestionably be ranked as an Idealist. The main question is: "In what particular school of Idealism shall Eucken be placed?"

Hermann, in "Eucken and Bergson, Their Significance for Christian Thought", calls Eucken's philosophy "Concrete Idealism" (p-53) and "Cosmic Personal Idealism" (p-60)

Eucken is ranked among the Critical Idealists. "Eucken is an eloquent partisan of spiritualism and idealism against both the naturalistic philosophy and what he deemed to be the deadening and confusing influences of modern life. Like Dilthey he finds in the history of philosophy the record of a spiritual movement to be interpreted in terms of an immediate revelation of the inwardness of life. But his philosophy, like that of Fichte, which it resembles through-

out, is a call to arms rather than a historical survey. Spirit is essentially action and struggle in which there is resistance to be overcome and a victory to be won. Life is a deed, and there is no deed without a duality of agent and object. The world is to be construed in terms of the demands of the fullest and most active personal life. This method of taking as the principle of truth the requirements of the whole of life, rather than of the mere intellect, he calls the 'noological' method. The world is in a sense what we make it. Although Eucken's philosophy is thus a philosophy of faith and of action, it does not employ these categories in any limiting sense. All knowledge is faith in the sense that it springs from the exigencies of action, but the activity whose urge is thus obeyed is that of a universally immanent spirit." (History of Philosophy. Weber and Perry. p-561)

Macintosh, in "The Problem of Knowledge" has the following to say about Eucken's Idealism: "Eucken's Idealism is an idealism which is the outcome of the disintegration of absolute idealism into its original elements. It is the spiritual or religious idealism to which many cling for its supposed religious and moral value. It is an approach to the original mystical idealism, although not a return to it. It may be regarded as a relic of the original mystical basis of idealism.

Eucken carefully distinguishes his 'New Idealism' from

'Immanent Idealism', that intellectualistic idealism which would obliterate spiritual distinctions and reduce all to degrees of rationality. But even this form of idealism is appreciated for its emphasis upon 'inwardness', in opposition to naturalism. Eucken does not stop to make explicit correction of the logical errors of the subjectivism with which this 'inwardness' is associated. There is simply a consciousness of the disparity between ordinary idealism and the philosophy of the Spiritual Life, and so the term 'idealism' is discounted as an 'outworn expression'. What we would inquire, however, is whether what Eucken is really interested in is not spiritual realism; and if so, whether such a philosophy is really so incompatible with physical realism as Eucken seems to suppose." (pp-208,209)

Boyce Gibson, the English disciple of Eucken, commits himself more fully to idealism than Eucken does. In his book, "God With Us", he calls his own position "Radically Idealistic". And he further describes his own view, which he declares is that of Eucken also, as "Religious Idealism".

Eucken in "The Truth of Religion" has this to say about idealism: "The fundamental truth of idealism is that the spiritual contents establish an independence and a self-value over against the individual, that they train him with superior energy and that they are not material for his purely human welfare." (p-179) In what Eucken calls the NOOIOGICAL method, he thinks the above truth gets full

recognition. Realism, on the other hand, is to find its rights as the particular human phases of life are developed. He would thus disagree with Macintosh about his relation to realism.

Eucken would prefer to have his philosophy go by the title "Activism". "True satisfaction can come only from an activity which finds its task in itself and does not strive after anything beyond itself. Such an activity is reached only when all powers unite and acquire a great depth of purpose under the guidance of reason; when a strong and earnest man consciously expresses himself and his character in his ACTIONS." (Thus Eucken analyses Aristotle and agrees with him. Life of the Spirit. p-344)

For Eucken the problems of life are solved by the life process. Truth for him is not merely the useful as in pragmatism, but it is gained intuitively through a life of action. It is action which leads to a relationship with the great realities of life. Eucken so frequently and persistently makes this remark. Such activity leads to a growth in certainty. Such a movement leads to spiritual freedom. "The end of the quest of Activism is spiritual freedom, beginning with the awareness of an original presence which will extend an awakening and formative influence over the whole of life." (Quests Old and New. Mead)

