

MANUAL
OF
ENGLISH RHETORIC.

*See "meditation"
as
invention*

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ject is treated of, but it was found that this could not be carried out with satisfactory thoroughness without adding too much to the size of the volume. And, indeed, the success of the few attempts that have been made to incorporate into a text-book the literature of the subject, has not been such as to encourage imitation.

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ENGLISH RHETORIC.

INTRODUCTION.

DEFINITION, AIM AND METHOD OF STUDY, DISTRIBUTION, OF RHETORIC.

Section 1. Definition of Rhetoric.—Rhetoric is the Science of the Laws and Forms of Prose. It investigates the method and general principles to which every discourse must conform that is designed to instruct, convince, or persuade.

2. Prose distinguished from Poetry.—The characteristic marks of prose as distinguished from poetry are the following:

1. Poetry belongs to what are called the fine arts,—so called because their end is not any practical or material utility, but the expression of the beautiful. Its aim is not to communicate knowledge or to influence the will, but to represent the products of the creative imagination in their appropriate forms in language. It accomplishes all that can be demanded of it when it suits the idea to the form and the form to the idea. The beauty of the representation, or form, is thus the ultimate end of poetry.

Prose, on the contrary, strives to accomplish some outward end. It does not describe or prove merely for the sake of

describing or proving, but in order to influence the minds and wills of the readers and hearers. The discourse is thus but a means of producing certain effects, and owes its origin to the design of producing them. The ends of prose are reducible to three:

- (1) To explain something not known or not distinctly comprehended;
- (2) To convince of the truth of some proposition that is either doubted or disbelieved;
- (3) To persuade to a determinate course of action.

2. Accordingly, while the poet yields to the free play of the imagination and emotions in clothing his idea in its suitable form, the prose writer is compelled to submit to many restraints imposed by outward circumstances. He is obliged to consult the condition, requirements, and character of those for whom he writes, and to accommodate his discourse to them.

3. Conformity to actual facts is not required in poetry: it idealizes the actual, and represents it in vivid images to the imagination. But in prose the notions and judgments that are communicated must have, or seem to have, the character of real truth, and must be exhibited with clearness and method to the understanding. Prose, it is true, appeals to the imagination also, but only to give greater clearness and force to its statements, and obtain for them a readier acceptance.

4. To awaken the emotion of the beautiful is the supreme end of poetry, but only a subordinate one of prose. In the latter, the purpose which the discourse has to serve is of primary importance; when the gratification of the taste comes in conflict with this, it must be sacrificed.

5. Verse is incompatible with the nature and aim of prose; while, if not essential to poetry, it is peculiar to it.

3. The Expression of thought subject to Laws.—The process of combining and expressing thoughts is subject to fixed laws inherent in the mind, which we are at liberty to violate, but, if we violate them, the discourse will fail to realize its end. We follow these laws unconsciously; as in

thinking we obey the laws of logic, and in speaking, the laws of general grammar, without having present to our minds the principles we put in practice.

We can ascertain these laws by reflecting on the operations of our minds, and by analyzing the works of eminent writers, and can reduce them to a system which has a valid claim to the name of Science.

The exposition of the laws of the expression of thought in language constitutes the Science or Theory of Discourse. It is divided into two special theories—Rhetoric and Poetic. These theories have much in common, but their points of difference are so numerous and marked that they ought to be studied separately.

REMARK.—The term discourse, in its widest signification, denotes the expression in language of a series of thoughts combined into a coherent whole. In this sense it includes all kinds of literary composition, of whatever extent, whether designed to be read or to be heard. It will be used in this very general sense in the present treatise.

For the sake of brevity the terms "writer" and "reader" will be used when the rules apply to discourse in general, as well as when they apply to written discourse exclusively.

4. The Aim of the study of Rhetoric.—The aim of the study of Rhetoric is practical.

1. It is a scientific introduction to the art of composition. The study of its rules and principles is chiefly valuable as a means toward acquiring skill and readiness in the effective communication of thought. We desire to learn not merely what are the essentials of a good style, but how to convey our thoughts in a manner appropriate to our subject and purpose. There is what is called natural Rhetoric, as there is natural Logic. Many who know nothing of rhetorical rules express their ideas clearly and forcibly. But in general, it is true of the art of discourse, as of all other arts, that before any considerable degree of perfection in it can be reached, the blind spontaneous process must be converted into a rational one, that is, into one regulated by a clear insight into its nature, end, and conditions.

We must not expect from Rhetoric what it does not profess to give, and can not give. It does not furnish the materials of a discourse, nor aid in distinguishing between what is true and what is false. It supposes that the writer has obtained knowledge from other sources, and confines itself to giving directions how to apply it for a definite purpose.

2. *It is an introduction to the critical study of literary models.* The study here meant is not for the sake of the thoughts which the work may contain, but one concerned with the manner of expressing the thoughts. It is directed to ascertain whether the work in its matter, arrangement, and style is adapted to its end, and conforms to the laws of the class to which it belongs. To conduct such an analytical study intelligently and successfully, we must be familiar both with the general principles of discourse and the special laws of its several classes.

It follows from this, that Rhetoric is a necessary preparatory study to literary criticism and the history of literature.

5. **Systematic Rhetoric must be neither neglected nor studied exclusively.**—The prevailing tendency is to neglect the study of systematic Rhetoric. The prejudice against it arises from a misapprehension of its nature and claims. It is not a system of minute technical and arbitrary rules, but of the general principles on which the communication of thought depends. It offers the results of the experience of those who have excelled in the art of convincing and persuading. The question then is,—whether it is not more advantageous for the beginner to learn these principles from the experience of others, than to be taught them by the tedious and frequently mortifying lessons of his own experience. There can be but one answer to this question. General as the knowledge imparted must be, it will aid in the formation of good habits and in preventing the formation of bad ones; will save from many a blunder; will confer that readiness and certainty which rest on the clear knowledge of the principles of the art; and will

impart the sense of freedom which springs from the conscious submission to law.

But to make the theory the exclusive, or even principal, object of study is as grave a mistake as to neglect it entirely. Something more than a mere knowledge of rules is necessary to enable us to write well. They must be so impressed on the mind and fused into our habits of thought that we can apply them when the occasion demands.

To acquire such a facility we must combine the study of the rules and technicalities of Rhetoric with assiduous practice in composition, and with the critical study of works of literature.

6. **Original Composition.**—This exercise is indispensable, but to be profitable it must conform to the following rules:

1. The composition must be on some definite subject. The rule is stated thus by Sir Wm. Hamilton: "The writing should be more or less limited, that is, be in answer to questions more or less articulate. The student should not be left to roam at large; but be made to think precisely and pertinently, by confining him to certain definite points."

2. The exercises should be suited to the age and attainments of the pupil.

3. There should be variety in the subjects of the exercises in order to cultivate both the powers of thought and of expression. Essays on historical, geographical, and literary subjects should be joined to those on political and moral.

4. The essays should be laboriously composed and carefully revised. By writing rapidly one can not learn to write well, but by writing well one learns to write rapidly. The effort to express our thoughts in their proper order and form is at first painful and discouraging. Every act requires deliberation and choice, but as by practice the habit is gradually formed, we proceed with increasing freedom and certainty, until, at last, we accomplish with ease and pleasure what, at the beginning, was forced and irksome.

7. **Exercises in which the matter is supplied.**—To pre-

vent the serious evils that result from attempting original composition before there is competent knowledge, it is advisable to prescribe to the beginner exercises in which the matter is supplied, that is, to furnish him with the thoughts, and require him to express them in his own words.

These exercises are of different kinds, some requiring a greater amount of intellectual effort than others, but in none is the writer called on to draw from his own stores; he has only to put the materials given him in a particular form, or adapt them to a special purpose. The most important are, Paraphrase, the preparing of Abstracts and Abridgments, and Translation.

Paraphrase.—This exercise consists in giving the contents of some work or passage of a work in other words in the same language. A paraphrase differs from a translation in not being a transfer from one language to another. When the transference is from poetry into prose, it is called Metaphrase. We generally associate with paraphrase the notion of an expansion of the original thought by definitions, periphrasis, examples, etc., with a view to making it more intelligible; but this is not essential. Here is meant the simpler form, in which the pupil reproduces in his own words the complete thought of an author, without attempting to explain it or to imitate the style.

It has been frequently urged against this exercise, that, in thus substituting other words for those of an accurate writer, we must necessarily choose such as are less expressive of the sense. It has, however, been defended by one of the greatest rhetoricians,—Quintilian.

The form of this exercise may be varied. One of the most improving, and not open to the objection just mentioned, is to prescribe passages from old English authors to be rendered into modern English according to the laws of style.

Abstracts and Abridgments.—Another exercise is to require the pupil to give the substance of an entire work, or of

an extended portion of it, in narrower compass. The original text may be modified in various ways; as, by abbreviating, condensing, substituting words and phrases, transposing sentences, etc. But whatever modifications are made in the matter and form of the text, the abstract should,

1. Contain nothing that is not found in the original;
2. Give all the essential parts, omitting the details;
3. Give them accurately and distinctly, and as concisely as is compatible with completeness and distinctness.

The abstract may be either a bare enumeration of the main points expressed in a series of short disconnected sentences, or a connected presentation of them with greater fullness. They may be given in the words of the original or in the pupil's own words; the latter method is to be preferred as a rhetorical exercise.

These exercises are most important as aids in acquiring perspicuity and precision of style. They compel the pupil to discriminate between the principal and the subordinate ideas of a work; to decide upon the relative importance of its parts; to attend to the arrangement of the thoughts; and to present them in their most compact form.

REMARK.—Dr. Arnold in a letter to one of his former pupils writes: "I am very glad that you continue to practice composition, but above all I would advise you to make an abstract of one or two standard works. One, I should say in philosophy;—the other in history. I would not be in a hurry to finish them, but keep them constantly going on,—with one page always clear for notes. The abstract itself practices you in condensing and giving in your own words what another man has said; a habit of great value, as it forces one to think about it, which extracting merely does not. It further gives a brevity and simplicity to your language, two of the greatest merits which style can have."—[Stanley's Life and Correspondence of Arnold, i. 334.]

Translation.—In this exercise the thoughts are given in a foreign language, and the pupil has to render them with equal clearness, fullness, and force into his own.

It is justly esteemed one of the best means of acquiring correct habits of thought and expression. It aids in cultivating

the taste as well as the logical powers. It compels to a more minute study of the peculiarities of our native tongue, enlarges our vocabulary, gives readiness and skill in constructing sentences, and leads to a better acquaintance with the characteristics of the different classes of compositions.

The laws of translation are:

1. The translation must be an exact representation of the sense of the original, neither adding to it nor taking from it.

2. It must preserve the spirit and style of the original. A perfect translation should make the same impression upon its readers that the original work produced upon those for whom it was written.

3. It must be idiomatic: it must conform to the laws and idioms of the language in which it is written, both in the choice of words and phrases, and in the structure of sentences. It should have the freedom and grace of an original production.

A perfectly adequate translation is impracticable. Every language has words and phrases for which another can supply no equivalents, and words have associations that can not be transferred to foreign ones. It seems that there must be a sacrifice in part either of fidelity to the original or of elegance of style. If the translator strives to give the exact meaning of the original, he is apt to neglect ease and grace of expression; if he is intent on giving to his work the graces of style, he will, very likely, fail to render the thought of the original with exactness.

Two extremes are to be avoided.—The one, that of servile literal translation, which is rather a translation of separate words than of entire thoughts. It adheres as closely as possible to the number and order of words, and to the construction of the original; word corresponds to word, sentence to sentence. Translations made according to this method are neither accurate nor elegant; they do not give the spirit and meaning of the original, are stiff and obscure, substitute foreign idioms

for native, and are mostly mere caricatures "which exemplify all the faults incident to language and exclude every excellence."

The other extreme is that of a loose or excessively free translation; one that renders the thought with great latitude and indulges freely in periphrasis, interpolations, and omissions. This method may present us with works written in idiomatic English and with great beauty of style, but they are unfaithful representations of the original; in many cases they mutilate, if they do not misrepresent its meaning, and they never reproduce the nice shades of thought involved in particular words and their arrangement.

While it is the duty of a translator to conform always to his native idiom, it is also his duty to present faithfully the thoughts of the original without mutilation and without any admixture of his own views. And if ease and elegance are attainable only at the expense of fidelity, some degree of roughness is to be preferred.

8. Study of Models.—The study of systematic Rhetoric and practice in composition will not accomplish to any adequate extent their end unless they are combined with the study of models of literary excellence.

It is a great mistake to exclude this study from a course of rhetorical training, or to give to it a subordinate place. It is only by the constant application of the principles of Rhetoric to the masterpieces of genius and taste (which are the most perfect results of the processes whose laws it investigates), that it can be saved from becoming a collection of narrow artificial rules, and rhetorical practice be prevented from degenerating into a mechanical process.

Without such a study of literary models, rhetorical rules and precepts can not be intelligible. Its relation to systematic Rhetoric has been very aptly compared to that which the examination of the actual experiments of the philosopher bears to the abstract statements and formulas in which the results of the experiments are embodied. The necessity of

examining experiments is even greater in literary studies than in natural science.

The benefits of an intelligent and prolonged study of the standards of taste are,—that it both shows the pupil what real excellence is and incites him to seek it; leads him to the knowledge of his own peculiar tastes and aptitudes; quickens his perception of what is correct and incorrect, beautiful and deformed; and imparts a more vigorous and elevated mode of thinking.

The beginner needs a judicious adviser to direct him what to study and how to study.

What to Study.—The works should be few, and those the most perfect of their kind. Writers whose style is bad are not suitable for beginners, whose taste is not yet formed, and who are more easily led astray by brilliant faults, than impressed by unobtrusive excellences.

There should be a sufficient variety in the selection. Otherwise, the pupil will be in danger of servile imitation, and will lose the advantages that are derived from the comparison of different writers. He should not be confined to prose, but should become familiar with the standards in all departments of literature. "One can," says Hegel, "and one ought to become acquainted with all that is glorious in literature." The "volumes paramount" of our English literature should be unremittingly studied,—those great national works "which have mingled with the life blood of the people, and from which all classes for generation after generation draw their views of nature and life, which form the bonds of intellectual and moral sympathy amongst all, in which all ranks may meet as in a church and all may feel at home."—[Hare, *Guesses at Truth*.]

How to Study.—The student should analyze the works and apply to them, and test by them, the principles of literary criticism. He should endeavor to discover the writer's reasons for his choice and arrangement of words and his management

of the subject. And as it is impossible in one exercise to apply all the rhetorical principles to a composition of even moderate size, the same work should be made the object of repeated special examination. At one time, its general plan may be examined; at another, the mode of amplifying some of the leading ideas; at another, the structure of the sentences and paragraphs; at another, the choice of words, etc.

The attention of the student should be directed to the beauties of the work, not to its defects merely. The best criticism is that which finds out the excellence of a composition; and it is by far the most difficult. It is the indication of sound judgment and refined taste. It should be remembered that our powers are improved by contemplating what is excellent, not what is deformed; and also that beginners are not prepared to point out defects.

9. Distribution of Rhetoric.—We shall first treat of the general principles common to all forms of prose, and then apply these principles to the different kinds of matter and discourse.

These principles relate to the matter of the discourse,—*i. e.*, to the thoughts of which it is composed,—and to the style,—*i. e.*, to the expression of the thoughts in language.

The thoughts are principal, the language is but accessory; but neither can be neglected by the writer. The merit of a literary work does not depend exclusively either on the quality of its matter or on its diction, but on the union of the two. There must be true and appropriate thoughts clothed in fitting words. A work in which great truths are communicated in obscure and confused language may be valuable as a work of science, but can not be ranked among works of literature. On the other hand, no artifices of diction can give value to a discourse wanting in vigorous thought. Sound thought is the indispensable condition of good writing. The student's attention is, accordingly, directed first to the mental processes concerned with the matter of the discourse, and afterwards to the laws for the expression of thought in language.

Different kinds of Matter.—The matter of discourse is of different kinds. In communicating knowledge, we may have an object to describe, an event to narrate, a general notion to explain, or a proposition to prove. Description, Narration, Exposition, and Argumentation are therefore the elements, or elementary forms, of all discourse. They must be considered separately, and the general principles be applied to each.

Different kinds of Discourse.—These elements are combined in different ways and modified according to the purpose of the writer. Thus arise distinct kinds or classes of discourse; as, didactic, historical, oratorical; each of which, while it has much in common with the others, has its distinctive features and special laws. It is part of the office of Rhetoric to classify the leading forms of prose, and to exhibit their characteristic marks.

This Work distributed into Four Parts.—This treatise is distributed into four parts. The first part treats of the processes conversant about the matter of a discourse; the second, of the principles of style; the third, of the elementary forms of a discourse; the fourth, of the principal forms of prose.

*Mind as a whole.
All in the first manner.*

PART I.

THE PROCESSES CONVERSANT ABOUT THE MATTER OF A DISCOURSE.

PRELIMINARY.

10. What are the processes conversant about the matter of a Discourse?—We are to investigate, first of all, the processes concerned with the matter of discourse and their laws. We shall examine and exhibit in their natural order the various mental acts involved in the process of composition, from the finding of the subject to its complete development. This part might very appropriately be entitled,—The Method of Composition (excluding what is concerned with the expression of the thoughts in language).

A preliminary caution is necessary. Any analysis of mental phenomena is defective and partially false, for it exhibits as separate what in nature are inseparable. The psychologist discusses separately thought, feeling, and volition, yet the three blend in every act. So in Rhetoric we separate thought and language, although they are mutually dependent, each supposing the other, and we consider as entirely distinct the finding of the thoughts and the arranging of them, whereas, in reality, the ~~two~~ processes often mingle. Still, as it is important that the student obtain a distinct view of the complex process, and as each part of it, though dependent on and implied in the others, has its distinctive features, it is necessary for the sake of clearness to examine each separately.

When one wishes to accomplish some definite object by means of a discourse either spoken or written, he has,—

"Exercise thyself unto godliness." "Train thyself—thy religious character—with an eagerness and activity, patience and perseverance like that of the athletes training their bodies for the games."

2. The relations of the several notions as limiting, qualifying, supplementing each other are to be carefully noticed, lest the subject be understood in a sense either too extensive or too narrow, and a subordinate be taken for the main idea.

Ex.—"The study of Mathematics as an exercise of mind." Not the *science* but the *study*; not the *practical*, material utilities of the study, but its utility as a means of intellectual discipline.

"If it be possible, as much as lieth in you live peaceably with all men." The duty enjoined can not be exhibited in its entire extent and with its necessary limitations, if the qualifications contained in the words, "if it be possible" and "all," are not accurately weighed.

3. It must be ascertained whether the proposition contains several judgments or but a single one.

If it is complex, it must be separated into the several judgments contained in it. Sometimes several distinct judgments can be combined, and a new one formed comprehending all of them.

Ex.—"The universality and evil effects of prejudice." Two distinct assertions are contained in this: (1) Prejudice is universal; (2) Its effects are injurious.

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."

The two assertions, that opportune moments occur in a man's life, and that the neglect to improve them brings disaster and suffering, may be embraced in the single imperative sentence, "Improve the present opportunity."

"Prove all things, hold fast what is good." The two commands may be reduced to one, "Avoid the extremes of credulity and skepticism."

13. The Subject chosen by the Writer.—When the subject is left to the choice of the writer, he is often embarrassed in

selecting from the crowd of thoughts presented to his mind the one that is suited to his purpose. His range of choice will be limited by his special studies, his taste, the opportunity for preparation, etc.; but that he may not err at the very outset, he must, in addition to these, take into consideration the relation of the subject to himself and to the reader.

The relation of the Subject to the Writer.—It must be appropriate to his age and attainments, and one, of the truth and importance of which he is thoroughly convinced.

Fullness of knowledge and thoroughness of conviction are the primary conditions of power in communicating thought. "Speak not at all, in anywise," says Carlyle, "until you have somewhat to speak; care not for the reward of your speaking, but simply and with undivided mind for the truth of your speaking."

The attempt to discuss a subject beyond the writer's capacity and knowledge must end in failure. He does not know what to say; he can not use the materials he has; his production will be a series of vague general expressions conveying no distinct notions to himself or to the reader, a collection of second-hand sentiments and empty commonplaces strung together in an artificial, frigid manner, which can neither interest nor affect others.

That the writer should be convinced of the truth and importance of his subject is demanded on rhetorical grounds apart from moral. Our feelings exert a powerful influence upon our intellectual activities. A deep moral interest in the subject fixes the attention on it, calls up from memory related thoughts, and directs them to the main end for which the discourse is made; while the consciousness of insincerity distracts the mind and prevents the writer from yielding himself entirely to his subject. His meditation will be languid and painful; and the coldness, artificial structure, and want of real unity of the discourse will betray his untruthfulness. This explains why many discourses that have very great defects are nevertheless so convincing and persuasive, while

others, apparently correct and finished, are so feeble. The laws of discourse are the laws of sincere utterance, and can be obeyed only by the sincere.

The relation of the Subject to the Reader.—It must be suited to the character and condition of those to whom the discourse is addressed.

The discourse is but a means to an end; if its subject is not appropriate to the temper, feelings, intellectual and moral condition, and circumstances of the readers, it can not interest them and must fail to accomplish its purpose.

14. The determination of the Subject.—The subject when first chosen by the writer has not the definite form and limits in which it will be presented in the discourse. In a well constructed work we find no difficulty in discovering its main idea,—that to which the others are subordinate and of which they are only the development. But we must not suppose, that the form in which we thus find it is that in which it occurred originally to the writer. It was at first a somewhat vague and indefinite general idea, connected in some of its parts with his purpose, but containing also much that had no connection with it; it was related to a number of other subjects, and was equally suitable to discourses of various kinds and for different purposes.

Prolonged reflection was necessary to limit this vague and indeterminate subject, and to adapt it to the special character and aim of the discourse. To effect this, it was necessary to contemplate it from a particular point of view, to dwell upon whatever it contained that related to the end to be realized, neglecting all that was irrelevant, however interesting and important in other respects it might be. This process is called determining the subject.

15. The Theme.—When the subject is thus determined and is expressed as briefly and precisely as possible in language, it is called the theme.

*5 themes from 3 subjects
1. Education 2. Commerce*

The subject and the theme are usually regarded as identical. The distinction between them is, however, real and important. The subject is a general thought connected with the aim of the writer; the theme is the subject limited and modified by the end in view, by the character of the discourse, and by the circumstances of the case. It is the clearest, briefest, most precise statement of so much of the subject as the writer intends to develop in his work.

A number of entirely different themes can be derived from the same subject. For example, several writers could discuss such a subject as Wealth or Labor, and no two of them have the same theme. One would confine himself to its economical, another to its social, another to its religious aspects. Each would limit and modify the same general subject, and appropriate what suits his special purpose.

Its requisites.—The theme is the germ of the entire discourse, for the discourse is only the explicit statement of what is contained implicitly in the theme. It is all important that the writer lay it down in his mind in its proper form; if he neglect to do so he will inevitably fail to accomplish his end. If properly laid down, the theme should comply with the following conditions:

1. It should grow naturally out of the study of the subject both in its real nature and in its relation to the object to be accomplished. If the subject is not mastered, the theme will be drawn from a superficial and erroneous view of it, will contain extraneous matter, and may have no connection whatever with it. If the subject is carefully studied, but without special reference to the application of it that we wish to make, the idea adapted to our purpose will not be found. In both cases the theme will be arbitrary. The writer must not be too precipitate in laying down his theme. He can not obtain it until the work of meditation is finished.

2. It should have unity. Unity is not simplicity. The theme may be a complex thought, but however complex, it should be but one thought. This is indispensable to the unity

*1st wrong
1 corrected*

of the discourse, which is the result of the subordination of all its parts to one dominant idea. If the theme is composed of a number of distinct thoughts, the discourse, instead of being one complete, organic whole, will be a mixture of fragments of several discourses on different themes.

3. It must be neither too broad nor too narrow. When it is too broad, *i. e.*, when it embraces more than is necessary—any thing more than the aim and character of the work demands—the writer, if he develops it naturally and correctly, is compelled to admit a great deal that is irrelevant, which, besides adding unnecessarily to the length of his production, withdraws the attention from the main point, and renders the total impression feeble and indistinct. When it is too narrow, *i. e.*, when it does not express the whole thought of the writer, and embrace all that is essential to his purpose,—as he dare not admit into the development what is not contained in the theme, he can not communicate what he wishes, or can do so only by abandoning his theme.

4. It should be comprehensive rather than extensive. Extensive or very general themes—such as cover a great deal of ground—are, for the most part, less fertile than more comprehensive or particular ones. The restricted view of a subject furnishes more abundant and valuable matter. In a broad theme, as the writer has not space to unfold and illustrate his statements, he is confined to vague generalities and trite remarks; while in a less extensive theme, he is compelled to examine the details more thoroughly and to distinguish them more precisely, and so can present a greater variety of particular ideas.

5. It must be clear and distinct. The writer must not be content with a mere general impression, but should state it with the greatest possible clearness and keep it constantly in view. Any uncertainty as to its meaning or extent, or indistinctness in the notions contained in it, will lead to the violation of its unity by confounding it with connected or related yet different ideas, and to looseness and obscurity in its treatment.

16. **The Title.**—The title is intended to convey to others a general idea of the nature and contents of the work. Its choice, especially in the more purely literary productions, is often a matter of considerable difficulty.

Rules for the choice of.—The rules to be observed in choosing a title are:

1. It should express the main idea of the work. A title drawn from a subordinate idea is idle and often misleading. Even those cases in which it is the purpose of the writer not to reveal at first the drift of his work are not exceptions to this rule. In all cases it is necessary that the appropriateness of the title, if not apparent at first, should become so in the course of the work.

2. It should not promise too much, and so raise expectations that will be disappointed.

3. It should be concise, readily understood, and easily remembered. Verbosity and new or uncommon words are nowhere more out of place than in the title. At the same time, whatever has the appearance of affectation, pedantry, and presumption ought to be avoided.

4. When figurative expressions are used, the propriety of their application should be easily recognized. Objection, for example, has frequently been made to the title of Johnson's *Rambler*; as it suits neither the character of the work nor of the author.

5. An explanatory phrase or clause is sometimes annexed to a figurative or general title to prevent misconception of the scope of the work or to indicate it with more exactness.

Ex.—“*Biographia Literaria*; or Biographical Sketches of my Literary life and opinions.” (Coleridge.) “*Social Statics*; or the conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the first of them developed.” (Herbert Spencer.) “*Truth, Falsehood, and Fiction;—an Allegory.*” (Johnson.)

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CHAPTER II.

INVENTION.

17. Invention defined.—Invention, in its widest signification, includes all the processes involved in the conception, development, and arrangement of the matter of a discourse: we may be said to invent the subject and plan as well as the ideas. In its narrowest sense, it denotes the process or art of finding the *main thoughts* of a discourse. In this sense it is here employed.

Invention as a power of the Mind.—No system of maxims or rules can teach one to find what suits his purpose. This is the act of an original power of the mind, which may be developed and strengthened by education, but can never be acquired. To the higher forms of this power of invention in science and art is given the name of genius.

Minds differ greatly as to the kind of invention they possess: some have it in abstract subjects, others in concrete; some in oratorical, others in historical, others in philosophical subjects. They are also very unequal with respect to fertility of invention: one finds much that is new and valuable in a subject that to another affords only what is trivial and commonplace. So far as these diversities result from constitutional differences of mind, they can not be remedied by education. No one can give himself a different kind of invention. But all may improve the kind they have.

Means of improving it.—This power is susceptible of a high degree of culture. We sometimes find those who can recall and apply their knowledge with promptness and certainty whenever circumstances require it. Such ready and habitual fertility of invention is however a rare attainment: it is one of the last results of long and severe mental discipline. Some of the important means towards acquiring it are:

1. *Extent of knowledge.*—The mind can not create: it

must receive before it can produce. Varied knowledge both determines it to more vigorous energy and furnishes the materials on which it can employ its powers; and, instead of being unfriendly to originality, is an aid to it. What Thomson says of scientific discovery is equally true of rhetorical invention: "The suggestive power may be educated as certainly as, though more gradually than, the critical. The discovery which we call a flash of genius, a happy thought, really depends as much upon previous acquirements, as the power of stating a case or applying a rule does."

2. *Habits of methodical thought.*—Those have a great advantage in invention who have formed the habit of associating their thoughts by their real and logical connections, and of referring particular facts to general principles and illustrating principles by facts. By thus methodizing their ideas and multiplying the number of relations between them, they retain them more firmly and can recall them more readily. Those, on the contrary, whose ideas are united by merely accidental associations and are thrown together in the mind without order or classification, have no control over their knowledge. When they would meditate upon a subject their thoughts are confused; many are suggested that have no real connection with the subject, while those that are appropriate remain concealed, or are discovered by accident only.

3. *Exercise.*—Like the other mental powers, it is improved by exercise. The more frequently we apply ourselves to gathering and selecting thoughts for a special purpose, the greater facility do we acquire. To be profitable, the exercise should be regular, systematic, and painstaking. The power of invention is feeble with most persons because it has never been properly exerted.

Invention different from investigation.—Invention differs, both in its aim and method, from scientific investigation. The scientific inquirer seeks to extend his knowledge and to give to it distinctness and harmony. He pursues his investigations for his own enlightenment only, without regard to the rel-

quirements of others; nor can he always foresee what conclusions his inquiries will lead him to. It is very different with the writer who intends to communicate knowledge. He is supposed to be already in possession of what he wishes to convey to others. The process of investigation is completed, the facts and principles are already ascertained, before the work of composition begins. Invention, then, is not a process by which we extend our knowledge or give to it greater clearness and certainty, but one by which we gather from our own stores whatever can aid us in accomplishing our object. It is not a search for new truths; but for facts, principles, arguments, and motives to explain, establish, or enforce what we already know or believe.

He who seeks to present truth in an intelligible and convincing manner to others must regard many things that ought never to influence him whose aim is to ascertain the truth. And it is not always the case, that one who has obtained clearness and certainty in his views has the skill to render them clear and certain to others. Invention differs from investigation in not being regulated exclusively by the nature of the subject-matter; it is a process whose direction and limits are determined by the object of the writer, by the kind of discourse he intends to make, and by the character and condition of those for whom he writes.

○ 18. **Meditation.**—Although we are supposed to be familiar with the subject upon which we propose to write, it is seldom that our knowledge is so completely under our control that we can recall it at once and present it in its appropriate form. Of what we have gathered at different times from various quarters, much lies dormant in the memory; the full import of much is not unfolded; many of the facts and principles bearing upon our purpose lie disconnected, and their relation to each other and their importance are not recognized. It is necessary to cause the subject to pass before the mind; to render clear what is obscure, to recall what is latent, to bring together the scattered fragments, and thus obtain a general

idea of the main thoughts which should constitute the development of the subject. The means by which this is accomplished is called meditation.

What included in?—It includes two distinct mental operations:

1. *Recollection*, or the gathering of the facts and principles involved in the subject or connected with it.
2. *Selection*, or the choosing of such as are suited to the nature and end of the discourse.

○ 19. **Recollection.**—The first step of the writer, after choosing his subject, is to recall whatever he has read, or learned, or thought that relates to it,—all the facts and principles involved in it or connected with it.

This process is governed by what are called the laws of association. No thought arises in the mind entirely isolated; each brings with it a number of related ones. The thought of an effect suggests that of a cause, the thought of an end suggests that of a means, the thought of one object suggests another resembling it or differing from it, etc. When we concentrate our attention upon any subject, we bring it with greater distinctness and vividness before consciousness, and, at the same time, awaken a number of accessory ideas.

Our success in gathering from the materials in our possession what suits our purpose depends upon our power of continuous thinking. The first suggestions are generally obscure, superficial, and commonplace. It requires perseverance to extort from the mind its treasures. By prolonged brooding over the subject our interest in it increases, and both the suggestive faculty and the judgment act more vigorously. New relations are detected, new combinations are formed, new applications are discovered, and the subject with all its qualities and parts and associated ideas is brought distinctly before the mind.

The young writer needs to be cautioned against being over-scrupulous and systematic in conducting this process. He

21. Systematic Meditation.—The process of meditation described above (Secs. 17–19) is called natural or free, because the order of thoughts is determined by the natural laws of the association of ideas. There is another kind of meditation called logical, or systematic, which is a regulated, methodical procedure. It consists in proposing a series of questions with reference to the subject and endeavoring to answer them.

Topics.—To aid in this, what are called topics are employed. These are certain very general notions which afford points of view from which to contemplate a given subject. By bringing these notions in succession before the mind and applying them to the subject to be examined, we can view it in its parts and relations.

The topics are of two kinds, general and special. We can frame questions that are applicable to a great variety of objects; *e. g.*, What is it?—by which we obtain its definition or description. What is its cause? With what can it be compared? etc. Besides these general topics, there are others which are used in certain classes of subjects. One series of questions is used when the subject is an event, another when it is a person, another when it is a general notion. Thus, with reference to a person the questions would be concerning his nation, age, rank, employment, character, etc.

With respect to an event, the questions would be as to time, place, parties engaged, causes, effects, attendant circumstances, etc.

Their utility.—It is manifest that every one must use some of these topics in writing. But there is a great disagreement with respect to the utility of preparing and using full schemes or lists of topics. This artificial method of invention has a prominent place in the ancient rhetorics, but has been very generally excluded from the modern. There is no doubt, however, that although it is liable to abuse, it can be employed with profit in a course of rhetorical discipline.

The use of topics does not exempt from the necessity of

patient reflection. They are not thoughts, but mere hints to guide our thinking, to indicate the direction in which we are to look for thoughts. They are of but little service to those who have already studied the subject scientifically, for these have a complete scheme of topics in the science; but to beginners they are necessary. To them the subject is at first vague and confused: their greatest difficulty is to know what to look for. A properly prepared scheme of topics assists them in giving order and distinctness to their thoughts, by limiting the extent of the field, by making prominent the points to be noticed, and by marking out a path in which their thoughts may proceed.

It is not meant that this topical meditation should be substituted for the natural. Its use is, (1) to prepare for the natural by giving a general view of the subject, and by bringing to notice its different sides; and (2) to supplement it, by discovering whether any essential points have been neglected.

The use of topics will be explained in considering the elementary forms of discourse. (Part III.)

22. Reading as an aid to Invention.—When the subject admits of it, reading upon the same or upon related subjects should be connected with meditation. Its uses are: first, to stimulate the suggestive faculty; secondly, to supply the deficiencies in our knowledge.

Method of Reading.—1. The general rule is, that it should precede writing and follow meditation; or as it is expressed by Jean Paul Richter, "Never write upon a subject without having first *read* yourself full of it, and never read without having first *thought* yourself hungry." Gibbon gives the same advice. "After a rapid glance," he tells us, "on the subject and distribution of a new book, I suspend the reading of it, which I only resume after having examined the subject in all its relations; after having called up in my solitary walks all that I have read, or thought, or learned in regard to the subject of the whole book or of some chapter in particular. I

thus place myself in a condition to estimate what the author may add to my general stock of knowledge, and I am thus sometimes favorably disposed by the accordance, sometimes armed by the opposition of our views."

By previous meditation, the end we have in view in reading is more firmly fixed, and the mind is less liable to be diverted to foreign matters, or into vague, general reading. Reading is also rendered more suggestive and profitable. When the mind is occupied with a subject, it detects quickly whatever is related to it, and finds materials in the most unexpected quarters. There are few books that will not suggest something new and appropriate to a full mind.

2. The reading should be varied. By seeing how the same subject is treated by different and opposing authors, new views are obtained, and our knowledge becomes more comprehensive.

3. The thoughts gathered or suggested should be written down in clear, precise statements. If only general impressions are received, reading will only confuse and burden the mind.

4. The materials gathered must be made our own by vigorous thought. They must be sifted; what suits our purpose must be selected, and, by prolonged meditation, be combined and brought into harmony with our own stores;—be fused into them, modifying them and in turn being modified by them. In this way only can the thoughts of others become our own; they are otherwise but lumber stored in the memory, and can not be transferred to our own writings without rendering us liable to the charge of plagiarism.

REMARKS.—(1) To what extent we may avail ourselves of the mental possessions of others is a question of morals. The two extremes of false originality and of plagiarism are to be avoided. He who will make no use of what others have done will not be likely to give to the world anything valuable. Nothing is easier and more worthless than the originality of ignorance. Our greatest authors have borrowed most freely; but, as Dryden says of Ben Jonson, "they invade authors like monarchs."

(2) "I call that the best theme," says Dr. Arnold, "which shows that

the boy has read and thought for himself; that the next best which shows that he has read several books, and digested what he has read; and that the *worst* which shows that he has followed but one book, and that without reflection."

CHAPTER III.

DISPOSITION.

23. **Disposition, nature of.**—Disposition consists in arranging the materials furnished by meditation in such an order and connection as correspond with the special character and aim of the discourse.

It presupposes that the writer has gathered the main ideas, and decided on the form of composition in which he will embody them. He is now required to distribute them to their appropriate places, fix their limits, and combine them into a complete, harmonious whole.

