SCIENCE OF RHETORIC:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THB

LAWS OF EFFECTIVE DISCOURSE.

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DY

DAVID J. HILT.i,
.PnorEBsoR tN TnR tJNIV E R etTT AT LJ:WIBBUllO.

"Th coo rul e., of old <ll•covcrc1l, not dcvl•cd,
Are Natille stlll, but Nature mclhodlzed."
Popa.

NEW YORK:

,

SIIELDON & COMPANY,

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:;~ ~-· :' .;

8 l\IURRAY .S TREET.

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OHIO UNIVERSITY ·
LIBRARY

( \?17

PREFACE.

CorrnronT,

!llIEf,DON & COMPAVY.
1877.

-".

Tms book is not designed as an introduction to
English composition, but rather as a systematic presentation of the laws of discourse, 1iiiiijll1111J!eMI!~~
Most of the text-books on Uhe one a e a ono-si ell.
view of the subject. Dr. Whately has treated Rhetoric
as a branch of Logic, making it " tho art of inventiug
and nrranging arguments ; " Dr. Blair treats it as a
department of applied A<Jsthetics, as if it were a purely
criticnl art; Dr. 'J'hct"Ctnin rcg11rds it as belonging to
Ethics, as if eloquence were a virtue. This little work
aims to explain the whole theory of effective discourse,
for whatever purpo~e and in whatever form it may be
used. The specific province of the rhetorician is to
render given ideas effective in producing mental
changes in others. Rhetoric treats of thought militant. Logic furnishes conceptions which are formally
trite; .Ai)sthctics, conceptions which are beautiful;
Ethics, conceptions which are just. Rhetoric takes
these conceptions and establishes them in the mind
of another.
Rhetoricians have frequently regarded Invention as
R part of Uhotoric. Invention implies the production
of some particular kind of thought, conditioned by the
nature of the subject-matter. What propositions are

1

PREFACE.

to. be. maintained .b! the lawyer, tho theologian, the
scientist, or the cnt10, must depend upon the facts of
law, theology, science and criticism. 'l'hc methods of
investigation are different in the various departments
of th?ught.. He1~~e no truly useful rules can be given
on t111s, snbJect. . lhe truth bus been forcibly stated by
,John Stuart Mill. Ho says : "lnvo11tio11, thon"'h it
can be cultivatc<l, cannot be reduced to rule· th.;·e is
no science which will enable a man to bethink himself
of that which will suit his purpose. But when he has
thought of something, science ~ill tell him whether
that which he has thought of will suit his purpose or
not."
Disposition has often been made a distinct division
of Rhetoric. Tho arrangement of matter contributes
g~e.atly to the effectiveness of discourse, but is so cond1t10ned by the natme of the subject-matter, that it
canno~ pro1~crly be made a distinct department of
rhetoncal sc10nce. 'l'he parts of a Description Narration,. Exposition, o~ Argument should be arrm;ged accordmg to the specific laws of these different kinds of
discourse. Disposition has been treated in connection
wit~1 the different classes of ideas, and not as a disti~ct
topic. No recognition is taken of the traditional di;ision of a Disc?nrse into (1) Introduction, (2) Divis1?11, (3~, ~ar~·at10n, (4) Explication, and (5) Peroration. Ih1s 1s regarded as meclmnical and conventional. '1.'here is o~ten nothing to divide, or nothing
to narrate, or nothmg to explicate. All this depends
upon the nature of the subject-matter. As a rule, the
less conventional the division of a discourse the better.
It has been customary to introduce into works on
Rhetoric some discussion of Taste, Beauty, Sublimity,

PREFACE.

5

etc. These topics belong strictly to .A!'lsthetics, a
<l°n'ision of science well worthy of the attention which
is now bestowed upon it by advanced educators, 1md
which will soon co-ordinate with Logic and :Ethics U8
a study in the college curriculum. It is as reasonable
to discuss the nature of trtHJJ..Jll.J)!. riglit in a text-book
on Hhetoric, nR t~;~t tho 11iH011H1:1io11 of '.1.'11Rt:o,
Beauty and Sublimity. Surely there is as good a
reason why our sentiments should be true and just, as
why they should. be beautiful.
.
Elocutio11 has long been regarded as a part of
Rhetoric, but it is by itself too important and extensive
a subject to be treated. as a di vision of rhetorical science.
It does, ind.ced, contribute to render spoken d.iscourse
more efiectiye, but so docs elegant chirography or clear
typography improve the effectiveness of written
thought. ·Rhetoric treats of discourse in general, not\
of written or spoken discourse in particular.
l
It has been common in treatises on Rhetoric t.o give
some account of tho Origin and Progress of Language.
'!'here is no reason why this subject should be treated of
in connection 'rith Rhetoric, since language is neither
a more nor a less perfect instrument of expression from
our knowing its origin and history. 'rhe Science of'
Language is now an independent department of .,...
knowledge, and deserves attention us such.
Hhetoricians lrnve frequently included the F~
of Composition as n part of their science. It is evidenrtllat completed literary works, such as epics, ie111ef
~lmmas, histories, novels, etc., belong to Li tern tu re,
'and their classification pertains to the critical section
1
of that department. If it be claimed that Rhetoric
treats of the means whereby these forms of composition

l
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6

7

PREFACE.

PREFACE.

are made excellent, it may bo answered that the pro.
duction of such works involves two processes : (1) that
of re.!!_4~.~i!!IL~~-given ideas cJicctivo ; nnd (2) tlrnt
of selecting and comL111ing suitable
fora particular ~ind of comp.osition. 'fhe first process is !:11otoric1i,
and is tho same Ill all composition ; the second is tccl1nical, and conditioned by the purpose of the writer •
t~~lC-W.l'.$ of tlie rhetorici~ the second i~
the work of the dramatist, historian, or novelist, as
sncli. The poet and the theologian alike make use of
Rhetoric, but, in addition, the poet must study Poe.tics,
and the iireacher Homiletics. Rhetoric is noLthe.
s~ienc~ oJ.pla,~tjpg or of pr~achingiJiiitJ;f~nde1fog
given 1d~as ~_!!~e, whether ma play or in a sermon.
The ola terms Purity, Propriety, Precision, Clearness, Vivacity, etc., have not been used in this treatise,
pa~tly because son~A of them are vague from their figurative use, but clucfiy because they are not dist·i nct
qualities of Style, and the division of properties denoted
by them involves repetition or incompleteness.
Having given reasons for the exclusion of some
topics which have commonly appeared in works on
Rhetoric, I shall now explain why some new ones have
been inserted.
s.ufficient prominence has not been given to the
rel~t10n between thought and its expression, This
top10 has been somewhat fully discussed in the
Introduction.
~he advantages. nn~ disadvantages of language as a
merhum of express10n 111 comparison with other means
of communicating ideas, have been fully exhibited, in
order that the peculiar conditions of verbal expression
might be realized.

The consideration of the J_,aws of Mind may seem
strange to those who have regarded Rhetoric as dealing
only with the communication of thought. Hnt if tho
rhetorical process nims at oJicctiug mental changes, tho
lnw~ according to which those changes must taku place
Corm rm important part of rhetorical science. 'l'ho
trnatmcnt of Ago us fnrnishiug particular laws of mind,
is not new. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, three chapters are
devoted to this topic. Experience and Affiliation are
11ot less important modifiers of the human mind, and
deserve the closest attention of the rhetorician.
That expression is conditioned by the nature of the
iden. to be conveyed is vaguely acknowledged by most
works on Rhetoric. 'l'he Laws of Idea, based upon
the essential nature of the four elementary classes of
ideas, are believed to be of great importance.
The Laws of Form are here for the first time derived from a single principle. The Law of Mental
Economy, as enunciated by Spencer, has been so modified and developed as to refct· all the valid precepts of
Style to a single law, thus affording to Expression what
Aristotle's dictum affords to Deductive Reasoning.
'l'aken in connection with the laws of Association,
this Law of Economy at once explains the great value
of Figurative Language, and furnishes rational rules
for its use.
A systematic analysis, by insuring a progressive exposition and avoiding repetition, enables the learner to
master the whole work in a very short time. Notwithstanding the compendious form in which tho subject is
presented, it is believed that the student will be able to
see the reason for everything as he proceeds, and it is
hoped that teachers who may use the book will be able

Ideas

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8

PREFACE.

to supplemcint it with oral illustrations. The Exercises
nt the end of the book are regarded as an important
addition, and their use in the class-room may be made
highl_y profitable. 'l'he topical 'method seems to be the
only prnper mode of recitation for advanced students,
nnd this work has been especially designed for thut
method. 'l'he headings, howe,·er, may be used as
questions by those who prefer the eatechetical method
of reciting.
It 1s not claimed that any new precepts of composition have been derived from the treatment here adopted.
'l'he merit of the plan is believed to be simply that of
scientific analysis, furnishing tho rationale of such
rules as have long been laid down by rhetoricians.
stronomy creates no new celestial movements ; it
imply aids us in comprehending those which were obcrved but not understood by the earliest shepherds of
our race. Hhctoric cannot make laws for con!l!_Q§.ij;ion,
but it can &over tlil:!ll}, ltfid explai~1 why oetry pleases
aniieIOqiiciicc wms, by referring their e ec s to he
laws of mmaancrlanguage.

µ
l

DAVID
UNIVERSITY AT LEWISBURG, Jul1J, 1877.

J.

HILL.

AN ALYS IS.
PAOB

l!fTRODUCTJON ...... ...... ...... • • • • ·• • • • • • · .. • • •• • ... " · ·" "" ... •
J t:sscntlnl Blomonts or Dl sconr~e . • · • • · .... ·• • • .. • • · ...... · •• • •
L 1'h" Hclaf.lons of Thought. am\ Lang1rnge .. · · · • .... · • "" • • ••' • · "·
(1) Language nntl rrtuiugh t Scpnrnble ·············:::::::::::::::
\2) 1.an"UHgo an Aid t.o 1 hon!( ht ............. • ..
(3) Lan~nngo Ahbrevlatcs Tluuklnir ....... • · ........... • · •" ... •
(4) Langnngo Vitiates 'fhoni;ht ................................. .
(5) J,angnn.i:o nn Instrument or Aunly•le ........ ::: : :::::::::::::
8 Mo1lc• or ~;xprc••lng Ideas ...... • .. •· .. · .. ••· .. •·
· (I) l!r•whiJl . . .. . ...... • ... • ·· • .... • :: : : : : : : :: : : :: :: :: : :::: ::: :: ::
(2) 1 nlnt.lng ...................... ..
\3) Scnlptnro ................ . ..................... ;:::::::::::;;:
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ID

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4. llc•lrlcUono or Formal Art ... ...... ..... .. :·:::::::::::::::::: :::: 20
2U
(I) Jllotlon .................... · .... ·• .. · · ·
(·I) 141\ll~URj.tO •.•••. • ••.•••••••• • •••• • • • •••••••••••

'

m'f:~·~'~r". :::: :: :::: :::::::: :::: ::::: ::: :::: :::: :::: ::::: :::::::::

(4)

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l'enctrntlvc lrnnglnntlon .... ...... • • ·• · ... •: :::: :: :: : :: : :: :: ; , 28
29

&. JtcstrlctlonA of Lnng:nngc ... • .. . • • • · · • • ·• • • ·• • • •
• .••• , •••.•••
(1) L •K .. lng'R Lhnlt.nt.lun . .• •. · ... . • • · .. · ••• •·· • • · · ·

Tl1.; Symbolic Chnrnct.cr or Words .• •· ... ·· .. •·· .. ···• ... ·::::
•
(·I) Lnngunrrcrm Impecll,ncnt ...............••....•..•. ::::::::":::.
8 Exccll1•11cc o't Style Udallvo •• ·• • · · • • • · • ...... ··" · · · ·
Tho IJlffcrcncc·hctwcon l'roec and Poetry · • .... : ·;::::::.;:::;:::
(1) Arl•totlo'd Opinion ........................ :.: ........... . ... .
(2) llacon'• Oplnlun ... ....... . .. · .. · ....... ..
(3) Colcrhl~o'• O~·lnlon .......... · ........ " .. • "·" "" ·" • ... '.'
(4) Hn•kln •Opinion .............. " ......... ·····" ....... """
(5 Whatel 'a Opinion ..... · · .. · • .. · • · • • .. • · • .. · • • • .. "·" • ·""'
The Tr~e Ditrcrcnco Dosed on Effects.... .. ..... ::::::::::::::
'l'he J>lfference ltc!alh'o, .. • · · • · •.... • """ ·" •
. , ......
(R) Vore!Rcallon n l'nrt or Ornmmnr .... • .... . .. • ........
..
8.
Tho Province or lthctorlc ·• .. • · .. • .... "· ": :: : '. :: : ; :; : ;;;;; :::: ..
t ll<•latc<I 8cl<mcos ........... • ........ " • .. "
(2)

(8) The Uncertainty or Worde aea Medium..................

1:

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. (~) ~'.'~~%'~·-~~·::: ::: ::::: :: :::: :::: :: :::: :: :: :: :: :::::::: :::: :::: ::

20
80
81
82

83
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84

84
84
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87
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Ill!
811

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..Eethetlc• ........ · .. • · .. • •.. • ·" • · ".' " .. · .. • · • .. · ' '. . .. ... 88
88
.l8
8tl
10. Departments of Ultctorlc ..... · .. • · ......... "·"

!~l
l~l ~iX.'.'~~~F.: ::: ::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::::: :: :::::::: :: ::::::
IlOOK I.-LA WS OF MIND.

of Trcntment Explained .. · • .... · .. "" · "·" " .... ·"""
1:at Method
Clnoolflcatlon of .Mentnl Phenomena . ....... ..... .. :··:::::::::::;
Relations or these Phenomena .... • . .. . ·• .. · .. •·· .. • ..

.; Division of this Book ............... . .. ..... .. . ........... : ...... ..

43
43

«43

10

ANALYSIS.

11

ANALYSIS.

CHAPTER I.

1'.l08

I. Old Ajte ......................................... ·::::::: ::::::::::: 64
64
(1) C11knlntln1? .... . ........ . ..... • • • .......... ·
.
(2) Dc•pondlng ................................. :: ::::::::::::::: .

THE GENERAL LAWS OF MIND.

~81 Humble ... ... .. ··· .. • .. .. " .. • • .. ·" • .... ..

SECTION !.-INTELLECT,
JleuoN ..... . .. .. .. .... . ....... .... ... ................... , , .......... ~A~~
I. Nnture. ot the Lnw• of Thought.. .. ...... ............. .... ......... 411
2. R!ic t.or1cnl U"e oft.he J,nws of Thought........................... 46
8. Dll'cct. Addre'~ to the Reason.. .. .. .. . .. .. • .. .. • . • .. • . .. . .. .. .. .. 47
4. General Co nfidence In Ren.on.... . .. . .. .. . . .. . .. . . • .. .. .. . • . .. .. . 47
IS. Pcrmnucnco of Fallncioufl Not.innR ... . •. .. . ... .. ..... .. .... . . . . • , , 48
8. I111pnrfn11ce of tho Laws of Thought . . . . . .. .. . • . . . . . .. . .. . • .. .. . . 48
11.-IMAOINATION ...... .... .... . ... • .. . . . . .. .... .. .. .. .. ... .... .. . .. .. •. 49
1. Attention ............................ ,............................. 49
2. Jlcllel ..................... , ........ , . . . • .. . .. • . . .. . . .. • .. • . .. • • .. .. 49
8. Action. ........... ......... .......... . . . ......... ...... ........... .. 50

JIJ . .l\IEJllOllY ............... , . ........ " " . ... • ... .... .... • . .. .... • ... .. •

5()

1. Conviction .• .. . . . . .. • .... .... • . • . . .. ..... ... .. .. . . . .. . ... • . .. • . • .. 50
ll. l'crsuaslou .. • .. . • . .. . .. . . • .. . .. . . .. .... .. . • . . .. • . • .. .. • .. .. .. .. • .. 61
8. Language .••...••••.••.. , •• • .•••••.•• ••• .•••••• ,................... &1

·I.

>

):i~~e:~fli~::
:::: :::::::: ::::: ::: :::::: :::::: :: : :::::: : ::
Powerful. .. .. ............... • .... • · .. • .. • · .... "• .. "·.... • •
(2)

64
65
65
65
65

SECTION II.-EXPEIUENCE,
t Tl1e Nnt.nrc of Expe ri ence . ... . ........ • .... •· ................... •·

1: Grnernl nnd Specific Experience .. · · .. · ........ "··" ... • ... · ... ·"

a. Inferred Experience ............ • .. · .. •· ·· ...... • ...... • ..... •• .... •

65

~

67

SECTION III.-AFFILIATION,
1 Rrlntlon of the Sprnkcr to his Audience .......................... : 68
· (I) Uon<I fl uneo ......... •• • ......... · •• • ........................ •
68
12) Ooo<I Wlil ... · • ...... • .... " • " " •" • •" • .... • •" • "· • "" ... ' · 69
(II) Oond l'rinclplce . ....... . ................... . .. ::::::::::::::::

t. P•rly Hpirlt .. . . · .. · · .. · · .. • · .... • · · ............. · • .

69

.. ... • • .. • .. • 69
70
(2) A•" .lll t:nns of Self-commendation .. •• .. .. .... •· ... ···· ·" ··"
o
(8) Method ofCountcrnctini: ....................... ............. .. 7
(I) Ae a Motive ....... · ... · ........ ·· .. · ...... """•

SECTION II.-THE FEEUNGS,
I. -CLA881F!CATION • ... .... .. .. .. .. .. .. ... • . . • .. .. . .. .. ... . ... .... • .. ..

~2

1. N ccc!'t-1nry l1nr1 e rrcctlon .. .•... . .. . .. .. . .•. .•..•. • . . , . . . . , . . .• • . . .

52

2. Sensntlous. nmJ Sentiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Scheme of I.lie Sentiments. . ............ . ............. . ............
Il.-T111: ] 'HODUCTION OF EMOTION......................................
1. The Ncccs•if.y of Feeling . ............ . ............ .. ..............
2. Emof.1ons Involuntary ......................... . . ... . .... ..........
8. Stimulating- Ci rcumstnncce .... ...... .. .. . .. .. . ........ .... .. ... .. . .
(I) l'rolmbl iity .... . ...............................................
(2) Veri>lmilitnde . .... . ........ ... .. ........ .. ...... ... ..... .....

62
M
54
54
54
55
55
55

(5) Proximity of 1'i mc... . .. . .. . . . . . .. .. ... . . •• ..... ... .. .. .... ...

57

BOOK IT.-LA WS OF IDEA.
t Kind• of I<lene .... ·· • · · · ..... • • .. ..... .. .. • ... • · · • · .. • • ........... • ~
'

m~W;~·,~t~rg~~~f1~:: ::::: ::: :::: ::: ::: :::: :: :::: :::::::::::::: :: :: gg

(6) P l'<>ximlt.y of Place. ... ... .....................................

57

(7) l't:r•o1111J Helalion.... .... .... .... ... .. ... . ... •.• ..... ••• .. . .. . 57
(8) ludircct.ness .. .. ....... ............ ....... .... , ............... 58
(9) G<•ncra l Importa nce .. . . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . . .. • . • .. . . • . .. .. • • . .. • 58
(10}

Vormcction wit h the Conseq uences.... .. .. ... .. . ... .... .....

2. Dom inant St.ates of .J<'eeling . .. • . . . . ... • • .. . . .. . . ... . ... .. . .. . .. ...
8. Tempornr~· J.~ mo!.ions............................ . .................
(1) Al111y111g t.he F'ecllngs .... .. ............................. . ....
(2) Diverting the Feelings........................................

59
60
60
61

CHAPTER II.
THE PARTICULAR LAWS OF MIND.
SECTION !.-AGE.
%. Yonth .............................................................. 63
(I) PnORionnte .... . .. • .. . .... • . . .. . .. • .. . .. .. . .. • . . . . . . . .. .. • . ....

m~:~1·~l'~:t~::: :: ::::::::: ::: ::::: :::: :::: :: ::::::: ::: :::: ::::::::
(4) Social..... .. • •• . .. • • . .. .... .. • .. • . .. • . .. . . • . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. • ..

63

i:

64

(5) MJschievou• . • • ... .. • .. .. .. • . .. .. .. • • .. . .. • .. .. .. .. .... .... .. • 64

ln<lhhlnnl Object• .............................. ::::::::::::::
flcncrnl Notion• . .. .................... • ... ·....
73
'l8

CHAPTER I.
DEBCHIPTION.

'711
75
75
i) Thr. Lriw of l'urposc ...... • .• ... · ... • ·• · · .......... • · •· • · .. • ·" 75
2) Tho Law of Unity ...... ... . ................................... 76
3) Tho I.nw of Comr.let.eue"s ......................... '. . . ....... : 76
(4) 'J'hc Lnw of Jlre v1ty .. ..... .. .. ·•· • · ·· ·• . ....... ..... ......... '76
Kind• of Descrlpt.lou .... . ........... · .. • • • • • · ...... · ·• ...... · · · ·"

I Drorrlhnhle Ohkr.ts .. · .. · · · · .. · · .. • · .. · .. • · .. "" .. ·" • .... • • .. "
L
Ocnr.rnl 1-~ws of flc•criptlon .... ........ ..... ....... .... ... ..... "

i

58

llJ.-TllE .M ODIFI CA TION 0.F EMOTION . .. ...... ... .. ........... ••·••••••••• &J
1. The L11w of C.:lrnni::e .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. • . . . . .. .. • . . . . . . • . . • .. • .. • . .. .. • 59

(I)
(21

t. Dlvlolous of this l:!ubject ......................... • • .... • .... • .. • ..

a.

SECTION !.-OBJECTS OF SENSE.,

:: ~f@}ff:ill~·~\:;::!!:;i :\ij::::;: j:::;;:•;;•••:;:;::::::::::
(\?)