Bergson said; "Speculation is a luxury, while Action is a necessity." (Creative Evolution. p-44) Eucken goes back to Greek Philosophy for the basis of his emphasis on

activity. In Hellenism: "Effort is supported by the conviction that the joy of life lies principally in activity, that it is therefore the chief object of endeavor to enter upon a state of activity, to assume an active and not a passive attitude towards things." (The Life of the Spirit. p-338) And he calls attention to the fact that activity was its own reward to the Greek.

Hermann, in Eucken and Bergson - Their Significance for Christian Thought, says of Eucken's Activism: "His activism stands not only for the Kingdom of God in the making, to be progressively realized through our action, but also for that complete renewal of the given without which such realization is impossible." (p-87)

In the case of Activism, "The effort is directed in the first place towards a fact, a fact upon which thought itself rests, the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life. What it contains must be made manifest as a fact, it must be exhibited, not deduced." (Main Currents. p-135) The end of activism is not an individual but a social one, but even here "Spirituality does not maintain itself by virtue of mere existence, but only through a continual renewal, an unceasing creation." (Main Currents. pp-193,194)

Eucken meant by activity not merely thought. Thought might be destructive or constructive in its nature. It might also lead to inactivity. He meant by activity, all the forces and powers and capacities of life unified,

co-ordinated and employed in the business of making life in its highest moral and ethical phases.

But to say that Eucken's philosophy is activistic is not to say that it cannot be classified as idealistic. It is not absolutistic idealism; it is not transcendental idealism; it is activistic idealism; above all it is religious idealism.

Ralph Barton Perry, in "Present Philosophical Tendencies", writes: 'The constant presupposition is that a spiritual life which is a unified whole is at work in the depths of our soul.' These words, written by Rudolf Eucken, admirably express the message of idealism to modern times. Idealism is a form of spiritualism in which man, the finite individual, is regarded as a microscopic representation of God, the Absolute Individual. Man's spiritual nature is a revelation of the principle of reality, and his ideals an imitation of the perfect and eternal reality. So that but for his limitations man would be God; and taken together with the balance of spiritual life, which compensates for these limitations, he is God." (p-113)

It would not be correct to say that Eucken is in hearty agreement with the whole of this quotation. Perry has indicated how aptly Eucken does express the gist of the philosophy of idealism for today. Beyond this Eucken would not accede to the principle which Perry lays down in the above quotation. For Eucken God, the Spiritual Life,

the good, the true and the beautiful, all moral, ethical and spiritual values are independent of man's knowing them or co-operating with them.

Chapter X.

EUCKEN'S MEANING AND MESSAGE FOR HIS AGE

In our final considerations of the Philosopher of Jena there must be both criticism and appreciation. His followers were many; his friends came from all parts of the world; his students were from all the nations.

Of his personality a word would not be amiss. Meyrick Booth, student and friend, has given us a fine appreciation of the philosopher and man. "The union of philosophy with practical life is one of his central aims and true to his conviction, Eucken reveals in his own personality the unflagging effort, the thoroughness, the spiritually directed and inspired activity, the faith, and the deep intuitive sympathy which are the proper fruits of a philosophy such as his. The great Jena thinker has been endowed by nature with faculties which peculiarly fit him for the task which he is performing. A rare combination of intellectual depth and keenness with emotional insight and sensitive sympathy has made it possible for him to develop a philosophy which is scientific and logical, yet plastic and intuitionist; a view of life which can satisfy the intellect without ignoring the experiences and needs of the heart and conscience. Professor Eucken has about him as little of the traditional German Stubengelehrter as can well be imagined. He is no dried up pedant absorbed in his pet theories; but a man intensively alive to the outer world and full of sympathetic understanding for all those of

every class and every nation who come into contact with him. Most characteristic of him, as indeed of all the truly wise, is his remarkable and unaffected simplicity of mind and character, his deep reverence, and his sense of humility. Notwithstanding his many years of arduous intellectual labour, which have left his hair as white as snow, Eucken is still young in spirit; and of all the many aspects of his personality perhaps the most delightful are his optimism and enthusiasm." (Rudolf Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence.)