Importance of.—There can be no discourse without order and proportion. A discourse is not a series of independent propositions, but the continuous development of a single theme; its effects are produced by it as a whole, not by some separate part. However numerous the thoughts contained in it, they must all be subordinate to one leading thought, all be mutually dependent as members of one organic whole. Only in this relation to each other and to the entire discourse, do they obtain their real significance.

It is not sufficient then that the separate statements are intelligible; they must be so arranged as to support and illustrate each other, and that each shall contribute to the total impression, else the entire thought is not communicated and the full import of the parts can not be understood.

REMARK.—The importance of disposition in composition has been insisted upon both by the most competent teachers of rhetoric and by

the greatest masters of style. Rinne pronounces it "the heart of the theory of style;" and the famous discourse of Buffon on style is but an expansion of the same idea; he defines style, as the order and movement we give to our thoughts. Originality, according to Pascal, consists not so much in the newness of the individual thoughts as in their combination. "The disposition of the materials," he says, "is something new. In playing tennis both use the same ball, but one places it better than the other. It might as well be objected that I use current words; as if the same thoughts did not form a different body of discourse by a different arrangement, just as the same words differently disposed form different thoughts." To the same effect Vinet says: "Good thoughts, as Pascal says, are abundant. The art of organizing them is not so common. It requires sometimes a greater capacity to find the relations and appropriate places of these organic molecules. We should perhaps be within bounds in saying that disposition in a discourse is not of more secondary importance than the mode of aggregation of molecules in a physical substance; this mode in a great measure constitutes the nature of the body." [Homiletics, Skinner's translation, p. 264.] So also Whateley: "Arrangement is a more important point than is generally supposed; indeed, it is not perhaps of less consequence in composition than in the military art; in which it is well known, that with an equality of forces, in numbers, courage, and every other point, the manner in which they are drawn up, so as either to afford mutual support, or, on the other hand, even to impede or annoy each other, may make the difference of victory or defeat." [Rhetoric, p. 168.]

24. Preparation of the Plan.—The law of order extends to every portion of the composition; to the combination of ideas in the sentences as well as to the more complex combinations of the principal divisions. But before proceeding to the arrangement of the details, the writer must attend to the more general procedure of fixing the limits and determining the contents of the organic parts of the discourse, which is usually called preparing the plan.

What are the organic parts of a discourse?—The organic parts of a discourse are the introduction, the body of the discourse, and the conclusion.

These are all essential parts of an organic, indivisible whole. We are not to infer, because some precede and others follow and we can separate them in our analysis, that they are inde-

pendent of each other, or that a discourse can be complete with some of them wanting. It is the same with a discourse as with a syllogism. We can separate the propositions of the latter, and each will express a distinct and intelligible judgment, but it will have lost its peculiar force and meaning as a part of the syllogism. So the introduction, body of the discourse, and conclusion, are all integrant parts of a complex but single and simultaneous thought; each has its special purpose to subserve, and is indispensable to the development of the theme; each is dependent on the others, and out of relation to them loses all its significance.

What contained in the plan?—The plan, or outline, contains a summary statement, in their proper order and connection, of the essential ideas of the introduction, of the body of the discourse, and of the conclusion. What is merely explanatory and illustrative is excluded, as attention to *minutiae* will confuse and lead astray, and defeat the purpose for which the plan is made. But although the main points are given briefly, they must be given with the utmost clearness and precision. The divisions and subdivisions should be carefully marked, and be so formed that the relation of the parts to each other and to the theme can be easily perceived and remembered.

The necessity of preparing one.—Without a clearly conceived plan, a writer is not prepared to treat of a subject of any degree of complexity. He can not select from the thoughts that occur to him those that are appropriate, nor give them their place; he will omit many essential ideas and exhibit others of them imperfectly, while subordinate ones will be disproportionately expanded; he can not avoid wandering from his theme, and resorting to repetitions and digressions. The discourse, in its want of clearness, of unity, of completeness, and of progress, will be a faithful expression of the uncertainty and confusion in the writer's mind.

But when he has a carefully traced plan he detects at once the omission of any essential point; he can examine the parts

and divisions, and discover what transitions are needed to bind them together and secure a continuous movement of the thoughts; he has before him all the main ideas by amplifying which he will give fullness and life to the development of the theme; and having determined the proportion of the various parts, he can give to both principal and accessory ideas their place and due prominence. He will proceed with ease and confidence, gaining strength as he advances; "he has only pleasure in writing," says Buffon, "ideas follow each other readily, style is natural and easy; warmth, springing from this pleasure, diffuses itself every-where, and gives life to each expression; all is more and more animated; the tone rises; the objects assume color; and sentiment combining with light increases it, extends it, transfers it from what is said to what is to be said, and the style becomes interesting and luminous."

But to secure these advantages, the plan must not be prepared until after prolonged meditation. We can arrange only such matter as we have; and if from the want of serious reflection, our thoughts are few, or trivial, or obscure, the disposition can not but be imperfect and comparatively useless.

25. The laws of Disposition both general and special.—

Disposition is of different kinds according to the matter and class of discourse. A method of arrangement adapted to a scientific treatise will not suit an oration. A narration, a description, an exposition, and an argument, require each a different kind of disposition. The laws for these special modes of disposition will be given in their appropriate places. Here we shall treat of the general laws of disposition.

These laws relate to the introduction, the body of a discourse, the conclusion, and the transitions.

- 26. The nature and purpose of the Introduction.—The introduction is a natural and necessary part of the discourse, although it is more prominent and extended in some works than in others. We see, for instance, in the briefest essay

how much depends on the aspect of the subject that is first presented.

The peculiar purposes of the introduction are:

1. To prepare the reader to apprehend the precise point to which his attention is to be directed, and to understand what is contained in the body of the discourse.

Whether we describe, narrate, or prove, we must presuppose that our readers are acquainted with facts and principles connected with the theme, which can not form a part of the body of the discourse. Without this preliminary knowledge our statements, explanations, and arguments will be imperfectly understood. If then the development of the theme is to proceed naturally and without interruption, those ideas and truths on which it depends must first be communicated to the reader. If we wish to describe an object, we may begin by giving the class to which it belongs; if we narrate an event, we may recount briefly what preceded; if we wish to establish the truth of a proposition, we may introduce the argument by stating some more general truth involving it or connected with it.

Ex.—Hallam in his *Introduction to the Literature of Europe*, in the 15th, 16th, and 17th Centuries, thus introduces his subject:

"Although the subject of these volumes does not comprehend the literary history of Europe anterior to the commencement of the fifteenth century . . . it appears necessary to prefix such a general retrospect of the state of knowledge for some preceding ages as will illustrate its subsequent progress."

2. To render the reader disposed to attend to the presentation of the subject.

The mind of the reader will, at first, often be occupied with other thoughts, and indifferent to the subject, and often will be prejudiced against it. It requires caution and skill to lead him into a new and foreign field of thought. Unless we can gain his attention, and render him favorably disposed, no explanations or arguments can produce any impression upon him.

27. We have to consider the rules for the contents of the introduction and for its structure:

Contents of the Introduction.—1. The matter of the introduction must be an idea or thought that is closely connected with the theme, and will conduct to it by a short and natural process.

It should not be one that belongs to the contents of the theme and has its place properly in the body of the discourse, nor one so general and remote as to require a long process of thought before the theme is reached; but one that is distinct from the main idea of the discourse, and, at the same time, in close contact with it.

It must have a real connection with the main idea, and lead to it naturally without any appearance of artifice or force. When the connection is fanciful or arbitrary, it neither prepares for what follows nor contributes to the development of the subject, but rather diverts the mind from it. It is a mistake to suppose, that any striking thought may be adapted by the ingenuity of the writer to the purposes of an introduction.

It must not be too narrow; it must prepare for the entire discussion and not for some division or head.

It follows, that the same introduction can not be equally well suited to a number of discourses. The same general thought may be employed, but the application will give it, in each case, an individual character that makes it appropriate to the one discourse and to no other.

2. The introduction must contain only what is easily understood and will be readily admitted. What needs explanation and proof is not suitable. We must proceed from the known and admitted to the unknown and disputed.

3. It must awaken interest and curiosity, and direct the mind to what follows. The principal offenses against this rule are selecting trite reflections and mere truisms, and the opposite fault of choosing abstract ideas or what requires subtlety of thought. Concrete ideas, as they appeal more directly to

the imagination and feelings, are better suited to interest, and when circumstances allow, are to be preferred.

Structure of the Introduction.—The structure of the introduction should correspond to its purpose and subordinate rank.

As it does not exist for itself, but only to prepare for what follows, its main idea should be expanded no further than is conducive to this end. An exhaustive, systematic presentation of it would be out of place. The greatest possible conciseness and simplicity are required; an undue expansion of a subordinate part destroys the harmony and proportion of the whole and detracts from the main idea. Its length will, of course, be determined by the nature and extent of the composition; it is always too long when it contains any thing that is unnecessary.

The greatest difficulty in the art of framing an introduction is to secure a natural and easy transition to the body of the discourse. That is the most perfect out of which the theme seems immediately to grow.

When to be prepared.—The introduction is usually the last thing prepared. We can not be sure of selecting an appropriate introductory idea until the subject has been carefully studied in its various parts and relations. Cicero tells us, and what he says applies to all kinds of composition,—that it was his custom first to plan and digest all the materials of his discourse, and last of all to consider with what he should begin; giving as his reason, that whenever he endeavored to invent the introduction first, nothing occurred to him but what was trifling and commonplace. It is not meant that it should be written last. As a general rule, it is advisable in writing to finish the introduction before proceeding to the body of the discourse.

28. **The Body of the Discourse.**—As the theme arises naturally out of the introduction, so the body of the discourse

- a. Corrupted the morals of her inhabitants,
- b. Overthrew her constitution,

2. And so enfeebled her moral power.

I. Hence the effects of the war on the internal condition of Athens were injurious.

- a. It diminished her navy,
- b. Destroyed her ports,

1. And so exposed her to assaults from all her enemies.

- a. Deprived Athens of her allies,
- b. Made her dependent upon Sparta,

2. And so degraded her from the leadership.

II. Hence the effects of the war on the external relations of Athens were injurious.

Consequently, the results of the war to Athens were only injurious.

Here the method is rigidly Analytic.

If the writer wishes to present his subject according to the Synthetic method, his mode of proceeding will be just the reverse. What formed the conclusion of the preceding process will now form the starting-point, and the disposition will be as follows:

THEME.—The effects of the Peloponnesian war on Athens were all injurious; for it,

I. Enfeebled her internally:

1. In her material power.

- a. As to her wealth—destroying her commerce.
- b. As to her population—diminishing it.

2. In her moral power.

- a. By the demoralization of the people.
- b. By the change of her constitution.

II. Enfeebled her in her foreign relations.

1. Destroyed her means of defense.

- a. By diminishing her navy.
- b. By the destruction of the long walls.

2. Deprived her of her place as leader.

- a. By the loss of her allies.
- b. By her dependence on Sparta.

30. Comparative advantages of the two methods.—Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. Which to prefer will be determined by our special object in writing.

The analytic is the longer process and is liable to become tedious. It has the advantage of presenting truths in the order in which they are discovered. The reader begins with actual facts, and understands each step as he advances. He obtains a greater feeling of certainty, while at the same time his mind is stimulated to greater activity. There is also always intellectual pleasure in ascending from the particular to the general, and something of the pleasure of discovery when the final result is reached. It is specially suitable for introducing a science, as it begins with what is known, exhibits its general drift, and enables the student to understand the details. It is also the natural method for such works as propose to investigate notions and their relations, to resolve difficulties, to remove doubts and answer objections.

The synthetic method has the disadvantage of beginning with the abstract and general; the reader can not see the use of the elements that are given to him, and, not knowing their relation to the whole of which they are parts, can not fully comprehend them. It has the advantage of brevity, and is the mode best adapted to presenting knowledge in a systematic form so as to exhibit the relations of the separate facts and principles to each other and to the entire system. It is hence frequently called the scientific, systematic, or dogmatic method. It is specially suited to such works as aim to communicate knowledge in a compendious form that can be retained in the memory. It is also the natural method of history, and the one usually employed in oratory.

REMARK.—The two methods may be united, and in works of any size generally are. The analytic method may be adopted for the general discussion, and the synthetic for the treatment of the parts; or the reverse. This may be easily exemplified by using the scheme given in section 29.

31. General rules for the disposition of the Body of the Discourse.—The following general rules are to be observed in the disposition of the body of the discourse, whatever be the mode of presentation adopted:

1. It should omit nothing essential and contain nothing unessential; nothing merely connected with the theme and not derived from it. For example, if the theme is, "Warnings against false conscientiousness," and the writer should treat first, of the nature of the error; secondly, of its signs and effects; and, thirdly, of the reasons why it should be avoided, the division would violate this rule. The first and second heads are not contained in the theme which proposes only *warnings* against the error. So the third head is the theme itself. The division would have been a proper one, if the theme had been, "False conscientiousness;" as it would have given first, its nature; secondly, its characteristics; thirdly, its effects.

2. That is the best disposition which (provided the virtue of adaptation is not neglected) exhibits the theme from different points of view, and contains those main thoughts the development of which affords the greatest variety of new and important truths. There is a great difference among writers in this respect; some give only superficial views, while others bring out all the riches of their subjects.

3. The disposition must be natural,—prescribed by the nature of the theme not imposed from without. This is required by the nature of prose. We can not enlighten, convince, or persuade when the connection between the thoughts is not recognized as real and necessary. This rule is violated by adopting one uniform mode of arrangement without regard to the matter; and also by a false symmetry which divides and combines arbitrarily, and seeks uniformity in the number and length of the divisions and subdivisions when the natural development of the subject does not require it.

4. It must be easily comprehended and remembered. A too great multiplication of divisions and subdivisions should be avoided, as it burdens the memory and prevents the mind

from obtaining a clear view of the whole. The various parts should be distinct; one should not contain what belongs to another; and the limits and prominence given to each should be determined by its relative importance. Each part should contribute to the clearness, completeness, certainty, and force of the other, each being in the place prepared for it by what preceded, and where it will best prepare for what follows.

32. The Conclusion.—The conclusion is that part of the discourse in which the development of the theme is brought to its suitable close, and a distinct impression of it as a whole is given to the reader.

An essential part.—Like the introduction, it is more prominent in some classes of compositions than in others. Its importance is greater and it demands a more elaborate preparation in the extended discussion of complicated subjects and in oratorical discourse. But it is an essential part of every discourse.

Without it the good impression made by the proper disposition of the preceding parts is marred and many of its results are lost. There will be an abruptness, want of completeness, and want of symmetry, which will not only offend the taste but also render the discourse less effective.

It is the writer's aim to cause the reader to appropriate his entire thought and to feel the force of its complete presentation. Without the conclusion this can not be effected. A number of thoughts have been crowded on the reader's mind, to each of which in succession he has given his attention. Should the discussion terminate suddenly he is left with his mind occupied with some subordinate part, some subdivision, and it can not be expected, that, without aid from the writer, he will recall the several parts and gain a vivid impression of them in their unity or practical bearings. It is the writer's duty to put him in a position to do this; to enable him to gather up the results; to see what has been gone over, what has been gained, and how it has been gained; and thus to

view the theme in the light thrown upon it by the previous discussion. This is the office of the conclusion.

Qualities of.—What is necessary to its perfection may be inferred from what has been said of its end.

1. It should accord with the nature of the subject, the aim of the discourse, and the manner of presentation. It should not be incongruous either in matter or form.

2. Its main thought should be one that concentrates in itself the force of all that precedes, or at least brings the view presented, the proposition explained or proved, the resolution to be adopted, before the mind with all the vividness and force that can be derived from the entire discussion. In most cases, a condensed summary of what has been gained, or an exhibition of the unity of the parts, forms the most appropriate conclusion.

3. All abruptness or appearance of artifice in passing from the body of the discourse to the conclusion ought to be avoided.

33. Transitions.—The work of disposition is not finished until suitable transitions have been formed.

By transition, in its widest sense, is meant the passage from one part of a discourse to another, it may be from one organic part to the following, or from one division or subdivision to another.

In some cases the connection between the thoughts is so close and necessary that the following grows immediately out of the one that precedes it, and no intermediate idea is needed to show their relation. But this seldom occurs,—never in extended discussions of complicated subjects, or long narratives, or where there are digressions and amplifications. There exists, it is true, a real and necessary connection between all the parts; this is implied in the work of disposition, but it is not always easy to make this connection apparent. Usually, after having prepared his plan, the writer finds that the connection between the main thoughts is remote; that they are

separated by intervals, so that if left in this form the discourse would have a fragmentary character, and could not be readily understood or remembered.

In order to give continuity to the discourse some thoughts must be discovered which will bind the parts together and unite them into one coherent whole. These intermediate ideas are called transitions, in the narrow sense of the term. They have been compared to the joints of the body. Vinet calls them "a kind of punctuation on a large scale;" as punctuation serves to mark the intervals and the relations of thoughts, so transitions serve the double purpose of distinguishing and uniting.

The most important transitions are that from the introduction to the body of the discourse, and that from the body to the conclusion. The former is the more difficult, and that in which most failures occur.

Essential qualities of.—A real connection between the parts to be united is assumed. An attempt to show a connection where none exists will but make the incoherence more glaring.

1. The transition must contain a real thought. A word caught up in passing from one division or paragraph to another, or the declaration that we now proceed to the next part or division is not a transition. It often consists in repeating what was said, or in a concession or qualification.

2. This thought should be one connected with the two which it is intended to unite. It must look to what precedes it and what follows. Its points of contact with both should be so plain that they can be instantly discovered. Whatever is abstruse, subtle, or far-fetched would obscure the connection instead of making it apparent.

3. When the reader can easily supply the connecting thought it should be omitted. Even abruptness is better than empty commonplaces, which only burden the discourse and enfeeble the reader's attention.

4. The thought must not be expanded further than is neces-

sary to accomplish the specific purpose for which it is used. When it passes beyond this it becomes a digression, and instead of promoting, interrupts the continuity of the discourse.

How to be found.—No rules can teach the art of finding suitable transitions. Much depends on the tact of the writer. The great source of the difficulty found by beginners in this part of the work of composition is the want of a mastery of their subject. When meditation has been prolonged and faithful, and the plan properly made, the connecting links will soon be found.

CHAPTER IV.

AMPLIFICATION.

34. Nature of Amplification.—By the preceding processes of invention and disposition the *main ideas* of the discourse have been selected and arranged in due order; the course of thought in its beginning, middle, and end has been clearly marked out. But only a very general outline has been obtained; the plan is but a meager summary of the points to be considered. This outline is now to be filled up. The writer must take up each of the main ideas laid down in a summary form in his plan, and subject it to the same processes as those to which he has subjected the original leading idea of the discourse. He must meditate upon it and develop it; he must gather the subordinate ideas, *i. e.*, definitions, descriptions, explications, arguments, comparisons, etc., that are necessary to exhibit its full meaning and relative importance. By this means the meager abstract is converted into a full, vivid exhibition of the subject. This process is called amplification. It must not, as is too frequently the case, be confounded with exaggeration, idle repetition, or the heaping up of insignificant circumstances. It may be defined, the process of gathering

and arranging such subordinate ideas involved in or connected with the main ideas given in the plan, as are necessary to present the subject with the greatest possible clearness, force, and completeness.

Its importance.—It is necessary in works of all kinds.

1. Abstract, summary statements are not intelligible to most persons, and can never affect the feelings and will. We demand, even in scientific treatises, that the writer give both logical clearness to his ideas by definitions and divisions, and æsthetic clearness by exhibiting the abstract in concrete forms by means of examples, facts, figures, etc.

Ex.—We may say, in brief abstract form, the Divine Being is omnipresent and omniscient. The theologian gives logical clearness to the thought by enumerating the notions involved in omnipresence and omniscience; as, presence in all space, knowledge of all things possible and actual, of objects animate and inanimate, thoughts, desires, etc. But the Psalmist exhibits the same thought with æsthetic clearness, in a concrete form, appealing directly to the imagination and the feelings: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand defend me. If I say surely the darkness shall cover me, even the night shall be light about me. Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee; but the night shineth as the day; the darkness and the light are both alike to thee."

2. The mind must dwell for some time upon a thought before it can receive a full and distinct impression of it. If we have an important truth to communicate, we can not content ourselves with a bare enunciation of it; we must fix the reader's attention upon it, and give him time to comprehend it and feel its truth.

REMARK.—The importance of amplification as a means of detaining the mind upon a subject, and so allowing the reader to yield to its influence, is very well stated by Whateley: "It is remarked by anatomists that the nutritive quality is not the only requisite in food; that a certain degree of *distention* of the stomach is required to enable it to act with its

full powers; and that it is for this reason hay or straw must be given to horses, as well as corn, in order to supply the necessary bulk. Something analogous to this takes place with respect to the generality of minds, which are incapable of thoroughly digesting and assimilating what is presented to them, however clearly, in a very small compass. Many a one is capable of deriving that instruction from a moderate sized volume which he could not receive from a very small pamphlet, even more perspicuously written, and containing every thing that is to the purpose. It is necessary that the attention be detained for a certain time on the subject; and persons of unphilosophical mind, though they can attend to what they read or hear, are unapt to dwell upon it in the way of subsequent meditation."

35. **Means of Amplification.**—It is impossible to give a list of all the means of amplification. It would include all the ways by which logical clearness is imparted to a thought, and by which a thought can be represented vividly to the imagination. A few of the more important are here given, which will serve to exhibit still further the nature and importance of the process.

Enumeration.—This consists in decomposing or analyzing the thought, and, instead of a bare statement, giving the details.

If it is a notion, its qualities or parts are enumerated. We may define it, or if a logical definition does not answer the purpose, we may give a fuller enumeration of its qualities; we may resolve it into the classes contained under it; if a narration or description, we may specify the particulars.

Ex.—1. Freedom may be defined, "Exemption from the power and control of others." But such an abstract and general statement will not suit the purposes of the orator; it is thus amplified by Fox in one of his speeches: "Freedom consists in the safe and sacred possession of a man's property, governed by laws defined and certain; with many personal privileges,—natural, civil, and religious,—which he can not surrender without ruin to himself, and of which to be deprived by any other power is despotism."

2. Cicero, instead of simply asserting that Pompey was a great general, amplifies the notion by enumerating the qualities that constitute a general: "Those are not the only virtues of a general which are commonly thought so. It is not courage alone which forms a great leader, but

industry in business, intrepidity in dangers, vigor in acting, prudence in concerting, promptness in executing. All which characters appear with greater luster in him than in all the other generals we ever saw or heard of."

3. The historian might briefly state the fact, that the fleet of William, after being for a short time in great danger, reached the harbor of Torbay in safety. But notice how Macaulay amplifies this by the enumeration of particulars: "The morning of the fifth of November was hazy. The pilot of the Brill could not discern the sea-marks, and carried the fleet too far to the west. The danger was great. To return in the face of the wind was impossible. Plymouth was the next port. But at Plymouth a garrison had been posted under the command of the Earl of Bath. The landing might be opposed, and a check might produce serious consequences. There could be little doubt, moreover, that by this time the royal fleet had got out of the Thames, and was hastening full sail down the river. Russell saw the whole extent of the peril, and exclaimed to Burnet, 'You may go to your prayers, doctor. All is over.' At that moment the wind changed, a soft breeze sprang up from the south, the mist dispersed, the sun shone forth, and, under the mild light of an autumnal noon, the fleet turned back, passed round the lofty cape of Berry Head, and rode safe into the harbor of Torbay."

A general truth is amplified by enumerating the instances, or particular truths, on which it is founded.

Ex.—Addison thus amplifies the general truth, that all nature is full of life: "Every part of matter is peopled, every green leaf swarms with inhabitants. There is scarce a single humor in the body of a man, or of any other animal, in which our glasses do not discover myriads of living creatures. The surface of animals is also covered with other animals, which are in the same manner the basis of other animals, that live upon it. Nay, we find in the most solid bodies, as in marble itself, innumerable cells and cavities, that are crowded with such imperceptible inhabitants as are too little for the naked eye to discover. On the other hand, if we look into the more bulky parts of nature, we see the seas, lakes, rivers, teeming with numberless kinds of living creatures. We find every mountain and marsh, wilderness and wood, plentifully stocked with birds and beasts; and every part of matter affording proper necessities and conveniences for the livelihood of multitudes which inhabit it."

Examples.—In some cases, one or two apposite examples or striking circumstances are more effective than a full enumeration of particulars.

1. The matter employed in amplification is never, nor in any degree, to be treated as independent; but always as subordinate to the end for which it is introduced; viz., to impart clearness, distinctness, and vividness to the main thought.

Judgment is to be exercised in deciding what thoughts require amplification and what do not. A greater degree of expansion is necessary in oral than in written discourse; and in popular works than in purely scientific. A brief exposition may be sufficient for those who have some acquaintance with the subject, while in addressing those of less intelligence a greater fullness of details is necessary. It is always a most serious fault to dwell on what is unimportant, trivial, or what can be supplied by the reader; it indicates a want of the power of just discrimination on the part of the writer.

A careful selection is to be made from the various thoughts suggested; only such are to be used as can be woven into the discourse and aid in the attainment of the end in view. This applies to all the modes of amplification: but caution is specially necessary in introducing accessory ideas. Parentheses, digressions, and episodes are to be sparingly used, and ought to be incorporated into the development of the thought. Writers are often led astray by introducing quotations; the thought may be important and striking, but not appropriate, and so is superfluous and diverts the mind from the main point. There is also great danger in embodying in the discourse detached passages that have been written without reference to the treatment of the subject as a whole. They do not harmonize with the rest of the discourse, and have the appearance of independent discussions.

When this rule is disregarded the materials of the composition will be rather placed in juxtaposition than, to use Whately's metaphor, be felted together. Whatever be the beauty of the details themselves, as they do not combine to produce one distinct, total impression, the work must be considered as badly constructed.

2. The details should be in harmony with the general tone of the discourse. The peculiar relation of the writer to the

subject and to the circumstances necessarily gives a distinctive character to his mode of treatment, which should be recognized not only in the selection of the main ideas, but also in all the details. The same principle of selection should be employed in choosing the principal and subordinate ideas. To change the principle of selection is as great a rhetorical fault, as in logic to change the principle of division. Examples of the grosser forms of the violation of this rule are flippant, ludicrous remarks in a serious discourse; abstract, speculative discussions in an oration, etc.

3. Every particular should be in its right place. There is properly but one place in the discourse for which a given particular is fitted, and in which it can best produce its effects. It is implied in this that it should receive no greater expansion than its relative importance demands. By this means we give to a discourse its distribution of light and shade, bringing into relief what is important, while the parts which serve to support and explain are placed in a less conspicuous station.

When the process of amplification is finished, the theme has received its full and harmonious development. The next step is to embody the thoughts in language that will convey them to others.



PART II.

STYLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE QUALITIES OF PROSE STYLE.

37. The principles, according to which the materials already selected and arranged are expressed in language suited to their nature and the end to be achieved, are contained in the doctrine of Style, which forms the second part of Rhetoric.

Nature and conditions of Style.—Style is the peculiar manner of expressing thought that pervades an entire production. It depends partly on the nature and importance of the subject, but chiefly on the character and disposition of the writer. It has been called the physiognomy of the mind, as it reveals *how* one thinks as well as *what* one thinks. When the thoughts are trite, obscure, or badly arranged, clear and effective expression is impossible.

While vigorous thought is an indispensable condition of a good style, it is not the only one. All great writers have been great thinkers, but the history of literature affords many instances to prove that not all great thinkers are great writers. We must embody what we wish to communicate in the forms offered to us by a particular language, and the thoughts will not avail without skill to use the instrument by which they are conveyed to others. He who wishes to excel in the art of expression must not only acquire habits of correct and comprehensive thought, but also master the resources of his native

tongue. He can not content himself with the few hundred trite, loosely applied words and phrases that suffice for the purposes of ordinary business, but must endeavor to gain an ample vocabulary of expressive, accurately discriminated terms, and readiness in combining them according to the laws of the language.

To give to our thoughts their adequate expression is not an easy task; it demands care and perseverance. The greatest masters of style have composed slowly and laboriously. In the first place, it involves many subtle processes of thinking. When we seek fitting words and weave them into sentences and paragraphs, we are applying to the primary elements of the discourse the same processes of analysis and comparison that we had before employed in dealing with large masses of thoughts. The most delicate and exact discrimination is necessary to impart to them the requisite clearness and distinctness. Secondly, the imperfection of language makes the expression of thought difficult. It suggests, does not convey, thought. The most perfect language contains but a comparatively few symbols for the infinite variety of conceptions to be expressed. And of these no man has ever mastered all. According to the estimate of Marsh, there occur in all the works of Shakespeare not more than fifteen thousand words; in the poems of Milton, not above eight thousand; few writers or speakers use as many as ten thousand words; ordinary persons of average intelligence use not more than three or four thousand. It is by means of these few symbols that a writer conveys new, complex, and subtle thoughts with all their parts in their exact relation to each other.

Its importance.—It ought not to be necessary to insist upon the importance of attention to style. All know that the favorable reception of a truth is owing, not wholly to its importance, but in a great measure to the manner in which it is presented. The same facts and arguments which, when stated by one, gain the understanding and affections, will, as exhibited by another, produce weariness and disgust. The duty is enforced by the

writer is not expected to render his meaning obvious to all. The degree of perspicuity of which the subject is susceptible and the character of the readers should be taken into consideration. The law of clearness demands that he do not add to the intrinsic difficulty of the subject by his mode of presenting it, but economize the attention of the reader by concentrating it upon the subject and allowing none to be lost in overcoming difficulties of expression. The writer who compels his readers to pause at words, to reread sentences, and painfully collect his meaning, should not be disappointed when he finds that his thoughts, although new and important, produce no impression. The power of attention is limited; when it is divided among a number of objects, no distinct and vivid image of any one is obtained; whatever is expended on the language is withdrawn from the thought, and weakens its force.

Spencer's statement of the law of economy of attention.—

This law of economizing attention is made by Herbert Spencer the one general principle from which all the rules of composition result. He says: "On seeking for some clue to the law underlying these current maxims, we may see shadowed forth in many of them the importance of economizing the reader's or hearer's attention. To so present ideas that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort, is the desideratum towards which most of the rules above quoted point. When we condemn writing that is wordy, or confused, or intricate; when we praise this style as easy, and blame that as fatiguing, we consciously or unconsciously assume this desideratum as our standard of judgment. Regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may say, that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and the better arranged its parts the greater will be the effect produced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine is deducted from the result. A reader or listener has at each moment but a limited amount of mental power available. To recognize and interpret the symbols presented to him, requires part of this power; to arrange and combine the

images suggested requires a further part; and only that part which remains can be used for realizing the thought conveyed. Hence, the more time and attention it takes to receive and understand each sentence, the less time and attention can be given to the contained idea; and the less vividly will that idea be conceived. . . . Hence, carrying out the metaphor that language is the vehicle of thought, there seems reason to think that in all cases the friction and inertia of the vehicle deduct from its efficiency; and that in composition the chief, if not the sole thing to be done, is, to reduce this friction and inertia to the smallest possible amount. Let us then inquire whether economy of the recipient's attention is not the secret of effect, alike in the right choice and collocation of words, in the best arrangement of clauses in a sentence, in the proper order of its principal and subordinate propositions, in the judicious use of simile, metaphor, and other figures of speech, and even in the rhythmical sequence of syllables." *Essays, Moral, Political, and Esthetic*, pp. 11, 12.

40. Vivacity.—The law of economizing attention is not entitled to the rank of the supreme law of composition; we must add to it another; viz., that the thoughts must be so presented as to call into vigorous energy the mental powers of the reader. Pain is the result of a want of a proper exertion of our faculties as well as of stimulating them beyond their natural limits. By forgetting this we may, in the endeavor to be perspicuous, become feeble, dull, heavy. It is necessary then to preserve the medium between the extremes of undue depression and over-exertion of the activities of the reader. This quality is called vivacity; it may be described as such a presentation of thoughts as determines the reader to reproduce them instead of merely passively receiving them.

Beauty.—The combination of these qualities constitutes beauty of style; which is not to be considered, as is generally done, a separate quality. This false notion has arisen from regarding style as something independent of the thought, and

has led many writers astray. A style is beautiful so far as—and only so far as—it is the adequate expression of worthy thoughts. There is no means of securing it, except by aiming at the highest possible degree of propriety, perspicuity, and vivacity.

41. The English language as to its power of expression.—Languages differ in their power of expression. Each of the great languages of civilization has its peculiar advantages and difficulties. The English may be surpassed by some others in separate traits, but in the combination of the requisites of adequate expression it yields to none.

It is a composite tongue; it has not grown up from a few germs by the processes of derivation and composition, but is the result of the conflicts and mingling of different languages. While its groundwork is Anglo-Saxon, the building is composed of materials from many quarters. Its two chief elements are Anglo-Saxon and Latin, which are so united as to give almost a double language.

The English language has suffered in the revolutions through which it has passed. It has lost most of its original inflections, and with them the liberty of position of words in the sentence; it has lost also to a great extent the power of composition and derivation. The greatest loss is that of the primitive meaning and suggestiveness of its words. The language is crowded with barren, arbitrary symbols, which do not suggest the ideas with vivacity, and are especially liable to be misunderstood and misapplied.

But its gains far exceed its losses. It possesses a copious vocabulary for all kinds of subjects and compositions. Its literary diction was founded by Chaucer; its religious diction, at the same period, by Wycliffe; its philosophical dialect was perfected in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and all have been enriched and invigorated by the great national controversies in religion and politics. It has also the means of supplying its deficiencies by appropriating from foreign sources, recalling words that have fallen into disuse, and drawing from

provincial dialects. It affords the means of varying the style; the writer may choose Latin words or Anglo-Saxon, or may combine them in different proportions; and according as he selects the words may vary the structure of sentences, making them more periodic when the Latin element, more elliptical when the Saxon element predominates. It is surpassed by no language in its power of clear and precise expression; the number of duplicate words which it possesses enables it to mark the delicate shades of difference between ideas. At the same time, it can convey them with brevity and force. Notwithstanding the frequent accusation made against it of extreme harshness, in the hands of great masters it is susceptible of a high degree of harmony and melody.

REMARK.—Grimm speaks thus of it: "None of the modern languages has through the very loss and decay of all phonetic laws, and through the dropping of nearly all inflections, acquired greater force and vigor than the English; and from the fullness of those vague and indefinite sounds which may be learned but can never be taught, it has derived a power of expression such as has never been at the command of any human tongue. Begotten by a surprising union of the two noblest languages of Europe,—the one Teutonic, the other Romanic,—it received that wonderfully happy temper and thorough breeding, where the Teutonic supplied the material strength, the Romanic the suppleness and freedom of expression. Nay, the English language which has borne, not as it were by mere chance, the greatest poet of modern times,—great in his very contrast with classical poetry—I speak, of course, of Shakespeare,—this English language may truly be called a world language, and seems, like England herself, but in a still higher degree, destined to rule over all the corners of the earth. In wealth, wisdom, and strict economy, none of the living languages can vie with it."

Marsh says: "In fact, it has so completely adapted itself to the uses and wants of Christian society, as exemplified by the Anglo-Saxon race in the highest forms to which associate life has anywhere attained, that it well deserves to be considered the model speech of modern humanity, nearly achieving in language the realization of that great ideal which wise men are every-where seeking to make the fundamental law of political organization, the union of freedom, stability, and progress."

42. Topics to be discussed in the doctrine of Style.—The laws for expressing thought with propriety, perspicuity,

and vivacity relate to the choice of words and their combination.

Words are either proper, literal expressions of ideas, or denote them analogically and figuratively. They are combined first into sentences, which may then be combined into a more complex unity, called the paragraph. The mode in which words are selected and combined gives rise to diversities of style, some of which it is expedient to describe.

The topics to be considered are as follows:

1. The Choice of Words.
2. Figures of Speech.
3. The Sentence.
4. The Paragraph.
5. Division of Style.

CHAPTER II.

THE CHOICE OF WORDS.

43. Importance and difficulty of a proper choice of words.—The selection of words demands special care in English composition. Owing to the comparatively little liberty allowed in arranging words in a sentence, a writer must depend mainly upon a judicious selection of them to give to his ideas their due importance and emphasis.

The choice of words is often a matter of great difficulty. The English vocabulary is one of the most extensive possessed by any language; it is widely diffused, and employed by persons in the greatest variety of occupations; so that it is not always an easy matter to determine what words belong to the common stock from which alone a literary writer is permitted to draw. A great number of words in common use are imported from abroad. Two serious evils result from this, which add to the difficulties of an English writer. The first is, that the general principles and analogies governing the formation

of words are obscured; the second is, that, as these foreign words are not, like those of native growth, derived by fixed laws from well known roots, their primary meaning is not known to the most of those who use them; they convey no distinct ideas, and are liable to be misunderstood and perverted.

We shall consider words with respect to—*National use, Present use, Moral dignity, Propriety.*

44. National use.—In the English language there are words and phrases which are understood and used by all educated persons, and universally recognized as composing the national speech—the common possession of all without respect to class, occupation, or abode. The words admitted into a composition should be drawn from this common stock; none should be used that belong to a foreign tongue or are current only in narrow circles.