76

76
Tl
Tl
77

78
ill
i8

l1111 cr (/unll!lrs .... . . . ...... .. .. ·• • • · · · · · .. · · · .... • ·· • · · · · · · • 78

~ nt~u::~~~!~'.·.;~~:: :: : :: : ::: :::: :: : ::: ::: ::: ::~~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~
(I) Cornpnrlsnus ............. .... ·• • · · • · .... · • · · · •

I~\
~~;;f::.-i:: :: :::::::: :::::~:::: :: ::::::: ::::::::::: :::::::: ::::
~4) Flied Ciassce ....................................... •

7R

78
7!1
71l
7!I

79
'IV

12

ANALYSIS.
SECTION !!.-MENTAL STATES.

:PAOll

t. The Jtrrnt.nl Vncnhnlnry . .............. . . . ... . ............ ........ ~A':i:l
( 1) 1\1 cl.n l,h.11rlt·11 I t.:hnruc tcr... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8()

(2) lndcl 1111.'""'"" .. .............................................

81

~

Sol
~~
8:l
83

~l

(3),:Suhj l'ctlve lk• ult .... .. ................................. : ....
I. Vnr1011 s .A!'.'l ~oc 1n1.1011s . ...••••• •• ••••••.•••••••. • •••••••. • ••••• ,, • •
l) Extt>r1111I Expres•ion .......... ...... . .... ... , ............ : .. • •
2) Actions .................................... , .. , . .. , • .. • .. • • . ..
8) Sunoundlngs ... , .... .... .... .... . .. • ... . .. . .. .. • .. . . ... • ... • •
4) Causes .. .. .. • .. .. .. • • • .. • .. .. .. • • • .. • • • • • .. • • .. .. .. .. .. .. • .. ..

~

SECTION llI.-CHARACTEU.
~· fndlvldunllty .................................................... , • 83

3' c~~ard l'riuclples. •. • ... • .... ... • . ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. • .. .. ... . .... • 84

.

crete For1n .... ..................... . . ·• • •••·. . . . . . .. . . .. . ... • . 84

t. Environment .. .. .. .. ... .. .. • .... .. .. • .. .. .. .. •.. .. • • • .. .. .. • .. .. • 811

CHAPTER II.
NARRA'fION.
SECTION 1.-THE SELECTION OF CIUCUMSTANCES.

!: E~~r;~~. :::: :::::: :::::::::::::::::: :: :: :: :: ::::: :: ::: :::: ::::::::: ~
, • Bompleteness . .... ................................................ 87
~. rcvlty .. • .. .. .. .. • .. .. .. .. • .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. • .. .. .. • .. .. • • .. • 88

4. Difl'ercnr~ hetween Definition and Dlvi•lon....................... !IR
Klr11IM of Jldlnltlon .. .............................................. llR
(I) Nomi
UH

e.

88

l:~:r~~~~l:gU;;,ll~~}~~~~~:."s ~~~.".r.?0f0 ~~~l.~:: :: ',',',',:: :: :::::::::,::: : r::

:.
4. Probability ........ . .. ..................... .......... .. ..... .. :.:.; 90

(I{ A dcftnition mnet ho <1<feg1<a/e...... ... .. .. • .. .. .. • .. .. .. • .. ..
(2 A dcftnli.lon mu•t nut dell nu by 11ezath:d or dlt'lslvd allrllm!u
(3 A dcflnltlon •hoti ld nut he ta11Wlog' cal ........................
(4 'l'he definition mu•t bcpnct&e.... ............................
(51 A definition •ltould be 1Jtr•1J/.cucm~ ...... ................... · ..
7. Kinds of Di\'ision .................................................
·
(J) J>artlt.1011 .................... ..... ...........................
(2) Logical Division .. ............................................
8. The Laws or Loi:ical Division ............................... .... .
(J) Every di vis.on ehould have some principle ...................
(2) EYery divl•ion •hould have but one principle •••••••• •• ..••.•
(3) The principle of divieion should be an actual and mtntlal
chai·acter of the divided wholu ..............................
(4) No dividing member m ust of Itself exhnust the subject .•••••••
(5) 'l'hc dividing member• must together exhaust the notion, bot
nolmon ...... ...... ......... ......... . ......................
(6) Thu dividing memhers should n'>t include one a1wlher .. ......
(7) A divi sion •lronld proceed rontl11uously, without ht&tus •• . • . ••
t. Exposition of a .l'rojlosltion ......... .. ........... • ............ • ...
•
(1) Uy lkflnition ..................................................
(2) By Division ..................................................

~\)'1;1~1~~f:;~~~rjj~~~~i1~'c'~i; •.. • •. . . , . .. •., • • . .... • • . . .....•...• •

!12
02
O:J

EXPOSITION.
0

~: ~~~m~ ir~x%~1~ro ;~~ 1.''.~: ·::::::: :: : : : : : :: : : : : : : : :: : ::: : :::: ::::: :g
SECTION !.-EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION IN ITSELF.

~· ~~~1~reh;m•ion nn<! Extension .. • .. .. .. .. .. • .. .. . .. • • .. .. .. .. • .. • • 96

-·------ --

·----- - - --

10~

101
101
JOl
101
101

!IN
lO'J
102

JOO
JOO

1<»

ARGUMENTATION.
t. The Rhetorlr.nl Use of Ar1n1ments ..... . ............... ............

J07

II. 'fhe llh•islon of Argmncuts ........................................ J07
(1) ~' orm .............. .. ................. . ....................... J07
(2) Subject-matter .................. . ............................. l!lfl

ml~rJ~o:~:::: :: :::: :::: :::: ::::: .::: :::: ::::: :: ::::: :::: :::::::: ~~
SECTION I.-A PRJ.ORI AUGU:MJ<:NTS.

CHAPTER III.

a: Natur: gf ~i~~/~t~twu.
"'." ...... " . .. ' • "· .. · .. · " ........ • • .. • •
.......... .. .... ... ............ .. ................

99

CHAPTER IV.

m~::i1.~~:1:::::::·:::·::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :
8

99 .

99
100
100
JOO
100
100

1. The JI[ et.hod of Particnlnrs ........................................ 105
II. 1'hc lllctho<I of Conell ti ons ........................................ JOii
8. The llletltod of Shnllara .............. " .. .. ............. .... ; ... • 106
4. The llletbod of Coutrnst .......................................... 106

91

{~) Contt:11<1i11g Patties . . .... ::::::·.:::·.·. : :·.".:::".::::::::::::::::: ~}
(~) ~r~1c1pal a11d ~uhordiu11tc Aclions .... • ........ .... .. .. .... . 91

( J r llrcnt Vou11lrlcs... . . .. .. .. .. .. .. • .. .. .. .. .... . .. .. ..
• . JIlean~
of E~prc1's ln 0i, Synchro11ism
· ··•· ·
(1) Se11•ihle Form s
" " " .. "
• .... "
· " " ' ... .. " "

::;:

SECTION 11.-EXPOSITION OF A NOTION THROUGH

SECTION III.-THE SYNCHRONISM OF EVENTS.

1.

nu!......................................................

ml ll~~~ii~ :::::::: ::: :::::::::: :::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::
8. The Laws of Logicnl Definition...................................

ITS UELATIONS.

SECTION II.-THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
1. Time ..................... . ................. .............. : ....

13

ANALYSIS.

97
117

Nature of the Argument .. ... ....... .. ....................... ......
Extent of lnfcrcucc from a Cause .................................
The Absence of n (;nusc ...........................................
Tho Degree of Connection between Cause and Effect ... ..........
Probnhllit.y E stnbliehcd by a prlmi Argmnents ...................
8. Ambiguity of Causal Words .. .. ................. . . ...............
1.
S!.
8.
4.
Ii.

110
110
Jll
Ill
112

113

SECTION II.-'-ARGUMENTS FROM SIGN,
1. N atnre of the Argiunent .. • .. • .. • .. • .. • .. • • • • • • .. .. .. • • .. • • • • • • • .. • 113

2. C&lculation of Chnnces ............................................ 114
a. Proof of a U11use ................ .. ................................ • 1115

14

4. T<W!Plon~ . . . i .... ;·\vi ............................. ,............ -~.&:i~

.. ""' '• '•'" ••"•' ••'•'' ••"""' m

'ir

(2) Cl:~fll<'.:~
~Vil ll C~~~:·.~·
lJO
(a) t:onc11r11·nt. Wl!n c••c• . .. :::::::::::::::::·"""·::: :: :::::::

(4) Advt•l'se Witn1•sses
•• • · ••
(5) C'hnrncter of Fncto iiii;;i;.i'" .. ............. · .... "" ........ !17
(6! 'J'lw lknlnl of Tcsthnon
· ·" """ " " • ........ "" • · · · · "• llR
II A ti 1 ·I 1 ·
y ................... . " • . . ............ !JR
l~~o Jr~;~·i~·c· ~:; ~; ~;;t: . ........ ........ . . .......... ......... 119
118

A; 1 1

u: 1•::u

··: · •·· •···•·••········ •···•··· •···•·•·

SECTION Ilf.-AIWUMENTS FROM ltBSEMJJLANCE.
1. Nnturc of the Ar,c mmcnt
2. E •s,•utlnl He•cmblnnccs :::::""" .... '"""" " ............. ... . no
' E ·
I
.. .. ......... . ........................ l 2C

·

ci) n.IJ~,~ .~~-~' ·F:~·;,;,-,;.·;
121
(2) l11\'c11 tcc1 Exnmplc. :::::::::" · · · · · """'"····"'"'""'"'' 11 ~21
(3) lllu •JraJ.ivc Exam Ice ..
'"" · .. "" '· ·" · ' ·' · • · · ... """ <•
4- I I ti
p •· .. ................. .......... . ....... 122
(i,"Ti.~?;,·.·t·1;~ci -~, ·i\;;;;~.;;~~i
123
(2) Tlw ~h>Jhocl or Difference """ "" • ""' ·""" ·""" "•"' 1 ~

· .............. · .. ... ·· ............ .. .. ....

············.. ·········.......... .. .

(3)

The Method or Hesld c

(4) 1'he Method or

.. .. .. .. • . • . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. • . ..

1
125

SECTION IV.-TTIE CONDUCT OF A DISCUSSION.
l.--1'11E PREPARATION 01" TJIR QUESTION

lt . E•p
N cceeslt
'"""
""""""""" •" •" ll2tl
ltly of !'reI1nra ti on . ..............
" .........................
2U

~: g~:~fi:; 1:·~ ;i: ;;:: :::: :: :: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::::: :: :: :: :: :::::::: :::::::: l~

- TuE IN 1l 1 'wus .......... • ..... · .. • ........ • · ..................
l . Desi 1~ ~1'~~'7.:?r~rl · · · · · ·" · .. " ·""" · · · "" .. "" " .. .. ........
2. KlncG f I t I ti ucllon . ... "·""'" "" • ·" • · •" " • ...... • ....
l)
o ~ rorn c on ... ... .............. .... ,. .. ....... .. .......
( 1 nqn l•1Urn ............. . ............................ .. ....... :
~arnc10{1 cnl. .............. , ..... , .• , .. ....... ,, ........ , ......
~ ) porrcct ~e ...... ..... . ... .......... .. , . . ........... ., .........

128
128
128
1211

129
129
129
Nrcporn .ory •••••• • , •••.•• ..•• • , • , •••.••.• , •• , • • • • • • • . • • •• •
129
15
c()
nrrntlve .. . . ... . ...... .. ... .. ............................. ::· 129

1:1
4

111

J30
1. 'l' ho Use," .of .the lJllierent Classes of Argi;.;,"~,;i~::::::::;:;:::::::: l~O
, - ONFlHllfATION, •• ,,. ,,, , . ,, , ,, ,, ,, , , , , , ,

m~1~,~·-~r.'.·:. ·:.-:.-.-.·:.:::-.: : :

0

:-;. ::::·.: :-. :::::::: :::::-.:::::::: ::::
(~) llc•cmhlnnce.. .. . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .
ll. The Arrnni;:omcntor Atgn mcnts .. ................ . .... .. ..........
(1) Iml)OJ'lllll CC or Arrn11crc1n c~1t
••••••••••••••.••••• ••••• •••• • •
(21 Ori crof Argnm ontsnccordl~g·i~·i{1;;ci:::::::::::::::::::::::
(3) Order of Argumc11 t e 11ccordlng to Strength . . ..... : ...........
I~) Pronng by Jnstnllments . ... . .. ..... .... .. .. ............ .. ....
(l) , ..

1

igg
l:lO

131

m
i. i: ... ... .. ........ ...... .. ....... ... ............. . ·
~,· In~ :·11~ r.~;,·;,;Ji~i,;~;:::::; .... ·......................... m

ivi-:-W;:,~;A('~~i .

131
132
li12

(2) Overthro\\l11g Arg um ent s •••••• : · ··············· · ·· ·· ··· · ··· · 133

·

T[i')6~~Yl:i18f.i~~!~~,~~og~ i,"c;ih ·si · ····:::: :: ::: :::::::::::::::::::: 135
(O) D . I
OJ . J"
des . ......... . ......... . .......... 13.5
<a, st~~~~,~~~n t ~r~ti,!f<~ii~~~:::::: :: ······························ 1 ~

8. )nutions roncnn f n~ Jtc futntlou . . •.. : :::: : : :: ::: : ::::::::: :: : :::: :
~mcthb1 lfrfutn1i on ........................... .. . ........
1
(SJ P~ 1~r 'c?i~ ricu~·~~e•s.
· •· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · •· •· · · · · •· · • •· ••· · •· · · • ·
(4
• ••. •• •• .••••••••••••.•••••• •• •• •• •• • •••. •••
(G)) ~cc1~~ions ..... .......... ... ........ ............ ............

136
137
137

(6)
:: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : :: : : ::: : :: : : :: : •
17) Pluce for Answering Objection• .............. .. ............ . :

I~

g: foo

Ac~~ssil~l~ T:~t~1~;iii~~:: ::
1

- --- --·- - - - ·-

BOOK III.-LAWS OF FORM.
PAO•

l. lmp... ~tanc e or 1\fotho<l ............................................
I. The Procc~ B of Jntcrprct.lng 11 Sentence ...........................
(I) Exercise or l'resentatlvc l'owcr ...............................
(2) Exercise of Conscrvuttvo Power •••••••••••••••• , •••• •• ••••• , •
C8J E•orclso or lteprese ntatlve Power ... ....... ................. .
(4J J£x.,rc1Hc or Ueullzlnf Power ..... .............. .. .............
8. D eduction o f the Genera. Law of Style ......................... ..
(I) Economy of Interpreting Power .............. . .......... . ...
(2) E conomy or the Feelings ... ....... .. ... .... . ..... ......... ... .
(8) Summury .. . .. .... .. .. . .......................................
4. Apparent Excc l>tlons .. ............................ .... .... ....... .
(I) lntcntlonu Ob•curlty .... ........ .. ...........................
(2) Excessive P erspicuity .. ... ........... ...... ..................
&. The Composer's l'owers not to be Economized . . ..................
6. Division of the Subject ............................................

~:;

130

~37

143

144

144
145
145

J.15
146
146
146

147
147

147
148
149

1411

CHAPTER I.

Q O

Conco~nfi,;~i "v~'ri~ii~~·.· ·· · · · · '' · · · · · · · · ·' · · · · ~~:

&. Annlogy ......•••••.• •. .••.•••••••• ••. •••.••. ::::::::::::::::::::::

n

15

ANALYSIS.

ANALYSii.

THE ECONOMY OF INTERPRETING POWER IN PLAIN
LANGUAGE.
1. The Con1lltlor.a or Sententiul i>tructuro .. ..........................
(I) '!'ho 'l'lme-ret11tlon . ..................... ... .... .......... ., ...
(~) '!'ho 'l'rnt.h·rolation ............... ... ..... ....... .............
8. 'l'ho Ht.ylo or Lt•gul Acls ............ .. .............................
8. N ntlou•I 'l'Y1Jes of Style ... ................. . . .... ...... . ........ ..
(I) 1'he German Style .. ..........................................
) The ~' rcnch Style ....... ...... .... .. ....................... ...
3) 1' ho lcnglish Style ...................... .... .................
4. T e Equilibrium of tbe•C 1''orccs . . ...............................
&. Division of the Subject . ................ . .. . ....... . ...............

~

151

151

mt

l&i
152
153
153
153

lM

1M

SECTION I.-DIOTION, OR THE CIIOIOE OF WOUDS.
I. -FA.MJJ.tA.RlTY • •·: • • • •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ' ••••• 155
1. Rcnsone for Familiarity .. .. ...................................... 155
2. Aristotl e's Opinion ........ ........ . ............... . ............... 156
8. Tho llnrharl• m . ........... .... . ............... . ................... 157
(I) Rnrbnrl sms from Tlmo .. ... .. ........ . . . .... .......... ........ 167
(2) Dnrbnrl •m s from !'In ce .. ..................................... · 158
4. Whe11 DnrlrnrlPms nrc nllowablo .................................. 158
(11 !Jlnlectlc Composition• ............. ... ... ... . ..... ........... 158
(2) T echnlcnl P ersons . .. .......... ........ .. .... . ....... ...... ... 158
II. The Law of Use ......... . ... .. .. . ... . .. . ......... .. ............... 159
6. The Formation o r N ew Words . . . ................................. 1&9
11.-1.ltNOTll ... .. . ..... . , ..... .. , .......... ., ...... , ... ., .. ; ...... , , •• ., .

180

1. lllt"tu lvnntngo ur Long \VortlK • .• ••.. . , •••••••••••••• ••••••• • •• ••••
(l) I>llllculty of Perceiving them ........................... . .....
(2) J)illiculty or Uememheriug them ................ ·. . ... : .......
2. Advantages of Long Words . ....... .. ..... ........... .............
(I) Souncl and Sense .. ..... . .. .... ............. .. ................
121 Actnnl Economy .. ..... ........... . ...........................
8. Vnl ue o r tlaxou lllnRtrntcd from I.ltcrnture .......................

100
160
161

161
161
1112
!62

111 . -INCLUBION ................... .. .. .. .. .......... . ... . ............... lG3

1. D efinition and Forms or Inclusion ................ . ...............
ll. Specl lle and Gene ral Words ......................................
(I) Difference bctwMn Specific and General Words ......... .....
(2) lleaeoua for the Supcrl!'Jr Force of S)?~'llc Exp~esslo~s. ~ ....
(3) Choice of Terms PosPtble . ....................... ...... ......

163
164
l6t

IM

166

16

ANALYSIS.
ANALYSIS.

a. Homonyms .. •• ....• •• •••• •.•••••• ••••••••••• •• ••.•••• •••• ••• •• ••••PAO•
167
· (1) Allowable flomonyrne .•••.•• ...•. •• ••..•. .••..• • ••.•...• . .•. • 167
(2) Ambiguous Homonyms ...................................... . 168
4. Annloi:ues .. . ........ ... ... .. ..... ... ... . ........ . ................ . 169
OJ Annlogues In Form ....... ....... ..... .... . ... . ....... ... .. . . 160
(2) Annl ogucs in AJenoiug •.. . •.••.••••••••...••••.•••..••.•• •• •••
lV .-lM rLICAT!ON • •••• •••••••••••••••••• , ., , •• , •• ., , • , • , • , • , • •• , •• , , • , , , 170
171
l. 'l'htl Effect. of Words on Thoughts •••••••••••.•••..••.••••••• . •·••. 171
2. 'J'he A•socl ntlous of Words .•.. ' ........................... .. ..... . lit
8. 1'bo Utlli zat1011 of Pro-exerted Energle1 ••• ,., •• , ••• ,.,, ,.,,,,. ,,,, 17~
BEOTION U,-BENTENOEB, OR THE OOMDINATIONS OF
WOllDS,
I.-TnR

NUMBED OP

Wonne ..... . .. . .. , ........... , .... . ... .... ... . ..... 173

t ?;:::n,~::;~,t;,y ·.:: :::::: :: :::: :: :::::::: :: :::::: :::::: :::: :: :::::::::: H~

8. Ulrc11111 loc111.ion .. ..... . ....................... . .. .. .. . ..... . . . ... ,. 176
II.-T11 v. J>of'l'l'loN OP 'Vonns ... . .... .. . • . . .. .......•. . ...... .. . .... .. .. li7
l. 1'he lndivitlunl Force o f Words ...................... . .......... ,. 177

m~1~i:~.;,~1~~;~:::::: ::: :::::::::::::::: ::::::: :::::::::: :::::::: m

51. 1'hc Modlfyiug Ellcct or Wordo . .. ....... ....... ....... ...........
(1) l'roxlmity ..... .. . .. ........... . ........... . ....... . .... . . ... . .
(2) l'nrc11thctlc11I Ex1wce•lon•.... . ... . .. . .. . . . . . • . . • • .• • . . .. . . . .
~. The Grnrnmntlr.11l llcl11tlon • of Words ......... .. ...... . . .... . ....
JJl. -'I111H l h: r~ ATION OP \Vmms TO TllE hH~A AS A \ Vnut.E . . ... .... .. •..
1. The 'l'lrnc-rclatlo11 o r Word s to the Whole lclcn .. .. ....... . ..... . .
2. The Trnth·n·l111.ion of Word• to the Whole Jdcn . .......... .. . .....

181

181
1811
1110

Co>1B I NA'r10N OF Sr.NTRNCES . . ............. .... . .... ... ... . ...