This is a very splendid appreciation the scholar has written concerning the master. Booth wrote this book in 1913, while Eucken was yet alive. But the average reader of Eucken is not disposed to believe entirely the opinion of Myrick Booth in this matter.. What he has to say about the personal characteristics of Eucken are no doubt true. But exception will be taken by many concerning his analysis of the philosophy of Eucken and the importance of his place in the History of Philosophy. Again let it be said that Eucken is not a systematic philosopher.

Eucken is often criticized because his writings are so obscure. And it is often most difficult to understand just what he means. Clarity is not one of his points of recommendation. This obscurity is sometimes added to by his loose use of terms. He describes rather than defines what he means by the terms he uses.

A most frequently repeated criticism is that he repeats himself. "Eucken repeats but he does not have a cut and dried system. He is no formalist, no academic absolutist, but a genuine seeker after a vital solution of the world's riddle, and therefore forever in the quest." (Quests, Old and New. Mead)

This seems so noticeable when his works are read in rapid succession. Place side by side the context pages of his books and this similarity is quite noticeable. It is evident that on the main assumptions of his philosophy there were not great changes after he entered upon his work in the University at Jena.

Concerning this, two alternatives present themselves. Either he did not study the field of life and philosophy with the intention of finding a better way, and he is accused of entering the field with firmly fixed prejudices, or he really had early searched and had found the better way. Other philosophers, scientists, religionists have reached sublime heights in youth, notably Sir Isaac Newton. Perhaps this was indeed true of Rudolf Eucken.

Moreover Eucken is accused of presenting an incomplete philosophy. In the main this criticism is true. One comes from a reading of the writings of this philosopher with the feeling that he has one key note and upon this note he has been playing all the while. This note is the Spiritual Life. Nothing is complete without it and everything, seemingly,

is fine if the spiritual life is given full sway in the life of the individual and the race. Such attempts at systematization as are made have their essence in linking up all the movements of human thought and life through the unifying power of the spiritual life. It would hardly be true to fact to call such a philosophy either a system or a completed philosophy.

Eucken's writings lack humor. Many a situation of clumsy reasoning and hard verbal sledding would have been saved by a bit of humor. Then, too, he does not seem to have the faculty of illustrating what he means. Lengthy presentations and obscure sentences could have been omitted in favor of a brief illustration of the matter in hand.

There are psychological implications in the theories which Eucken presents. These implications he pays little or no attention to. It has been said that every presentation of Absolute Idealism is apt to turn into Psychological Idealism. Eucken fails to recognize this point. As an illustration, many readers of Eucken's works declare that he is presenting a purely subjective form of idealism. This Eucken explicitly denies by a mere sentence. The mere denial is not sufficient because in spite of the denial it is not clear just what psychological bearing, if any, the spiritual life does have. "Activism suffers from lack of psychological deepening." (Eucken, his Philosophy and Influence. Booth. p-199)

This lack of a clear conception of the psychological implications of the spiritual life causes Eucken to neglect the experiential phase of religion. For this reason he seems to give slight attention to such an element as prayer in religion.

Eucken's major concern is with the spiritual world. He falls into difficulties when he presents the spiritual life as the only solution to the problem of life. If the reality of the spiritual life is granted there yet remains to find out how it is realized and achieved. If the spiritual life is the normative basis of morality, how are these norms to become clear to us and to enter into our life? These questions are still asked by Eucken's students and critics. (Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence. Booth. p-200) So long as these questions remain unanswered, Eucken has not answered the most practical questions about the spiritual life.