This rule is violated by the use of barbarisms and provincialisms.

Barbarisms.—Foreign words and phrases should not be employed except when the national language has no terms in common use that adequately express the thought.

This rule does not prohibit absolutely the use of foreign terms. Purity must not degenerate into purism. It is no defect in a language to contain foreign ingredients, and no excellence to be without them. Our language, as it has been transmitted to us, contains a vast number of elements which can not be separated from it: and extended intercourse with other nations by commerce, immigration, study of their literatures, etc., is continually bringing new accessions. In addition to this, our language having lost to a great degree the power of forming new words from its own materials, is obliged to resort to foreign languages for aid.

The foreign words in the language can be divided into three classes.

1. Such as are naturalized. They express notions current

among the people for which the vernacular has no other equally suitable designation; by long use they have lost their foreign appearance, and have accommodated themselves to the native idiom.

The naturalization of a word is effected in different ways:

(1) By change of accent; as, pretext', pre'text; essay', es'-say, etc.

(2) By change of spelling; as, chirurgion, surgeon; vehiculum, vehicle; carrière, career; innocentia, innocence; per-ruque, periwig, wig.

(3) By change of inflection; for instance, instead of dogmata, we say dogmas; instead of epocha, epochs; and instead of gymnasia, some of our best writers are using the form gymnasiums.

(4) By change of signification. Foreign words retain at first the sense they bore in the language from which they were taken; but by use the original meaning is lost or greatly changed, and a derivative or secondary signification becomes the leading one; as, contrition, tribulation, considerable, lunatic.

Words that have been naturalized are a portion of the national language, and should be used in their popular form and meaning. It is mere pedantry and a violation of the purity of the language to attempt to restore them to their primitive form, pronunciation, or signification.

2. Words that retain their original form, and are recognized as foreign, but for which we have not any exact equivalents in English. Many of these are of technical import, designations of rank, of modes of life, and the like; for instance, terminus, plural termini; phenomenon, phenomena; interregnum, desideratum.

While in this form they may be looked upon as candidates for admission into the language. In time, they will either become fully naturalized or be supplanted by native terms. Their use is unavoidable, although it is allowed to propose substitutes for them. When employed they should appear in their original form.

There are also many foreign phrases that have passed from the arts, sciences, and learned professions into popular use;—for instance, *bona fide*, *verbatim et literatim*, *lapsus lingue*, *pro tempore*, *vice versa*, etc. Most of these can be dispensed with; their frequent use is a violation of purity and propriety.

3. Foreign words and phrases that can be replaced by equally expressive and euphonious English words in actual use.

These are barbarisms, and should be unconditionally rejected. They are superfluous, as they express no thought nor shade of thought which is not expressed altogether as well by current words; and since superfluous words are not tolerated in a language, they can be retained only by dropping the more intelligible and suggestive native words. The result of this process, if long continued, is to render our classic authors antiquated. They are prohibited because they are unintelligible to the mass of readers. Their introduction leads also to the corruption of the syntax; as words generally bring the foreign construction with them. They are to be rejected on aesthetic grounds; the confusion of words of different languages in the same work is incompatible with simplicity and harmony, which are essential qualities of a literary production.

REMARK.—The tendency to introduce aliens to the exclusion of the natives is the result sometimes of ignorance, sometimes of pedantry, and sometimes of fashion and caprice. Most of the words thus introduced are drawn from the Latin and French languages. The works of many authors of former periods are crowded with Latin and Greek words. The fashion at present is to employ French.

The following extracts from a discourse of Culverwell (1652) will illustrate the style of many theological writers of that period: "For as in the most glorious creature as a creature there is *aliquid nihili*; so in the most contemptible creature as a creature there is *aliquid Dei*. I (ay) but the atheist he shuts his eyes, and *quid cæco cum speculo?* what should a blind man do with a looking-glass?" and so on throughout the entire discourse.

This appears barbarous; but it is not more so than the profuse employment of French words which is admired by many as fine writing. This species of barbarism is exposed by a writer quoted by Dean Alford: "A class of writers has sprung up who appear to think it their special business to enrich the language by dragging into it, without any attempt

at assimilation, contributions from all the tongues of the earth. The result is a wretched piece of patchwork, which may have charms in the eyes of some people, but which is certainly an abomination in the eyes of the genuine student of language. We need only glance into one of the periodical representatives of fashionable literature, or into a novel of the day, to see how serious this assault upon the purity of the English language has become. . . . The heroes are always marked by an *air distingué*; the vile men are sure to be *blasés*. . . . Then there is a bold man to describe. Having acquired the *savoir faire*, he is never afraid of making a *faux pas*, but no matter what kind of conversation is started plunges at once in *medias res*." And so on. *The Queen's English*, pp. 265-268.

A more dangerous form of barbarism is the adoption of foreign idioms; as, "The king *assisted* [was present] at the ceremony." "Louis the Fourteenth *had reason* [was right] when he said, 'The Pyrenees are removed.'"

The use of such idioms perverts the meaning of the English words and changes the fabric of the language. We are threatened by this corruption from two quarters. First, the number of translations is continually increasing, most of which retain some of the constructions of the original. Secondly, the many foreigners who make use of the English language introduce their own idioms; although they employ English words they still retain the construction of their native tongue. From this source, many German idioms have gained admission into the popular dialect of portions of this country.

Provincialisms.—Provincialisms are words and phrases the use of which is confined to a particular district. They are not a part of the national language; although readily understood in the region in which they are current, they are not intelligible beyond its limits.

The wide extension of the English language will occasion many important local variations from the standard speech; already in the United States, in India, and in Australia such differences appear. Those which are regarded as peculiar to the United States are called *Americanisms*.

The difference between American and British English has

been greatly overestimated. The words that are considered Americanisms may be classified as follows: (1) Such as were brought to this country from Great Britain by the colonists and have been retained by their descendants. Bartlett estimates that nine-tenths of the colloquialisms of New England belong to this class. These words are either such as were provincial at the time of the emigration and still are current in the same counties; or such as were of reputable use, but have since become obsolete in England.

(2) Words that owe their origin to the new objects, modes of life, and institutions of this country. These are either authorized words employed in a different sense from that in which they are used in their native country; or new words, some of which are necessary, others useless.

(3) Words that owe their origin to foreign influences. The numerous colonies—Dutch, German, French, Spanish—as also the negroes and Indians, have all introduced corruptions into the language, which at first were confined to particular localities, but afterwards became more general.

REMARK.—The importance of local and provincial dialects as illustrating our early language and literature is becoming more generally recognized, and a juster estimate of their nature is entertained. Our poetic diction has been enriched by many additions from this source. Prose is allowed less liberty in this respect; but no one nowadays would maintain that the adoption of a provincialism into the literary dialect is absolutely prohibited.

45. Present use.—The language of living men undergoes a constant change. Words become old and disappear, and new ones are introduced. The laws of style require that the words employed in composition shall be such as are in use. This rule prohibits obsolete words and neologisms.

Obsolete words.—Obsolete words are such as were once current, but have disappeared from use. There is no standard by which to decide whether a word has become obsolete. In reference to many there can be no doubt; they are at once pro-

nounced to be no longer a part of the current language. But as to others there is no agreement.

Campbell would consider as obsolete those words and idioms which have been disused by all good authors for a period longer than the age of man extends to. It is not possible to apply this test; no one is able to survey the whole field of contemporary literature. Again, it is not safe; the mere passing from actual use does not justify us in considering a word as permanently obsolete. Words that have been condemned by the critic as obsolete or obsolescent often revive and take their place in the current language. Few of the present day will accept the decision, that words which have not been used within the knowledge or remembrance of those now living are no longer a part of our intellectual coin, and can not be employed without violating the laws of good taste.

The only test is the subjective one. If the word would not naturally find a place in prose writings of the present day, or if it appears strange when met with in earlier authors, it may be regarded as obsolete. This test can be applied only by those who have been long familiar with the best writers. No two would entirely agree in their decisions as to what are and what are not obsolete.

No absolute rule can be laid down respecting the recalling of words that have fallen into disuse. Many deserved to be discarded; they were defective in form and logical clearness, and have been replaced by better words, or were banished as coarse, or rejected as marking useless distinctions; others were worn out by use; changes in the arts and employments caused the disappearance of whole classes. The language has not suffered by losing them. On the other hand, many valuable words have been lost, not by the progress of the nation in knowledge and refinement, but by its decline. In times when the national spirit had decayed, foreign words were permitted to supplant native; when the direction of mental activity is changed, and important fields of investigation are forsaken, the terms employed in these sciences are left to perish; looseness of thinking, by neglecting the important distinctions indicated by

words, renders many superfluous, and thus contributes to making them obsolete. To restore such words to their place will be a benefit to the language. With the quickening of intellectual and moral life, and the resuming of long abandoned studies and pursuits, many of them will be revived. The task of recalling obsolete and obsolescent words is committed mainly to poets; the philosopher and historian are subjected to greater restrictions.

Neologisms.—New words may be formed by composition and derivation from native or foreign materials. The privilege is to be used with great caution. The tendency at present is to recklessness in coining them; a most important part of the work of verbal criticism is to guard against the corruption of the language by neologisms.

To be entitled to a place in the language a word should comply with the following conditions:

1. It should denote a new and important conception that is not adequately expressed by any native or naturalized word. 24 A term that brings to distinct consciousness a new combination of thoughts, or an important distinction, is an addition to the intellectual wealth of a people; while one that merely disguises an old notion in a new dress, or denotes a low, trivial conceit, or a useless distinction, is a violation of good use; as, *author-ess*, *poet-ess*, *conduct-ress*, *jeopardize*, *happify*, *donate*.

2. It should be formed according to the analogy of the language. 24 Anomalous words,—*i. e.*, those violating the general analogy of the language, have a foreign, repulsive aspect. The force of the prefixes and suffixes must be carefully observed. By themselves they are without meaning, but have peculiar significance in composition and derivation: some are active, others passive; some can be used with but one part of speech, others with several. The suffix *-able* occasions a great deal of perplexity, as may be seen in the discussions on the word *reliable*: the suffix *-ize* is very improperly employed with all parts of speech; for example, *burglarize*, *experimentalize*, *funeralize*, etc.

The analogy of the language is often violated by forming *hybrids*,—i. e., compounds with parts derived from different languages; one part may be Anglo-Saxon, the other Latin or Greek; or one may be Latin, the other Greek. Such compounds are not absolutely prohibited in the English language. The distinction between its different elements is not so broad that each is left entirely to its own laws. The Latin has yielded in many cases to the Anglo-Saxon. Many hybrids have been received as a permanent part of the language and have become familiar to us, and new ones analogous to the old are formed.

There are many words in which a native suffix is attached to a Latin root; as, *motion-less*, *pain-ful*, but the analogy of the language does not favor the joining of a Latin suffix to an English root. As a general rule prefixes are of the same language as the word to which they are added. There are, however, many exceptions, especially in the use of the negative prefix *un-*, which is of native origin, but is prefixed to Latin words; as *unjust*, *unidiomatic*. The tendency, however, at present is to substitute the Latin *in-* for *un-*, in words of foreign extraction. In the word *un-grate-ful*, we find a native prefix and suffix with a Latin root.

The word *linguistic*, which seems to be naturalized in scientific nomenclature, is a hybrid compounded of a Latin noun and two Greek suffixes.

3. It should be euphonic. It is not a sufficient reason for rejecting a word otherwise unexceptionable, that it is somewhat rough or harsh; but if it is difficult of utterance it does not serve the purposes of speech, and has no good claim to be adopted.

Words that are defective in respect to euphony are reduced by Campbell to the following classes:

(1) When the syllables which immediately follow the accented syllable are so crowded with consonants as of necessity to retard the pronunciation; for example, questionless, remembrance. *shalinties*

(2) When too many syllables follow the accented syllable; for example, primarily, summarily.

(3) When a short or unaccented syllable is repeated or followed by another short unaccented syllable very much resembling. This gives the appearance of stammering to the pronunciation; for example, holily, sillily.

4. It should be intelligible at once to those for whom it is designed. A word needing a commentary is superfluous. "The true criterion," says Julius Hare, "of the worth of a new word is its having such a familiar look, and bearing its meaning and the features of its kindred so visible in its face that we hardly know whether it is not an old acquaintance. Then more especially is it likely to be genuine, when its author himself is scarcely conscious of its novelty. At all events, it should not seem to be the fruit of study, but to spring spontaneously from the inspiration of the moment." *Guesses at Truth*.

Our great writers are sparing in the use of new words; they accomplish their purpose by a felicitous selection and arrangement of old and familiar words. It is safer for the writer to be somewhat behind than in advance of the language. In respect to both old and new words, the rule given by Quintilian should be followed,—to prefer the oldest of the new and the newest of the old. Or as it is expressed by Ben Jonson: "We must not be too frequent with the mint—every day coining, nor fetch words from the extreme and utmost ages. Words borrowed from antiquity do lend a kind of majesty to style, and are not without their delight sometimes; for they have the authority of years, and out of their intermission do win themselves a kind of grace-like newness. But the eldest of the present and the newest of the past language is best."

46. **Moral Dignity.**—Both in what is spoken and in the manner in which it is spoken we should be governed by the moral purpose of language. All words or phrases that directly or by association are offensive to moral purity or delicacy of feeling are to be shunned. This rule prohibits:

1. **Words and phrases that express directly and vividly what is base, vicious, coarse, and disgusting**—whatever is low, or becomes low by being spoken of.

We can not always avoid mentioning such objects; when compelled to do so, we should employ *euphemisms*,—that is, general or foreign terms, or circumlocutions which express the same idea but vaguely and less offensively. As a people advances in refinement, its language purifies itself; many words are banished as indecent that were formerly used without offense. We find in our earlier writers—as Chaucer and Shakespeare—a coarseness of phrase that would not be tolerated in a writer of the present century. This is to be explained in part by the ruder manners of their times, and in part by the fact that the words had not then the ignoble associations that are now connected with them. Words become degraded by use; being brought in contact with unworthy persons and themes, they lose their purity and elevation, and sink to the vulgar dialect. These authors are not to be judged by the present standard; we should wrong them were we to attribute to them the depravity which would be justly attributed to a writer of the present day who should be guilty of like grossness.

In shunning coarseness the writer must not run into the other extreme of scrupulousness and prudery. The ill-timed and excessive use of euphemisms is the indication of conscious impurity. A corrupt mind can defile the most innocent words. There are many objects which it is a transgression of conventional decorum to make the themes of conversation, but it is vulgar affectation in a writer, who finds it necessary to refer to them, to hunt for euphemistic expressions instead of using their proper and perfectly harmless names.

2. **The wanton misapplication of terms that designate moral qualities.**—This pernicious corruption is becoming prevalent in popular, especially in humorous literature. One form of it is the use of words that conceal and palliate vice by representing it as trifling or innocent, thus subverting the dis-

functions between right and wrong, which are clearly marked in every cultivated language. Another form is in making use of low, degrading terms when speaking of sacred objects and relations. Another, and the most common form, is that of applying the terms which are set apart to denote what is honorable, noble, and elevated, to vile and contemptible persons and objects.

This abuse of language is the sign of the moral deterioration of a community, of the decay of self-respect and of reverence for, and belief in, what is highest and best, and is the most effective means of increasing the evil from which it springs.

3. **Vulgarisms, or corruptions of language**—whether in the form of its words or in their application—that are indications of ignorance and want of culture. They offend against the structure, clearness, harmony, and dignity of the language, and are suggestive of what is low and mean; they are, therefore, violations of respectable use, and although admitted occasionally into conversation and familiar writings, they are excluded from serious discourse, whether oral or written. Here belong—

(1) *Colloquialisms*.—We tolerate in ordinary conversation anomalous words which betray capriciousness in their formation; contractions and mutilations, trite and trivial expressions, and popular ephemeral words, which have no place in literary diction.

(2) *Slang*.—The use of slang is one of the characteristics of our popular prose style. Many think that they are thereby writing in an easy, familiar manner adapted to the taste and capacity of their readers. Slang consists of words and phrases, which in themselves may be either significant or meaningless, used in an arbitrary and, generally, ludicrous sense. They are often metaphorical and racy, but degrade a subject by low and unsuitable associations, and are therefore unfit expressions for serious thoughts. They are not a portion of the permanent language; they spring up one knows not where, are popular for a short time, and suddenly disappear. Occasionally, how-

ever, one is adopted by respectable usage and takes its place among the lawful words.

(3) *Cant*.—By cant is usually understood a vocabulary of words peculiar to, and characteristic of, a particular profession, trade, class, or sect. Its use beyond its proper sphere betrays the influence of occupation and external circumstances, is an obtrusion of the personal and professional, and the manifestation of a contracted, vulgar mind. Properly, cant is a jargon composed of words that have lost their significance, and are used without any distinct meaning attached to them,—which may mean any thing or nothing. Thus, much of the nomenclature of philosophical and theological systems passes into cant. This form of cant is a violation of propriety rather than of the moral elevation of language. Its source, however, is untruthfulness; those who do not write and speak from their own experience will almost inevitably fall into it.

47. Propriety.—Propriety consists in employing words that express the exact ideas to be conveyed, and that are appropriate to the nature and purpose of the discourse. It is opposed to inaccuracy and incongruity.

Accuracy.—As every word is the representative of a definite notion, we should select those which according to established usage are the authorized symbols of the thoughts which we wish to express. A writer is deficient in accuracy who chooses words that are significant of different ideas from those he means to suggest. It may seem superfluous to warn against using words that have no affinity in sense to those whose place they occupy, but the fault is a common one. He may also be deficient in accuracy by using terms that, instead of conveying his ideas precisely and completely, contain more or less than he intends. The principal sources of inaccuracy are:

1. The misapplication of words similar in sound, or derived from the same root, but of entirely different meaning; for example, observance for observation, conscience for consciousness,

predicate for predict, demean for debase, corporeal punishment for corporal punishment, exceptionable for exceptional.

2. The want of exact discrimination in the use of synonymous words.

Synonyms are usually defined as words of the same language and same grammatical class, identical in meaning. There may be, especially in a composite language like the English, words that are precisely equivalent. But use will soon make a difference between them; for language tends always to reject what is useless. Some drop out of use, others are appropriated to poetry or science, while with others what Coleridge has called the desynonymizing process takes place; different shades of meaning are attached to the different words, and from being equivalent terms they become synonymous. Strictly, synonyms are words of the same language and grammatical class that agree in their main idea, but differ in their subordinate and accessory ideas. They are not identical, but similar in meaning; the points of similarity are easily recognized, while great care is often required to discover the precise point of difference.

With the improvement in knowledge and refinement the differences of objects are more carefully noticed and recorded in the language. The number of synonymous words is constantly increasing, and with their increase the language acquires greater perspicuity and precision.

An acquaintance with the shades of meaning of these words is an indispensable condition of accurate thinking and writing. The writer must avoid confounding them with each other. By such a misapplication of them he fails to express his thought; the general idea may be conveyed, but the secondary one, that limits and determines the general, will not. This promiscuous use of distinct words is also a corruption of the language, as it tends to destroy its logical clearness and precision. Sometimes, however, it is not necessary to discriminate accurately between the various shades of meaning; it answers the purpose of the writer to give merely the general idea; in such cases he can use different words to express the same thought.

The accumulation of synonymous words is also to be avoided. The effect is to perplex the reader, who naturally endeavors to discover a meaning in each of the words, whereas the writer has used them as equivalents; as when the truth and veracity, or the courage and bravery of a person are spoken of.

Synonyms are sometimes combined for the sake of completeness. One word does not give the thought, and two or more must be joined to express the full meaning. This is not a case of improper accumulation of synonymous words, but of bringing together several words to denote a single idea, which can not be expressed with sufficient fullness and accuracy by a single term.

REMARK.—The English language owes much of its richness in synonyms to its composite character and the readiness with which it admits foreign additions. The following examples will show from what sources our synonyms are chiefly derived. It will be seen that some belong to the same stock, others are drawn from different languages:

Ex.—1. Mute, *L.*; Voiceless, *A.-S.* 2. Durable, *L.*; Lasting, *A.-S.* 3. Bold, *A.-S.*; Brave, *Fr.* 4. Place, *Fr.*; Position, *L.* 5. Weariness, *A.-S.*; Fatigue, *Fr.*; Lassitude, *L.* 6. Trick, *A.-S.*; Finesse, *Fr.*; Artifice, *L.*; Device, *Ital.*; Stratagem, *Gr.* 7. Honesty and Integrity, *L.* 8. Mild, Soft, Meek, *A.-S.*

3. The use of equivocal terms. Equivocal terms are words and phrases that admit of being understood in a sense different from that in which the writer applies them. They are found in every part of speech, and are the converse of synonyms, being words identical in form but differing in meaning.

The use of words having a plurality of meanings is unavoidable; language is finite, while the thoughts to be expressed are of illimitable variety. No language has a separate sign for every single notion; hence most words represent a cluster of related ideas; they are but hints which the writer must leave to the intelligence of his readers to interpret. He must enable them to do this with ease and certainty. It is a violation of accuracy to suggest a wrong meaning, or to leave it doubtful which one of the ideas denoted by the word is intended to be conveyed.

There are some words which with the same form signify totally different objects; as, for example, the word *rent*, which signifies a rent caused by tearing, and rent paid for houses and land. Such words are not properly equivocal.

Another class is composed of words which with identity of form denote different aspects, relations, and applications of the same notion. It is in this class that all the really important equivocal terms are found. Thus the same word, or rather the same combination of letters, may admit of being applied:

(1) In a wide and in a narrow sense; for example, *thought*, in its wider sense, denotes all mental acts; in its narrower, it is confined to the acts of the understanding.

(2) Literally and figuratively; as in the words, *walk*, *weigh*, *upright*, etc.

(3) Actively and passively; for example, *imagination* signifies both the act of imagining and the result of the act; so also perception, induction, deduction, inference, and many others of the same kind.

(4) Subjectively and objectively; for example, a *fearful* heart (subjective), a *fearful* height (objective); so also terms denoting both a sensation and its cause; as, for example, *heat*, *cold*, and others.

(5) Absolutely and relatively; for example, *oldest inmate*, *oldest scholar*, etc. Is it meant that he is the oldest inmate, *i. e.*, has been longest time in the establishment? or that he is the oldest person among the inmates or scholars? In the first sense it is used relatively; in the latter, absolutely.

There are many words that are so indefinite as to be a source of great confusion and error when admitted into philosophical discussions. Thus the word *nature* is employed in a wide sense, as equivalent to the sum of created things, and in a narrower sense, as equivalent to material objects; sometimes actively—"Nature relieves disease,"—sometimes passively; in a figurative and literal sense, etc. *Law* is another of these very indefinite words; it does not mean the same thing in the phrases, *law of nature*, *law of thought*, *moral law*. *Idea* is another instance: "Word and thing," says Sir Wm. Hamil-

ton, "*ideas* have been the *cruz philosophorum*, since Aristotle sent them packing, to the present day."

Congruity.—The terms chosen should not only express the ideas accurately, but should at the same time be appropriate to their nature and importance, and to the purpose of the discourse. This rule is violated in many ways; only some of the most general offenses against it need be mentioned here.

The first is the fault which has become prevalent of employing a phraseology alien from the common forms of speech. It has been already shown that words and phrases are tolerated in conversation which are not admissible into a composition. But in the effort to avoid a coarse and too colloquial style, many go to the opposite extreme of an equally offensive fine writing. A genuine popular style is free from both pedantry and coarseness. The most cultivated writers incline to the plain and familiar; they adapt the expression to the thought, and where choice is allowed select the common, idiomatic words.

What should be the proportion of Saxon and foreign words in a discourse can not be fixed by any rule. The diction of a correct writer will vary with the subject he discusses; when it is a question of science or criticism, the Latin element will preponderate; and native terms, when it is a familiar object or occurrence. The general rule is, that, other things being equal, Saxon words are to be preferred. It may be adopted as a safe principle in writing, "that every Latinism which can be displaced by a Saxonism is a defect avoided, if not a beauty gained."

The best writers of the present day recognize the importance of the native element of the language, and employ a larger proportion of Anglo-Saxon words than the writers of the last century. But with the greater number of writers the reverse is true. They make use of a latinized English, or an anglicized Latin phraseology, whatever the subject and occasion. It is characteristic of this style to eschew the familiar expressive terms of daily life, and to employ on the most trivial themes sounding, uncommon words. It is supposed that the use of

such terms gives greater dignity to style. On the contrary, it renders it formal and monotonous; destroys all force and grace, which are inseparable from naturalness; and frequently becomes ludicrous from the contrast between the feeble, commonplace thoughts and the labored, pompous expression.

Ex.—The following extract from a criticism in the London Times of one of Thackeray's works will exemplify the faults here condemned: "It has been customary of late years for the purveyors of amusing literature to put forth opuscles denominated Christmas books, with the ostensible intention of swelling the tide of exhilaration or other expansive emotions incident on the exodus of the old, or the inauguration of the new year."

This pretentious style, which Trench calls, "that worst and most offensive kind of bad English, which disguises poverty of thought, and lack of any real command over the language, by the use of big, hollow, lumbering Latin words," has been treated of very fully by Dean Alford in his *Plea for the Queen's English*, and by Richard Grant White in his work upon *Words and their Uses*. A few examples from these works are here given. A man is an "individual," or a "person," or a "party;" a woman is a "female," a name which might belong to any animal tribe: a child is a "juvenile," and children *en masse* are expressed by that most odious term, "the rising generation." A man going home is set down as "an individual proceeding to his residence." Instead of, most of the people of the place, we have, "the majority of the residents in the locality." Men nowadays "experience" a sensation; the weather "experiences" a change. It would be an unpardonable want of dignity to say: "When I came to the spot, I met a man running towards me with his hands held up." It must read, "When the very reverend gentleman arrived in close proximity to the scene of action, he encountered an individual proceeding at a rapid pace in the opposite direction, having both his hands elevated in an excited manner." *Alford, p. 245 et seq.*

The following sentence is found in the report of a committee of the legislature of New York on street railways: "It is not to be denied that, any system which demands the propulsion of cars at a rapid rate, at an elevation of fifteen or twenty feet, is not entirely consistent, in public estimation, with the greatest attainable immunity from the dangers of transportation." *Words and their Uses, p. 32.*

Another offense against congruity is exaggeration; that is, the use of language disproportionate to the importance of the ideas to be expressed. Such an inflated, overcharged style is characteristic of much of our popular prose. It is inconsistent

with truthfulness, as it gives a false view of the subject, or of the writer's feelings in reference to it. Though employed for the sake of emphasis its effect is the reverse; the endeavor to give importance to what is low and feeble by using strong language, only renders the feebleness more apparent. It destroys both the logical precision and the moral dignity of a language. The use of strong terms on ordinary subjects and occasions is a certain sign of poverty of thought and shallowness of feeling. Sobriety of judgment which sees things as they are and appreciates them at their real worth, and sincerity and earnestness of feeling, employ the language of moderation, such as expresses less than is felt rather than more.

48. Conclusion.—The rules which have been given relate to words used in their literal, proper sense. By observing them we present a clear and truthful statement of our thoughts to the understanding.

But when we aim at the highest possible degree of perspicuity and vivacity; when we would call into activity the reader's powers in reproducing the ideas; and when we would excite his feelings and passions and move his will, we must endeavor to bring the notions down from the abstract generality in which they are presented to the understanding in their appropriate signs, and exhibit them in sensible forms to the imagination.

The means of doing this are the Figures of Speech, which will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III.

FIGURES OF SPEECH.

49. Figures of Speech in general—Definition.—Figures of speech are deviations from the strictly grammatical and logical modes of expression, by means of which ideas and thoughts are conveyed with vividness and force.

Are natural and necessary.—The real nature of the relation of figures to thought is very generally misunderstood. The majority of rhetoricians treat of them as mere ornaments, which render a discourse more pleasing, and which may be used or rejected at pleasure. Some writers—as, for example, Locke—condemn their employment in works intended to convey knowledge and truth; they are pronounced inventions, which serve only to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and mislead the judgment.

But instead of being inventions of art, they are the natural, and therefore necessary and universal forms, in which excited imagination and passion manifest themselves. The young and the old, the barbarous and the civilized, all employ them unconsciously. Languages in their earlier state are highly figurative; as they grow older they lose their natural picturesqueness and become collections of lifeless symbols. These abstract forms are regarded by rhetoricians and grammarians as the natural and ordinary forms of speech, and so they describe figures as departures from the usual forms of expression.

They are, it is true, deviations from the forms in which cool, unimpassioned reflection expresses itself, but not from the ordinary forms of the expression of emotion and affection. Excited feeling manifests itself in the movements of the body: much more will it leave its impress on language. For a person under great excitement to express the thoughts that agitate him in the ordinary logical forms, would be as unnatural as for one whose mind is perfectly calm to employ the language of passion. Nor is it true that the use of figures obscures the thoughts. Abstract ideas are communicated to the illiterate much more clearly by figurative expressions than by their appropriate general terms.

Their classification.—A great deal of ingenuity has been expended in discriminating and classifying the figures of speech. Almost every violation of strict grammatical law has been made a figure, and received a name. In this process of

endless division and subdivision their real nature and significance have been lost sight of.

The numerous and complicated classifications of the older Rhetories need not be enumerated, as they are of but little practical value, and at the present day are very generally neglected. It will enable us to understand better the nature and use of the figures of speech to keep in view the twofold purpose which they accomplish. In the first place, they reproduce ideas with something of the fullness and vividness of objects of sense; in the second place, they give emphasis to the thoughts the truth and importance of which the writer wishes to impress on his hearers. Some figures are better adapted to the first, others to the second of these purposes. We may therefore divide them into two main classes or divisions:

1. Figures of Intuition.
2. Figures of Emphasis.

50. Figures of Intuition.—These figures present an idea or judgment in a sensible form to the imagination, either directly, by clothing abstract notions in a concrete image, by endowing inanimate objects with life and sense, and by bringing distant objects near and into living connection with us; or indirectly, by comparing them with familiar and striking objects.

They give a distinct, vivid image from which the understanding constructs the notion to be conveyed; at the same time they give emphasis to the notion.

They are Tropes, Personification, Figures of Ideal Presence, Similes, Allusions, and Epithets.

51. Tropes in general.—Tropes form that class of figures in which there is the substitution of one idea for another, with the transfer of the word denoting the one notion to the other. The word is thus no longer applied in its ordinary, established signification, but in a derivative one. There must always be some relation existing between the ideas that justifies the exchange. The use of tropes is only a particular manifestation of

the natural process by which the mind seeks to realize general notions; the individual is substituted for the general, the concrete for the abstract.

The points to be noticed in all tropes are:

- 1st. The original, main thought, or the proper, literal signification of the term.
- 2d. The substituted thought, or the derivative meaning of the term.
- 3d. The relation between the two, or the principle on which the transfer has been made.

The relations which serve as foundations for this figure are those of the whole and its parts, cause and effect, resemblance and analogy, and all relations that determine the association of thoughts. The tropes are, Synecdoche, Metonymy, and Metaphor, representing single notions, and Allegory, representing a judgment.

52. Synecdoche.—Synecdoche is a trope founded on the relation of the whole to its parts, and consists in the substitution of a part for the whole.

There are various forms of synecdoche, answering to the different kinds of wholes and parts.

1. A species is put for the genus, an individual for the species; as, bread for food; silver and gold for riches; "They shall beat their *swords* into *plowshares*, and their *spears* into *pruning-hooks*"—swords and spears are here used for all weapons of war, plowshares and pruning-hooks for the implements of the peaceful arts; a *Homer*, instead of an epic poet; a *Demosthenes*, instead of an orator. "Such an *Orbilius* mars more scholars than he makes"—Orbilius, instead of a harsh school-master.

Many of these tropes have become trite; as, a Solomon, for a wise man; a Judas, for a traitor. In introducing new ones care must be taken that their application be instantly recognized.

2. A quality or attribute of an individual object or person is put for the individual: "Thus spoke the *tempter*"; "the *phi-*

isosopher," for Aristotle. Although seemingly substituting the general for the particular, it really presents the individual with some prominent characteristic, and thus makes the notion more distinct.

3. The matter of an object is put for the form; *i. e.*, the material for the thing made: "The breathing *marble* and the glowing *canvases*"; so *steel* for sword, *lead* for bullet. The object is thus presented more vividly by suggesting some of its visible aspects.

4. A part of an integrate whole is given instead of the whole; as, fifty *sail* for fifty ships; the *waves* for the ocean; the *head* for the whole body.

5. A determinate number is put for an indeterminate, the singular for the plural, and, in general, a less for a greater; as, "*ten thousand* swords"; "*an* old man is venerable."

The effects of this trope are owing to its conveying what is abstract and general by means of particular and individual notions that can be pictured in the imagination; and to its presenting, in sensible objects, those prominent, characteristic parts which suggest most naturally and readily the entire object.

It is not, then, a matter of indifference what parts are chosen. That only should be chosen which is appropriate to the idea and purpose of the writer, and corresponds to what is said of the whole which it represents. "We desecrated a sail," is proper; but we can not say, "Our sails plowed the deep," as there is no connection between the sails and the act of plowing. "The enemy are in possession of the walls," conveys fully and appropriately their being masters of the city. We say *roof* for house, when the idea of shelter is the prominent one in the mind; as, "I adjure all roofs"; but *hearth* or *fireside* when the ideas of home intimacies and enjoyments are to be suggested.

The converse of synecdoche is the substitution of the general for the particular; as, the genus for the species, the whole for the part, the plural for the singular; for example, a *vessel* for a ship; the ignorance of *mortals*; *weapon* for sword, etc. Its

effect is the opposite of the synecdoche, as it renders the impression less vivid. It is one of the usual forms of euphemism.

53. Metonymy.—Metonymy is a trope founded upon the necessary relations of objects. It substitutes one notion for another that is closely connected with it. The principal of these relations are:

1. Cause and effect. The cause is put for the effect; as, the author for his work, the inventor for his invention, the ancestor for his descendants; for example, "I read *Milton*"; a *Davy*, for the safety-lamp; *Israel*, for the Jews. Here belongs the use of mythological names; as, *Bacchus*, for wine; *Ceres*, for bread, and the like. Other examples of this form of metonymy are: He shall bear his *iniquity*; your *sin* will find you out; he supports them by his *labor*; to bask in the *sun*.

The effect is put for the cause; as, *shade*, for trees; *drunkenness*, for wine; to send *death* into the ranks of the enemy. Physical effects are put for the actions or mental states causing them; as, *tears*, for sorrow; *sweat* of his brow, for labor. A passion or emotion is put for its exciting cause, or the object on which it terminates; as, the *terror* of the oppressed, *i. e.*, he who inspires terror. The instrument is put for the agent, the process, or the effect; as, to write a good *hand*; the *sword* without; the *pen* is mightier than the *sword*; "I will speak *daggers* to her, but use none."

2. Time and place. The time is put for what existed or happened in it; as, antiquity, the nineteenth century, a refined or barbarous age, instead of the people then living. The name of a place for what is contained, or produced, or took place in it; as, "the whole *theater* applauded"; "they devoured the *land*"; "he drank the fatal *cup*"; "to be fond of the *bottle*"; "*France* would not consent." *Calico*, *demijohn*, *china*, are metonymies of this class, which have lost their figurative meaning.

3. Possessor and thing possessed. The owner is put for his property, and *vice versa*; as, "to devour the *families* of the

widow," instead of their means of subsistence; the *land*, *house*, *farm*, pays tax or rent, instead of the owner.

4. Sign and thing signified. Instead of naming purely intellectual objects their visible symbols are named; as, the *laurel*, instead of victory; the *olive branch*, instead of peace; the *throne*, the *purple*, the *scepter*; the *cresecent* and the *cross*.

The force of this trope is owing to its employing expressions that present the notion in a more concrete, particular form, than the proper name of the object. It loses its force when abstract and general notions take the place of the less general and sensible; for example, the clouds drop *blessings*, for fruitful showers. A process of reasoning is required in such cases to gain the idea, and the attention is thus withdrawn from the thought.

Antonomasia.—This trope is of the same nature as metonymy, although it can not be said to exhibit the idea more vividly. It consists in putting in place of a proper name, another notion which may be either in apposition to it or predicated of it. Its principal use is to avoid the repetition of the same name, and the too frequent use of the pronoun. The most frequent forms of it are, naming a person from his parentage or country; as, Achilles is called *Pelides*: Napoleon Bonaparte, *the Corsican*: or naming him from some of his deeds; as, instead of Scipio, *the destroyer of Carthage*; instead of Wellington, *the hero of Waterloo*. In making use of this trope such designations should be selected as are well known, or can be easily understood from the connection, and free from ambiguity,—that is, are not equally applicable to other well known persons.

54. **Metaphor.**—The metaphor is a trope founded upon resemblance. It is the substitution of one notion for another in virtue of some resemblance or analogy between them. It is often called an abridged simile. It agrees with it in being founded upon resemblance, but differs from it in structure. In

the metaphor there is no explicit statement of comparison; one object takes the place of the other; in the simile we say that one object is like another; as, "Man is as the flower of the field": in the metaphor we say that one is the other; as, "All flesh is grass."