'l'IIE ECONOMY OF INTERPRETING POWER IN FIOURA'flVE LANHUAtJE.
1. Defin ition of Flicurcs ...... . ... .... ........ .... ................ . .. . 203

2. I~n.,,· e of 1\ ~~oclnt.10 11 . .. ... .. ...•.... .•... .•.... • ... . .•. .• •.••.••••. 2l).1
8. 'l'beee Lnwe U cducctl to 'l'hrec ....... . . .. .. ... ...... ... ... .... ..... 201

4. Use ot these Lnws ... . ....... . .. . ... .. .... .. .... .. .. ... . ........... 001
(1) Why Fi,:urcs Improve Style . ...... ... .. .... , .. . . ....... ... . . . l!(J.&
(2) What Figures are Advnntngeous ................. . ............ 200

SECTION I.-11IGURi:S FOUNDED ON RESEMBLANCE,

----

Purflonltl cntlon In <>rntory • · · · •• • · •• • · ·• • • · • · • • · · · ·• • • ·• • · •· • ···' • 2221

2l~

12.1
2211
2".13

a . Ln\\'fl of Alll'j.?Oty ... . . .. . ·.· ........ . ... ... ... .•.. .. . . .••. .• •. ....•. 224
m
(I) D<•vulopuwut of tho ltndlcnl lllctnphor .. • · • ·• • ...............
(2) Tho Aualogy Evident .......... •• •. ······•·· · ····· · ···· .. ···• • 225

1 . -BTNY.CllOCllE •• • • •· • · •• • · •• • .... • " ' •• • • •" '••• • ••• •' • •• • ••• •• •• . ... • 22~

CHAPTEU II.

·- -

-w

n•11

a.

11!8

4. Value of Annlysls ........................... .. .................... 201

--- --------·

! . PL•te1111ltlt·nt.lo11 Nntnrnl t.o :fttnu · · • · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •' • • · · ·• · · •

'- Furrn"' t•t ]'1•r,,011ldffttlo11 ... ..•• ···• · · · • ···•·• · •• · ·•• ••• · · ·· ·•••• •• ·
(1) 1'cr.1111nllty AH:rlbctl. . • ... • ..... •• .. ·• • • ·• • ••• • • ••• • ...... · ·"
(21 Qunllt.lus of Life Attributed ........ .. • ... •···•··•• . ... • .... •"
IV.-At.1..Y.~IJll Y ..... .. . . .................. . ..............................
l. 'I'll<! Nnturu of Allegory .... .. ..... .. ... ... · . .. ................... ·
a. Alh·!(ory J)lstlngulshcd from Allied Forms••·········· .. · · · ··· "·

SECTION 11.-FIOUllES FOUNDED ON CONTIGUITY.

1. Pro,!!rc~i:: i \·c l h:\'<'lofun c ut .. ......•. ...• . .. ...•.• .•. .• . ...• . . ••..••• 1H9
2. J<:xpliclt Hd1·ro\11 e~ . ...... ..... . .. .. .......... ... .. . ... .. . ....... . . 200

l. 1''<>rms ot Simile .... .. . . . .. ..... ....... ......... ..... ....... .......
(l) IJlrect IteRemhlnnce .. . . .. .. . •. . . . .. . . . . .. .. . ... . . . .. • .... . .
(2) Uc~emhlnnce of Cunscs ....... . ...... ... ...... .... ... .. ...... .
(3) I!cscmblnnce or EO'.ccte ... .......... . ... ...... . ... .. .. .. ......
(4) lle•cmblnnce of Untlo• . . ... . . ... ... ... . . ..... . ....... . . .....
t. J,aws of Simile ... . ...... . ... .. ... ............................ '. ....
(1) Slmllnr Objects....... ..... . . .. .. ....... . ... .. .. ...... .. ... ..
(2) Vague llescmblances ...... . ....... .. ......... . ................

(51 Concrel.c l\l ctnphurs • • • • · · • · • · • • · • • · · • • · •• • • •' • • • •'' • • • • •' • • • • 2J7

t . Tho \'aluu of Mct•phor ....... · ·· • ••••·· · ···-·· ·"' . ................ 2 18
Ill - J> 1::u~oN1F1CATloN . .. ••. . ••.•••••.• .•.••• . •••••• • •• ··•·· • •• ••• •• ·• • • ,
i. The Nn t11rl~ nud Orlgln of l't~nm utl\cuthm .. •• • • • · • • • • •• • • • • · • • • • • ~m

ma

3. Nccr.l'l~l ty or n 'l' llctuc ....• .••• . .. ........•..••. . .•......••......••• :.!el l

{.-SI!llLE • •••••• •• •••••• •••• , ••••• •• •• •••••• ••• , •••• •• , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

.
PAOB
(11) Simpler Objcct.e .•..•••• •• • . .... ·• • • •• • • •• • • •• • • •• • ••• • ••• • ·" ~g
(-1) 'fhe l'osltlon of Parts In a Simile .. · · .. • • .. · • •"" • · · • • •• • ·"
213
. -MF.TAPllOR . . ...... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. . •••••••• ........ . .... . .......... . 213
1. N11t11rc of Metnphor ..... ·• •• . -· · ·· ............. · ....... . . ....... " 214
11. Hupurlorll.y or N et&phor to Simile .. • · · • .. • .. • · .. · • • • • · • • • · • • · " • • 1-1
3. Mclllphor Hued on Analogy • • • • .. • • ·• • ·" • · ·" · ·• "• • • · · ·' · ··' •" 2
21"
4. La"·• o( llh•tnphor .... · · · • · ... ••• • • • • •" · .. "·• • · · •• • •• • • ·• · ••• • •• 215
(I) Neee••lty o r Clearn c••.... . . •....... .•...• · . . . .... ........ •
•
(2) Jll c11<il 11!( Pluin nod l<"lg uratlve Language .. • · .. • · • • • .. • • • · .. • ~le
(3) Mlxlllll Met.nphors .... ... .. .. ..... .... . ......... • ............. 210
(4) f:ltrul11l111l Mclnphore ...... • ·" • •" • • ... · ••• • ·• • • •• • ·" • ... • ·" 21a

lUl

IYI

(1) Ru ggcs tivcncss .. .• ..........•• . .....•• .. ....••..•...••.••..••• 193
(2) U ulty ....... ... ...... .. ......... ... . ... .. . ... ; ......... .. . .. .. . 195

IV.-1'nr.

U

17

206
200
206

206
207
20,<j

21~J

210
210

1. The Theory Explained ................ · •• · .. ••··•··•··•••··•• .. •··• ~
I . Fonns of Coutlgult.y . ... .. . ...... · · · .. · • · .. • · · · • "• • • · · · · • • • • · • • · • • 2:"'

1. For111flll of Sy ncc1h1chc . . · · · • • · · · • · • · • • · · • · · • • · · • · · · • • · · • • · · • • · ·• • · • ·
(11 A l'nrt tor tho Wholo ·• • · ·• • •• • · · ·· · · ... •· • • · •• • • ··" ... "" · •
(2) The \\"hnlo for n. l'nrt.. · · · · · · · · · • · · · • · · • • · · · • • · · • · • · '· · • ·' • • '' •
(3) 'l' hc Jllatcrl11l fur the Uhjccl .• . ..• .. · ... · •. · .. • • • • · .. • · • • • · ·"
11.-JllKT<>NYHY .. •• • .... . .......... . .. ·· •••• ••••••••• .. ••• ••·••• .. ••• •••
t. Forms of Jl!ctonymy ...... . ......... .. .......................... ·"
(I) Cnn•o and EtI ...ct .......... · . .. . .. · .. ·• • .... · · · · · .. ·• • · ·• • · ··"
(2) 1'hc Bl~n and t.ho 'l'hluic Rlicnlflccl. ... . .. · ._. · ......... "" • .. "

22""

227
2:.?H

2'.lS
2'.18

22!1
~,g

.,._lO

(:J) Co11tul11cr n11d 'J'hlng Co11t.al11cd ... ... • .. .. • • • • • • • • •·• • • ••• • • • ~

I. The Lnw of Selection .. •· ••• .. ····•··• "" · · • .. •·•·•••···· ... ·· •••· 230
230
t )fimnluir of Co-cxistont Emotion!' .. •·· ·· . ... .. . ··•••••••• ........ ·
231
51. Figure• fo1111d ed on Co-exl•tent E motlone .• • · ... • · · • · ... · .. • · ... • 2:1!
(1) ~;xc11111111tlon .. . ...... . ... · · .. · · •• · · •• • ... • •· .. • ·• • • · · • ... '· •' Zl2
(2) llyp,.rholc ....••.•.• · ..... · · · • · • •• • • · • • · · · · · · .. • · • · • · · · · "• · ·' 2ll3
(~) Al"'• l.rophe ....... · · · • · .. · · ·• • · • • .. • · • · • · ·" • · •• • •· • • • · ·" ··' · 234·
(4) V sio11 ............ ...... . ..... · ... · · · · • · · · · · · · •• • · · · • · · • .. · .. · 2'!!
3. Rx,.1a11ntlon of lhc•e 1''1guree ................ • • · · · · .. • · ·•• •·• • · ... · 236
4. Lftw• of thCBc Figures ............... · .. •··••···•·••• . ... ··•• ... •• '
.

111.-C'-O-KXl • TENT EHOTION• ........ . . ...... . ..........................

SECTION 111.-FIOUR.ES FOUNDED ON CONTRAST.
I. The Theory of Contrn•t .... .. .......... · ·· · · · · • · . .. · · · • · •• ·• • · ·•• • ~
:1. p;._cnllnls of n l'urfcct Contri"'t · .. · ·· · · •• · · · · · ·• · . . .. · · • · · ·• · · • · · 288
8. Fl~ure• J•'oundcd 011 Contrast .... ··•··•····••· • ·· ···· ·•·• .... · ·· ·" 288

i.1~~~·;::m:.~~1.~~~.~~,~~-~:·.·.:

·.·.·.::·.·.::·.·.::·.:::: ::: ::: :::::: :: ::::::::: :: =:

(1) The Nnlurn of Aut.llhe~ls .. · ·· • · · · · · ••·•· ···• ........... · · ·· • 239
(2) Tho Nnturul l'orm of Antithesis ... ·•••·· • ............. •·• ... »IO
(R) Lawe of Antlthc•le . . · · • .. · • · · · • · · · • · · · · · · · · · ·• • .. · · .. " · • . ... 240
t. Climax ... ............... ..... ..... .. .... ••·•••••••••••••·•• • ••• ••• •

18

ANALYSIS.

CHAPTER III.

INTRODUCTION.

ECONOMY OF THE FEELINGS.
l. The Rtrcct or Words on t.ho Scnsibilltlce
Hnmiitou 's Theory of the F'cellngs
'"' '"' "" "" • "" •" .. 244
8. Application or the 1'heory to Expre~.·1 ~·~ • "" · · · · · · · · · · · · · · .. · • .. • 244
.......................... 243

».

SECTION !.-VARIETY,
1. 'J'.he Ncce ~•it.y or Vsrlet.y .................. ..
2. 1 he Appll cnt,JOne of Vuricty
·"" .. "" ........ "•
1.-L~TTF!l~S .. , .. , , .. . , .. , .. ,. .. , , ::.:: :-.:·.:: :: : : :-. : : "• • " • · "• " " " , , .
1. fhe Vumnlntlon or Con sonant•
" " " "•" .. " .. • • •
'" ' "" ... "" · ...... • • .. · · " .....
9. 'fhc V1111111lnt.1011 or Vowcla
11.-Wonns AND SYLLABLES
................... .. .... . ..............

246
240
246
!17
217
l. Tnulophony...
• .............. .. " " " "" .................. 248
(!) otrcn slvo 1·~".;topi1;;n;. ·"" · · · · "" .. · •.. •.. •.. · · · · ...... •· .... 248
(2) lut.enlionnl Tnutophony"..""'
"· "' " · · · "• · .. · • "• • • ........ 248
2. llfcter....
.. . ................. .. ........... . .. 248

... " ...... ·.... · .. .... · ........ · ..

Prooi ~r · ih~ \>oi1U'~ ;;;r.i~i.~~
251
(2) E:rnmplc .. ..
""" " ' .. " " .. " ............ • ... 251

(1)

(3) Adnplntlon oi":Jii~i~;i~·p~~t;y""' " "'""'" ......... · ..... 25!
(4) Rhythm........
.
....... , ..................... . .. 25~
lll.-S~5~T~~~~r8 no Violation ~i \ra'ri~t),':::: :::::: :::: : ::: : : :: : ::: : : :: : : ~~

·+~1IB~ ~u. •.u~ -•. :. ••..:::E·: :-. :::•·•,· ::•::•1
SECTION II.-HARMONY.

I,-SotTND• ........ .. . . .......... .
1. Other Sounds
"'"""""" "" • "" "•" .......... 256
0

l I1!~ ~:d~~::!t~):::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
~
·"" .. " ·" "·"" " " " .... ""
5. 'l' hc A green hie nn'd iii~d 0~;~~~i;1~"
259
6. Clnnnx In Sco•c
" " " " ' " " . . " " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
1

u.1.F.:fi~ ~1;,;i~· ~r· Fi:~;~~::::::::: : :::::::: : ::::::::::: : ::::::::::::::: ~
2 The Number or

j:· 1gur ~~·

.. ... .. .... ' ..... " " " " " ' " ... .......... 261

sx~J~i":ois'~~.".~' F1gurc8. ::: ::: : : ::: :::: :::: :::: ·:: :::: ::::: ::: : ::: : : :I~
....................................................... 264

1. Essential Elements of Discourse.
Bvery eontenco is designed to communicate nn iclen,
and employs hmgurigc as the medium of communication. The idea may be definite to tho mind of the
communicator, but vague to the interpreter of the sentence. '!'his is because tho medium does not always
perfectly reveal the idea. There is obviously such a
distinction between the idea and the medium as to
present two classes of fuctR for our consideration.

a.

The Relations of Thought and Language.
A proper conception of the relations of an idea and

its medium of' expression, is of primary import1mce.
Ae the question belongs both to Linguistics and to
Logic, we shall cite authorities from hoth sciences.
(1) La.ngua.ge a.nd Thought Sepa.ra.ble.-After showing that thought is antecedent to expression; Professor Whitney says : "Language, then, is tho spoken
means whereby thought is communicated, and it is
only that. Language is not thought, nor is thought
language; nor is there a mysterious and indissoluble connection between the two, as there is between
, eoul and body, so that the one cannot exist and
manifest itself without tho other. Thero can hurdly

· -----'H

;,

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

elementary forms of discourse, we shall cover the whole
ground of the conditions of communication depending
upon the nature of the idea. These four classes of
ideas give rise to four different processes of communication: ,,
(1) Tue parts of a simultaneous whole are presented
to the mind by Description.
(2) 'fhe parts of a successive whole are presented to
the mind by Narrat-ion.
(3) A 3eneral notion is unfolded to the mind by
Exposition:
(4) A proposition is confirmed to the mind by
~ rgumentation.

CHAPTER I.
DESCRIPTION.
Complex o Jee s on y are capa le of

escnptiou.

A simple object, as for instance the color blue, cannot
be described. We may give instances of it, but one
who had never seen any blue object could never learn
from description what blne is. In order th~t anything
may be capable of description, it must c01:s1st of ]>itl'ts
which may be mentioned, and whose relat10ns may be
ahown.

2. General Laws of Description.
There arc some general qualities which every de.
ecription should possess.
(1) The Law or Purpose.- ~Vhcnev~r W? dcscnbo
anything, we do so with a defimle end 11~ view. ~ct
the subject be the United State~. We might d:scnbe
the United States for a geographwal purpose, to mfor~
tho mind how the parts of the country are related m
direction and distance; for an antiquarian purpose, to
portray the condition of uboriginnl tril~es ; for a ~eo­
logicnl purpose, to illnstmtc the opcro.t1011 of physical
forces; for a political purpose, to demonstrate the ne·
CNlity of national unity in so vast a country. .our
•lcction of circumstances should be governed entirely
~1 tho purpo~e of the description.
· .
(2) The Law of trnity.-The mere enumeration of

76

THE

SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

LAWS OF IDEA.

q,nalities is not sufficient for a perfect description.

'l here must be coherence between the parts enumera-

\

'

ted, a mutual depend ence nnd conelation. Jleucc the
necessity of proceeding according to some definite plan.
(~) ~he Law of Completeness,-It is necessary that
notl1111g important to the purpose be left out of the r t
1
of. qualities. It is not to be supposed th at all the co ~­
stituents of an obj.act must bo mention ed. 'l'he purpose regnlutes tlus. A description of the United
States which should leave out the great rivers miO'ht
be proper for son:ie .purposes, but for industrial ~r­
poses such a dcscr1pt1011 wou l<l be worthless.
(4) The La.w of Brevity.-'l'he memory is soon
O\·e~powered by details. H ence a description should
~Y?1d all. useless. minntim, and even leading character1st~cs winch are 1rrelernnt to the purpose. Vivacity is
gamed by this elimination, and th e attention is more
easily retained.

1

3. Kinds of Description.

I~ ~II bo c~nvenient to distinguish three kinds of
descr1pt10n, whwh, from th eir peculiarities, should be
treated separately. They are description of (I) onJ.ECTS
OF SENSE j (2) MENTAL STATES; (3) CHARACTERS,
SECTION I.

'.

OBJECTS OF SENSE.
l. Purpose.
(1) Point of Visw.-Th c purpose for which we dc-

sc~be an object should determine our point of view.
This should be settled in the beginning.

.A description

77

of the United States for a class in geography might
muke the actual position of the class the point of viC\~,
and proceed outward in straight lin es ~r .c.oncenLnc
circles. If we were describing th e peculiari ties of the
country to a foreigner, wo might sel~ct his ~utrnnce
into an American harbor ns tho pomt of vww, uml
then conduct him into the interior and across the
continent. 'l'ho point of view should not bo shifted
without warning.
.
.
(2) Division.-Complcx ohjccts reqmre systematic
division in onler to be understood as u whulu. 'l'he
kind of' division depends upon t he purpose, taken in
connection with the churitcter of the object. A desc_ription of the earth's surface for a ~1oliti cal purpose,
clivides according to national bonn<l anes ; for a meteorological purpose, according to zones ; for a purely geographical purpose, according to continents.

2 Unity.
(1) Order.-Alth ough a proper 11il· ~ si o n is helpful
to unitv as well as important in its relat1011 to purpose,

the order in which the pa~ts are con sidered is still
more essential. 'J'he order ~ill depend also upon the
purpose of the description, but . must be chose ~1 chie.fly
with regiwd to unity. If a central and causatn·~ prmciple can be found, it will assist. t~nity to f~Jlow tho
operation of this. 'fhus, in descnbmg the climates of
tho earth, it wanld be best to follow tho npp1trent
mm·cments of th e sun, beginning at th e equator. Another means of sec uring unity is to foll ow the order of
uctnal percep tion. In describing a distant mou.ntt~in,
for instance unity would be promoted by ment10nrng
the various' phases of its appearance in the order in

'iB

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

which they would occur to one approaching the
mountain.
(2) Fitness.-Jt is conrlncivo to nnity to hold conrnind the exact purposti of the closcri11tion,
nl! purticulurs are suggosted, aud to decide upon their
fitness for the cud in vie1V,

st::in~ly in

3 . Completeness.
(l} Location.-Ono of tho cornmon 1'iolutions of
the Jaw of completeness is the 'omission to fix the place
of the object described. A description of any thing
ought to be infroducod by information about the place
where it is found. 'l'his is especially the case when
the object is local.

(2) Inner Qualitiss,-A description of an animal
would be imperfect without some account of its instincts ancl habits. Tho mere extr::rnal form and size
are the least inter·esting facts with regard to animals.
'l'heir sagacity, their modes of life, und their disposition toward man are essential to any complete account
of them.
(3) Time.-EH!ry t.hing in nature is snbjcct to
change. A description is, therefore, unsatisfactory
unless tho time of tho obsen·ntion be given. We should
know wheU1er a plant 01· animal was young or old when
the observer saw it. Even the posture, tl1e time of
day, the antecedent circumstances may be important.
Tmrelers h'.tre varion sly described the chameleon, for
its hue dcpoucls upon its own mood, the color of the
objects about it, and eren the temperature. In a
certain sense all nature shares the qualities of this
reptile.
(4) Magnitude.-Misconception is likely to result

LAWS OP IDEA,

79

.
t the mngnitnde of an ~bjec~.
from a farlnre to no .e
f.
bvious r elations, it
When tho size is unknown rn;nt od
shonl<l always bo in some ways u e •
.
4. Brevity.
-Among the various me.ans of

(1) .Oompa.r!aona.
'ti ti I iw of l.H·cvr'ty, com1mrison is nso-

complymg w1 l .1e . i
ct·i hor ·often presents a
ful. A happy s1mil~· o~: :tpRingle word. Novel
somewhat comp lex. o lJCC' 'I ,',s b1·ott"'ht to mind, and
·1·
I. ects 'tre • 1
°
·
1·icws of fmnr rnr o IJ
'.
I l11fttl to the descr1ptten t10n arc ie
.
ti
by etimulatmg ·~ a .
t ti s describes the sea.tion. An American poc
rn
shore:" The curved strand
Of cool gray sand
"
Lice like a Bickle by the sea.

· g the deA ther means of s hor t enm
~o ti10 e ffect upon the mind, and
.(2)
t' Eft'eots.is to descnbe
scnp wn
fill out the picture.
leave the fancy to

ts may be described by
, , • •
I111s 18
contrasting them w1 1 we
. t bn t care is necess1iry
.
I t
d tive of brev1 .y,
generally pro ~1c ....,.
t always determme w ia
'd b tr1ty
We canno
. .
t
to avo1. oti'sectlike· from
•
a know 1e dg 0 of what it 1e no
an obJec

(3)

·b.

C t t Some o JO C
•
.
on ras .- ' ti
11 known opposites.

Man objects may be suffiClassesb·--:yfc1·1·cd to certain fixed
'b d by e111g re
I
ciently descn e
le needs only tie
b t · t for examp '
classes. 'l'he o ams ' I t .. or,,er to know its char. of ·i p ·in 111 u
J
genus and specws
' . , I , cteristics of a minrra
0 I tl 18 lead mg c i.tra
, 'I .
ncter
ll Y
'
• ci·n] oO'ist
l 11R,
·
d
"b · t for a 1111 11 " " •
•
nre necessary to esc11l e i'fi tion rather than descrrphowever, is properly c ass1 ca
'
tion in its common sense.
like.