Every philosophy and every science begins with far reaching assumptions. Eucken's Philosophy is no exception, but he seems to forget the fact that he is working with these far reaching assumptions. Axioms become to him clearly demonstrated and empirical facts. He is not concerned with the logic of the affair. For this reason he is accused of being irrational.

Myric Booth, "Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence", (p-201) gives it as his opinion that one of the major

criticisms of Eucken's Philosophy centers around his theory of the Person of Christ and the Spiritual Life. The critics object to the vagueness of the spiritual life. This vagueness could have been overcome if Eucken had recognized the manifestation of it in the person of Christ.

It is difficult to combine the fervor of a prophet with pedantic exactness. "An inspired and profound philosopher can not be expected to spend much time over verbal niceties." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. A.J. Jones. p-86) In this manner the students and friends of Eucken come to his rescue. Their explanation is plausible. Eucken was a prophet and more interested in ethics and morality than in systematic philosophy. "Eucken has not come forward to offer man a fresh set of intellectual opinions. His object is to influence their lives." (Booth. p-203)

Eucken is sometimes criticized because he makes everything depend on work. He so emphasizes activity that he does not sufficiently give place to joy, spontaneity and creativeness of the true spiritual life. 'Work'; 'striving'; 'task'; are forever coming to the front. This criticism seems far fetched. In the section, "Reason as Observer of the World" in Hegel's "Phenomenology of the Mind", he draws the conclusion that the self can win unity with the world not through mere observation but through action. This is just what Eucken would say. Eucken does give emphasis to 'work' and does stress 'activity', but the meaning of this

emphasis must be understood in the light of his prophetic objection to the ceaseless, meaningless, and irrational struggle through which humanity is going in the pursuit of mere material possessions. He transfers activity into the realm of ethics, morality and the spirit.

On the other side of the matter, Eucken has made some contributions to the field of philosophy for which he ought to be recognized and appreciated. From the point of view of the Philosophy of Idealism, he did make a careful survey of the various other theories of philosophy and presented their inadequacies.

He took philosophy from the parlors of the academic and brought it into the work shops of the common people. He made philosophy a practical matter and put it in a place where all could see its importance.

To free religious thought he gave a worthwhile stimulation. His emphasis upon the reality of the inward and higher nature of man gave added courage to religion. "In Eucken we have one of the greatest thinkers of the age - some would say the greatest - setting his life upon emphasizing the spiritual at a time when the tendency is strongly in materialistic directions. He has gathered around him a number of able and whole hearted disciples in various countries and future ages may find Eucken the greatest force in the revulsion of the twentieth century from the materialistic position. to take religion up again, and particularly

the Christian religion, as the only satisfying solution of humanity's most urgent problem." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. A.J. Jones. p-90,91)

Again, in all fairness, it must be said that the writer of this appreciation is too extravagant in his praise. There is an element of truth in what Jones says, but he is too radical in his appreciation. Many of the books of Eucken are already out of print. Of course they may be revived in coming generations. That is not for us to say.

It is a much disputed matter as to who is the greatest thinker of the age. Very few would agree with Jones that Eucken is the one. He may have been the greatest thinker of his age in Germany, but even that is quite open to dispute. Indeed it is a question whether Eucken was a great thinker in the same light that Plato, Augustine, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Kant, Hegel and others were classed as great thinkers. Eucken was a great enthusiast in ethics, morality and spiritual living. He was the voice of one crying the values of spiritual living in the midst of a wilderness of naturalist, materialistic and instrumental philosophies.

Eucken, indeed, was interested only in a philosophy of life. Those aspects of life that are not immediately concerned with his main problem he gives very little attention to. "Eucken is a philosopher who lays foundations and deals with broad outlines and principles; it must be left to his many disciples to fill in any gaps that exist on this account,

by attempting to solve the subsidiary problems with which Eucken for the present cannot concern himself." (Rudolf Eucken, A Philosophy of Life. Jones. p-13) And now Eucken has been dead for more than three years. Interest in him is disappearing from the field of philosophy.