The resemblances upon which metaphors are founded are either direct or indirect. They are direct, when the objects are alike in certain common qualities or modes of action. It is enough to put one notion for the other; the resemblance is recognized at once; as when we say *table-land*, or to *fly*, instead of to move swiftly.

They are remote, when the similarity is not of qualities, but of relation. We say, "the *evening* of life," and all understand that old age is meant. There is not any direct resemblance between old age and evening, but the relation of the evening to the day is the same as the relation of old age to a man's life. We substitute the notion *life*, of the second term of the proportion, for *day* of the first part, and by so doing we change the signification of evening; it loses its proper ordinary meaning and acquires a secondary metaphorical one. The qualifying phrase, *of life*, shows that the word evening is to be taken figuratively, and also explains it: it shows that we are to understand by it the close of a human life. At the same time the use of the word evening imparts a new character to the notion life; it is no longer general and abstract, but is represented to the imagination as a single day with its parts morning, noon, evening, and followed by the night. The metaphor, "The ship plows the waves," is another example of remote resemblance. There is the transfer of the action of one object to a related one. There is no direct resemblance between a plow and a ship, but there is an analogy between their effects; what the action of the plow is to the ground, is the action of the ship on the waves.

The metaphors from analogy, or remote resemblance, are the most frequent and important; by many they are regarded as the only metaphors. Thus Bishop Copleston defines the metaphor as "a contracted comparison in which two terms of the

analogy are omitted, and no mention is made of the similitude."

Divided into three kinds.—Metaphors are divided with respect to the objects between which the exchange is made into three classes.

1. Those in which the qualities and acts of our intellectual and moral nature are represented by external, material objects; as, when we speak of *weighing* a matter, *halting* between two opinions. So, also, the *light* of knowledge, the *darkness* of superstition, a *ray* of hope, etc. The terms used to denote the acts of the mind are applied primarily to external objects; as, spirit, reflection, attention, acuteness, sagacity, etc.

Ex.—"Philosophy, justly curious to observe the structure of our faculties, and the nature of those wondrous operations by which man alone, of all creatures, has acquired a history, endeavors to untwine the finished web of thought, and lay out the variegated filaments,—the warp of constant nature and the woof of flying experience,—from which the texture seems to have been composed." "Outbursts of song and pulses of prayer are as successive strokes of the ever beating wing of aspiration."

2. Those in which physical properties are represented by intellectual and moral. As the former materializes the spiritual, this spiritualizes matter; gives life to what is inanimate, thought and feeling to the senseless; as, the sun *rejoices*, the morning *laughs*, *imperious* ocean, *angry* flood. This metaphor is the simplest form of personification.

3. Those in which both the objects belong to the same sphere—both are material, or both spiritual; as, when the body is called the "soul's dark cottage"; the sun, "fair Nature's eye."

Its force.—The metaphor is one of the most frequent and one of the boldest of the figures of speech. Its effect is not merely to render discourse intelligible, but to impart to it the greatest possible degree of vivacity. It accomplishes this end by giving the idea with greatest brevity—calling up by a word

what would require otherwise a whole sentence to communicate; by exhibiting the acts and qualities of living objects by means of other objects, which set them forth in livelier colors; and by presenting abstract notions, and ideas of a purely intellectual order in images that address the senses. It thus economizes the attention, calls the imagination into activity, and employs the understanding in tracing the resemblance, solving the apparent contradiction which it involves, and reproducing from the image the precise thought.

Rules for its use.—The improper employment of metaphors is one of the most frequent faults of style. The laws for their use and formation must be borne in mind. As metaphors are the natural expression of excited imagination and feeling, they must be judged by the laws of these powers. A cold, logical analysis would condemn some of the most noble and forcible.

1. There must be a real resemblance between the two objects, and this resemblance must not be too close, nor in an accidental and insignificant quality.

Where the objects are nearly related, and the points of similarity are numerous and apparent, nothing is gained by comparing them; there must be resemblance in the midst of differences to give employment either to the imagination or the understanding. To substitute one member of a class for another of the same—as one man, or one flower, for another—seldom adds to the vivacity of the representation, while the interchange of objects of different species exhibits the thought in a stronger light.

But while metaphors should be drawn from objects that differ in the main, they must not be founded on superficial qualities and relations. Their force depends on the intimacy of the relation between the notions compared. It is not meant that there must be a real analogy in essential points such as the understanding demands in the process of reasoning, but such a similarity as will enable the imagination naturally and easily to identify the two objects. Where this is not the case the slightness of the resemblance is only made more apparent

by the attempt to combine them; and the metaphor is called forced, trivial, far-fetched; it may excite surprise, and can be used with effect in comic productions, but is unfit for serious discourse.

Many metaphors, in which natural objects are represented by images drawn from artificial productions, are violations of this rule; as when the heavens are spoken of as, "this gorgeous apparatus." The following from Addison, though pronounced by some beautiful and expressive, is exceptionable. Speaking of Milton's art, in the description of the descent of the band of angels into Paradise, after the Fall, he employs this metaphor: "The whole theater of nature is darkened that this glorious *machine* may appear in all its luster and magnificence."

Some metaphors violating this rule please by their ingenuity, and are admissible in sprightly works addressing the fancy, although out of place in the more elevated productions of the imagination and of serious prose; as when the dew is described as, "The tears of the day for the loss of the sun."

2. The metaphors must be true. They must not contradict what we know of the objects and events from which they are drawn; as when one speaks of the "strings of an instrument touched by a tone"; or of "gathering the honey of earthly wisdom not from flowers, but from thorns."

3. A metaphor must have simplicity. This is opposed to abstruseness and want of intelligibility. The point of resemblance must be obvious—one that the persons addressed will perceive at once. A metaphor that can not be understood, or is understood only with difficulty, obscures the idea instead of illustrating it. Learned and technical metaphors are in most cases violations of this rule. Where there is danger of obscurity a writer may often prevent it by beginning with a simile and passing to the metaphor, or by inserting it as a parenthesis; sometimes a qualifying word removes the difficulty. Frequently he introduces a somewhat bold metaphor by an acknowledgment of its audacity or an apology for it; at other times he adds an explanation that serves to render it both clear and forcible. These bold metaphors are frequently em-

ployed, even in didactic discourse, to bring into prominence some important idea; the necessity of explaining the metaphor fixes the attention upon the idea, and impresses it upon the mind.

Ex.—"The subsequent movement of the English speech has not been in a right line of recession from the scriptural dialect. It has been rather a curve of revolution around it. Were it not carrying the metaphor too far, I would say it is an elliptical curve, and that the speech of England has now been brought by it much nearer to that great solar center, the focus of genial warmth and cheerful light, than it was a century ago."

4. A metaphor must have unity. It must offer a distinct, consistent image to the imagination. The qualities and acts ascribed to the representative notion must be such as properly belong to it. The terms employed must be understood in their literal sense with respect to the representative object, and in their secondary, or figurative, sense with respect to the object represented.

Unity is violated:

(1) By combining the literal and the metaphorical. The metaphor must be altogether figurative; the attributes and predicates introduced must not be understood partly in their literal and partly in their figurative sense. Where the true and false are thus mingled no distinct image is offered, and the mind is confused in attempting to reduce the parts to unity.

Ex.—"My heart is turned to stone; I strike it and it hurts my hand." In the first clause "stone" is used figuratively; in the second, it is taken literally. "Be Mowbray's sins so heavy in his bosom, that they may break his foaming courser's neck." Here "heavy" is first used in a figurative, then in a literal sense. In both examples the rule is violated which requires, that the terms employed be understood in their figurative sense with respect to the object represented.

(2) By blending different and incompatible images. Not only must all the parts be figurative, but all must be parts of the same figure. The writer must end with the same metaphor with which he began—not begin with a storm and end

or "the battle of life," etc. In this we have a metaphor. But when it is said, "Unity gives strength," or "Dissension brings weakness," a general truth is asserted. This truth may be conveyed figuratively, as in the story of the old man and the bundle of sticks; we have then an allegory. The essential difference between the allegory and the other tropes is, not that the former is extended while the latter are brief—the allegory may be short, as in many proverbs—but that the one is the figurative expression of a thought or general truth, the other of notions or general ideas.

An allegory, then, is a continuous narration or description intelligible when taken literally, which is intended to inculcate a truth different from what is contained in the literal statement, but bearing some relation to it. It is like a hieroglyphic—one thing is said, another thing is meant. We are called upon to interpret it, and to collect from what appears that which the writer wishes us to understand. If we do not go beyond the literal statement, we know nothing of what is meant.

The laws for the structure and use of tropes in general apply to allegories.

1. They must be perspicuous. "The allegory must dwell in a transparent palace." The relation of its two parts—the image, or proper literal sense, and that which is intended to be declared, the secondary, allegorical sense—must be such that the meaning can be immediately seized.

2. The various details of the image must have their counterpart in the fact which is to be set forth. This rule, however, must not be enforced too rigidly. Minor details are admitted for ornament, which are not to be considered as parts of the allegory.

3. The literal and figurative must not be mingled or confused. It must be in itself an intelligible, consistent statement. All the terms employed should be literally applicable to the image or representative subject; no conditions or acts should be ascribed to it that are not in accordance with its real nature.

Parable.—The parable is one form of the allegory. It is properly the exhibition of a religious truth by means of facts from nature and human life. It is not pretended, however, that the statements are historically true; they are offered only as a means of conveying a higher general truth. But they are always true to nature; the laws of the nature of the different beings introduced are strictly observed, and the events are such as might have taken place.

Fable.—The fable differs from the parable in this, that it attributes the actions and words of rational beings to what is inanimate and irrational. They are purely fictitious—brutes and plants are made to think, and speak, and act like men. The laws of the nature of the actors in the fable are thus violated, and what is ascribed to them could not take place.

Allegory, parable, and fable are also distinct species of composition, the nature and laws of which are treated of in the Theory of Poetry.

Ex.—The student may consult the following passages: Isa. v: 1-7; Ps. lxxx: 8-16; the parable of Nathan, 2 Sam. xii: 1-4; and the parables of the Savior; the fable of Jotham, Judges ix: 7-15.

56. Personification.—Personification consists in representing inanimate objects and abstract notions as living, and ascribing to them the actions of persons. The tropes give to notions a visible form; this endows them with life, intelligence, and activity. The other figures tend to this, and blend with it, so that it is often an essential part of them.

It is founded on the natural tendency of the mind when agitated by passion, to transfer to outward objects the mental and moral qualities of which it is conscious. Its force and beauty arise from its exhibiting lifeless things in a human form, and as possessing human sensibility and affection.

The qualities and acts of inanimate things are sometimes described by attributes belonging to living and intelligent beings; as when it is said, "a *furiosus* dart," "a *raging* tempest," "a *frowning* mountain." In such expressions we have

the germ of personification, but it is more convenient to class them with the tropes, and confine personification to those forms in which inanimate objects, physical phenomena, and mental processes and qualities are represented as performing the actions of living persons. Thus, inanimate objects are exhibited as addressing us, or as addressed by us, or as acting like intelligent beings; abstract qualities, as hope, fear, death, religion, slander, etc., are represented with the form and qualities of persons.

Ex.—“O eloquent, just, and mighty Death! whom none could advise, thou hast persuaded; what none hath dared, thou hast done; and whom all the world hath flattered, thou only hast cast out of the world and despised; thou hast drawn together all the far-stretched greatness, all the pride, cruelty, and ambition of man, and covered it all over with these two narrow words, *hic jacet*.” *Raleigh*.

Cautions with respect to using it.—1. As the use of this figure is prompted by the instinctive craving of our nature for sympathy, no objects should be personified that are not of sufficient dignity and importance to awaken such feelings; not only low, trivial objects, but as a general rule artificial productions can not be personified with a good effect.

2. As each one is intended to gratify a particular passion, it should be confined to it, and whatever is contrary or foreign to it should be excluded.

3. There should be a perfect consistency of the parts; the qualities ascribed should all be such as belong to intelligent beings, and should harmonize in one character.

4. The higher forms of personification can be admitted only into the most animated prose; they are employed much more freely in poetry. The personification of abstract qualities is frequent even in didactic prose.

Personification
57. **Ideal Presence.**—This includes several figures which represent objects distant in space or time as present.

1. The present tense used for a past or future.—The low-

est form is that in which past or future events are narrated in the present tense, thus making the reader a spectator. This mode of narrating is especially adapted to discourses that address the passions, but it is also admissible in familiar discourse. Its use is limited by the following conditions:

(1) It should be justified by the subject and the writer's feelings. It produces an unpleasant effect when the subject does not call for such a degree of vivacity, or when there is a want of lively interest on the part of the writer.

(2) It should not be too frequently employed nor too prolonged. It becomes wearisome when excessive.

Ex.—“The circumstances now clearly in evidence spread out the whole scene before us. Deep sleep had fallen on the destined victim, and on all beneath his roof. A healthful old man, to whom sleep was sweet,—the first sound slumbers of the night held him in their strong embrace. The assassin *enters*, through the window already prepared, into an unoccupied apartment. With noiseless foot he *paces* the lonely hall . . . he *winds* up the ascent of the stairs, and *reaches* the door of the chamber. Of this he *moves* the lock, by soft, continued pressure, till it *turns* on its hinges without noise, and he *enters* and *beholds* his victim before him. . . . The deed is done. He *retreats*, *retraces* his steps to the window, *passes* out through it as he came in, and *escapes*.” *Webster*.

2. **Vision.**—Another figure of this class is vision. In this the writer declares himself an eye-witness of some event, and depicts it as taking place in his presence. It is the expression of powerful emotion, and should be used but seldom and with greatest caution.

Ex.—From a speech against impressing seamen. “Would the learned gentleman not let one father, one brother, or one child escape in this general scene of oppression and injustice? Methinks I hear the heartfelt shrieks of the miserable wife this instant piercing my ears, and entreating, in accents of rage and despair, the midnight ruffian not to drag from her side the father of her children and her only support! I think I hear the aged, helpless parent, in accents of sinking woe, misery, and distress, bewailing the loss of his dutiful, affectionate son!”

“Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks; methinks I see her, as an eagle, mewing her mighty youth, and kindling

her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and scaling her long abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms." *Milton.*

3. Apostrophe.—Another figure of this class is apostrophe, which consists in addressing the absent as though they were present. It brings those who are distant in time or place into our immediate presence, and represents them as listening to us. The figure receives additional force when the address takes the form of questions.

We may thus address living persons who are absent, the dead, former ages, future ages, and invisible beings.

Ex.—"But, alas, you are not all here. Time and the sword have thinned your ranks. Prescott, Putnam, Stark, Brooks, Read, Pomeroy, Bridge! our eyes seek for you in vain amid this broken band. You are gathered to your fathers, and live only to your country in her grateful remembrance and your own bright example." *Webster.*

"Yes, noble Galileo, thou art right, 'It does move.' Bigots may make thee recant it, but it moves, nevertheless. . . . Close now, venerable sage, that sightless, tearful eye; it has seen what man never before saw; it has seen enough. Hang up that poor little spy-glass; it has done its work. . . . Rest in peace, great Columbus of the heavens,—like him scorned, persecuted, broken-hearted." *Everett.*

4. Sermocination.—Still another of the same class is sermocination. In this figure absent, invisible, or supernatural beings are represented as addressing us. It may be combined with apostrophe; the discourse then takes the form of animated dialogue.

Ex.—"Ask the very soul of Peter, and it shall undoubtedly make you itself this answer: 'My eager protestations made in the glory of my ghostly strength, I am ashamed of; but those crystal tears wherewith my sin and weakness was bewailed have procured my endless joy; my strength hath been my ruin, and my fall my stay.'" *Hooker.*

"Suppose that God should address you in these words: 'O man, I would to-day take away this heart and give you another; you have only the power of man, I will give you that of God.'" *Hooker.*

58. Simile.—A simile is the explicit statement of the resemblance between two objects or notions belonging to different classes.

Like the metaphor, it renders a notion clearer and more vivid by comparing it with another that is better known, and can be more easily pictured in the imagination; it differs from it in that it does not identify the two notions, but asserts explicitly their similarity.

Strictly speaking, a simile is composed of two members, one containing the notion to be illustrated, the other the illustrative notion; ordinarily the illustrative member—introduced by *like*, *as*,—is regarded as the simile. The order of the arrangement of the members is not invariable; whether the illustrative shall precede or follow that which contains the notion to be illustrated, is determined by rhetorical considerations. There may be also a difference in the prominence given to the different members. The main notion may be expanded and its likeness to the illustrative notion be but briefly indicated, or the reverse. In the older Rhetorics the former was called comparison, and the latter simile.

The objects compared must belong to different classes. This constitutes the difference between a simile and an example. A comparison between two individuals of the same species, or between two species of the same genus, is not a simile. The objects must be dissimilar in their general nature, but have certain qualities in common which can be perceived immediately, or sustain similar relations. We have therefore two classes of similes—those of direct resemblance and those of analogy. The objects may be both from the same sphere—both material or both spiritual,—or from different spheres—one spiritual, the other material.

Ex.—"The sun was now resting his huge disc upon the edge of the level ocean, and gilded the accumulation of towering clouds through which he had traveled the livelong day, and which now assembled on all sides, like misfortunes and disasters around a sinking empire and falling monarch." *W. Scott.*

"As used in this rude state, language resembles the harsh music of the

Alpine horn, blown by the rude Swiss herd-boy. It is only when the lofty peaks around take it up that it is transmuted by their echoes into exquisite melody." *Rogers.*

"His melancholy genius plays in wild and rapid flashes, like lightning round the scathed oak, about the fallen greatness of man." *Hallam.*

Different orders of Similes.—The use of similes involves some degree of activity of the imagination, but no powerful disturbing passion. They are natural only in a state of mind that permits a deliberate comparison of objects. They serve chiefly to explain, elevate, and adorn. A perfect simile exhibits the object in a clearer light, in new and pleasing aspects, and awakens the appropriate emotions.

The lowest class of similes is composed of the purely didactic, whose main purpose is to render obscure notions distinct. It is sometimes difficult to discriminate them from logical illustrations. The rules to be observed with respect to this class are:

1. The object with which the illustrated notion is compared must be a familiar one. The less known must be compared with what is better known.
2. The point of similarity should be discovered without any effort of attention.
3. No circumstances should be admitted which are not absolutely necessary to convey the notion clearly and fully.

In this class of similes dignity and elevation are not sought after; if the analogy is just and the object be explained, nothing further is demanded; the more homely similes are often chosen as the more effective.

But there are similes of a higher class, which, besides giving a more distinct representation of an object, confer additional pleasure by the novelty of the comparison, and by associating the object with elevated and agreeable subjects.

Ex.—"The style of Canning is like the convex mirror, which scatters every ray of light which falls upon it, and shines and sparkles in whatever position it is viewed; that of Brougham is like the concave speculum, scattering no indiscriminate radiance, but having its light concentrated into one intense, tremendous focus."

"The ideas, as well as the children, of our youth often die before us; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching, where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery molds away." *Locke.*

"As iron girders and pillars expand and contract with the mere variations of temperature, so will the strongest conviction on which the human intellect rests its judgment vary with the changes of the human heart, and the building is safe only when these variations are foreseen and allowed for by a wisdom intent on self-knowledge." *Bulwer.*

It is essential to the perfection of such similes that they be not too greatly extended nor fanciful. The poet is allowed to expand his similes and to incorporate details which, while not necessary to illustrate a notion, embellish it and call up agreeable associations; but this is forbidden a prose writer. When the resemblance is not apparent, or is arbitrary and fanciful, similes, instead of rendering a notion clearer, obscure it. Such similes belong rather to the fancy than to the understanding and imagination; they surprise and dazzle, but accomplish none of the ends of prose.

Ex.—The following, though not strictly fanciful, have an air of subtlety and ingenuity which makes their use of doubtful propriety:

"Our planet, thus instinct with devout life, girded with intent and perceptive souls, covered over as with a *divine retina* by the purer conscience of humanity, is *like a living eye*, watching on every side the immensity of Deity in which it floats."

"The mighty-spirits of our race are as the lyric thoughts of God that drop and breathe from his almighty solitude."

59. Allusions.—Allusions may be considered a species of comparison. They give greater clearness and vividness to a notion by indicating its connection with some well known object or event. The connection is not exhibited in full, but merely pointed out; it is left to the reader to complete the image. In order to accomplish their object they must be made to familiar objects; when an explanation is required they are faulty. Unmeaning allusions, which stand in no relation to the thought, must be avoided.

The principal sources of allusions are, history, the sacred

scripture, classical and standard authors. Passing events and the ephemeral productions of the day may also afford them.

Ex.—“Genial, almost to a miracle, is the soil of sorrow; wherein the smallest seed of love, timely falling, becometh a tree, in whose foliage the birds of blessed song lodge and sing unceasingly.”

“The inundation of lawless power, after covering the rest of Europe, threatens England; and we are exactly, most critically, placed in the only aperture where it can be successfully repelled, in the Thermopylae of the universe.”

60. Epithets.—Epithets deserve special mention as a means towards vivacity. Adjectives are joined to substantives, to limit them and thus form particular notions out of general ones; as when we say, “a white rose,” “a gold ring;” when thus used they are indispensable to the completeness of the notion, and can not be omitted without destroying it. But adjectives are also used, not to add any thing to the sense, but to signify a quality of the object to which it is desired to direct attention; as, resistless lightning, heartless pride. When thus used they are called Epithets.

By the judicious employment of epithets we may bring distinctly to view, with the greatest brevity, an object with its characteristic features. Their abuse is a common fault of untrained and of inferior writers. They are used improperly:—

1. When they are not apposite. As they belong to the language of the emotions, they can not be applied to ideas that have no significance or value for the imagination and feelings. What is trite and tame can not receive force and dignity by being presented with an array of qualifying words; the feebleness of the thought is thereby made the more apparent, and the style is tawdry and frigid.

2. When they are unmeaning. Epithets are unmeaning when they do not give greater fullness or vividness to the thought. They should condense a judgment, an argument, or an image. Faulty in this respect are such as signify a quality already sufficiently indicated by the noun itself; as, frozen ice, white snow, and the like. In the early periods of literature

such epithets were not offensive, but at present they are objectionable in poetry and unendurable in prose.

Another class of unmeaning epithets are such as suggest no distinct quality, but are altogether indefinite, and are applied indiscriminately to the most heterogeneous objects. As instances of this class, may be mentioned the words, fair, sweet, goodly.

Stereotyped epithets, such as have become hackneyed by long use, belong to this class. They no longer recall an image, and nothing is gained by their use. They indicate that the writer has no vivid impression of the object, and has not observed it for himself; but is narrating or describing by rote.

3. When they are too frequent. The redundant employment of epithets is a great and offensive fault. It springs from indolence, a want of clear and distinct thought, or of a proper appreciation of the relative importance of the several notions, and is the cause of a frigid, effeminate style. We disgust our readers by forcing upon their attention whatever we deem remarkable; if we wish to keep their attention, we must leave a great deal to the activity of their minds. By attempting to give equal prominence to every idea, we depress all; in composition, as in painting, we must attend to the distribution of light and shade.

Adverbs are also used as epithets to qualify verbs and adjectives; their use is subject to the rules given above.

An epithet may be either a single adjective or adverb, or a compound; as, a way-side violet, heart-hardening gold, stiff-necked pride. Some of these compound epithets are among the most beautiful in the language; they are, however, more appropriate to poetry.

Epithets may signify either natural and distinctive qualities of an object or such as are attributed to it figuratively. The principal sources are given in the following epitome taken from Jernyn's Book of English Epithets:

Epithets are either literal or figurative.

I. Literal—expressive of any quality eminently characteristic of a subject. They are either positive or negative.

passionate feeling, it should not occur too frequently, and should be brief.

Ex.—“Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!” “How is the gold become dim! how is the most fine gold changed!” “Oh what a revolution! and what a heart must I have to contemplate without emotion that elevation and that fall!”

63. Hyperbole.—Hyperbole consists in magnifying an object beyond the bounds of what is actual or even possible. It is the natural expression of strong passion and emotion, and occurs more frequently in poetry than in prose.

The rules for its use in serious prose are:

1. The objects must be great and unusual, capable of producing extraordinary effects. Its use with common, trivial objects is unnatural. It betrays feebleness to be greatly excited by common, insignificant objects and events.

2. It should be brief and be used sparingly. The long continuance and frequent repetition of such violent effects are exhausting.

3. It should not be introduced unless the imagination and feelings of the readers are prepared to admit it.

4. It should be new: the stereotyped exaggerations of ordinary conversation impart neither surprise nor pleasure.

The hyperbole resembles the synecdoche, as it frequently gives, instead of the particular idea to be presented, a higher notion of the same class. The form of synecdoche which consists in giving an abstract quality of an object for the object itself, has the force of a hyperbole; as, “He is goodness itself,” “The hope of the family.”

Hyperboles are of more frequent occurrence when a comic effect is intended; as, “The English gain two hours a day by clipping words.”

The converse of the hyperbole is called *Litotēs*, which gives emphasis to a notion by employing terms that convey less than the truth; as, “Show thyself a *man*” (exhibit the noblest qualities of manhood). A common form of this figure is the denial of the opposite notion instead of a direct assertion.

Ex.—“And thou, Bethlehem in the land of Juda, art not the least among the princes of Juda” (one of the greatest). “An enemy not to be despised” (to be feared). “A work he need not be ashamed of” (proud of).

Irony.—Irony is a figure in which the literal import of the words is the contrary of what is meant to be expressed. The writer seems to praise what is base and foolish, and in doing so sets forth the contrast between the real character of the object and what is said of it. When skillfully employed it has great force, and has the additional advantage of not affording any handle to an opponent. It has the disadvantage of being very liable to be misunderstood: in oral discourse the meaning may be suggested by the manner of speaking; in written discourse, in which this aid is wanting, great care is requisite to make it apparent that the opposite of what is said is intended. Another disadvantage is, that it is personal, and exhibits those against whom it is directed in a ridiculous light. As it thus serves chiefly to expose and humiliate, it must be used with great moderation and discretion; when it fails of its purpose, it almost invariably creates a prejudice against the one who employs it.

64. Climax.—Climax is the arrangement of the several notions or thoughts of a sentence in a graduated series, according to their relative importance. Each member of the series makes a stronger impression than the member immediately preceding it. By this means the attention is excited, and the main thought is exhibited in the clearest light. That the climax may accomplish its purpose, the gradation of thought must be real and easily recognized, and the progress from the lower to the higher must be continuous. When it becomes artificial, its effectiveness is destroyed.

The inversion of this order is called *Anticlimax*; it is allowable in comic writings, but is a fault in serious discourse.

Ex.—“It is an outrage to bind a Roman citizen; to scourge him is an atrocious crime; to put him to death is almost parricide; but to crucify him—what shall I call it?”

65. Antithesis.—As in climax the importance of a thought is exhibited by connecting it with its inferiors, so in antithesis a notion is illustrated by being brought into comparison with its opposite. Opposites when brought together reflect light upon each other. The notion is determined more precisely; the particular characteristics or marks to which the attention is directed are brought out more vividly. When the opposition of thought is made apparent by the structure of the sentence, it is called Antithesis.

It is a brilliant and dangerous figure. There must always be a real opposition of thought; merely verbal antithesis, in which there is an opposition in language without any in thought, is always offensive. It is not suited to the expression of strong passion, and is better fitted for lighter kinds of composition. It may, however, be employed occasionally with effect in the higher forms of prose. The frequent recurrence of it gives to a discourse the appearance of artifice and affectation.

Ex.—“Like the sun, it (the understanding) had both light and agility; it knew no rest, but in motion; no quiet, but in activity. It did not so properly apprehend, as irradiate the object; not so much find, as make things intelligible.” *South.*

“When an author is yet living, we estimate his powers by his worst performance; and when he is dead, we rate them by his best.”

“My strength hath been my ruin, and my fall my stay.”

“Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it.”

“Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive even in servitude itself the spirit of an exalted freedom.”

CHAPTER IV.

THE SENTENCE.

66. In the preceding chapters, words have been considered simply as the signs of separate notions; we have now to consider them as combined to form sentences.

Sentence defined.—A sentence is a combination of words expressing a single, complete thought. To constitute a sentence there are required (1) two notions—the one, that which is determined and qualified, called the Subject—the other, that which determines and qualifies, called the Predicate; and (2) the Copula, which affirms or denies the relation between the subject and predicate.

Division of Sentences.—Sentences are divided according to various principles. The classes to which reference is most frequently made in rhetoric and criticism are the following:

1. *Intellective and Volitive.*—Intellective sentences include propositions, which enunciate a judgment either categorically or conditionally, and interrogative sentences, which are the expressions of ignorance or doubt. Volitive sentences include such as express an emotion with its exciting cause, desire and aversion with their objects, or an act of the will.

2. *Simple and Compound.*—A simple sentence is the explicit assertion of a single main thought without any coördinate or subordinate sentences. It contains but a single subject and predicate, both of which may be expanded by the addition of qualifying words. A compound sentence consists of two or more simple sentences so combined as to express a single judgment. It is of two forms; there may be one principal sentence with other sentences subordinate to it, or the sentences may be coördinate.

3. *Loose Sentence and Period.*—In a loose sentence the parts are so connected that the construction will yield a com-

plete sense at some point before the close. Thus, in the following example, there are several points where the reader may pause and have a complete thought:

"The only light of every truth is its corresponding error; | and, therefore, in the contemplation and exhibition of truth, a philosopher should take especial care not to keep himself too loftily aloof from the contemplation and exhibition of error, | as these proud spirits, Plato, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Hegel most undoubtedly did, | much to the detriment of their own profound disquisitions, | and to the loss of mankind, | who, had their method been different, might have profited more largely by their wisdom."

The parts of a loose sentence are not entirely independent of each other; if they were, we should have a series of distinct sentences. From the example it will be seen that while the words preceding a stop form a sentence grammatically perfect, those that follow do not, but depend on what goes before.

A period is a complex sentence the members of which are so reciprocally dependent that no one of them by itself gives a complete sense; they remain suspended in the mind until the whole is finished, when the meaning is flashed back from the conclusion to the commencement.

Ex.—"As for Jonson, to whose character I am now arrived, if we look upon him while he was himself (for his last plays were but his dotages), I think him the most learned and judicious writer which any theater ever had."

"If grammar is learned by speaking and writing; if a man can not become an orator without repeated efforts to speak in public, nor a poet without practicing the mechanism of verse till he can use it with ease, it seems absurd to expect that a course of lectures heard, with a string of definitions learned, will make a logician."

67. Characteristics of the English Sentence.—Every language has its peculiar laws and forms for the collocation of words; the sum of these syntactical forms and usages constitutes what is called the idiom of the language.

The peculiarities of the sentence grow out of the general character of the language. The most important division of languages, so far as rhetoric is concerned, is into inflected and

uninflected. In inflected languages the relations of the words to each other in the sentence are indicated by modifications of their form—by terminal syllables, which once had a significance, but have lost it, and serve merely to denote the relations of number, case, person, mode, tense, etc. Uninflected languages are not provided with a complete set of inflections, and the relations of words in the sentence are indicated by their position and by means of particles.

The ancient languages were inflected. The tendency of the modern is to discard more and more the inflections they still retain. From the circumstances of its history, this tendency has been carried further in the English than in any other European language. The Anglo-Saxon had a tolerably complete system of inflections, but the revolutions through which our tongue has passed have deprived it of most of them. As consequences of this loss we find that our language has a large body of particles, which are indispensable to the construction of sentences of any length; that there is a prescribed order of arranging words in a sentence; and that this order is what is called the grammatical,—the nominative precedes the verb, the article and adjective precede the nominative, the objective follows the verb.

As some of the peculiarities of the English sentence, may be mentioned:

1. In order to understand a sentence, we are compelled to look not to the form of the words but to their meaning. The relation of the words is determined by the relation of the thoughts. The logical analysis of the sentence thus precedes the grammatical. While in the classical languages the attention is directed mainly to the terminal syllables in order to discover the relation of the words, in English it is directed to discovering the ideas which they signify. It is on this account that, as Marsh thinks, "the construction and comprehension of an English sentence demand and suppose the exercise of higher mental powers than are required for the framing or understanding of a proposition in Latin."

2. There is a greater liability in long sentences to equivoca-

tion. It is difficult to frame a long sentence in English which is not at least grammatically ambiguous.

3. The relations which are expressed in the inflected languages by the form of the words, are expressed in English by particles, which are syllables with no meaning of their own. They increase the number of words necessary to convey thought, and often encumber the sentence and destroy its force and harmony. We are also often compelled to resort to awkward compound expressions.

4. Inversion is admissible only to a limited extent, and there is consequently often a want of harmony between the order of the words and the natural order of thought. We are often not able to give to the emphatic word the emphatic place.

5. The periodic structure is not adapted to the language, owing to the absence of the aids to attention given by inflectional endings, and to the limited extent to which inversions and transpositions are possible.

6. There is a greater liability to a uniform, monotonous structure.

7. The language presents fewer difficulties; the range of errors in syntax is a contracted one. But this less liability to error leads to carelessness: among English writers, more than among those of any other modern nation, there prevails gross negligence of the laws of syntax. The peculiarity of the English sentence already mentioned, that the attention is fixed chiefly upon the ideas and the words representing them, seems to confirm the tendency to disregard the few syntactical laws which our language yet retains.

68. The Structure of Sentences.—The mental processes involved in combining notions into thoughts expressed in sentences, are identical in nature with those employed in building up thoughts into paragraphs and connected discourses. In the construction of sentences, then, the general laws of thought and style appear in their most elementary form.

Essential to a perfect sentence are, Correctness, Energy, Melody.

THE SENTENCE

69. Correctness.—The most elementary rule for the structure of sentences is that the collocation of words shall conform to the laws of syntax. Grammatical correctness is the necessary condition of the other graces of expression, and although in itself not a great virtue, the want of it is a great fault.

Violations of grammatical propriety are frequent even among the best English writers. The simplicity of the structure of the language is one occasion of this; a writer can make himself understood with but little labor, and at the same time the fewness of forms tends to produce carelessness in using them.

The enumeration and classification of the violations of correctness are given in the grammars under the head of syntax. Only a few of the most frequent need be mentioned, to call attention to the points in which writers are most liable to error.

1. Many mistakes occur in the use of pronouns. Especial caution is needed in employing the pronoun *it*. "Never," says Cobbett, "put an *it* upon paper without thinking well what you are about. When I see many *its* in a page, I always tremble for the writer." The relative pronouns are also very often used improperly.

Ex.—"Let me see, who do I know among them." "Precision imports pruning the expression so as to exhibit neither more nor less than an exact copy of his idea, who uses it." "It is *me*." "Robert is there, the very outcome of him, and indeed of many generations of such as him." "He and at the same time combating the revolution with its own weapons, which it labored." "He met it with its own forces; but he rested their efforts on a nobler principle."

2. Mistakes in the use of verbs are of various kinds, as in the indiscriminate use of singulars and plurals, confounding preterites with past participles, employing the strong conjugation for the weak, or the weak for the strong, the omission of a part of a compound tense, the use of the wrong auxiliary, etc.

Ex.—"The poetry and eloquence of the Augustan age was assiduously cultivated in Mercian and Northumbrian monasteries." "It was one of

the most important *alliances* that ever *was* formed." "The use of fraud and perfidy, of cruelty and injustice, *were* often subservient to the propagation of the faith."

"At present trade is thought to be in a depressed state if less than a million of tons *are* produced in a year."

"He bowls along with ease in a vehicle which a few centuries ago *would have been* broken to pieces in a deep rut, or *come* to grief in a bottomless swamp."

"I shall do all I can to persuade others to *take* the same measures for their cure which I *have*."

3. Other inaccuracies are found in the use of the degrees of comparison; as, "That style of warfare is, *of all others*, the most barbarous";—in the use of *than*; as, "To reconstruct such a work in another language were business for a man of *different* powers *than* has yet attempted German translation among us."

REMARK.—The student will find a more complete enumeration of prevalent offenses against correctness in Breen's Modern English Literature, from which most of the examples given above have been taken.

The law of correctness must not be pressed so far as to exclude forms of expression which, though sanctioned by usage, are deviations from the syntax of the language. These departures from strict grammatical law abound in every language, and are called *Idiotisms*. Frequently, also, we find a thought expressed in a condensed, energetic form that will not stand the test of grammatical analysis; as, "Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook it shines." To reduce such expressions to grammatical correctness would destroy their force.

70. *Unity*.—A sentence has unity when it is the expression of one leading thought, and all the particulars contained in it are exhibited in their relation to this main thought and to each other.

This is an essential quality of a sentence. However long and complex it may be, it must set forth but one main thought, to which all the notions and judgments are subordinate.

Unity is violated:—

1. By bringing into grammatical connection thoughts which have no real nor logical connection. Such heterogeneous matter can not be reduced to the unity of a single judgment, and should therefore be expressed in separate sentences. Et

Ex.—"His own notions were always good; but he was a man of great expense."