(4) Fixed.

80
THE SCIENCE OF HIIETORIC.
LAWS OF IDEA.

SECTION II.

lVIENTAL STAT.ES.
In the strictest s
·
l!cribed Ur I
' . :-,nsc mental states cannot bo de.
•
i css s11111 ar states 11·1re b
.
by the tnincl addressed ti
b' . cen experienccrl
by indi
t
' rny can e communicated only
. .
rec means, and even then with d btf I
c1s1on. 1'he modes of comrnu . .
ou n preare two · (I) by tl1 .
nicatmg states of rniud
•
•
e men ta! vocabul . .
d
r10us associations I tl
. a1y ' an (2) by vawe include only ti1e
·~~~~press10n "mental states"

s:h

and not the

co~sciousue~s of e::~:i:: ~~j:~1;:.ciousness,

l. The Mental Vocabulary

Th~ words usrd

to designate states of • .
the vanous 11owers of ti
. d
fcelmg and
sense descri1Jt1' •·e 1'1
ie nun are not in any truo
• .
iey arc syn b r l .
with certain 11henorneua ;1'11. I t~ o JCa signs associated
ic l ~ey serve rudely to indicate. The chances
are, therefore ~cry g~·e·ntHstaIIke Ill their interpretation
.
'
seemrng
va"uencss
of . '' t· . J - cnce
• tipu d I·m en 1ty nnd
0
me ap 1ys1cn l
t
peculiarities of the meu tal _
sys ·Oms. Several
attention.
'ocabulary need SjJCcia]

f .

(1) Metaphorical Ch
t
ments o.f Iungnnge 01. ~ra~fier.-AJI the radical ele,
" C s1gni C'lll t f
]
substances qualities
t
d '
o pure y physical
'
·
, ac s, an relatio
s
as perception, im(/gimetion a
'. ns.
uc 1l words
radicals primarily s· ·n nd feeltng are derived from
.
'
ign1 ic:mt of m t .· I
we forget ti
t
.
a e11a thrn"s. If
ie me aphoncal ch•tru t . f
o
speech, we shall be cont"
11
c .CI o all h ighcr
supposing that tl
. rnun y e_d mto tho error of
iere .1s an essen hal 1"k
b
mental processes and 1 J ·~ · 1
i eness
etween
,
i lJ "1ca acts.
That there is au

l

"':':"· -

81

annlogy there can be no doubt, and in some instances,
po~@ibly, a direct reimmblance. Bnt we are not at
liberty to suppose that mental and physical pho'nomc11a correspornl through out.
(2) Indeflniteness,-Frnnr t.hiR want of correRpon<l·
once betwee n internal states and external phenomena,
the lnngnn.go of the mind is often indeliuito. When
we spenk of a mountain, n rivm·, or a free, distinct
notions rise in the mind; bnt wh en wo speak of love,
joy, a11gei·, and othe1· states of feeling, n.u apprehension
of what is meant implies a personal experience of these
l!tutes. 'l'h e indefiniteness of language is increased by
the individual modilication to which all these states aro
subject. 'l'hns love may mean widely different things
to different persons, according to their tem11erament
nnd extent of experience. Joy, too, may be either a
cnlm, tranquil qui escence, or a tumultuous delight.
Anger may mean to one a petty irritation, to another,
n righteous indignation in which tho whole moral
nature is profound ly agitated.
(3) Subjective Result.-The effect of laugnnge descriptive of the feelings upon the mind addressed,
therefore, depends npoii' an infinite number of incalculable circumstances. 'l'he attempt to communicate
the feelings .nnd other complex mental states by tho
ordinary vocabulary of the mind, is almost certain to
}wore unsuccessful. The simpler and more common
states of feeling may be thus reproduced in another or
tolcrnbly well suggested by the use of their propel'
uames; but ns soon ns the phe110monon becomes exceptional, as in the finer shades of emotion, the exac~
commnnirntion of it in this way becomes al most im
possible.

82

THE SCIENCE OF RlIETORIO,

2. Various Associations.

What cannot be done snccessfnlly by the ordinary
\"ocabnlary may often be easily accomplish ed by various co11co111itn11ts. 801110 of these may be 11otico<I.
(1) External Expression.-Thoro is n natnral ln.ngnage of the body which is unii-crsal among men, nnd
founded on laws of muscular and nervous action. 'fhe
leading emotions of the mind lrnve their characteristic
modes of expression in the tones of the voice, the color
of the face, aurl the gesticulations of the body. Lore,
joy, anger, pain, and 11leasure, have each 1tn external
sign which is seldom mistaken. In describing the
feelings, this language may be joined with the proper
mental voeabnlary to enforce expression. A deseriJ1tion of the external accompaniment of an emotion is
often the best possible description of the emotion
itself.
(2) Aotions.-Closcly allied to the bodily expression, is the conduct prod need hy mental states. Tho
habits of meu are regulated by their feelings. 1'he
worship of art or literature springs from a devotion of
soul which none but derotees can fully comprehend by
any direct description ; but all form some notion of tho
intensity of this feeling when the humiliation, pain,
and depression endured for its sake arc minutely described. In one of his tales, Crabho very successfully
describes the state of an unfortunate girl hy naming
110r favorite occupations. 'l'he qnestion, how must
one fed to select tliesc pursnits? leads the inquirer
with great exactness to the proper state of mind.
(3) Surroundings.-The sunonndings have mnch
to do with our feelings. We are impressed by tho

-- _
-=------.
,_ -.

.

.

--·~

LAWS OF InEA.

83

..
I11p,
. 'and the probable .occurth
11ccncry, e companions
'
· t ti 0 commumca t·10 n
It
th erefore, ass1s
1
.
. I 't
rences. . may,
.·
the circumstances m wluo l J
of a frelmg, to desc11 be
. directly state the charwns 11rod need' an cl th en mo10t
I fentures of the oc1.
'l'he ex erna "
ncter
of
the
fee
mg.
.
t
·etation
of what might
.
. \v1'll thus assist tho m e1 pl
cnston
.
otherwise be obscn:c. }
ature is governed by
4) C es Smee rnman n
t t f l
(
aus ,- f like dispositions are ap o ee
general laws, men o
Very often tho most
the same from the snme c::m.sest. n emotion is to state
to commnn 1ca e 1t
sntisfactory w~y
VI n the emotion is unusually c~m­
the causes of it. ' ie I
in which the feclmg
11lex, this is oftc~ thed on 'I~l we a~arious dispositions of
1
b
'
•
•
.
tho
can e co mmunwatc
th· mode somew Irn t uncerhrn
· ' smce
men causes
render produce
is
.
t effects in different per·
same
d1fferen
10118.

SECTION III.

CHARACTER.
. enerally reflected in a
The character of men tis g .dered as a complete
f ti . lives bu cons1
l.
nnrmtivo o
imr
' d' ·bed . Several pecu tar·
te may be escn
·
f
growth, charnc r
. t'
of character. Some o
Tes belong to the descnp ion
l I
t'
d
these may be men ionc .

1. Individuality.
are worth describing. The
Only marked clrnrncters
s•try ton. sncccsi;fnl
ts
f
n
man
arr.
ncccs •.
.
t
0
•
distinctive rm
d .·
mon with most men
Those share rn com
. ·
<l b
descnpt10n.
b sufficiently indicate y reof t.he same class may e th t class. The power to
ferring the character to
a

- - -------84

TIIE SCIENCE OF RTTETORIC.

seize npon wh t ·
.
a Is purely rndividual . ti
great charncter p11i11ti11<r It . , is ie secret of all
11
11c11tly Ly SI k
b'
ns possessed pre-emi111 espcarn.
His fem I
I
very numerous, and ene1··11l .
a o c iaraclors are
creatious in liter· tg .
•' y ,1111011g tho most exquisite
-,
.1 111 e,
'And tho
SI k
women," says wIi iJ> 1 " ti
se
rn ·ospem·ian
I' O,
IOtt<Tfi uil · . 1· , ,
ono groat i<le I f
"'
· rnuia.10111:1 from
.a o ll'o1111111hood a1·e at ti
.
tensely indiridn·diz l E 1'
• io samo tune in' Cl •
ac 1 has a sep
t
ti ie processes of intell
t
ara e soul, and
ent in each."*
ec as well as emotions are differ-

2 · Inward Principles.
. Specific acts are important on! as er
•
internal princirilcs '.l'I
Y
su 0 gestive of
'
·
wse
make
ti
External acts am lwlnfu1 t0 ti
up. ie character.
t er, b nt this
· carries us
,. be ·ond10 portrmtur
. e ot c IJIU.acscl'iption, and in v·t1l ' ti}
t~ie rog1on of mere de•
'
cs 10 tcrntor 0 f
·
wluch the g 1·owtlt of 1 •
Y
narmtwn, in
.
c1mactor1sexh'b·t d 'I.'
cess of investigatinq character - I I e • . he proFrom isolated manifest· 't.'
sh.on Id be inductive.
.
,1 rnns we lllfer ti
t
t
mo 1ves, and th us anfre ·it th
.
10 ac nating
mind aud heart
'.l'J l ' . ~ don11nant qualities of
IC ~ escnptzon of
I ...
be deductive. ·'l'h e ruli
. .
c J,lJ.tcter should
first, und exemplif'1ecl 'fng pnnc1plcs should be· stated
1 1iecoss·wy b 'JI
stances. Thus c~·ci·y 't
. '
Y 1 ustmtive in1 cm will have ti
f
co1~firmation, instead of bein
. le orce of a
which to infer the principle. g a me1e datum from

3. Concrete Form.
No mere sum of al t. t'
fully represent a

char~c;:r~ac ,1,on s, 1101~cvcr,

can truth.
A. man is not an abstract
• ~ Literature of the Age of Elizabeth.

~---------

---·.

LAWS OF InEA.

85

pnssion," sn.ys Taine. "Ile stamps the vices n.nd virtnes whir~h he possesses with his indiridnal mark.
'l'hcsc Yices and rirtncs receive, 011 entering into him,
a bent and form which they hare not in others. No
ono is unmi.'i:crl sensuality. Take a thousand sensu11liste, n111) )'OU WiJI !ind IL lhollHillltl uiffere11t JllOlh.'R of
sensnnlity; for there arc a thousand paths, a thousand
circumstances and degrees in sensuality."* Portraitures of men which represent them as incarnations of a
single vice or virtue arc evidently untrue. No man is
"·ithout redeeming virtues, and no man is absolutely free
from faults or inconsistencies. }Jven an ideal character
should not be perfect, if designed to represent any
possible human being.

4. Environment.
A cl1arnctcr is a prmluct,, nn1l must ho studied

in its environment. Apart from his circumstances
in life, a man excites little genuine interest. Vir
tncs and vices are wonderful or common-place, according to the soil in which they grow. Piety is
11n essential and natnml clement in tho life of a great
divine, 111111 hence would be much more striking in the
life of a common sailor. Vices which would seem
natural to the seaman would seem to be foul blots upon
the chnractcr of the divin e. Ronco consistency requires that character be described in connection with
it.a atmosphere.
•English Literature, Vol. I.

-- LAWS OF IDEA.

CHAPTER II.
NARRATION.
is tho
a successive wfi~~;cutiattion to the mind of the
1 e ated c~·c nt
. · ·t" s theme is
· a senes
. of
s occun111
self related to time 'I ,g Ill imc. Langu:ifTc bcin 't•.s .t SllCCCS''.
f , o '
g' l
J•·t I·Jy II d aptcd t
,, JOI) () Sl"llS .
>1·
t
o lla.l'l':Ltion 1'1 . f o ' is part1cu1 csen s three
· .
·
11s orrn of d ·
OF SUIT
. p1·111c1pal problems . (I)
isconrse
TIO
AHLE CIRCU)ISTANCFS,
•
the SELECTION
N OF EVENTS IN THE
.. ' (2) the REPUESENT
the REPRESENTATION ~IU l' llOl'Elt REQUENOE • 'and (~
NARRATION

~alrts of

A~ TO SIIOW THEIR TRU F SYNCHRONISTIO
W1JI b d'
E RELATIONR
'l'

EV~NTS

SO

he. se problems
.
. e iscusscd in the foll . "
t mct10n is
· nccess·11·y b t
ow111g sec t'·JOils No d'
'
'
e ween r 1
.
·
1ssrnce the aim of fi t.
.
ea and Ill vented
. even ts,
c 1011 1s to count ·f .
e1 e1t reuhty.

SECTION I.
THE SELECTION OP
CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. Purpose.
1'he selection of ·
c1rcumst
.nnc~s depends greatly on
e purpose for whicJ1
may give special ntte t? nnrmt.1ve is composed
W
d
u ion to ti
.
e
an so produce InC're a1 l
ic temporal element
~elate the changes to wb~:~ s or cltt:onicles; we
Jected, and so narrate i'ts ' . tauy tl11ng has been sub
•
IHS ory.
' we may explain the
th

ma;

~--

87

ca11ses which have bC'en operatiYe in effecti ng those
chnng<'l'l, and so construct a philosoplticnl history. "l\Te
mny write the history of a country, England for exnmplr, to illn strnte the progress of literature, science,
or ciril institutions. In all these cascR, onr purpose
must gorcrn our selection of circumstances from the
grC'nt mnss of facts. 'l'he same law of purpose is of
cqual nuthority, no matter what the chu.ructer of the
narrnthe, whether u nution's history, or a short
anecdote.

2. Unity .
We shoulrl be infl11r11cccl in the sclc•ct.ion of materials
This requires that all the elements
of n narrative be parts of a great whole, und organically
related with one another. The introduction of collat-(
cral circumstances having no bearing npon the main\
conception is a violation of this law. Loose narrators \
nrc prone to digress into episode, and thus mar the ef- (
feet of their narrative. Writers of fiction who arc paid
for the quantity of their work are specially in danger
of this gross fault. Jn following the fortunes of a hero,
we do not need to be tolcl of the personal habits of his
distant relatives. This prohibition of nnrclatccl details
ought not to be und erstoocl us a cond emnation of appropriate details 011 Urn gronnd of their in<liviuu al insignificance. The minutest particnbrs, if they have a
direct bearing, are often the most significant and indispensable.

by the law of unity.

3. Completeness.
Sufficient fulln ess to maintain the interest and to
explain importa11t occurrences, is necessary to a successful narrative. Few minds are interested in mere

- - ·----88

TITE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

compendi! nnd nbstrncts. Specific details fix the atten·
tion nud fasten cvrnts in the memory. A narrative has
nn artificial 111'.prarance if each ernut be uot exp lained
by the precr.d111g events. 'l'he omission of details is
therefore in~urions to the ~tl'cct, .when they are vitally
~01111ected w1t!1 the s11ccess10n of mcldents. No history
1s complete without occasional rcfcronccs to contmnpor.ancons fact~ in other departments. A history of
hternture wluch should take no notice of those social
nnd political revolu tions which produce great men and
gc~1ernte epoch-.niaking ideas, would be unworthy of
bcmg called a l11story.

4. Erevity.
Prolixity is the bane of effective narrative. Novels
. in two or three thick volumes, recounting the insipid
ndvc11tnrcs of some common-J>lacc i1ersonagc, arc the
most tedious of literary creations. Histories which
spin out t.he thread of events to undue length, though
often prmsrd and quoted, arc seldom consecutively
react '.1.'he memory can retain only a limited 1111mbcr
of details, and nanativcs constrnctcd without reference to the natural limits of this faculty, are almost
~ure to ~n~ the_reualty of ilnJJ11 oss. Viracity, also, as
lll dcscr1pho11, is secured by confining the narrative to
what is essential.

SECTION II.

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
J

1

1. Time.
It is important to a narrative that its incidents Le
related in the chronological order in which they occur.

J,A WS OF IDEA.

80

This is usually the philosophical order, for e"ents nro
not mere isolat.etl links, bnt form 11art of nn endless
chain of antecedents and conscqncnts, each of which is
a cause of its consequent, and an effect of its antecedent. A narrator rises in dignity in proportion ns he
becomes a philosopher, und ex'plnins tho ernnts ho
nnrmt:rs. 'l'hifl requir('S a co n ~ lant roforcncc to t.ho
actual seq11cnce of events in time. Chronology 1t1.'d
geography have been aptly. called the two eyes of lustory. Uhronolog-y, hy a tl11Tn_renf; rn ctaphl>r,. has l:~cn
culled tho latitn<le n111l long1 t.11do of narrah \'C, I ho
rrndcr misses a marginal chronology in Gibbon's great
history.

2. Reasons for Violating the Order of Time.
Sometimes it may be desirable to violate the actual
order of events for a special reason. Thn8 Virgil, in
the "iEnrid," first describes the storm which wrc~kell
the fleet of his hero, and threw him upon tho Afr1ca~1
coast, and then causes him to relate to Queen Dido 111s
own previous 1iilvcnt.11roH.
llo11wr 111111 mnploy~"l n
11imilar plan in the "Utlyssey," where Odys8c11s is .represented ns recounting his 111i~fortuncs to the Phmacmn
court. In these cases the violation of the natural order
is for tho obvious purpose of allowing tho hero to a~d
tho charm of personal narration to the .st~ry ~f his
wnndrriugs. George Eliot has use1l a s11nilar mvor11ion for' a 1lifferrnt purpose. In "Daniel Dcrondn,"
tho heroine i~ introcl11cc1l t.o tho roaclcl' as a clPspcratc
plensnrc-scl'kcr in a gambling sec no. . 'l'h o. rem a i ndel'
of tho story is to a great extent occupied with a retrospective history of her life. 'l'hc obvious. design ~f the
inversion is to absorb the reader's attention and mtor-

91
90

LAWS OF IDEA.
THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

est in the chain of events which brought Gwendolen
Harleth to the gaming table.

SECTION III.
SYNCHRONISM O'F EVENTS.

3. Retrospective References.
A backw:trd reference may be necessary in pl:tcing
the true order of events beforo the mind. Mttcaulay,
in his "History of J~11glantl," inti·oduccs his account
of the periorl nbout which he speci11lly writes with n
i1refotory summary of English history from the Roman
invasion. Thu s his readers are prepared to pln.ce the
events which make up tho history in their proper
r elations with their antecedents. A plan somewhat
different from this is, to describe a recent or existing
sfatte of affairs, and then to point ont the causes which
lrnve produced it. An acquaintance with present facts
interests us in their antecedents. In his" ]~l e ments
of Geology," Sir Oha.rles Lyell has first shown what is
to be accounted for, and then proceedR to narrate the
geological history of previous ages, by which he accounts for the prese nt state of the globe.

4. Probability.
Probability ought to be attended to in a narrative.
It depends greatly upon the order of events whether or
not they seem probable. Writers are most in danger
of making their story improbaule when there are many
concurrent eve nts having a causal relation, but which
are not brought into 0110 view. 'l'his leads us to the
topic of the next section, in which tho best modes of
surmounting this obstacle will be pointed out.

j.

1. Kinds of Concurrence.
,

.. ,
.
f mirrntion arise when con·
'fho ch ief dtlltcult1cs o .
l
·l '\Jitcd as conf vents have t o JC ex\\
.
curring stre11ms o c
1
tl cir actual relations.
·
nlcr to s 1ow 1 '
temporan cnus 111 0. f scYC l" l l k'Ill as.
'fhiR concnrrence is o , . , t
t -'l'h e li fe of a
't
f Depa.r men s.
l
(l) l'lura. l Y o
l
·t1i cn t •1cts npon another,
.
lex One l l' \ Hll i . '
.
nntion is co mp . ,
' oth er <1Ppart111cnts. Mi\Jt:iry,
and is acted npon \J;
I . t"fic li fe !tll How on
. J l' lCl"ll"Y fll\( SCICll ,\ ,
110\itical, f\O(:l:l • 1 · ' · '
. • n incrl e and impart
. , d their cnrre11ts c\ CI 1 "'
.
• -·t
to"eth
ct'
.tn
.
l
.
l
..,
J • 'l'he ll" \ CR·t' gc11in s' is rcr1ms1 o
color to one a not. ic1. _f prourcss i n a tr ue
to exhibit all t h ese Tan ous mo cs o
b

\

J

•
·r1 c l1istori an onght to
Panornmic view. . l'a.rt1es
- 1
(2) Cont en amg
• 1 , tlwro arc two sid es,
,
. ..ti c ' Ill' 1 W l Lll

h l n l1"pi d 111g
riRc n.hovc t.l 1c all ·' lH ' • ' · '
t
. L'
l) !Tlll'l '~l ' ll ' 1'" 1 .
\ is nn1ler ol >l t"ll 1011 (
·
ts of Loth
IC
• .
"" fi' et where th e J1l0\'Cllll'll
nny k1111l of con .1 , . .1 t l 1ere is grr1it danger of con·
f ·
sides arc t o uc muTtlCu,
'
' ft"
if th e 11 oint o view.
.
f
frequent s111 rng t
1
.
, 1 • tacre of Kinglakc at t ic
fusion rom a
Few historians have the ,~ct rnn . J°e retains his point of
l . ns nn eye-w1 ness, 1
.
f
Alma, w i e1e,
{\' t '!'hose who cornp1\e rom
,-icw thronghont the con_ ic .
·e in <l ·111<Yer of sacrit
f m•tny witnesses 111
• b
the nccon.n ·s 0
' .
. ·in\)' th e whole picture.
ficincr0 un1t.y. and of blmr "'b .:i· te Actions -In a
" · al and. . Su
or1.1.ma.
·
(3) "'• rmc1p
ion of a cnmpaign or voyage,
biogrnphy, or the nan at
k
Some are
t all of the same ran .
the events are no
b d" te 'rhese must be
principal, others merely su or ma .