In order to arrive at a just appreciation of the work of Rudolf Eucken it is well to find out the aim and purpose of the man. Shall Jones reveal to us this aim? this purpose? "Eucken's aim is definitely an ethical aim, and his purpose is a practical one of the noblest order, and not one of mere intellectual interest." (p-14) Again he writes concerning Eucken's purpose: "He is anxious to solve the riddle of the universe in order that there might be drawn from the solution an inspiration which shall help the human race to concentrate its energies upon the highest ideals of life." (p-13) And further he analyses Eucken's aim and purpose: "The desire to find a meaning which will explain and at the same time infuse zest and gladness into every department of life has become a passion with him, and in finding that meaning, his greatest endeavour is to prove the truth of human freedom and personality. He wishes to solve the riddle in order that man may become a better man; the world a better world." (p-13)

Looked at from the point of view of these quotations, the Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken is not difficult to appreciate or to understand. To use the frame-work of

speculative philosophy in the study, i.e., to go about the study with the questions of epistemology, logic, and all the rest, and to try to make this philosophy fit into a consistent whole, will cause the student to miss the real aim and purpose of the Philosopher of Jena.

Hermann, in "Eucken and Bergson, Their Significance for Christian Thought" (p-83,84), in a mere poetical manner attempts to tell what Eucken was trying to do.

"His philosophy is the history of the soul putting the inward whisper of its independence and divinity to the supreme test in defying the principalities and powers that would brutalize it. Life is not a debating society for him; it is a battle-field where rival powers are striving in a gigantic combat for the soul of man. Eucken said; 'The emergence into new life of the humblest soul is more to me than the birth and discovery of a thousand new worlds.'"

The whole of Eucken's Philosophy centers around the ideal of the spiritual life. Spiritual life is not simply a withdrawn or abstract or subjective state. "The life of a spiritual being does not begin and end with its subjective condition; it includes the objective also, and must get into relationship with the objective. It is driven to insist that the rift between subjective and objective shall be overcome, and feels confinement to the merely subjective conditions as an intolerable restriction."

(Main Currents. p-48)

He aimed to destroy the Cartesian dualism and to bring life to its unity in the spiritual life. To rid the consciousness of this intolerable dualism is worthy of the aim of any philosophy and any philosopher. Eucken sought to show the unity, the real unity, in the apparent manifoldness of life. His philosophy can be appreciated when viewed from this angle.

But there is something so abstract about cosmic views of life and the like. Eucken put the matter on a still more practical basis. All his work was in the direction of helping society and the individual to the highest possible plane of life. He sought the workings of the spiritual life in the realm of the personality. Personal progress, personal ethics, personal morality, personal inclusion in the spiritual reality and life, were all emphasized in his philosophy.

In the July 31, 1929 issue of The Christian Century there is an interesting article written by Julius Seelye Bixler in estimating the value of Eucken Philosophy and the consideration which is given it in Germany today. Mr. Bixler gives the following title to his article. "Eucken's Spirit Still Lives." He tells us that there are three outstanding items in the evidence for this conclusion. In the first place there is the "Eucken Bund". This is an association which was founded soon after the war, while

being unconnected, is a good evidence of the spirit of tolerance in Germany today. Its circle of readers is growing.

In the third place, as an evidence of the continuing spirit of Eucken, the house in which he lived in Jena has been set aside by the city and by a group called "The Rudolf Eucken House Association" as a "place where an agreeable social setting is provided for the meeting of representatives of different cultures and ideas." In this house still live Eucken's widow and daughter. They act as hostesses to visitors and at all the social functions. This house is the rendezvous for foreign students at the University of Jena. The library and reading rooms are accessible to all the students and there is a room prepared for the lodging of foreign guests.