"Archbishop Tillotson died this year. He was exceedingly beloved both by King William and Queen Mary, who nominated Dr. Tennison, Bishop of Lincoln, to succeed him."

"In this uneasy state both of his public and private life, Cicero was oppressed by a new and cruel affliction, the death of his beloved Tullia, which happened soon after her divorce from Dolabella, whose manners and humors were entirely disagreeable to her."

The artificial union of incongruous or repugnant ideas may be considered as a violation of this rule. It is admissible for comic effect, but ought to be avoided in serious composition. 2

Ex.—"On every side they rose in multitudes, armed with rustic weapons and with irresistible fury." "Separated by mountains and by mutual fear."

"To one so gifted with the prodigality of Heaven, can we approach in any other attitude than of prostration?"

"Of the nineteen tyrants who started up under the reign of Gallienus, there was not one who enjoyed a life of peace or a natural death."

2. By what is called shifting the scene of a sentence. The rule laid down by Kames, and repeated by all writers upon Rhetoric who have followed him, is liable to be misunderstood: "During the course of a period the scene ought to be continued without variation; the changing from person to person, from subject to subject, or from person to subject, within the bounds of a single period, distracts the mind, and affords no time for a solid impression." This must not be interpreted as meaning that the same subject must be retained throughout an entire sentence. The fault intended to be pointed out is that of connecting with a main proposition a series of accessory propositions, in which the succeeding one is subordinated to the one Et

that immediately precedes it. This structure violates the unity of the sentence. There is no compact statement of a distinct thought, but a rapid enumeration of particulars, a constant transition from a higher to a subordinate thought. The end of such a process must be entirely arbitrary; and in many cases no connection can be discovered between the thought with which the sentence begins and that with which it closes.

Ex.—“After we came to anchor, they put me ashore, where I was welcomed by all my friends, who received me with the greatest kindness.”

“After a short time he came to himself; and the next day they put him on board his ship, which conveyed him first to Corinth.”

“To the memory of Lord George Bentinck, second surviving son of William Henry Cavendish Scott, whose ardent patriotism and uncompromising honesty were only equaled by the persevering zeal and extraordinary talents, which called forth the grateful homage of those who, in erecting this memorial, pay a heartfelt tribute to exertions which prematurely brought to the grave one who might long have lived the pride of his native country.”

3. By attaching to a sentence already complete, a clause which ought to have been inserted in the body of the sentence. Such appendages, presenting themselves to the reader when he supposes that the sentence is already finished, invariably produce a disagreeable effect. He is compelled to take to pieces the thought which he has built up, and to incorporate into it the new elements given in the supplementary clause, and in doing so he often finds that the sentence obtains an entirely different meaning. Where the waste of attention is not so great, there is still a violation of unity by putting a merely accessory circumstance in an emphatic position, thus destroying the distinction between the main and subordinate members of the sentence.

Ex.—“The French idea of liberty is the right of every man to be master of the rest; in practice at least, if not in theory.”

In this sentence, the subordinate clause, beginning with “in practice,” is an essential but subordinate part of the statement, and should be placed where it will contribute to build up the entire thought; thus, “Whatever it may be in theory, it is clear that in practice the French idea of liberty is the right of every man to be master of the rest.”

4. By the improper use of parentheses. Parentheses are words and clauses which have no grammatical connection with any members of the sentence, and may be omitted without affecting its meaning. Their use is sometimes unavoidable; they often give emphasis to a word or clause, contain an explanation, or suggest important relations of a thought which however do not enter into its development. But great caution is needed in using them. They are not organic parts of the sentence, and are apt to withdraw attention from the main thought, and to interrupt its harmonious development. Their frequent use is an indication of the want of thorough mastery of the idea to be expressed. Many that are met with could be rejected as useless, and others, by a little care, could be worked into the fabric of the sentence.

Parenthetic marks should not be inserted where there is no parenthesis; as in these:

“Any two circumstances (not naturally connected) are more rarely to be met with.”

“The distribution of the predicate depends (not on the quantity, but) on the quality of the proposition.”

It is a graver abuse to make them a means towards concealing a faulty construction; as in this example:

“Our ancestors founded certain great schools (that now rear the nobles, the gentry, and the merchants) for the benefit of the poor.”

If the parenthetic marks are removed, the statement will be, that the schools rear the nobles, the gentry, and the merchants for the benefit of the poor.

A parenthesis should include nothing by the omission of which the sense of the proposition is left incomplete; as in this example:

“In Ben Jonson’s ‘Tale of a Tub,’ one (and more than one of the characters) speaks thus.”

two members it belongs. In general, to preserve members distinct, that signify things distinguished in thought, the best method is to place first in the consequent member some word that can not connect with what precedes it." *Kames*.

Ex.—"Hence he considered marriage with a modern political economist as very dangerous," instead of "Hence he, with a modern political economist," etc.

"The minister who grows less by his elevation, like a little statue on a mighty pedestal, will always have his jealousy strong about him."

"When I hear a person use a queer expression, or pronounce a name in reading differently from his neighbors, it always goes down in my estimate of him, with a minus sign before it."

3. The improper position of the limitative and exceptive particles, such as *only, alone, just, merely, at least*.

"Not only Jesuits can equivocate," means others besides the Jesuits can equivocate. "Jesuits can not only equivocate," means Jesuits can equivocate and do other things besides. The force of the particle varies with its position. In logical language, when it is annexed to the subject of the sentence, it distributes the predicate and limits it to the subject alone; as, Only men, or men alone, are philosophers = All philosophers are men. Annexed to the predicate, it limits the subject to the predicate, without quantifying the predicate or excluding it from other subjects; as, "Jesuits can only equivocate" = It is all that they can do, although others also may do the same. The following examples can be tested and corrected by this rule:

"One species of bread, of coarse quality, was *only* allowed to be baked;" i. e., *allowed* and nothing more.

"Theism can only be opposed to polytheism or atheism."

"By greatness, I do not only mean the bulk of any single object, but the largeness of a whole view."

4. The frequent repetition of pronouns in a sentence in which several persons or things are spoken of, frequently causes ambiguity. It is better, in such cases, to change the construction or repeat the noun.

Ex.—"Two other words occur to me which are very commonly mingled by our clergy. One of these is 'covetous' and its substantive covetousness. I hope some who read *these* lines will be induced to leave off pronouncing *them* covetious and covetousness. I can assure them that when they do thus call them one at least of their hearers has his appreciation of their teaching disturbed."

5. The uncertain or wrong reference of pronouns, both demonstrative and relative. 42

Ex.—"No one as yet had exhibited the structure of the *human kidneys*, Vesalius having only examined *them* in dogs." Note also the wrong position of *only*.

"The professor soon perceived, however, that the *intellectual qualities* of the youth were superior to *those* of his raiment."

"It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life by heaping up treasures, which nothing can protect us against but the good providence of God." The relative should be placed as near as possible to its antecedent. In the sentence quoted the relative refers not to treasures, but to accidents.

"A verdict was obtained against him (Wilkes) for No. 45 (of The North Briton), as well as for a piece called An Essay on Woman, an obscene and scurrilous libel in parody of Pope's Essay on Man, in which Lord Sandwich and Bishop Warburton had been reflected on and ridiculed." The relative refers to An Essay on Woman, and not, as from the arrangement would be naturally supposed, to Pope's Essay on Man.

"The Earl of Falmouth and Mr. Coventry were rivals *who* should have most influence with the duke, *who* loved the earl best, but thought the other the wiser man, who supported Pen, who disoblged all the courtiers, even against the earl, who contemned Pen as a fellow of no sense."

"By the pleasures of imagination or of fancy (which I shall use promiscuously), I here mean such as arise from visible objects." The real antecedent is not expressed, viz., words. As it stands, the natural reference is to pleasures.

"I know that all words which are signs of complex ideas furnish matter of mistake and cavil." The ambiguity of this sentence arises from our not knowing whether the relative clause is intended to limit its antecedent, *words*, or simply to explain it. Is it meant that all words are signs of complex ideas, or that there is a certain class significant of complex ideas? In the former case, the relative is explicative; in the latter, determinative. This distinction is an important one, and should be borne in mind.

Observe the difference in these sentences: "It is possible to express a

general truth in terms *that* shall be themselves highly concrete." The relative is determinative (in highly concrete terms).

"Subordinate clauses, *which* must not by their length overwhelm the principal clause." Relative is explicative (and they must not, etc.)

"The court opposed, *which* was anticipated." "In narration, Homer is at all times concise, *which* renders him lively and agreeable." The relative should not, as in the last two examples, have a sentence as its antecedent.

6. The equivocal signification of many of the conjunctions. The conjunction *or* particularly is equivocal. It may mean either, that the two notions are identical; as when I say, notion *or* concept, rhetoric *or* the theory of prose: or that they are different; as, logic *or* rhetoric, history *or* philosophy. Et 2

7. The improper omission of words. Ellipsis may be carried too far and words be omitted so as to alter the meaning of the sentence or render it unintelligible. Et 2

Ex.—The omission of a preposition.

"You will seldom find a dull fellow of good education but (if he happen to have any leisure on his hands) will turn his head to one of those two amusements for all fools of eminence, politics or poetry." Insert *to* before the words politics and poetry.

Omission of a nominative with its verb.

"South, as great a wit as a preacher, has separated the superior and the domestic." Insert *he was* between *as* and *a preacher*.

Nominative without a verb.

"The *Germans* of the present day, although greatly superior to their ancestors, there are who opine that they are still distant from that acme of taste which characterizes the finished compositions of the French and the English authors."

The article omitted before adjectives connected with the same noun when the design is to express qualities of different objects, and not different qualities of the same object.

"A cold and empty composition" means one composition that is both cold and empty.

"A cold and an empty composition" means two compositions, one cold,

the other empty. When distinct objects are intended, the article, if used before one adjective, must be repeated before the others.

"The logical and historical analysis of a language generally, in some degree, *coincides*." Two distinct kinds of analysis are spoken of. The article should be repeated before historical, and the verb be put in the plural.

A compound sentence may be free from the faults just mentioned and still be deficient in clearness. Too many ideas may be crowded into it; and the reader, not being able to retain all of them in his memory, loses the connection, and is obliged to read the sentence over in order to comprehend it. More frequently the obscurity arises from the want of method in distributing the materials. It often requires great skill to dispose the parts of a complicated thought. The great object is to avoid burdening the memory with a number of disconnected circumstances, and to present the parts in such an order as will enable the reader to understand them as they are presented, to retain them in his mind, and to bind them together readily into one whole.

To accomplish this we must avoid throwing together loosely a number of details. When it is necessary to admit them, they should be distributed among the members of the sentence. By this means the sentence is made more coherent and compact, and is more easily understood. The effects of a want of proper disposition can be seen in the following example:

"And that it was not peculiar to the gift of language or tongues only, to be given at the moment of its exertion, but common likewise to all the rest, will be shown probably on some other occasion more at large in a particular treatise, which is already prepared by me on that subject."

A too frequent or a too prolonged suspension of the sense is fatal to clearness. It sometimes favors clearness and force to introduce the qualifying circumstances first, reserving the principal member until the last. But the use of this construction is limited. When many qualifications are mentioned that are not intelligible until the qualified member is discovered, the suspense in which the mind is kept is painful, and soon breaks

down the power of attention. The mind can not carry so many disconnected statements, nor connect them so as to discover their meaning.

An accumulation of negatives is another occasion of obscurity. The same thought may be expressed in an affirmative proposition and in a negative; as, "I entertain a favorable opinion of him," and, "I entertain a not unfavorable opinion of him." The latter is called by Hamilton, an indirect and idle way of speaking. When many negatives are accumulated, the sentence is often unintelligible.

Ex.—"It is not to be denied that a high degree of beauty does not lie in simple forms."

"As a general maxim, no epithet should be used which does not express something not expressed in the context, nor so implied in it as to be immediately deducible."

72. Precision.—Precision is the opposite of redundancy. It consists in rejecting all superfluous words and phrases. Superfluous words and phrases are those which are not necessary to complete the thought, to set it in a clearer light, or to promote the end of the discourse. Precision is an essential quality of a well constructed sentence; words that add nothing to the sense detract from the clearness and force of the expression. Like perspicuity, it is a relative quality; the same degree of brevity is not adapted to all kinds of discourse. Before we can decide what words are superfluous and what are not, we must consider the nature and aim of the discourse, and the condition of those to whom it is addressed.

The principal offenses against precision are:

1. Tautology, or the unnecessary repetition of a notion in different terms. The most common form of this fault is the coupling of synonyms. Writers frequently become so accustomed to linking together such words that when we meet with one of them we expect the other. This is sometimes the result of ignorance of the full meaning of the words, and sometimes of an effort to secure greater clearness and precision. Such

expressions as, "plain and evident," "clear and obvious," "joy and satisfaction," "intents and purposes," and others which the student will recollect, are of frequent occurrence. The employment of these stereotyped and unmeaning modes of speech is an offense not only against perspicuity and precision of style, but also against the standard of good taste. It must be distinguished from the combining of synonymous terms with a view to completeness. Ex

Ex.—"Particularly as to the affairs of this world, integrity hath many advantages over all fine and artificial ways of dissimulation and deceit; it is much the plainer and easier, much the safer and more secure way of dealing with the world; it has less of trouble and difficulty, of entanglement and perplexity, of danger and hazard in it."

2. Pleonasm, or the insertion of words designating notions that are already sufficiently implied in other words of the sentence. There are various forms of this fault. Many phrases are pleonastic; as, "in so far as," "from whence."

Expletives, as, *do*, *did*, *there*, are often redundant. They are not always to be struck out; they sometimes serve to mark light shades of meaning, to express feeling, and to give emphasis. Many epithets are pleonastic; as, "the verdant green," "the azure sky." In the religious dialect many pleonastic expressions taken from Scripture are used, which are not admissible into ordinary prose; as, "We have heard with our ears," "we have seen with our eyes," "the birds of the air," "the fish of the sea." Ex

The nature of this fault and some of its most common forms will be learned from the following examples:

"We are to act up to the extent of our knowledge; but, in so far as our knowledge falls short," etc.

"They returned back again to the same city from whence they came forth."

"Hence has ensued an entire change in our whole domestic policy."

"The Inquisition arrested the progress of general intellectual advancement."

"The whole sum total of information." "A chaos of confusion."

"Trifling minutiae of style." "The universal love of all men."

"His efforts were necessarily confined only to remonstrance and exhortation."

3. **Verbosity**, or unnecessary diffuseness. The words may be neither tautological nor pleonastic, but there may be too many of them. The other offenses against brevity may be corrected by striking out the unmeaning words; but to correct this fault it is often necessary to alter the structure of the sentence—to compress as well as to blot.

Verbosity is generally connected with prolixity, which means the introduction of unimportant circumstances, or such as the reader can readily supply from his own knowledge or from the context. It is necessary for the writer to be so completely master of the thought he would express, that he can distinguish between what is relevant and what is irrelevant; and to exercise a wise self-control, so as not to be led astray by the desire to say all that he might say upon the subject. He must leave something to the reader's activity of mind.

Circumlocution is often a species of verbosity. A lengthened, round-about mode of speech is allowable for the sake of variety or emphasis, or when a direct assertion might be offensive; but when none of these ends is accomplished, it is feeble and affected.

A *profusion of adjectives* is another form of verbosity. The use of epithets has already been considered; besides these, many expressions are current, which are supposed to give dignity and solemnity to the style, but which, as they have ceased to be any thing but meaningless ornaments, should be rejected. Instances will be found in letters of condolence, resolutions of sympathy, etc.

The *Paraphrase* frequently degenerates into verbosity. Its aim is by expanding what is too concisely expressed to give greater perspicuity to the style; but it too generally obscures and enfeebles by an excess of words.

The brevity that has just been described is distinct from that form of conciseness which expresses the greatest amount of

thought in the fewest possible words. This laconic style is very energetic, presenting thoughts in a form that arouses the attention and fixes them in the memory. It makes free use of ellipses and figures; even grammatical improprieties are allowed; as in this instance—"Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook it shines." But such energetic brevity is not an essential quality of style: it is suited to proverbs, epigrams, detached thoughts, sentences, and the like; but its frequent use in continuous discourse is a fault. It makes the style obscure, fragmentary, and unnatural.

73. **Energy**.—The qualities mentioned in the preceding sections are all necessary conditions of strength. A weighty thought when enunciated with clearness and precision can not fail to impress the mind of the reader. There are additional means towards the same end which are to be mentioned here.

1. **Inversion**.—According to the English idiom, the subject precedes the predicate, the object follows the verb, and qualifying words are placed as near as practicable to the words qualified. This arrangement is observed so long as the natural order of thought coincides with the grammatical; that is, so long as the grammatically important words are identical with the logically important. This is not always the case. It often happens that a word occupying an inferior position is the most prominent one in the thought, and the one to which the writer is specially desirous to direct attention. A speaker can effect this by emphasizing the word; a writer, by such a collocation of words as will give the notion a conspicuous place in the sentence. The grammatical succession is changed; the word to be emphasized is taken out of the position assigned it by the rules of syntax, and put in one in which it will attract attention. There is thus a conflict between the syntactical order and the natural order of thought and feeling; to express suitably the latter, the former is violated. Such a departure from the strictly idiomatic arrangement of the members of a sentence for the sake of emphasis is called *Inversion*.

Owing to the loss of inflectional forms, inversion is possible only to a limited extent in the English language. Our older writers, in imitation of classical models, allowed themselves a great deal of liberty in using it; they sometimes, by this means, gave great strength and harmony to their style, but more frequently they rendered it stiff and obscure. Although the liberty of position is greatly abridged, we still have within limits the power of indicating, by the structure of the sentence, the emphatic word.

The principal forms of inversion allowed are:—The predicate (adjective, noun) may take the place of the subject; as,

"Few and evil have the days of the years of my life been." "And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house: and it fell, and great was the fall of it." "Nabal is his name and folly is with him."

The verb precedes its subject; as,

"Then burst his mighty heart." "Then suddenly would come a dream of far different character."

The object (accusative) precedes the governing verb; as,

"Silver and gold have I none." "Me he restored unto mine office, him he hanged."

Adverbs of time, place, manner, and adverbial phrases are separated from the words they qualify and placed before them; as,

"In the integrity of my heart have I done this." "Into these dreams only it was, with one or two slight exceptions, that any circumstances of physical horror entered. All before had been moral and spiritual terrors. But here the main agents were ugly birds," etc.

Infinitives and participles are placed before the auxiliary verb; as,

"Go I must." "Avoid it I can not." "Blessed is he that considereth the poor."

In the following example we have an inversion of an interrogative sentence:

"Your fathers, where are they? and the prophets, do they live forever?"

To effect an alteration in the arrangement of a sentence, the words *it* and *there* are often employed, which serve to place the subject after the verb; as,—

"There appeared unto them Moses and Elias."

Compare these three sentences:

"Cicero praised Cæsar." "It was Cicero that praised Cæsar." "It was Cæsar that Cicero praised."

Inversion should not be employed except in compliance with some necessity of thought or passion. To use it for its own sake, when strong emphasis is not required, is unnatural and often ludicrous. The following are instances of such trivial inversions:

"Into this hole thrust themselves three Roman senators." "War at that time there was none."

It should not be admitted when it would lead to ambiguity or obscurity. It should be used moderately. Inversion is to written discourse what emphasis is to spoken; to emphasize every word produces the same effect as to emphasize none. The allowable forms of inversion are few, and a writer should not venture upon novelties in the collocation of words. He should especially exclude the idioms of foreign languages.

2. Connectives.—*Asyndeton* and *Polysyndeton*.—The strength of a sentence depends greatly on the proper use of connectives, *i. e.*, of words having no signification of their own, whose office it is to indicate the relations of words and clauses. They are to the sentence what transitions are to the entire discourse, and are subject to the same general laws.

The shortest should be chosen. Most of them are monosyllables, but many are polysyllables; as, *nevertheless, notwithstanding, furthermore*. The length of the latter makes them too prominent, and attracts to them a disproportionate share of attention; when it is possible, monosyllabic connectives should be substituted for them. The use of these drawling conjunctions is characteristic of our older writers; they are rare in good modern writers.

In some cases it is conducive to energy to omit the signs of connection between the different members of a sentence, leaving the reader to supply them; while in other cases it is necessary to give to every member its appropriate connective. The former construction is called *Asyndeton*; the latter, *Polysyndeton*. Both make conspicuous the relations of the notions to each other and to the main thought of which they are parts; but with this difference, that in *asyndeton* the individual notions of the series are separated from each other by a pause, and each is made emphatic; in *polysyndeton*, on the other hand, we enumerate the different members and call attention to their multiplicity, but by inserting the conjunctions between them, contrary to ordinary usage, we indicate that they are parts of a more comprehensive notion; this notion it is, and not the separate parts, that is made prominent.

Ex.—“Closing their shields, they were impelled, they fought, they slew, they were slain.” “He was a cheerful, active, brave man, a kind father, a faithful friend.” “For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present,” etc. “Over every form, and threat, and punishment, and dim sightless incarceration, brooded a killing sense of eternity and infinity.”

3. *Periods and loose sentences.*—The periodic structure promotes energy, as it preserves the unity of the sentence and concentrates its strength in a single point. But it has an artificial appearance; it is unfitted for some kinds of composition, and its frequent recurrence is always disagreeable. It is not easy, without more help than the English language furnishes, to enable readers to retain in their minds the members of a

complex thought, and at the close bind them easily and promptly into unity. To prevent obscurity and overtaking the attention, superfluous words and thoughts should be excluded from a period, and the members and clauses should be few and short. In arranging the clauses of the members, the same rule must be followed that governs the arrangement of the members of the period; the reader must not be led to suppose that the sentence is finished until it actually is so. When this rule is neglected, a period has the tediousness and feebleness of a badly constructed loose sentence.

In the following example the periodic structure of the clauses is neglected: “Having already shown how the fancy is affected by the works of nature, and afterward considered, in general, both the works of nature and of art, || how they mutually assist and complete each other || in forming such scenes and prospects as are most apt to delight the mind of the beholder, I shall in this paper throw together some reflections on that particular art which has,” etc.

The second clause, beginning with the words “and afterward considered” and ending at “beholder,” is defective; Campbell proposes the following alteration: “And afterward considered, in general, how in forming such scenes and prospects as are most apt to delight the mind of the beholder, the works both of nature and of art mutually assist and complete each other.”

A loose sentence is not necessarily deficient in energy. By a judicious choice and arrangement of words, the writer may keep the mind of the reader in suspense even in sentences that are grammatically complete before their close. A sentence may thus be loose and yet have the force of a period. Still, loose sentences are very liable to degenerate into incoherency and feebleness. To prevent these faults, the following cautions should be observed:

1. The sentences should not be too long. Long sentences are liable to vagueness and intricacy; but even when otherwise faultless, they may become feeble from the number and length of their parts; the reader becomes impatient and is apt to rest at every pause that occurs.

2. The two modes of arrangement may be united in one sen-

tence; the key word not being kept back until the close, but introduced at a convenient point, while, at the same time, the clauses of the members are arranged according to the laws of the period.

3. A complex sentence is often tedious and dragging from ending with a much longer clause than it began with. By reversing the order, the unpleasant effects are prevented.

4. Symmetry is conducive to energy. Resemblance and contrast between thoughts should be marked by similarity of structure. When the relations of thoughts are thus indicated, by framing the members of the sentence in the same manner and of the same length, they are made more conspicuous, and the thought, by the repetition of the form, is impressed on the memory.

The resemblance or opposition should be real. This balanced structure of the sentence is puerile when it does not spring from a necessity of thought.

The following are instances of balanced structure: "He remits his splendor, but retains his magnitude; and pleases more, though he dazzles less." "But, my lord, you may quit the field of business, though not the field of danger; and though you can not be safe, you may cease to be ridiculous."

The following are instances of the violation of the rule: "There may remain a suspicion that we overrate the greatness of his genius, in the same manner as bodies appear more gigantic on account of their being disproportioned and misshapen." Better:—"in the same manner as we overrate the greatness of bodies that are disproportioned and misshapen."

"If men of eminence are exposed to censure on the one hand, they are as much *liable* to flattery on the other. If they receive reproaches which are not due them, they likewise receive praises *which they do not deserve*." Substitute for "liable," "exposed," and for "which they do not deserve," "which are not due."

"The laughs will be for those who have most wit; the serious part of mankind, for those who have most reason on their side." Better:—"the serious, for those who have most reason on their side."

Other emphatic verbal forms are given in the chapter on the Figures of Speech, secs. 61-65.

74. **Melody.**—Prose, although not admitting of rhyme and meter, is susceptible of a melody which every writer should aim to attain. It is subordinate to the great ends of prose discourse, and must not divert attention from the ideas to be presented, nor be purchased at the cost of clearness and force. A vigorous roughness is to be preferred to a tame smoothness. But a conflict between the logical perfections of language and melody is of rarer occurrence than most persons suppose. So intimate is the connection between sound and sense, that if we have chosen the fitting words, and connected our ideas according to both their main and their subordinate relations, our sentences will seldom offend the ear. Harmony and melody are not so much independent qualities, as the natural and necessary result of the conformity of language to thought and passion. Inharmonious sentences will generally be found to be deficient in correctness, clearness, precision, or energy; when the logical defects are remedied the disagreeable roughness disappears.

Some of the offenses against melody and harmony are:

- (1) Using words that are hard to pronounce; such, for example, as contain a cumulation of consonants, or a succession of short unaccented syllables, or occasion a clash of vowels. 2/2
- (2) The frequent recurrence of the same sound, either from the repetition of the same syllable or the admission of rhyming words. 2

Ex.—"The rules of emphasis come in in interruption of your supposed general law of position." "This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans whom our decision will *make*; to the wretches that will be roasted at the *stake*," etc.

The effect is still worse when there is a recurrence of metrical feet, thus: "When parallel rays come contrary ways, and fall upon opposite sides."

- (3) Disproportionate length of one of the members of the sentence; want of variety in the length and structure of the different members; want of symmetry when the thought requires it; closing with an insignificant, unemphatic word. Cx

The following criticism (borrowed from Bain's Rhetoric) on a short sentence of Johnson's will suffice to illustrate the foregoing principles:

"Johnson says: 'Tediumness is the most fatal of all faults.' The stiffness of this sentence is felt at once. On examination we note: 1st. The want of melody in the word *tediumness*, from the crowd of consonants, and the iteration of *s*. 2d. The additional hissing consonant in *is* (although the hard sound *z*). 3d. The concurrence of four unemphatic syllables in succession; namely, the last two in *tediumness* and *is the*. 4th. The additional *s* in *most*. 5th. The concurrence of consonants at the end of *most* and the beginning of *fatal*; this can not always be avoided. 6th. The alliterations *fatal all*, *fatal faults*, *all faults*, make the last few words singularly unmelodious."

(4) The repetition of certain words in close succession. This is a frequent offense; one from which good authors are not altogether free, and which those who are compelled to write hastily seldom avoid. Et

Ex.—"Guizot has embodied in his *views* a more extensive *view* of human affairs." "It soon *appeared* that these diplomatic courtesies meant more than *appeared* on the surface." "The few who *regarded* them in their true light were *regarded* as dreamers." "Wellington was *anxious* to be relieved of all *anxiety* in that quarter." "They consented to *maintain* such troops in them as might be deemed necessary to *maintain* their tranquillity." "The *proposal* was no great violation of the liberties of the *subject*, for it only *proposed* to *subject* military persons to the trial of their military superiors."

*Right of
disposition*

CHAPTER V.

THE PARAGRAPH.

75. Paragraph defined.—In the foregoing chapter we have treated of the rules for combining words and clauses into sentences. But sentences do not appear in a discourse as separate, independent enunciations of thought; they are parts of a larger unity, each sustaining a definite relation to the one that

precedes and the one that follows. A connected series of sentences containing the development of a single topic is called a Paragraph.

76. The structure of Paragraphs.—The general laws governing the construction of a paragraph are the same as those governing the composition of an entire discourse. As it is a more or less full development of a complex thought, it may be regarded as a discourse in miniature, to which the same principles for preparing the theme, properly disposing the parts, and marking their connection are applicable, as are applied to an entire essay, oration, or treatise.

The art of constructing them is not acquired without labor and patience. One may be skillful in framing sentences and not succeed in combining them into connected paragraphs. Exercises in constructing them, and in analyzing those of different writers on different subjects, to learn their method of framing them, ought to have a prominent place in a rhetorical course. Such exercises are the most convenient means of applying the general principles of style, and of cultivating correct habits of thinking and writing.

Paragraphs are of different kinds according to their matter; they may be narrative, descriptive, expository, or argumentative. Hence they are subject to the special laws of the Elementary Forms of Discourse (Part III).

77. The requisites of a paragraph are Unity, Continuity, Proportion, Variety.

Unity.—This quality requires that a paragraph should have but a single theme; that all the sentences should have a direct bearing on the theme, contributing to explain, illustrate, prove, or apply it; that whatever is irrelevant be excluded; and that it be not overloaded with details.

Continuity.—The exact relation of the constituent sentences to each other must be distinctly indicated.

The relations between the sentences may be of various kinds and of various degrees; some of the sentences may be coördinate with those preceding; some may be subordinate. But whatever the connection, however close or remote, it is indispensable to clearness and force that it be easily and certainly recognized. It will not suffice to present the details with clearness; the reader must understand their significance and bearings, and obtain without too great an effort a view of the entire structure of which they are parts.

It is not always easy to comply with this rule. Accurate and often subtle thinking, and considerable practice in writing, are required to give facility in seizing the exact relations of thoughts and expressing them with clearness and accuracy. Careless and unpracticed writers often suggest, by the language they employ, connections of thought entirely different from those they intend, or leave the reader in doubt what is the connection to be expressed. Others, who are not guilty of so gross faults, fail to discern and bring out the more delicate and subtle relations upon which the force and elegance of style greatly depend.

The connection between sentences is marked in various ways.

1. By conjunctions (copulative, illative, adversative, etc.) and by conjunctive phrases (*add to this, on the contrary, in short, to conclude, so far, etc.*)

With respect to the use of conjunctions and conjunctive phrases, it is to be remarked, First, that they are not always necessary.

No rule can be given to direct when to use and when to omit them. Our older authors used more conjunctions and used them more lavishly than is customary at the present day. They marked the minute relations of thoughts by different conjunctions, leaving nothing to the reader to supply, and thus made their style dragging and stiff. The tendency nowadays is to diminish the number of conjunctions by forcing one to perform the office of several, and to dispense as far as possible with the use of them. The style becomes thereby more

sprightly; but when the tendency is carried to excess, it breaks up the paragraph into short, independent sentences, between which no connection can be found, and which it is impossible to retain in the memory.

Secondly. The frequent repetition of the same conjunction is a fault, amounting at times to offensive mannerism. It is generally connected with a defective structure of sentences resulting from slovenly thinking.

Ex.—“Angereau was soon, *however*, dismissed the corps for a serious offense, and returned to Paris penniless and in disgrace. There, *however*, his lofty stature and military air again attracted the attention of the recruiting sergeants, and he was enrolled in the regiment of carabineers commanded by the Marquis Poyanna. There, *however*, his mischievous disposition a second time broke out, and he was expelled from his new corps for carrying off his captain's horses to sell them in Switzerland.”

“It is true he was an inveterate reader, amorously inclined towards vellum tomes and illuminated parchments, *but* he did not covet them, like some collectors, for the mere pride of possessing them; *but* gloried in feasting on their intellectual charms and delectable wisdom, and sought in their attractive pages the means of becoming a better Christian and a wiser man. *But* he was so excessively fond of books, and became so deeply engrossed with his book-collecting pursuits, that it is said some of the monks showed a little dissatisfaction at his consequent neglect of the affairs of the monastery; *but* these are faults I can not find the heart to blame him for, *but* am inclined to consider his conduct fully redeemed by the valuable encouragement he gave to literature and learning.”

Thirdly. The accumulation of conjunctions without necessity ought to be avoided. Two conjunctions may meet together at the beginning of a sentence when one connects the sentence with the preceding, and the other expresses the relation between two clauses of the sentence.

Ex.—“I go to prepare a place for you. *And if* I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself.”

“It is of the utmost importance to us that we associate principally with the wise and virtuous. *When, therefore*, we choose our companions, we ought to be extremely careful in regard to the choice we make.”

Sometimes we find a sentence with three conjunctions in

succession. But such an accumulation is rarely compatible with clearness and force.

Ex.—“To those who do not love God, the enjoyment of him is unattainable. *Now as that we may love God, it is necessary to know him; so that we may know God, it is necessary to study his works.*”

2. By the structure of the sentence. The relation of a sentence to the preceding may be distinctly indicated by means of inversion, contrast, and words referring to something that has gone before. By this means we may form a series of sentences in which the succeeding will appear to be suggested by some expression or turn of thought in the one preceding. In skillful hands this method imparts a high degree of beauty to the style, but with inferior writers it degenerates into feebleness and affectation.

The following sentences will illustrate the nature of this mode of reference. The words of reference are in italics. “One day a Malay knocked at my door. What business a *Malay* could have to transact among the English mountains. I can not conjecture.” “He lay down upon the floor for about an hour, and then pursued his journey. *On his departure*, I presented him with a piece of opium. *To him*, as an orientalist, I concluded that opium must be familiar,” etc. (Notice the inversions.)

X 78. Proportion.—The several thoughts which are brought together in one paragraph ought to be presented in their due relief. The important ones should have the conspicuous positions; the inferior should be put in the obscurer places. The main thoughts ought to be exhibited as such, and the subordinate be exhibited as subordinate.

This rule is violated when a thought which ought to be contained in a principal member of a sentence is given in a subordinate clause; also when any of the details are too long dwelt upon, and thus raised out of their proper place. It is better to allow a subordinate thought to pass imperfectly exhibited, than by disturbing the relations of the parts to destroy the impression of the whole paragraph.

Variety.—Variety in the structure and length of the successive sentences must be consulted. Uniformity is inconsistent with a just exhibition of the relations of the thoughts, exhausts the attention, and becomes intolerably irksome.

One species of uniformity is produced when the series is composed of sentences of the same class; as, when all are conditional or interrogative, loose, periodic, or balanced. Even to begin or end sentences too often in the same manner is objectionable.

Another species is produced by a succession of sentences of the same length.

Writers differ greatly as to the length of sentences; some prefer long, others short. Short sentences are more lively and familiar, and better adapted to works of entertainment and popular instruction. Long sentences require a greater effort of attention, and are suited to weighty, abstruse, and elevated thoughts. Nowadays we incline to the use of short sentences. It is, however, often important to exhibit a complex thought with its necessary qualifications, limitations, circumstances, etc., in a single view; to break it up into minute fragments would be to destroy it. In the higher forms of prose, both didactic and oratorical, long sentences are frequent and unavoidable.

But whatever may be the respective advantages of brevity and length, they will be lost if a number of sentences of the same length, whether long or short, follow each other in the same paragraph. Although each separately taken may be understood without an effort and produce a pleasing effect, the repetition of the same mental process in attending to the series inevitably engenders weariness. In a series of very short sentences in which the thought is distributed into disconnected portions, a painful effort is constantly required to make out the relation between them, to keep them in view, and to gather from them the leading idea. A series of long sentences leads to the same results in a different way; the mind is exhausted by the uninterrupted effort of analyzing and remembering the complex presentations of thought.

Hence, a mixture of long and short sentences is necessary to prevent the languor resulting from uniformity; it does not merely gratify the ear,—it aids the mind in following and retaining the train of thought.

The style in which the sense is given in short sentences, each complete in itself, is called by the French the *style coupé*, and is distinguished from the *style periodique*, in which the sentences are longer and duly linked together.

The following is an example of the *style coupé*: "From a political point of view, there is but one single principle: the sovereignty of man over himself. This sovereignty of myself over myself is called liberty. Where two or several of these sovereignties associate the state begins. In this association there is no abdication. Each sovereignty gives up a certain portion of itself to form the common right. That portion is the same for all. This identity of concession which each makes to all is called equality. The protection of all over each is called fraternity. The point of intersection of all these aggregated sovereignties is called society."

As a general rule, it is advisable to make the sentences at the beginning of a paragraph brief. As a sentence ought not to close with an insignificant word, so it is a fault to end a paragraph with a secondary, unimportant thought. The conclusion should be a leading thought, embodying the result of what has gone before, or preparing for what is to follow, and will usually be expressed in a sentence of some length. A very short sentence is not appropriate unless it be an energetic, condensed statement of a weighty truth.

There are exceptions to the law of variety. To give to a thought its just expression, it is often necessary to study symmetry in the structure of the paragraph, just as it is often necessary to study it in constructing sentences. When by preserving uniformity of structure we can keep the main ideas in their proper position, bring out the points of resemblance and difference of objects, and make important relations prominent, it would be a blunder to vary the construction. This would be to sacrifice the higher qualities to the sound.

Ex.—To vary the structure would weaken and obscure the following parallel: "Homer was the greater genius; Virgil the better artist; in

the one, we most admire the man; in the other, the work. Homer hurries us with a commanding impetuosity; Virgil leads us with an attractive majesty. Homer scatters with a generous profusion; Virgil bestows with a careful magnificence. Homer, like the Nile, pours out his riches with a sudden overflow; Virgil, like a river in its banks, with a constant stream."