\

__ ......

92

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

carefully distincruished
d
.
to the principalocrents ''~~il:~~mm~nce .must be giYen
le mmor rncid ents must
be duly subordinated. '

(4) Different Countries

I·-:-Tl

1·

conntrics, Grecl'e for c•x t11
rn 11story of some
·
a Jl e ts the hist
f
·
race, but at the same t' . ' . .
ory o : a s111glo
l1istories. Spnrt•t At! 11110 consu;ts of u plurality of
pendent life 'l'l:c' I . tie1.1s, and 'l'hebes live an inde.
us orrnu of Gree
the story of all these t· t
.
c~ must carry along
nies, so as to maintai~ :: c~L with thmr numerous cologive to each state its se :~r~~ennd at ~he same time to
The difficulty is increase~ who place ~n tl~e narrative.
to narrate the conct11·1. t
n the h1stonan attempts
en progress f t
mately connected ns .
l .
o s ates less intiIll a u story of E
'
}
word.
Here the hi..,.! t
. .
urope or of tho
·
"' H' s genms 1s nee
. t
·
A n 111 tercsting uni vei·•· tl 1 . t
.
essai Y o snccess.
"
us ory 1s 1 . <l ' I'
an epic poem, and it ma b
-.
no10 ii wult than
its production remains ~~so~v:~~d that the problem of

2. Means of Expressing Synchronism
'l'hc expedients resorted to in r .
.
•
poraneons events are of
t
ep1esentmg contemlcave many things for rr~r~a ~ractical value, yet they
terious way. M11co11]· o nms 'fo solYe in its own ln}'S" "Y was gr ted
1
other men with the p
f
. ' per rnps beyond all
'
. ower o seemg period f h.
organic wholes and ll•ts
so 1story 11s
'
' succeeded in .
.
ns such. Taine thus sp k f . . ~iesentmg them
ea s o tlus gift . "S
accumulated e\·cnts form with h'
.
o many
whole. Exphnations
Im not a total, but a
dotes, illustr:;t i~n s co' r1ncco'.111ts, disse rtatio111;, ancc'
1pansons allusi
t
events, evcrythin" i
'
ons o mod ern
o s connected in h' b k
t. d .
is oo . It is
b ecause everything is
h d
connec e m bis
. d
a n most lively consciousnes f
mm . Ho
s o causes ; and causes

•

I

fjgfj1 t

;;;

§'

LAWS OF IDEA.

__

93

unite facts. By them scattered eYents are assembled
into n. single event ; they nnite them because they produce them , aml the hi storian who seeks them all out,
cannot fail to perceive or to feel the u\(ity which is their
effect.""'
Of the ordinary means of overcoming the difficulties of synchronism, we may mention the following:
(l) Sensible Forms.-Uharts in the form of trees,
streams, aud other physicrtl objects, may be helpful in
fixing the relations of p01·iods iu the mind. In written
history they are of very great service, but eren in
spcnking they may often be cm ployed . Herc the mctnphor or simile takes the place of the actual chart.
For exam ph~, in tracing the history of the In<lo-Eu. ropean family, the mi~rat.ions of that race may be represented under the lig11rc u( Heve11 HlrcamK divorgi11g
from a common fountain, anJ, although each is followed separately, the mind will readily perce ive that
the others are · flowing simultaneously, aud this may
bo indicated by concentric circles intersecting the
streams and representing centuries.
(2) Ana.lysls.-A p_erspicuons 1livision into chapters
und sections assists the mind in iissociating ey nchronistic
events. Hence eYery complicated mirrative should be
80 divided as to suggest the parallel oconrrences.
'l'he
division of history according to reigns is uot so philosophical as a division according to great historic movements. In composing the biography of a great man,
it wonld be nbsnrd to divide his life according to the
contemporary presidents. In every life, individual or
nntional, there are causes which impel the man or the
nation in certain different directions. 'l'hese a.re tho

*

EnglisT1 Literat·ure, Vol. lll.

-

\
I

\

1·

94

THE

j.

SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

true outlines of analysis, and give rise to distinct
epochs.

(3) Summary.-A condensed summary of 11 pe·
riod may be useful in setting events necessarily sepa·
rated in the prngfess of the narrath·e in their proper
chronological rclutions. Such ubridgments serve the
same purpose 11s maps after an observation of tho
ground. 'l'hcy correct the erroneous impressions resulting from detached views. 'l'he proper place for a
summary depends upon circnlT!stanccs. If i11tercst in
the plot will be diminished by a revelation of it, the
summary ought not to be presented in the introduction,
If, however, by comiug first it will ab.ridge the process
of arrangement in the mind of the reader, it may be
placed at the beginning, ns a topogmphical map is
spreud out before a campaign. Usually the summary
is retrospective. Coming after the detailed narrative,
it serves to straighten the entangled threads of the
story.
/

. i

CHAPTER III.
EXPOSITION.

1 The Nature of Exposition.
·
· of a gen·
. t ·n su ch an ana Iys1s
EXPOSITION cons1s s I
I
. d the general
·n
ake clear to t ic mm
" .
eral term as wi m
.
I3 " eneml term IS
notion of which it is the sign.
y t~
By "gen. d. f
a geneml no wn.
meant a word m ica mg l f thought in which cer·
• t
t . " . me·mt n. mo< e o
rml no ion Is
'
b l
ing to ccrtuin obJeC s,
Thus "animal"
tnin attributes arc takm.1 as c o~g
and as uniting them m one c.asds.,, "sentient," etc.,
t 'b t s "organize ,
includes the a tn u e
. t
"men '' "!torses,"
and is applicable .to suchk obJeC t~1: class ,: animal" by
d
mu e up · z" "sentien
. t , " c t c.,
" ogs, " e tc., wlnch
tt ·b tcs "organizet
,
possessing tho a n u
. distinguished from a
.
A general term Is
N ·z
m
common.
'-'
R
singular term, such 8:8 ome, Julius Owsar, the i e,

indicating a single obJect.

2 Forms of Exposition .
I.

·
forms. (1) Exposition of
Exposition assumes two
'.tion of the notion
the notion in itself ; n.nd (2). exposII oithor of tl1oso
in its relation to other nohonha.
nsingle terms, or
' tion we may ave
f
forms o expos1
' . .
I
der to avoid use. d ·
posit10ns
n or
f
terms umte m pro
t d that the exposition o
less repetition, it ma~ ?e s. a e
position of the prop·
the terms of a proposition IS an ex
.

t

'·

I
I

94
THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

true outlines of analysis, and give rise to distinct
epochs.

(3) Summary.-A condensed summary of a period may be useful in setting events rwccssarily sc11aratccl in tbe progfcss of the narrative in their proper
chronological relations. Such abridgments serve the
same purpose us maps after an observation of the
ground. 1'hey correct the erroneous impressions resulting from detached views. 'l'hc proper }Jlace for a
summary depends upon circu111stances. If interest in
the plot will be diminished by revelation of it, the
summary ought not to be presented in the introduction.
If, however, by comiug first it will abridge the process
of arrangement in the mind of the reader, it may be
placed at the beginning, as a topographical map is
spread out before a campaign. Usually the summary
is retrospective. Coming after the detaileu narrative,
it serves to straighten the entangled threads of the
story.
,,.

a

·I
I

CHAPTER III.
EXPOSITION.

I. The

Nature of Exposition.
. f a gen-

. t . such an analysis o
s J1l
1 mind the general
clear to t ic
,, ·
. rr
By "general term 1s
t . n of which it is the s1011.
t'
By "genno 10
.
.
.
enernl no 10n.
meant a word md1catmg a gl f thought in which cer" · iean t a moi e 0
b · ts
rral notion is n
. b I n ing to certain o Jec '
tain attributes are take~ as e o lg
'rlrns "animal"
. .
tl1em m one c nss.
" t
· d" "sentient,
and as umtmg 'b t s "organ1,ze
e c.,,,
,
· ludes the attn u e
"
i " "!torses,
me
h obJ'ects as mm'
b
and is applicable to sue
ti class " animal" y
I · J1 muke up ie
" t
"dons
" etc., w llC'butcs "organize
· d " "sentient, c c.,
;f '
,
possessing the attn
al term is distinguished fro~ a
in common. A genei;,, R
Jul{us Cresar, tlto Nile,
singular term, such 3:8 ome,
indicating a single obJect.

I ,

EXPOSITION COllSIS

·n . ke
crnl term ns WI .m~

2 F 0 rms of Exposition.
of
E xposition· assumes two f orm s .'.t.(l)n Exposition
of the notion

d (2) expos1 10
the notion in itself; an
.
I either of these
ther not10ns.
n
.
t
in its relation o o
1 nve single terms, or
't' n we may 1..
'd
forms of expos1 10 ' . .
I order to avo1 use. d .
ro1Jos1t10ns.
n
. t'
of
terms umte mp
t d that the expos1 wn
less repetition, it ma~ ?e s~a e exposition of the propthe terms of a proposition 1s an

Ii

i
i I
!
I

96

THE SCIENCE OF ltlIETORIC.

97

LAWS OF IDEA.

position itself. Thus in the proiwsition, "Frco institutions nrc promotive of happiness," an exposition of
the subject and the predicate would be an exposition
of the whole prnposition. 'l'he copula "ai·e" l'eq niros
no exposition. Any doubt with rcforcnco to the copula, is not n doubt us to the meaning, but as to the
trutlt of the i1i·oposition. 'l;he truth of a proposition
must be established by argument, which takes for
granted the meaning of tho terms, and is occupied
with the ncgatire or affirmative quality of the copnla.
Exposition elucidates tho meaning of "free insU!utions" and "p1'0molfre ~f ltappiness; nnd here its
office ends.
Argumentation then decides whether
the copula should be "are" or "are-not."

SECTION I.

.EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION IN
ITSELF.
l, Co?llprehension and Extension,

cla.~s, in cludes
certain attributes and ce r tain objects to which the attributes belong. For example, the word man inclnclcs
snch attributes as rat£011ality, -intcllecturelity, voluntary
power, etc., and al so in c ludes all the individual beings
known to us as men. Man is also an ani11uil, hnt this
terrn inelutlcs a greater 11u111lwr of oujects than the
worrl man, fo1· it embraces lwr.scs, dn!Js, etc. nut
these other a nimals do not possess rrtlfonality or inlclled uali(IJ. The cla ss "animril" excludes common attri bn tes in proportion as it includes more objects. We
h:we, then, in a general noti on, two kinds of quantity:
(1) comp1·el1ension, which is made up of the different
A general notion, or conception of a

.
· the notion ; n.nd (2) c:rlcns/on,
nlfrilmlcs mcltt<lcd m
b:, ·t, which arc i11cluilcrl
. .
l, I of those o '}Cr, ,.~
d
\Thteh 1s m:u e u >.
'l'I , two comprehension an
in the general notwn.'
ics~ t'o t~ each other.• As wo•
•
. •11 nn mversc u1 .1
t•xlt'ns1011, 1110 t
.
l" ti 10 cxtcnsion mcrcast•s,
-- '
l lllSR from " 111an "to" a11111w.
a·'
.
..
included
. . I nsion tmtms Irn s.' tl1e ob7'ects
.
lrnt
the
comp1
c
ic
h
tt
"b
tes
implied
are
less nunrc nioro numerous, t e a 1 i it
c

morons.

2. Nature of a Definition.
. .

.

.

f tl

omprcheusion .of a notion HJ
The expos~t1?1.1 o
~~l~us in tho notion man there
it11 logical tlc~11nt10n. otfons 'uie firs t inclnding the atnre two coustttnen.t n
. 'l ti e second including the
. t
f ti 1e notion anrnw ' l
.
t
tnhu
es
o
t. z These const1tuen
.
8
. t
f the not10n ra ,wna .
1 d
tt.nbn
es o· l and ratwna
.
l , may
. in tnrn be r eso vc
.
not10ns, am.ma . '
. 1 cntary noti'ons, and so 011
in like manner mto mote c elm
tn1·y •ts to satisfy the
t'
re so c omen " •
·
until those no wus a
.
of resolution we have
. <l I
h of these processes
·
mm . 11, cac t otion wlllch
.
. .z .c,s t he notion de·1,1u; 111 1
one constitn cn n
'l'I c other co 11 stit11fincd. 'l'his is C:t!lctl the !JenUS. • . Id, r' •d from the
. t.
. lie• the not1011 c me
ent notion di s 1l!JWS · u .-n.·
t·
A definition is,
.
l ·
. 11 l the cb;11 eren ?.a.
"Cnns,
n.nt is c,i ec
.
l
n
ot1'on
nccordmg to.
"
U· · ·
f a <YC ll Cl!l.
thorcfo~·c, a 1v1s10nl~ ,' ttmt a simple notion, whi ch
its uttnb11tcs. It fo o11 s
t be defined. 'L'hus
'·
(
l to no gen ns, can no
.
1
c1111 uo re. o1TOl
l
Lo tho miutl is im O·
bniug, tho highest genus o10w11
,
.i

fiinble.

3 . Nature of Division.

°

·

. .

't'
f the extension of a notion is its
The expos1 10n
dcr it
1
.
11 otion man m e 1nt cs u11
division. 'l'hn s, the
t ai vidcd according
toltile men, Ulack men, red men,, e c.,
tc divided

to color; Afi ".
ir;an s' Asiatics' Europeans, e .,
5

- - - - --

98

THE SCIENCE OF RHETOilIC.

according to geographical h'.nes; Jews, Afnhammedans

B1~ddh1:sts, C'hrililians, etc. dirided according to rel(qion~
It JS evident that the character of om· division will de.
p~n.d entire!! u~on tlrn principle according to which we
dJv1de a notwn mto its constituent objects. It follows
that a notion cannot be divided when it includes only
one object.

4. Difference betwe~n ·Definition and
Division.
Definition and dirision are opposite processes.

Compreh~n~ion is si?1ply the snm of the qualities,

charactenstics or attr1bntos of which a notion is composed, and is resolved into its 1mrts by definition. Extension is simply the sum or complement of the objects
wh~se resem~ling charnctcristics constitute the general
no~1?n, and JS resolved into its parts by division. Defi~uti?u. is ~ discrimination of attributes; division a
?1scnmmat10n of objects. As the list of attributes
is length ened, th~ list of objects possessing them is
shortened ; and vice versa. Being is the maximum of
exte1.1sion and the minimum of comprehension. Includmg the grentes~ number of objects, it includes the
least number of attnbutcs.

6. Kinds of Definition.
Three principal kinds of definition are distinguished
by Hamilton.
. (1~ Nominal.-Nominal definitions are mere exphcatioi'.s. - '1'~1ry n.rc'. th~rcfore, generally preliminary
~·o. ~ moJC 11rec1se d1stmct10n. Tlrns the nominal dcf1m~1on of a circle is, " The word 'circle ' signifies a
uniformly curved line."

LAWS OF IDEA.

!J()

(2) Real.-In real definitions, th~ object defined is
considered as existing, and the 11ot10n precedes tho
definition. They are merely analytic, noth.ing .being
girnn explicitly in the dd1ning number which JS not
contained implicitly in the subject defined; us, "A
circle is n. line returning upon itself, of which all the
.
' t"
parts are cq11i-<lista11t from u given
pom.
(3) Genetic,-'l'he genetic definition rep'.escnts th.o
clofincll ohjod, nR in the process of bccom111g. It JS
therefore synthetic ; ns, "A circle is formed whl'll wo
drnw arounll, and always at the same distance from
I\ fixed point, a movable point which lcav.es ~ts tm~o,
until the termination of tho movement comc1dos w1t.11
its commencement." The genetic definition is possible
only when the objects to be defined are quantities repre_sented in time or space.

6. The Laws of Logical Definition.
T110 following are the laws of a strictly logical
definition.
(1) A definition must be adequate.-'l'hi s .n~~e.cA­
sitates n genus und.~.n ditfercn tia. A trno <lch111t1011
will admit of a transposition of the subject and the
predicate. Such a trunsposition is nn easy test of a
definition. If " Man is a rational animal" be nn adequate definition, it mnst be trne that a J:ational a~in;ial
is a man ; for otherwise something besides men JS mclutlcd in tlw rlcfinition.
(2) A definiticn must not define by negati~e ~r
divisive attributes.-Wc do not say what a 11ot1011 JS
uy say ing what it is not; nor do we drfine a notion by
referring it to one class or another, which is n process
of division. 'These expedients may properly precede

I ,

. \'

I)

I!
100

an~ ~r.epare

dehmt1011s.

t

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

LAWS OF IDEA.

the way for a definition b 11 t
'
they are not

(3) A definition should not b t

,

cannot a. cfine !Ill OUJ'ect I. 't ..zr e, ' ~ut?log1ca.l.-We
•
•
.
uy 1- ·ll ·1• J Im; 18 c·tll •I " l
1,Ill lllg
Ill u c1rclo "
'l'l 11s
· 1s
· u very
·
·
' 'f 1.1
' e.
·
cornr
non au 1t, 1ind
is fostered by the b'f' 1
1 1
1 0
language, which ren~: '.:gi ; ~ ~!:~t ~~c:c ~ :. the English
0
Saxon word by n N . ,
c rne un Angloverbal form conceals ~1111,'.n-F1:e~1ch equivalent, 'l'he
mode of oxplaininO" b I~ l~potibon. of thought. 'l'his
must not be mistal~en~ eqm;al?nts Is often useful, but
(4) Th d fi ~ ', oi· a og1cal definition,
e e n1tion must be pr ,.·
A
.
not essential to the d. t·
.
e.,1se,- ny uttnbnte
is mct1011 on Jy
f
·
looseness of a def ' t·
1
. . co11 uses it. 'l'he
llll wn cares 1t ope 1 t
f'
·
'l'l ie Platonic' definition
"l\J· .
1 o re utat10n.
without feathers," was ;cfnte~nl is a t1:0.-J;-ggc1l :mirnal
bird, which by trrrno1 't•·
'Y exluL1tmg a plucked
'
' . . JORI !Oil of the s I.'
t
cate would be
.
. uu;cc and prcdi'5) A d fi •a. man.. if the
d
fi
't'
.
e llll .1011 were correct
(
e nit1on should be
•
,,
·
object of a delinit1'01 . 1.
persp1cuous.-Ihc very
l 1s c rarness
'l'l . ·
.
Le perspicuons is th . f .
.
. i.tt it should itself
' ew Ote, scJf.ov1do11 t ll . · ·
generally ncces~nry to peropicuit . F'
. . rcnty Is
will often render d f' .t··.
·'· •1g11ratne lang11:1g~
e 11J1 tons lnilli·mt b t ·t .
quently expose them t
"f .
, .' II J will frc.
o cu ic1smfor v10lati11g this law,

1

·

0 1
0

7. Kinds of Division.
(1) Partition.-'l'ho notion m
as made up of cert-tin att 'L t an may be regarded
Uonal, mortal etc ''l'I . id·1. t~ ~s; as living bei:ng, ra-

'
•
llS
IVJSJOn of II n t'
.
.
component nttrihntes is c·1lled
.. o JOn mto its
from definit'
·
·.
partitwn. H differs
wn 111 enumcratma ·ill ti
tt 'b
make np a whole while l fi "'!t~ . IC a n ntes which
and different1'a 'rt d'lf c e m1 wn states only a genus
•
1 ors fro
· l division
·
m I ogwa
in

101

being n division of tho comprehension, not of tho
extension.
(2) Logical Division.-A logical division is an ex
position o[ I. he c:d.nnHion of a nor.ion ; it c1111111ernfos,
not tho allrilrnles I.mt lhc Hpeeiei; uf a 110Lio11. 'J'huH
man mity Le divi<led into the various species together
comprising the general not.ion man, and the division, as
1wcvionsly shown, may be according to any ono of many
principles. 'l'he principle of di vision is the one essential
attribute according to which the division is made.
'l'he notion is called the dhiidc<l whole ; its parts are
tho dividing members ; thm1e with reference to 0110
nnother a re co-ordinates ; with reference to the divided
whole, subordinates.

I

i

I

4

8. The Laws of Logical Division.
The logical division of n notion is regulated Ly
SCH'l'fll laws.
(1) Every Division should have some Principle.
- The reason of this is manifest. lf t here Le no attribute with reference to whid1 objects arc classed, thero
can Lo no division.
(9) Every Division should ha.ve but one Principle.
-If there are two or more principles of division, there
will be 110 division. 'l'l111s, to class men as white, African, E11glish, moral, and Jews, would not be a division cf men, for these classes include one anothcr:(3) The Principle of Division should be an a.ctua.l
and essential cha.ra.cter of the divided whole.-Unlcss
snch a principle Le schoetcd, there will Le no 1listinct
and recognizable lin~ of demarcation uetween the subordinates.

(4) No dividing member must of itself exhaust

•I

r

102

TUE SCIE}WE OF RHETORIC.

103

LAWS OF IDEA.

the subjeot.-'l'his law follows from

the axiom tlrnt n
part is less than the whole. That then must be a faulty
dirision which represents n part as e>xhausting the whole.
A division of n1 cn into intelligent mccs aud barbarous
races, would violate this la1V, since all men possess some
degree of intelligence, and are hence included under
the fl rst class.

(5) The dividing members must together exhaust
the notion, but not more.-Leaving out a distinct class
,.iolutes this law. 'l'hus, if we were to divide all actions
into the morally good and the morall11 bad, cxch11li11g
those which possess no mom! quality, the division
would be incorrect. 'l'his dfrision would be n correct
one of moral ac tions, hut not of actions genemlly, since
some are momlly indifferent. 1f we were to tli\'ide
geometrical figures into smfaces, sol£ds, lines, and
points, we should more than exhaust the notion ex}11'essed hy the word figures, for lines and points,
t110ugh elements of figures, are not figures.
(6) The dividing members should not include one
another.-'l'Jiis law is often practically dil:licult to follow. Presenting the same subordinnte more than once
is a violation of this law. A 11erfect exposition of a
science would so classify its facts that they would appear but once. Pmctical!y t his is almost impossible.
Logic and .iEsthctics, for example, aro distiuct from
Uhctoric, but there could be no science of Rhetoric
wl1ich should not repeat fact;s of Logic and .iEsthetics.
Again, the laws of nlietoric are laws of mind, of idea,
and of form, but they are all so interdependent that
the
same fact often reappears under each of these
divisions.