Mr. Bixler is impressed with the fact that at present there are many of the older group of students in the vicinity of Jena who attribute their mental and spiritual awakening to the influence of Rudolf Eucken. In adding a personal interpretation and evaluation of Eucken's contribution to philosophy, he writes; "Eucken was never noted for his originality, but few writers have been more successful than he in turning philosophy to practical account and showing its meaning for the enduring aspirations of humanity. His consistent emphasis on the actuality of the spiritual life thrills the reader even today." The

influence of Eucken in Germany, Bixler believes, is due to the fact that he took the appealing human elements in German traditional idealism and made them available to readers who were unschooled in philosophical terminology.

In summing up his estimation of Eucken and his philosophy, Bixler writes; "He kept the challenge of the Kantian call to duty while rejecting its final philosophical agnosticism. Hegel's solution for Kant's problem he supplemented by emphasizing anew the importance of the part played by the individual. With his ringing appeal to the conscience as well as to the intellect it is not surprising that his philosophy seemed to many to furnish the needed foundation for a belief in spiritual values in an age of increasing skepticism." Nevertheless, even this recent visitor to the place of Eucken's life and work, acknowledges that Eucken's vogue outside of Germany has certainly passed. It is indeed a question how long his popularity will continue in Germany.

During the World War Eucken, as one would naturally expect, sided with Germany and defended her position. For this reason his philosophy, as a philosophy of the spiritual life, lost cast in America. The activistic appeal for which he was so famous was diverted a little too easily into militaristic channels. He tells us of his own activities during the years of the war. The task to which he was assigned was the task of keeping up the spirit of the people

and the soldiers. It was in the spirit of the people that he first read the defeat of the German cause.

In a general way the place and value of Eucken and his philosophy are not difficult to determine. The statement has been repeated several times that he is not a systematizer of philosophy. He is a spiritual prophet and his chief interests are in the field of ethics, morality and religion. In these matters his contribution is valuable. Booth (p-196) declares that Eucken's supreme service to his age consisted in his having again made it possible for men and women to accept the reality and supremacy of the spiritual and the divine. He reverses the realists' field of values and makes materialism seem out of date. This indeed was Eucken's contribution to his age. How successful he was in promoting his own system of life and philosophy only time can tell.

This criticism and appreciation will be concluded with a somewhat lengthy but very expressive and revealing quotation from "The Meaning and Value of Life" (p-146) Here, as if in an attempt to epitomise his whole philosophy of life, Eucken states the meaning of the synthesis for which he was striving. "We shall then have to find our satisfaction and gladness in discovering at the very heart of life a synthesis which must then come to terms with the environment in and through the labour of life itself. Such a synthesis is indeed indispensable if our life is to

hold together. And it is difficult to see how it can be reached from any other standpoint than that of an independent spiritual life. Nowhere else can we find a primitive and spontaneous source of creative production; yet apart from such a source, how can any synthesis be sufficiently vital and inspiring?

The whole cry of our age is for greater plainness and simplicity, not in the sense of dull taking-things-for granted, but in the sense of a spiritual spontaneity. It is a demand which comes alike from the nature of our culture and from our human experience. Through much collection and compilation, research and reconstruction, our culture has become altogether too diffuse and complicated. It confuses great and small, alive and dead, chaotically together. It fails to distinguish between temporal and eternal. In the endless diversity of our historical heritage it can not discover simple guiding lines along which to direct our effort towards a steadfast goal." p-145.

"But the simplicity we speak of is not to be found in the world as given. We can only win to it in inwardly transcending the given and taking up the standpoint of an independent spirituality. For only thus can what is simple be at the same time great; only thus can it be the convincing expression of a new depth in the universe and give us a spiritual assurance in regard to it. It is with a simple truth of this kind that early Christianity moved

and rejuvenated the world, and only through such a simple truth can we, in turn, win spiritual anchorage and triumph over the irrational and the chaotic." p-146

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