79. Announcing the Theme.—The theme of the paragraph ought to be distinctly indicated. Sometimes it is not explicitly stated, and the reader is left to gather it from the text. In some subjects this may be safely done, but it frequently produces obscurity. When the theme is new or at all abstruse, it should be announced.

It may be laid down in a brief sentence towards the beginning; not necessarily in the first sentence; for paragraphs are connected together as parts of a larger unity, and the opening sentence is often a transition, in the form of a summary of something previously given, connecting a paragraph with the preceding.

Sometimes, instead of being stated at the beginning, it is withheld until the close. The author first enumerates the particulars before announcing the general truth which he draws from them, or gives his arguments and prepares the way for the proposition before he brings it forward. Occasionally the theme is stated at the beginning, and is repeated at the conclusion.

To give due emphasis to the enunciation of the theme, it is sometimes repeated; the second statement is often a condensed, figurative one.

Ex.—"The practical danger which has sometimes been apprehended from metaphysical pursuits, has in reality only been found to follow from their stunted and partial cultivation. The poison has grown up; the antidote has been repressed."

80. Examples illustrating the foregoing rules.—Those who wish to become familiar with the principles of the construction of paragraphs should study carefully passages taken from different authors, and from various classes of composi-

tion—history, didactic treatises, and orations. The examples below will answer to illustrate the rules laid down, and will give the student some hints how to apply them.

(1) "The other thing to be considered is, that in this great work, the understanding is chiefly at the disposal of the will. (2) For though it is not in the power of the will, directly either to cause or hinder the assent of the understanding to a thing proposed, and duly set before it; yet it is antecedently in the power of the will to apply the understanding faculty to, or to take it off from the consideration of those objects to which, without such a previous consideration, it can not yield its assent. (3) For all *assent* presupposes a simple apprehension or knowledge of the terms of the proposition to be assented to. (4) But unless the understanding employ and exercise its cognitive or apprehensive power about *these terms*, there can be no actual *apprehension* of them. (5) And the *understanding*, as to the *exercise* of this power, is subject to the command of the will; though as to the specific nature of its acts it is determined by the object. (6) As for instance, my understanding can not assent to this proposition, 'that Jesus Christ is the Son of God;' but it must first consider, and so apprehend what the terms and parts of it are, and what they signify. (7) And *this* can not be done if my will be so slothful, worldly, or voluptuously disposed, as never to suffer me at all to think of them, but perpetually to carry away and apply my mind to other things. (8) *Thus far* is the understanding at the disposal of the will." *Dr. South's Sermons.*

This is an argumentative paragraph. It contains the proof and illustration of a single proposition, viz., that the assent of the understanding to the truths of religion is in a great measure under the control of the will. Every sentence has a direct bearing on the theme.

The theme is explicitly stated (1), and is repeated at the close (8). It is given due prominence throughout. To present it more distinctly and obviate all misunderstanding, the necessary qualifications are given, and the proposition maintained is put in contrast with the erroneous views with which it is liable to be confounded (2), (5).

The sentences are closely connected. (2) is the statement of a general truth confirming (1). (3), (4), (5), are arguments proving (2). (6), (7), are an illustration of the proposition.

The connection of the sentences is carefully marked both by

conjunctions and words of reference (in italics). The reasoning would be more readily understood, if uniformity of structure had been preserved in (3), (4), and (5). The emphatic words in these sentences are, "*assent—apprehension*," "*apprehension—exercise of the understanding*," "*exercise of the understanding—command of the will*." There is a mixture of long and short sentences.

The next example is from Macaulay's Essay on Lord Bacon:

(1) "The years during which Bacon held the great seal were among the darkest and most shameful in English history. (2) Every thing at home and abroad was mismanaged. (3) First came the execution of Raleigh, an act which, if done in a proper manner, might have been defensible, but which, under all the circumstances, must be considered as a dastardly murder. (4) Worse was behind—the war of Bohemia, the successes of Tilly and Spinola, the Palatinate conquered, the king's son-in-law an exile, the house of Austria dominant on the continent, the Protestant religion and the liberties of the Germanic body trodden under foot. (5) In the meantime, the wavering and cowardly policy of England furnished matter of ridicule to all the nations of Europe. (6) The love of peace which James professed would, even when indulged to an impolitic excess, have been respectable if it had proceeded from tenderness for his people. (7) But the truth is, that, while he had nothing to spare for the defense of the natural allies of England, he resorted without scruple to the most illegal and oppressive devices for the purpose of enabling Buckingham and Buckingham's relations to outshine the ancient aristocracy of the realm. (8) Benevolences were exacted. (9) Patents of monopoly were multiplied. (10) All the resources which could have been employed to replenish a beggared exchequer, at the close of a ruinous war, were put in motion during this season of ignominious peace."

The theme is announced in the opening sentence (1), and repeated in a more determinate form in (2). It is confirmed by an enumeration of particulars—the murder of Raleigh (3); mismanagement abroad (4), (5); mismanagement at home (6)–(9); closing with the comprehensive statement (10). The unity is complete; the proportion of parts is observed; the parts are closely connected by their relation to the common theme, and in most of the sentences by words of reference, etc. The sentences are short, but sufficiently varied. Notice the construction of (4).

CHAPTER VI.

DIVISION OF STYLE.

81. Recapitulation.—The portion of rhetoric which has been gone over constitutes what may be called General Rhetoric, as it embraces the laws of prose composition in general without regard to the matter and aim of the particular discourse.

Part First contains a description of the mental processes involved in the act of composition. The subject, which is either given to the writer or chosen by him, is at first vague and undefined. The first step is to reduce it to a determinate, precisely stated theme. The next step is to form an outline or skeleton of the discourse, which is done by gathering by meditation the main ideas, and then arranging them in such an order and proportion as their logical relations and the necessities of the discourse require. These main ideas are then to be developed; the ideas necessary to connect them (transitions) are found; and the thoughts necessary to explain, illustrate, and confirm them are gathered and arranged in due order. Thus the outline or rude scheme becomes a completed, well rounded, consistent whole.

So far we have dealt only with the thought as it exists in the writer's mind. But this thought is to become external—be imparted to others. It must, therefore, be embodied in language. Language was, of course, employed in the processes of thinking which we have just described, for language and thought are inseparable; but the writer's attention was directed mainly to the invention and elaboration of ideas, with no special regard to the manner in which they should be expressed so as to be understood by others. But having become master of his thoughts, his next task is to embody them in such language as will convey them to others, and bring their minds and wills into harmony with his; *i. e.*, to give them an adequate expression.

The rules for the adequate expression of thought have been given in the preceding chapters of this Second Part.

To be adequate, the expression of thought must comply with two conditions.

1st. As to the matter: it must convey the exact thought in a manner corresponding to its importance.

2d. As to the hearer: it must call his powers of thought and feeling into free and unimpeded activity, neither stimulating them beyond, nor repressing their tendency toward their natural limit. Hence it must both economize his attention and give free play to his activities.

The essential qualities of style resulting from a compliance with these conditions are propriety, perspicuity, and vivacity.

These qualities of style depend on the choice and arrangement of words. As to the words which are the proper, literal signs of ideas, those only are to be selected which are recognized as belonging to the common national speech; are in current use; are offensive neither to moral purity nor refined feeling; and are accurate, becoming expressions of the ideas to be conveyed. To secure the highest degree of vivacity, the figures of speech are employed, which serve to present ideas in a concrete, sensible form to the imagination, and with emphasis to the understanding and feelings.

The words are combined into sentences to express thoughts. The requisites of a sentence, it has been shown, are correctness, unity, clearness, precision, energy, and melody.

Sentences are combined to form a larger and more complex unity, called a Paragraph; the essential qualities of which are unity, continuity, proportion, and variety.

82. Differences of Style.—The qualities described in the foregoing chapters, and briefly mentioned in the last section, must appear in every composition on whatever subject it is written; there can not be an adequate expression of thought where any one of them is lacking.

But the manner of expression is modified by the matter and aim of the discourse and the peculiarities of the writer. If a man writes with simplicity and earnestness, his mental and moral character will reveal itself both in his thoughts and lan-

guage. Where the stamp of individuality is wanting there is no style.

Style, then, is as varied as human character, and it may be said that there are as many kinds of style as there are writers. But there are points of view from which we can contemplate this infinite variety, and reduce it to a few classes. It is plain that there are many divisions of style possible, since there are many qualities any one of which can serve as a principle of division. Thus, it may be divided with respect to the matter into historical, didactic, etc.; with respect to the number of words, into the concise, sententious, laconic, terse, copious, diffuse, verbose; with respect to the use of figures, into the florid, ornate, plain, dry; with respect to the arrangement of words and clauses, into the natural, indirect, inverted, periodic, epigrammatic, flowing.

The division adopted in most Rhetorics is one founded on the difference in the general character of style. The most general characteristics are chosen as the basis of classification, and no sharp discrimination is attempted. According to this division, there are three kinds or species of style, viz.: the simple or lower, the grand or higher, and the middle.

✓ **83. The Simple or Lower Style.**—It is characteristic of this style, that, without disregarding the difference of written and spoken discourse, it imitates the conversational language of cultivated society. It employs familiar words and idiomatic expressions; prefers the figures of speech that give distinctness to the more brilliant and passionate; the sentences are not often very long or complicated, and are loose or mixed, seldom periodic; rapidity and energetic condensation are foreign to it; some degree of diffuseness characterizes it, but not unnecessary wordiness. It is appropriate to discourses that address chiefly the understanding, but is not adapted to move the feelings and passions. It is employed in narrating the events and describing the objects of ordinary life, and in communicating instruction and information.

The simple style ranges from the plain style, which rejects

all ornament, allows many negligences, and approaches most nearly to the language of conversation—to the elegant. It is susceptible of a high degree of beauty; accurate knowledge, clear thinking, correct taste, and social refinement impart to it a classic elegance. The ideas are conveyed so clearly and with such an absence of effort, that the reader's attention is not attracted to the mode of expression, and he is apt to imagine that he would have employed the same. The difficulty of writing in such a style is known only to those who attempt it.

The extremes to be shunned are: 1st. Dryness and languor, arising from the use of abstract and commonplace ideas and language, formal definitions and divisions, slovenly sentences, etc. 2d. Coarseness and vulgarity, into which many are betrayed by false notions of familiarity.

✓ **84. The Grand or Higher Style.**—This style is appropriate when treating of the most elevated subjects of thought, and of objects that concern the most important interests of individuals and communities. It supposes that the writer is affected to an extraordinary degree by the object, that he is inflamed with enthusiasm for what he believes to be great and good, or with moral indignation at some wrong.

The adequate expression of the noblest principles of our nature, when affected by elevated objects, will necessarily possess force, grandeur, and sublimity. These qualities may be exhibited in various ways. Great thoughts are often clothed in a majestic simplicity; sometimes the resources of language are employed to present them with a fullness and magnificence that will carry captive both mind and heart. The noblest and most expressive words are chosen; the boldest figures are employed—as, personification, vision, sermocination. The sentences are sometimes brief and pregnant, conveying the thought in a form that seizes the attention and compels the reader to reflect on it; at other times they are flowing and rhythmical.

From the nature of this style, as the expression of extraordinary excitement of the imagination and emotions, it is adapted to but a few classes of composition, and only to subjects of great

importance. Further, it can not pervade an entire discourse, but will be confined to the portions in which thought and passion reach their highest stage. It can not be employed unless the hearer or reader is in sympathy with the speaker or writer.

The faults to which this style is liable are extravagance, exaggeration; the use of hollow, conventional phraseology, which is supposed to give stateliness and pathos; the excessive use of figurative language, enervating and obscuring the ideas instead of enforcing them—faults which spring from the want of knowledge, taste, and sincerity.

85. The Middle Style.—This holds a position between the simple and the grand style; it is the transition from the one to the other, and combines some of the characteristics of both. It resembles the simple in striving to communicate truth to the understanding with clearness, and resembles the grand in aiming to influence the feelings and passions. It is bolder and more profuse in the employment of figures and the various emphatic verbal forms, than the simple style; but does not use those appropriate to intense feeling, which are found in the grand.

This style is employed in all compositions intended not only to inform and convince, but at the same time to move the feelings and passions. Its character varies with the predominance of one or other of these ends. When instruction and conviction are predominant, it approaches the lower style; when influencing the feelings is the main object, it partakes more of the character of the higher.

86. Caution.—The student is to be cautioned against supposing that a discourse is necessarily confined to one of these kinds of style. This erroneous opinion has been fostered by the prevailing custom of perusing extracts from authors instead of entire works, and thus of judging of the whole from a mere fragment. All three styles may be found in the same discourse. With a genuine writer, the thoughts control and shape

the language; the style will be simple when the appeal is mainly to the understanding, and the other powers are called into but moderate activity; grand when intensity and elevation of passion and emotion are to be expressed; and the middle style will be adopted when the aim is to call into harmonious, vigorous activity, understanding, feeling, and passion.

87. The application of the principles of General Rhetoric.—The divisions just given are too indefinite to afford much assistance in original composition and criticism. Before the student can learn to discriminate between the different kinds of style, he must become familiar with the application of the principles of general Rhetoric to discourse as determined by its matter and aim.

This is the subject of the two remaining parts, which, as distinguished from the portion now completed, may be considered as constituting Special or Applied Rhetoric.

It treats of:

1. The Elements, or Elementary Forms of Discourse.
2. The Principal Forms of Prose.

PART III.

THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF DISCOURSE.

88. Preliminary.—The objects of thought can be reduced to two classes; viz., individual objects and general notions.

Individual objects are of two kinds. Either they are simultaneous wholes; *i. e.*, those whose parts exist at the same time, whether individual things existing, or conceived to exist in space; as, this tree, house, etc.; or particular mental states and qualities of which we get a knowledge by consciousness;—or they are successive wholes; *i. e.*, those whose parts are not presented as existing at one time, but which arise in successive periods of time; as, for example, a storm, a battle, the life of a man—in general, all changes in the internal and the external world.

General notions are formed by comparison and generalization; they have no one object precisely corresponding to them, but are applicable to an indefinite number of objects; as, tree, man, house.

We may consider individual and general notions in themselves, or we may endeavor to show that two or more of them are related.

What are the Elementary Forms of Discourse?—Corresponding to these distinctions we have, as the elements or elementary forms of discourse:

1. Description, or the exhibition in language of the parts of a simultaneous whole.

2. Narration, or the exhibition of the parts of a successive whole.

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3. Exposition, consisting in the explication of general notions and propositions formed from them.

4. Argumentation, by which the truth or falsehood of a proposition is evinced.

There can be no connected discourse without one or more of these forms. In a composition in which several of them enter, one will predominate, giving character to the whole.

CHAPTER I.

DESCRIPTION.

89. Definition and objects of Description.—A description is the exhibition in language of the coëxistent parts and qualities of an object of sense, whether real or imaginary.

Only complex objects are capable of description; purely simple objects or qualities, as a simple color, can not be described. The objects of description are all complex objects of perception, such as natural products, creations of art, landscapes, states of mind, characters of individuals and classes, etc.

90. Requisites of a good Description.—The aim of a description is to enable the reader to form an image of the object corresponding as nearly as possible to that in the mind of the writer. Its requisites are: 1. *Truth*.—It must not only be free from self-contradiction, but the features must be those of the actual object; the representation must harmonize with the reality.

2. *Completeness* (opposed to inadequacy or mutilation).—The essential features must be given; what subordinate points should be mentioned will be determined by circumstances. Nothing should be omitted that will promote the aim of the writer.

3. *Unity*.—The mere enumeration of single traits does not

constitute a description. The parts must be connected in such a manner as to afford a distinct image of a single object, so that it can be recognized and discriminated from other objects.

4. *Vivacity*.—The object must be described as it appears to the senses. The degree of vivacity differs in the various kinds of description. The general rule for all is, to reject what is abstract and vague, and to seek what is determinate and particular.

5. *Brevity*.—The mind speedily becomes wearied with the effort to combine and retain a number of qualities; in description, more than in any other form of discourse, brevity is indispensable.

91. *Difficulty of the art of Description*.—The art of representing an object in language is a difficult one. The chief causes of the difficulty are: 1. The number of qualities belonging to an individual object is greater than it is possible to comprise in a description. To attempt to give to it the fullness of an actual perception would lead to an accumulation of details that could not be retained in the memory and united in a single image. 2. The properties and qualities of the object co-exist and are presented to sense as parts of a simultaneous whole, whereas when represented in language they are exhibited in succession. Hence, to succeed in this art, great skill is requisite to analyze the object, and to select and combine the separate traits.

92. *Rules of Description*.—1. The first rule is: *Determine the point of view from which the description is to be made*. This rule is laid down first, as it is only by complying with it that we can bring the subject, otherwise illimitable, into bounds, and decide what topics are to be selected and what order is to be pursued. The same object admits of being described in a variety of ways according to the occasion, the end to be realized, etc. When the aim is merely to enable the understanding to distinguish one object from another, the description approaches to definition, and, both in the matter selected

and in the mode of treatment, differs from the more elevated forms which appeal directly to the imagination. Among these there is also a difference. A description may be objective, *i. e.*, may aim to present a vivid image of the object as it is; or it may be subjective, *i. e.*, aim to exhibit the object together with the emotions which it excited in the mind of the writer. Subjective description occurs most frequently in poetry and eloquence.

2. *Select traits that are characteristic, i. e.*, such as give a clear and correct impression of the real nature of the object; interesting either in themselves or in their relation to the object; determinate, concrete, as opposed to whatever is vague and abstract. Care must be taken to choose qualities that blend readily into one image; out of a successive presentation of parts the imagination retains only such as coalesce with what follows without losing their individual characteristics.

3. *Avoid accumulating too many details*. The mind can retain but a few, and when the attention is overtasked the impression becomes feeble and obscure. The force of description depends more upon the character of the traits selected than upon their number. One striking circumstance will often bring an entire scene before the mind with greater vividness than a minute enumeration of the details. Carlyle says on this subject:

“On what quality of observing, or of style in describing, does this intense pictorial power depend? Often a slight circumstance contributes curiously to the result; some little, and perhaps to appearance accidental, feature is presented; a light gleam which instantaneously excites the mind, and urges it to complete the picture and evolve the meaning thereof for itself. By critics such light gleams and their magical influence have been frequently noted; but the power to produce such, to select such features as will produce them, is generally treated as a knack or trick of trade, a secret for ‘being graphic’; whereas those magical feats are, in truth, rather inspirations; and the gift of performing them, which acts unconsciously, without forethought, and as if by nature alone, is properly a genius for

description. One grand invaluable secret there is, however, which includes all the rest, and, what is comfortable, lies clearly in every man's power—to have an open, loving heart, and what follows from the possession of such. Truly it has been said—*emphatically* in these days ought it to be repeated—a loving heart is the beginning of all knowledge. This it is that opens the whole/mind, quickens every faculty of the intellect to do its fit work—that of *knowing*, and, therefrom by pure consequence, of *vividly uttering forth*. Other secret of being graphic is there none worth having; but this is an all-sufficient one.”

93. Disposition of details.—The features selected must be arranged in a natural order, so that the description may correspond to the object described. In a large class of natural and artificial products the order is given with the objects, so that there is very little room for choice with reference to the parts with which the description shall begin. In complex subjects greater liberty is given. We may give first a general statement of the class to which the object belongs; the uses to which it is applied; its outline and size. We may then descend to particulars, dividing the whole into large masses, and then giving the details belonging to each. The proper relation of the parts should be observed; description is not a bare enumeration of separate traits; the parts should cohere—the preceding should be easily retained in the memory and connect readily with what follows, and thus each part illustrate and support the others, and all combine into one distinct image.

In describing the social condition of a people—the morals, institutions, and the like—still greater liberty is allowed. The main object is to afford a distinct general view of the whole complex subject; the process requires skill in logical division. Excessive subdivision is to be guarded against, as it renders the obtaining of such a general view difficult, if not impossible.

When an object is to be described that can not be apprehended in a single view, but the parts of which are presented in succession, as in an extensive landscape, the description may

follow the order of presentation. In such cases it takes something of the form of a narrative, and has a higher degree of vivacity than the ordinary form of description.

94. Auxiliaries.—The vivacity of a description is promoted in several ways. The object may be compared with similar or with dissimilar objects; associated circumstances may be given, or associated thoughts, feelings, memories; the writer may interpret the outward signs, mingle inferences with the description, and in various ways put the reader in possession of all that is nearly or remotely connected with the subject.

Rules of expression.—The expression in language varies with the nature and end of the description. The naturalist and orator adopt a very different style in delineating the same object. The effect is destroyed by employing vague and abstract terms; in all cases the writer should aim to particularize and individualize. Metonymy and synecdoche both contribute to this end, and are of frequent use; likewise epithets suggesting comprehensive details, points of resemblance, etc. Stereotyped forms of expressions render a description feeble and commonplace, and should be unconditionally rejected; novelty is indispensable to interest in this kind of discourse. Brevity, so far as it is compatible with completeness, must also be studied. No class of compositions is more liable to become tedious.

95. Description of natural and artificial products.—The objects included under this head are the products of art, as buildings, machines, etc., and natural products, both organic and inorganic. The aim is to exhibit the peculiarities of the object so as to enable the reader to discriminate it from other objects. It embraces:

1. A general notion or description, which serves to locate the object.
2. A particular description, giving the characteristic qualities of the object, its uses, etc.

No general scheme can be given for inorganic substances.

Some of the topics to be employed are: their genus, composition, appearance (form, color, etc.), locality, uses.

The topics for the description of an organic substance are: its partition (main parts), characteristics of individual parts, circumstances of place, uses, division or different species, appearance (form, size, color, etc.).

In describing animals, we must give the physical marks, and also the inward marks, such as intelligence, susceptibility of education, relation to man, mode of life, and similar qualities.

The marks selected should be essential and characteristic, and should be so grouped as to bring the related qualities together.

Physical appearances.—The description may be either of scenery or of phenomena of nature. The former embraces landscapes of greater or less extent. The main points to be noticed are the relative position of the locality; its length, breadth; its main divisions with their subdivisions, noteworthy circumstances and features. When the scene is an extensive one, that can not be taken in at one view, the points will be presented in succession, and those dwelt upon which give the most lively perception of the scene. To succeed in description of this kind, a writer must have the power to select from the many objects presented to him those which will make the strongest impression on the imagination and feelings.

The description of natural phenomena—as of a sunset, sunrise, thunder-storm—is nearly related to narration. We have here a passing phenomenon connected with a particular locality. The phenomenon can be grasped as a whole only by taking in the changes as they occur. The scheme for such a description corresponds to that for the narration of an event. It contains:

1. The preceding circumstances, including the cause, occasion, indications, and the like.

2. The beginning, middle, and end of the phenomenon. *proposed*

3. Its consequences, general and special, immediate and remote.

In both these forms of description great vivacity is indispensable. Particulars that address the senses should be brought forward; a single striking feature that may be expressed in a single word is often more effective than an extended enumeration of details. Personification, metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy are freely used. The unity of descriptions of this class consists in a great measure in the impression made upon the feelings, whether joyous, serious, gloomy, sublime. The nature of the emotions to be awakened by the entire description must be kept in view, and such characteristics selected as are suitable to them; what would disturb the harmony of the impression should be omitted.

96. Mental states.—The states of thought, feeling, and desire are described by giving the class to which they belong with the specific difference, and adding, when greater fullness is required, (1) the causes producing, the occasion on which they arise, their object and end; (2) the mode in which they manifest themselves, as by words, gestures, the countenance, actions; (3) their influence and effects; (4) circumstances modifying, checking, exciting them; (5) their perversions; (6) comparison with cognate and opposite states.

Characters.—The description of a character consists in giving a faithful, graphic delineation of the permanent, distinctive qualities of which it is composed. It is of importance in history, biography, and oratory. The subjects may be taken from real life, from history, or from fiction.

In this kind of description the following points are to be observed:

1. It should embrace both the natural and acquired peculiarities. In every character there are certain predominant tendencies, on which the others depend, from which they proceed, and which modify and explain the rest. These fundamental qualities, as they are the central principles of activity, are to be selected first, and made prominent throughout. The descrip-

tion must embrace the intellectual peculiarities, the moral qualities, and temperament.

2. The external circumstances and relations which influence the formation of character—such as nationality, religion, civilization, education, etc., should be carefully considered. The vicissitudes in the life of the person should be mentioned when they throw light upon the character. The difference between biography, which narrates the events of a life, and delineation of character, which exhibits permanent traits, must be kept constantly in view.

3. The various qualities must be exhibited in their relation to each other. No character is absolutely simple, *i. e.*, governed by one principle exclusively; it is the result of a combination of principles which act and react on each other. The qualities must be shown as thus modifying and modified; the dark and bright sides should be exhibited in contrast with each other; the different degrees of worthiness and dignity of the various principles should be shown, as according to the predominance of one or another set of principles, a character is pronounced good or bad, noble or base, refined or coarse; care must be taken not to present traits severed from those with which they are intimately connected, and without which they convey a false impression; where there is apparent contradiction, it must be removed, and the consistency of the character made apparent.

4. The description of a character seeks to give the inward principles from which outward acts proceed, and which can be recognized only by their outward manifestations. It is necessary, for the sake of clearness and vividness, to introduce the modes by which the internal principles manifest themselves; to give the words and deeds of the subject, and the spheres of life in which the qualities have been exerted; as in the family, society, profession.

5. The character may be compared with other characters either similar or different. A lengthened comparison of two characters is called a parallel. It may begin with a summary of what may be said in general of the two, and then proceed to

indicate what was common to the two, as to time, place, family, and other conditioning circumstances, and then how they differed in respect to the same. They may then be compared as to the points of resemblance and difference, as to character, plans, labors, the results of their labors.

character
General characters.—Instead of sketches of individual characters, we may have what are called general characters. These are delineations of the peculiarities of a class or profession, or of the manifestations of some virtue or vice. They occur in satiric poetry and in didactic prose. The faults to be avoided are unnaturalness, exaggeration, caricature, inconsistency. The characters should appear such as can actually exist, and the traits and actions be such as harmonize with each other and with the central principle.

CHAPTER II.

NARRATION.

97. The nature and aim of Narration.—A narration is the recital of a consecutive series of incidents forming a single transaction. The facts narrated may be either those of the external world, including physical phenomena and the actions of intelligent beings, or those of the internal world—what one thinks, feels, desires. They may be simple, being composed of but a single series of incidents, or complex, containing a variety of subordinate or concurrent incidents.

Narration is the main end of historical discourse; it enters more or less largely into all classes of composition both in prose and poetry. Its form varies with the end which the writer has in view. The simplest is that which it receives when the aim is to give an accurate statement of facts that will enable others to form a correct judgment of them, as in official reports and in many business transactions. The higher forms are intended to

call into activity the feelings and imagination; these forms are principally regarded in Rhetoric. In many cases the narration is not an independent element of a discourse, but is employed merely as the basis of an argument or generalization, or as a means of arousing the passions. In judicial eloquence particularly, it is a very important element. It is also frequently employed for didactic purposes, as to illustrate and enforce a lesson of prudence, morality, or religion, as in fables, parables, tales.

98. The selection of particulars.—The aim of narration being to exhibit an event as a whole, in its rise, progress, and completion, it involves the necessity of a careful selection of the particulars that are to be incorporated into it. The art of selecting is one of the most indispensable accomplishments of a good narrator. Those lacking this qualification do not discriminate between what is essential and what is not essential; they bring together a crowd of particulars, but give no clear, connected presentation of the subject.

In the process of selecting, the writer should be governed by the following rules:

1. There is in every event, however complex, one leading fact of which the others are but the dependents. This must be seized; otherwise the narrative can not have unity. The unity of an action may be in the subject (as in biography, the person whose life is narrated; in history, the particular nation), in the place, or in the end or result. The place is of subordinate importance; the main thing to be attended to is the result. All incidents that terminate in one final event are parts of one whole; it is only by reference to this result that the several incidents can be explained, and their place and importance determined.

2. All the essential incidents must be given; that is, all that are necessary to the progress of the action. The omission of any of these renders the narrative incomplete and unintelligible by destroying the connection between the parts. If the narrative contains only a summary of the essential parts, it will

lack vivacity and interest; it is accordingly necessary to amplify them, and to incorporate whatever aids in imparting clearness and vividness to the recital. What is superfluous must be omitted, as it but retards the movement of the narration and leads to obscurity. Regard must be had, as in description, to the relations of the details; there are some so related to each other that if one be given the others must also be given. When this rule is neglected, the narrative becomes false, although the separate statements are all true.

3. The end to be accomplished by the narration must be kept in view. The same fact will be related in a different manner in an official report, in an oration, and in a didactic treatise.

4. The circumstances selected should interest us by addressing the imagination and feelings. General statements convey no distinct image, and render a narration lifeless; it is necessary to descend to particulars, and to present the facts in as concrete a form as possible. The degree of interest depends on the aim, and on the nature of the subject of the narrative. Where the aim is merely to impart information, great vivacity is not so indispensable; it can not be neglected in the higher forms of narration, as in history and eloquence. Internal phenomena—our thoughts, feelings, and desires—can not be presented so vividly; a narrative of these is apt to be tedious; whereas when they are exhibited as manifesting themselves in outward deeds, the narrative can be made highly interesting.

99. Disposition of the incidents.—The separate incidents are, in the next place, to be arranged in an order that will secure a continuous movement of the narrative towards the grand result.

1. As a general rule, the order of time is to be observed. But we can not adhere strictly to this order in all cases—particularly when the event is complex, and involves several parallel series of incidents. Great skill is then required to connect the parts, and preserve the unity and continuity of the narrative.

2. A narration should do more than simply exhibit incidents

in succession; it should exhibit one as arising out of another, and all as combining to produce one definite result. It should thus account for the event and render apparent its necessity.

3. When the principal event has a number of subordinates, care must be taken to preserve the prominence of the principal. This is effected by the position given it, the fullness of its details, and style in which it is presented. We must not permit a subordinate point to supplant the main one by a too extended treatment of it, or by superior vividness of style. The transitions from the main to the subordinate parts should (particularly in long narratives) be distinctly marked.

4. Avoid, as far as possible, shifting the scene. The needless transfer from one place to another is a strain upon the attention, and interrupts the continuity of the action. So also with the actors; it is a great advantage to have one central character around whom the events may be gathered.

5. When the narrative is a long one, and particularly when there is a break in it, the labor of comprehending and remembering is lightened by giving a summary of what precedes. The summary contains only the main points and the general result, with the omission of the details. It serves to recall what has been gone over, and prepares the reader to resume the thread of the story.

100. The parts of a Narration.—The parts into which a narration may be distributed are:

The introduction.—The object of the introduction is to awaken the reader's interest in the subject, to indicate the point of view from which the fact is contemplated by the writer, or, in general, to make the reader acquainted with whatever is necessary to a correct understanding of the course of events. It may be a summary of such preceding events as have a direct bearing upon the one to be narrated; a general description, or the statement of a general principle. It is sometimes expedient to exhibit the result or the consequences of the fact, and then proceed to the narrative of the events which led to it. The introduction should be brief, simple, and should throw light

upon the subject. It is a common fault in giving preceding events to go back to too remote a point.

Exposition.—Every action must have a beginning, middle, and end. The exposition is that part of the narration which gives the beginning of the action. It sets forth the various circumstances and relations in which the action took its rise. The topics to be used are: the cause of the event, which includes the incidents, institutions, circumstances which led to it; as also the character and motives of the actors; the place in which it occurred; and the time or period at which it happened. The characteristics of the time, its tendencies and civilization, should be mentioned.


Narrative proper, or the plot.—This contains the various circumstances, the complication of which forms the transaction to be narrated. It exhibits the incidents in the order and manner in which they were called forth, and the causes operating to produce them. The means employed and the manner of employing them must be stated; the circumstances that either hindered or facilitated the progress of the event should in all cases be prominently set forth.

Conclusion.—The conclusion contains the final result of the action; that to which all the preceding parts tended, and in which they are consummated. The expectation of the reader has been directed to this point during the entire narration; it should satisfy expectation, and should not be so long as to cause attention to flag.

Consequences.—It is often appropriate to add a statement of the consequences, immediate and remote, of the action on the agents and on others.

Reflections.—Reflections are often an important part of a narrative. The writer may give an estimate of the character, importance, and worth of the action. Its nature, the motives leading to it, the means employed, the manner of doing it, are all taken into consideration, and tested as to their conformity to law, morality, and piety; or he may compare it with similar events, or its opposites; or he may draw from it general principles and practical lessons. Whatever the character of the

reflections, they must be subordinate to the narrative, arise naturally from it, and be neither in matter nor tone discordant with the subject.



CHAPTER III.

EXPOSITION.

101. Exposition defined; its objects and aim.—Exposition is the explanation of notions and propositions formed from notions. The term notion is here used in its technical sense to denote a general idea of the point or points in which a number of objects coincide. Its characteristics are:

1. It contains one or more attributes or qualities, and applies to a number of individuals or classes. Thus the notion animal designates the qualities organism, life, sensation, voluntary motion; these marks or attributes form the intension or depth of the notion. It applies to many classes of objects that agree in possessing these qualities; as, lion, horse, dog, etc. This constitutes its extension or breadth. Notions vary greatly with respect to their depth and breadth. Some are simple, containing but a single attribute; others, complex, involving a number of qualities; others again are very broad or general, including a great variety of classes; while others are limited, containing but few classes, or it may be only individuals.

2. The combination of the marks or attributes in a notion is not arbitrary, but corresponds to the real nature of the object to which it is applied.

3. The notion is expressed in language by an arbitrary symbol.

From their nature it is apparent that notions are peculiarly liable to obscurity. The marks or attributes may not be clearly present to the mind; essential qualities may be omitted; qualities not belonging to it may be introduced; the essential and non-essential may be confounded: from any of these causes a

notion may be wanting in distinctness, completeness, and accuracy. The aim of exposition is to guard against all these defects, and to impart to our knowledge clearness, fullness, and order. In the exposition of a notion the points to be noticed are: the name by which it is expressed; the notion itself; its relation to other notions.

102. Verbal explication.—The verbal explication of a notion includes several processes:

1. Give the etymology of the word; *i. e.*, its origin, derivation, and composition. This is necessary when the word is foreign, or compound, or used in a derivative or figurative sense. It is frequently a means of discovering its signification, and of precision in its use. It brings the concrete idea of the radical before the mind, and suggests the analogy on which the use of the word is founded. By this means what was but a lifeless symbol is made a picture that represents the idea with vividness. Let one take such words as precipitate, convert, tribulation, and many others which are vague and abstract, and observe what force is given to them when their primary meaning is ascertained.

2. Give a history of the changes in the form and signification of the word. In scientific works this is often very important.

3. Give the equivalent terms, or synonyms. These do not define the word; if they are better known than the term to be explained, they suggest the sense, but, in most cases, only vaguely.

4. Resolve the ambiguity of the term. The various meanings of an ambiguous term ought to be given before attempting to define it; it is thus separated from the notions with which it is liable to be confounded. See Sec. 47, 3.

103. Logical explication.—The logical explication of a notion consists in analyzing it, first, as to its depth, or intension, and, secondly, as to its breadth, or extension; *i. e.*, in defining and dividing it.

Definition.—Definition is concerned with the intension of a notion; it is a brief, precise declaration of its essential characteristics. The strictly logical definition contains two elements: (1) the genus of the defined notion; *i. e.*, the marks or attributes that it has in common with some other notions: and (2) the specific difference; *i. e.*, the marks by which it is discriminated from these same notions. Thus, if Rhetoric be defined the theory of prose, the genus is theory; by this its similarity to a number of other notions is pointed out; as, the theory of poetry, of music, etc. The specific difference is prose; by this mark this one theory is distinguished from every other.

A logical definition gives only the essential marks, and of these only those which are original; that is, such as are derived immediately from the notion itself, and from which others can be derived, but themselves are not deduced from any other quality. The possession of reason is an essential and original mark of the notion man, and must enter into its definition; but the capacity of speech is a derivative essential, being involved in and deduced from the attribute rationality; it can not therefore form part of a logical definition. It admits only positive characteristics. It tells what the object is; but negative statements merely show from what a notion is excluded, and do not show what it contains. The test of a good definition is its adequacy; it must apply to all of the class, and to no other. When it does not embrace all, it is too narrow; when it includes more than the defined notion applies to, it is too broad. When man is defined to be a rational being, the definition is too broad; when Rhetoric is defined the art of argumentative discourse, the definition is too narrow.

The definition should be expressed with greatest brevity; the words should be used in their ordinary acceptation, and be immediately intelligible. The accumulation of abstract terms, and the use of figurative expressions, should be guarded against.

A definition is intelligible only so far as we understand the meaning of the terms employed in it. When the brief, abstract definition is not sufficient, its terms may be analyzed and de-

fined; the new definitions may again be subjected to the same process, until notions are reached that, as simple, do not admit of definition, or, as well known, do not need it. It often requires a series, or system, of definitions to secure the requisite degree of clearness.