(7) A division should proceed continuously with-

proximat.et
· • • m•ty }lfOC'C'Cl1 1•1tronn-h
"'
'
t hiatus.-Dmsion
'·
·f t division <locs no
OU
bd. ·isions. A pc1 cc
. .
y for
or
i\I athcmat1c1:111 s ma
1( remote sn n .
"111 on' r intcr111c<l1at.c strp:st.1 1· 1·1·,,ht or acute, or ob.
I . 'Ll'C (' I IC
,..,
,
I
.
0
cs• . • •
Lrc\"t
1 ·Y s·1y
• • "An"
won 11, I1e, "A n"o cs :uc
t
A continuous
<l1n
s1onl·
use. ,, right
. '·m<l
t w o Ll1·c1uc • either acute
.
either
or ob 1iquc'
or obtuse."
Irnperfect.
I. Hi ght.

Angles. { 2. Acute.

a.

outuse

(Janflnuoua.

1

Angle•. 1.

ll ' ht
•g
· {(I) Acute.
ull ue

2. 0

q

• (2) OIJtuae.

9 Expos1't'io n of a Proposition.

't'

ex~~s1 ion
bo hy defimtion or

x ilicatccl by the

A 11ropos1t1011 may be ~· .1
.
'l'l11·8 xpos1t1on m.iy
e.
. y he illnstrntcd.
.
by division. '1'1
- i~ prnccss
•
A 111.1
proposition may b c ex·11h(1)
By Defi.n.. 1hon..
.
Let us take tho
tc(l by
·t· of its
terms.
.
,,
the
dcfin1
ion
ti·,,
ca
.,
is 11romo 0 of liberty.
.
·
"
Dcmoc1
.icy
,,
1
uo
cx~orcl "promotive n cec s ..
propos1
t10n,
A
ssuming
that
t
he
'
,
expos1't'1o11 of .thid proposition
,,
d
··
·t·ion, we ha\ e an I ti terms "d en ocracy
an ,,
11os1
'
1
I l we lrnvc dcf1ncl
w Jet
k.
f rJCthe• genus of "democracy,
"liberty.". ln·£c_e mg e~hcr we mean n. form of govwe must first decide wh
. the avowed principles of
crnmcnt, a political partyt,I corfirst jiorm of government
1
I
f ',,
vc mean
l Ill
· tl10
•
that party.
diffcreutia ' is cxprcRSC(
is the genus. 1 he ''. h <listinauishes it from other
phrase bJJ the llCOjil\ " l:~IIC Joaic~l definition of "deforms of goyern.men . . .LI.Ji
'"'arm of government by
mocrncy, ,, in this sense, JS,
. .
• • •

of its terms.

tlie people.
be defined. In its political
"Liberty,, mnst now
d to the genus state of
sense, "liberty ,, ma y be refcrrc
. f
uished from others tates
&OClC tY• I t must now be dis mg

..

-

r

104

TIIR SCIENCE OF JUIETomc.

of society, such as licr11sc, anarchy or despotism. The
difl'crentia regulated b,1; .fust laws <listingni shcs it from
these, since license is law!rss, miarchy is the abse nce of
bw, nnd despotism interferes with it. 'l'he definition
of "liberty" is, A state of society regulated by.fust la11Js.
Substituting tlw two definitions for the origiual terms,
we have the proposition, A f orm of government by lite

v eople is pro111oti11e qf a state of society regulated by Just
laws. 'l'his is an exposition by definition of the origi-

nal proposition.

(2) .By Division.-Lct us take the proposition,
"Free institutions are compatible with literary progress." Assuming that the exp ression "compatihlc
with" nreds no ex planation, the exposition of tho terms
"free institutions " and "literary progress," is the exposition of the whole proposition. Before dividing the
subject" free in stit11t.io11s," wo mn st select a prin ciple
of <lirision. L et it be the interests of society. 'l'heso
are educationrrl, J!Olihcal, religious, commercirrl, industrial, etc. We .m ay then state the proposition th ns :

I

cdncntlonal,)
ti cul,
poll

rcllgiuus,

.

Free commcrclnl, Institutions nre compatible with literary progress.
nud
Industrial

,I
'

I

We may now diYicl e the predicate. "Literary progress" may bo diritl cd into the progress of the different departments embraceJ under the notion literature.
Th ese mny be irnpcrfrct ly enumerated as orator;11,
poetry, !tistory, criticism, journalism. Substituting
this complex pred icate for the term "literary progress," we Jiave this exposition of the original proposition:-

105

LAWS OF IDEA.

•l

po1!i~.lc~~·

cdncntlonat,}
re 1 ~10t · , 1 1ne

Free comnwrcln ,
n11d
Industrial

tllutlon~ nr~ compatible \E{frl:
crltlcis rn,
urnnlle~
.
.,re::;:!- iu
wt t h prug

j

nm\

o

. t1 t if the expanded subit is impo~'tttnt t~ ~ol\h~rt truth of the original
:cct and pred icate ao1e~,
If on tho contrnry,
•
. .
.
·itle ernlcn t.
'
t f t1 o
propos1tion is m, . own hetween any elemen o I
disarrreementcan be slid
lement of the expanded
cxp:nded
ti
proposition is not
subject, it shows t ia
I
o
universally true.

predicat~ ~1 :n~r~rriual
SECTION IT.

HE NOTION THROUGH
EXPOSITIOr;To: :ELATIONS.
.
ition of a notion is not conWhen the log1cal expl~s t d throuO'h it.s relation to
't
y be exp !Ca e
o
.
be
·rnnieut., i . ma
.'ii methods of doing tl11s may
oth er notions. Seve1 t
ennmernted.

h

Method of Particulars.
.
1. T e .
notion by mentioning part1CnThis is a simple cxpeWo may cxphcat~ a
rete m stances.
u .
lar cases or cone
l
"<le1· of intelligence, an iedient, adapted to a ofw or ernlization. 'rhus, poetry
ns ,
' "
·
quiring no po wers o ,gen. tingrcprcsentativopo01
may be explained by ennme1a l of tho beautiful in
nnu beauty by concrete examp es
objects.

2 The.Me

th d of Conditions.
o

•
x licating a notion is to me.nA second method of e F1 t its production or existion the conditions essent1a o
5*

106

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

tence. Thns the notion dew may be explained b)I· the
enumeration of the circumstances in which the moisture of atmospheric rnpor condenses. Cause ancl elfect
are both included under this liead.

3. The Method of Similars.

CHAPTER IV.

A gPnp1·aJ n0Lio11 nmy be cxplai11ell liy compal'ing it
to similar notions. No direct similitude is necussary,
but simply a resemblance of relations. Onr notioni:: of
divinity anrf ~nrcrnatural Lei11g;;; nre •'xplir:1I1•1] f li r"11gli
1Jolio11s of h1•inr; :i11d s,niri( :t.-; fl1 I'\' :ti'•. ' l;r1 "'' 11 fl)
II .' 111 ''"ll'' i11 11 ;:11l':i~.
Ht•Hec lllany of the rnn~t i111p11r-

AHGUMJrn'l'ATION.

1. The Rhetorical Use of Argument.

0 11r

hnt i1l1·:1 s of pl 1il.,, 11)'Jiy and reJigi uu arc PxpJi,,atcd i11
I his 11·ay.

4 . The IYietl10d of Contrast.
lrn mny girc :rn l'\po.-<ilion of a 11oti"11 tlirourrli it.,q
opposite. A II knnn·] ,'clgt• is do11Glc. J feat :rnd rold ,
light and CTflrkn0.<,, good aw] evil, arc 1ixcd in tlio11.glit
as opposite poles. Some of om· rnnst rnm1nou iwl io11s
r:m to di.'i'1 i111i11ated <mly Ly this method. The notion of self, 01· the E,qo, is di8tinguishcd from the not8elf, or non-Ego, by the method of contrast.

1) 1.

JN
•

lJl>ll

lll: 111 ,Y lll Of ' (
11. . ,
11:1-; llll 1 ,,IC< ·

I

j

, r

<.:.' \' l. : !t' JlJ~

, .. .

. ,•

0

l'I I t.•·i(1
. r[(' '
.,

'j'iJ,, \\ -hriJL1 firn1T:-:s o

,

[

: 1rlr11?n(
i ntn.~
•

tt

• 11 fi rlll : I 0 II
c 1i .
.
· ·-· )
fr) 1lisf lll.L'll !., l

I , , •r
l
\\'1· ]!l' l'<l. 111111 \ ( .
jqrC'fc rrr ·rlf <>
.'
• dlre·L
the
..
l . 1 nnd Ilic r 1101.onc:
, ·• trncntnf
' .
between the ng1ca • ·
' . · , , hll's of t.li•i11glit as
,
J ' , j ,,d~ Wrf 1J I 1If , ' '
.
,
sn bjt'd.
« >L'lc : ', . " l · '.tit tlw LLws of :ti Lerrng or
thou crl1 t : Hli1·I im c ik.1. ~ II l
ll
f J on-if' is 1Yi th
•
Tlir pro J r•m o , .'
Prod11·"=' r in.::;- rn111·1• rhn11
.
. . " ·1· l1·1t co11clusion m :1y
s l )J't'lll l:--C':.:, \ • (
,
crrt:i in prnpo.-; 1c1on s J.
..
·J ]· ' of thmwlit? 'J he
• j .

'

'

·
,.., .
we draw Ill acco1r .tr .
.
.
i •nls i~ given, a
', ,
, lj ' JIJJ)rr :t1g11Jl L
' •
•
11roLlem of Hlilllu1,IL
eo 11 ce
."'
. firm it to the mllld
.
l.
lowma.y11ccon
.
1
ccrt•un cone 11 s wn ,
t t of ·ucr11ments,
'
? Lo(Tic gi1·es us tic
c.1
' "'
.
1
of another.
"'
f . , kinrr them effective.
·
·
the rules or m.l.
.-,,
·
Hhdonc gives us ,
t t'
forms an impor. t'ion, argnmeu a 10n
With this <list.inc
tant part. of Hhctoric.
.

2

·l·icc'w1lht1e.rns

. .
The Div1s10n
o f Arguments.

•
l
t of "nrgnmcmts is to
· ti. trea1.mcn
.
The first step m,, ic. , f their kin<ls. Several <l1flnd n. correct classif1caL1011 o

Tisinns h:l.YC been given .
d' 'ded into irrrg11Jar
.
They h'tve been 11 1
(1) Form.'
llogisms. svllog1sms
, nd rrgnl:Lr, or sy
' ..
. t
or enthymemes, ,t
.
t' · l. the categorical m o
into categorical arid hypothe ica '

106

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

tence. Tlrns ti ie notion dew ma b
J•
enumeration of ti
.
y e exp mned by the
'
1c c1rcnmstrtncc ·
.
nre of atn10~1ihcric Y
'
s in w1uch tlie moisture both included undap~1t·lc?nldenses. Cause and effect
e1 us 1ead.

A

3. The Method of Simil

•I
I

!
;

:1

ars.

general notion may b
I .
to similar uotions. No di~ccxp .au~ ~d by ~om11aring it
but simply a resembl
f .ct s1.m1htnde Is nec0ssnry,
divinity and snperuat:~.~~ ~ei:1~atwns. ?nr notions of
our notions of b .
d
."'~arc explicated through
us in consciousne:~zg aIIn spiri.t ns they are known to
.
of ti 1c most impor.
t ant ideas
of phi! · 1 cnce many
. .
this way.
osop iy and rcl1g10n are explicated in

4. The Method of Contrast.
We may girn au cxpositio f.
.
opposite. All kn I ,, . n o ,t notion th rong"h its
ow currc IS do bl
If
'
.
light and darkness
d"' d '.l c. . cat ancl col<I
an cnl
. thonrrht'
S
· ' 'are ti xe d 111
as opposite pole<> 'goo
c.
ome of om· most
."'
can be discriminated on) b
.
common not1011s
tion of self, or the E
. y .Y.tl11s method. TJrn noBelf, or no1LEgo by fi:~ is dth1std1nguished from the not.
'
me o of contrast.
,.,.:.,.

,,j;

CHAPTER IV.
ARGUMENTATION.

1. The Rhetorical Use of Argument.
IN many modern systems of Rhetoric, argumenta.tion has no place. The whole process of confirmation
is referred to Logic. We need, however, to distinguish
between the logical and the rhetorical treatment of tho
subject. Logic deals with the laws of thonght as
thought; lthctoric <lea.ls with the l:tws of -altering or
proilucing conviction. 'fhc problem of Logic is, with
certain propositions as prcmi~cs, whn.t conclnsion mn.y
we draw in n.ccordance with the laws of thonght? 'fhe
11roblcm of Rhetoric concerning arguments is, given, a
certain conclusion, how may we confirm it to the mind·
of another ? Logic give§ us the test of arguments ;
Rh!:ltoric gives us the rules for making them ~tfectivei
With this distinction, argumentation forms an impor•
taut part of Uhetoric.

2. The Division of Arguments.
The first step in the treatment of arguments is to
find a correct classification of their kinds. Several divisions have been given~
(l) Form.-They have been divided into irregulitr
or enthymcmes, and regular, or syllogisms; syllogisms
into categorical ari.d Q.ypothetical; the categorical into

j;

IJ

108

TIIE SCIENCE OF RHF.TORIC.

those of the first, second, third, and fourth f:i"ttres •
"'
'•
the hypothetica l in to the conditional and disJ"trnctivc
.
'
as rn the following scheme :
1•1· Fl«nre
2tl l:ig~oro
{ 3d J~ l~nro
Argument•{ Ii . Syllogi sms {
41h 1".i~ ure
2. llypothetlcnl. { C<_>11d1t.111!111l
T Enthymcmcs

1. CRtcgorlcal

llJ !!JUllCtlVf!.

This is evidently a division nccordin"
to the jiorm
•
0
m which they may Le stated, for any argument may
be stated in imy of the forms mentioned.
(2) Subject Matter.-Anoth er division of arguments is into necessary or demonstrative, and moral
or probable ; thus :
Arguments. {I. Necce•nry or demonstrative,
If. l\Iornl or probable.

This is evidently a division according to the nature
of the su~ject-matter. In mathematics, all arguments
are necessary; in human affairs, they are generally
only probable.
(3) Purpcse.-Argnments nre als~ divided into
direct or indirect, according as the intention is to
establish a given proposition, or to reduce a proposition
to an absurdity.
Arguments { I. Direct,
II. Jud1rcet.

This is plainly a division according to tho purpose
for which the arguments are used.
(4) Arguments as Such.-'rhe three schemes of
division aLorn mentioned do not divide arO'umcnts
as
b
suclt, but according to some peculiarity of form or use.
Hence arguments may at once belong to all three
classes. }i'or example, the same argument may Le a
syllogism, necessary and direct.

LAWS OF IDlU,

109

In order to find a principle of division by which to
classify 1trg11111011ts aceonling to t.hcir essential nature,
we must iinu wherein lies the essence of 1111 argument.
Arguments are distingui shed from other propositions
by some relation between the subject-matte!· ~f the convlusion and the subject-matter of the proposition used as an
argument. A true classification of arguments will be
a classification of the kinds of relation which may subsist between things. Wc find these kinds of relation to
be three.
Let the conclusion to be established be, "It will
rain to-morrow." What. proposition can confirm this
conclusion, or, in other words, serve as an argument
to prove it ? Clearly none whose subject-matter is not
related to the production of rain. "The clouds are
forn\ing," would be such a proposition, .bec~use ~ho
forming of the clouds shows a cause wluch, If nmmpe<led, will produce rain.
Let the proposition be, "It has rained." What
.
? " .Tl
· cone1us10n
proposition will con fiirm tl us
. 1o
ground is everywhere .wet," wonlU bo a pr.opos1~. 10n
whose subject-matter is related to the conclusion, srnce
the general wetness is a sign ~r effect which requires
min as its necessary condition.
Let the proposition be, "'ryrants are selfish
men." The proposition "Cresar wns a tyrant and a
selfish man," would be an argument., because Cresar is
an example of tyrants, and the su bject-rnatter of the
two propositions is related by resemblance.
.
Cansc~, signs, and resemblances, are th e only kmds
of relation in the subject-matter by which a proposition cnn be established. 'fhe argument from cause is
called the a priol'i argument. 'l'hc arguments from

:. .=n- ---

i

l1
'!

II'
110

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,
LAWS OF IDEA.

sign and resemblan
lJ d
'
0
The di vision of ~ra~~~:~:~i e a f ~terior! ~rguments.
following scheme /'
as sue I is exh1L11tcd in the
Arguments,

{ 1' A Prloi-l ,
11. A /IO<llci•lorl,

J 1. Sign,
12. Resemblance.

Theseclasses, with theirsubd' . .
.
more SJJecifically· in the f II . I v1s10~s, will be treated
o owmg sec twns.

SECTION I.
.A PRIORI ARGUMENTS.
1 .. Nature of the Argument.
The
· an argument from
. a1n·wri
.
..".1gnmen t is
to ~fleet. By the word
.
.
cause
cause 1s 11crc mc·u 1 t ,
10011ld account fol' a 1. .1 'f ti f
'
W11alevm·
ti .
.
" ac ., J •c act were ·1dmitt J
I .
n s sense the word sometim es b t 110 t ,
. c .- n
n IJhj·sicaI c·ttt se If
u
a l ways rndicatcs
'
·
we were t 0 ,1dd
'
tiou "Tl
'
nee the proposi. ,,
10 811n s rnys arn most near] vert' I .
m er, to prove that "'l'h
. .
Y
.tea Ill snm1
th e logical and }Jhj•sic·il e cm ti 1s warmest rn summer,''
' causes would coinc 1'd
If
were to claim th·tt A ll . d C
c.
we
cnusc they arc m~n, the
ic·tI possess intelligence bcfrom any physical c·msc ~ .'Ac;~1se would be distinct
intclligeut because ti. .''. o1
a11d C arc no more
icy ,11 c men than the
.
cansc they are intcllirrent y
.
y :uc men bcthcy are men account~ o~ i et, srnce .the fact that
should be regarded a
~ , . . ~., ex~larns why they
s po~sessrng rn tclhgcn
ti . .
a pn'ori argnmcnt 'l.'I
d
cc, us 1s an
.
ic wor cause is
d .
J>opu lar sense.
use Ill tho

j:

. 2. Extent ?f Inference from a Cause

When a cause 18 knoi t
.
•
its existence any effect w~1~ lo ·~x~s t, we muy infer from
IC l 1 IS capable of produc-

111

ing, unless impedim ents arc presented to its operntion.
'l'hns, if a man is known to entertain a bitter hatred
of n neighbor, and that neighbor is found dead, with
ohvio11s nm.rim of nRRflRRi1111.f.io11, RllRpicion mn.y point to
tho hos ti lo ucig h uor. Jr i 111 pud i111e11 l1i Lo Uw oporntion
of hatred us the cause of this murder, such as fear of
punishment, the fear of God, a forgiving spirit, absence from the place, or some similar circumstances,
cannot be shown, the suspicion will be very strong. In
this case, howe1·cr, a posteriori proofs would be 11eeded
for conviction, since uther cause's might have prod11cetl
this effect, even if hatred be ad mitted as an adequate
can so. Let the case be a purely physical one. Let
the steam be t11rned on in a locomotive, and it is cer~
tain that the locomotive will move, unless frnpcd cd by
too heavy a train, or some other mechanical preventive.

3. The Absence of Cause .
As from an existing cause we may infer its effect,
eo, on the other hand, the absc11 ce of a cause is proof
that the effect will not follow. If a tree is kn ow n to
be without vitality, it is certain that it will not put
forth lcaYes and bear fruit. If a man has no motive
to commit u crime, and no opportunity of performing,
it, we may infer that it shonld not be laid to his charge
It may not always be necessary to assign causes, when
the a posteriori proofs are overwhelming, for some
eunses n.rc beyond our discovery, although t.heir effects
prove that they exist.

4. The Degree of Connection between Cause
and Effect.
The degree of connection between a cause and its

112

THE SCIENCE OF RHETourc.

LAWS OF IDEA.

113

effect is mcasn rod by the ) . b b ..

As this prouabili ty of I . 11~~ a ihty ?f hindcmnce.
.
llllC ( 1:1.llC() V:tl'lt'S .... ,, 11
mu st tho ccrhiul
,.
.
,. ,., 11.1 . y, so
. ·Y o1 an l'1Icd when 1't
and is opera ti YO J'J . ..
s .cause exists

.
IJ s1c,t 1 c·mscs ·ire
l
connected with thoil' c·1I • t t.I .
'
more c osely
If we know the lcYcl 'f. co st mn moral or meutal.
•
:> a wa er course w k
·
certamty in what dire t'
ti
' e now with
man is known to l1"tt' cl. .1011 . tel water will flow. If a
.. , 11s 11e11r 1bors 1·t · b
certain that he will inJ· . tlb
'
is Y no means
t
me iern . for lrn n
b d
k
'
my e eerred by many motirns
himself. Even throatcn;~1 v~1~wn to ~ny one beside!
nity for its e . .
o once with an opportnxeteJSe, would not pl
II
beyond all dot1bt
ace an a eged crime
·
· wrcver ti
·u
·
the connection of c
d
te wi 1s concerned,
anso an effect is uncertain.

'''I

6. Ambiguity of Causal Words.
Such words as why, because, and tltcr~(vre, arc ambignons, since they lll'ty designate more than one kiucl
of sequence. Clearness of thou g ht in the use of a priori nrg11mm1ts requires a close distinction between these
dilTorrnt ~cnst'S. Tho wonl 1clty for Pxnm11le, mny inqnil'o after the ph..1;,~ical causo ; as, "Why do thumler
storms occur in mm m er ? " the logical cause ; as, " Why
is the sum of the angles inn triangle equal to two right
angles ? " or the final cause or purpose; ns, "Why is
mun filled with aspirations after immortality ? " '

Y

SEOTION II.