It is a not uncommon error to attempt to define ideas that are from their nature indefinable. The limits of definition should be understood, and the writer ought to be aware what kind of definition the object is susceptible of, if it be definable at all; he will otherwise fall into obscurity and error. Simple notions and notions of individuals can not be defined logically. In the first, a higher notion under which to bring them can not be found; in the latter, there can be given only a number of accidental qualities by which one individual is distinguished from others.

A writer, even in a scientific treatise, is not restricted to logical definitions; he is at liberty, and is often compelled to use in their stead, or to add to them, what the logicians call descriptions. These contain qualities which are not essential, but are better known or more easily suggested to others, and are therefore better suited to the ends of discourse. Thus may be given the properties of an object; *i. e.*, qualities that belong exclusively to the class, not deducible from the qualities contained in the definition, but always found in connection with them; or some attributes which the object has in common with other objects; or even merely accidental qualities.

104. Division.—Division is the analysis of a notion as an extensive whole; it gives the subordinate classes of a notion; its aim is to give order and completeness to our knowledge. The notion is called the divided whole; its parts, the dividing members, which, with reference to their relation to each other, are called coördinates, and with reference to the divided notion are called subordinates or species.

The principle of Division.—The most important and difficult part of the procedure is to find the principle of division.

This is a quality belonging to some of the species, but not to all, by means of which the higher notion or genus is split into parts. Thus, if we are to divide the notion science, we find that some sciences are concerned with the facts and laws of the material universe, and others with the facts and laws of mind, and accordingly we divide science into physical and mental.

It is plain that as a notion may be contemplated from different points of view, different principles of division can be chosen and different divisions made. The notion mankind may be divided with reference to color (Caucasian, Negro, etc.); with reference to regions occupied by them (European, Asiatic, etc.); with reference to descent (Indo-Germanic, Shemitic, etc.); with reference to sex, age, culture, occupation, etc.

As to the principle of division, the rules to be followed are:

1. There must be but one for the same series. It may be a complex notion, but it must not be changed. If it is, there will not be a true division. Should, for example, mankind be divided according to color and age, we should have a cross division; some belonging to one of the members would be found in the other.

2. The principle chosen must be adapted to the purpose of the writer. Different sciences and different purposes require entirely different divisions. A distribution of men that would be of importance in political economy, would not be adapted to the purposes of the moralist.

3. It should be fertile; *i. e.*, afford the greatest number of important determinations. It should accordingly be an essential, not an accidental quality. The division of animals according to the number of legs would be barren.

The process can be repeated on the subordinate notions; each of them can be divided, and their parts again be subdivided until notions are reached that contain under them only individuals. The resolving of these latter into their parts is sometimes called distribution. In the sciences, in which it is important to bring together related, and to separate the different parts, the gradations of notions are marked by different terms. The grand divisions are: I. Primary Divisions; II.

Classes; III. Orders; IV. Genera; V. Species. Several of these are subdivided; as orders, into subordinate orders and tribes; species, into variety and race.

Laws of Division.—The laws of division are:

1. The dividing members must, when taken together, be equal to the divided whole.

2. The dividing members must exclude each other.

3. The division must not be forced; the number of members is not to be determined by some preconceived scheme, but by the nature of the notion and the special purpose of the division. Excess of symmetry should be avoided; it does not follow that because one coördinate is divided, the others also should be.

4. The division should not be too minute; excessive subdivision, instead of aiding in obtaining a general view of the whole and of the relations of the parts, causes indistinctness and confusion.

105. Exposition of the notion in its relations.—The full explication of a notion requires, in addition to its definition and division, the consideration of its various relations: Ex

1. The antecedents and consequents, the circumstances of time and place, and especially the relations of cause and effect, should be mentioned. Under cause, are included all the circumstances without which an event could not have occurred—the occasion and instruments employed, as well as the efficient cause. The enumeration of the effects is a very important part of the exposition of a large number of subjects. The most important ought to be given, and, if numerous, be classified. The less important are either omitted or but briefly mentioned.

2. The notion should be compared with similar notions. It must first be shown wherein the notions agree; as, that they belong to the same genus, or can be referred to the same cause, or have the same end, etc. The points of agreement should be in important qualities; mere superficial resemblances can give no just view of the real nature of the objects compared. But,

as all comparison implies a difference, it must, in the second place, be shown wherein the objects differ. Here, again, care is required not to mistake slight points of difference for essential ones.

3. The notion is further to be explained by comparing it with its opposites; *i. e.*, such as are contradictory or contrary. The contrast excites attention, brings to view the qualities that are to be made prominent, and separates them more distinctly from qualities with which they are liable to be confounded. When the simple mention of the opposite notions does not give sufficient clearness and fullness to the exposition, they may be analyzed and their parts enumerated.

103. Additional instruments of Exposition are:

1. **Examples.**—By an example is meant a particular case, either an individual or species, which is taken as the representative of the entire class. Thus, the botanist explains the nature of a class of plants by means of a single one; the mineralogist takes a single specimen to exhibit the qualities of a class of minerals. The individuals are of no importance except so far as they are representative of a large number; all merely individual peculiarities are overlooked, and those dwelt upon which are characteristic of the class.

In selecting an example, we should seek for one in which the point to be elucidated is prominent, and in which there are the fewest qualities likely to mislead. As it is not always possible to do this, it is sometimes necessary to employ a number of examples, so that by exhibiting the principle under a variety of circumstances, its distinctive character may be apprehended.

2. **Analogy.**—When the direct resemblance of a notion with others can not be exhibited, it may be illustrated by means of analogies. Two objects may not be alike, yet they may stand in identical relations to other objects. Analogy, taken in its strictest sense, is identity of relation; as, for example, the relation of 2 to 4 is identical with that of 8 to 16. In elucidating

ideas which do not lie within the sphere of experience, this is the only mode by which we can suggest them to others. We avail ourselves of it, for example, when in endeavoring to exhibit the relation of God to the human race, we describe him as our Father.

107. **A scheme of Exposition of a Notion.**—A scheme for the exposition of notions, with some of the topics to be used, is here given. It will be understood that all the topics given can not be applied in every subject.

I. **Explication of the term** by which the notion is expressed. When possible a single term should be chosen instead of a phrase.

1. Give the synonymous words.

2. Give the etymology of the word, including its composition, origin, primary and derivative significations, and the history of its changes in form and meaning.

3. Resolve its ambiguity; giving its popular and scientific use, and the sense in which it is to be understood in the discourse.

II. Explication of the Notion in itself.

1. Analyze the notion in its intension. This includes:

(a) The definition, or the declaration of its original and essential qualities, which, in its most concise form, is a logical definition composed of the genus and specific difference.

(b) The derivative essentials, or qualities involved in and deducible from the definition.

(c) Logical description, or a statement of the properties and accidental qualities of the object.

2. Analyze the notion in its extension. The limits to which the division is to be carried depends upon circumstances. It may be either a simple division or a classification.

III. Explication of the Notion in its relation to other Notions.

1. Mention adjuncts, circumstances of time, place, etc.
2. Give its cause, occasion, instruments.
3. State fully the effects, classifying them if numerous.
4. Compare with similar or cognate notions.
5. Compare with diverse, contrary, and contradictory notions.
6. Illustrate by example and analogy.

108. Exposition of a Proposition.—In a proposition notions are bound together so as to form a single thought. It is the object of exposition to ascertain and exhibit this thought precisely and fully.

1. To accomplish this it is necessary, in the first place, to fix the meaning of the terms, and to analyze the notions according to the method already given. Special attention should be given to figurative expressions, and to qualifying words and phrases. The division of the leading notions is an important means of giving clearness to the statement of a general principle; what is affirmed of a whole class is by this means shown to be true of all the subordinate classes; and instead of the vague impression produced by a general statement, there is the distinct one arising from dwelling upon a number of particular statements.

2. The nature of the sentence should be noticed. Sentences are declarative, interrogative, imperative, optative. Whatever its form, it is necessary to draw from it the judgment intended to be expressed. It may also be simple or complex; if complex, the various judgments which are combined must be discriminated, and exhibited in their relation to each other.

3. A proposition may be expounded by repeating the truth in other words. There are various modes of varying a statement. It may be expressed literally and figuratively. It may be given in an amplified and in a sententious form. When this mode is chosen, the expanded declaration ought to precede, and the brief follow; by the first, the thought is made intelligible; by the second, it is conveyed with energy and impressed on the memory. It may be given positively and

negatively. As every affirmation involves the denial of the contradictory judgment, we may affirm a principle both directly and by denying the counter-proposition; as, "All our knowledge is from experience; there is no intuitive knowledge." Frequently a proposition is not intelligible without the statement of its opposite; as, "The poet is born, not made." The negative is necessary in such cases to fix the limits of the positive assertion; even when it is not thus absolutely indispensable, the combination of the two forms contributes greatly to the correct understanding of the proposition.

4. The proposition may be compared with others enouncing the same or a similar judgment. In examining the writings of an author, the various statements of an important principle should be compared; as these limit, qualify, and explain each other, we can gather from them the exact thought, which may not be fully given in any of the separate propositions.

5. The general principle may be made intelligible by examples. The rules to be observed are the same as those given for the elucidation of notions.

6. The judgment may be considered in its relations to other judgments. Here especially may be shown from what it is derived, and what consequences, inferences, and applications may be drawn from it.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT.

109. Argument: what, and what implied in.—An argument is a series of propositions or judgments by which the truth or falsehood of a given proposition is evinced. It always implies doubt or disbelief in reference to a particular question; its aim is to produce conviction. In this it differs from exposition, which seeks to remove ignorance as to the nature and relations of notions. When doubt or disbelief results from ignorance,

exposition alone suffices to remove it. In most cases the truth or falsehood of the question in dispute can be established only by showing that it agrees with or conflicts with some admitted truth.

Nature and degrees of Conviction.—Conviction must not be confounded with mere subjective belief. We may not be able to give the reason why we believe; our belief may be the result of ignorance, prejudice, education, or passion. But this is not conviction; which is a feeling of certainty founded upon a clear apprehension of the grounds or reasons of our belief. As it is the aim of argument to produce conviction, it must set forth the reasons why a proposition is affirmed or denied. It does not merely assert *that* it is true or false, but shows *why* it is.

Conviction is of various degrees. When the possibility of doubt is excluded it is called certainty, or absolute certainty. The objects about which we can obtain absolute certainty are few; we must be content in most matters with probability; that is, with the likelihood that the assertion is true. Probability is also of various degrees—from a stage but little removed from doubt to one approaching certainty. We distinguish the different degrees of probability by using such adjectives as, slight, considerable, high, etc.

Argumentation is either Positive or Negative.—Positive argumentation, or *confirmation*, establishes the truth of a proposition; negative argumentation, or refutation, shows the falsehood of a proposition or the want of validity of an argument.

Both may enter into the same discourse; both employ the same forms of reasoning; but as they have points of difference that require to be noticed, they will be treated of separately.

110. Confirmation.—Confirmation consists in proving the truth of a particular proposition by showing its connection with some admitted truth. It contains:

1. The *Thesis*, or that which is laid down to be proved. It must be a categorical proposition, *i. e.*, a direct, unconditional assertion of the agreement or disagreement of two notions. Ex

2. The *Premises*, or reasons, which are judgments true and well known by which the truth of the thesis is established.

The force and validity of the reasoning depend upon the truth of the premises, and their relation to each other and to the thesis. When the premises are true and their connection strictly logical, the conclusion is true. But the argument is not valid when any of the premises are false, or when, though true, they are not in proper relation to each other, or when they are less known and certain than what we would prove by them. The certainty of the conclusion can never be greater than that of the weakest of the premises.

111. Preparation of the Question.—When the question is complicated, a number of preliminary procedures are often necessary to prevent misunderstanding, to obviate difficulties, and to prepare for the introduction of the arguments. These preliminaries are included under the head of—The preparation of the Question.

Importance of.—The first rule to be observed in arguing upon any question is to lay down with the greatest possible precision the proposition that is to be established. This is necessary in order to select appropriate arguments. When there is uncertainty as to what conclusion is to be reached, it is impossible to select premises from which it can be naturally or necessarily deduced. Some of the worst vices of reasoning, such as begging the question and irrelevant conclusion, often result from the neglect of this rule.

It is also necessary in order to determine the relations of the various arguments employed. In discussing a question, it is often necessary to introduce subordinate questions, which have to be settled before we can proceed with the main argument. There is great danger that in discussing these subordinate points the main issue will be lost sight of. This occurs most

frequently in oral discussions. The only means of preventing this evil is to fix clearly the issue, recall it frequently, and judge of all that is introduced by its relation to it.

The rule is to be observed even when circumstances make it expedient not to enounce explicitly the thesis. The clearness of the writer's view will be communicated to the entire discourse; the reader will gather from its drift the precise point to be proved, and will receive the impression intended to be produced. When, on the other hand, there is the least vagueness in the writer's view, the reader will not be able to tell how far he agrees with him and how far he differs from him; will often mistake the question; and will fail to see the bearing and force of his reasoning.

et **Mode of preparing the Question.**—The means towards preparing the question are:

et 1. Explication of the terms of the question. The rules for this process are given in the chapter on Exposition (Sec. 102-107). To what extent the explication should be carried depends on the nature of the subject. A full exposition is sometimes needed; on other occasions a brief resolution of the ambiguity of a single term will suffice. It ought not to be carried further than is indispensable to prepare the way for the arguments to be presented. Only such terms should be explained as are liable to be misunderstood; and only those meanings should be given which affect the question.

The careful discrimination of the meanings of words aids in finding arguments, guards the reasoner against the many errors arising from ambiguous words, and prepares him to meet the objections, solve the difficulties, and expose the fallacies originating from the same source.

et 2. Fixing the nature and extent of the question. (The process is explained in Sec. 108). The character of the reasoning varies with that of the proposition to be proved. Arguments that would be valid to establish a matter of fact, are not suited to prove a purely theoretical proposition; so, also, what is sufficient to show the possibility of an object, will be inadequate

to prove that it actually is or that it must be. The exact nature of the assertion must be settled before searching for arguments; whether it is of a matter of fact or a general truth; whether of what can be or is likely to be, or of what actually is, or of what must be; whether it is made absolutely or with qualifications and restrictions. The quantity of the terms should be marked. In ordinary conversation we allow many ellipses, but in reasoning we must guard against the misunderstandings that arise from their use. When any of the terms are undesigned, so that it is not apparent in what extent they are to be understood, the proposition is ambiguous. "A reasoner who expresses particular assertions without explicit limitation, must do so either because he designs to be ambiguous, or because he thinks confusedly, or because he is (perhaps unconsciously) suppressing some step in the reasoning, which it would be right to force out into explicit statement." [*Spalding's Logic*, pp. 59, 60.]

The question may be a complicated one, involving a number of distinct points, as is the case in many resolutions. The complex proposition is then to be resolved into its several points or heads, in order that the arguments bearing upon each may be distinctly brought out and placed in their proper connection.

et 3. The statement of what is conceded. In every controversy two things must be carefully distinguished. There are certain points in which both sides agree, and which therefore are excluded from the discussion; and there is a definite question proposed for decision. It is advisable to state what points are not disputed, or what, as not an essential part of the question although connected with it, is conceded. By this means the real issue is set in a clearer light, and many prejudices and false impressions are removed.

When the writer does not wish to argue a particular point involved in the question, but would reserve the right to do so afterwards, he may waive it. This is not the same as conceding it; and he must make it plain, that while declining for the present to dispute it, he does not admit its truth.

After having shown what is not in dispute, the thesis should be laid down with all the necessary limitations and qualifications. If any of the original terms are ambiguous, paraphrases and definitions should be substituted. Care ought to be taken not to advance more than the writer intends to establish. The conclusion of the reasoning must be identical with the thesis as laid down.

4. Enumeration of the various contrary opinions. In affirming one proposition we may deny several contrary ones; as in asserting the superiority of the republican form of government, we virtually deny the superiority of every other form. In difficult and abstruse questions it is important to state explicitly the contrary opinions of which the thesis is the denial. The advantages of so doing are, that it prevents the hearer from supposing that there is but a single alternative, and, by exhibiting the thesis in contrast with the several antagonistic opinions, presents it with greater fullness and clearness.

112. Invention of Arguments.—The question having been prepared, the reasons which evince the truth of the thesis are in the next place to be gathered and arranged. We have to consider, first, the various kinds of reasoning, or the division of arguments; next, their selection, and then their arrangement.

113. Direct and Indirect Reasoning.—A proposition may be proved either directly or indirectly. In the first case the grounds or reasons are laid down, and the truth to be proved is inferred from them. In the second case the procedure is more complex. The truth of the thesis is not proved immediately, but by showing the falsehood of its contradictory. Indirect reasoning is founded upon the logical law, that of two contradictory judgments only one can be true, and one must be true, so that we are warranted to conclude from the truth of one contradictory to the falsehood of the other, and from the falsehood of one to the truth of the other. The usual mode of proceeding is, to state in a disjunctive proposition both the

thesis and its contradictory, and then, assuming the truth of the contradictory proposition, to show that it involves some false principle, or leads to consequences that are manifestly false. The proposition assumed must consequently be false, and its contradictory (the thesis we design to prove) must be true.

Ex.—If the thesis is, Man is a free agent, then the antithesis is, Man is not a free agent. To prove the thesis directly, we should have to lay down positive arguments; as, the consciousness of the power of contrary choice, the consciousness of responsibility, etc. The indirect proof would take some such form as this: Man is either free or he is not free. Let us assume that he is not free. If he is not free, he can not, in cases of conflicting motives, choose, but must blindly follow one of the impulses. But we know from consciousness that he can decide between conflicting motives; therefore it is false that he is not free. He must therefore be free.

Conditions of the validity of Indirect Reasoning.—In order that indirect probation may be valid, we must be sure, in the first place, that the proposition assumed as a premise is the contradictory, not merely a contrary of the thesis. There can be but one contradictory of a given judgment; there may be several judgments in contrary opposition to it. While in asserting the truth of one proposition we deny that of all its contraries, we do not in denying a proposition assert the truth of some one of its contraries. If we deny that a color is red, we do not affirm that it is blue. In the second place, the falsehood or absurdity to which the contradictory judgment has been reduced must be real. To show that something is uncommon or incomprehensible is not proving that it is impossible.

Comparative advantages of the two methods.—The direct method is the one ordinarily used. It is more in accordance with the natural course of thought to deduce the truth of a proposition from its positive grounds. Both methods are valid. The indirect excludes the contradictory more definitely, and often gives a greater certainty than the direct, but it offers no reasons to confirm the truth. The direct, on the other hand,

affords the satisfying conviction that arises from perceiving the connection of a truth with other undoubted truths. The indirect is much more liable to fallacies.

As a general rule, the direct is to be preferred. There are, however, occasions in which it is more convenient to employ the indirect. The nature of the subject or the character of the audience may make direct proof difficult; or the contradictory of the thesis is better known, and we can exhibit its absurdity in a striking manner. It is often the only means of dealing with the ignorant and prejudiced, and with unreasonable and disingenuous opponents. False doctrines and untenable, pre-tentious systems are in no way so safely and surely exposed as by showing their internal contradictions, and that they lead by legitimate reasoning to the impossible and the absurd.

Reasoning is most effectual when the two methods are combined. In this case, we first show that no other proposition than the thesis can be true, and then show why it is true.

114. Direct reasoning is divided into deductive and inductive.

Ex **Deductive Reasoning.**—In deductive reasoning we proceed from a general truth to a particular; from the whole to the part. A judgment is derived from a more general one by means of an intermediate judgment; the conclusion contains nothing more than is virtually contained in the premises. The argument is composed of three essential parts—a general rule, which may be either a universal truth or a generalization of experience; the application of this rule to a particular case; and the proposition drawn from them.

Ex.—All bodies moving in elliptic orbits are subject to the law of gravitation. (General rule.) Comets move in elliptic orbits. (Application of the rule.) Therefore comets are subject to the law of gravitation. (Conclusion.)

The general rule is called the *sumption*; the application of the rule, the *subsumption*; the inferred proposition, the *con-*

clusion. The *sumption* and *subsumption* form the antecedents or premises; the conclusion is sometimes called the consequent.

Inductive Reasoning.—Induction, in its widest sense, includes all the modes of reasoning by which what is unknown is inferred from what is known. The conclusion is not merely an explicit statement of what is implicit in the premises; it contains more than is involved in them. The laws of formal logic do not answer to test the validity of this mode of reasoning; it has its own special laws, which are given in inductive logic. It includes:

1. **Induction in the limited sense of the word;** by which we conclude that what belongs to some of the species or individuals of a class belongs to the whole class; as when we infer that because gold, silver, and copper melt, therefore all metals will melt; or that all great conquerors are great lawgivers, because Alexander, Cæsar, Justinian, Charlemagne, and William the Conqueror were lawgivers.

2. **Analogy,** or the inference from the partial similarity of two or more objects to their complete similarity. Here we do not conclude that because a number of objects (A, B, C, D, etc.), belonging to the same class, possess in common the quality *m*, therefore we may expect to find this quality in all the individuals or species of the class; but that, because A and B agree in certain essential characters (*l, m, n*), it is likely that the quality *r* which is found in A will be found in B. The argument is not, that because some of a class have a certain quality, therefore all have it; but that, as two objects resemble each other in several points, they are likely to resemble each other in all. Thus we infer that the planet Mars is probably inhabited as the earth is, since it resembles the earth in the possession of an atmosphere, clouds, water, etc.

Example, by which we infer that something will prove true in one case because it happened in another; as, that Harvey,

or any other discoverer, will be persecuted because Galileo was persecuted. One form of this argument is the argument *a fortiori*, which consists in proving that a thing being true in one case is more evidently so in another in which the circumstances are more favorable. It is but an application of the principle that the greater includes the less. Thus, we infer that if a man is cruel to his fellow-men, much more will he be cruel to brutes.

3. **Signs**, by which we seek to prove the probable existence of a fact by adducing some other fact or mark that always or in most cases precedes, accompanies, or follows it. We can thus infer from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect; or, on the other hand, may argue from the effect to the cause.

The argument from cause to effect is generally called *a priori* reasoning. Its formula is stated by Whately thus: "As far as any cause, popularly speaking, has a tendency to produce a certain effect, so far its existence is an argument for that of the effect. If the cause be fully sufficient and no impediments intervene, the effect in question follows certainly; and the nearer we approach to this, the stronger the argument."

The force of this argument is to establish the antecedent probability of the thesis; it gives grounds for believing that what is maintained is likely, by showing that there are influences that have a tendency to produce it. Its efficiency depends upon our certainty as to (1) the existence of the causes that are assigned, (2) their sufficiency to produce the effects attributed to them, and (3) the absence of counteracting influences.

By this mode of argument we infer that a deed was committed by a certain person, because he had a motive to do it, or because it accords with his character, and that an event will take place because all the usual conditions of its occurrence exist. This man is the murderer, for he coveted the property; or he is revengeful. Lying is hateful to God, for he is the God

of truth. Dew will fall, for the night is clear and calm, the atmosphere moist.

The argument from effect to cause is sometimes called the *a posteriori* argument. It proves from the existence of a certain phenomenon the presence of a circumstance that is either its cause or its condition. As far as any phenomenon or combination of phenomena is the condition of a given effect, so far is the existence of the effect evidence of the existence of the condition. Thus, we suspect one of robbery, because the stolen goods are found in his possession; we suspect a man to be the perpetrator of a murder, because he was seen in company with the murdered man, his clothes were bloody, etc.

115. Extrinsic Arguments.—All the arguments that have so far been given belong to the class of *intrinsic* arguments. They are obtained from the thesis by the exposition of its essential notions. There are others that are extrinsic, which must be sought for outside of the subject. To this class belong laws, legal decisions, resolutions, treaties, testimony, etc. They may all be embraced under two heads: 1. Testimony. 2. Authority.

1. **Testimony.**—By means of testimony we establish the truth of a fact that is beyond the sphere of our own personal experience or that of our readers. It can be employed only in matters of experience; general truths, which are gained by comparison and inference, are not objects of testimony. Testimony is either immediate or mediate. It is immediate when the witness reports what he himself observed; it is mediate when he reports a fact upon the testimony of others. As a report is apt to be altered in its transmission from one person to another, direct testimony is preferred to indirect.

In estimating the credibility of testimony we must consider the competency of the witness, *i. e.*, his fitness to observe and report the fact, and his veracity, *i. e.*, his reputation for truthfulness, and the absence of motives to testify to what is false. The presumption in favor of the truthfulness of a witness is

weakened when it is found that his testimony is for his personal benefit; it is strengthened when it leads to suffering or loss on his part.

Testimony may be given indirectly. The writer or speaker may not intend to testify to a fact, but by incidental hints and allusions when treating of a different matter, he shows that he takes for granted its truth. The testimony of adversaries is often given in this undesigned manner.

When the same fact is reported by several witnesses, it must be ascertained whether there has been any concert between them. If concert is excluded, the concurrence itself, independent of the character of the witnesses, proves the truth of the fact reported. Such an agreement would be impossible unless the occurrence had taken place. It is very important, in dealing with concurrent testimony, to discriminate between variations in unessential points, which will always occur when the witnesses speak the truth, and contradictory statements.

2. **Authority.**—When a declaration is made, not as to an individual fact of experience, but to a general truth, or the cause of some phenomenon, or what is beyond the range of observation, it receives the name of *authority*. That one event succeeded another is an object of testimony; but that the one always follows the other, or that the first is the cause of the second, is a matter of inference. To declare that a drug was administered to a sick person, that peculiar symptoms were afterwards manifested, and that the patient died, is testimony; but to declare that death was caused by a particular poison, that the symptoms were those always accompanying that kind of poisoning, is not testimony. These are general truths about which there may be a great diversity of judgment among honest and able men. So when a judgment is pronounced respecting the genuineness of the handwriting from its resemblance to that of the supposed writer, it is an inference drawn from comparing the writing with a standard in the mind of the one who pronounces the judgment. All such declarations belong to authority.

To this head are referred precedents and decisions of courts.

116. The selection of Arguments.—The arguments gathered should be carefully weighed, and those be selected which are not only applicable, but decisive. Weak arguments excite suspicion, and destroy the force of the valid arguments with which they are connected. It is often extremely difficult to tell what are the strong and what the weak arguments. We apply these terms with scarcely any discrimination, forgetting that they are merely relative. In deciding upon the efficiency of an argument we must consider two things:

1. *The nature of the matter to be proved.*—The strength of an argument can not be determined by the source whence it is drawn; that which in one class of subjects would be of great force, would be feeble in another class. Extrinsic proof is usually regarded as of inferior value. In theoretical subjects it holds, if admitted at all, a subordinate place; but when the question is one of fact, it is more decisive than any other. In theological discussions the appeal is to the teachings of Scripture; in legal proceedings, to the decisions of the courts; in both authority is of supreme importance. When the question is as to a future event, the *a priori* argument is the most decisive: analogy and example are also employed. These kinds of proof are therefore the most important in senatorial eloquence, which is occupied chiefly with questions of expediency. When the aim is to establish the presence of a certain cause, the *a posteriori* argument is the most effective; when the probability of a past event is to be shown, testimony is preferred, and after it, the argument *a posteriori*. These, accordingly, are the most important forms of proof in judicial oratory.

2. *The condition of those addressed.*—It is not necessary to dwell upon what is so evident, that what is complete proof to those who have some acquaintance with a subject, is often ineffective with the ignorant. When our purpose is to convince others, we must in choosing arguments consider the degree of intelligence and the capacity of attention of those whom we address.

It is not less important to regard their moral condition. A different procedure is necessary when we address candid minds, who are willing to hear and weigh the reasons presented, from that which is proper when we deal with those who are prejudiced and captious; whom we can hardly expect to convince, but whom it is desirable to silence.

117. Arrangement of Arguments.—The efficiency of arguments depends greatly on their arrangement. A skillful disposition will often give strength to proofs comparatively weak, while by a defective arrangement the strongest are rendered powerless. The talents of the reasoner are shown principally in his success in combining his materials into one compact whole, in which each argument has its proper place, and is exhibited in the clearest light, and in its relation to the other parts and to the thesis.

Analytic and Synthetic order.—Either the analytic or the synthetic method of arrangement may be adopted. In the former the question is stated first; the answer is then given; and the arguments follow, proceeding from the less to the more general. This is the natural and logical order. But when the opinion we advocate is unpopular, or is in danger of being misunderstood, it is sometimes expedient to adopt the synthetic order. In this we begin with the most general of the premises, which those we address will readily assent to, and conduct them gradually to the conclusion.

Principal and Subordinate Arguments.—Great care is required in arranging coördinate and subordinate arguments. We may adduce a number of independent arguments each of which is intended to prove the truth of the thesis. Thus, in proving the existence of God we may argue from the evidences of design in creation, from the moral nature of man, and from the idea of perfection. Each of these constitutes a separate, independent argument in support of our proposition. They are all coördinate. But it is often necessary to prove the truth of

some of the coördinate arguments. The proofs in this case are not intended to establish the truth of the thesis, but of a proposition subordinate to it. These are subordinate arguments. It is important to discriminate these two classes carefully, and in arranging our materials leave no doubt as to their rank.

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments.—When different kinds of arguments enter into a discourse, they must be so arranged that the first shall prepare for the second. What follows must strengthen the impression made by what precedes. In order to do this, the peculiar force of the various classes of arguments must be carefully noticed.

Intrinsic arguments should precede the extrinsic. Among intrinsic arguments some naturally come first, others last; and when this difference is disregarded they lose much of their efficiency. The first place belongs to those which establish the possibility or probability of what is asserted. After having raised a presumption in favor of our position by the *a priori* argument, the attendant circumstances and testimony can be introduced, and following these, examples and analogy. By this method the anticipation of the truth of the thesis is first excited, and then confirmed by the various circumstances adduced. If the process is reversed, the effect of the arguments from example, analogy, etc., is counteracted by the suspicion which is always felt when we can find no sufficient reason for the fact alleged. To overcome this a greater number of decisive proofs is required; whereas, after having established the antecedent probability by showing the existence of a cause adequate to the effect, a few well chosen circumstances will remove all reasonable doubt.

118. Syllogistic and popular modes of arguing.—The strictly logical, or syllogistic, mode of argumentation is stiff and tedious, and is rarely used. The popular mode differs from it in several respects.

The forms of the propositions are varied, the order of premises is changed, and their terms transposed.

The syllogisms are abridged by suppressing some of their members. The omitted premise must be one that the mind can easily supply, else the syllogism will lack perspicuity. The reasoning may be amplified by adding to one or both of the premises the reasons of its truth. By this means the proofs used to establish the conclusion are kept before the reader's mind, and as he sees them with their evidence he obtains a clearer knowledge and firmer conviction.

Perspicuity must not be sacrificed in the endeavor to avoid a too scholastic mode of reasoning. The following rules are to be observed:

1. The premises must be recognized *as premises*. Frequently the statement is so defective, that it is uncertain whether a proposition is an argument, an explanation, or an illustration. The premises should be made prominent in their real character. They must not be merely incidentally mentioned, or concealed in subordinate clauses and sentences, or mixed with irrelevant matter.

2. The exact connection between the arguments and the conclusion should be made apparent; especially whether each argument is valid in itself, or is intended to be combined with others to form a single argument. The distinction between coördinate and subordinate arguments should be distinctly marked.

3. Avoid metaphorical expressions, and an excess of words in laying down the main positions.

4. After fixing the meaning of a term do not deviate from it. It is better to repeat the same terms than by varying them to run the risk of being misunderstood.

119. Refutation.—Refutation consists in proving that a given proposition is false, or that a particular argument is not valid.

A proposition is refuted indirectly by proving the truth of its contradictory. The confirmation of a thesis is thus the virtual refutation of its antithesis. A proposition is refuted directly by showing that it conflicts with a recognized truth, whether a

law of thought, an axiom of morals, or a fact of experience. The different kinds of argument may all be used for this purpose.

The refutation of arguments demands a more detailed consideration.

Before proceeding to the examination of arguments, we must ascertain what is the conclusion intended to be established, and whether it involves the denial of the position that we maintain. If it does not, there is no dispute.

If the conclusion be antagonistic to our own, the process by which it has been reached must be tested by the laws of logic. The procedure varies with the nature of the reasoning.

If the reasoning is deductive, we must, in the first place, ascertain whether, admitting the premises to be true, the conclusion is legitimately drawn from them. The tests are few and simple; and the defects of the reasoning can be made apparent to those who are familiar with logical processes, by simply stating it in syllogistic form, or in symbols. It is not always easy to expose formal fallacies in addressing persons destitute of logical training. The most convenient, and often a very effective mode, is, to introduce an argument identical in form with that to be refuted, in which the falsehood of the conclusion is manifest. We thus show that if such a way of reasoning is valid, we can prove the truth of a palpable absurdity.

If the form of reasoning is correct, it then remains to examine the principles of proof that have been assumed; in other words, to investigate the truth of the premises. We may impugn either the sumption or the subsumption, or both.

The falsehood of the sumption, or general rule, may be shown in various ways. It may be shown to prove too much. Assuming it to be true, we deduce consequences from it which are generally admitted to be false, or are rejected as false by those who have advanced the general rule. The argument against the study of Rhetoric, that it can be employed dishonestly or for a bad purpose, is refuted in this manner. The assumed premise is, whatever is capable of being abused should be con-

denmed: if this be true, the use of language, religion, etc., are to be condemned, for they are susceptible of abuse.

The supmption may be only an apparently general truth. There are many loose generalizations expressed as universally true, while they are but particular truths; they are true of some of the class, or of the majority, but not of all. We are not justified in applying them to particular cases. If it is argued that a certain individual will seek revenge upon one who has done him wrong, for injured men seek revenge; the reasoning is fallacious. The assumed general truth is not a general one; and is refuted by bringing an example of the contrary.

The subsumption is refuted by showing that the general rule is not applicable to the case in hand. We refute an inductive argument, in the limited sense of the word, by denying the sufficiency of the instances; an analogy, by showing that the resemblance is merely superficial and metaphorical, or that points of difference have been overlooked which vitiate the analogy; an example, by proving that it is not parallel in the essential point, by counter-examples, and by showing that owing to different circumstances the inference drawn from the particular case is not warranted.

84 120. Rules of Refutation.—1. The refutation should be directed against what has been adversely alleged. The grossest violation of this rule is answering a position that is not maintained by the opposite side—the misapprehension or change of the issue. Inexperienced and loose reasoners often reply to more than is alleged; while it is one of the most common forms of sophistry to answer less; a subordinate point is taken and the rest is left untouched.

2. Avoid wasting time on irrelevant and trivial parts of the opposite argument. It is not necessary to notice every weakness and defect; the strong points—those on which the decision of the question depends—are the only ones to be discussed. Irrelevant topics are often introduced by sophistical reasoners to draw the attention of their opponents from the essential

points. A cautious reasoner will never allow himself to be deceived by such arts, but will pass over all foreign and unnecessary matter and seize on that which is vital to the question.

3. State the arguments to be answered candidly and forcibly. It is characteristic of all great reasoners to exhibit boldly in its full strength the argument they intend to subvert.

4. It is often expedient to reduce an argument to its strict logical form; to supply suppressed premises; to separate a complex chain of reasoning into its parts, and arrange them so that they can be answered in order. Besides exhibiting the argument with greater distinctness, we are thus frequently able to expose the weakness of the opposite side, by showing that many arguments apparently distinct are in reality but repetitions of a single argument.

5. If any of the objections urged are found to be unanswerable, their validity should be acknowledged. A disputant will never gain any thing by attempting to hold a manifestly untenable position.

6. It must be borne in mind that to refute an argument is not the same thing as proving a thesis or disproving a position of the opposite side. The reasons brought forward may be shown to be insufficient, and the proposition nevertheless be true. To complete the work of refutation, we should, after having shown that the arguments produced are not sufficient to establish the truth of a particular proposition, proceed in the next place to show that there are unanswerable, positive arguments against it.

7. Finally, we should ascertain and exhibit the grounds of the erroneous opinion, or, in other words, account for its origin. The refutation of an error is never complete and entirely satisfactory until this is done.

121. Scheme and Topics of an Argument.—The points to be considered in constructing an argument, and the topics to be used, are given in the following scheme. It is very seldom that the scheme just as it is here presented is adapted to an

actual discourse. The peculiar aim of a discourse and the circumstances of the case will determine what order should be observed. It must be remembered also that not all of the topics can be used in every question. The scheme only exhibits the essential parts of a complete argumentation; the proper use of it depends on the intelligence and judgment of the pupil.

I. Introduction or Preface.—Various topics may be used, as, 1. The importance of the question either in itself or from its connection with questions of acknowledged importance. It may be shown how the decision of this question will affect that of others. 2. The circumstances that have led to the dispute; the origin, spread, effects of erroneous views on the subject.

II. Preparation of the question, including—1. An explanation more or less full of all the terms of the question that are liable to be misunderstood. The topics to be employed are given in sec. 107.

2. The state of the controversy, which involves:

(a) An explicit statement of what is held in common or conceded by all sides, and which therefore is excluded from the dispute.

(b) A statement with all necessary qualifications and limitations of the question proposed for decision.

(c) A brief, candid declaration of the various opinions on the subject.