6. Probability Established by a priori
Arguments.
Probability is shown b
.
producing its causes I y acctount1.11g for an event, or
.
n poo ry ·md r oma
't .
no t necessary that the c·rnses I
'
'nee, i is
should be such as t
'
s wuld be real, but they
.
.
'
o neconnt for the effect
I
t 10n,
an 1mportan t . l .
s. .n fic111 e is, to rehte only sn I . 'd
as can be accounted for Ii ti , .
c i rnc1 en ts
eratire '1'1
I
. y ie causes shown to be op•
ie exp ·11rnt10
d
mind is lost in ~lJ·~te;-v bn iti~et !not be given until the
t
' u I s IOWS a lack f
c 1ose a volume without I .
.
o ar to
air of prolmbility
. iartmgl given to the whole an
II
east of
.· . ·1·
F nturc events rest , o1,
ve11s1rn1 1tnde.
110 11 Y n1m11 a' priori
w
·rr
E xarnplcs may indeed 1
u
111buments.
ahility of fot.11'1·0 oc • . ' JC use to establish tho prohct11Tt•11ce~ b t
t r
example implies thee " ·t
,, u uo r irectly. 'l'ho
likely to operate n , :"-IS en?e of a cause which will bo
'1'1 .
'g.nn as It has in tl
.
us cause then becom
. .
ie given casoes an a vriori argument.

ARGUMENTS FROM SIGN.
1. Nature of the Argument.
The n.1·gnment from sign is an argument from an
to a conchtion. An effect implies the existence
of some conclil.ion so connected with tho eficct that tho
existence of the condition may be inferred from the
existence of the effect. For example, a man is found
with a bloody dagger in his hand, and another man is
found near by stabbed to death. The possession of a
bloody dagger is an effect implying somo 11se of the
dagger as its conuition. If no other comht1011 t.han a
murderous use of the dagger can be snggcstcu, the
JlO ~R<'RR or of tho clul!gPr ii; proYc<l t.o ho tho 11111nlrrcr.
If n.uother use of the <laggcr is avowed, guilt must bo
determined by the balance of probability that tho
rn11rderous use, and not the alleged use was tho condition.
~fleet

- ---

----_

- ----~----_,,,=-----.-

..,!':_ ·~

114

If a condition he nhsolnf.elv essential to t he dTcd,
t he cxis t l'llco of llH~ l'ff! ·d is! !l·111011slrat irn proof o f t he
condition. 1f a watch were fo un t[ i11 an u11pop11la t1 'tl
island , i t wo1ild l1u 1(e111 u11s( 1·ttf i1'C prnuf lliaL i t l1 :ul iil' l' ll
ranicJ there, that Luin g tho ucec~sary condition of il 8
hcin g there. 'l'hl' pr(' Sl' llCO of the watc h wo11ltl be
fl1'nbable evid ence that :L man hall been there, bn t n ot
demunstrativc, for other conditions are snpposablc,
such as tho wreck of a vessel, and the drifting of some
portion to tho islanJ.

1 bronrrht to th o
,..,
.
1 ilit v of its l1ri 11 rr nrn ll r liy :t m rm r1n1
II•
• •
,.., •
'I'\ ' . 11111:1 ri .-'<lll u[ c li: 1111· 1•s 111
, ·I· l
~ Ollll~ I\ :1 \ .
11 . l "

I\ j . ' l l' l"l ll"' '"l O il L
j ,; l! ill I H•l.\\l'l' ll
I' '
' .. .
··
·
t. \ , in•t•n t h o l'r11b: 1ii1li1 y
11
ns OJ'l''"'l't\ t< 1 n11 11 t \ll'r , Lu . ' .
l tic p ruln bilil y
t l1ttt it w:1 s fo r m c<l fo r 11n 1111r1111s.1·, 1111< I
'

1;: .il l!

This leads ns at once to the doctrine of chances,
since it is often necessary to decide between scrcrnl
possible conditions, one of which mnst be inferred from
tho giron effect. In the case above citetl, a sophist
might ask, what is tho objection to tho supposition
that the watch was al ways on the island, was, in short,
tho product of uncou scions natural forces i' Men lrnve
r ousoncd similarly about tho fossils of extinct animals.
They have asked why those objects may not have been
produced just as they arc, and for no distinct purpose.
'l'ho obvious answer is, they show marks of des ,;gn. But
the elements of those foss ils or of this watch, app:trently adjusted with so much skill, must exist in some
form, why not in this? Th ere are as many chances
against one form as against any other given form. 'l'he
solution of this diflicnlty lies in the fact that such roa;;oning presents a fal se altcrnatiro. The proper comparison of chances is not between this arrnngemcnt of
particles in tho watch and some oth er determinate
nrrangement, but between the probability of tho watch
being the product of unconscious forces and the prob-

111

l I10 case o

·

f

·
1 \iP fo o ~ il

,

tl;:tt it is tl ie rcmr11'ns of ~o rnc a11111wl.

3. Proof of a Cause.
.
Amonrr condi t ionf', Rome have no c:tnsal connec'.1 011
"
tl . 1 ·1 v c such a connect1on.
~ ·1 t] 1 rt 11lie110111e no11 , o · ic i s 1' ·
d ,
.
n
'
•
,
\\'I , t ·l ·' " ill11 strn1 1
011 , 1• 1· a m,' I ll Ull'S· t o- .a ·i '
'1 ()

2. The Calculation of Chances.

115

LA WS OF IDEA .

THE SCIE NCE OF RIT ETOUIC,

11 so

J ,l l -'

~

' .

" .

.-1·

lli:' bc JllO'

r

. f . t\l'lt ho \\':LS :ii II e } ( S tl.l t .L_) • .
.
. "
we may Ill cl ·
·
.
, t" l condit1011
.
. . . t · l'1v however wl11le a.n esscn J,t
nI "c )'es .ct< • ,,,
'
l . to iiro<l uco h 1s
f his cl •ing to-day, has no tenccncy
.
od tl t ) da,· Su1;1e collllitions have !I cau sal relation
ca 1 o- ' , ·
.
<l
an tecod c n t
. IT• •t If tho man il1es to- ay, som 0 <
•
to ti 10 e cc ·
l t I ·, ,IT, ·t It ts
u i iose<l to hav e pr<ld ucc1 ; lit-> c cc .
must be s 11
. ..
cause from tho
.
·u1 to 1wove n.ny comld.1on as a o!Icct . f there
1111poss1 e
' 1
A cause may prove an
ettoc t n.l one.
'
. 1 •1 be othercanscs;
nro no himl orances, althou gh thorn n , ·Yti
ff ct for it
but tho cause cannot be inferred from io e o d ' to be
, . be certain that the cause suppose
can no' er
· ti
z or opera t.we ca11~e Prictical\y the
11rovcd is io o1.i y .. l f.
tho effect with snnleient
10111
cnuso nmy be mfci 1•0 l
the essential
. •
b· b.litv to establish convwtion when
.
iiro .1 l J
1 one In that case, s111ce
condition seems to be on y
• e infer that the solo
C\"cry eilect must ha,·e a cause, w
.
f . not
But tlns proo is
condition mnst be t 110 cause.
. rent from
re for th e trne eanso may be d1fiot'
dolnoll '~ti"tti
·
'
the supposed
cause,
and yet osca.pc our d.e>toe ion .
0

•

'

4. Testimony·

of

.
f · ·
lyin11 ns a condition
Testimony is a kmd o sign 1m1i . " .
d
Th
its existeuce the truth of the fact attoste •
e

116

!'

~

t~.1 ~:
~,
, ~'

I

..

=~~~~-.

~:

'

!~

,.,

THE SCIENCE OF RllETORIC.

laws of ~otiv.e render it prolmblc .that testimony would
not be given 1f tho attestation Wcl'e not called forth by
fact. ~'he same 1:t1:. loads t~s to infor the possibility
of a <hfforeut co11d1tton, as 111competency, falsehood,
etc. In every case whore testimony is used as an argunient, we must decide hotwccn tho truth of the attcstatio.n on the one hand, and the incompctcney or corrnpt1011 of the witness on the other. 'l'he decision of
such ques~ions requfres us to attend to several particulars aticctmg the mine of testimony.
(1) The ?!umber of Witnesses.-Thc greater the
number of witnesses, other things being equal, tho
greater th.e ntlne of the testimony. 'l'hc number,
1rnwcv?r, IS frequcnt.Jy ovel'cstimatcd, as when men
bear witness to the truth of certain doctrines of roJicrion
and.scie~nce. I!aring 110rer girnn these n personal investigat10n, thcll' testimony is not really to the truth
of these doctrines, but to tho fact that they are held as
true.

(2) Character of Witnesses.-The moral and iutelJoctual character of the witness is important to the
value ~ft.ho testimony. A man may be so deceived as
to behove that to have lmppencd which in reality
~ever occuned. Dr. Whately regards the testimony of
Ignora.nt and prejudiced mcu as especially valuable
when it attests things too abstrnso for them to invent,
o~ c?ntrary to their prejudices. '.l'he testimony of tho
~sc1:les of Jes.us, though corning from comparatfroly
li:,nornnt m~n, is not tho lrss vnluablc si nce they testify
to facts wh1?h they had not the ingenuity to invent,
and to doctr111es contrary to all their Jewish prejudices.
. (3) ~onourrent Witnessss.-Concurrent testimony
Is especially valuable if there has been no opportunity

117

LAWS OF IDEA.

for collusion. Too close concnrrcnce, however, leads
to the suspicion of previous conference, and the invention of a tale. 'J'he testimony of different witnesses
who have observed tho same tmnsaction ought to 11.rcscnt differences of dot:iil from their having occupwcl
different points of view, and from their subj?ctivc
modification of the facts, as well as from observmg at
slightly different periods of tim~. 'l'l~e slight differr,ncc in the stories of the ernngolists with reference to
the garment worn by our Saviour at his cruci~xiim, is
confirmatory of their trnstworthincss as witn~ssos.
.,. 'L'ho difference may naturally ho accounted for e1~her
liy tho different times of day when the observat10ns
were made, 01· by an optical ilifferoncc not uncornmo1~,
or, perhaps, both. 'l'he divergence of statement IS
proof that there was no coll usiou.
.
.
(4) Ad verse Witnesses. - Ad verse test.1111011 y is
usually inciclental, as in tho J cwish work c.alled the
"Generation of Jesus, " which refers the nurneles of
Jrslls to magic, thereby ad 111 iI ti11g t.lil'ir nct11al pc.rformancc. tlnch 0Yidc11co 11·ill gPncr:illy he found rn
11 omc minute detail, but the intrinsic insignificance of
tho circumstance is no measure of its value in an argument. Much skill in cross-examination m:~y .. be
necessary to draw ont tho te~timony of an unw1llmg
witness, or to show the inconsistency of his story. Dr.
Whately can tions against brow-beating a wi~nes~, m~d
sums up tho whole philosophy of cross-cxammat10n m
the forciule senleuce : " The more the storm ului;ters,
the more carefully he wraps round him the cloak
which a warm sunshine will often induce him to
throw off." *

· * Rlicto1·ic, Part I., Chap. ii.

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118

TUE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

. ~6) ~haracter of Facts Attetted.-We need to
d1stmgu1sh sharply between matters of fact and mutter~ of opinion. Witnesses almost inrnriably minO"lo
then· own opinions and explanations with the fa~ts
actually observed. '.l'estimony ns to matters of fuct is
'·aluuble when tho witness is ltonest and Jias sound
sen~es, Testimony to matter8 of opinion requires inielhgence, or the ability to form a J'udO"n1c11t i'
J 1·
f
o
, II ltl I 1l~U to honesty and sound organs of perception. Any
tlung heyond the trntnral expectations of the witness
and so nut li.koly to cuter his 111i11d cxc(•pt Ly tho actuai
oceurrc.nc.e, ls of additional weight on that account. So
the om1 ss1011 from a story of what would naturally occur to a fabricator, is indicative of truth.
(6). The ~enial o.f Testimony.-'l'o deny tho story
of a 1utncss is to Lcl1eve that he has invented it, or is
d~lnd:!d, Hore we need to remember that belief and
d1sb~hef arc the same mental state with regard to con~rud1ctory p~·opos! t!ons. The proper opposite of belief
is ~oubt, 01: mdee1s1011. To reject testimony is, therefo1e, to :ifl1rm that some other condition than truth
must be mferred,-iuvention, or misunderstanding.
5. Authority.
The opinions of com110tent men are often used as
an argument, and in this case the argument is called
proof from authority. Authority is a kind of. .
·
't
·
sign,
smce l s existence supposes the truth of what is asserted as a condition of tho assertion's bein(J" . ,
'.l'I
· 1 Id . .
m.tc1e.
0
. ius, m ega ec1 swns, the ability an1l honesty of the
Judge, and the carofu I ad rocacy of both sides by competent lawyers, assure us that the decision would not
have been what it is, unless truth and law required it

LAWS OF IDEA •

119

to be so. Qnotations from the Scriptures, precedents
in law, the opinions of philosophers, and the decisions
of physicians, are all rnlid arguments in their rcspectire spheres, because their existence implies truth as
the condition of their being what they are. 'l'he multiplicity of facts and the preoccupation of men ~vith
their special lines of investigation, render anthonty a
chief source of convict.ion in departments of thought
lying with on t our range of personal observation. Our
religious, polit.ica.1, and philosophical doctrines, usually
rest 011 Lh is kind of l' roof.

6. The Progressive Argument.
Another kind of argnment belonging to the class
called sign, is "the argument from progressive approach." It consists of a series of signs, each one of
which proves more conclusively than the preceding that
n certain condition r.xists. If we roll a ball along the
fl oor it ceases movinCT after it has rolled a short dis'
b
••
tnnce. We may infer from the effect, that fr1ct10n
and grnvitation and the resistance of the air retard i~,
und that if thcso retarding causes wcrn removed, it
would roll on forever. We roll a smoother ball orer
a smoother floor, and the duration of its motion is increased. If· we continue to dimiuish the resistance •
ns much as possible, the duration of the motion increases in proportion to this diminution. A succession of signs satisfies the mind that if these means of
resistance were entirely rcmorcd, a body with a given
momentnm would morn on forever wit;h undiminished
,·elocity. 'l'his argument may he applicll to moral us
well as to physical cases. llishop Butler has employed
it in the "Analogy" to show the inherent power of
virtue.

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120

TIIE SCIENCE OF RIIETORIC,

l!

121

LAWS OF IDEA.

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'f

SECTION lII.

ARGUMENTS FROM RESEMBLANCE.
l. Nature of the Argument.
The argument from resemblance rests upon the
constnn ey of nature. It has no validity except upon
tl~c ground ~hat what is true in a certain case or cases
w1.ll be true m other similar cases. It is cvi<lent that
tins argument is liable to great abuse owhi..,. to the
dillicuity of dccidincr wliat c·ises arc essc 1'1 t 1· 11 ° · ·1 '
u y s1m1 ar•
"
•
1 ·
. f it be true .that like cases arc owing to like causes
aml produce like cfTcets, it is equally ti:ne that unlike
case~ are not referable to like causes, and are not product1>e of like effects. Hence the value of the argument depnnds wholly upon the detection of essential
resemblances.

2. Essential Resemblances.
In order to test the validity of arguments fonndc<l
on r?sc.mbl:~nce, we must have some criterion by which
to d1sbngu1sh between important and unimportant ro. semblances. . It is not necessary that the cases should
c~rrcspond m every particnlar. Men ma.y beloncr to
d~lforent nat~ons, engage in different pursuits, and !~ave
~11Icrcnt hah1ts of life, yet they possess certain qualities
m common with ~11 m?n, and so far as they resemble
one another what 1s alJ1rm cd of one may be affirmed of
an.other. Sopl~ists .arc en:ir ready with the objection
~hat the cases differ rn some respects. They may d iffer
m all respects except one, and still the aro-umcnt from
resemblance may be valid, Again, the c~ses may re-

I'

11cmble each other in every particular except one, and
still the argument from resemblance may be invalid.
'l'he essential point is, are the similar features owing
to lite same cause?
Let us tttkc, for example, the proposition, "All
tyrants are selfish." \Ve may adduce as an argument
the proposition, " Cresar and Napoleon were selfish.''
Here the resemblance between "all tyrants" and
"Oresar and Napoleon" is the basis of the argument.
'l'yr:mts may differ in many iicrsonal qualities, in nationality, and in the age in which they live. They rei;cmble one another, however, in one important point,
the desire of controlling others. If this distinctive point
of rescm blance be referable to selfislmes.y mi its solo
cause, i.e., if tyranny be an effect of scltishncss, it is
clear that all tyrants arc selfish, for selfishness is the
cause of their being tyrants. Arguments from resemblance arc but probable, for they arc valid only in
so far as they prove a common cause, but the proof of
e. cause is never more than probable. The degree of
probability depends partly upon the closeness of connection between the cai.1sc and its effect. As in a vriori
arguments, physical causes and effects are more closely
connected than moral causes and effects.

ii
\!
\I
11

I:

ii

I:

ii

,ii
'I

,1

i'

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I
I
I

3. Example.

I

(l) Nature of Ex.ample.-Among the varieties of
argument founded upon resemblance, the simplest,
and, perhaps, most common is example. 'l'hc logical
analysis of this argument is as follows. We assume,
ns a major premise, that whatever is true of the case
adduced as an example, is universally true in like cases.
In the minor premise we assert something to be true in
6

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.....
. . . -.·~..,

- 1rnr-1··•r111-·1122•r·~······~·

122

THE SCIF.NCE OF 1\IIETORIC.

the example. In the conclusion we infpr that what has
been asserted is true of all like cases. U sin()' this conr.l nsion as a major prcrn isc, we nsscrt in the ~ii nor that
nn in<liri<lual case ~clongs to the class mentioned in tho
major, and onr conclnsion is, that the assertion in the
major applies to the indi vidual case.
(2) Invented Examples.-Fictitions cases arc often
a~ducod 11s arguments. 'l'hey arc legitimate in propor·
t10n to their verisimilitude. Aristotle cites 1111 instance
of invented example used by Socrates, in which tho
latter fihows the absnrdity of choosing magistrates by
lot by tho folly of selecting a pilot in the same man·
ner; since, if the lot fe ll on 1111 unskilled person, it
would probably result in the loss of the ship. Although
only a supposed case, t his example has considerable
force. '~'his ~o'.·ce is wholly derived from its general
truth ; i. e., it is snch n. case as might a.rise, and if it
should, the relations of cause au<l effect would be as
reprcsen tcd.
(3) Illustrative Examples.- Examples are frcqnently nscd merely as illnstrations, not to confirm
bnt to explain a proposition. Illustrative examples
n_ffirm nothing more than a resemblan ce, urgi;mcntn.ti ve examples aflirm n. common cause of which the re·
semblance is the effect. Hence it is unfair to treat
mere illustrations as if they were desig ned as arguments. Fables ancl legcnils arc frequently employed
us embellishments of di scourse, or to explain the general meaning. It is sophistical to attack these as unreal, as if the trnth of the main proposition depended
upon the truth of the illustrations. It is fair and important, however, to point out the fact that these explanatory examples have no argumentative force, and

LAWS OF IDEA.

123

ehould be taken, not as instances of the general trnth
alleged, 1'ut us supposed consequences of it. In this
cnAe tho trnt.h of the exampl es prmmpposC's the general
truth, nnd hence it wonltl be arguing in u cir~!? to
11rovo the Jaw from supposed instances. Suppositions
illustrate, but prove nothing.

4. Induction.
If we stop at the oO'enorn.l conclusion of the first syl.
logism in the illustration of example, tho argument is
cnllcd induction. The cases from which the conclusion is drnwn may be one or many, according to the
nature of the subject-mutter. In physical investigation, one experiment may be sufficient to establish the
conclusion. If, for exrtmple, a substance turns blue
litmus paper red at the first trial, the chemist is satisfied that the snhstrmcc possesses acid properties. If
five men have dirnl in a certain town on live successive
Satnr<lays, it would be a hasty inference to lay it 1lown
ns certain that some citizen of that town will die on
every followin()'0 Saturday. As in the argnmc11t from
.
example, we must elifhinate as far as possible what JS
accidental, and dcterm i no what is csscn ti al aml causal
in the similar cases. 'l'his is done in seveml ways. ·
(1) The Method of Agreement.-When two or
more phenomena arc uniformly associated, as a surface
colder thnu the surrounding air and the production of
dew, we infer that one of the associated phenomena is
the cause of the other. 'l'hcrc is great danger of error
in the use of this method. 'l'hus misfortune and piety
m1ty be associatrd uniformly in the enterprises of a
man, but it would be fallacious to make the one the
cause of the other, on that ground alone.

124

THE SCIENCE Oll' RHETORIC.

(2) The Method of Differenoe.-When a. phenomenon A is not associated with a phenomenon B, but is
~miformly nssociated with a phenomenon C, we may
mfcr that A is caused by some difference between B
and C. '!hen that dilforence lies in o. single purticulur,
that part1011lar may be regarded us tho cause of A if
. bo of a causal nature. If, for example, t'imes were
'
it
hard under one administration of the government, and
prosperous under a new rule, with no difference in the
state of affairs except that a change had been made in
the financial system, the new rule would properly be
regarded as tho cause of prosperity. 'l'his is the
method of difference. 'l'his also is liable to sophistical
uses. The failure to detect any other difference than
the change may be owing to the limitation of our
faculties or our facilities for knowing. A common
laborer may be led by a demagogue to attribute to a
ne\v administration what is really owing to some other
cause, as a good crop, or a demand for labor occusioued
by a new discoYery.
,
(3) The Method of Residues.-If we carry out the
meth.o~ of difference as far us possible by removing one
cond1t1011 after another until one remains, we may regard the remaining circumstance as the cause. If we
wish to find tho cause of a man's failurn to perform a
certain piece of work, we may show that his failure was
not for want of help, for help was given ; nor of time,
for there was sufficient time; nor of ability, for he was
fully capable ; nor on account of sickness, for he was
in good health; nor because of preoccupation, for he
was at leisure; nor from forge tfulness, for he was reminded at the time ; nor from indolence, for he was
fond of labor ; we may infer that it was very probably

125

LAWS OF IDEA.

ttntoillingness. This, howev-er, cannot be inferred
unless every other equally probable supposition ha's
been exclnded. 'l'his il:l calle<l the method of resiuues.