(d) The enunciation of the thesis, or proposition we intend to confirm.

III. Confirmation, or proof of the truth of the thesis. The kind of proofs to be employed, and their order, will vary with the nature of the question, of the controversy, etc.

The topics to be used in searching for proofs are: 1. Definition of the fundamental notions of the thesis. 2. Genus and species (reason from the genus to species, or, as in induction, from the species to the genus). 3. Cause and effect. 4. Sim-

ilarity and difference. 5. Testimony and authority. 6. Concomitant circumstances, as of time, place, manner, etc.

IV. Refutation, which includes:

1. The setting aside of the exceptions, limitations, and distinctions that have been made by an opponent.

2. Answering objections made to our arguments.

(a) Is the objection pertinent? does it contradict what is advanced by us? If it does not, it is to be thrown aside as foreign to the question. It will suffice to show that it does not meet any position of ours.

(b) Is the form of the reasoning correct? *i. e.*, is the conclusion fairly deduced from the premises?

(c) Are both the premises true?

3. Refutation of the arguments adduced to prove the counterposition.

4. Positive arguments to show the falsehood of the opposite opinion.

V. Conclusion, containing a recapitulation of the main points.

PART IV.

THE PRINCIPAL FORMS OF PROSE.

122. Preliminary.—In this part we shall consider the principal forms of prose discourse.

It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to make a satisfactory classification of literary productions. Their number is so great and they are susceptible of so many modifications and combinations that we are frequently left in doubt as to the class to which a particular work belongs. "Genius," says Lessing, "laughs at the restrictions of critics."

Several divisions of prose.—Prose, taken in the limited sense in which we have employed the word as denoting compositions designed to accomplish an outward end, that is, to inform and instruct, to convince, and to persuade, admits of several divisions.

1. It is divided into oral and written discourse. A discourse intended to be heard by an audience composed of a number of persons differs in its materials, form, and style from one that can be deliberately read.

2. It is divided as to external form without reference to its contents into continuous discourse, in which the development of the theme proceeds without interruption; dialogue, in which two or more take part in developing the theme; letters, which are directed to an absent person, and are a substitute for oral communication.

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3. It is divided as to its matter and end into didactic prose, historical prose, and oratorical prose.

CHAPTER I.

THE DIALOGUE AND EPISTOLARY PROSE.

123. Introductory.—The continuous method being adapted to all subjects that require an uninterrupted development of their contents, is the method almost universally employed in literary works. It will be fully illustrated in the following chapters. This chapter is confined to the consideration of the dialogue and epistolary prose.

124. The Dialogue.—In a dialogue there is a communication of different and opposing views on a particular subject between two or more speakers. It is an imitation of an actual conversation, and may be employed to exhibit a character, unfold an action, or discuss a truth. The rules of rhetoric apply to the last mentioned use.

The characters.—The characters represented as taking part in a dialogue should be persons, not mere abstractions—such as virtues and vices—and each distinguished from the others by his peculiar modes of thought and feeling. When abstract qualities are introduced instead of persons, the dialogue is without life and reality; when the characters are not discriminated, there is no interchange of opinions. The characters may be fictitious or taken from history or from contemporaries.

Subjects.—The only subjects suitable for a dialogue are those which admit of being contemplated from different points of view and give rise to controversies in which differences of

character can manifest themselves. This kind of composition is adapted particularly to the analytical method of investigation. It affords an opportunity of tracing the subject through its successive stages, and of bringing forward and removing misapprehensions, difficulties, and objections.

125. The Requisites of a Dialogue.—The qualities of a properly constructed dialogue are as follows: 1. It must exhibit a conflict of views resulting in a mutual understanding. A dialogue is neither a series of questions and answers, nor a monologue, but the unfolding of a theme by the exchange of opposite arguments and opinions. The conflicting views ought to be exhibited in their full force by their respective representatives. At the same time, since the great aim of the dialogue is not merely to manifest differences but to reconcile them and lead to a mutual agreement between the parties, a reconciliation must grow naturally and necessarily out of the conflict exhibited in the body of the dialogue.

2. It must be appropriate to the subject and to the characters taking part in it. When well known persons are introduced as speakers, no views should be ascribed to them inconsistent with their known character and opinions: when the characters are fictitious their consistency must be preserved throughout. The tone of the dialogue should be influenced by the circumstances of time and place in which it is represented as being held; the scene should harmonize with the subject discussed.

3. Much greater liberty of arrangement is allowed than in continuous discourse. Instead of an unbroken development of the theme the course of thought is modified by the questions, answers, and remarks of the different parties. Digressions are permitted when they throw light on the point under consideration, or add to the interest and liveliness of the discourse. But there is a real and natural connection between the thoughts, and every question and answer should be a response to what has just preceded.

4. A dialogue is a work of art, and while retaining the

features of actual conversation, it is elevated above it. Greater clearness, precision, and elegance; greater nicety in the choice of words and care in the structure of sentences, and a greater elevation of style distinguish it from ordinary conversation.

126. Epistolary Prose.—A letter is a communication of facts and thoughts to an absent person. A correspondence may be regarded as a conversation in writing, and the letter as a substitute for oral communication. Narration, description, exposition, argument, and persuasion may enter into it; its subjects may be drawn from literature, science, art, private or public affairs.

Numerous divisions of letters have been made; the most familiar is into business letters, occasional letters (of ceremony, politeness, and the like), didactic letters, and letters of friendship. Most of those that have a place in literature belong to the last-named class.

It would be tedious and useless to give special rules for these different classes. We shall mention briefly the general characteristics of epistolary prose.

127. Its general characteristics.—1. Unity, so essential a quality of other species of composition, is not looked for in a letter. A number of topics, having no connection with each other, can be introduced, their selection being determined by their relation to the one addressed; and no formal transition is needed in passing from one topic to another.

2. The epistolary style is an imitation of the conversation of intelligent and refined persons. It is free from formality, pedantry, and whatever gives an appearance of labor. To elaborate a letter, as we would a purely literary production, would destroy its charm, and even its distinctive character. A letter never pleases if written for the public. On the other hand, it is free from the faults of ordinary conversation. It is purer and more correct; the rapidity of oral discourse allows many violations of grammatical law to pass unnoticed, which

are great blemishes in a written composition. It is less prolix; what, in a conversation is expanded into its details, is conveyed in a few lines, often but lightly indicated, the reader being left to fill up the outline. At the same time it demands a high degree of clearness, since the person to whom the communication is made is absent, and has not an opportunity to clear up difficulties immediately by proposing questions.

3. The natural course of thought and feeling is followed. The effort to appear witty and elegant, a profusion of ornaments, and rhetorical display are incompatible with the nature and aim of this kind of composition. The sentences should be short and simple; periods are here out of place.

4. Appropriateness is a most important quality. It is an unpardonable fault in a letter to be wanting in appropriateness—either in matter or form—to the character and circumstances of the recipient, and to the relations existing between him and the writer. Frankness and self-respect joined to a delicate consideration for the character, position, and claims of the one addressed must give to a letter its tone; otherwise, instead of producing a favorable impression, it will offend and fail to attain its object.

This rule involves a strict observance of the conventionalities and mechanical details of a letter, such as the date and place of writing, the forms of address, subscription, name of the recipient.

CHAPTER II.

DIDACTIC PROSE.

128. What is included in Didactic Prose?—Didactic prose includes all compositions the aim of which is to give instruction. It addresses the understanding, and is concerned only with general and abstract truths. What is individual and concrete is admitted merely as subservient to the general. All appeals to feeling and passion are excluded from it, as are also

narration and description that give actual facts as such without investigating the general principles involved in them.

The forms of Didactic Prose are: Scientific prose, popular scientific prose, and criticism.

129. Scientific Prose.—Scientific, sometimes called dogmatic, prose is the methodical presentation of the principles of a science. Its general characteristics are:

1. Its aim is to convey a complete and connected view of the truth, which the reader can understand and appropriate.

2. Its matter must have the characters of real truth and importance. On the part of the writer, a thorough knowledge of the subject in its principles and history is required.

3. As in this species of discourse the understanding is principally addressed, the form must be adapted to the requirements of the understanding. These are clearness, distinctness, completeness, certainty, and method. The beauty of didactic prose consists in the combination of the real truth of the thoughts and the logical perfection of the form.

4. There is no communication of knowledge where the truth is not understood in its relation to other truths. It is therefore necessary that the separate statements be not only intelligible in themselves, but be seen in their proportions and bearings; as included in or growing out of others; as connected with what precedes and as leading to what follows.

5. Perspicuity is an essential requisite. It is to be remembered that this is a relative quality, being determined in part by the nature of the matter, and in part by relation of the subject to the hearer.

There are subjects which, from the nature of the matter, are not capable of being clearly exhibited. Perspicuity is not to be purchased at the cost of accuracy and thoroughness. Scientific clearness,—the clearness of what is known to a few, or may be readily discovered by their self-activity, is not such as is intelligible to all. The law of perspicuity is violated by attempting to discuss scientifically subjects which lie within

the sphere of speculation only; by carrying analysis too far; by seeking to define and prove primitive facts.

The relation of the reader to the subject must also be taken into account in pronouncing upon the clearness or want of clearness of a scientific discourse. It is a writer's privilege to select the class whose requirements he will endeavor to meet. If the reader does not stand upon the level, possess the attainments and powers of thought which the writer presupposes in his readers, he will find the work obscure. If the work is intended for those already informed on the subject, an acquaintance with the elementary notions and technical terms, the history of the science, and the various controversies that have been agitated, will be presumed; inferences may be drawn and allusions made, which will be unintelligible to others.

130. The use of general terms.—From the nature of the matter of didactic discourse, general terms are freely employed. As these are but symbols which do not convey distinct images to the mind, they are liable to be misunderstood: It is a fault to accumulate them; where it does not interfere with the ends of the discourse, concrete terms should be used. The excessive employment of abstract words gives an indistinctness to the presentation. The idea may be gathered, but it requires an effort, and the impression made is always feeble.

The Latin element of our language is more extensively used in this species of composition than in any of the others. This is inevitable. Authors in whose writings upon popular subjects the Anglo-Saxon element predominates prefer Latin terms in scientific discussions.

The use of technical terms.—The use of technical terms is a distinctive peculiarity of didactic prose. With the development of science, there must grow up a nomenclature. The generalizations of science are not those of the vulgar; and the difference between scientific and loose popular thinking can not but be manifested in the use of language. The objections to

the employment of technical terms in scientific treatises are frivolous. Such terms are necessary for many reasons. (1) They are needed to express combinations of thoughts for which the language has no name. Many qualities and relations of objects which are neglected in popular thinking require to be specially designated in science. (2) Ordinary words are used loosely, and are applied to objects with which they have no real connection; clearness and distinctness require that such occasions of error be avoided. (3) Without technical terms, the work of scientific analysis and criticism is impossible. Many useless controversies have originated in a defective nomenclature, and many erroneous views have been perpetuated in the same manner. (4) Technical terms are conducive to brevity as well as to precision. They express by a single word combinations which, without them, could be conveyed but vaguely by a tedious circumlocution. One who understands the nomenclature of a science, possesses a large body of analyses, which he could not otherwise possess, and the means of clear and rapid thinking.

Sources of technical terms.—Technical terms are formed in different ways. (1) New meanings are sometimes given to words in actual use. (2) Words that have fallen into disuse may be revived. (3) Compounds and derivatives may be formed from existing materials. (4) Terms may be drawn from foreign languages. The Latin, and more especially the Greek language, are well adapted to furnish terms for a scientific nomenclature. Native terms are unfit, as they designate objects by some accidental, arbitrary relation, and often suggest erroneous views. Terms are required that express precisely the object, without any disturbing or misleading associations.

Under what conditions to be used.—The use of technical terms is subject to the following conditions:

1. It is not necessary or even desirable to have a separate word for each distinct notion. To carry analysis so far gives

a complicated nomenclature harder to understand than the subject itself.

2. The technical term should express the idea with greater precision than the common word.

3. It should be formed according to the laws of the language.

4. It should be fitted to form compounds and conjugates.

5. It should be free from ambiguity, and be immediately intelligible.

131. Use of Figurative Language.—Figurative language is admissible only to a limited extent. Comparisons, illustrating the less known by what is better known, and contrast, are most frequently employed. The extended simile is preferred to the metaphor. The figures are used to illustrate, and should be drawn from familiar objects. The frequent use of them imparts an air of flippancy to the style, and is often an indication of a want of mastery of the subject.

In reference to the use of figures, and to style in general, every thing must be subordinated to the main end,—the setting forth of the truth. Beauty of style is not to be sought at the cost of the truth and logical perfection of the thoughts. Whatever excites feelings foreign to the matter in hand, or weakens the interest in the truth presented, is a blemish. A grave, simple style is the only one befitting this class of compositions.

132. Kinds of Scientific Prose.—To scientific prose belong text-books and disquisitions.

1. Text-books.—Text-books contain a complete but summary statement of the principles of a science. They are prepared for students of different stages of advancement: one designed for elementary schools differs in matter and manner of treating the subject from one intended for academies and colleges.

It is not the aim of a text-book to investigate particular doc-

trines or discuss disputed points. It assumes that the principles are already settled, and presents them in such a form that they may be understood and appropriated by those for whom the work is prepared. It is entirely expository, consisting of definitions, divisions, rules, and examples methodically arranged; argument finds but little place in it. Its style ought to be precise, perspicuous, and destitute of ornament; as it supposes a living teacher, the ideas and rules need not be amplified.

2. Disquisitions.—By a disquisition is meant a connected and extended discussion of a scientific theme. It differs from a text-book in that its aim is not to give a summary statement of principles assumed to be true; on the contrary, it proposes to establish a new or disputed doctrine, or to overthrow or correct one that is held to be true. The discussion may embrace a whole science or only some of its principles. Argument accordingly predominates in this class of composition. The author aims to produce conviction; he sets forth the reasons for what he advances, shows how the results have been reached, enumerates difficulties, shows how they are overcome; and examines and confutes opposing theories.

Being intended for those who have already some knowledge of the subject, the mode of discussion differs from that adopted in text-books: it is distinguished by a freer use of technical terms; an absence of examples, a greater amplification of statement, and a more elaborate structure of sentences.

133. Popular Scientific Prose.—A very important class of works is that in which scientific truth is conveyed in a popular form. Works, which like text-books and disquisitions are fitted for the use of but a few, can hardly be classed among literary productions; but the popular presentations of science deserve a high place in literature. They require a combination of qualities rarely found. To convey a knowledge of a scientific subject to those ignorant of it implies a complete mastery of the subject. Popularity is not to be confounded with a

superficial treatment of a theme: there may be entertaining essays, but if the entertainment has been purchased at the cost of truth, completeness, and precision, they can have no value. Only one who knows a subject intimately is competent to select the aspects that are best adapted to the comprehension of the ignorant. As in such productions technical terms are discarded, there must be added to the mastery of the subject, a mastery of language that is equally rare.

134. Criticism.—The peculiarity of criticism is that it develops truth not systematically as in the other forms of didactic composition, but in the examination of a production of literature, science, or art. The most frequent form in which it appears at the present day is that of reviews.

The aim of literary criticism is to determine how far a work corresponds to the idea of the class to which it belongs. The work is considered as a whole. The critic enters into the writer's train of thought, discovers the theme or main idea of the work; and ascertains to what class of literature it is to be referred. If these conditions are not fulfilled the criticism is arbitrary and worthless. Two great evils result from neglecting this rule. In the first place, the critic singles out particular passages for praise or censure, without noticing their connection with the whole. In this case the work is not criticised; only some details, chosen at the whim of the critic, are examined. In the next place, works are criticised without regard to the principles of the class of compositions to which they belong. Entirely different tests ought to be applied to a scientific work, from those applied to an oratorical; so the laws of lyric poetry are not the same as those of dramatic. Much of the prevailing criticism assumes that there are no fixed principles of literature, and that the only test of the merits of a work is the feeling of the individual critic.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORICAL PROSE.

135. What is comprehended in History.—History is the narration of the important events in the life of an individual or a nation. It embraces "all that pertains to the outward or inward life of humanity, and enters essentially into its social, political, intellectual, moral, and religious progress and development. It comprehends the thoughts, words, deeds, and the prosperous and adverse events which constitute the past, and which have produced the existing state of civilized society." *Schaff, History of the Apostolic Church, General Introduction.*

136. Wrong methods of Historical composition.—History is one of the oldest kinds of prose composition, and has always been one of the most interesting and instructive. It is also one of the most difficult. Only in the present century have there grown up a proper appreciation of its importance and correct views of the method of writing it. There are two defective methods of historical composition which are very prevalent.

1st. History deals with individual concrete facts, and aims to embody them in an affecting picturesque narrative; it is closely related to poetry and romance. If it is written with a view simply to give a brilliant narrative that shall please the imagination and satisfy curiosity, it becomes a romance; and realizes none of the ends for which history is written.

2d. If the writer gives prominence to the principles which can be derived from the facts, and make his work a depository of general views, that gratify the speculative intellect, he does not write history; his work is a scientific treatise, wanting in the essential features of genuine history. Of history, written according to this method, Guizot says: "It no longer wears its former real and living physiognomy; individual characters take

up less space, and no longer appear under living forms; the mention of names becomes rarer; the narrative of events and the description of men are more its pretext than its subject; all becomes generalized; history becomes a series of dissertations on the progress of the human race, and the historian seems to call up the skeleton of the past, in order to hang upon it general ideas and reflections. This occurred in the last century: the English historians of that period, Robertson, Gibbon, Hume, have represented history under that aspect; most of the German writers still follow the same system. The philosophy of history predominates. History, properly so-called, is not to be found in them."

137. Genuine Historical Method.—A perfect history avoids both extremes. It gives to imagination and reason their due; and combines vivid narration with broad philosophical views. History is not science. It exhibits individual facts, and is not a system of notions and general principles: it does not admit of elaborate processes of reasoning; it does not lay down a general principle and proceed to deduce particular truths from it; it tells, not what generally is, or what must be, but facts that once occurred and that will never occur again.

At the same time it aspires to accomplish more than to gratify curiosity. The interest that we feel in the past is something more than a mere desire to know what has been; we would understand the present and anticipate the future.

"Men expect from history," says Guizot, "experience analogous to the wants they feel, to the life they live; they desire to understand the real nature and hidden springs of institutions; to enter into the movements of parties, to follow them in their combinations, to study the secret of the influence of the masses, and of the action of individuals. Men and things must resuscitate before them, no longer merely as an interest or diversion, but as a revelation of how rights, liberties, and power are to be acquired, exercised, and defended; how to combine opinions, interests, passions, the necessities of circumstances, all the elements of active political life. This is what history becomes

for free nations; it is from that point of view that Thucydides wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war, and Clarendon and Bishop Burnet, that of the English revolution. . . . The need of broad philosophical views of the course of human affairs and progress of society has gained strength instead of becoming extinguished; we have not ceased to look to facts for something more than mere narratives; we still expect them to be summed up in general ideas, and to furnish us with those great results which throw light on the sciences of legislation and political economy, and on the vast study of the destiny of the human race. Far, then, from being less inclined to consider history under a philosophic point of view, it seems to have acquired a wider interest in this respect."

In attempting to meet this practical interest history does not sacrifice its distinctive character as an independent narrative of events. It is not written with a view to establishing a theory, or enforcing a moral or religious truth; when facts are thus selected and combined we have didactic or oratorical discourse. The authority of history as a teacher is impaired by thus subordinating it to any didactic end. The orator may combine facts so as to produce the impression he desires to make, but the historian must exhibit them as they actually took place.

138. Essential Qualities. 1. Truth.—The first requisite of historical composition is that it give only what is true. Without this the essential mark of history is wanting, no brilliancy of narration nor profoundness of reflection can compensate for its absence. The historian appears as a witness, and in assuming the office pledges himself to absolute truthfulness. His work must be a faithful reflection of the past: reporting nothing false, suppressing no truth that is necessary to the exhibition of the fact, supplying nothing, mutilating and distorting nothing.

No rule is more generally violated. Almost every writer is betrayed into misrepresenting events and characters by national prejudices, party spirit, personal attachments, or devotion to

a theory. The distorting of facts to suit general principles is one of the most common faults in writers of history. The majority of histories are partisan in their character; the writers carry the prejudices and passions of the present into the past, and exaggerate, suppress, and combine circumstances to accord with them.

In exacting the most rigid impartiality of the historian, it is not demanded that he suppress all personal feeling. There is a false objectivity of history which consists in the absence of all feeling and interest on the part of the writer. Narratives written in such a spirit are but colorless, characterless details, destitute of literary merit, because not bearing the impress of the writer's personality. Indifference of this kind, far from guarding against partiality, leads to it. The historian should have fixed convictions; we expect him to feel moral indignation at wrong, and to sympathize with what is noble and good. He is a judge as well as a witness; it is his right to distribute praise and blame; we do not demand that he shall be destitute of feeling, but that he regulate it according to the dictates of truth and justice.

2. **Local color.**—^{From} The events must be exhibited with the individual features and details that belong to the age in which they took place. In reading of rude ages and peoples, we should be made to feel that the manners and institutions are such as belong to barbarous times. The historian too frequently transfers to the past the institutions, customs, and views of the present; attributes to the actors motives which belong to an entirely different period, and judges of their actions by the standards of the present day. This is to falsify history, and render it altogether valueless. What utterly false views does one receive of the past, who understands the terms king, court, religion, in mediæval history as designating what is understood by them now!

To set the past before us in its true colors the historian must have a powerful and vivid imagination. He must divest himself of the passions and prejudices of the present, and enter into

the modes of thought and feeling of entirely different ages, and identify himself with the period of which he writes. Without this sympathy he can not understand the views and characters of the period, and can not reproduce them vividly or even truthfully.

3. **The historical significance of facts exhibited.**—Events must not only be vividly portrayed; their historical significance must be made apparent; that is, their meaning and importance for the growth and destiny of the nation or the individual. The facts are shown not as isolated but in connection with their causes and effects. The main event is exhibited in its rise; its necessity is shown, with all that contributed to it. The tendency of many writers is to make history false by confounding apparent and real causes. Instead of exhibiting the whole complexity of circumstances out of which an event springs, some of which may be very remote, they trace it to some insignificant circumstance which is often but the occasion not the cause. It is the office of the historian to discover and report all the influences that have combined to produce a given effect; which will be found in remote events, in institutions, in individual men, and in the dispensations of Providence.

4. **Completeness.**—By completeness is not meant that all the particulars are to be given. This is impossible. A very small proportion of circumstances can enter into a narration. "No picture and no history," says Macaulay, "can present us with the whole truth; but those are the best pictures and the best histories which exhibit such parts of the truth as most nearly produce the effect of the whole." Nothing that is essential to the consistency and unity of the whole, or to explain the course of events, can be omitted. This involves careful discrimination and selection, which is one of the most important conditions of writing history. The heaping up of minute details—the endeavor to omit nothing—has been pronounced a fault in a historian next to that of falsehood. "A

writer may," as Macaulay says, "by showing nothing but the truth produce all the effects of falsehood. It perpetually happens that one writer tells less truth than another, merely because he tells more truths."

It is in his skill in detecting the relations of facts, discerning their value, correctly interpreting them, and distinguishing what is permanent from what is transitory, what is essential from what is accidental, that the historian's powers of generalization and his philosophic culture are shown. The exhibition of facts with scrupulous exactness without these higher qualities gives us chronicles and annals—the materials of history; but there is wanting a correct view of the meaning and bearings of the events reported. These the historian discovers; he draws from the rude narratives what the original writers never saw in them.

139. Historical arrangement.—The disposition of the materials is an important and difficult part of the historian's task. There is no one method that can be exclusively employed. The mode of representation varies with the point of view of the writer, and the subject of the history.

In history, as in every literary work, unity is indispensable. Historical unity is not the same as scientific and oratorical. It resides in the subject—in the society, institution, individual whose life is narrated. Whatever is connected with it may be incorporated into the narrative. But such fullness is never attempted. Every writer contemplates his subject from a particular point of view, which determines what he is to select and what omit. The first condition of unity is to reject every thing not essential to the faithful representation of the fact.

The difficulty of securing unity in history arises in part from this—that every event is but the fragment of a larger whole, and can not be severed from it, so as to have no reference to what precedes and follows. Hence the difficulty of finding the beginning and close, and of giving a complete, well rounded presentation of the subject. The difficulty is increased by the great number of events and topics that must be noticed in

modern history; as, different nations, institutions, arts, manners, etc. It seems almost impossible to combine these numerous figures into one picture—to give an adequate view of so many different objects, and at the same time preserve the continuous movement of the narrative.

Various methods of arranging the materials of history have been adopted.

The Chronological Method.—The chronological method gives the events in the order of their occurrence. Chronology lies at the basis of all historical disposition. But the exclusive employment of this method destroys the unity of the narrative, separates related and throws together heterogeneous matter; and produces a rude, undigested mass, not an organic whole. It is often necessary to depart from it, in order to exhibit events in their true relations and significance. "A dry and heavy annalist," says Fenelon, "knows no other order but that of chronology. He repeats a fact every time he has occasion to mention any thing that depends on it. He dares neither set forward nor postpone a particular narration. But a historian that has a true genius, out of twenty places, chooses that in which a fact may be most commodiously set, so as to give a light to all the rest. Often a fact mentioned long before the order of time it happened in, clears up all the train of events that paved the way to it. Sometimes another incident will appear in its full light by being postponed, for then it is introduced more appositely as the occasion of other events. Cicero compares this just order to the care that a person of good taste takes to place fine pictures in an advantageous light." *Letter to the French Academy.*

The Topical Method.—The topical method is an arrangement according to subjects. The matter of the history is distributed into a certain number of heads, and the history of each head is given separately. Thus, we may give the history of the external life of a state, its political institutions, education, religion, industry, commerce, arts, each irrespective of

the others. This method is a favorite one in ecclesiastical history, and has sometimes been employed in secular history.

Its disadvantages are that it destroys the unity of the history by giving a number of parallel histories; it exhibits the different institutions as independent, and does not show how they mutually influence each other, and can not consequently make known their true significance; it involves frequent and tedious repetitions.

The Pragmatic Method.—In the pragmatic method the subjects are selected and combined with a view to some specific purpose, mostly to make it instructive for practical life. The great interest of history at the present day is the practical one (sec. 137), and in one sense all history should be pragmatic—it should exhibit events and institutions in their causal connection; exhibit results and show what produced them, and afford lessons for the present. The method has been greatly abused; not only by a wrong interpretation of facts, but also by allowing the deliberate purpose to impart theoretical knowledge to corrupt the form of the presentation; an abstract, logical plan is substituted for the narrative, and instead of a history there is produced a philosophical disquisition.

The Natural Method.—The natural method combines what is good in the chronological, topical, and pragmatic methods. It adheres to the order of time so far as this is possible. It discriminates the various elements of the life of a nation, traces the growth of each, but instead of presenting them as detached fragments, it exhibits them in their living connection as parts of one indivisible whole. It gives what is important in a period in one complete picture, in which the parts are brought together according to their real connection, and are represented on a scale corresponding to their comparative importance, thus affording a simultaneous view of the whole. "The reader has the pleasure of foreseeing somewhat of the

sequel without confusion; he observes always one event rising out of another, and longs to see the winding up of the whole, which is artfully concealed from him, to hasten him on to it with the greater impatience. When he has perused the whole history, he looks back like a curious traveler, who, having got to the top of a mountain, observes all around him, and takes a delight in viewing from this situation, the way he came and all the pleasant places through which he passed." *Fenelon*.

140. Distribution into Periods.—When the history is an extended one, a proper division into periods is an important means toward clearness and completeness. The divisions of history are called periods, the boundaries of a period are called epochs,—literally, stopping places. Epochs are points of time marked by an important event which terminates one series of events, and gives a new direction to the course of history. They thus serve as convenient points from which to survey the past, and enter upon a new stage. The birth of Christ and the Reformation are epochs of universal history. The life of every nation is marked by special epochs; as, in English history, the Norman conquest; the Revolution of 1688.

The division adopted must be, in the first place, *rational*. It must be founded on some principle, there must be some reason for it. It will not suffice to select arbitrarily some date as the beginning or end of a period. Each period should have a distinctive character arising from the nature of the events that were unfolded in it; should be an act in the drama, in which the plot is carried through a definite stage; and should have its beginning, middle, and end. The division into centuries adopted in some ecclesiastical and secular histories is an example of merely accidental division; the epochs do not coincide with the close of the centuries; and the narrative is interrupted in the midst of the development of an event.

The division, in the second place, must be *natural*. It must be drawn from the facts; and not be imposed upon them by arranging them in conformity to a favorite theory or scheme.

In the third place, the divisions and subdivisions should *not*

be too greatly multiplied. When carried too far, division becomes puerile; instead of conducing to clearness and order, it produces only confusion. The great historians are remarkable for their skill in presenting the most complex subjects with the greatest simplicity and clearness.

141. Introduction and Conclusion.—The conclusion of a history may be a brief summary of what was accomplished in the progress of events; or may direct attention to important results flowing from them. The introduction is of more importance and of greater difficulty. Its aim is to prepare the reader to understand the course of events; in most cases it contains a summary account of the state of things previous to the period at which the history begins. The faults to be avoided are, on the one hand, abruptness, on the other, disproportion, and ascending to too remote a period.

Ex.—Macaulay begins his history thus: "The events which I propose to relate form only a single act of a great and eventful drama extending through ages, and must be very imperfectly understood unless the plot of the preceding acts be well known. I shall therefore introduce my narrative by a slight sketch of the history of our country from the earliest times. I shall pass very rapidly over many centuries; but I shall dwell at some length on the vicissitudes of that contest which the administration of King James the Second brought to a decisive crisis."

142. Description.—Description enters more or less largely into all historical works. The events are so closely connected with localities and persons, that in order to render them even intelligible, the historian must endeavor to place before the minds of his readers a vivid picture of the entire land, of particular localities, and of the character of the leading actors. The field of historical description embraces, besides the objects just mentioned, a vast number of objects, such as,—the character of an entire people at a particular time or of particular classes of society, the forms of government, modes of life, industrial arrangements,—in a word, all the forms and products of human activity.

Reflections.—The historian frequently mingles reflections with his narrative; these often impart a peculiar charm to the history, and further the great ends to which it is conducive. The privilege is frequently abused. It is worse than useless to state explicitly what would suggest itself to an intelligent reader of the narrative. The main uses of reflections are to explain apparent contradictions; to point out the resemblance between a particular fact and some other event in history; to exhibit the motives of an act, or indicate its bearings. In every case they should connect easily and naturally with the narrative, and embrace what is involved in it; they may be given directly or indirectly; they should be brief, striking, and not extended into dissertations: often a judgment is suggested by a single epithet.

143. Essential qualities of Historical Style.—In the historical style are combined the greatest clearness, precision, vivacity, and dignity.

The first quality required is clearness. The objects themselves and their relations to each other should be clearly exhibited. As history aims to exhibit events in their inward connection and progressive development, it is indispensable that there be a sustained movement in the narrative, no interruptions nor omissions, but each part should be connected with what precedes and what follows. A rigid exclusion of unnecessary matter—of all events, circumstances, reflections only remotely connected with the subject—is required. Excess of description and of comparison obscures the connection. As history is written for general readers, a regard to clearness requires the avoidance of all local, provincial, technical terms.

Vivacity is closely connected with clearness. It requires the rejection of abstract expressions, which are not suited to narration. Complex sentences and periods are incompatible with it. The opposite extreme is equally to be shunned; it is not the aim of history to move the feelings and passions, and the writer can not adopt the style of the pamphleteer or orator. The figures of passion, such as the interrogation and hyperbole,

do not suit the style of history. Imaginative beauty is not banished from this class of compositions, it holds however but a subordinate place; too much embellishment is a disadvantage.

Brevity is a means toward clearness and vivacity; it is not to be made an end. From the nature of the subjects dealt with, there is great danger of verbosity in this class of compositions. Regard must be had both to the choice of circumstances and the number of words. Cicero says, "There is nothing more pleasing in history than a simple perspicuous brevity."

Dignity, or nobleness, is another essential quality. This is the natural expression of the state of mind which the great events narrated should produce. The writer sets before the reader important transactions which have influenced the destiny of the race; teaches practical lessons to the present and future; and expects his work to be permanent. Whatever savors of levity has no place in such works: a regard to dignity requires the exclusion of all low words and expressions, and of many that may be admissible in ordinary conversations and writings pertaining to merely practical concerns.

There was long prevalent a false notion of dignity, which had a disastrous influence upon the manner of writing history. The majority of historians filled their works with narratives of wars, revolutions, conspiracies, and negotiations, regarding these as the only objects of historic interest, to the exclusion of all those details which throw light upon the character of persons and the state of society. A history written according to this code contains only a record of the movements upon the surface, but of all that is vital and important beneath, it reveals nothing. The great historians of the present day reject this false notion, and regard no fact as trivial that helps us to understand the life of a people in a given period.

144. Division of History.—History is divided with respect to the extent of its subject into universal history, special history, and biography.

Universal History.—We may regard the history of the race as one great drama in which each nation has its part to perform, and contributes to the final result. It is the aim of universal history to set before us in their proper connection the great events in the progress of the race. In so vast a subject, there is required a careful selection of circumstances; only those are admitted which have a universal interest. There is great danger of being influenced in the choice of materials by some preconceived theory. It is hard to avoid one of two extremes in this class of histories: the one, that of making it a dull, lifeless conglomerate of facts, the other, that of converting it into a philosophical dissertation, in which abstract notions and discussions take the place of facts. The great importance of fixing the epochs and of a just distribution into periods, as well as of giving to each event that degree of prominence which its importance requires, is self-evident.

Special History.—Every society can have its history. The most important of this class is the history of a nation. It is the story of the life, growth, and struggles of a nation, with the exhibition of its characteristics and its relations to other nations, either during the entire period of its existence or during a portion of it. The general principles already laid down apply particularly to this class. No further discussion of it is necessary. It is needless to enumerate the various histories of different societies; they do not admit of classification. One of the most important is church, or ecclesiastical history, *i. e.*, the narrative of the extension of the church—the record of the deeds, struggles, and sufferings by which the principles of Christianity have been diffused through modern society.

Biography.—A biography is the record of the life of a person. Biographical interest is of different kinds; it can be either in the outward deeds of a person, as in the lives of warriors and statesmen, in which case it resembles historical interest, or it can be in the exhibition of the individual char-

acter. Many of the most interesting and elevating biographies, are those of men who have lived in quiet and obscurity. The interest in this case is psychological.

The subject of the biography is not to be treated as merely a central figure around which to group the events of a particular period. This is permitted to the historian in order to give unity to his narrative, but not to the biographer. The aim of biography is to present a complete picture of the life and character of a single person. The writer is guided in the selection of facts, not by their importance in the history of the nation, but by their relation to the character, activity, and fate of his subject. Often a slight circumstance, or word, becomes all-important as revealing the motives and principles of a man, or as exerting an influence on his life.

To be a faithful record, a biography must not be a dry register of the birth, occupation, and public acts; all should be exhibited as proceeding from and as affecting the personal character. Here care is required, so that a connection be not devised which has no foundation in fact. The biography must not become a mere panegyric. This takes place when only the bright sides of the character are exhibited, and the faults, weaknesses, and errors are suppressed or extenuated. Coldness and want of sympathy are equally fatal to success in writing a biography: such a writer can not understand the peculiarities of the one he would make us acquainted with; he is wanting in one of the essential requisites of a faithful biographer.

Special Histories of Institutions, Industries, Arts, etc.—

A class of histories of great and continually increasing value embraces works that trace the rise, growth, and changes of particular institutions, laws, manners and customs, and whatever else is connected with the inner life of a people. Thus, there are histories of philosophy, literature, art, education, law, commerce, and industry. The personal interest of history proper is wanting in works of this class; they are chiefly expository and critical, partaking more of the nature of scientific

treatises. A great defect of the whole class—one which can not be remedied—is, that by treating of institutions and various products of human activity, irrespective of the character and condition of the age and the circumstances modifying them, they present an image that is necessarily imperfect. The literature of a nation, for example, can not be appreciated without a knowledge of its political and social history. (See Pragmatic Method, sec. 139.)

CHAPTER IV.

ORATORICAL PROSE.

Review Abstracts

purpose registered

145. Oratorical Discourse defined.—An oration is a public discourse made with a view of determining the wills of the hearers to some definite action either near or remote. It is intended to be heard, not read. It presupposes an audience composed of persons varying in age, condition, and culture. Its distinctive characteristic is, that it has for its end to lead to some determinate action. There may be public discourses for other purposes,—as to instruct and to entertain; but they do not properly belong to oratory, and are governed by different laws. The power to influence the wills of others by continuous discourse is eloquence.

146. Analysis of Persuasion.—In order to persuade it is necessary both to enlighten and convince the understanding and to move the passions.

The orator must give to his hearers a clear view of the nature and aim of the action proposed, and convince them of its necessary connection with their duty, interest, or happiness. There may occur cases in which the existence of a conviction may be assumed, and in which the main thing is to overcome indifference and awaken interest in the subject. This, how-