(4) The Method of Concomitant Variations.-If
now we viiry the circumstances, so as to produce gm1lations of a phenomenon, we have the method of concomitant rnriations. If it be shown that the higher
we raise the temperature of a mass of iron tho more
space the mass occupies, we conclude that heat expands
iron.
By these methods we determine whether or not a
imrticnlar fact exists, and whether or not certain particular facts nro similar. By induct.ion wo infer that
these pa.rticnlar trnths are'nnivorsal. No real induc- 'tion is Ionnally valid. In allirming that what is true
of a part is true of the whole we transcend onr actual
knowledge, and hence may fall into error. The four
methods above are intended to re<luee this possible ·
error to its minimum.

5. Analogy.
The argument from analogy is founded on a resemblance of relations, while ordinary examples are
founded on a dfrect resemblance. Thorn is an analogy
between the human heart and a great city, and hence
it has been argued that when the size of a city is greatly
increased its fnnctions are impaired. 'l'he argument
for the inhabitation of the planets is of this kind, since
they resemble t he cal't.h in their general relations,
though not in all particulars. The argument frqm
analogy has great force in winning the assent of superficial thinkers, but its logical analysis reveals the dan..
ger of depending upon it, unless confirmed by collateral proofs.

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126

127

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

LAWS OF IDEA.

SECTION IV.

evant, and impart to the whole train of argument the
character of coherence :t11d acl:tptation.

THE CONDUCT OF A DISCUSSION.

2. Exposition.

Argnmentation, unlike the other elementary forms
of discourse, admits of two sides, and implies mental
conflict. 'l'he conduct of an argumentative discussion
requires skill in addition to a knowledge of the different
classes of arguments. We slrnll, therefore, in this
section consider those iwinciplcs of argumentation
which go-rern the enforcement of our ideas when they
ure exposed to opposition. 'l'his subject naturally falls
under the following head s : (I) the PJlEl'AltATION OF THE
QUESTION; (2) the INTltODUCTION; (3) the CONFiltMATION OF THE THESIS; and (4) REFUTATION.
These
will now be treated in their order.

When the proposition is l:tid down, it should be
cnrnfully studied, in order to satisfy the mind that it
is just what is meant to be asserted, and that we are
iweparcd to establish precisely this proposition and not
nnothcr allied to it. Debate is frequently rendered
unnecessary by mere c:q1~tsition ; the appl'ehension of
tho reul meaning putting the question beyond all
tlonht. When the proposition is perfectly clear, a
formal and avowed exposition of it is unneecss:wy. All
ambiguities and special senses should be cxpbincd iu
the beginning. lf the proposition is to be debated, it
should be stated in the form of an aflirmative resolution. The advocate of the nfJirmutivo assumes the
bnrtlcn of proof, aml 1111t.il arguments arc advanced in
confirmation of the proposition, none are needed iii
refutation. Much has been written on "presumption
and burd en of proo.f ." The simple and universal rule
on the subject is, that the burden of proof always lies
with the affirmative. 'l'his rule is founded on the selfevident principle that no one should be bound to prove
a negttti vo.

I.

TIIE PRRPARATION OF TIIE
QUESTION.

1. Necessity of Preparation.
The importance of attending to the form of the
proposition to be proved is equally great whether it is
to be discussed nflirmatirnly and negatively by different persons, or is to constitute the theme of a single
speaker or writer. It is not necessary that the proposition be formally announced at the beginning. lf it be
offensirn or insignificant, its announcement should be
withheld until the facts and arguments have remornd
tho prejudices against it. But if the proposition to be
proved be laid down in the an th or's mind in the beginning, and be steadily hold in view throughout tho
discussion, it will insure the absence of what is irrel-

3. Concession.
In the exposition of any question it will be seen
that there arc certain facts which both sides admit.
These should be eliminated from the discussion by a concession of their re:tlity. Silence is often interpreted
as concession. Care should be taken to dcprirn nn opponent of the right to claim such a concession. A

lij

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128

129

TilE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

LAWS OF IDEA.

t?pic .may be waived, with the express promise to cons1d~r it at another ti~e. 'l'his may properly be done,
a.s it may. not be possible to put the topic in its trno
light until certain facts and argnments have been
prese!1ted. Sophists frequently waive a subordinate
but .1mpo~·tant ~roposition, and evade any farther
consideration of 1t, or finally claim that it is unnecessary.

after he had finished the composition. Mere generalities are thus ~wo ided, and the introduction is made
trnly subservient to its end. Although the altentioii
needs to be stimulated less 'than nt any other part of a
discourse, since all attend to the first few words, it is
desirable to arouse interest by the character of the
intro<l uction.

4. Contrary Opinions.

Adaptation to its purpose requires that the introduction vary with the character of the composition.
A few Yarietics are enumerated by Dr. Whately which
readily suggest others.
(1) Inquisitive.-The inquisitive introduction aims
to arouse interest by asking some question, or showing
the importance of what is to be treated.
(2) Parad.oxical.-Whcn one is perfectly sure of his
proofs, it may stimulate interest to state tho conclusion
to be reached in some paradoxical way, or to represent
it as stran11:e or unusual.
(3) Corrective.-It_ may be well to show that the
subject has been misund erstood, i10glcct,od, or misrepresented, and shou Id therefore engage the attention.
This may be called the corrective introductiou. It is
particularly appropriate if the subject be a trite one.
(4) Preparatory.-It is sometimes necessary to
guard against some mistake, explain some pccnliarity
in the discussion, or account for some deficiency. This
has been called the preparatory introduction.
,,
(5) Narrative.-It is often desirable to inform the
read er or hearer of some event, or to describe some
state of affairs, necessary to be known for the comprehension of what is to follow. All historical questions

It is ?ft~n advisable to state contrary opinions
at the ?egmnmg. There are several advantages in this,
b.e~ongr.n?' to ~iffere~t cases. When the only alterna~· l'i.e opm1on 1s mamfcstly absurd, the statement that
1~ is the .onl~ alternative will win favor for the proposifao~ mamtmned. When there are other alternatives
besides the one assumed by our opponent, a statement
?f that fact has the effec t of leading to the belief that
if we are wr?ng, our opponent at least may not be right.
Other theones may have to be cleared away before our
own can be established. Burke bccrins his work on
the "Sublime .au~ Beautiful" by sho~ving that beauty
does not cons1St rn "adaptation," "proportion," or
" perfection."

\/

II.

TllE INTRODUCTION.

1. Design of an Introduction.

~n introduction is uot an essential part of a compos1t10n .. Its very ni~me. implies that it is preparatory
to somethmg e~se, winch 1s complete in itself, but needs
to be bro.ught mto relation with the time and occasion.
Hence Cicero's rule was, to compose the introduction

2. Kinds of Introduction.

130

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

require an intrndnction of this kind. This is the narrative in trod 11 ction.
Two or more of these forms may be combined.

III.

CONFIR11fA'l'ION.

1. The Uses of the Different Classes of
Arguments.
Wh en the thesis has boon l:iid down, formally or
mentally, we need to confirm it by such ar"umcnts 119
ttro best suited to its nature. 'l'he uses of ~he various
arguments will, therefore, now be considered.
(1) A Friori.-'l'hc a priori nrgnmeut is used to
accou nt for u fact, and to establish future events. As
J1as been shown, wo may infer an effect from the existence of a cause, proportionatC'ly to tho tendency of
tl'.e cause to p~·od11co the effect. In this way past
e\Cuts are ex plain ed, and future ernnts are anticipated.
(2~ Sign.-The argument from sign is used to
establish a fact after its occurrence, or as a general
truth. Thus murcler could be proved by tcstimonv or
by circumstantial signs, such as blood on the ha"i:ds
pos~ession of an id entified weapon, an effort to conce:ii
ones ~elf, etc. A gen eral truth may be proved by
authority ; as, for example a legal or religious doctrine.
(3) Resemblance.-Argumcn ts from resemblance
nre less certain than the preeeclin" kinds but often
b
'
qm'te as sa t'1sfactory to minds pred isposed
to the conclusion. They are most useful in showing the consisten cy of an alleged fact. Induction is the means of
establishing new general truths, as in the sciences.
Future events .are inferred from examples, bnt always
on the assumpt10n of a common cnuse uniformly acting.

L.!.WS OF IDEA.

131

2. The Arrangement of Arguments.
(1) Importance of Ammgement.-As in the military art, so in composition, arrangement is. of tho
greatest importance. If one were to attempt to prove
that a miracle had been performed without giving any
reason why it should be, the proofs would need to be
very strong in order to be satisfactory. If, however,
it be first shown that a revelation might be expected
from a benevolent deity, and that it could not be confirm ed wit.hout miracles, much less proof would be
.necessary. In the contest between .LEschines and Demosthenes concerning the cro wn, the formc1· requested
the judges to require tho latter to adopt the same
arrangement in his reply as had previously been chosen
by his ndvcrsary. Demosthenes rightly cl1iimcd that
this demand was unfair, and chose his own order.
(2) Order of Arguments According to Xind.-It
is plain that a priori arguments ought to have the prcce1l cncc, since they rend er natnrnl what might otherwise seem improbable•.,. A theory of the causes cannot
always be given, but it is desirable tl1at a fact be accounted for. A posteriori arguments, or positive proofs
of the facts, arc then received with less hesitation. 'fho
nrgument from cause may not be sufficient. It does
not follow because a phenomenon mi'.ght occur, that it
nctnally did occur. When antecedent probability has
been establii;;hed by arguments from cause to effect,
nrgnmcnts from sign and resemblance may be added to
show that the causes alleged were actually operative,
and did produce the alleged effect.
(3) Order of Arg11ments According to Strength. Tho most obvious a1·gumcnts should come first, yet not

132

133

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC.

LAWS OF IDEA.

in such a way as to bring the weakest first. Tho Nes·
torian arrangement of troops, with the weakest in the
midtl le, suggests an nd nm tagcons order of nrgu men ts.
It avoids unti-clinrnx, and at the same time opens Ili c
discussion with n. stro11g 11rgumc11t. An inrnrsc rccttpitulation of the argum ents also obviates the cffcot of
anti-climax, when m tho original order the weakest
comes last. A mere mention of the weak n.ro-umonts
at the beginning, with the statement that yo;; do not
rely upon them or mean to use them, may often prove
effective.
(4) Proving by Installments.-Sometimes it is
necessary to divide a proposition into several, and to
in·ove each of these by itself. If Paley in his Evidences
had proceeded at once to prove that wo ou()'ht
to be0
lieve the statements of th o Scriptures, his argument
would have been unnecessary in the view of believers,
and probably inconclusive in the view of skeptics. He
proves several propositions which together establish
bis main proposition, and thus the discussion is made
entertaining to believers and conclusive to many who
were skeptical. His successiYe propositions are as
follows:(a) 'l'hc apostles s1~Uered.
(b) 'rhey suffered knowingl,IJ.
(c) They suffered.for th eir testimony.
(d) 'l'hey testified to miracles.
(e) The miracles were the same as are recorded in tha
New Testament.

firm. &wcral particnlars with rcfcrcnco to its management ttrc of great iw 1,orlancc.

IV.

REFUTATION.

. Re!utation consists in overthrowing arguments and
obJections opposed to the thesis which we wish to con-

1. Modes of Refutation.
A concl11sion can ho comlmt.oi.l in two ways; we
mny prove its cont.nulictory, or we may overthrow tho
arguments by which it has been supported.
(1) Proving the Contradictory.-Sincc contradictories cannot both be true, it is a practical refutation
of an argument to prove the contradictory of its conclusion. This is often easier than to detect and exh ibit
the fault of an opposing argument. In this way
writers who know nothing of each other's works may
refute eac h other's statements. While important and
often snfTi cicnt, this motlc of procedure is not specifically rcfu tatory.
(2) Overthrowing Arguments.-Rcfutation, in its
specific sense, means the ornrthrow of an opposing argument. 'l'his overthrow may be accomplished in two
wu.ys : we may deny one of tho premises, or show a
fallacy in the }H'ocess of reasoning.
We may deny the premise when it is false. The
false i1rcmiso is gcmcrnlly suppressed, and the argument stated as an enthymcme. A syllogistic statement
of the argument will generally reveal the falsity of the
suppressed premise, and this may then be pointed out.
The deistic argument against the divine authority of
Moses may be stated thus:
~/Jfajor, A divinely appointed lawgiver would certainly reveal the doctrine of immortality;
.Jlinor, Moses does not mention it;
Conclusion, Moses was not a divinely appointed
lawgiver.

134

THE SCIENCE OF RIIETORIC,

The deistic argument, as staterl by Us ad11ocates,
suppressed the mnjor prrrniRe, which ~as supplied by
Wa!·burton, * who dcuics its truth, and thus refutes
then· argument.
On.c way of ~howing the falsity of a premise is t.
make it a premise of a syllogism in which the other
premise is an admittccl trnth, and hence to dmw an
ab.surd conclusion. 'l'his proves the falsity of the premise taken from the opposing argument, for in a correct s.yllogism there is nu altcrnuti ve except to deny a
p1·cm 1sc or accept the conclusion. The conclusion cannot be accepted for it is absurd, the snpplied premise
cannot be denied for it is an :vlrnittecl tmth ; hence
the opponent's premise must uo false. Tho conclusion
of 111~ opponent may uc made a premise and proved
false m the same mann er. This is called the indirect
argument, or redw:tio ad absurtlum. It is particularly
adapted to controversy on account of its ironv. and
power to tnrn the langh on an opponent. It is ;~id of.
an argument which can be thus m1swe.red, "the argnmcut proms too much," since, if true, absurdities
would logically follow from it. In his "Defence of
~atnral Society by a Late Noble Lord," Burke, fcio-nrng to accept the principles of Bolingbroke, makes the
~rg1~me~ts brought by the latter ngainst ecclesi:u:;tical
~n st1tntions overthrow civil society as well, thns showrng that the arguments prove too much.
The detection
of fallacies in the rcusoninrr
is •a
.
b
pure IY I og1cal process. If a fallacy exist it will be
fo111~d by run~ing over the list of fallaci~s gircn in
Logic, and testing the argumrnt with respect to each.
When the fallacy is seen the simplest refutation is tho

* IJivine L egation.

LAWS OF IDEA.

135

construction of 11 parallel case in which the logical fault
will be evident to all.

2. Treatment of Objections.
Objections may be offered which are not cxpresse
in the form of 1irgumcnts. In oruer to exhiuit their
argumentative value they should bo thrown into a regular syllogistic form. If this be impossible, .tho opp~­
nent may be challenged to show the bearing of Ins
objection; if it be exhibited us a syllogism, its answer
will be more readily suggested. Several rules of a
special character deserve attention in tho treatment of
objec tions.
(1) Valid. Objections on Both Sid.es.-'rhero may
be valid objections on both sides of a question. If two
armies arc contending, one tulvocate may rightly nrge
the superior skill of his friends, another may claim the
superior cr1uipmcnt of his friends, ns reasons why each
should be victorious. Both sides here have reasons for
expecting victory, both sirlcs are met with objections,
and no logic but the logic of events can decide between
the opposing claims> Ernn in physical science such
objections may exist on both sides. There are objeo·
tions to the infinite divisibility of matter, and objections
to the contmdictory doctrine. These difficulties often
grow out of the limitation of our faculties and the relativity of our knowlerlgo. Valid objections should be
candidly explained as referable to such a deficiency in
our powers or our knowledge.
(2) Decisive Objections.-Ohjed.ions to our views
mny ue offered which are not only valid, but really decide the question at issue. Such objections should be
acknowledged as final. H is more expedient, to say

136

THE SCIENCE OF UHETORIC.

nothing of the ethical qnality of the action, to acknowledge error than to r esist palpable tm th. No one
belierns in Olli' infallibility wh en W\l ltl'O not moreu Ly
obvious trnth, but a confession of error inspires confidence in one's hon esty of pnrpose. 'l'hern is sometimes
a sophistical acknowledgment for no other purpose
than the establishment of a reputation for fairness.
(3) Statement of Objections.-If objections are
not stated in their full force, thorn is danger of producing the opinion that we either underestimate the
full force of the opposing statements, or are not prepared to meet th em. On the other hand, it is still
more unfair, if not so inexpedient, to overstate objections, making them appear to be made against more
than they really oppose. Thus a person who objects
to a certain interprclnhon of the Scriptures is often
represented ns rejecting the authority of the whole
book. Those who object to certain modes of public
trial and punishment are sometimes answered as if
they rejected all administration of just.ice.

3. Cautions concerning Refutation.
The attempt to satisfy other minds that our ideas
alone are correct is attended with some special dangers.
(1) Too Forcible Refutation.-A violent attack
upon some objection or argument may magnify unduly
its importance. When a man lays aside his coat and
makes great preparntion for labor, it leads us to suppose that he is impressecl with the magnitude of his
tnsk. A debater may ensily give his anditors a similar
impression by laboring too obviously to overthrow an
objection.
(2) Too Great Clearness.-If any new proposition

LAWS OF IDEA.

137

be established too clearly, it may create surprise that
any one coulu ever have doubte<l it, or that wise men
slwulu huve failed to discover it, or that so able a man
as yonr opponent could possibly dissc1~t from it, a1.1d
hence it may be conclndccl that thel'O IS somo sn\Jt.tle
fallacy in your argument, which it is ditncult to ue.tcct.
(3) Prior Convictions.-'l'his will be moro likely
to be tho case if the persons addressed 111we themselves
strongly held tho opm1011s controverteu. 'l'hcy nro
mnvillilw to believe that they havo been so long embmcing ~onsense without knowing it. I~ iH ~ore.nat­
ural to conclude th:i.t the speaker or wnter is either
ignornn t of some fact, or that his nrgu mont is fallacious.
(1) Accusa.tions.-This feeling .reaches its 110.i~ht
nml is acco111p:rniL:d wilh i11dig11at.1011 when IL d1'.·e1·t
charge of criminality or imbecility is made ngmnst
those who hold the opinion refuted. Men who have
l:cen actuated by right motives in holding these views,
and there are ge11crnlly some such in every sect or
party, know the unfairness and untrnthfuln~ss. of these
charges. 'l'hcy, a~ least, ditl not hold th~ opuuons condemned from any other than pure motives, and they
do not believe themselves wholly stupid. 'fhey, therefore, prefer to regard their calumniator as a foe, w~ose
arguments they may not answer, but whose conclusions
th ev indi gnantly repel.
·(5) Weak Arguments.-Wl~c~ tho argu.~ents to
be rdnl'ed are excessively weak, it is often d1lhcnlt to
make them appcrtr more foolish than they seem to be,
without n direct charge of nLsurdity. As snch arguments are usually advanced by such persons as are.not
really convinced by them, but who must say somcthmg,

138

139

THE SCIENCE OF RHETORIC,

LAWS OP IDEA,

they are •• ot likely to convince any one else. If they
a.:-e answered by really strong argt1ments, they will
have no force with the candid, and to others the most
!'uccessful refutation will be of small account, for

. a refn t a t'ion .' but when this. is not
nble to begin with
·u
mention of objections in the openmg w1
. the case, the .
. d ... l air to onr assertion, by
be likely to gt ve a pa.111 oxic.i
·d ainst
implying a consciousness that m~1ch.may be ~~fc~1~ed to
I l v'tll
l' t Jf 11g•11i11 all 11w11t.io11 or ol1JOCt1011R. he
" last tho arg11mc11Ls w1·11 u Hcu LJ!l l11:1lc11c1
u ·I' 1 k·
the
b
. :'
I
I10 ·y suppose us to e ove1 oo
prejudice by t iose w ma
·
'd
Sometimes
hat may be urged on the other s1 e.
.
~n~ wd it will be ditlicult to give a sittisfactory refutal111 ee
.
t'll
I ave gone throng
.
ti . 1t
t ion of the opposed opimons, l we l
f
wn
•
even
m
the arguments in support o our o
'
. f i.1
't 'II be better to tuke some bne nocase, however, J WI
• •
'tJ
rromise
tico of them early in tho compos1t1011, w1 l n d
f tof afterwards considering them more fully, an re u
ing them." *

"Ono co11\'i11cotl ngnln"t hi11 will,
ls of the same opinion still."

(6) Accessible Authorities.-It is generally best
to use ouly those authorities which are accessible to
the class addressed. Appeals to writers in other
languages rmd to unknown philosophers will have ,·cry
little weight, if the opponent chooses to deny that the
citations apply. People holding different views from
those maintained suspect subtlety when a reasoner sets
aside the received translation of tho Scriptures, and
attempts to expound the original. However necessary
this may be in order to arrive at trnth, this procedure
is looked upon as a resort of one whose views are not
confirmed by the received version, but who can wrest
tho original to his purpose without the risk of detec·
ti on. None but recognized scholars are safe in attempts
of this kind, and even they are less liable to misconstruction when they are addressing those competent to
understand their exposition. 'l'hese .r emarks are not
so fully npplicablo to those who are addressing persons
who are already conYinced.
(7) Place for Answering Objections. - Whately
nddses placing tho answer of objections in the inid<lle
of the argument, but nearer the beginning than the
end. He says on this point : "If indeed very strong
objections have obtained much currency, or ham been
just stated by au oppone11t, so that what is asserted
is Jikely to be regarded ns parltfloxical, it may be ad vis-

*

Rli.etoric. Part I, Chap. li~. § 7,

·-· "

...~ .

